Hurricane Oscar initially formed north of Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic as a Tropical Depression on 19 October before strengthening into a category 1 hurricane with maximum windspeeds of 139 km/h.

On 20 October, the storm made landfall in eastern Cuba and caused at least seven fatalities, primarily affecting the towns of Imías and San Antonio del Sur in Guantanamo. The storm brought heavy rainfall, leading to major flooding, particularly in Baracoa, and resulted in blocked roads and additional damage in areas such as El Jamal. Cuban authorities responded by evacuating approximately 15,000 people from the most affected areas.

The storm also affected the Bahamas, prompting tropical storm warnings as Oscar moved through the central and southeastern parts of the archipelago. The National Hurricane Center (NHC) reported that Oscar’s strength diminished as it moved northeastward, with maximum sustained winds reducing to 56 km/h as of 22 October, leading to the discontinuation of all tropical watches and warnings in the Bahamas.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The impact of Hurricane Oscar has exacerbated the continuing energy crisis in Cuba, where nationwide blackouts have resulted from a power station failure in Matanzas combining with a wider energy crisis, with at least four major blackouts recorded.

While Cuban President Díaz-Canel reported that 70 per cent of electricity services have been restored, the country continues to face ongoing blackouts. The blackouts have triggered multiple demonstrations in Havana, leading to traffic disruptions. The government has partially laid the blame on the US for increased economic sanctions.

Further blackouts are likely across the country with the authorities prioritising the restoration of power to the capital.

Unrest which began in September continues to grip Martinique. Protesters launched a new wave of unrest over the high cost of living, leading to violent clashes and significant disruptions.

Protesters have established roadblocks on major highways, such as the N2 near Case-Pilote. At least seven barricades were set up overnight on 22-23 October by protesters in several areas, including Sainte-Luce, Case-Pilote, and Fort-de-France. These protests have seen aggressive actions against security forces, with the use of molotov cocktails, projectiles, and gunfire being reported. Video footage captured scenes of barricades on fire in the Fond Lahaye area of Schoelcher.

French authorities have responded by extending an island-wide 00:00-05:00 curfew until 28 October to curb the unrest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Food prices in the Caribbean French overseas department of Martinique are approximately 40 per cent higher than in mainland France. Key protest organisers, The Rally for the Protection of Afro-Caribbean Peoples and Resources (RPPRAC), are calling for price parity with mainland France.

On 16 October, the local prefecture signed a protocol with numerous local groups intending to reduce the price of basic goods by approximately 20 per cent. However, the RPPRAC has refused to sign the deal and has called for continuing unrest. The unrest has very likely been inflamed by the deployment of the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), elite riot police that have not been deployed in Martinique since the 1959 “Black December” riots. These resulted in three deaths being attributed to the CRS.

The current spate of unrest has been markedly violent, with at least one death being reported thus far due to gunfire during the looting of a shopping centre on 10 October. While the cause of the Martinique unrest is distinct from the May riots that broke out in the Pacific French overseas territory of New Caledonia (which were sparked by a local voting reform change) there is a realistic possibility that the Martinique unrest could develop to be as severe. In New Caledonia, the violent riots led to the declaration of a state of emergency and the deployment of the French army, with foreign nationals struggling to evacuate due to the closure of the main international airport.

In Martinique, the Aime Cesaire International Airport (FDF) briefly closed on 17 October after protesters stormed the runway. While the closure was only temporary (with the airport reopening on 18 October and Flightradar24 indicating normal operation currently) there is a realistic possibility that further escalating unrest and targeting of the airport by protesters could lead to airport closure. This would leave maritime options as the only way to depart the island.

Peru transport workers strike

On 23 October, bus drivers in Lima, Peru, went on strike for the third time in less than a month, protesting against violent attacks and extortion, with the strike leading to significant disruptions in the capital. In response, soldiers were deployed to maintain order, and the government closed schools. Despite a state of emergency declared last month, President Dina Boluarte promised to capture criminal leaders and announced increased surveillance of foreigners, linking Venezuelan migrants to the rise in insecurity.

Haitian gangs intensify attacks in capital.

Haitian gangs have intensified their attacks in areas not yet under their control, according to the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). The BINUH warned the UN Security Council that violence has escalated, particularly from the armed gang alliance Viv Ansanm, spreading across the capital Port-au-Prince and surrounding regions. The gangs are likely exploiting the fact that only a fraction of the 3,000 troops pledged to support the Haitian police have arrived and are attempting to consolidate territory before their arrival. The attacks have compounded food shortages, with over five million Haitians facing food insecurity and have led to thousands more being displaced.

Security situation continues to deteriorate in Mexican state of Sinaloa.

Violence in parts of Mexico has continued to increase as a result of the power vacuum left following the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada of the Sinaloa Cartel. It is estimated that at least 200 people have been killed due to intra-cartel violence since early September. On 22 October a shootout near the Sinaloa state capital of Culiacan led to the deaths of at least 19 gang members after they fired on Mexican soldiers. The security state is currently classified by the US State Department as Level 4: Do Not Travel, due to the increased violence.

Tropical Storm Nadine causes significant damage in Central America.

Tropical Storm Nadine, which formed east of Belize City on 19 October, has caused significant destruction across Mexico and Central America. There were at least four deaths and flooding in 22 municipalities in Chiapas, Mexico, while Veracruz saw two fatalities and 3,000 homes flooded across 32 municipalities. Oaxaca also reported one death and several landslides that disrupted roads, with landslides also recorded in Puebla. The Mexican government has deployed 23,000 military personnel for relief efforts with the remnants of Nadine still causing issues.

Extratropical cyclone brings severe weather to Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil.

A rare extratropical cyclone has developed in the South Atlantic and has moved inland, affecting regions of Uruguay, northeastern Argentina and southern Brazil. The system has brought heavy rain, strong winds and severe weather conditions, resulting in at least three fatalities in southern Brazil. The severe weather is forecast to remain until at least 26 October and will likely spread to parts of southern Paraguay, likely leading to floods, landslides and property damage across the wider region.

On 23 October, the headquarters of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAS) near Ankara was attacked by a male and female militant. The small arms fire attack resulted in the deaths of at least five people and 22 injured. The attack has resulted in the Turkish authorities increasing security measures throughout the country, including at major airports. Initial observations indicate that at least one of the suspects was a member of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The Turkish military has responded with increased strikes against Kurdish targets in Syria and Iraq.

Solace Global Assessment: 

No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack; however, the involvement of a female militant indicates that the attack was highly likely conducted by a Kurdish militant group. The TUSAS headquarters was almost certainly attacked due to its involvement in the production of military equipment used in Turkey’s war against the Kurds, which expanded into Syria in 2019 following the US withdrawal.

Turkish intelligence officials have stated that retaliatory strikes have targeted military facilities, ammunition depots and energy infrastructure, the latter of which is not considered a legitimate military target unless certain conditions are met. Turkish strikes have targeted a gas plant in as-Suweyda, Syria, which was hit, causing extensive damage and disrupting gas production; a power plant in Kobani, Syria, where the airstrike led to significant power outages in the region; and a medical facility in Qamishli, Syria, which was allegedly used by militants.

The Turkish strategy appears to be similar in nature to Russia’s in Ukraine, targeting civilian critical national infrastructure (CNI) before the advent of winter. These strikes will likely have a major humanitarian effect and will likely result in retaliatory attacks by Kurdish militant groups. It is likely leveraging the fog of war in Syria, with regional instability creating a more permissive environment for Turkey to target civilian sites, a strategy that would highly likely receive greater condemnation if conducted in Iraq.

The Turkish authorities have also arrested 12 suspects linked to the  FETÖ organisation in Ankara, a group associated with the exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen who died on 20 October. Gülen had been implicated in the 2016 attempted coup against incumbent Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The Turkish government is likely exploiting this attack to crackdown on supporters of Gülen, the most influential and vocal critic of the Erdoğan administration.

Tens of thousands of demonstrators attended a pro-Europe “Georgia Chooses the European Union” rally in Tbilisi’s Freedom Square on 20 October. In attendance was President Salome Zourabichvili, who is a vocal opponent of the ruling Georgian Dream party. The rally was held in anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary election on 26 October, with the primary issue of the election being further geopolitical alignment with either the West or Russia.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the ruling Georgian Dream party denies that it is pro-Russia, it has pursued a neutral to pro-Russian agenda. The prospective passage of the “foreign agents” bill that was passed in May, which is similar to an equivalent law in Russia, led to considerable civil unrest marked by violent clashes in both March 2023 and from April to June 2024.

While polling indicates that 79 per cent of Georgians want to join the European Union, the opposition parties are highly disunited. Overall, however, available polling averages indicate that support for the various pro-European parties is 54 per cent compared to Georgian Dream’s 34 per cent. It is therefore likely that without significant electoral interference, pro-European parties will win at least a plurality in the upcoming election. Despite their disunity, it is likely that such a result would lead to efforts to form a pro-European coalition.

If Georgian Dream wins, it is likely that there will be accusations of vote rigging and calls for a recount, due to the use of a new electronic voting system that will be used by approximately 90 per cent of voters which has triggered concerns regarding vote rigging. It is also likely that if Georgian Dream wins, they will pursue closer relations with Russia, possibly seeking a deal regarding the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which would almost certainly inflame further unrest.

If the opposition wins, there is a realistic possibility that political violence targeting high-profile opposition leaders may be triggered, with far-right organisations such as Alt-Info having encouraged such violence in the past.

Documents attributed to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) showing classified US intelligence on Israel’s preparations for a potential retaliatory strike on Iran surfaced on social media on 18 October, although their authenticity remains unverified. The FBI has confirmed an investigation is being conducted into how the unauthorised release of Top Secret documents occurred.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the NGA documents are authentic, due to the reaction by US authorities. The reports indicate specific munitions the Israel Defence Force (IDF) is preparing for retaliatory strikes against Iran following the 1 October Iranian missile attack on Israel.

The primary weapon systems observed being prepared by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) for highly likely impending strikes against Iran, are long-range air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs), with the intelligence report claiming the IAF “has handled at least 16 Golden Horizon ALBMs, and at least 40 IS02 Rocks since 8 October, according to imagery analysis”. No activity relating to Israel’s almost certainly existing nuclear weapons program was observed, due to the lack of observed Jericho II medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) activity – which notably but unsurprisingly, against Israel’s official policy of deliberate ambiguity about its nuclear weapons program, is confirmation that the United States Intelligence Community (IC) is aware of the existence of Israel’s nuclear weapons.

Israeli retaliation strikes will highly likely be greater than the retaliation for Iran’s April attack against Israel, with concerns that further regional escalation could be triggered. While it is most likely that Israeli strikes will be limited to Iranian military installations and facilities, there is a realistic possibility that Israel could additionally target Iranian oil facilities, and while unlikely, Israel could also target Iranian nuclear facilities.

On 24 October, Mozambique’s electoral commission declared that Daniel Chapo of the incumbent FRELIMO party had been elected after reportedly securing 70 per cent of the votes, enabling FRELIMO to increase its seats in parliament to 195 out of 250, up from 184.

However, the relatively new PODEMOS opposition party and external observers, including a European Union (EU) mission had reported irregularities and incidents of electoral fraud from the 9 October election. Accusations of fraud and democratic backsliding have triggered unrest throughout the country, leading to dozens of arrests.

Tear gas and live ammunition were also used to quash violent confrontations, primarily between the supporters of PODEMOS and the police.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The official declaration of FRELIMO’s victory will unlikely stop the current unrest, with reports circulating that the ruling party, which has ruled for nearly 50 years, registered almost one million fake voters. Moreover, the opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane, has called for nationwide protests. Mondlane, who came second in the disputed election, is hugely popular with Mozambique’s youth, who are currently leading much of the protest action.

The scale and intensity of the protests have likely increased in response to government actions, particularly the use of live ammunition in isolated cases, external criticism from the EU and the country’s underlying economic conditions. On 19 October, Mondlane’s lawyer and a senior figure in PODEMOS were assassinated in the capital Maputo. This development has further energised the protests, with many alleging that the government was directly involved in the killings.

There is a realistic possibility that Mondlane’s call for nationwide protests could bring thousands onto the streets across Mozambique, with demonstrators likely attempting to block roads and shut down businesses. To counter the protests, the government is likely to introduce countermeasures like curfews, suspend communications, and deploy more forces, likely leading to violent confrontations and disruptions to transport and business operations.

In a rare interview, a senior leader and founding member of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the Emir of Katiba Macina (MLF) Amadou Koufa (also spelt Hamadoun Kouffa), answered several questions regarding JNIM’s activities and intentions in the Sahel and West Africa.

Koufa justified the pervasive violence against civilians conducted by JNIM in the region as part of a conflict with the rival violent extremist organisation (VEO) Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP). Koufa also stated that JNIM is “open” to negotiations with Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, as long as they occur within the framework of Sharia law.

Most notably, Koufa confirmed that JNIM are attempting to expand into the West African states of Ghana, Togo and Benin.

Solace Global Assessment: 

JNIM and other jihadist VEOs such as ISSP are highly active in the Sahel Junta states of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, which have each struggled to contain the insurgencies without the support of Western military forces which they have each expelled. There is a realistic possibility that one or more of these juntas could collapse in the next year.

The threat of VEOs in the Sahel poses a significant risk of spillover into the wealthier and more stable neighbouring West African states, and jihadist VEOs are launching attacks in the northern areas of such states with increasing frequency. For example, on 23 September JNIM released claims of responsibility for attacks against government forces in both Togo and Benin, claiming to have attacked a Togolese army patrol east of Kankanti with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and a Beninese army installation in Bangoun which led to the deaths of two Benin Armed Forces (FAB) soldiers.

The public statement of JNIM’s intent to expand into Ghana, Togo and Benin will almost certainly add to concerns amongst West African authorities about the increasing threat of jihadist VEOs, groups that are almost certainly able to leverage the expansive “ungoverned space” in the Sahel junta states as a base from which they can further expand operations into the wider region.

If a Sahel junta state completely collapses, or attacks in West Africa considerably escalate, it is likely that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), likely with Western support (particularly from the US and France), will be compelled to intervene with a military campaign against Sahel-based VEOs, which would in turn likely increase the risk of a wider conflict with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the rival confederation to ECOWAS formed by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

Police shooting in Amadora, Portugal leads to unrest.

On 21 October, a police shooting of a suspect in the city of Amadora on the outskirts of Lisbon resulted in several consecutive nights of rioting. Violence escalated after rioters set fire to a bus, forcing the police to increase their presence in the area. Unrest spread to the Carnaxide area of Lisbon where the police deployed rubber bullets to disperse the rioters. There is a realistic possibility that the unrest will spread further across Lisbon and wider Portugal as a result of police action.

General election in Bulgaria to be held on 27 October.

It will be the seventh general election in just three years, with political crises having gripped Bulgaria since 2021. A recent poll published indicated that the level of public trust in the Bulgarian parliament is just six per cent, a record low, which is almost certainly reflective of widespread dissatisfaction with the political status quo in Bulgaria.

All elections since 2021 have failed to result in a single party winning enough seats to form a stable government, and it is highly likely that the upcoming election will once again produce a heavily fragmented parliament. There is a realistic possibility that continuing political dysfunction in Bulgaria will precipitate the rise of anti-establishment populist forces, such as There Is Such a People (ITN) who are polling at 5 per cent, and far-right ultranationalist formations such as Revival who are polling at 15 per cent.

Russia’s intelligence services (RIS) are highly active in Bulgaria, and it is almost certain that Moscow has attempted political interference operations, with the observed intensified distribution of pro-Russian and anti-West/Ukraine propaganda in Bulgarian online spaces. 

Election fraud alleged in Iraqi-Kurdistan parliamentary elections.

The semi-autonomous Iraqi region of Kurdistan held parliamentary elections on 20 October, resulting in a landslide victory for the incumbent Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). However, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal), The People’s Front (Baray Gal), and the National Stance Movement (Halwest) have all alleged that there were multiple incidences of electoral fraud and violations, promising to release evidence in the coming days. Should the parties release credible evidence of fraud, there is a realistic possibility of unrest, further fuelled by the ongoing economic crisis and existing dissatisfaction with the current government.

Israeli airstrikes in Gaza amid imminent cease-fire talks in Qatar.

In Gaza, Israeli airstrikes targeting residential buildings and command centres, resulted in significant civilian casualties, with reports indicating at least 200 Palestinians killed and many more injured. Notable attacks occurred in the Al-Shati refugee camp and Rafah.

On 24 October, reports confirmed that Mossad Director David Barnea is set to attend talks in Doha over this coming weekend, concerning hostages and a potential ceasefire. The US is also involved, with CIA Director Bill Burns expected to join the discussions.

However, it is highly likely that the key issue of the Philadelphi Corridor will continue to act as a major obstacle to progress,  regarding its leadership following the death of Yahya Sinwar.

Saudi and Iran conduct first-ever joint naval drills.

The Royal Saudi Naval Forces conducted their first-ever joint naval drills with the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy in the Sea of Oman on 24 October in what almost certainly marks a significant development in the increasingly thawing relationship between Riyadh and Tehran. The two Middle Eastern powers only restored diplomatic ties in 2023 following a China-brokered agreement. Saudi still officially maintains a neutral stance concerning the war in the Middle East and is likely currently engaging with Iran as it fears that highly likely impending Israeli retaliation strikes against Iran could trigger the targeting of Saudi oil facilities by Iran and its proxies.

Reports indicate Russia provided targeting data to Houthis in Red Sea.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russia has been providing targeting data for the Houthis’ anti-merchant shipping campaign in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, which has involved the targeting of over 80 vessels. The report alleges Russia provided satellite targeting data to the Houthis which was then relayed to the Houthis via Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). The data has likely enabled the Houthis to more accurately target vessels and has been used by Russia to undermine the US, force resources to be dedicated to the region over Ukraine and increase oil and gas prices to Moscow’s benefit.

Germany records first case of new Mpox strain.

On 22 October, German health chiefs from the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) announced that they had identified the first confirmed case of the new clade Ib strain of the Mpox virus. The institute revealed that the carrier was infected abroad but released no further details. The virus, which is behind a major outbreak of Mpox in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), has now resulted in at least 1,000 deaths across Africa and has prompted a global health emergency alert from the World Health Organisation (WHO). However, the RIK has stated that the threat to the general population in Germany remains low after isolating this case.

Severe flooding in multiple Italian regions.

From 20 October, multiple regions across Italy, including Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, and Sicily, were severely affected by flooding, prompting a series of emergency declarations and evacuations. The flooding in Sicily has triggered a state of emergency and in Lombardy, troops have been drafted in to help with rescue efforts. The flooding has resulted in road and school closures and other forms of disruption. With rain forecasted for much of Italy, the situation is likely to deteriorate further.

Severe flooding in South Africa’s Eastern Cape.

At least ten people have been killed and over 3,000 displaced by severe flooding in South Africa’s Eastern Cape. The flooding has predominantly affected the Nelson Mandela Bay area, including the cities of Gqeberha and Kariega, causing widespread damage to homes, infrastructure, and disrupting daily life. The area is on high alert with further heavy rain forecasted.

Cyclone Dana made landfall in India’s Odisha state on 25 October at Very Severe Cyclonic Storm strength. The storm had maximum windspeeds of 120km/h in the Bay of Bengal, equivalent to a Category 1 hurricane, but made landfall with maximum windspeeds of 109km/h before further weakening.

Authorities evacuated 1.1 million people Cyclone Dana caused adverse torrential rainfall in Odisha and West Bengal state. In neighbouring Bangladesh, several houses collapsed due to strong winds in Kalapara, though no significant damage has been reported in other areas.

The Indian Meteorological Department had earlier suspended flights at Kolkata airport as a precautionary measure, and train services were cancelled in Odisha state, however, flight operations and most train services have now resumed.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As of the morning of 25 October, no deaths or major damage has been reported. However, this is highly likely to change. The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) assessed that Cyclone Dana could have a “high humanitarian impact based on the maximum sustained wind speed, exposed population and vulnerability”.

While India is assessed by GDACS as being highly vulnerable to the impact of tropical cyclones, Indian authorities effectively conducted mass evacuations before Cyclone Dana made landfall, with hundreds of personnel from the National Disaster Relief Force (NDRF) going door-to-door with loudspeakers. In 2019-2021, major cyclones such as Amphan, Yaas and Fani killed hundreds of people and caused billions of dollars in damages.

Last year was the deadliest North Indian Ocean cyclone season since 2017, with 523 deaths and GBP 2.3 billion in damages in India alone. It is highly likely that global warming is a key driver for measurably worsening storm seasons, increasing both the frequency and intensity of cyclonic storms, as well as the window for when storms are formed.

Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) has issued an arrest warrant for former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina for alleged involvement in mass killings during violent protests earlier this year. Student-led protests against job quotas escalated into widespread unrest, with her government’s violent crackdown leading to almost 200 deaths, including 32 children. In addition, over 60 complaints have been filed against Hasina and her Awami League party, accusing them of enforced disappearances, murders and extrajudicial killings.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hasina, who had ruled Bangladesh for over 20 years, fled to India in August after an interim government took control of Bangladesh following the unrest. Her government initially established the ICT, which has faced longstanding criticism from the UN and human rights groups for being used as a means to eliminate her political opponents.

With the ICT now being coopted by her rivals and likely used in a similar way, it is unlikely that India will execute the arrest warrant, with a refusal likely to result in strained relations. Moreover, after the breakdown of the Hasina government, which had traditionally been an advocate of secularism, there were multiple reports of attacks on Bangladesh’s Hindu minority.

If India’s Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party-led government refuses to acknowledge the arrest warrant, there is a realistic possibility of escalating sectarian violence in Bangladesh against the Hindus. Conversely, if India honours the arrest warrant and Hasina is returned for trial, there is a strong likelihood of civil unrest being instigated by her Awami League supporters. This could further destabilise the country, almost certainly leading to violent clashes between demonstrators and security forces.

Recent episodes of unrest in Bangladesh have resulted in widespread transportation disruptions, internet and mobile phone shutdowns, the introduction of curfews and major supply chain disruptions.

On 23 October, The US Embassy in Sri Lanka issued an alert relating to “credible information” of a plot to target tourists in the popular Arugum Bay surfing resort in the southeast of the country. The embassy has urged all US citizens to avoid the area until further notice.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The issuing of a terror alert by the US State Department is relatively rare and typically reserved for situations where credible intelligence indicates a significant and imminent threat. The Arugum Bay area has become popular with Israeli tourists and the alert is likely predicated on a threat directly targeting Israelis. However, forms of attack such as small arms fire or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) pose a serious and indiscriminate threat to anyone at the resort.

The last major terrorist attack to occur in Sri Lanka was the April 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, a coordinated series of suicide bombings targeting three churches and three luxury hotels across the country, including in Colombo, Negombo, and Batticaloa. These attacks killed over 260 and injured an estimated 500 people. The bombings were conducted by local extremists of the National Thowheeth Jama’ath militant group but with alleged links to the Islamic State (IS).

The war in the Middle East has almost certainly resulted in higher rates of local radicalisation, which was likely already exacerbated by a series of anti-Muslim policies introduced in the aftermath of the 2019 bombings, including a burqa ban and the forced closure of Islamic schools. There is a realistic possibility that the attackers may react to the issuing of a terror alert and adapt their plans. The terrorists could become more cautious to avoid detection or alter their attack plans, potentially targeting a less secure target to gauge the effectiveness of the security services or nominating a new target outside of the indicated area.

Bangladeshi students storm presidential palace.

On 22 October, students in Bangladesh began demanding the resignation of President Mohammed Shahabuddin after he made controversial comments over Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. Protestors attempted to storm the presidential palace in Dhaka, resulting in clashes with police, multiple injuries and many arrests. The demonstrators accuse the president of collaborating with Ms Hasina’s “fascist regime”, whose legacy continues to drive tensions and unrest in the country.

Japan to hold snap elections on 27 October.

Japan is set to hold snap general elections on 27 October after a series of political scandals and the resignation of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, creating a volatile political environment which may threaten the economy. Current indications are that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner Komeito, are likely to maintain their majority but could lose up to 50 seats. However, the LDP could benefit from increased tensions with China and North Korea, due to its traditionally stronger stance on defence.

IED targets government office in Kabul, Afghanistan.

On 23 October, an improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated outside of a Taliban office issuing ID cards in the Pamir Cinema district of Kabul, leading to at least two deaths and multiple injuries. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack but the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has been behind similar attacks in Kabul since the Taliban took power in 2021, who are likely attempting to undermine the Taliban’s rule with increased attacks in the capital.

North Korean leader visits country’s missile bases.

In a further provocation to South Korea and its Western allies, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has visited the country’s missile bases to ensure that his forces are ready to conduct “strategic deterrence”, a term that almost certainly refers to North Korea’s developing nuclear capabilities. The dictator also warned of the US nuclear threat to his country which justifies North Korea’s force readiness. The visit comes amid heightened tensions, with North Korea recently demolishing infrastructure on the Korean border, increasing the readiness of its artillery, amending the constitution and deploying troop to Russia to assist with the war in Ukraine.

US approves military package for Japan.

The US State Department has approved a foreign military sale to Japan, which includes Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 2B Tactical Missiles and related equipment, estimated at USD 360 million. The package will enable Japan to bolster its area defence capabilities and protect critical air and sea lines of communication in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Japan’s procurement is almost certainly in response to increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea and to help counter the developing military alliance of North Korea, China, and Russia, the latter two of which have territorial disputes with Tokyo.

Taiwan President visits frontline islands.

President Lai Ching-te visited the Kinmen islands on 24 October to celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of Guningtou, which enabled Taiwan to retain the islands after the Chinese Civil War. The move will almost certainly be lambasted by China as a direct provocation given the island’s proximity to mainland China and the symbolic importance of the anniversary. The visit is likely a response to China’s large-scale war games around Taiwan but will highly likely provoke the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into conducting similar large-scale exercises, the frequency and scale of which are making it challenging to distinguish between routine military drills and what could be an actual invasion.

Chinese Coast Guard vessel twice expelled from Indonesian waters.

A vessel belonging to the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) was twice expelled from Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, some 1500km away from mainland China near the Natuna Islands. The vessel was likely attempting to disrupt a survey commissioned by the Indonesia state energy firm, Pertamina and follows the recent inauguration of President Prabowo Subianto. CCG incursions into Indonesian waters are relatively uncommon compared to their frequent activities in the waters of the Philippines and Vietnam. The CCG is primarily deployed to enforce Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea, and often acts aggressively in areas rich in undersea resources like oil, gas, and rare metals. A major Pertamina discovery will almost certainly result in an increase in CCG activity.  

Severe flooding and disruption in Bengaluru, India.

On 23 October, the Indian city of Bengaluru suffered severe disruption as a result of unprecedented rainfall, estimated to be the heaviest in three decades. Widespread flooding has damaged much infrastructure, shut off roads and even resulted in a fatal building collapse. The extent of the flooding is almost certainly indicative of unplanned rapid urban development and environmental degradation, which includes the loss of almost 90 per cent of the city’s green space in less than four decades- a trend that has been mirrored across India.

Tropical Strom Trami causes at least 65 fatalities in the Philippines.

Tropical Storm Trami, known in the Philippines as Kristine, made landfall in northern Luzon, Philippines on 23 October. The storm resulted in at least 65 fatalities across the Philippines, primarily due to floods and landslides. 33 of the deaths occurred due to landslides in the Batangas province south of Manila. The storm affected more than 3.3 million people, with approximately 288,000 individuals still in government shelters as of 25 October. In the aftermath, over 400,000 households in regions including Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, and parts of Metro Manila remain without power, as efforts to restore electricity continue. Despite the storm’s exit from the Philippine Area of Responsibility on 24 October, it is likely that the storm will loop back next week.

SECURE YOUR SPOT NOW

We’re offering an exclusive 50% discount on your CSO 360 registration. Use code SOLACEGLOBALROME50 at checkout to take advantage of this special offer.

On 13 October, elements of the Colombian army launched an attack on the FARC dissident group Central General Staff (EMC), aimed at retaking El Plateado. At least 17 army personnel were reported to have been injured in the early stages of the operation, with multiple injuries caused by EMC’s use of cheap drones. El Plateado has been under EMC control for approximately five years and is a strategically important hub for drug trafficking in the country’s west.

Last week, the government and the central command of the EMC agreed on a truce in the Cali area for COP16, which Colombia will host between 21 October and 1 November. Earlier in 2024, the Colombian government of Gustavo Petro suspended its ceasefire agreement with elements of the EMC in the areas of Cauca, Nariño and Valle del Cauca.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The offensive into El Plateado is likely meant to exploit fractures within the complex network of EMC-affiliated groups, and to bolster the Petro government’s position before the summit. It nevertheless may result in an overall increase in tensions, possibly affecting Cali.

Moreover, the offensive highlights the Petro government’s continuing ambivalent strategy which combines ad hoc negotiations with limited coercive measures. This approach likely reflects the government’s understanding of its own limitations vis-à-vis the EMC and other regional armed groups, which retain significant assets as well as local support and sources of income.

Entering into ad-hoc ceasefire agreements with parts of the EMC is likely helping the government to divide the rebel group. The EMC, likely due to its rapid growth over the last decade, has evolved into a fractured organisation, made up of four national blocs and dozens of sub-structures, which operate in accordance with their own interests and local considerations while maintaining a degree of hierarchical cohesion.

For instance, in July, the government’s unilateral decision to suspend its ceasefire agreement with the main Cali branch of EMC, while retaining it with the group’s elements in Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Meta and Caqueta, reportedly resulted in significant internal disagreements among EMC’s leadership on the feasibility of continuing talks with the government. However, this strategy is likely to lead to the splintering of groups and may result in increased violence within the areas where they operate.

Following a 10 October announcement by a Bolivian prosecutor that confirmed an arrest warrant had been issued for former Bolivian president Evo Morales, after he did not appear in court on charges of human trafficking and statutory rape, Morales supporters engaged in a wave of unrest.

On 14 October, protesters initially blocked two major roads that connect the department of Cochabamba with the cities of Sucre and Santa Cruz. Following violent clashes with police forces, with the police deploying tear gas, a protest was dispersed in Parotani.

On 17 October, the Bolivian Highway Administration stated that the protesters have increased the number of blockades to 13, with blockades located at: Pongo-Confital, Bombeo-Pongo, Suticollo-Parotani, San Jacinto-Paracti, San Germán-Ichilo Bridge, Rodeo-Cruce Vacas, Obra-Rodeo, Lope Mendoza Bridge-Epizana, Epizana-Tiraque C, Copachuncho Bridge-Pojo, Aiquile Exit-Railroad Crossing, Arce Bridge and Tholapalca.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The unrest has arisen within a context of growing economic insecurity, dissatisfaction with current president Luis Arce, and democratic fragility following the failed June coup attempt. Morales was Bolivia’s president from 2006 to 2019, before resigning after unrest resulting from the contested 2019 election and going into exile.

Evo Morales has since stated his intent to stand again in Bolivia’s August 2025 election, against Arce who is in the same party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). The prospect of Morales standing was almost certainly a key trigger for the general Zúñiga’s failed attempted coup in June.

The unrest also follows violent clashes at protests in El Alto in September when Morales led supporters in a march from Caracolla to La Paz, leading to supporters of the rival MAS factions, the pro-Arce Arcistas and pro-Morales Evistas, clashing with firecrackers, improvised bombs, and stones. The Evistas have stated that the unrest will be indefinite, and it is highly likely that intermittent unrest will continue in Bolivia until at least next year’s election.  If Morales is arrested, as per the issued arrest warrant, it is highly likely that the current unrest will escalate even further.

Canada-India diplomatic row continues as Indian ambassador expelled

Canadian authorities claimed Indian embassy staff had been involved in the June 2023 killing of a Sikh separatist activist in British Columbia. India, in turn, expelled multiple Canadian diplomats. It is highly likely that India has intensified activities to exert influence over large diasporas abroad, including in Canada, the UK, Australia and the US, and has leveraged local communities to carry out intelligence operations. Canada’s tougher stance on India may be followed by the UK and other countries.

US Manhattan stock exchange protests

At least 500 individuals staged a sit-in on 14 October in protest to Washington’s policy of military support for Israel. Local authorities reported that 206 participants were arrested during the protests. The protest almost certainly was a response to the Israeli forces airstrikes in northern Gaza during the weekend, which killed at least 200 Palestinians, as well as the announcement that the US will provide Tel Aviv with a Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system following the Iranian 1 October missile strike. There is a high likelihood of further protests near US financial and political centres in the weeks before the presidential elections.

Another possible assassination attempt on Trump prevented in California, USA

On 12 October, a man was arrested near the location of a campaign rally of former President Donald Trump in Coachella, California. The man was allegedly in possession of an unregistered firearm, and multiple fake documents and had a vehicle with fake licence plates when he was stopped by police approximately 500 metres from the location of the rally after trying to enter with a fake VIP pass.

According to authorities, the suspect likely is a member of a right-wing anti-government group and runs a website where he espouses conspiratorial and anti-establishment narratives. If this assessment is accurate, it highlights how trends of copycat violent actions cannot be restricted to a single ideological profile.

There is a realistic possibility that continued copycat assassination attempts will inspire further lone wolves to target other US politicians.

Venezuela’s regime increasingly using passport restrictions against opposition

The Financial Times reported on 12 October that at least 40 civil society figures, mostly journalists and humanitarian workers, have had their passports annulled since the country’s last election in July. Reportedly, individuals had their passports confiscated by authorities while attempting to board flights from Caracas. It is highly likely that the government will continue to expand passport confiscations, as they offer a much lower political cost and visibility than incarcerations and killings.

Canadian Jewish girls’ school targeted by gunmen

The attack took place on the night 12 October, Yom Kippur, and resulted in no injuries as the institute was closed. The Toronto school had already been targeted similarly in May. The attack was almost certainly an intimidation operation by local radicalised elements. While the dynamic of the attack demonstrates that the perpetrators almost certainly sought to minimise the risk of being caught, there is a realistic possibility of further lone-actor attacks on Jewish individuals and institutions in Canada and the US in line with developments in the Middle East.

Governor of Sinaloa, Mexico announces troop deployments

Officials in Sinaloa, where a deadly gang war between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel continues to intensify, have announced the deployment of 300 extra personnel from the National Guard as well as a special forces company. More than 100 people were killed in Sinaloa between July and September, after the outbreak of violence following the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada in the US. 

Peru has record wildfires in 2024

Data from the Global Wildfire Information System (GWIS) showed that Peru had more than 10,400 wildfires in 2024, which burned 2.5 times the amount of area of the previous most severely affected year, 2020. The most recent wildfires occurred in the country’s north. Climate scientists have argued that both anthropogenic and non-human factors have contributed to the high incidence of wildfires in Peru and neighbouring South American countries. These include low rainfall volumes and higher temperatures caused by El Nino, and by patterns of deforestation and intensive farming which have reduced local ecosystems’ resilience.

Through mid-October, widespread flooding occurred in France as a result of adverse weather, particularly affecting the southern and central regions. On 17 October, weather warnings were issued across affected regions, with the departments of Ardèche, Loire, and Haute-Loire placed on red alert. By the evening, six departments were on red alert, including the cities of Lyon and Cannes, and 33 others were on orange alert. Authorities closed roads and evacuated the most at-risk neighbourhoods.

By 18 October, the red alerts were lifted, but 18 departments remained on orange alert. The flooding caused significant disruption, including 186-mile delays on roads in the Ile-de-France region and public transport disruptions. One person was killed and two others injured in Paris when a tree fell on them during the heavy rains.

Emergency services conducted over 1,000 interventions on 17 October, including 25 flooding rescues. In Lyon, at least 480 evacuations and 520 emergency interventions were carried out.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The adverse rainfall resulted from the remnants of Hurricane Kirk moving across western Europe. The French Ecological Transition Minister described the current floods as “unprecedented”. The French floods follow the September central European floods from Storm Boris, which impacted Austria, Czechia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Moldova, Germany and Hungary, leading to at least 27 deaths and between EUR 2-3 billion in damages.

While France has resilient infrastructure and considerable emergency response capability, the significant disruption caused by the widespread flooding highlights the increasing threat of environmental risks in Europe which will highly likely continue to intensify as a result of climate change.

While emergency services remain active in managing the aftermath of the floods as of 18 October, no red alerts remain in place and the worst of the rainfall is forecast to be over.

Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units have continued to advance across multiple axes on the Israel-Lebanon border, occupying and clearing villages from Hezbollah assets and military infrastructure developed by the group. On 15 October, IDF channels announced that elements of a fifth division – the 210^th Division – has begun operating in Lebanon. Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem described Hezbollah’s war against Israel in existential terms, and seemed to contradict previous hints by other officials that the Lebanon-based group would be willing to agree to a ceasefire deal with Tel Aviv that did not include Gaza.

On 15 October, the Biden administration warned Israel that it has “30 days” to implement measures to guarantee significant improvements to the humanitarian situation in Gaza, at the cost of interrupting military aid transfers. In September, the amount of aid entering Gaza was assessed as being the lowest of any month since the start of the war. In the north of the Gaza Strip, aid provision has been particularly affected by an ongoing IDF offensive in the Jabalia area, where Israeli forces assess Hamas has successfully begun restructuring some units.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israeli ground operations in south Lebanon are almost certainly aimed at creating a scenario in which Hezbollah units are unable to carry out further operations from territory adjacent to the Israeli border. Instead of a protracted deployment, IDF operations are highly likely focusing on destroying civilian and military infrastructure that Hezbollah could leverage following their withdrawal.

So far, combat in south Lebanon has proved costly for the IDF, which has faced stiff Hezbollah resistance without however achieving large-scale engagements that could result in high Hezbollah casualties. Hezbollah, in turn, has almost certainly acquired significant knowledge of Israeli tactics and defence capabilities, allowing the armed group to inflict significant attrition both in south Lebanon and north Israel.

During the last reporting period, a Hezbollah drone strike – which, according to reports, was conducted in a way that “disoriented” Israeli air defences – injured 67 IDF soldiers and killed four in a base near Haifa, the single highest-casualty event suffered by the IDF since 7 October 2023.

On 17 October, IDF channels reported that Yahya Sinwar, military chief of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and de facto head of the group since Ismail Haniyeh’s death, was killed in Rafah. Reports that no hostages were found in the building where Sinwar was killed highly likely indicate that the Hamas chief was killed in a raid by IDF troops, rather than an airstrike.

On 15 October, the Biden administration warned Israel that it has “30 days” to implement measures to guarantee significant improvements to the humanitarian situation in Gaza, at the cost of interrupting military aid transfers. In September, the amount of aid entering Gaza was assessed as being the lowest of any month since the start of the war. In the north of the Gaza Strip, aid provision has been particularly affected by an ongoing IDF offensive in the Jabalia area, where Israeli forces assess Hamas has successfully begun restructuring some units.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Sinwar’s death is almost certainly a politically relevant development. It follows multiple decapitation strikes on Hamas and “Axis of Resistance” members over the past months. Sinwar was the last major figure associated with the 7 October 2023 attack to survive in Gaza. After the death of Haniyeh, his succession as the political leader of Hamas represented a victory for the hardliners of the group against the moderate wing and the leaders outside of Gaza.

While other senior Hamas officials – namely Sinwar’s brother Mohammad – survive in Gaza and maintain some leverage over Israel in the form of the surviving hostages, the almost complete destruction of the group’s leadership is likely to hinder its ability to reform as a viable political force. The killing of Sinwar therefore likely further creates opportunities for Israel to develop an alternative political structure for Gaza which excludes Hamas, a task which can likely only be accomplished by leveraging surviving Gaza clans opposed to Hamas, Fatah, or both.

In the short term, the latest decapitation is unlikely to change the military situation in Gaza, where depleted Hamas units, who almost certainly already act with a high degree of independence from their leadership, will continue “hit-and-run” attacks on IDF forces.

Due to the extremely high visibility of Sinwar, it is likely that the attack will result in an increase in extremist messaging in the short term, and there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory acts of violence targeting Jewish communities in Israel and the West. In particular, Hamas has recently increased the volume of terror attacks in Israeli cities, targeting high-traffic areas such as shopping centres and transportation hubs. There is a high likelihood that Hamas-affiliated channels will seek to inspire lone wolf attacks in Israel. Moreover, as shown in the case of the recent terror attack in Munich, Germany – which coincided with the anniversary of the 1972 Olympics massacre – anniversaries and significant developments in the Israel-Palestine conflict are drivers of extremist action.

Government of Iceland collapses

Icelandic Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson called for parliament to be dissolved and for new elections on 30 November, over disagreements within the governing coalition. Benediktsson, the leader of the centre-right Independence Party, is currently allied with the Progressive Party, a centrist group, and the Greens. The government collapse is likely to boost the position of the opposition parties, especially the Social Democrats.

Various Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT)-linked demonstrations in northern Europe

The Dutch chapter of the Salafi group held a demonstration in Amsterdam on 13 October. Additionally, approximately 5,000 supporters of the Salafi group Muslim Interaktiv (MI) staged a march in Hamburg, Germany. MI is largely assessed to be a “rebrand” for HuT, which is banned in Germany, and shares considerable ideological elements with HuT, including calling for the establishment of a “caliphate” as a solution to a vast array of domestic and international issues. HuT, like other Salafi groups, has almost certainly leveraged the Palestinian cause to build international support for its political project. The MI protests in Hamburg will almost certainly be leveraged by the far-right and lead to further polarisation within Germany.

Le Pen trial begins in France

The leader of the far-right National Rally began her testimony in a trial over the alleged embezzlement of European Parliament funds on 14 October. If found guilty, Le Pen and her associates risk a fine of more than EUR 1 million, a prison sentence and crucially, a ban from running for public office, which would erase Le Pen’s ambitions for the 2027 presidential elections. The trial proceedings, which are expected to last until late November, are highly likely to result in increased civil unrest in France.

Left-wing wins Lithuanian elections

The opposition Social Democrats (LSDP) party won the largest share of votes (approximately 19.5 per cent) in the first round of the country’s parliamentary elections on 13 October, matching results predicted by polls. The SD will now almost certainly enter talks with the Farmers and Greens Union and the Democrats “For Lithuania”. The result is unlikely to change Lithuania’s foreign policy or to result in significant civil unrest. The second election round, on 27 October, will however likely be crucial to assess the composition of the new coalition.

Unrest continues in Albania

On October 17, tensions escalated as protesters set a fire outside the City Hall in Tirana during a demonstration against corruption, according to local media reports. The protests, which have been ongoing for several months, have seen increased confrontations between demonstrators and law enforcement. The unrest follows an incident in which Albanian Democratic Party deputy Flamur Noka claimed that a police officer pointed a firearm at him inside the parliament building, after protests last week. Last week’s unrest occurred on 7 October, with clashes between protesters and police near the parliament building resulting in injuries to at least seven protesters and 12 police officers. The police used tear gas to disperse the crowds, leading to multiple injuries among the demonstrators. It is likely that unrest will continue in Tirana, characterised by violent direct action. 

Large protest in Madrid, Spain, over high cost of living

More than 12,000 people marched through central Madrid on 13 October over high costs of living, and notably over the low availability of long-term rental. Protesters have notably sought to bring attention to the expansion of the number of “for-tourism” rental properties and platforms like Airbnb. Spain has had the largest anti-tourism protests in Europe. 

Clashes between protesters and police in Bahrain

On 11 October, Shia protesters clashed with police after Friday prayers outside the Imam Sadiq Mosque in Diraz. According to reports, the clashes occurred after attendees displayed pictures of recently killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Bahrain, like other Gulf States, has sought to prevent pro-Palestine protests and other forms of civil unrest, and authorities often deploy violent crowd control measures, including tear gas, to disperse protests.

FRELIMO wins Mozambique elections with reports of fraud

As expected, the party – which has ruled Mozambique since independence almost 50 years ago – won the majority of the popular vote. On 13 October, independent opposition candidate Venancio Mondlane threatened to call a nationwide strike accusing FRELIMO of doctoring the results. Other opposition figures associated with the Podemos party have stated that FRELIMO leaders doctored the result to grant RENAMO – the other major opposition party – the second-highest vote tally, to establish RENAMO as a controlled opposition. There is a realistic possibility that the various challenges to FRELIMO’s victory will result in civil unrest in Mozambique, with the capital Maputo being particularly at-risk. If protests break out, it is highly likely that the Republican Police (PRM) will respond violently.

Brother of Oklahoma election attack suspect arrested in France

Last week an Afghan national was arrested in the United States for reportedly planning an attack during election day in the name of the Islamic State (IS). French media has reported that the brother of the US suspect was arrested in Toulouse, under highly similar circumstances. According to French authorities, the individual – who was arrested following a joint US-French operation – intended to carry out an attack on a stadium or shopping centre. The case is interesting as it may offer analysts some more insight about patterns of cross-country radicalisation.

Mass-bomb threats to diplomats in Ukraine

On 14 October, more than 60 embassies and diplomatic offices in Ukraine received coordinated bomb threats, almost certainly from the same sources. The threats resulted in multiple offices temporarily suspending services to citizens in Ukraine. In total, more than 2,000 messages were reported as of 16 October. Indications that the messages originated from Russian IP addresses make it likely that they were part of a hybrid operations meant to cause confusion in Kyiv. However, their state provenance remains unclear, and it is possible that pro-Kremlin non-state actors may have been responsible for the operation. Notably, the messages included threats towards Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), which recently conducted an investigation on Russian sabotage operations in Ukraine.

USA Central Command continues to increase strikes in Syria

On 12 October, the US CENTCOM reported having conducted a “series” of airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) targets in Syria, including training camps. The attacks follow previous strikes during the past weeks. US forces have increased strikes on ISIS assets, which likely corresponds to the growing level of activity of ISIS. Notably, IS attacks in Syria since August have increasingly targeted security forces.

Italy bans surrogacy

The Italian Senate approved a law to extend a ban on surrogacy to couples that seek arrangements abroad. The bill has been a longstanding project of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and likely appeals to elements of the Catholic electorate in the country, and follows similar calls for a ban raised by the Vatican. The bill’s approval has been criticised by LGBTQ civil society groups in the country. There is a high likelihood of demonstrations being staged in Rome over the next week in protest to the bill. Importantly, the bill’s approval overlaps with the government’s new 2025 budget and is therefore likely to offer some political breathing room at a crucial time.

Moderately strong earthquake in the Eastern Anatolia region of Turkey

A magnitude 5.9 earthquake struck the Kale district of Malatya, Turkey on 16 October. The earthquake resulted in 94 injuries, primarily due to panic, according to the Governor of Malatya. Two buildings sustained heavy damage, and at least four people were rescued from a partially collapsed structure. The Turkish Interior Ministry reported that a total of 187 citizens were affected by the event. Shaking from the earthquake was felt across northern Syria and the Turkish regions of Diyarbakir and Elazig, prompting crews to be dispatched for damage assessment.

Tensions continue to heighten between North Korea and South Korea, following a series of developments – an announced increase in North Korean artillery readiness, the detonation of infrastructure, and an announced change in North Korea’s constitution.

On 13 October, North Korean state media reported that North Korea’s military had ordered its artillery units stationed near the border to “get fully ready to open fire”. This was followed by the detonation of two pairs of roads and railway routes on the edge of the military demarcation line (MDL) in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) by North Korea on 15 October.

On 16 October, the North Korean state newspaper Rodong Sinmun confirmed that a meeting last week to adjust the constitution in North Korea’s legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), resulted in South Korea being declared a “hostile state” in North Korea’s constitution.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The developments follow an increase in tensions between North and South Korea this year, following North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s order in January that North Korea will abandon the goal of peaceful unification and designate South Korea as the North’s “invariable principal enemy”. The announced constitutional amendment likely provides constitutional justification for the January order and was used in official announcements this week to validate the destruction of infrastructure in the DMZ.

Tensions have been further increased since May when North Korea started sending balloons into South Korea carrying detritus and faeces, with South Korean activists sending balloons into North Korea carrying US dollars, USB sticks downloaded with K-pop and K-dramas, and leaflets.

The key trigger for this week’s events has been accusations by North Korea that South Korea has used drones to drop propaganda leaflets in Pyongyang three times this month, which has been neither confirmed nor denied by South Korean authorities. There is a realistic possibility that these Pyongyang drone flights were conducted by private individuals in South Korea, due to the ease of access to such drone technology by the public, and the historical record of evangelical Christian groups, defectors and conservatives in South Korea using balloons to send propaganda into North Korea.

While North Korea has been conducting operations in the DMZ for several months, including the erection of anti-tank barriers and the laying of mines, it is unlikely that the destruction of infrastructure was part of general North Korean efforts to fortify the border. Instead, it is likely that the unused roads and rail lines were destroyed for their symbolic value – the infrastructure was primarily constructed with South Korean funds during the period of rapprochement between the two powers that occurred in the late 90s and 2000s.

Despite escalating tensions, it is unlikely that North Korea would launch a major pre-emptive operation against South Korea which would risk full-scale war, without an external extenuating factor such as China invading Taiwan, as a war would pose a significant risk to the survival of the North Korean regime. Instead, it is likely that increasingly bellicose North Korean behaviour is aimed at bolstering internal support and warding off South Korean influence.

There is a realistic possibility that such actions are additionally aimed at providing leverage for hypothetical future nuclear negotiations with the US.

On 14 October, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a large-scale military exercise named Joint-Sword-2024B in the waters surrounding Taiwan. The exercise was conducted with assets from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the China Coast Guard (CCG).

In a map issued by the PLA theatre command, two exercises occurred on Taiwan’s east coast, three on the west coast, one to the north and three in the vicinity of Taiwan-controlled islands off the coast of mainland China. Numerous warship surface action groups with air support took part in the war games, with a reported 17 warships (including a Lianoning aircraft carrier task force east of Taiwan) and 125 aircraft taking part, which is the most Chinese aircraft ever detected in a single day by Taiwan. Notably, four formations of CCG vessels entered the restricted waters off Matsu and Dongyin islands.

Joint-Sword-2024B was claimed by PRC military authorities to involve simulated missile launches, the opening up of “air assault corridors”, and long-range bomber missions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is likely that in terms of practicable military training benefit, the exercises were practising an island-wide blockade of Taiwan, the prevention of foreign force troop deployments and aid, and the closure of international shipping lanes. The significant role of CCG vessels in the exercise is a notable development, marking the first incursion by the CCG into the restricted Matsu island waters, which in addition to the continuous CCG’s use in contested waters in the South China Sea against Philippine vessels, almost certainly further indicates the utility of the CCG as a sub-threshold force for Beijing’s objectives.

The main purpose of the exercise was almost certainly as a follow-up to Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te’s National Day speech on 10 October. Lai, who has a reputation as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan’s independence” and who is considered by Beijing to be a pro-independence “troublemaker”, reiterated in his address Taiwan’s independence from the PRC and that the PRC “has no right to represent Taiwan”. Chinese military officials have stated that the drills were a “stern warning” to Taiwanese separatism. It is highly likely, however, that Joint-Sword-2024B was planned well in advance of the speech and would take place regardless of the content of the speech. Lai’s speech was relatively restrained, involving overtures of collaboration with Beijing on multiple issues including climate change. It is likely that if such major exercises continue to occur regardless of key triggers, they will lose their deterrent factor to coerce compliance and caution in Taiwan’s political leaders and officials.

Joint-Sword-2024B is the second major blockade simulation exercise to take place in 2024, after April’s Joint-Sword-2024A which followed Lai’s inauguration. It is likely that Beijing is seeking to normalise large-scale military exercises around Taiwan as a method of providing cover for any future hypothetical invasion of Taiwan, in a similar manner to how Russia conducted multiple exercises near Ukraine before the 2022 invasion. By making such exercises routine, it would complicate distinguishing exercises from genuine operations that require a kinetic response when observing considerable Chinese deployments.

However, a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan would highly likely have a significant observable military build-up, though likely under the guise of military exercises. This week’s exercise was more limited than April’s – it was only one day as opposed to two, and the PLA-denoted exercise zones were smaller. Additionally, the exercise involved no missile launches (unlike 2022’s exercises), no announcement of live-fire exercises, and no impositions of no-fly zones. A factor in the exercise’s relative limits likely was to avoid making Taiwan a key issue in the ongoing US presidential election campaigns.

Bangladesh government issues Hasina arrest warrant

On 17 October, Bangladeshi authorities issued an arrest warrant for the ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who fled to India in August during nationwide severe protests. The interim government of Bangladesh, headed by Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus continues to have to balance a precarious political situation.

The arrest warrant for Hasina is highly likely meant to appease radical opposition parties which now support the interim government but have ambitions to rule the country. So far, much of the interim government’s authority has been supported by a consensus to root out the remnants of the Awami League, Hasina’s party which had long-controlled most government institutions, and “fill the gaps” left by this process.

Subianto set to become Indonesia’s new president

On 20 October, Prabowo Subianto is set to be inaugurated as Indonesia’s new president. The former special forces commander, who has been linked to former regime abuses, has attempted to soften his image and has promised to unite the Indonesian people. However, given his previous record and controversial comments made regarding democracy, there are major concerns over what a Subianto presidency would look like. Human rights groups and likely many Indonesians fear an authoritarian leadership marked by an increase in the power of the military and less transparency. His forecasted aggressive approach to foreign policy may also jeopardise Indonesia’s traditionally non-aligned international posture.

Reports of mass-killings at Iran-Afghan border

On 17 October, Taliban officials stated that they were investigating reports of a large-scale attack on Afghan migrants by Iranian security forces. The attack allegedly took place on 13 October near the town of Saravan, in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan which is located on migration routes for Afghans trying to reach the countries further west. According to some reports, which are at the time of writing still unsubstantiated, the attack may have killed up to 250 migrants. The case has the potential to intensify tensions between Iran and Afghanistan, possibly leading to a security escalation similar to the one in May of 2023.

Indian states mandate controversial anti-Muslim policies

The Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh have introduced controversial new anti-Muslim laws that are likely to be emulated in other states. The laws require that workers at restaurants will have to publicly display their names. This has been interpreted as a measure designed to discriminate against Muslims by exposing their faith through their names. This will likely lead to the boycott of restaurants with Muslim workers by hardline Hindus and may also result in targeted attacks. The controversial law is also likely to result in the sacking of many Muslim workers, which in turn is likely to increase radicalisation and sectarian divisions.

Ongoing dengue fever season kills two more in Bangladesh.

According to Bangladesh’s Directorate of Health, two more deaths have been recorded within this year’s ongoing dengue fever epidemic season. The total number of dengue fever deaths this year in Bangladesh currently stands at 201. The mosquito-borne disease has been an annual issue in Bangladesh since the first outbreak occurred in 2000. The 2023 outbreak was the deadliest on record, killing approximately 1,705 people.

The 2024 outbreak has so far been far less deadly than in 2023, however, the general annual trend has been towards increasing dengue-related deaths, highly likely due to a confluence of environmental and viral host factors, but likely also due to failures in managing dengue patients by authorities.

Highly active Japanese volcano erupts multiple times.

The active stratovolcano Sakurajima located near the city Kagoshima in southern Kyushu, Japan has been notably active in the past week. On 13 October, an eruption at the volcano caused volcanic ash to spread towards Kagoshima city. On 18 October, a more explosive eruption occurred, sending ash 4,000 metres above Sakurajima’s crater, and triggering ash fall warnings in Kagoshima and Miyazaki. The eruption is the most significant at the volcano since 29 July, although no injuries or damage have been reported.

Sakurajima is the most active volcano in Japan and has near-constantly erupted since 1955. In 1914, a considerable eruption killed dozens. The authorities dedicate substantial resources to monitoring the volcano, due to its proximity to dense population centres, and have issued emergency warnings and evacuations due to the volcano’s activity in recent years.

On the evening of 9 October Hurricane Milton made landfall near Siesta Key on the west coast of Florida. Hurricane Milton was initially a category 5 hurricane with maximum windspeeds of 287 km/h in the Gulf of Mexico, but weakened to a category 3 with maximum windspeeds of 193 km/h before landfall.

At least 16 deaths have so far been attributed to the storm, which is highly likely to rise, with four of the deaths being caused by tornadoes in St. Lucie County. Evacuation orders were issued in the Tampa Bay area, largely due to fears of a 4.5 metre storm surge (the rise in sea level caused by a storm, which can cause considerable flooding).

The hurricane destroyed at least 100 homes and left 3.4 million customers without power.

Solace Global Assessment: 

At its strongest while category 5 in the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Milton was the fifth most intense hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic. However, the storm weakened considerably before landfall and the predicted storm surge did not occur. Hurricane Milton ended up tracking south of Tampa, effectively sucking water out of Tampa Bay, instead of causing a 4.5 metre storm surge. A 2.4 to 3 metre storm surge was however still recorded in parts of Sarasota county.

It is almost certain that Hurricane Milton will be assessed as having caused fewer deaths than Hurricane Helene in late September, which caused at least 227 deaths, which made it the deadliest hurricane on the US mainland since 2005’s Hurricane Katrina. This is almost certainly due to the reduction in Milton’s reduction in strength before landfall, the lack of predicted storm surge, and the path the hurricane took – cutting straight through Florida from west to east rather than tracking north into other southeastern US states. Many of the deaths caused by Helene were caused in North Carolina, with at least 72 deaths recorded just in Buncombe County where the city of Asheville was devastated.

The cost of damages by Milton, however, may be similar to Helene – Helene is estimated to have caused up to USD 47.5 billion in damages, whereas estimates suggest that Milton could cost insurers USD 30-50 billion. Former President and Presidential candidate Donald Trump criticised the federal government response to the hurricane. Following the devastation caused by 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, George W. Bush’s ratings fell considerably and never fully recovered.

While it is highly unlikely that the federal response to both Helene and Milton will have a similarly significant political impact, disinformation and conspiracy theories regarding government manipulation of weather have been proliferated in response to Hurricane Milton, including by Republican Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, leading to condemnation by at least three other Republican Representatives. It is a realistic possibility that small-scale civil unrest may materialise directly as a result of the hurricane.

As of 11 October, Hurricane Milton has reduced into a Post-Tropical Cyclone and is tracking eastwards in the Atlantic, scheduled to track south of Bermuda on 12 October.

On 3 October, the Haitian gang “Gran Grif” launched an attack in Port-Sonde, in the country’s west. During this reporting period, information emerged reporting that the attack, carried out with firearms and bladed weapons, resulted in at least 70 deaths, as well as the displacement of 6,000 residents. The leader of the Gran Grif group, Luckson Elan, stated that the attack was in response to civilian apathy regarding gang members being killed by the police and a grassroots “vigilante” movement, known as “Bwa Kale”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is likely notable as the highest-severity violence in Haiti has been mostly concentrated in the capital, Port-au-Prince, where gangs continue to oppose the UN-backed and Kenya-led international police mission. Gangs lack an overarching strategy. However, their actions – including the violent attacks on civil society and institutions like churches and missions – signals a general aim to prevent the Haitian population from accessing other sources of welfare, thus keeping in place a system of coercion and reliance in areas under gang control.

The Haitian vigilante movement developed in April in Port-au-Prince, likely in response to the solidification of part of the gang front, and has carried out targeted attacks on gang members, as well as summary executions of suspected criminals. A report by a local NGO assesses that the vigilantes killed at least 160 suspected gang members in their first month of operations.

The gangs in the Bas-Artibonite region, where Port-Sonde is located, are allied to members of the capital’s powerful G-Pep alliance, which has, according to available information, sought to increase its influence in areas north of the capital where much of Haiti’s agricultural production is concentrated. G-Pep is one of the two main gang networks operating in the country, and was involved in a struggle with the rival G9 group.

In February 2024, G9 and G-Pep leaders announced the formation of Viv Ansanm, a coalition of gangs that has at times espoused “political” aspirations to influence the transitional administration of Haiti. The stability and actual functioning of Viv Ansamn is however unclear, especially outside of Port-au-Prince. In the capital’s informal settlement of Cite Soleil, divisions between the two groups were recorded at least until late July, when G9 and G-Pep agreed on the removal of roadblocks.

The Port-Sonde attack underscores the extremely severe internal security situation in Haiti, and almost certainly demonstrates the insufficiencies of current international efforts meant to restore order to the country. Currently, the almost totality of UN-backed efforts are focused in the capital. This is likely both a reflection of the mission’s overall interest in providing a stable administrative “centre” from which the new interim government can begin in-country operations, and of the significant shortfalls and deficiencies of the UN force’s assets.

The renewal of the police mission by the UN Security Council, on 30 September, is not likely to drastically change the situation in the short term. The UN mission currently operates with 410 personnel and is expected to eventually grow to a total manpower of 2,500.

Cost of living activists clash with police forces in Martinique

On 7 October approximately 50 cost of living activists clashed with police in Lamentin, Martinique, resulting in 11 injuries to police officers. Law enforcement employed necessary measures to disperse the unrest, resulting in five arrests. The unrest is a broader movement against the high cost of living, a continuing theme in the French West Indies, which was initiated in September by the Rally for the Protection of Afro-Caribbean Peoples and Resources (RPPRAC).

RPPRAC calls for food prices in Martinique to be aligned with mainland France, where prices are (according to French media) approximately 40% lower. As well as the cost-of-living protests, Martinique has seen a rise in urban violence, leading to the government imposing curfews in the capital Fort-de-France and the district of Lamentin to maintain public order.

Afghan lone wolf arrested in US over election day attack plans

The suspect was arrested by the FBI in Oklahoma, after leaving an online and financial trail that alerted authorities to his plans for an attack. The suspect, an Afghan national, reportedly planned to acquire semiautomatic weapons and carry out a mass-shooting on behalf of the Islamic State (IS).

The suspect is almost certainly a self-radicalised “lone wolf” and planned to carry out an attack on election day due to the event’. In the United States, the ease of accessing firearms almost certainly makes lone wolf attacks significantly deadlier than those that occur in Europe, which are mostly conducted with bladed weapons or vehicles.

New armed cartel founded in Mexico

The “Tabasco New Generation Cartel” (CTNG) reportedly operates in the municipalities of Jalpa and Macuspana in the Tabasco area. The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), one of the country’s largest, also operates in the area, as does another smaller group known as La Barredora. Alleged CTNG members released videos threatening government forces and other criminal groups in the area, although it is not clear if the group has already carried out any actions, beyond some alleged fires at commercial establishment in the area.

Brazil wins legal contest against Elon Musk’s X

On 8 October, the Brazilian Supreme Court allowed the social network X.com (previously Twitter) to resume service in the country after it agreed to comply with court rulings regarding content moderation that owner Elon Musk had previously rejected, as well as to pay fines. The development is likely a political victory for the administration of Brazilian President Lula. Musk has recently transitioned towards a more politically “visible” role in support of international right-wing politicians, most notably endorsing Donald Trump’s campaign for the US presidency. In April, former President Bolsonaro directly praised Musk for his opposition to the Brazilian Supreme Court’s rulings.  

Ken McCallum, the director general of the UK’s domestic security service MI5, provided an overview of current security risk trends faced by the UK during a rare threat update on 8 October. The speech was the first of its kind since 2022, and broadly covered topics including Iranian, Chinese and Russian espionage and hybrid warfare, as well as more specifically focusing on terrorism.

McCallum argued that, currently, UK intelligence and security services are facing an increased threat from Islamist Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs), and that the Islamic State (IS) is most active among them. McCallum also highlighted how MI5 resources are currently overstretched.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of the speech, two weeks before the UK’s Labour government is set to publish its 2025 budget plan, makes it highly likely that its primary objective is to secure increased funding for MI5. The highlighting of the threat from IS almost certainly reflects not only the return of the Islamist group to active planning of sophisticated terror attacks abroad – as in the case of the March Crocus Hall shooting in Moscow – but also the growing traction that the group’s messaging has in driving cases of self-radicalisation and lone wolf terrorism.

Despite suffering significant setbacks, the Islamic State almost certainly retains a strong online presence, via both “affiliated” and semi-official channels and international networks of supporters that use the group’s easily identifiable symbols and rhetoric (its “branding”). In July, the terrorism research platform GNET released a report highlighting IS’ use of sophisticated techniques to recruit and radicalise target audience members, for instance by seeking to “hijack” Islamic communities online or using “micro-influencers” to spread extremist propaganda and direct sympathisers to private channels – mostly on the Telegram app – where further radicalisation and planning can occur.

Notably, McCallum reported that, in the 2021-2024 period, MI5 analysts observed a threefold growth in the number of individuals under 18 involved in terrorism and extremist activity, meaning that underage individuals currently make up approximately 13 per cent of the total number of people involved in terrorism cases. This almost certainly reflects the growth in online radicalisation – likely favoured by increased isolation and social media usage during and after the COVID19 pandemic – which has benefitted propaganda efforts by VEOs like IS, as well as other Islamist and far-right extremist groups.

The demonstration – which had not been authorised by authorities – took place on 5 October in south-central Rome. The majority of the individuals that were injured were reportedly members of the police, which clashed with demonstrators as some groups tried to break through their lines. According to some attendees, the Italian Interior Ministry, and reporters, the violence was caused by groups of far-left “black bloc” activists.

Over the rest of the reporting period, further protests occurred in various European cities, with some university-based activist groups resuming occupations and other actions on campus. Clashes between university students and police were recorded in Paris, as police intervened to clear a demonstration at Sciences Po.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The high volume of protests is highly likely to continue over the next week, and to particularly increase on 12-13 October, the anniversary of the first entry of Israeli troops into Gaza which began a year-long ground operation. Further developments in Lebanon are highly likely to impact civil unrest in Europe, and particularly countries that have large Lebanese diasporas – firstly France. Moreover, the start of the new academic year in late September, nearly coinciding with the 7 October anniversary, is likely to further drive unrest episodes at European university campuses.

The Rome protests are likely to cause a political reaction from the Italian government, which is currently in the process of approving security legislation that the opposition denounced as “authoritarian” and expands penalties for unauthorised protests and road blockades – likely targeting environmentalist groups and far-left activists. OSINT analysis shows a significant deployment of security forces in key at-risk locations in Italy, including Jewish places of worship, religious schools and government buildings.

The reserve 146^th division of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) joined the 36^th, 91^st, and 98^th divisions in the Israeli ground operations in Lebanon, which are currently concentrating on the eastern part of the Israel-Lebanon border. IDF forces continue to carry out limited raids to destroy Hezbollah facilities near the border without reportedly seeking to retain control of the positions they take.

Fighting in south Lebanon is likely particularly difficult for the IDF due to both the terrain’s features and Hezbollah’s ground fortifications. On 10 October, reports emerged that Israeli troops fired at three UN peacekeepers’ positions, including the main base in Naqoura, injuring two peacekeepers. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has operated in Lebanon’s south for decades and received an enhanced mandate in 2006.

Tel Aviv is also currently considering options for retaliating for Iran’s 1 October strike, which may represent an escalation of the conflict. Likely options include: a strike on Iranian military targets, on oil infrastructure, or on nuclear plants.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Biden administration has likely sought to persuade the Israelis of carrying out a limited strike on Iran’s military infrastructure, as this would almost certainly pose the lowest risk of regional escalation. If Israel, instead, strikes Iran’s oil fields, refineries, or fuel shipping hubs, there is a realistic possibility of Tehran and its Axis of Resistance retaliating by targeting oil facilities in the wider region, and/or blocking the Strait of Hormuz, threatening region-wide economic and possibly military crisis. A strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities – while likely the preferred option of the Israeli government’s most hawkish components – is unlikely to succeed without direct US help, an option that the White House has already rejected. There is a high likelihood that the Israeli retaliatory strike will occur during the weekend.

Israeli operations in Lebanon are likely aimed at destroying Hezbollah structures in the south as part of a prelude to achieving the strategic objective of returning Israeli residents to the north border areas. Hezbollah, whose leadership has been significantly depleted over the past weeks, almost certainly continues to face difficulties at reconstituting a clear political chain of command, although its structure is highly likely flexible enough to not be impacted by Israeli decapitation strikes in terms of its battlefield operations.

Hezbollah, while still deeply influenced by Tehran’s decisions, almost certainly maintains retaining its political authority in Lebanon as a vital objective, and there is a realistic possibility that Israeli operations in Lebanon are partly aimed at eroding Hezbollah’s popularity and support base in order to coerce the Shia group into making significant and strategically valuable concessions.

New French government of Michel Barnier survives no-confidence motion

On 8 October, the French National Assembly failed to pas a motion of no-confidence put forward by the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP) coalition, which would have ousted the new Prime Minister Michel Barnier weeks after his appointment by Macron. Only the NFP supported the motion and, while the centre’s opposition was expected, it was the far-right National Rally’s (RN) abstention that was fundamental to the government’s survival.

The RN, which failed to achieve a major victory at the latest National Assembly elections, likely remains the only kingmaker in the current fragmented French parliament. The RN’s support for Barnier almost certainly remains conditional on the new government’s policy proposals. The tacit agreement between the Macron government and Le Pen’s RN will likely continue to be a driver of protests by the left in France.

Hungarians protest state television

On 5 October, the leading Hungarian opposition party TISZA organised a thousand-strong protest in Budapest, near the offices of the state broadcaster MTVA, over accusations of it functioning as a propaganda organ of Prime Minister Orban’s government. TISZA is a new political formation launched by former Orban ally Peter Magyar. It is a strongly personalistic and populist party and likely constitutes the major current challenge to Orban’s rule.

TISZA’s political strategy is likely aimed at challenging the base of Orban’s support by presenting an alternative – yet still “anti-establishment” – position. Further high-visibility protest actions are likely to take place in Hungary, especially targeting cultural and political institutions perceived as aligned with the Orban government.

Romanian Russophile candidate banned ahead of presidential election

Romania will hold presidential elections in two rounds on 24 November and 8 December. The polls are currently led by Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu and former NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana. On 5 October, the Constitutional Court ruled to remove Diana Sosoaca, leader of far-right, anti-EU and anti-NATO party SOS Romania, from the list of eligible candidates.

The court claimed that Sosoaca’s opinions made her unlikely to respect the presidential mandate to respect the constitution if elected. The ruling is likely to boost Sosoaca’s public image and will draw increased criticism of the country’s judiciary. There is a high likelihood of civil unrest in Bucharest, and especially near governmental buildings.

Saied predictably wins Tunisian elections

The current president secured a reported 91 per cent of the vote, with a low turnout of 29 per cent. Much of the opposition boycotted the vote, after numerous candidates were either imprisoned or prevented from running. The turnout levels, the lowest since 2011, likely highlight a continued voter apathy towards the political system of Tunisia, which has gradually become more authoritarian since Saied took power in 2019. Some civil unrest is likely to take place after the vote, but it is unlikely that it will result in severe disruptions or large-scale violence.

Norway raises terror threat alert level

The increase brings the country’s terror threat level to the second-highest level. Authorities justified the increase as responding to the broader situation in the MENA region. However, it is likely that Norwegian security services are also reacting to tangible threats targeting the Jewish community and Israeli assets and individuals in the country.

Norway has an overall low terror threat. However, an increase in radical activity and recruitment in northern Europe, especially notable since 7 October, has likely translated into a cross-border risk increase. The threat level increase results in police officers now being able to carry firearms nationwide, a precaution that almost certainly significantly increases their ability to respond to terrorist action.

The main terror threat in Norway highly likely remains that from lone wolves, self-radicalised terrorists, especially espousing an extremist Islamist ideology.  

Six wounded in Israel stabbing attack

The attack took place in the Israeli city of Hadera on 9 October. The alleged attacker was killed by responding security forces. It is highly likely that the attack was a lone wolf action, and there is a likelihood that it was a copycat attack inspired by the recent firearm and knife attack in Jaffa.

Wagner’s north Mali expedition ends with no clear outcome

A column of more than 60 Russian and Malian vehicles, directed towards the Tinzaouaten area near the Algerian border, returned to their base in Kidal without a major engagement with the Tuareg and Islamist groups that had inflicted a severe defeat on the group in July. The expedition, which was highly likely aimed to retaliate for the disastrous July ambush, was marked by considerable logistical difficulties, with the column reportedly being forced to abandon part of their equipment en route.

In addition to the considerable material expenses, the failure of the expedition will almost certainly be considered a political victory for the al-Qaeda-affiliated and Tuareg groups in the country’s north. It also highly likely represents an embarrassment for the junta – and Wagner – who promised a decisive military result after months of setbacks.

North Niger rebel group form alliance

The “Coordination of the Free Forces of Niger” was formed by four rebel groups based in the country’s north. The four groups are mostly comprised of Tuaregs, support the pre-junta government, and have carried out targeted operations, including kidnappings and assassinations, against junta officials. The Nigerien groups have also increasingly pursued closer cooperation with their Malian counterparts.

Clashes between army and al-Shabaab in south and central Somalia

At least 59 members of the Islamist group were killed, as well as four soldiers, in two separate operations in the Garilay area of Galgaduud region and in the Hawadlay area of the Middle Shabelle region. The operation is highly likely a success for government forces, whose offensive against al-Shabaab has stalled with the exception of few regions. Progress in Galgaduud follows the liberation of the town of Ali Yabal last week.

Peace talks continue between Armenia and Azerbaijan

In an effort to ease tensions in the South Caucasus region, the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments are actively pursuing a peace deal. This follows a year of tense negotiations that escalated after Azerbaijan militarily occupied the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September 2023, which led to thousands of Armenians fleeing the area.

The peace talks have been challenging, with both sides accusing the other of lacking a genuine commitment to end the decades-long conflict, which began following their respective independence from Russia in the 1990’s. In a significant development earlier this year, Armenia withdrew from several Azerbaijani villages it had controlled since the 1990’s as part of the peace process thus, allowing thousands of Azerbaijanis to return to the areas.

Armenian president Vahagn Khachatryan expressed cautious optimism of the peace deal being reached before the 29^th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) scheduled from 11-24 November in Baku.

Rwanda begins Marburg vaccinations

The disease, a viral haemorrhagic fever that is similar to Ebola, was first detected in the country in late September. So far, around 50 cases have been reported and 12 casualties – this reflects the high fatality rate of the virus, which can be higher than 80 per cent. It is highly likely that the actual number of cases is higher, especially in rural areas. Uganda also has had outbreaks of the virus in the past, and there is a realistic possibility that the spread of the virus could impact countries neighbouring Rwanda, including Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

On 7 October, a Chinese convoy travelling from the Port Qasim Electric Power Company, a joint China-Pakistan coal-fired power plant project, was attacked by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) near Jinnah International Airport (KHI) in Karachi. The attack was conducted using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), with the Pakistani Bomb Disposal Unit specifying that 80 kilograms of commercial explosives were used, destroying three vehicles and damaging 12. Two Chinese nationals were killed, with at least 10 injuries.

The Chinese embassy strongly condemned the attack and stated that they are working with Pakistani authorities and advised Chinese citizens to avoid travel to the southwest province of Balochistan and the northwest province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Baloch militants also conducted several other attacks during this reporting period, including a 5 October attack that allegedly killed three security personnel in Kalat district (claimed by BLA), an 8 October armed assault on military personnel in Mand Chokap, Kech which the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) claim killed two, an 8 October rocket attack against a military camp in the Tijaban area of Kech claimed by the BLF, and a 9 October attack against on a Sabakzai Dam checkpoint that reportedly killed one and injured 11 others.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack on a Chinese convoy follows multiple BLA attacks covered in the previous Global Intelligence Summary, including an attack against workers at a gas and oil exploration company site in Musakhail. In August there was a distinct spike in Baluch militant activity, with coordinated attacks killing over 70 people. It is highly likely that the intensification of Baluch attacks seen in recent months will continue, likely indicating a coordinated campaign. Balochistan is the poorest province in Pakistan, which is highly disproportionate to its considerable oil and mineral wealth. Since Balochistan’s accession to Pakistan in 1948, there have been multiple secessionist insurgencies. The political marginalisation and cultural suppression of the Baloch people, as well as the increasing economic exploitation in the region, are almost certainly key factors in sustaining Baloch militancy.

On 15-16 October, Pakistan will host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Islamabad, with representatives from Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran attending. In combination with recent violent protests in Islamabad in support of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, it is likely that the declining security situation in Balochistan (as well as in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where numerous Islamist militant groups are active) will raise questions about the security of Pakistan for the summit. It is a realistic possibility that the summit will be a high-value target for attacks and/or disruption by the various groups and movements that challenge Pakistan’s security.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPED) is the flagship project of Beijing’s grand strategic Belt and Road initiative in Pakistan, intending to connect Gwadar Port in Balochistan with the Xinjiang region in China with highways, railways and pipelines. Over USD 62 billion has already been invested in the project. Empowered by local grievances about the project, Baloch militants (primarily from the BLA) have consistently targeted Chinese nationals linked to CPEC projects since 2018. It is likely that increased Chinese involvement in local security will occur, however, it is unlikely that Baloch militancy against Chinese interests will decrease.

Tens of thousands of activists supporting the imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan clashed with security forces on the roads into Islamabad on 4-5 October. Overnight on 4 October, the chief minister of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Ali Amin Gandapur, led thousands of protesters to block the Islamabad-Peshawar highway. Riot police deployed teargas and baton charges against the demonstrators, cutting off mobile internet access and blocking roads into Islamabad. The Interior Ministry has stated that over 550 people were arrested, and over 80 police officers were injured in the clashes.

Imran Khan’s party, Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), has claimed that Gandapur has been abducted and unlawfully detained. Pakistani troops have been deployed in Islamabad-Rawalpindi and are scheduled to remain until 17 October, after the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit which will be held in Islamabad on 15-16 October. In Lahore, security forces also suspended cell phone and internet services, and blocked roads into the city with hundreds of containers, with clashes being reported near Lahore’s High Court on 5 October.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that unrest will continue in Pakistan, with PTI issuing a fresh call for a series of protests. Disruption to the SCO summit will highly likely present a high-value target for opposition forces in Pakistan. Imran Khan has been held in jail since August 2023, with over 100 charges relating to terrorism and corruption. In March 2023, following attempts by security forces to arrest Khan, large scale, widespread and violent unrest was triggered across Pakistan, leading to at least eight deaths.

Highly likely due to the success of government suppression in preventing protesters from entering major urban centres such as Islamabad and Lahore, PTI leadership figures have stated that the party will shift its protest strategy to instead focus on “district-level protests”, rather than solely concentrating on larger cities. Nonetheless, there are indications that the PTI is planning a nationwide call for a demonstration in Islamabad, pending discussion amongst the PTI leadership. There are currently protests scheduled in Multan and Sahiwal on 11 October, Gujranwala and Sargodha on 12 October, Dera Ghazi Khan on 13 October, and Lahore and Faisalabad on 14 October.

Pakistan’s security profile faces considerable challenges from three fronts: civil unrest in support of Imran Khan, an intensification of attacks by militants in Balochistan, and a deterioration of security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is highly likely that draconian government suppression over the past week is due to concerns over disruption to the SCO summit, however, it is likely that rather than reducing the threat from these three distinct issues, opposition forces will be driven further to increasingly violent methods.

Pakistan bans prominent Pashtun rights group

The Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) was founded in 2014 and advocates for the rights of Pakistan’s ethnic Pashtuns. Pakistan’s counterinsurgency against the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other militant groups in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has allegedly led to widespread oppression of Pashtuns. This week, following recent mobilisations, the PTM planned a three-day national gathering in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to oppose military abuses against Pashtuns and recent declining security amidst a marked increase in militant attacks in the past few months.

The PTM have been proscribed by Pakistan’s Interior Ministry under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which freezes the organisation’s assets, closes offices, prohibits publishing literature and enables the seizure of published material. PTM’s leader, Manzoor Pashteen, has gone into hiding, and hundreds of PTM members have been arrested. A PTM spokesperson has stated that the group still intends to undertake the three-day national gathering, despite efforts by security forces to violently prevent it.

The PTM likely operated as a political outlet for local Pashtun grievances, and it is likely that the group’s proscription will drive PTM members and supporters into more radical and violent actions.

One hospitalised in India during doctor hunger strike

A junior doctor was hospitalised after carrying out almost a week-long hunger strike in protest over the rape and murder of a trainee medic in a hospital in Kolkata, which resulted in widespread protests in August. The case continues to highlight the significant political impact of the attack, which protesters have argued demonstrated ongoing and widespread gender inequality and oppression in India. The latest hunger strike was motivated by doctors’ perceptions of insufficient government responses to their demands for greater security at hospitals. There is a realistic possibility that the hospitalisation of the junior doctor will spark further localised civil unrest in Kolkata.

Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wins in Haryana

The opposition Congress party’s alliance won the first elections in Jammu and Kashmir in the first vote after the border state was stripped of much of its autonomy. The BJP was projected to lose in Haryana, and the surprising result is likely to provide a significant domestic boost to Modi, after his party’s underwhelming victory at the past general elections. Congress officials challenged the vote results, claiming that the voting process was marked by irregularities. If Congress’ challenge of the results progresses, there is a realistic possibility that it will result in unrest and possible sectarian violence in the state.

China and the Philippines clash over disputed territories in the South China Sea

Tensions between China and the Philippines have sharply escalated over disputed territories in the South China Sea, with reports of six aggressive incidents having occurred in August alone. Five of these incidents took place near Scarborough Shoal and Sabina Shoal, areas within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that China claims as its own. Hostile actions have included intentional boat rammings, uses of water cannons to target vessels, and other forms of physical confrontation.

China has characterised its relationship with the Philippines as being at a critical juncture, urging Manila to reconsider its future actions. This situation poses a potential risk of involving the United States, which maintains a mutual defence treaty with the Philippines and has pledged to support Manila in the event of armed attacks against Filipino forces.

Speaking at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 10 October, the president of the Philippines called for an urgent speed in negotiations to resolve the increasing tensions.

Sri Lanka issues red alert flood warnings to coastal regions in the south and southeast

Red alert flood warnings have been issued for the south and southeastern coastal regions of Sri Lanka. Local media have already reported images of flooding in Walagedara. The areas with the highest warning and risk are the coastal areas extending from Puttalam to Hambantota, via Colombo and Galle.

It is expected that wind speeds will reach 60-70 kph and naval and fishing communities are being advised not to venture out until further notice. Sri Lanka has been in an economic crisis following its meltdown in 2022 and although the new government has shown positive signs of improvement (with The World Bank confirming Sri Lanka is recovering faster than expected) it is heavily reliant on the country maintaining stability.

Mental Health Due Diligence is a must: Before sending employees abroad, conducting thorough risk assessments for both personal safety and mental well-being is essential. It’s important to recognise that in many remote locations, access to English-speaking mental health services is limited, if available at all.

It can be a challenging topic, particularly when some individuals may be reluctant to speak openly about their mental health, fearing stigma or concern about missing out on career opportunities. Therefore, it’s important for risk and security managers to go beyond the usual checklists for physical security risks.

Here’s how managers can take a more personal approach:

Heavy fighting between two rival factions of the Sinaloa cartel is ongoing, primarily in Sinaloa’s state capital, Culiacan. Since the fighting initially broke out on 25 July, at least 132 deaths have been attributed to the cartel civil war, 20 of these civilians, and an additional 160 people have been reported missing or kidnapped.

On 29 September, approximately 1,500 residents marched through Culiacan demanding peace, organised by the civic group “Culiacan Valiente,” or Brave Culiacan. On 30 September, it was announced that the approximately 1,000-member local municipal police force had their firearms seized by the military, with soldiers, state police and National Guard taking over patrolling.

The state governor, Ruben Rocha, subsequently announced that local police will not return to duty until they retrieve their weapons.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Sinaloa cartel civil war stems from the July arrest of Sinaloa leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada by US authorities. El Mayo was lured onto a private plane by one of former Sinaloa leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman’s sons, Joaquín Guzmán López, which then landed in El Paso, Texas. The two rival factions are Los Chapitos, those loyal to the El Chapo’s other sons, and La Miyaza/Mayitos, who are loyal to El Mayo.

While Culiacan has historically been the epicentre of multiple outbreaks of cartel violence, such as the 2019 Battle of Culiacan, the current civil war has been notably intense. Firefights have broken out even in Culiacan’s downtown, as well as in upscale neighbourhoods. Cartel members have made barricades of burning buses and trucks to block the highways around Culiacan, which has led to security forces deploying five ‘anti-blockade’ units.

It is highly likely that the seizure of local police firearms has been conducted due to distrust of the local police force, rather than routine inspection of permits and serial numbers.

With the violence having already spilt over to other northern Mexican states, including Sonora, Baja California, Chihuahua, Zacatecas and Durango, there is a realistic possibility that a spillover of violence could manifest in US cities, particularly in California, Texas and Arizona. Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), the now former-President as of 30 September, partly blamed Washington DC for the surge in violence, a claim denied by the US ambassador to Mexico, Ken Salazar. It is likely that this has further increased diplomatic tensions, in addition to the recent spat stemming from comments made by Salazar criticising the planned judicial reform overhaul in Mexico.

The new Mexican president sworn in on 1 October, Claudia Sheinbaum, faces an immediate challenge in tackling the Sinaloa civil war. AMLO pursued a “hugs not bullets” policy towards cartel violence, intended to tackle the issue with job opportunities and training programmes rather than armed force. A record number of homicides were recorded during AMLO’s presidency, however. While Sheinbaum’s tenure as the mayor of Mexico City saw the homicide rate halve, with Sheinbaum implementing expanded surveillance and police monitoring policies, it is highly unlikely that such policies will be replicable nationwide.

While Sheinbaum has appointed former senior police officer Omar Garcia Harfuch as security secretary, which potentially indicates a change in security policy, Sheinbaum has publicly stated that she will continue AMLO’s policy platform.

On 3 October, the President of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, declared an extension to the current state of emergency which will last a further 60-day period. The extension will cover the same areas as the previous state of emergency which included the provinces of Guayas, home to Guayaquil, the most populated city in Ecuador, along with Los Ríos, El Oro, Manabí, Santa Elena, and Orellana, as well as the canton of Camilo Ponce Enríquez – a mining enclave in Azuay province, where criminal gangs have attempted to seize control of illegal mining operations.

However, the state of emergency will now cover the capital Quito, which has been justified within the presidential decree by “the intensification of hostilities, the commission of crimes and the intensity of the prolonged presence of organised armed groups”. The state of emergency will include a curfew from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. in areas with high crime rates and will temporarily suspend rights such as the inviolability of homes and freedom of assembly.

Despite this, the Constitutional Court is set to review the decision and has previously annulled similar measures.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Since coming to power in November 2023, President Noboa has sought ways to curb endemic gang violence within Ecuador which has been the main driver behind a fourfold increase in the homicide rate between 2018 and 2022. In 2023, alone there were an estimated 7,500 murders in a country of just 18 million, providing a murder rate of 44.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, behind only Jamaica in the Western Hemisphere.

In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele has reduced the murder rate to 2.4 in 2023 as part of his “guerra contra las pandillas” or war against the gangs. This has involved multiple states of emergencies, expanded powers, the suspension of constitutional rights and the arrest of over 80,000 suspected gang members. President Noboa has attempted to emulate these tactics in Ecuador. However, early indications are that these policies have not been successful and there has been an increase in crime.

Unlike in El Salvador, Ecuador’s gangs are not unorganised or poorly funded street gangs. Ecuador’s gangs include well-organised, well-armed and heavily financed outfits associated with the Mexican and Colombian cartels, both of which have expanded their power in the country since the demobilisation of the FARC group which used to control much of the cocaine trade. These cartels are unlikely to submit to Noboa’s policies due to the strategic significance of Ecuador, which sits between the major cocaine-producing countries of Peru and Colombia, and its ports have been key exit points for cocaine shipments.

The prison system is another critical point of failure in Noboa’s crackdown. The major cartels control operations and recruit new members within the prison system, enabling them to establish stronger networks, leading to more violence both within and outside of the prison. The militaristic strategy of the Noboa administration may still yield short-term reductions in crime; however, by underestimating the power of the cartels and failing to address some of the other underlying conditions that have driven violence, the security situation in Ecuador is unlikely to significantly improve and will likely remain trapped in a cycle of state of emergencies.

On 3 October, thousands of students marched in multiple Argentine cities including Buenos Aires and Rosario against planned government education budget cuts. The marches unfolded mostly peacefully, although some cases of violence towards counter-protesters were recorded. Hours before the demonstration, President Javier Milei had threatened to veto a law that would guarantee university funding for the academic year.

The protests represent the second instance of large-scale civil unrest driven by student groups within the past six months, following significant demonstrations in late April over budget cuts. The protests occurred only weeks after Milei published the government’s 2025 budget bill, which predicts a continuing surplus and shrinking inflation, as well as the further devaluation of the Argentine Peso.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The socioeconomic situation in Argentina continues to remain extremely precarious and is almost certainly exacerbating political divisions. Despite the Milei government’s success in reducing inflation to its lowest levels in decades, cutting the government’s spending deficit, and beginning to replenish foreign currency reserves, these policies have also led to a sharp rise in poverty and a drop in consumer spending. This has placed severe pressure on key economic sectors, with small- and medium-sized businesses suffering the most.

Milei’s popularity levels have remained consistent for much of the past year, despite experiencing a relative decrease in September. However, despite relatively high popularity rates, Milei’s continuous attacks on the public sector and welfare state have continued to drive large-scale protests, led by the country’s unions, left-wing parties, and student groups. Recent estimates indicate that poverty rates under Milei have soared to over 50 per cent as a result of Milei’s austerity measures.

With poverty rates this high, Milei’s popularity is likely to decrease and larger segments of the population will likely become susceptible to unrest, leading to increased disruption, instability and potentially political violence.

US Supreme Court tackling of sensitive cases likely to drive civil unrest

The conservative-leaning Supreme Court began its new nine-month term on 1 October, as part of which it is scheduled to review a series of cases on highly contentious political issues, including gun control and LGBTQ rights. There is a high likelihood that decisions made by the legislative branch will play a key role in the political system of the US in the coming weeks, especially due to the high likelihood of legal challenges being raised prior to and after the elections.

Claudia Sheinbaum sworn in as Mexico’s first woman President

Sheinbaum takes power while Mexico is struggling with multiple issues. As highlighted in her inauguration speech, the president’s main priority in the immediate term will be to reassure foreign partners and civil society regarding the highly controversial judicial reform bill passed by her predecessor. Moreover, the first test faced by the government will be the budget, which has a deadline of 15 November.

More broadly, Sheinbaum inherits a precarious domestic security situation, marked by increasing violence between the two main cartels present in the country, the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation which have been fighting since the arrest of the former’s senior leadership.

Dominican Republic to deport “10,000” Haitians a week

The Dominican government announced on 2 October that it will start mass deportations of Haitian migrants in the country, citing an exponential growth of migrant numbers, almost certainly due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in its neighbouring country. In 2023, the Dominican Republic deported more than 170,000 people, almost all Haitians, and expelled at least 65,000 in the first half of 2024. The announcement and implementation of the plan is likely to translate into an increase in civil unrest, as the opposition continues to criticise the government of President Luis Abinader for its harsh treatment of Haitian migrants.

Mexican soldiers fire on migrants near Guatemalan border

On October 1, 2024, Mexican soldiers shot at a truck carrying migrants near Huixtla, Chiapas, resulting in six fatalities. The military claimed the truck was evading personnel and followed by vehicles linked to criminal groups, prompting the soldiers to open fire after hearing gunfire. This incident underscores the ongoing violence and risks faced by migrants in Mexico, exacerbated by increasing enforcement measures likely influenced by US policies. Critics have argued that militarisation in immigration enforcement endangers migrants, making their journey to the US even more dangerous.

At least 200 deaths attributed to Hurricane Helene in US

Hurricane Helene, which had initially made landfall in the Big Bend area of Florida as a category 4 storm on 26 September, caused at least 200 deaths across the Southeast US. Deaths have been reported in the states of Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee and Virginia. North Carolina was particularly affected, with at least 72 deaths reported in Buncombe County alone. Buncombe County’s city of Asheville was devastated by flooding.

By the morning of 30 September, over two million customers remained without power. With the death toll highly likely to continue to rise, Helene is one of the deadliest hurricanes to impact the mainland US in 50 years, and the deadliest since 2005’s Hurricane Katrina.

The demonstrations have been organised by local groups and are meant to commemorate one year since the start of the conflict. Protests have been scheduled to take place in multiple large cities and capitals, including London, Paris, Rome, Warsaw, Madrid, Amsterdam, Athens, Berlin, and Istanbul.

Some of these planned gatherings have not been approved by authorities, including the event scheduled to take place in Rome on 5 October – although organisers have still called for the event to go ahead. In addition to its overlap with 7 October, the scheduled period of protests begins on the day following Rosh Hashanah, and will also end on the eve of Yom Kippur, thus occupying the period between the two holiest days of the Jewish religious calendar.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The choice to hold pro-Palestine protests overlapping with the anniversary of the 7 October Hamas attack in southern Israel will likely be perceived as a provocation and almost certainly result in an increased security risk at the protest locations. There is a high likelihood of pro-Israel counter-protester groups seeking to disrupt the pro-Palestine gatherings. Likewise, there is a high likelihood of clashes breaking out between protesters and police, especially in cities where clashes have previously occurred (such as Paris), and in those where the protests have not been approved.

The scope and high visibility of the demonstrations are also likely to result in an increased threat from lone-wolf terrorism, either targeting the protesters or high-visibility targets in protest locations, including government buildings and places of worship.

The case of Italy is likely to be particularly affected by the latter dynamic. The government’s refusal to grant protesters a permit to demonstrate has been met with severe backlash by the opposition. Moreover, the Italian lower chamber recently passed a new security law, which has been strongly criticised by the opposition for reportedly restricting freedom of protest.

These two developments will likely drive significant civil unrest on 5 October and in the coming weeks in large Italian cities.

On 29 September, Austria held legislative elections to elect the 28^th National Council, the lower house within Austria’s bicameral parliament. The far-right FPÖ party won more than 29 per cent of the vote, almost doubling its vote share from the last elections in 2019. The centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and Green Party both saw an important decline in the number of votes, while the Social Democrats (SPÖ) held their 21 per cent vote share.

The results’ announcement quickly translated into some civil unrest. On 30 September, protests took place near the parliament building in Vienna.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The vote is highly likely a historic result for the Austrian far right, and further emphasises some visible trends from across Europe: a collapse of the Green parties – marked by a shift among young voters towards more established left parties, or the populist right – and a decrease in the traction of establishment centre-right parties. The FPÖ’s success was almost certainly achieved through its ability to tap into a range of concerns shared among large sections of the Austrian electorate. The party’s main source of success has been its ability to leverage concerns over immigration and national identity.

The FPÖ has championed policies and concepts that include the “remigration” of immigrants and the creation of a more homogenous Austria. However, what sets the party apart from some of its European far-right counterparts is its attempts to appeal to Turkish-origin voters, a demographic estimated to be as many as 500,000. This tactic has involved framing Turkish-origin voters as well-integrated compared to migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and other Muslim nations. It is currently unclear as to how successful this tactic has been. However, early indications are that it has proven reasonably successful with the Turkish youth.

Moreover, by appealing to well-integrated Muslims, this tactic helps the FPÖ distance itself from accusations of being racist, nationalist, or exclusively Christian. In the long term, this tactic, which has been disparaged as opportunistic, may be emulated by other members of the European far-right if deemed successful. This form of selective inclusion, whilst also championing policies like remigration and deportations, is likely to stoke divisions within the Muslim diaspora, potentially undermining social cohesion and potentially leading to incidents of unrest or violence that strengthen the FPÖ’s core narratives.|

It is currently unclear as to whether or not the FPÖ will become part of a ruling coalition. To achieve this, the FPÖ will require a coalition partner. The only prospective “kingmaker” is the centre-right ÖVP. However, the ÖVP’s leader and current Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer, has ruled out entering a coalition if the FPÖ leader, Herbert Kickl, insists on becoming Chancellor. A potential outcome would be the mirroring of the 2023 Dutch elections, where a coalition was formed only after far-right leader Geert Wilders agreed not to be prime minister.

An FPÖ-ÖVP coalition with the ÖVP nominating a Chancellor is assessed as the most likely development. Both parties have some ideological overlap over issues like immigration, however, if the FPÖ is forced to give up the Chancellery, it will likely demand support for stronger policies over immigration. There is a realistic possibility that the advancement of immigration policies like stricter border controls and increased deportations, could create an environment where violence is more likely to occur, as well as strain the relationship between migrant communities and the government.

The only real viable alternative to an FPÖ-ÖVP coalition is a coalition between the ÖVP and the centre-left SPÖ. However, this coalition will likely be interpreted as an attempt to establish a firewall around the far-right, similar to the tactics observed in Germany, and has several issues. Firstly, a centre-right-centre-left coalition will likely be ungovernable and both parties will likely risk alienating their base by betraying their respective values. There is a high likelihood that such a coalition will collapse, leading to early elections where the FPÖ could extend its vote share. Secondly, a firewall around the  FPÖ could play into the party’s hands by reinforcing their narrative of being outsiders persecuted by the political establishment, thereby increasing their appeal to voters who feel increasingly disenfranchised by mainstream politics.

On 27 September, a large-scale Israeli strike in southern Beirut killed the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, as well as other high-ranking officials of the Lebanese militant group. Shortly after 23:00 local time on 30 September, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) launched what they described as a “targeted and delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon”, aimed against “terrorist targets and infrastructures of Hezbollah”.

As of the time of writing, available OSINT shows that IDF operations have been limited, with no attempts at penetrating deep into Lebanese territory. Israeli ground operations in Lebanon have so far been mainly carried out in the two directions of Odaisseh and Maround al Ras. On the first day of operations, the IDF reported that 8 soldiers had been killed in combat.

On the afternoon of 1 October, Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack on targets throughout Israel, with reportedly at least 180 missiles being used. Israeli missile defence forces, as well as IAF and allied American and Jordanian air force units, contributed to the interception of the majority of the Iranian projectiles. Nevertheless, this attack was likely more successful at penetrating Israeli defences that the previous large-scale strike in April.

The attacks resulted in only one confirmed casualty, a Palestinian civilian who was killed by debris near Jericho, in the West Bank.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The IDF’s ground offensive has likely been timed to exploit the current lack of command and control (C2) within Hezbollah which has been achieved through a series of decapitation strikes on the group’s senior leadership. In September, the Netanyahu administration added the return of Israeli citizens to settlements near the Israel-Lebanon border to their list of stated war aims.

The significant degradation of Hamas forces in the Gaza Strip following a year of conflict has also almost certainly allowed Tel Aviv to shift its focus to the north. Israeli officials almost certainly assess that a reduced ground force, combined with a constant threat of airstrikes, will be sufficient to prevent Hamas from reforming units capable of significantly threatening IDF forces in Gaza.

IDF operations are highly likely aimed at destroying Hezbollah assets in the south of Lebanon and preventing the group from targeting north Israel. While Hezbollah maintains some long-range weapons systems, much of the group’s arsenal has a maximum range of ~40km. IDF operations will highly likely seek to force Hezbollah to retreat north of the Litani River, as per the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

It is unlikely that the IDF will commit to a long-term occupation of southern Lebanon, which would entail high political and economic costs as well as a high rate of casualties.

The latest attack by Tehran is likely to allow Israeli forces the political justification to increase strikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as strikes on other regional Axis of Resistance members. Israeli forces may seek to capitalise on the recent decapitation strikes to significantly degrade Hezbollah’s manpower and, especially, weapons stocks as a prelude to a UN-mediated deal on its northern border.

An Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal, remains, as of now, highly unlikely to occur imminently, especially due to the approaching 7 October anniversary, whose political significance makes such a deal unthinkable for the Israeli leadership.

Israeli forces will almost certainly retaliate for Iran’s attack. However, it is likely that retaliatory strikes targeting Iranian assets or territory will be limited to avoid further escalation and meant at re-establishing deterrence. There is a realistic possibility that Israeli forces will opt to strike Iranian officials and assets in Iraq or Syria, including IRGC members.

Moreover, Israeli strikes could also target military targets, including missile launch sites and air defence stations, in Iranian territory, as well as strategic objectives like oil extraction facilities and refineries. Finally, there is a realistic possibility of Israeli strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, which would likely only be symbolic due to the impossibility of causing genuine damage to Iran’s largely underground nuclear facilities with long-range fires and the necessity to conduct such an operation with airframes penetrating deep into Iranian airspace carrying bunker buster bombs.

While such a course of action has been advocated by “hawkish” elements of the Israeli government, as well as some allied political figures, such a move would highly likely be opposed by London, Washington, and Brussels, as it poses an obvious threat to the possible resumption of nuclear negotiations, which Pezeshkian has repeatedly called for in his recent speech at the UN General Assembly.

Growing unrest following general strike call in France

Starting on 1 October, major French unions have called for a general strike, with 180 events taking place across the country. Not all major unions have supported the appeal, with some citing that it is still “premature” due to the Barnier government having only recently been installed. Students have also joined the strikes, with multiple high schools in Paris and other major French urban centres being occupied.

There is a realistic threat of political violence during the strikes. In Lyon, on the night of 30 September, reports indicate that local far-right groups staged impromptu demonstrations and “patrols” in residential areas.

“Ecotage” action targets Flamanville nuclear power plant, France

The plant is the newest to be commissioned in France (in 2007), and, after years of delays and significant cost increases, is set to become operational in the next months. On 30 September, anarchist activists claimed responsibility for targeting an electricity pylon supplying energy to the site.

The action did not result in any notable damage. However, the case continues to highlight the risk that ecotage (sabotage carried out by radical environmentalists, often targeting energy infrastructure or vehicles) poses to high-visibility targets and industries.

Around 3,000 march in Portugal against “uncontrolled immigration”

The demonstrations, which took place in Lisbon on 29 September, were organised by the right-wing populist CHEGA party. In 2024, CHEGA, which was only founded in 2019, won 50 seats, becoming the third-largest political force in the country. The latest protests were notable as participants deliberately marched through areas of Lisbon with large migrant communities. Moreover, reports indicate that members of neo-Nazi and far-right groups, including the Grupo 1143 – a former hooligan club reconstituted into a militant formation – attended the event.

FRELIMO almost certain to win Mozambique elections

General elections are scheduled to take place in Mozambique on 9 October. The vote will serve to appoint the president and 250-member Assembly of the Republic for a five-year term. Mozambique has been governed by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) since independence from Portugal in 1975. FRELIMO has gradually drifted towards authoritarian rule and recent elections have been likely doctored to ensure its victory. FRELIMO will almost certainly win the elections, which will likely be fraught with irregularities.

There is a high likelihood of civil unrest following the vote and a realistic possibility of violence against government officials and police. While all the major RENAMO-originated armed groups have been largely neutralised, some anti-government cells likely remain operational and will seek to stage anti-government action.

Two teenagers arrested over suspected bomb attack at Israeli embassy in Denmark.

The two teenagers, both reportedly Swedish citizens, were arrested on 3 October, the day after two early morning explosions occurred near the embassy compound in Copenhagen. It is highly likely that the attack was a botched attempt at targeting Israeli diplomatic personnel.

It is likely that the case will bring further attention to the crime and extremist action threat in Denmark originating from neighbouring Sweden. The reported use of “hand grenades” during the attack is likely a demonstration of the overlap between radical networks and organised crime groups in northern Europe, with the former increasingly having access to more sophisticated weaponry, including explosive material.

At least 31 wounded in arson, vehicle, and machete attack in Essen, Germany.

An individual, reportedly wearing a keffiyeh and Palestinian flag and identified as a Syrian national, set fire to multiple buildings in Essen, North Rhine Westphalia and then drove a van into local storefronts, before exiting the vehicle and trying to attack bystanders. The motive of the attack is still unclear as of the time of writing, but authorities have claimed that the most likely reason is related to mental health. Still, the attackers’ choice to wear items associated with the Palestinian cause will almost certainly be used by anti-Palestine channels, and will likely increase far-right sentiment within Germany.

US Central Command kills 37 ISIS and Hurras al-Din fighters in Syria.

The two strikes, on 16 and 24 September, are among the largest conducted by US forces in the past year, and were reportedly successful in killing a Hurras al-Din local commander and at least four Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leaders.

ISIS and other Islamist groups have increased the volume of attacks in Syria and Iraq, especially targeting oil and gas facilities. On 3 October, ISIS channels released information concerning a large-scale attack on Iraqi security forces in Anbar, which reportedly resulted in eight government casualties.

Militant groups are likely exploiting regional tensions, with coalition forces currently concentrating their efforts on Iranian proxy forces such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). This has likely provided Islamist groups more freedom of movement and groups like ISIS have likely been emboldened by the recent announcement that the US will withdraw its forces from Iraq.

Terror attack in Jaffa, Israel kills seven.

On 1 October, two individuals carried out a gun and knife attack in Jaffa, south Tel Aviv, killing seven and wounding at least eleven. The perpetrators were killed by responding security forces. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack, although the credibility of this claim is uncertain. While the dynamic of the attack remains partly unclear, there is a high likelihood that it will result in spontaneous retaliatory violence in the West Bank, perpetrated by both the IDF and Israeli settlers.

Yemen’s Houthis exchange strikes with Israel and attack two vessels in Red Sea.

After Yemen’s Houthi militants launched a ballistic missile towards Israel on 29 September, reportedly targeting Ben Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv and intercepted by Israeli air defence, Israel’s military conducted air strikes on Hodeida and Ral Isa, Yemen.

The Houthis then claimed they launched several one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) toward Eilat and Tel Aviv, Israel. Their claims that the OWA-UAVs largely bypassed air defence systems, are however likely untrue.

Additionally, the Houthis attacked two vessels in the Red Sea on 1 October, after an almost month-long lull in Houthi anti-merchant shipping attacks. One of the vessels, the Panama-flagged  CORDELIA MOON (IMO: 9297888), was struck by an uncrewed surface vessel (USV), puncturing a ballast tank.

The CORDELIA MOON is reportedly part of Russia’s “dark fleet”, vessels trading under opaque ownership that allow Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, despite an agreement between Russia and the Houthis that exempts Russia-linked vessels from being targeted.

Islamic State Somalia Province (ISSP) reported to have “doubled” in size since 2023.

The group is particularly active in the country’s north. While ISSP is comparatively smaller and less active than other branches of the Islamic State (IS), it benefits from being a hub for the rerouting of funds originating from supporters in Africa, and from its geographical closeness to IS Yemen Province (ISYP).

Reports indicate that the leader of ISSP – Abdulqadir Mumin – is a key figure in the global organisation of IS, and likely acts as the de facto leader of IS’ external operations. Some reports have, moreover, identified Mumin as the current Caliph of IS (the group’s figurehead is currently only known via their nom de guerre). However, this is unlikely as IS has its “heartland” in Iraq and Syria and has heavily emphasised its belief that a “rightful” Caliph should come from Prophet Mohammed’s Quraish tribe – and therefore be ethnically Arab.

ISSP almost certainly remains too small to threaten Mogadishu, other regional powers, or the much larger al-Shabaab. However, ISSP may be following al-Shabaab in exploiting the Somalian state’s current weakness and the rifts between Mogadishu and the breakaway northern region of Puntland, to accelerate recruitment.

Iranian separatist group attacks police forces in Khash.

Militants from the Jish al-Adl group, a Baloch and jihadist separatist militant group which operates in the Iran-Pakistan border area, conducted twin attacks on 1 October in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province. The attacks are estimated to have killed six Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Islamic Republic law enforcement personnel, including a local IRGC commander. Despite Iranian efforts to curtail the activities of militant groups in the Baluch region, groups like Jish al-Adl remain highly operational and are likely capitalising on the continued destabilisation of Afghanistan, where they can easily procure weapons and seek refuge. Moreover, Baluch groups have likely been emboldened by the recent surge of attacks by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Pakistan.

Marburg disease potentially identified in Germany.

A platform was cordoned off at Hamburg Central Station on 2 October over concerns that train passengers were infected with the Marburg virus. A medical student and his partner developed flu-like symptoms after returning from Rwanda where there is a current outbreak of the disease. The Marburg virus, which is transmitted through contact with infected bodily fluids, can cause severe illness with symptoms such as fever, headaches, vomiting, and diarrhoea, and has a mortality rate of approximately 50 per cent according to the World Health Organisation (WHO).

Wildfires in Corinthia, Greece kill two people.

In northwestern Corinthia, approximately 35km northeast of Corinth, two people died as a result of a wildfire that began on 29 September. Two firefighters were also injured. An estimated 11,791 hectares of land were in the burned area. The Greek fire service stated that the fire was suspected to have started accidentally by a beekeeper smoking out hives. Due to its climate, Greece annually experiences significant wildfires. However, due to abnormally severe summer heatwaves, drought, and higher-than-average spring temperatures, 2024 has seen a record number of wildfires in Greece. While wildfires typically primarily occur during the summer months, many wildfires, such as this week’s Corinthia fire, took place earlier or later than normal. This is likely due to the impact of climate change, and the trend will likely continue.

UN calls for increased donations for Yemen due to cholera outbreak.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for Yemen has pleaded for more donations for Yemen due to the spread of cholera in the country. The agency assesses that there are over 186,000 suspected cases and there have been almost 700 associated deaths since March 2024. The outbreak has almost certainly been compounded by heavy rains and years of conflict, which together have strained resources, resulted in poor sanitation and provided the conditions conducive to the spread of waterborne diseases. The outbreak, which has been ongoing since 2016, is estimated to have killed almost 4,000 people, with Yemen accounting for 84-93 per cent of all cholera cases in the world.

Pro-Palestinian demonstrations are expected to occur throughout the Asia-Pacific region during October, particularly around the anniversary of the Israel-Hamas conflict on 7 October. Several protests have already been scheduled throughout the region.

In Australia, a pro-Palestine rally will be held on 7 October near Victoria Barracks. In India, left-wing parties have called for nationwide gatherings on 7 October to demand a ceasefire, and in Indonesia, protests have been organised outside the US Embassy. Protests have also been organised on 7 October or on the preceding days in Malaysia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The vast majority of protests throughout the Asia-Pacific region are likely to be relatively small and peaceful, although travel disruption is forecasted in major city centres due to heightened security measures. However, Australian police have attempted to ban protests on 6-7 October due to the higher likelihood of violence.

Australia is an ally of Israel and has a relatively large Jewish population (c. 100,000), who are expected to hold vigils on 7 October, which are likely to be coveted targets for acts of terrorism. There is also the potential for violence between protestors and counter-protestors in Australia and to a lesser extent in New Zealand.

Impromptu or not publicly announced protests are likely to occur outside of the embassies and consulates of countries providing political and material support to Israel, such as the US, UK and France. Protests are also highly likely outside of Israeli embassies within the region and have previously been observed in Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines.

In Pakistan, two of the country’s largest parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party have announced joint protests on 7 October that will cross the political divide. Protests are likely to develop outside US diplomatic buildings in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar. There is a realistic possibility that militants may seek to attack large gatherings to undermine the government in Pakistan.

The attacks took place on 28-29 September, in the Panjgur and Musakhail districts of Balochistan, and were reportedly carried out by multiple, coordinated groups of militants. As part of the operations, militants attacked a gas and oil exploration company site in Musakhail. In late August, another major attack took place in Musakhail, as gunmen killed 23 individuals, mostly workers from Punjab, after pulling them out of their civilian vehicles. The August attack, as well as other recent raids across the province that resulted in a total death toll of more than 50, were claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA).

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the latest attacks were also carried out by BLA militants. The BLA maintains the strategic objective of eliminating what it sees as “foreign interests” from Balochistan, as part of a broader effort to destabilise the central Pakistani government and pave the way for the creation of an alternative local administration.

Attacking workers and targeting isolated plants and other industrial hubs is likely an attractive strategy to BLA militants due to its relatively low risks – with authorities almost certainly unable to effectively prevent raids – and high political and economic impact. Baloch militants have especially sought to target Chinese interests and workers engaged in projects in Pakistan as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative.

During the Summer, Beijing has increased appeals to Islamabad to allow a greater Chinese security involvement in the country to protect its interests and, in late September, a growing number of reports indicated that the two countries are likely close to agreeing to a deal to create joint security companies. Such a deal would, for the first time, allow Chinese forces to operate as security providers in Pakistan.

Notably, available information indicates that the division of responsibilities is being decided in order to minimise Chinese forces’ “visibility”. This is most likely meant to avoid a backlash that would play into the hands of the BLA and other independentist movements, as well as, possibly, Islamist groups.

Typhoon Krathon made landfall over Kaohsiung on 3 October at typhoon strength, with maximum windspeeds of 160 km/h. The typhoon had weakened, previously reaching category 4 super typhoon strength in the Luzon Strait on 30 September with maximum windspeeds of 241 km/h. While tracking north of the Philippine’s northern Luzon island, the typhoon caused at least 2 deaths and displaced thousands in the Philippines.

In Taiwan, the typhoon caused at least two deaths, with several people still missing, and over 120 injuries. The typhoon caused significant torrential rainfall, with landslides being reported even in far north-east Taiwan. Schools, offices and shops were closed, and 170,000 households were initially left without power, reducing to 51,000.

All domestic flights were cancelled, in addition to 242 international flights, and considerable rail disruption occurred, including the north-south high-speed rail line which suspended services between the central and southern regions. Also on 3 October, a hospital fire killed 9 people at Pingtung County Hospital outside Kaohsiung – the fire is suspected to have been started by an electrical fault, not the typhoon, but response efforts were complicated by the typhoon conditions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Krathon, called Typhoon Julian in the Philippines, was unusual in that firstly, the storm moved slowly, hovering off Taiwan’s coast for an unusually long period before making landfall. Secondly, Taiwan’s west coast is typically not directly hit by typhoons. The last significant storm to cause major casualties in Kaohsiung was Typhoon Thelma in 1977, which caused mass devastation and killed 37 people. Fears that a similar level of impact would occur with Typhoon Krathon did not materialise, almost certainly due to Taiwan’s considerably improved storm resilience and preparedness measures.

38,000 troops were placed on standby for disaster response, sandbags and water pumps were widely distributed, and 10,000 people in high-risk areas were evacuated. Disruption was still widespread, however, and Taiwan’s stock exchange shut for two days for the second time this year after July’s Typhoon Gaemi killed 11 people in Taiwan. The storm has quickly weakened into a tropical depression post-landfall, however, adverse rainfall is forecast to highly likely continue over the coming days in eastern and southern Taiwan.

Anti-judicial reform protests organised in Pakistani capital

From 4 October, schools have been closed and roadblocks established in Islamabad in preparation for a major protest led by former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. The PTI are protesting constitutional amendments that they view as attempts to undermine the independence of the judiciary, a claim denied by the incumbent government.

The government is expected to suspend mobile phone services and issue Section 144 orders that restrict public gatherings. Section 144s have already been issued throughout the Punjab province, including in the cities of Bahawalpur, Faisalabad and Mianwali. The protest in Islamabad is anticipated to draw large crowds to the capital, leading to widespread travel disruption. Furthermore, the police have deployed significant resources to the main protest site near D-Chowk, with recent protests often involving clashes between the security services and the protestors.

Bangladesh interim government pursues constitutional reform

The new government, led by Nobel prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, formed a constitutional reform panel, in a move that was justified by the executive as an effort to prevent a return to authoritarian rule. Moreover, initial reports indicate that the government may pursue constitutional reform prior to calling for a new election. Although such a decision is likely intended to bolster the state’s stability before the upcoming vote, implementing a vertical reform could lead to a resurgence of civil unrest, particularly fueled by militant factions within the post-Hasina coalition.

Japan’s incoming Prime Minister calls for elections in October

Shigeru Ishiba, who is set to replace Fumio Kishida as Japan’s prime minister after winning the leadership vote of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), almost certainly called the vote to re-establish the party’s political legitimacy and to accrue political capital. While Japan has free and fair elections, the LDP has ruled Japan almost uninterruptedly since the end of the Second World War, and the party is highly likely to win the vote. It is, likewise, highly likely that Ishiba also called the vote in order to ensure political stability prior to the 5 November US elections.

Mass-stabbing before China National Day highlights a unique security threat

On 30 September, the eve of the national celebration, a man launched a stabbing attack in a shopping centre the Songjiang district of Shanghai, killing three and injuring at least 15. According to initial reports, the man had been involved in a financial dispute, and was not likely driven by a specific ideology.

Seemingly “random” stabbing attacks have increased over the past year in China – some involving the targeting of foreigners. Chinese authorities have likely sought to underplay these events, with little information, beyond descriptions of attackers being affected by “mental health issues”, being briefed to local and international media. There is a realistic possibility that the growing trend of mass stabbing attacks follows a dynamic comparable to that of “Mudjima” (“don’t ask why”) stabbings in South Korea.

Both countries’ cases often occur in highly trafficked areas – including shopping malls and markets – and are seemingly committed by ideologically “unaligned” individuals. Perpetrators, instead, are often reported as dealing with financial issues or declare themselves as feeling “resentful”, and portray their actions as a way to attack society as a whole. These attacks, moreover, are dissimilar from the “lone wolf” attacks that take place in the West, in that they do not focus heavily on obtaining high visibility – instead maximising the number of casualties – and lack many of the distinctive elements of lone wolf terrorism, such as perpetrators sharing “manifestos” or other media to explain and broadcast their actions and beliefs.

Cambodia invites US Navy to use Chinese-made naval base

Cambodia has stated that the US Navy will be allowed to make port calls at the Ream Naval Base in the Gulf of Thailand. The base, which is being constructed with the help of China, has raised concerns over a permanent People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) outpost adjacent to the southern parts of the contested South China Sea. However, Cambodia’s invitation to the US is likely a deflection from the underlying reality that the base is likely to serve as an obfuscated permanent outpost for the PLAN which is reflective of Phnom Penh’s strategic realignment with China.

Flooding continues in northern Thailand

The economic impact of flooding in Thailand this year has been estimated to be as high as USD 1.4 billion USD, 0.27 per cent of Thailand’s GDP. Torrential rainfall, worsened by the tropical cyclones Typhoon Yagi and Tropical Storm Soulik in September, has led to significant flooding and landslides across northern Thailand, with Chiang Rai province being the hardest hit.

Adverse weather conditions continued in the past week, with weather warnings being issued for all provinces in the North, Northeast and Central Plain, including Bangkok. Thailand’s Prime Minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, stated that Bangkok will not experience substantial flooding like the city did in 2011, due to major dams still having spare capacity.

Although flooding is common during the annual monsoon season, which runs from July to October, authorities indicate that this year has seen the worst flooding in decades, highly likely conditioned by La Niña conditions in the Pacific Ocean.

In the past weeks, multiple protests have been announced in the period between 5 and 10 October. This period is both highly visible and highly significant from a cultural and political perspective: it begins on the day following Rosh Hashanah, and will also end on the eve of Yom Kippur, thus occupying the space between the two holiest days of the Jewish religious calendar.

It would likely be incorrect to speak of a single cohesive international pro-Palestine movement, or of any specific ideology associated with it. Past protests and initiatives, as well as the ones scheduled to take place over the next weeks, have been planned by a series of diverse actors, including groups espousing ideologies that theoretically do not overlap with the Palestinian cause.

This high level of intersection between different local initiatives likely underscores a high level of transnational communication and planning, also facilitated by social and digital media.

In addition to numerous pro-Palestine protests, there also are a large number of pro-Israel demonstrations planned to coincide with the anniversary of the Hamas attack. More ideologically cohesive, these demonstrations have so far been overall smaller, although their volume and traction has heavily varied depending on local political landscapes.

Europe, and especially north and west Europe, likely is particularly at risk for civil unrest during the period. Protests have been scheduled to take place in multiple capitals and large cities, including London, Paris, Marseille, Rome, Bologna, Warsaw, Madrid, Amsterdam, Athens, Berlin, Vienna, Malmo and Istanbul.

In the Asia-Pacific region, likewise, protests are expected to take place in cities across Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea.

The United States will also highly likely be a hotspot for civil unrest around the anniversary of the start of the conflict. American universities spearheaded the global pro-Palestine movement, and almost certainly popularised certain forms of protests – including campus “encampments” – that were replicated by universities in Europe and Oceania.

The majority of these initiatives have been developed at the activist group and civil society level. However, the high political relevance of the anniversary has likely driven an uncommon degree of government and party involvement in the promotion (or opposition) to the event.

In particular, there are at least two notable cases of direct government intervention to prevent organised unrest from going ahead. In Australia, the police and government initially banned a solidarity “vigil” planned for 7 October in Sydney. The ban on the event – Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the planned demonstration “incredibly provocative” – was eventually overturned following an agreement between the organisers and police.

In Italy, the government did not grant permission for a planned gathering on 5 October in Rome, prompting a severe backlash from both the pro-Palestine activists (who have reiterated their intention to carry out the demonstration) and the left-wing opposition.

In addition to these government-imposed bans, other protests scheduled to take place on university campuses have been prohibited by academic administrators.

There is a high likelihood that there will be an increase in civil unrest in the 5-10 October period (and possibly beyond 13 October, the anniversary of the beginning of Israeli operations in Gaza). Further developments in the conflict, especially in the Lebanese front, could drive rapid changes in the volume and scope of civil unrest incidents.

European cities are likely to be particularly at risk. The choice to hold pro-Palestine protests overlapping with the anniversary of the 7 October Hamas attack in southern Israel will likely be perceived as a provocation and almost certainly result in an increased security risk level at the protest locations.

There is a high likelihood of pro-Israel counterprotest groups seeking to disrupt the pro-Palestine gatherings. Likewise, there is a high likelihood of clashes breaking out between protesters and police, especially in cities where clashes have previously occurred (such as Paris), and in those where the protests have not been approved.

The scope and high visibility of the demonstrations are also likely to result in an increased threat from lone-wolf terrorism, either targeting the protesters or high-visibility targets in protest locations, including government buildings and places of worship. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility of foreign actors seeking to leverage European open media spaces to encourage violence, also through the spread of disinformation, in a way similar to the recent Southport riots in the United Kingdom.

Conversely, the majority of protests throughout the Asia-Pacific region are likely to be comparatively more peaceful. Travel disruptions are still a realistic possibility in major city centres due to heightened security measures.

In addition to scheduled gatherings, there is a high likelihood of impromptu or not publicly announced protests being staged outside of the embassies and consulates of countries providing political and material support to Israel, such as the US, UK and France. These protests will likely have a greater risk of violence, and especially vandalism targeting diplomatic assets and offices.

Protests are also highly likely outside of Israeli embassies within the region and have previously been observed in Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines. In Pakistan, two of the country’s largest parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party have announced joint protests on 7 October that will cross the political divide. Protests are likely to develop outside US diplomatic buildings in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar.

The threat of clashes between government and police forces and protesters is particularly likely in countries where the executive is considered to be actively opposed to the protest movement. Again, the cases of Australia and, especially, Italy, are exemplary. In the latter, the recent government refusal to approve the demonstration planned for Rome is also compounded by broader legislative developments. In particular, the Italian lower chamber recently passed a new security law, which has been strongly criticised by the opposition for reportedly restricting freedom of protest. These two developments will likely drive significant civil unrest on 5 October and in the coming weeks in large Italian cities.

NAVIGATING CIVIL UNREST SAFELY

Explore our comprehensive Civil Unrest Guide, designed to equip travellers with essential strategies for navigating protests, riots, and civil unrest. Learn practical tips on how to stay informed, avoid high-risk areas, and respond effectively in crisis situations, ensuring safety and peace of mind while travelling.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FOR LEBANON CRISIS

With a highly dynamic and evolving security landscape, businesses operating in the region are likely to be considering the evacuation of their employees and/or securing their assets. Beirut’s airport remains operational, but safe travel options may become limited due to the rapidly changing situation on the ground.

Solace Global can help global organisations facilitate for the safe transportation of their people as Western governments prepare for potential evacuations. We offer emergency evacuation services designed to ensure your people’s safety during a crisis.

Hurricane Helene made landfall late 26 September in the Big Bend area of Florida. Just before making landfall, the storm was a category 4 hurricane, with maximum sustained wind speeds of 225 kmph. The storm rapidly weakened into a tropical storm as it moved overland.

However, over one million people in Florida were left without power, rising to over two million when including those in Georgia and the Carolinas. Floridian authorities issued evacuation orders, warning that the storm was “unsurvivable” for those in at-risk coastal or low-lying areas. States of emergency were declared in Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, Virginia and Alabama.

The hurricane caused a storm surge, with water levels being recorded as almost two metres higher than the mean average at Clearwater Beach and Cedar Key, with official warnings that this could increase to 4.5-6 metres in Florida’s Gulf Coast. So far, three deaths have been attributed to Hurricane Helene, one in Florida and two in Georgia.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hurricane Helene is the joint fourteenth strongest hurricane to hit the US since records began, and the seventh strongest in Florida. The storm is the eighth named storm of the current Atlantic hurricane season, which the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) forecast would highly likely be an above-normal hurricane season. This was due to the high temperatures recorded in the Gulf of Mexico.

The Gulf of Mexico, where Hurricane Helene formed, has had record-breaking ocean temperatures recorded over the past few years, almost certainly due to climate change. Climate change is highly likely causing more destructive storms, according to climatologists, because of greater moisture evaporation from warmer seas and the simultaneous impact of warmer air retaining more moisture.

So far, however, the NOAA prediction has not occurred – predictions of 17-24 named storms and 13 hurricanes have not materialised with only nine storms and six hurricanes thus far, trending below average, which has confounded the hurricane forecasting community.

While Hurricane Helene has significantly weakened since making landfall, it is highly likely that the death toll will increase once the true extent of the storm’s impact is assessable in its aftermath.

The category 3 hurricane – which had maximum sustained wind speeds of 190 kmph, hit Mexico’s Pacific coast on 23 September, near Punta Maldonado, killing two. On 25 September, the hurricane weakened into a tropical storm, though still had significant record wind speeds of up to 90 kmph.

On 26 September, new forecasts indicated that the storm was once again strengthening over the Pacific Ocean, and could be expected to again become a hurricane and make landfall near the southwestern city of  Lázaro Cárdenas during the weekend. When it did, on Friday, it resulted in another three deaths in Guerrero state.

Hurricane John’s first landfall resulted in widespread disruptions, including the loss of power to at least 100,000 homes on the Pacific coast. The second resulted in less material damage.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the storm’s recorded wind speeds have considerably reduced, adverse rainfall highly likely threatens a continuing risk of flash floods and landslides. In 2023, Hurricane Otis devastated the area, the severity of the damage almost certainly being exacerbated by the lack of modern infrastructure and sufficient rescue resources. Hurricane Otis killed more than 50 people and caused an estimated USD 15 billion in damages.

Initial data suggests that there is a realistic possibility that Hurricane John could result in damages comparable to those caused by Otis. By the end of 24 September, the storm had resulted in more than 10cm of rainfall in parts of Guerrero and Oaxaca. These two states are two of the poorest in Mexico, and further impacts from the storm are likely to be particularly severe. Damages to infrastructure and housing in the region are likely to have important secondary effects. Internal displacement of thousands of individuals is a common driver of civil unrest, and a lack of security presence following the disaster could be leveraged by organised criminal groups to increase smuggling, extortion and trafficking operations in the area.

Argentina’s USD deposits increase

On 23 September, the central bank of Argentina reported that, since December 2023, foreign currency deposits have increased USD 8 billion. While libertarian President Javier Milei has likely abandoned plans to “dollarise” the Argentine economy, at least in the short-to-medium term, his administration has emphasised the need to drastically expand foreign currency reserves which have been depleted by years of crisis.

The latest figures have likely been reached due to a generous amnesty plan, in place until 30 September, which encourages residents to transfer funds held outside the national banking system. While Milei and his supporters will almost certainly hail the news as a triumph of the government’s drastic reforms, the political situation in the country remains unstable.

As recently as 12 September, protesters clashed with police outside the Congress building in Buenos Aires, after Milei vetoed an opposition bill to increase pensions, with further unrest almost certain.

Haiti UN police mission deadline near, as no resolution to conflict in sight

The 12-month mandate of the Kenya-led police mission in Haiti is set to expire in early October. However, the country continues to be plagued by the conflict involving powerful gang networks, which control much of the capital Port-au-Prince as well as nearby rural areas.

Fighting between gangs and the coalition of government and international forces has been particularly heavy in recent weeks, especially near the international seaport of the capital, a key entry point for essential imports. Gangs reportedly opened fire on approaching vessels, and recently allegedly kidnapped two Filipino seamen.

By attacking civilian vessels and thus delaying or blocking the delivery of vital goods, gangs likely aim to become the only welfare provider for the local population, ensuring protracted control.

Increased Hezbollah activity in Latin America a realistic possibility

Due to the recent escalation in conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, it is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah activities in Latin America will increase. In 1994, a Hezbollah-linked bombing at a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, Argentina killed 85 people. Hezbollah has a notable presence in South America, particularly in the “Tri-Border Area” between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, countries that each have sizable Lebanese diasporas.

Hezbollah’s activity in the region over the past decade has primarily been fundraising, with accusations of possible connections to local organised crime groups. As recently as in November 2023, however, Hezbollah was accused of plotting attacks against Jewish communities in Brazil, with two Hezbollah-linked individuals being arrested by Brazilian police.

One dead in attack on Peru gold mine

Authorities have connected the attack, which occurred in the province of Pataz, on the Amazon border, to criminal groups carrying out illegal mining activities in sites used by recognised companies. Since 2022, at least 30 people have been killed in attacks targeting Peruvian gold mines. In December 2023, a raid on a mine in the same province killed nine workers.

Government of St. Lucia reports Dengue fever outbreak.

The announcement follows a reported increase in the number of cases detected since August. At least 205 cases have been identified since January 2024. While reported cases are especially prevalent in the island’s north, particularly Castries and Gros Islet, there is a high likelihood that they will continue to increase across St. Lucia’s territory in the short term.  

On 23 July, Swedish authorities claimed that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sent at least 15,000 SMSs to Swedish Muslims encouraging them to take revenge over Quran burnings in the Summer of 2023. While Sweden permits the desecration of religious texts as part of its constitutional commitment to free speech, the episodes have greatly affected Stockholm’s international position and increased threats to Swedish interests and nationals abroad. In July 2023, a planned Quran burning resulted in the Swedish embassy in Baghdad being attacked by a mob. In October, an Islamic State (IS) sympathiser in Brussels, killed two Swedish football fans.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of the reported messages is likely highly relevant. In 2023, Sweden was still in the process of joining NATO, and facing Turkish opposition – with Ankara also citing the Quran burnings, an increasingly common form of anti-Islam protests in Scandinavian countries, as a reason to deny Swedish entry. Iran therefore likely had a significant incentive to accelerate polarisation in Sweden by encouraging sectarian issues. However, the action was also highly likely linked to broader ongoing Iranian efforts to leverage Muslim communities in Sweden to pursue its global interests. In May 2024, Swedish authorities accused Tehran of taking advantage of organised criminal networks in the country to target Israeli and Jewish individuals and assets.  

Iran is almost certainly not the only country leveraging sectarian divisions in Europe to increase polarisation and divide societies. Russian hybrid operations in Europe have targeted both “sides” of the religious divides, in efforts aimed not at boosting Moscow’s position – but rather at destabilising rival nations. For example, in November 2023, French and Moldovan authorities identified several Moldovan citizens as having been recruited by Russian intelligence to paint dozens of stars of David on multiple buildings in Paris – likely in an effort to stoke both antisemitism and Islamophobia.

While hybrid operations require a level of coordination and expenditure, social media has increasingly enabled authoritarian regimes to carry them out. First, the mostly open media spaces in democracies allow for the easy propagation of inflammatory material and disinformation, including disingenuous calls to violence. Secondly, and more subtly, open media environments where users share their identities and opinions also allow authoritarian states to identify potential supporters and sympathisers, enabling the recruitment of internal actors.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted extensive airstrikes across Lebanon, reportedly killing at least 600 people. The strikes have primarily hit targets in southern Lebanon south of the Litani River and the Beqaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, but also Beirut.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, regularly launched rocket and missile attacks at targets in Israel. These strikes have been primarily targeted at northern Israel, including both civilian and military targets including a Rafael Advance Defence Systems complex near Haifa which has been targeted numerous times, as much of Hezbollah’s weapon arsenal has a maximum range of ~40km. Hezbollah also attempted to strike the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv with a longer-range ballistic missile, but this was intercepted.

The US and France proposed a 21-day temporary ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, however, this has so far been dismissed by the Netanyahu administration. IDF leadership informed Israeli troops that operations are being conducted to prepare for a possible ground offensive into Lebanon.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the aftermath of the 17 and 18 September remote detonations of Hezbollah tactical communication devices (highly likely conducted by Mossad), the extensive IDF airstrikes and increased Hezbollah rocket attacks mark a further significant escalation in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip have evolved into low-intensity counterinsurgency operations, with Hamas brigades likely assessed by the IDF as defeated (no longer able to function as cohesive military units, although still able to conduct opportunistic attacks) in large sections of Gaza, and the IDF has been moving units to northern Israel over the last two months. The return of the approximately 60,000 residents to northern Israel, who left due to the threat of Hezbollah rocket attacks, has been made an official war goal for Israel.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, has engaged Israel over the past year in what Hezbollah leadership highly likely calculated were sub-threshold attacks in solidarity with Palestine, to pressure Israel with multi-front attritional warfare to force it to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza that would allow Hamas to remain as a viable political and military force.

Without diplomatic off-ramps, even further escalation is currently likely. This is firstly because the Israeli war goal is only achievable with a cessation of Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel, which is militarily highly likely only achievable with a ground offensive. Secondly, Hezbollah likely cannot cease their rocket attacks without losing all credibility.

The 2006 Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah exposed several limitations in the IDF, which were too reliant on airpower and did not have the required public support to justify the predicted level of troop fatalities for a major ground offensive into Lebanon.

If the IDF conducts a ground offensive into Lebanon, it would most likely consist of a limited offensive in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. Israeli officials have cited UN Security Council Resolution 1701, issued after the 2006 war, which calls for the removal of Hezbollah forces south of the Litani River, as justification for a possible ground offensive.

Hezbollah, however, has a much stronger force than Hamas, with an estimated 50,000 fighters and 150,000 rockets and missiles. It is likely that an IDF ground offensive would incur a relatively high number of casualties, which may in turn increase domestic political and public pressure in Israel against the war.

There is an additional risk of regional escalation, as groups in Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’, the informal coalition of Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, may intensify attacks against Israel as part of the ‘Unity of the Arenas’ strategy – the coordination of Axis of Resistance forces to necessitate a multi-front war. Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds in Iraq have both called for increased attacks against Israel. Iran, meanwhile, has yet to carry out retaliation strikes against Israel for the 31 July assassination of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, which has been repeatedly vowed by Iranian military and political figures.

On 23 September, the al-Qaeda aligned Islamist group, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) released claims to have attacked government forces in both Togo and Benin. In Togo, JNIM operatives reportedly used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack a Togolese army patrol to the east of Kankanti, in the north of the country. In Benin, JNIM claimed to have attacked a Beninese army installation in Bangoun, close to the border with Niger, killing two soldiers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs), like JNIM and other groups aligned to the Islamic State (IS) are especially active further north, in the three junta states of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, it is highly likely that they are pushing to obtain a presence closer to the coast. Coastal states, like Togo, Benin, and Ghana, are comparatively richer, and VEOs likely aim to leverage their resources to both strengthen their operations in West Africa and to support their associates abroad. Moreover, by forcing West African nations to divert resources internally, VEOs will likely achieve more freedom of movement in the Sahelian states. Increased attacks may also enable VEOs to increase their funding, propaganda and recruitment, especially in the northern regions of West African states where there are often disenfranchised local populations.

The ongoing tensions between the junta states and the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are likely to play into the hands of the Islamist groups, by preventing meaningful cooperation on counterterrorism operations. Despite the attempts at mediation by Senegal’s government, recent developments continue to highlight the overall decay in ECOWAS-AES states. On 23 September, the same day as the JNIM attacks, Burkina Faso’s ambassador to Ghana was reportedly sacked following the junta’s accusations that Ghana’s government is sheltering groups seeking to oust the Burkinabe leader Ibrahim Traore.

The Sudanese military lost most of the capital to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) at the beginning of the conflict in April 2023. The latest stage of fighting, which has quickly resulted in major early gains for the government forces, began with airstrikes on 26 September. Government forces are pushing southeast from the city of Omdurman, which is separated from Khartoum by the White Nile. Reports from local media have indicated that the fighting has already resulted in “hundreds” of casualties, although it is extremely difficult to assess its impact as of the time of writing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The offensive is highly likely intended to push RSF forces south of the capital, and possibly at gaining control of the entire Khartoum region. Importantly, the operation in Khartoum is likely also meant to relieve some pressure from al-Fasher, in north Darfur, where government forces are besieged by the RSF.

Currently, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) forces have almost certainly taken control of key bridges over the White Nile to the northwest of the city centre, and have highly likely obtained a bridgehead in areas of Khartoum previously under RSF forces. Securing tenable positions in Khartoum would allow government forces to solidify control over neighbouring Omdurman, where SAF clearance operations have been concentrated during the summer.

In August, operations focused on neighbourhoods adjacent to the river, as well as to the city’s west. It is almost certain that these advances in Omdurman were a prelude to the ongoing offensive into Khartoum. Retaking Khartoum is a fundamental political objective for the Sudanese authorities, and the launching of the attack was highly likely planned to coincide with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 26 September.

Urban fighting in Khartoum is likely to be extremely costly and will highly likely pose a severe threat to civilians present in the city. While initial reports of SAF advances may indicate that RSF units were unprepared to meet the offensive over the river, there is a realistic possibility that the frontlines will gradually solidify south of Khartoum’s city centre. Both sides continue to heavily rely on artillery to support operations, and it is highly likely that artillery fire will intensify as the SAF’s advance slows, which continues to be one of the main drivers of civilian deaths in the conflict.

France’s new Prime Minister unveils government

Centre-right politician Michel Barnier, appointed by President Macron to try to resolve months of political crisis following a stalemate at the recent National Assembly elections, assembled a cabinet which has been widely described as drastically tilting the executive to the right.

The new cabinet members are from Macron’s centrist coalition, as well as from the Republicans (LR), Barnier’s party. Some of them, like new Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau, are considered to be part of the right-wing of LR. It is likely that the appointments are meant to obtain at least the informal support of the far-right National Rally (RN), led by Marine Le Pen.

Still, it is highly likely that the new government remains unstable. In particular, the left is highly likely to increase action against Macron, possibly calling for protests.

Significant civil unrest likely in Paris during the weekend

Multiple protests have been scheduled to take place in Paris (and other major French cities) starting on 27 September. The increase in civil unrest is likely to be driven by the increase in Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon, by the appointment of a new, right-leaning government, and by the ongoing “impeachment” procedure against Macron, which is scheduled to be reviewed by the National Assembly on 2 October. There is a realistic possibility of clashes between left-wing protesters and police. Finally, as highlighted by cases from Lyon and Paris, there is a remote possibility of groups of far-right militants attacking left-wing demonstrations to disrupt them and injure participants, especially in urban centres with a large far-right presence.

German government narrowly survives Brandenburg elections

Following the first victory for a far-right party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), in a German state since 1945, the elections in Brandenburg were narrowly won by the Social Democrats (SPD) in what was almost certainly a crucial boost for the unstable coalition government. The AfD still finished second, winning 29.2 per cent of the vote (compared to the SPD’s 30.9 per cent).

Despite multiple controversies, the AfD has made important gains, especially among younger demographic groups. The result in Brandenburg will highly likely give Chancellor Olaf Scholz greater room for political manoeuvre in the short term. However, with the rise of the AfD, it is highly likely that the SPD, as well as the other major parties – the Greens and the Christian Democrats – will be increasingly forced in local-level “cordon sanitaire” deals to keep the far-right away from power.

The Greens have performed particularly poorly in recent elections – also due to important losses among their traditionally younger base of voters – and, following the vote in Brandenburg, party leaders Omid Nouripour and Ricarda Lang resigned.

Austrian right likely to win elections

The legislative elections will be held on 29 September. The vote is for the National Council, the lower Austrian chamber. According to the latest available polling data, the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) is on track to win the most votes (forecasts indicate it may win 25-27 per cent of the vote). The centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) is in a narrow second place, with 25 per cent of the vote according to polls. The Social Democrats (SPÖ) are assessed as having 21 per cent of preferences.

The current vote split presents a very divided situation, with no clear majority in sight. The ÖVP is currently in a coalition with the Greens, who are however likely to perform significantly worse than in 2019. There is a realistic possibility of an FPÖ victory leading to the formation of a FPÖ-ÖVP alliance, with the latter in a junior position.

Such an alliance would almost certainly result in the (at least partial) implementation of some of FPÖ’s more draconian policies, likely increasing the overall risk of civil unrest in Austria.

Burkina Faso claims to have stopped coup attempt

The junta of Burkina Faso announced that it stopped a “Western-backed” coup attempt. The Burkinabe junta, in power since 2022, has been greatly destabilised by a growing Islamist insurgency, with Islamist militants carrying out multiple attacks on government forces and civilians essentially at will. On 24 August, JNIM militants killed hundreds of civilians who were building defences for the town of Barsalogho.

The junta accused the West, as well as multiple ECOWAS states, of planning a coup to pursue their interests. These accusations highly likely reflect a growing internal worry about the police of a government collapse, or a palace coup, which was made increasingly likely by the repeated failures of junta forces. Junta leader Ibrahim Traore has notably limited his diplomatic trips in recent months, almost certainly due to the threat of a palace coup.

Finally, on 25 September, an AES “special judicial unit” opened an investigation on a France24 journalist who reported on the August attack in Burkina Faso and other Islamist operations in the region. Attempts to stifle foreign and domestic oversight on junta military failures are likely to increase as the juntas’ situations worsen. Junta governments across the Sahel are likely to prioritise regime survival over the protection of citizens, providing VEOs more opportunity to conduct attacks.

Benin arrests three suspected putschists

On 25 September, authorities announced the arrest of three officials, including a presidential guard commander, for allegedly planning a coup. The action was reportedly planned for 27 September, and would have likely entailed the removal of President Patrice Talon. Talon’s second term ends in 2026, and one of the putschists has declared his intention to contest the presidency at the next vote.

Son of Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni says he will not run in 2026, endorses father

Muhoozi Kainerugaba is Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, and is largely seen as a possible successor to his father, who has been in power since 1986. Uganda is an authoritarian state, and the regime maintains control both via the armed forces and via a system of clientelism with local armed groups that maintain a degree of independence from Kampala. The 2026 elections are almost certain to be neither free nor fair and are highly likely carried out to further bolster the regime’s claim to authority. Museveni is currently 80, and, while his son is likely the main candidate to replace him, there is a realistic possibility of a succession crisis arising from Uganda’s fragmented internal security structure.

Russia revises nuclear doctrine

On 25 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted changes to the country’s nuclear weapons doctrine during a meeting of the state’s Security Council. The changes most notably include a provision that, if a non-nuclear state attacks Russia “with the participation of a nuclear state”, then the action will be considered a “joint attack”. It is likely that this point is in connection to ongoing discussions by NATO members on whether to allow Ukraine to use Western-supplied weapons to strike deep inside internationally recognised Russian territory.

It is, however, highly unlikely that this note departs from Russia’s broader “nuclear sabre-rattling” practice, which has been ongoing since the beginning of the conflict. In fact, Ukraine’s ongoing operations in the Kursk Oblast – which includes NATO-procured equipment – likely already meet the threshold that would justify Russian nuclear retaliation, according to their revised doctrine.

Russia is more likely to increase elements of its hybrid doctrine against the West, including increased incidents of espionage, sabotage, disinformation and cyber-attacks.

Third reported Islamic State (IS) prison riot in Russia

On 24 September, reports emerged that a group of individuals associated with IS were detained while trying to break out of a detention facility in the Novgorod region of Russia. In August, four people were killed when four IS detainees launched an attack inside another prison in Volgograd, while in June a prison riot occurred in Rostov, where six IS inmates were killed by responding special forces. The latest case in Nizhny was reportedly stopped in its earliest stages, and no casualties have been reported. As of now, it is unclear if the individuals were radicalised in prison or were arrested for associating with IS.

Junta and Wagner forces likely to launch another offensive in Kidal, Mali

On 23 September, satellite imagery identified at least two separate convoys – likely consisting of combined junta and Wagner forces – moving north towards the stronghold region for the Tuareg rebels. Early reports suggest that the buildup could be aimed at an offensive towards Tin Zaouatine, at the Algeria-Mali border. It is highly likely that the operation is linked to the repeated setbacks suffered by the AES juntas and by their Russian security providers over the last few months, especially the disastrous ambush in Mai’s north in July, and the more recent attack in Bamako.

A successful military operation would allow Wagner forces to save face at home after the recent setbacks, which have added to ongoing worries about the viability of the group’s current operational approach and calls to accelerate the group’s transition to being fully controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defence as the ‘Africa Corps’. They would also provide important political capital to the Malian junta, which has faced significant domestic backlash following the Bamako attack.

In August, Malian and Burkinabe forces conducted drone strikes near Tin Zaouatine, resulting in multiple civilian deaths and likely no significant military progress. It is highly likely that large-scale Wagner-Malian operations would result in high civilian casualties in the area. Finally, even if the operation against the Tuaregs succeeds, it is unclear whether it would have any adverse impact on IS and JNIM, the latter posing the main threat to Bamako.

Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) carries out attack on Nigerien forces in Inkiwan

According to video and photo evidence, at least 30 Nigerien troops were killed in the attack, and ISSP forces also captured significant quantities of military equipment. The position of the Nigerien junta is likely as unstable as Burkina Faso’s junta, and the recent attack continues to reflect the general unpreparedness of local militaries to combat the growing insurgency. Out of the three AES members, Mali likely benefits from the greater presence of Russian troops, although the military government remains unstable.

Belarussian authorities restrict forest access due to risk of wildfires

The fire season in the country usually begins much earlier in the year. However, a red alert was declared in mid-September in the three regions of Gomel, Mogilev and Brest, and fires have continued throughout the month. Significant parts of Belarus’ area, like Canada’s, are marked as peatlands. However, only one-third of local peatlands are reported to be at a “natural” or “nearly natural” state, the rest having been drained for agricultural use. Drained peatlands are particularly conducive to wildfires. Moreover, peatlands store large amounts of carbon dioxide, which is released via combustion.

Egypt warns of possible cholera outbreak

The Egyptian health minister has carried out water testing in the Aswan region, following an increase in hospitalisations with stomach flu symptoms, which have driven worries of a possible spread of cholera from neighbouring Sudan. Reports from 25 September indicate that more than 430 people died from the illness in Sudan in August alone, with the ongoing conflict almost certainly creating severe difficulties in obtaining treatment.

The tightly contested election took place on 21 September. The leader of the far-left Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party Anura Kumara Dissanayake won, contesting the election as part of the leftist National People’s Power (NPP) coalition. The election was the closest in Sri Lanka’s democratic history. Sri Lanka uses a limited ranked voting electoral system where voters preferentially rank candidates and the winner requires over 50 per cent. Dissanayake won on the second count, the first case since presidential elections began in 1982. Dissanayake dissolved Parliament and called a parliamentary election for 21 November. The NPP only had 3 seats in parliament. While the president can issue executive orders, Dissanayake will need the support of parliament to pass laws.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The primary issue that influenced the result of the election likely was the ongoing economic crisis in Sri Lanka. The economic crisis has consisted of chronic inflation, shortages of essential goods and considerable international debt. In 2022, the crisis led to mass power outages, and fuel shortages led to the disruption of public transport and even medical transport. Following mass unrest across the country, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country. The economic crisis was at least in part, highly likely due to structural issues with the Sri Lankan economy. Following the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009, the government focused on the provision of goods domestically, rather than international trade – this limit of exports led to the economy becoming disproportionately import-focused, which resulted in Sri Lanka essentially running out of foreign currency reserves.

Rajapaksa’s replacement, Ranil Wickremesinghe, declared a nationwide state of emergency after coming into power. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has given Sri Lanka a USD 2.9 billion bailout, with conditions regarding the implementation of substantial austerity measures. The austerity measures implemented by Wickremesinghe have generated mass discontent and Dissanayake’s defeat of Wickremesinghe has highly likely been enabled by this. Dissanayake ran on an anti-corruption and anti-austerity platform and has promised to renegotiate the IMF deal.

The JVP party, which Dissanayake leads, conducted armed insurrections in the 1970s and 80s. While still Marxist-leaning, Dissanayake has moderated the more extreme far-left tendencies of the party. A comparison can be made with the 2015 election in Greece, where the far-left Syriza coalition was elected to power following the imposition of austerity by the ‘Troika’, which the IMF was part of. Like in Greece, where Syriza ultimately capitulated to the demands of the IMF, it is likely that Dissanayake’s far-left coalition will have to equally make significant concessions, which may in turn generate unrest.

On 25 September, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) announced the detection of 43 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and eight People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels around Taiwan. According to the MND, 34 of the aircraft “crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait”, entering Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ). Chinese aircraft, including J-16 fighters and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), reportedly flew through the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan and then up past Taiwan’s eastern coast. On 26 September, the MND announced the detection of a further 29 Chinese aircraft patrolling with warships. The aircraft did not enter Taiwan’s territorial airspace. Additionally, on 25 September, China conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test, launching the missile into the Pacific Ocean.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The military exercises were likely to practice area denial to “stop foreign assistance” during a China-Taiwan war, in addition to air superiority and air refuelling. In the event of a major war in Taiwan, it is highly likely that the PLA would enforce a naval blockade and no-fly zones. Unlike Ukraine, where NATO members have been able to continually supply and resupply the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) across Ukraine’s substantial land border with friendly nations, Taiwan would effectively be cut off from the rest of the world in the event of a full-scale invasion.

In this scenario, evacuation options would be extremely limited without the provision of internationally agreed evacuation corridors. A full-scale invasion of Taiwan, however, would likely require the largest amphibious operation in military history, dwarfing the WWII Normandy landings in scale. Because of this, such a scenario would most likely be preceded by a significant and observable military buildup by the PLA, likely under the pretext of being “military exercises”, with the movement of considerable blood supplies and other key medical supplies being an especially notable development that would suggest imminent invasion.

An alternative scenario, that could precede a wider offensive, would be China seizing the Kinmen islands, a small group of Taiwan-controlled islands just off the coast of Fujian province in southeastern China – this would test the will of US-led international support for Taiwan in honouring defence obligations. Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels regularly sail into Kinmen’s restricted waters, 42 times this year and twice just on 26 September.  

The ICBM test conducted by China on 25 September was likely a display of China’s strategic nuclear deterrence against Western intervention, in addition to the practical testing value. Chinese authorities notified the US of the test, and warned the Japanese Coast Guard about “space debris”. Such a test is rare, in that Chinese ICBM tests are generally conducted unannounced in isolated provinces like Inner Mongolia rather than in the Pacific Ocean.

The ICBM was highly likely launched from China’s Hainan Island in the South China Sea, indicating that it was launched from a road-mobile platform such as a DF-31 or DF-41, instead of an inland static silo. The launch’s location in the increasingly contested South China Sea likely further adds to the test’s value as demonstrative deterrence, while the launch platform indicates the continuing diversification and advancement of China’s nuclear capabilities.

Protests in India over labour codes.

On 23 September, thousands of protesters gathered in multiple large cities in India, including Kolkata, New Delhi and Lucknow. The unrest is linked to demands to repeal labour codes which local unions consider to be skewed in favour of large multinational corporations.

The nationalist government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been marked by policy reforms meant to make India more competitive as a manufacturing hub, with a particular focus on high-demand sectors like microchip manufacturing. Modi’s bid to compete with China and Southeast Asia states hinges on maintaining low labour costs and a lax bureaucratic environment.

Lack of pay increases, however, combined with poor safety standards and increased economic inequality, especially notable in large urban centres, is increasingly driving civil unrest. The recent protests are highly likely to be contextualised alongside the ongoing labour strike at a Samsung plant near Chennai, in the country’s south.

Japan’s ruling party leadership vote to replace Prime Minister Fumio Kishida

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has ruled Japan for much of its post-war history and remains uncontested despite significant scandals, including a recent corruption probe. Fumio Kishida announced that he would resign in August. Former Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba narrowly won the contest after a runoff vote and is scheduled to replace Kishiba in October. It is unlikely that the appointment will have drastic consequences for Japan’s domestic politics and economics. However, the appointment is likely to be relevant from a foreign policy perspective, as Ishiba is widely considered to offer a bolder strategic outlook than some of his competitors for the position. Ishiba will almost certainly continue to deepen Japan’s cooperation with the US and South Korea, regardless of who is elected to the White House in November.

New “anti-Taliban” group announces first attack in Afghanistan

A newly-established group, called Jibhat al-Ribat, claimed responsibility for assassinating a Pakistani Taliban (TTP) leader in the Paktika province of Afghanistan. While this is the first claimed operation by the group, its existence was already reported by pro-Taliban channels in August, with claims that it was “created” by the government of Pakistan to combat the Taliban. No corroborating evidence for this claim is available but the targeted assassination of a TTP commander across the border – and its reporting in the group’s propaganda as the killing of a “terrorist” – likely demonstrates that the group maintains a clear anti-Taliban position.

Japanese warship transits the Taiwan Strait

It is the first time since the Second World War that a Japanese warship – destroyer “Sazanami” – transited the contested passage. The 10-hour transit was conducted alongside Australian and New Zealander vessels and resulted in a complaint by Beijing. The move is likely highly symbolic and highlights the continuation of Japan’s transition towards a more confrontational stance towards China. The transit, moreover, was almost certainly a response to the recent passage of a Chinese aircraft carrier near the Japanese island of Yonaguni, located east of Taiwan.

Mpox clade 1b variety identified in India.

At least one case was reported in Kerala, affecting an individual travelling to India from the UAE.

Clade 1b was first identified in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and is characterised by a higher transmission rate than other strains, as well as more severe symptoms. The high population density that characterises Indian urban centres entails a realistic possibility that more Mpox cases could be identified in the coming weeks.

Information correct as of 1200 BST 2nd of October 2024

Nations worldwide are activating contingency plans for evacuating their citizens, with key efforts focused on securing safe transport routes out of Lebanon. Western governments including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, United States, and Portugal, are urging their citizens to leave the country immediately, and preparations are underway for evacuations by sea and air.

Western government actions taken to date:

With a highly dynamic and evolving security landscape, businesses operating in the region are likely to be considering the evacuation of their employees and/or securing their assets. Beirut’s airport remains operational, but safe travel options may become limited due to the rapidly changing situation on the ground.

Our comprehensive journey management and secure transportation services provide immediate solutions for companies with operations or personnel in high-risk areas like Lebanon.

On 15 September, US Secret Service agents opened fire at an individual at the golf club owned by former President Donald Trump in West Palm Beach, Florida. The individual – later identified as a 58-year old US citizen – reportedly was spotted by agents as he aimed a scoped rifle through the perimeter fence of the golf club. After being fired at, the individual escaped on foot and was subsequently arrested uninjured.

According to available reports, the individual, who intended to assassinate Trump, never had the former President in his sights and did not fire any shots. Trump claimed that the rhetoric used by his Democrat Party opponents is a major factor in driving targeted violence against him.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The suspect has a large online and legacy media footprint, as well as a criminal record, including a charge for possessing a “weapon of mass destruction” in 2002. On his various social media profiles, he shared pro-Palestine, pro-Taiwan content, and had reportedly carried out efforts to encourage US citizens to move to Ukraine to join foreign units fighting for Kyiv.

It is almost certain that the most recent assassination attempt was inspired by the first one that occurred in Butler, Pennsylvania, in July. The dynamic of the latest attempt – with the shooter waiting in an easily-accessible area of the golf course’s perimeter – suggests a low degree of organisation and sophistication. Nevertheless, some elements – including the Go-Pro wearable camera retrieved on the scene – suggest that the suspect sought to either livestream his action or boost its visibility via online broadcasting.

It is highly likely that this incident will further contribute to the polarisation of the ongoing electoral campaign, and there is a realistic possibility of further copycat actions targeting US politicians or government officials. Moreover, the scope of possible security threats is likely to extend beyond the US – due to the extremely high visibility of former President Trump, attempts on his life may drive copycat actions in third countries. Finally, as in the previous case, the assassination attempt resulted in the widespread online sharing of conspiracy theories, some likely meant to instigate lone wolf terrorist attacks on specific private companies or individuals. It is highly likely that this rhetoric will continue to be spread on social media in the weeks prior and immediately after the election.

Overnight on 16 September, major urban violence occurred in the Saint-Therese neighbourhood of Fort-de-France. A group of individuals set up barricades on the road and targeted police officers and vehicles with gunfire and Molotov cocktails. The unrest lasted for much of the night and at least seven police officers and one rioter were injured.

Authorities responded aggressively, with allegedly more than 300 tear gas canisters being used on the night in attempts to quell the unrest. As a result of the unrest, looting and vandalism occurred at the port of Fort-de-France. Only two arrests were reported.

On 18 September, an overnight curfew was announced in the Dillon and Jambette areas of Fort-de-France between the hours of 21:00 and 05:00.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This violence follows a recent trend in Martinique of police officers being targeted by gunfire. On 2 September six police officers were shot and injured during unrest in Fort-de-France and, on 6 September, the Fort-de-France police station was targeted with gunfire by two suspects, causing no casualties.

The recent unrest is occurring in parallel with protesters demanding that retailers align their prices with those charged in mainland stores. There have been multiple calls for nationwide protests until demands are met. It is highly likely a higher number of police officers will be deployed to deter future unrest, particularly in the Saint-Therese neighbourhood.

Further outbreaks of violence remain likely until the government responds to the protests. A general strike is also a realistic possibility. In 2009 a strike occurred in the Fort-de-France with an estimated 11,000 people involved, paralysing the capital. The strike action in 2009 was successful in its aims to get the minimum salary increased, and so it is possible the government agree to the protesters’ demands as an attempt to stop the protests and violence.

The National Liberation Army (ELN) attacked the installation in the northeastern Arauca province on 17 September. Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated that the attack “practically closes” peace talks. The ceasefire in place between the ELN and the Colombian government expired in August. The government has simultaneously pursued separate peace talks with ELN splinter groups.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Both sides accused the other for the failure of the ceasefire agreement. In August, government officials stated that the military would resume operations against the ELN, likely reflecting Colombia’s government assessment of a better strategic position to combat the group. The ELN, which is assessed as having 6,000 active members, has strongholds in the departments of Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Arauca, with a smaller presence in more than a dozen other Colombian departments.

Moreover, the ELN operates transnationally and has a sanctuary in Venezuelan territory, where it maintains friendly relations with pro-regime forces. The recent ELN attack is likely a reflection of ELN’s leaders’ confidence in the group’s ability to conduct protracted armed struggle against the government while retaining its main drug-related sources of income. Moreover, it is likely an attempt at destabilising the government’s parallel efforts to strike a ceasefire with rival splinter groups in disputed regions, such as the Comuneros del Sur, in Nariño.

Contrary to the assessment that the ELN has improved its position, President Gustavo Petro claimed that the ELN is “stagnant”. This assessment, however, appears untenable, as it both contradicts official government assessments of ELN growth and does not provide a clear explanation for the group’s decision to directly attack the military.

Haiti’s transitional administration sets up electoral council

As of the time of writing, there is no clear exact date for the elections, which are scheduled to be held by 2026. The gangs, which still control much of the country despite the arrival of a Kenya-led, UN-backed police contingent, are likely to continue attacks against officials, as part of their likely strategy to delay the creation of alternative administrative bodies that could challenge their authority.

Venezuelan authorities claim arrested Americans were planning coup

On 15 September, Venezuelan channels released more information about six American citizens, including a former Navy SEAL, arrested in the country in August. According to pro-regime sources, the six were planning a coup to oust Maduro.

It is highly likely that the Venezuelan regime is increasing efforts to provoke a domestic “rally round the flag” effect to minimise the risk of further post-election protests. Detaining foreigners – especially US citizens – allows the Maduro regime to bolster its claims of being under attack from abroad, while also granting greater leverage for future negotiations in the form of political prisoners.

It is highly likely that the regime will take advantage of further opportunities to arbitrarily detain foreign travellers to the country.

Evo Morales supporters clash with counterprotesters in Bolivia

The former president called for his supporters to join a “March to Save Bolivia” from Caracollo to La Paz. The march was initially peaceful but was reportedly attacked by supporters of current President Luis Arce. The two sides then clashed using improvised bombs, among other weapons. Tensions have remained high in Bolivia since the attempted coup in late June. Morales has announced plans to run in the 2025 presidential election, and will likely continue stoking unrest to retain a central position in the country’s politics.

At least 30 killed so far in Sinaloa, Mexico in cartel clashes

Heavy fighting in Sinaloa state between two rival factions of the powerful Sinaloa cartel, formerly led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, started on 9 September. Clashes have been particularly severe in the state capital, Culiacan. In July, Sinaloa leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada was arrested by US authorities after being reportedly lured onto a private plane by one of El Chapo’s sons, Joaquín Guzmán López, which then landed in El Paso, Texas.

Since then, it is almost certain that a power struggle has broken out between those loyal to El Chapo’s other sons, the “Chapitos”, and those loyal to Zambada. This is highly likely the primary cause for the clashes, effectively a cartel civil war.

While 2,200 personnel from the military and National Guard have been sent to Sinaloa, it is unlikely security forces will be able to quell the violence without substantial reinforcements. The outgoing Mexican President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), has adopted a policy of “hugs not bullets” against the cartel, seeking to resolve Mexico’s endemic crime problem with job opportunities and training programs, a policy that will highly likely be continued by his successor Claudia Sheinbaum.

Brazilian wildfires continue

Severe droughts are exacerbating the strength and spread of wildfires in Brazil, as authorities continue to struggle to combat a particularly intense wildfire season in the Amazon this year. On 15 September, the Supreme Court authorised the lifting of spending restrictions for wildfire and drought response in the Amazon and Pantanal regions.

It is highly likely that, while the drought conditions continue, authorities will struggle to contain the fires. In addition to the widespread agricultural impact and threat to residents in the Amazon and Pantanal regions, air quality has been considerably lowered in the major cities of Sao Paulo and Brasilia, which has led to flight disruptions and school closures.

At least 24 people have been killed by large-scale flooding in multiple European countries, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Romania, Hungary, Germany, and Italy. The flooding was caused by a low-pressure storm which stemmed from a Genoa low, a relatively rare weather system which develops south of the Alps, and which was favoured by extremely high surface water temperatures in the Mediterranean Sea. After affecting Central Europe, where it caused more than EUR 1 billion in damages according to early reports, the storm moved southwards to Italy, where it caused widespread flooding in the region of Emilia Romagna.   

Solace Global Assessment: 

Researchers have predicted that the damages from storm Boris will reach the EUR 2 billion threshold by 20 September. Indirect damages from the floods will highly likely be much higher – the 2023 floods in Emilia Romagna alone caused damages of EUR 8.5 billion – and especially notable in regions that have lower flood-resilient infrastructure. The European Union has already pledged EUR 10 billion from the emergency “cohesion funds”. Infrastructural damage will almost certainly have short-term consequences for travellers and residents in the affected areas.

It is highly likely that the storm’s severity was affected by climate change. In 2024, extremely high Mediterranean Sea surface water temperatures were recorded, with season highs of above 31 degrees Celsius. Protracted high temperatures allow a greater level of atmospheric humidity, and therefore likelier severe precipitation events. Researchers have also argued that climate change also favours a phenomenon known as “atmospheric blocking”, whereby lack of movement between high- and low-pressure zones favours persistent weather conditions in the summer, with high-pressure areas experiencing protracted clear weather, possibly leading to drought, and low-pressure areas being at risk of considerable heavy rainfall.

On 17 September thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah members simultaneously detonated across Lebanon. At least 12 deaths were reported, including the son of a Hezbollah MP, and approximately 3,000 injuries, including Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon. Then, on 18 September, thousands of walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah members detonated, with unconfirmed reports that other devices such as home solar energy systems and biometric fingerprint scanners also exploded. 20 deaths were reported, with 450 injuries. Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed retribution for the attacks in a 19 September speech. During the speech, Israeli warplanes flew low over Beirut, and the Israeli military conducted over 52 strikes across southern Lebanon soon after the speech.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the 17 September pager detonations were more widespread, the 18 September walkie-talkie blasts were more powerful and deadly. The attacks were highly likely conducted by Mossad, but an official claim of responsibility is highly unlikely. Speculation that the attack involved hacking into the devices to make the batteries explode is almost certainly untrue, the detonations were almost certainly caused by remotely detonated small quantities of military-grade high explosives. The pagers that detonated were Taiwanese company Gold Apollo models, mostly AR924s. Hezbollah reportedly ordered over 5,000 pagers before distributing them to members throughout Lebanon, as well as to members and allies in Iraq, Syria and Iran – at least 14 people were injured in Syria.

Gold Apollo have since stated that the pagers were manufactured on license by the Budapest-registered company BAC Consulting, that they encountered issues with remittances from BAC and that payments had come through the Middle East. It is highly likely that BAC Consulting was an Israeli front posing as an international pager producer. It is highly likely that Israeli intelligence similarly infiltrated the supply chain of the walkie-talkies that detonated, primarily IC-V82 models from the Japanese company ICOM, with ICOM stating that they ended production of the model 10 years ago.

The most likely reason for the specific timing of the attack is that the capability was about to be exposed – a case of “use it or lose it”. It is likely that the operation was originally intended to be conducted as an immediate prelude to a wider operation into southern Lebanon by Israeli forces, but the potential imminent discovery of the device tampering expedited the operation.

On 16 September, the Israeli security cabinet made the safe return of residents to northern Israel an official war objective, and the defence minister Yoav Gallant stated after the device detonations that Israel is “opening a new phase in the war”, as Israeli forces reorient to the northern front against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

It is highly likely that Hezbollah will attempt to retaliate, due to the extent of the operation and the humiliation caused, however their operational effectiveness has almost certainly been degraded and Hezbollah will not wish to give the Netanyahu administration an excuse to launch a major IDF offensive into southern Lebanon.

Additionally, the at least 52 IDF strikes across southern Lebanon were almost certainly pre-emptive, as they largely targeted rocket launchers, further degrading Hezbollah’s capability to retaliate. Nonetheless, it is likely that Hezbollah will launch further retaliation strikes to the limited attacks already made, which will most likely consist of rocket and missile attacks against targets in northern Israel within range of the majority of their weapon systems, or about 40 kilometres.

King Abullah II of Jordan appointed the Harvard-educated palace aide Jafar Hassan as prime minister on 15 September, replacing former diplomat and palace advisor Bisher Khasawneh who had served as prime minister since 2020. The appointment followed the resignation of Jordan’s government, which conventionally occurs after legislative elections, with a parliamentary election having earlier taken place on 10 September.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

While Jordanians elect representatives to Jordan’s lower house of parliament, the House of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwwāb), as they did on 10 September, Jordan’s king holds all substantial powers within Jordan’s political system, with ultimate authority over the executive, legislative and judiciary. In this regard. the appointment of the technocrat and loyalist Jafar Hassan is almost certainly a continuation of the status quo. In addition to pervasive economic issues, namely unemployment and declining tourism because of regional conflict, Hassan will need to wrestle with increasingly Islamist (political Islam) sentiment in Jordan.

The political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist Action Front (IAF) made significant gains in the parliamentary election, winning 31 seats out of 138, their best result in 35 years. This makes the IAF the largest political grouping in parliament, although pro-government independents and tribal factions are still overall dominant. The result came about firstly due to electoral reform in Jordan which allocated an increased number of seats to party lists. Political parties have previously only had a limited presence in Jordan’s legislature. Secondly, the aforementioned economic issues and a general “climate of disillusionment” have driven discontentment with the political system, benefiting the Islamists. Thirdly, and most notably, the ongoing Israel-Hamas war in Gaza has led to widespread protests in Jordan and increasing popular support for Islamism.

Compared to 2020 where polls indicated that 44 per cent of Jordan’s population expressed a positive view of Hamas, in November and December 2023 polling showed a rise to 85 per cent. The IAF has regularly organised protests, particularly in Amman, with common protest slogans including “we are all Hamas” and “Yahya Sinwar is our leader”. Between 50-70 per cent of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin, and the Israel-Hamas War has highly likely generated the greatest political shift in Jordan, a key military ally for the US, in decades.

On 17 September, the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), attacked the military airport in Bamako, Mali. JNIM claimed that the attack was in retaliation for recent joint operations involving Malian forces and Russian Wagner group operatives. The group also claimed that the attack killed up to 100 junta troops and destroyed dozens of military vehicles including six aircraft. There are reports that, following the attacks, lynch mobs formed in Bamako and killed uninvolved residents of the Fulani – also known as Peul – ethnic group, which have often been singled out as “allies” of the Islamists in local discourse.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is highly significant for multiple reasons. First, it likely represents the greatest direct security failure experienced by the Mali junta, and the first attack of this kind in Bamako since 2016. The attack likewise further demonstrates the junta’s growing inability to cope with a growing Islamist insurgency and follows other significant losses and setbacks – most notably, the loss of at least 100 Mali and Wagner troops in a joint Tuareg-JNIM attack in the country’s north in July.

Second, JNIM operatives likely aimed to obtain maximum political leverage out of the attack. The attack solely targeted a military installation – unlike many  other JNIM attacks which target civilians indiscriminately. The Mali junta, as well as its allies in Niger and Burkina Faso, are likely increasingly unable to respond to a growing insurgency, which is also emboldened by the evident security vacuum in the Sahel following the withdrawal of Western counterterrorist assets and their replacement with more brutal but likely less effective Wagner forces operating under the Russian Defence Ministry-run Africa Corps.

Botched counterinsurgency operations by the juntas have resulted in civilian casualties, with cases of arbitrary and brutal treatment of civilians – including reported summary executions of even children – being leveraged by Islamist groups to bolster recruitment operations. As a return to cooperating with the West is highly unlikely due to the extremely high political costs, it is likely that the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) will further rely on extremely violent – and likely less strategically effective – counterinsurgency operations.

Currently, Islamist groups almost certainly have the capacity to strike Ouagadougou and Bamako at will, and will likely soon have the capacity to directly strike Niamey. Further attacks in major urban centres are likely to increasingly put pressure on the top junta leaders, making palace coups and replacement of current junta heads likely in the coming months. There is a realistic possibility of the complete collapse of one or more juntas in the medium term.

Eight migrants die in attempted English Channel crossing

On 14 September, 801 people arrived on small boats to the UK from France, the second highest daily number this year. The increased volume of crossings is almost certainly dependent on multiple days of relatively mild weather at the beginning of September. The deaths reportedly occurred near the French coast, as the vessel carrying migrants struck rocks near Ambleteuse.

Georgia parliament passes “family values” law

The law is largely seen as an anti-LGBTQ bill mirroring similar legislation in Russia. The law is highly likely to be understood as part of the broader process of alignment with Moscow that the current Georgian government has undertaken, most notably via the controversial “foreign agents” bill. The law is likely to drive further protests, and, as in Russia, it is highly likely that the law will allow Georgian authorities to further attack civil society and NGOs under the pretext of “defending family values”.

Armenian officials say they thwarted a Russian coup attempt

On 18 September, the Investigative Committee of Armenia stated that, earlier in 2024, Moscow attempted to carry out a coup via a trained network of at least six insurgents. The extent and scope of the alleged plan are still unclear.

Protests in Tunisia before Presidential elections

The vote will take place on 6 October and will highly likely be won by current President Kais Saied, who has concentrated significant power and reduced the freedom of independent election commission officials. In the last weeks, Saied’s government accelerated its campaign of arrests of political opponents, including detaining 97 members of the opposition party Ennahda on 12 September. It is highly likely that protests will continue in the coming weeks before the vote, and that Tunisian authorities will respond to them violently.

Elections in South Sudan postponed by two years

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir unilaterally announced the extension of the transitional period by two years, postponing elections for the second time – the first postponement having occurred in 2022. South Sudan’s government transition period started with the 2018 peace deal which ended five years of civil war. The decision to postpone the elections was largely expected, but it is unlikely that government forces will manage to solve all the issues that Kiir highlighted – including the lack of a constitution and widespread insecurity – before the end of the new two-year extension period.

Islamist knife attack in the Netherlands

On the evening of 19 September, a man carried out a stabbing attack on Erasmus Bridge in Rotterdam, killing one and wounding at least another. Information available so far indicates that the perpetrator, which was overpowered by a witness and then arrested, likely was a self-radicalised lone wolf Islamist terrorist.

Two explosions in Cologne, Germany, in less than a week

On 17 September, a second explosion in three days occurred in Cologne, Germany. Both blasts occurred in the city centre, outside residential buildings. The blasts are still unexplained, but observers have indicated that detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is a common intimidation tactic used by gangs in the Netherlands, which borders Cologne’s state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The blasts are therefore likely linked to drug trafficking routes from the Netherlands towards central and eastern Europe.

Eight Azeri troops killed in clashes with Islamist group

Local media reported that the troops were involved in counterterrorism operations in the Qusar district of north Azerbaijan. In August, an Azeri public official was reportedly killed by unidentified “Salafi” militants in the area. Residents in Qusar have reported ongoing counterterrorism operations for the past two weeks. The IS-affiliate an-Naba magazine claimed that IS was responsible for the attack on Azeri forces. If these claims are true, then it is highly likely that the militants were affiliates of the Caucasus Province of IS (ISCP), the branch of the group that was responsible for the 23 June attack in Derbent and Makhchkala, Dagestan.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) authorities sentence 37 to death after failed coup

The prisoners include three American citizens, a Belgian, a UK citizen, and a Canadian. They were captured following a suspected coup in May, which involved an attack on the home of a government ally. The attack was almost certainly carried out by the “New Zaire Movement”, a group linked to Christian Malanga, a DRC politician who was killed in the attack and had previously lived in political exile in the US. The DRC allows the death penalty, but had a moratorium on it for two decades, which was only lifted in March, making executions in this case likely to occur. There is a realistic possibility of international involvement affecting the sentences faced by the six dual citizens.

Comoros President stabbed, attacker found dead in cell days later

Comoros President Azali Assoumani was stabbed during a funeral procession and received minor injuries to his hand on 14 September. Days later, the suspect that had been arrested in connection with the stabbing was found dead on the cell where he was being detained. The alleged perpetrator of the attack was a 24-year-old soldier, with no clear personal or ideological motive.

Three firefighters dead due to Portugal wildfires

At least 50 wildfires are currently active in the country, and approximately 5,300 firefighters have been deployed to combat them. The fires have caused multiple roadway and railway closures, and are likely to have significant protracted effects on the mainland. Despite the end of the hottest months of the year and a higher volume of precipitation than usual, temperatures in Portugal and Spain continue to be around 30 degrees during the warmest part of the day, which facilitates the outbreak and spread of fires.

Kenya invests more resources to combat Mpox

Kenyan officials committed USD 52 million on 15 September after five cases of Mpox were confirmed in Taita Taveta, Busia, Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru. It is highly likely that the actual number of cases is much higher. The rapid transnational spread of Mpox has led the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention to declare its first-ever Public Health Emergency of Continental Security.

On 16 September, Typhoon Bebinca made landfall in Shanghai as a category 1 storm with maximum recorded windspeeds of 151 km/h. 400,000 people were evacuated, 56,000 rescue workers were deployed, and 30,000 homes lost power. Bebinca caused severe travel disruptions, with mass flight and train service cancellations, and widespread business closures occurred as Shanghai authorities issued a weather alert at the highest level. Considerable port disruptions also occurred in Shanghai and Ningbo, with vessel bunching at the ports disrupting departures from container terminals. One injury was reported in Shanghai.

Typhoon Bebinca eased into a Tropical Storm, moving into Jiangsu province, causing two deaths in Zhoushi Town after a high-voltage power line fell. Then, on 19 September, a second named storm hit Shanghai, Tropical Storm Pulasan. Pulasan twice made landfall, first in Zheijiang Province and then in Shanghai later in the day. The storm caused torrential rainfall, with local precipitation records being broken in parts of Shanghai. While some parts of Shanghai experienced notable flooding, no reports of serious damage or casualties have been reported thus far as a result of Pulasan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Bebinca is the most powerful tropical cyclone to hit Shanghai in over 70 years, since the 1949 Typhoon Gloria. Tropical Storm Pulasan, meanwhile, is the 14^th named storm in the Asia Pacific region this year, with the highly powerful Typhoon Yagi having recently caused significant damage, disruptions and deaths in the Philippines, China, Vietnam and Myanmar.

Disruptions in Shanghai over the past week have been extensive, however, the level of damage and casualties has been remarkably low, almost certainly due to Shanghai’s very high level of development, the substantial state capacity afforded to response operations, and the rigorous preparedness and resiliency measures deployed.

Climate change is highly likely a significant factor in conditioning the measured worsening of annual tropical storm seasons internationally, as warmer seas highly likely cause stronger storms. China is the world’s biggest carbon emitter, though the United States has a significantly higher per capita emission rate. Some studies suggest that predicted levels of climate change could lead to large portions of the most populated and developed region of China, in and around the North China Plain, experiencing severe habitability challenges by 2100 on current trajectories. This is due to the threat posed by “wet-bulb temperatures”, the phenomenon where both humidity levels and temperatures are so high that evaporative cooling via sweating in humans is limited to the extent that humans will very quickly die from hyperthermia.

China has made substantial investments into renewable energy and now has more renewable power capacity than any other country in the world. It is highly likely that these policy decisions have been made due to China’s particular vulnerability to climate change. It is likely that Beijing will make increasingly strong diplomatic efforts to make combatting climate change an international priority as climate change continues to worsen.

A man was sentenced to 14 months in prison for “sedition” after pleading guilty to wearing a t-shirt with the slogan “liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times”, associated with the 2019 protests. The individual is the first person to be charged, convicted and sentenced under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), the new national security law in effect since March 2024.

Solace Global Assessment: 

At least 12 other people have been arrested for sedition since the SNSO was enacted. The new legislation is almost certainly aimed at nullifying the possibility of further anti-Beijing protests, and is part of broader Chinese efforts to diminish civil society and opposition forces in Hong Kong. The recent crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong has likely de facto ended most aspects of the “one country, two systems” framework in place since the UK handed over the territory in 1997.

It is highly likely that, in addition to its political implications, the strict implementation of the SNSO will also increasingly affect Hong Kong’s competitiveness as a global hub for finance and business. Combined with high US-China tensions, Beijing’s growing influence and oversight over the city has likely contributed to accelerating the exodus of foreign companies to other business-friendly locations in Southeast Asia. Between 2019 and 2021, the number of global companies that had their regional headquarters in Hong Kong decreased by approximately 13 per cent, many having relocated to Singapore.

At the same time, however, much of this decrease has been compensated by an influx of Chinese companies, likely contributing to maintaining Hong Kong on an upward economic trajectory in 2023 and 2024.

Presidential election in Sri Lanka set to take place on 21 September

The election has been tightly contested, with the economy being the key issue, and the outcome will likely be close. After collapsing in 2022, Sri Lanka’s economy has struggled to recover with inflation rates almost reaching 70 per cent. With 38 candidates running, the front runners are the incumbent President Ranil Wickremesinghe, the leader of the opposition Sajith Premadasa, and Anura Kumara Dissanayake.

Wickremesinghe became President in 2022 after his predecessor was forced to flee Sri Lanka due to widespread unrest stemming from the economic crisis and is a centre-right liberal conservative. Premadasa is a centrist who wishes to change some conditions in the International Monetary Fund’s USD 2.9 billion bailout programme. Dissanayake is contesting the election as part of the National People’s Power (NPP) coalition, a left-wing coalition that includes the far-left People’s Liberation Front, which Dissanayake leads.

Sri Lanka uses a limited ranked voting electoral system where voters preferentially rank candidates. Almost every presidential election since 1982 has resulted in a candidate winning a majority in the first count. This election, however, is likely to go to second or even third counts. Polling indicates that Dissanayake is the most likely to win the first count, although the accuracy of Sri Lankan polling is unreliable. With the first preference centre and centre-right vote split between the other two frontrunners, it is likely that Dissanayake will fare worse in any additional counts.

North Korea conducts multiple missile tests

South Korean and Japanese authorities have reported that North Korea conducted missile testing twice in one week, on 18 and 19 September. The missiles were primarily short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), with North Korean state media (KCNA) claiming that they were new Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5) designs with “super-large warheads”. KCNA additionally claimed a test of a “strategic cruise missile”. The new missile design is highly likely an iterated Hwasong-11 (KN-23) design with a larger warhead. Hwasong-11s have highly likely been used by Russia in its war against Ukraine, according to Ukrainian state prosecutors who examined missile debris, though Moscow and Pyongyang deny this. The missile tests are likely part of North Korean efforts to speed up the development of the new missile variant to sell to Russia.

Taliban suspends Polio vaccinations in Afghanistan

The decision was taken despite the increase in polio cases recorded in Afghanistan, 18 in 2024, up from six in 2023. Taliban officials did not provide an explanation for the move, which was announced days before the scheduled beginning of a September immunisation campaign. The lack of immunisation is likely to not only affect Afghanistan, but also neighbouring states and especially border regions in Pakistan, due to the high influx of Afghan migrants and refugees.

Tropical Storm Soulik makes landfall in northern Vietnam

At approximately 14:00 local time on 19 September, Tropical Storm Soulik made landfall in Quang Tri province, northern Vietnam. Expected to follow a similar trajectory to the recently devastating Typhoon Yagi, the storm has prompted mass evacuations in both Quang Tri and Binh provinces. While Soulik’s strength is far weaker than Yagi, the lingering devastation from Yagi’s recent impact will likely exacerbate the storm’s impact on northern Vietnam and neighbouring Laos.

Flooding from Typhoon Yagi kills at least 226 people in Myanmar

Although Yagi, which had earlier hit Hainan, China and northern Vietnam, was significantly weakened, Myanmar is highly vulnerable to the impact of flooding. The ongoing civil war in Myanmar means that a third of Myanmar’s population already required humanitarian aid, and many of the worst impacted regions are difficult to access for already highly limited rescue operations. The major cities of Naypyidaw and Mandalay also experienced significant floods. Shan State, which has had considerable heavy fighting during the civil war, was also particularly impacted. The rebel forces that control most of Shan State are almost certainly under-resourced to deal with the floods, exacerbating the impact.

Hezbollah members have been using pagers for years, due to operational security concerns regarding Israeli tracking of cell phones. A speech by Hezbollah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah in February encouraged members to discard their cell phones, which led to more widespread adoption of pagers amongst the rank-and-file. As well as being used by Hezbollah members throughout Lebanon, pagers were distributed to members and allies in Iraq, Syria and Iran and the pager detonations injured at least 14 people in Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The attacks were highly likely conducted by Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency. Historically, responsibility has not been publicly claimed by Israeli officials for Mossad operations conducted abroad, therefore it is highly unlikely that an official claim of responsibility will be made for the attacks.

While there has been speculation that the attacks involved hacking into the devices to cause the batteries to explode, this is almost certainly untrue. While overheated lithium-ion batteries can combust and in rare instances, cause small explosions, the explosions were almost certainly caused by small quantities of military-grade high-explosives.

The model of pagers that detonated were mostly Gold Apollo’s AR924 model. Hezbollah had reportedly ordered over 5,000 pagers, before distributing them to members. Gold Apollo, a Taiwanese company, has stated since the attack that these models were manufactured on license by the Budapest-based company BAC Consulting. Gold Apollo additionally stated that they had encountered issues with remittances from BAC, and that payments had come through the Middle East. According to three intelligence officers briefed on the operation who spoke to the New York Times, BAC Consulting was an Israeli front posing as an international pager producer.

The walkie-talkies that detonated, meanwhile, were primarily IC-V82 models from the Japanese company ICOM. ICOM has stated that they ended production of the model 10 years ago. It is highly likely that Mossad similarly infiltrated the supply chain for the walkie-talkies.

If you’re navigating through high-risk regions and require expert journey management services, Solace Global is ready to assist. Our specialised team delivers tailored solutions to enhance your safety and security, ensuring you can operate with confidence in challenging environments. Reach out to us today to discover how we can provide the support you need for a secure and seamless journey.

Second presidential debate, Trump sentencing delayed, and 6 January 2025 security plans.

Former President Donald Trump and current Vice President Kamala Harris participated in their long-awaited presidential debate on 10 September. The debate was the first between the two candidates, but the second in this electoral season, as current President Joe Biden dropped out of the electoral race following a widely criticised performance in his own debate with Trump in June.

Days prior, Judge Juan Merchan, who presided over the hush money trial of the former president in Manhattan, delayed the sentencing to 26 November, to be after the presidential election. In May, Trump was convicted of 34 felony counts of falsifying business records. The maximum sentence that Trump could receive is two years in prison, though such a sentence is unlikely. On 5 September, Trump also pleaded not guilty to federal charges over alleged attempts to interfere with the 2020 election, in a separate case.

Solace Global Assessment: The postponement of Trump’s sentencing is likely to reduce the risk of civil unrest and violence prior to and immediately after the election. However, there is still a realistic possibility of unrest occurring during the remainder of the electoral season. During the debate, the former president repeated claims that the 2020 election results were fraudulent. Trump’s 2024 running mate, J.D. Vance, also separately echoed these views and criticised the results’ certification process for the 2020 election. Moreover, local media have highlighted a growing number of local officials that have either hinted at, or outright threatened, not to certify the 2024 election results if they perceive that they are affected by “irregularities”. Recent notable cases include new Georgia State Election Board rules that instruct county boards to conduct “reasonable inquiries” before certifying the election results, and a lawsuit in Michigan against a county board member who stated that he would refuse to certify the 2024 electoral results if the election were to be “stolen”.

The likelihood of another incident like the 6 January Capitol attack occurring has been significantly reduced by planned security measures and is therefore highly unlikely. On 11 September, the Department of Homeland Security declared the 2025 results’ certification date a “National Special Security Event”, meaning that considerable security – including federal, state, and local assets – will be deployed to secure the Capitol and other key areas in Washington D.C. Nevertheless, a realistic possibility remains of civil unrest at a local level, especially in states where officials have raised doubts about their willingness to certify the election results.

Judicial reform bill approved by Senate after protesters storm the Senate chamber.

The controversial judicial reform bill was approved by the Mexican Senate in the early hours of 11 September, after protesters had stormed the Senate chamber on 10 September. The judicial reform bill proposes that approximately 7,000 state and federal judges, including the Supreme Court, will be replaced by popular elections that will take place in 2025 and 2027. The bill additionally reduces experience and age requirements for multiple judicial roles. Protesters against the bill broke through the door of the Senate chamber using pipes and chains, with security forces deploying tear gas and fire extinguishers. As a result of the incursion, the Senate took a temporary recess, before reconvening and approving the bill.

Solace Global Assessment: The storming of the Mexican Senate by protesters almost certainly marks a further escalation in the anti-judicial reform unrest that has intensified in the last few weeks. Unions representing many of Mexico’s 55,000 judicial workers started an indefinite nationwide strike on 19 August, and on 3 September were joined by the Supreme Court justices.

Protests were initially notably peaceful, until a demonstration by striking judiciary workers blocked access to the Congress building on 3 September before the Chamber of Deputies approved the bill. The drivers of unrest, therefore, have been the Congress votes in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. With the bill now approved by both houses of Congress, all that remains now is for the bill to be ratified by the state legislatures, which will highly likely occur.

President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum will be sworn in on 1 October, and it is highly likely that judicial reform will be the biggest issue she will face at the start of her administration. On the one hand, there is a realistic possibility that unrest will decrease as the opportunities to stop the bill have been almost exhausted. On the other hand, however, it is more likely that unrest will take a more disruptive and violent character. The bill has spooked investors, with concerns that it may undermine the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade pact, and has been met with international condemnation, notably drawing criticism from the US ambassador.

The Peso has weakened by 17% since the landslide victory for the Morena party in the 2 June elections, and a former central bank official has stated that a recession next year is likely.

Venezuelan opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez lands in Madrid.

Gonzalez, who is the most prominent opposition figure in the country alongside Maria Corina Machado, went into hiding following the 28 July election, staying at various diplomatic offices and residences in Caracas. From Madrid, Gonzalez will highly likely use the freedom to speak publicly to gather international support against Maduro. However, it is also highly likely that the Maduro regime will use Gonzalez’s escape as a pretext for increasing accusations of foreign interference and “treason” by opposition forces. This, in turn, may grant the government greater legitimacy to suppress remaining civil society groups and non-aligned figures.

Venezuelan authorities revoke Brazil’s custody of Argentina’s diplomatic offices.

The decision was justified with the accusation that Brazilian officials were using Argentine offices to stage acts of terrorism. The decision will likely result in retaliatory moves in Brazil, and will likely further isolate the Venezuelan government by weakening Brazil’s mediating role. Members of the opposition are currently sheltering in the Argentine ambassador’s residence in Caracas, and the decision by Venezuelan authorities has a remote possibility to be a prelude to a more forceful violation of diplomatic rights in Venezuela.

USA “Terrorgram” leaders charged with allegedly inspiring terrorism.

The transnational collective’s name refers to the social network Telegram. It espoused white supremacist ideology and praised past far-right lone wolf terrorists as “Saints”, in efforts to motivate further attacks. American authorities accuse the two informal “leaders” of the collective of inciting at least three specific terror attacks – an anti-LGBTQ shooting in Slovakia, which killed two, a planned attack in New Jersey, and the recent stabbing outside a Mosque in Turkey. If convicted, the two face up to 220 years in prison.

The development is likely important and may become a key legal precedent in the prosecution of stochastic terrorists. The term “stochastic” identifies a “probabilistic” type of terrorism, where radical messages and calls to violence are indiscriminately spread within a target community (usually online) with the expectation that one or more members will act upon them. Stochastic terrorists are difficult to prosecute as they are not often involved in the planning and organisation of attacks, and maintain some plausible deniability regarding their involvement. There is a remote chance of violent retaliatory actions by Terrorgram supporters in the US.

Canadian counterterrorism arrests Pakistani citizen over 7 October terror plot.

The man was arrested on 7 September over an alleged plan to attack the Jewish community of New York City on the anniversary of the Hamas attack in southern Israel. The individual was almost certainly a self-radicalised lone wolf but nevertheless planned to carry out the attack in the name of IS. 7 October, as well as the 11 October Yom Kippur holiday, are likely to be at a particularly high risk from extremist action targeting both Jewish and Muslim places of worship in Western countries.

El Salvador police chief dead in helicopter crash.

Since 2019, Mauricio Arriaza Chicas was a central figure in implementing the crackdowns on local gangs spearheaded by President Bukele, which led to up to 80,000 arrests and a drastic reduction in murder rates. Chicas was travelling with Manuel Coto, a former credit union head, who was accused of money laundering and was being transported back to El Salvador. Bukele expressed suspicions about the incident’s cause.

South California wildfires destroy homes and cause mass evacuations.

At least three major wildfires erupted in southern California on 8 September. The fires have been especially difficult to contain, highly likely exacerbated by protracted hot and dry conditions in the region, and have expanded particularly quickly due to strong winds. As of 12 September, the fires have destroyed at least 100,000 acres of land, injured 13, and destroyed approximately 40 homes.

All three fires pose a direct threat to the greater Los Angeles urban area, and reports of Californian state firefighting resources being overstretched likely indicate that efforts to contain the blazes will continue throughout the weekend.

Hurricane Francine makes landfall in Louisiana, USA.

Making landfall as a category 2 hurricane, Francine hit southern Louisiana on late 11 September. The storm had maximum record windspeeds of 157 km/h, but quickly weakened into a tropical storm post-landfall. The New Orleans area experienced heavy rainfall, and flash flood emergency warnings were published by authorities. There have been no reported deaths or injuries as of the time of writing, and the storm was downgraded into a tropical depression on 12 September over Mississippi.

Tropical Storm Illeana forms south of Baja California Sur, Mexico

On 12 September, Tropical Storm Illeana formed in the North Pacific, roughly 400 kilometres south of the tip of Baja California Sur, Mexico. Initial forecasts anticipate the storm will bring heavy rainfall, strong winds, and storm surges to the peninsula, as well as to the states of Michoacán, Colima, and Jalisco over the weekend. There is a realistic possibility of localised travel disruptions and damage to physical properties in affected coastal areas.

Bolivia declares a state of emergency due to wildfires.

Over the past three months, wildfires have destroyed an estimated ten million acres of land, especially in the states of Beni and Santa Cruz. The Bolivian government announced that it will seek international support to combat the fires, which have additionally caused disruptions in La Paz and other urban centres.

On 11 September, IDF officials stated that Israeli forces have degraded Hamas forces in Gaza to such a great extent that Hamas is no longer able to operate as an organised military force. However, they also claimed that the complete destruction of Hamas may take approximately another year. The report seems to be based on a captured letter written by Khan Yunis Brigade leader Salameh prior to his killing in July, where the Hamas official claims to only retain a fifth of his personnel, ten per cent of his rocket arsenal, and less than half of his stocks of anti-tank and small calibre munitions.

On the same day, two Israeli strikes on a school building in Nuseirat killed at least 18 people, including six workers of the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency UNRWA. The organisation stated that the strikes resulted in its highest death toll in a single incident throughout the war. The al-Jaouni school had been targeted by Israeli strikes four other times since October 2023.

Solace Global Assessment: The IDF’s assessments of Hamas’ continuing degradation as a viable combat force are likely accurate. The Palestinian militant group has been likely cut off from its main sources of smuggled resources and weapons, Egypt, via the protracted Israeli occupation of the Philadelphi Corridor, and the destruction of much of the tunnels in the area. Satellite imagery from late August showed that Israeli forces had begun paving a road extending six kilometres inland along the corridor, likely an important signal of Tel Aviv’s intention to retain a presence at the Egypt-Gaza border. Hamas, moreover, has likely lost much of its most experienced personnel and morale is highly likely poor.

Nevertheless, Hamas likely retains some capacity to operate small units from densely populated areas previously cleared by Israeli forces, in efforts to inflict protracted attrition on IDF units. Hamas also likely maintains some political leverage via the dozens of hostages still under its control. The new “guidelines” for the treatment of captives issued by the group, which state that its fighters will kill Israeli hostages if IDF troops approach their location, are highly likely aimed at deterring raids by Israeli forces.

Additionally, these measures likely reflect decreasing confidence amongst the Hamas leadership in the organisation’s capability to keep the hostages.

The killing of six UNRWA workers highlights the continuing severe threat to non-combatants in Gaza posed by IDF aerial strikes. Moreover, the strike likely indicates the continued erosion of deconfliction processes in Gaza – whereby humanitarian organisations share their locations, operations and movements with militaries and armed groups.

The administrations of the US and Iraq reached a preliminary deal which would result in the full withdrawal of US and coalition forces from Iraq by the end of 2026. Partial withdrawal will begin in 2025. The deal follows six months of negotiations, and now requires the final approval from Washington and Baghdad. The deal was reached amid increased attacks by Iran-backed, Iraq-based forces on US bases in the country, which this year have killed three US troops and injured dozens more.

Solace Global Assessment: The deal will likely directly benefit Iran and allow Tehran’s proxy forces greater freedom in carrying out operations in Iraq. In return, it may result in a growing volume of Israeli strikes in the country, as Tel Aviv will likely increasingly bear the brunt of containing Iran’s proxy operations.

However, IS still carried out up to 200 attacks in the two countries in the first half of 2024, and likely retains considerable operational capacity. Despite a post-2019 tendency to under-report attacks and territorial control, IS core likely remains the political centre of the global terrorist network. A resurgent IS core may benefit from a decreased Western presence in the area, as well as the growing assets and expertise of other branches, like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), in Afghanistan, and the Islamic State Greater Sahara Province (ISGSP) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), in the Sahel.

Local media reported on 11 September that six humanitarian workers of the NGO ALIMA were kidnapped by an unspecified armed group in the sub-prefecture of Liwa. At least one of the six was shot dead, while three escaped. The remaining two humanitarian workers are unaccounted for as of the time of writing.

Solace Global Assessment: Incidents affecting aid workers in Chad are less common that in other neighbouring Sahel states. According to the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD), there has been one case of kidnapping of aid workers in the country in 2024, with one victim. The kidnapping occurred in Dona Manga, in the country’s south.

The latest case, instead, occurred in the Lake Chad basin area and was therefore likely carried out by one of the Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the area. These include Boko Haram and their rivals the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The kidnapping of aid workers in the area is mostly conducted for ransom, as both local and foreign nationals working for NGOs are perceived as being far wealthier than the general populace.

Due to a lack of state resources to combat local militant groups, targeting NGO workers can be a relatively low-risk effort, especially in regions affected by a security vacuum such as Lake Chad. In general, the risks faced by NGO workers in the Sahel have increased in recent years, while not reaching the severity of the Sudan area. This is likely due to the worsening domestic stability of local authorities, and the growing strength and scope of terrorist groups operating in the region.

Barnier promises new French government “by the end of next week”.

The centre-right politician and newly appointed prime minister is considered by Macron – and, according to some polls, by a slim majority of the French electorate – to be able to compromise with the main parliamentary forces to end the months-long political crisis that followed the European elections.

However, it is unlikely that Barnier’s picks will be able to satisfy the two radical forces in parliament, the far-right National Rally (RN) and the populist, left-wing France Unbowed (LFI). The latter, alongside much of the rest of the New Popular Front (NFP) coalition, has already vowed to support a no confidence vote against the new government.

This means that Barnier will likely be forced to make some important concessions to RN. However, here, RN’s commitment to oppose fiscal reform may prove impossible to accept, as the Barnier-appointed government will only have weeks before the 1 October draft budget deadline. If the Barnier government fails to survive, it is almost certain that the NFP and RN will renew calls for new elections, and there is a likewise high likelihood of severe civil unrest.

Germany begins temporary border controls.

The measure, which is initially scheduled to be in place for six months, follows the terror attack by a radicalised Islamist in Munich, who targeted the Israeli consulate on the anniversary of the 1972 Olympics massacre. It is also likely an attempt by the government coalition to toughen counterterrorism measures after two state-level positive results by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). In late September, state elections will be held in Brandenburg, and the high likelihood of another AfD positive result threatens the stability of the current government.

Abdelmadjid Tebboune predictably re-elected president of Algeria.

Tebboune reportedly won 94 per cent of the vote, after campaigning with the support of the military and the National Liberation Front (NFL). Turnout was low, at a reported 23 per cent, and opposition figures boycotted the election citing the likelihood of fraud. In an unusual move, Tebboune challenged the election results, and particularly the reported turnout rate. There is a realistic possibility of civil unrest following the elections, although this is unlikely to reach the same severity of the 2019 protests.

President Faye dissolves Senegal’s parliament in preparation for upcoming snap-elections

Faye assumed office in April 2024, the first opposition politician to win an election in Senegal’s post-independence history. The decision to hold legislative elections three years earlier than expected is largely attributed to the parliament’s opposition to President Faye’s proposed reforms. The current majority in Senegal’s National Assembly belongs to the United in Hope coalition, founded by former President Macky Sall.

Sall’s controversial presidency saw widespread and often violent protests, particularly by Senegal’s youth, who are largely represented by Faye’s PASTEF party. With the elections approaching, there is a realistic possibility that the tensions witnessed during Sall’s tenure could resurface, potentially instigating renewed civil unrest.

Danish gang-member arrested after antisemitic group attack.

The individual, alongside other accomplices, allegedly carried out an arson attack against a Jewish individual’s residence. The 21-year-old is allegedly a member of a group with links to the street gang Loyal to Familia (LTF), a group based in the Nørrebro district of Copenhagen. In recent years, LTF is one of the main gangs that have tried to expand into Sweden, where there is a greater network of organised crime groups. The case is notable as there is a realistic possibility that it highlights the overlap between organised crime and extremist activity in Denmark, a trend that was already observed in other European cities like Marseille.

Chechen couple sentenced to prison for Antwerp, Belgium, terror plot .

According to authorities, the two had made concrete plans to attack the Jewish quarter as well as an LGBTQ bar. The couple had reportedly self-radicalised, but also contacted Islamic State (IS) members on Telegram and received instructions and guidance on how to carry out the attack. The case likely highlights the considerable overlaps and complex relationship between patterns of self-radicalisation and vertical organisation. Belgium is a desirable target for Islamists as the seat of key EU institutions, and has previously acted as a base for terrorist cells planning attacks in neighbouring countries, especially France.

Russia claims involvement of Finland and Sweden in drone attacks in Murmansk

Ukraine has conducted drone attacks in the Murmansk region since 11 September. According to Russian sources, three Ukrainian drones were shot down on 11 September, with a further two shot down on the following day.

Russian military-affiliated sources have stated that no Ukrainian drones have successfully hit targets in the Murmansk region. Notably, a source linked to the Federal Security (FSB) claimed that the drone attack on 11 September originated from Finland. Furthermore, a prominent Russian military blogger, “Kotenok”, has hinted at a possible Sweden’s involvement in Thursday’s attack due to a Swedish surveillance plane flying near the Murmansk border.

However, no official Russian source has not echoed this latter claim. There is a remote possibility that these accusations could lead to further tension in the region, and greater Russian aggressive moves at its northwestern borders.

Israeli forces strike Masyaf, Syria.

On 9 September, Israeli forces launched a missile strike in the vicinity of Masyaf, targeting facilities reportedly being used by Iranian and Iran-affiliated groups. According to NGO sources, the strike killed at least 25 people, including a number of civilians. There is a realistic possibility of retaliatory strikes on Israeli cities by local Iranian proxy groups or by other members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”.

Terror attack at Allenby Bridge, Jordan-Israel border.

On 8 September, an individual opened fire on Israeli workers at the border crossing with Jordan, killing three. The bridge, also known as King Hussein Bridge, is the only active Israel-Jordan border crossing, and is therefore almost certainly a high-value target for extremist action. The attack was carried out with a pistol and was unsophisticated, which suggests that the attacker was likely not affiliated with any specific terrorist group. Iran and its proxies have increasingly sought to smuggle weapons to organised groups inside Jordan, and the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has favoured anti-government sentiment inside the kingdom. Similar incidents, which force a security response, likely put a high level of political pressure on authorities’ efforts to retain some stability and popular support.

Dozens of “armed bandits” kidnap travellers in Zamfara, Nigeria.

The kidnapping of an as of the time of writing still unspecified number of travellers occurred on 12 September, just hours after the expiration of a deadline for payment requested by a local bandit leader, known as Bello Turji, and the deployment of increased military assets to the area. The region of Zamfara is extremely underdeveloped, and authorities exercise only partial control over it. It is highly likely that the kidnapping case, is linked to the high level of organised militia activity in the area, and there is a likelihood that it relates to the recent extortion attempt.

Anti-air travel and miscellaneous groups plan “International Day for the Ban on Night Flights”

Dozens of activist groups, almost entirely based in Western Europe, have released a joint statement protesting night flights and calling for a day of sensibilisation on 13 September. While no planned protests were identified, there is a realistic possibility that activists, especially in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands (where the movement is most present) will seek to stage disruptions and protests at or near international airports. These, in turn, may affect travel and business.

Nigeria dam collapse provokes severe floods, displaces thousands

Heavy rains in Borno State, northeast Nigeria, caused the Maiduguri dam to overflow and collapse on 10-11 September. The resulting flooding has affected, according to authorities, up to one million people, with at least 30 reported fatalities at the time of writing. Nigeria’s northeast suffers from poor infrastructure and a lack of authority presence, meaning that rescue efforts are often delayed or impossible.

Moreover, the security situation in Borno is further worsened by the active Boko Haram insurgency. The severity of the floods is likely to result in a sharp number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria’s northeast, and will almost certainly further stretch already insufficient government response assets.

Repeated extreme weather events moreover have a direct negative impact on food security, with young people and at-risk demographics particularly affected, and directly contribute to increases in violent crime. Boko Haram, as well as other violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and bandit groups, have taken advantage of disasters to carry out recruitment efforts among the displaced or dispossessed.

Dengue fever epidemic declared in Central African Republic (CAR).

The CAR’s Minister of Health, Pierre Somsé has declared an epidemic after 13 cases of Dengue fever was declared by the national epidemiological surveillance system in the cities of Bangui and Bimbo. Dengue fever, also known as “tropical flu”, is an infectious, mosquito-borne disease caused by a virus of the same name.

The incident rate of dengue fever in the CAR has significantly increased and is now classified as a ‘re-emerging’ disease. The development reflects the wider trend in rising dengue infections across Africa, with over 270,000 cases and 753 deaths reported across 18 African Union (AU) Member States between 2019 and June 2024.

Ganesh Pandal riots show looming threat of sectarian violence.

On 8 September, a number of individuals reportedly pelted a pandal (a temporary structure erected to celebrate a Hindu god) with stones in Surat, Gujarat. The episode resulted in a riot, and in at least 30 arrests. In the days following the incident, authorities began demolishing irregular settlements in the area, in a move that observers identified as retaliatory targeting of the local Muslim community (although authorities claimed that the demolitions were planned weeks in advance).

Solace Global Assessment: The case almost certainly represents the latest escalation in sectarian, religion-based conflict in India, and there is a realistic possibility that it will lead to an increase in violence in the state.

There is a significant threat of sectarian mob violence in India, with recent cases particularly involving the Hindu and Muslim communities. Local and national officials of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have repeatedly encouraged mob violence – including “bulldozer justice” – against Muslim minorities, and studies have found a correlation between BJP state rule and sectarian anti-Muslim violence.

The BJP is the ruling party in Gujarat, and officials and sympathisers have likely deliberately increased sectarian tensions. During the electoral campaign for the 2024 elections, Gujarat BJP officials accused opponents of unfairly “giving quotas” as “other backward classes” (OBC, a designation that entails some access to reserved government jobs and higher education posts) to Muslims. In March, Muslim students carrying out Ramadan prayers at the University of Gujarat were reportedly attacked by a “Hindu mob”. In September, BJP members were accused of arbitrarily enlisting local secondary school students as party members.

Alongside internal development, sectarian violence in India has also likely been influenced by social media-based disinformation, with radical groups using international developments as instruments to stoke domestic violence. For instance, the recent cases of anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh following the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, have been reposted and likely inflated by Hindu nationalist influencers and pages in India. OSINT analysis shows that the recent Gujarat case has also been broadcast online as a case of concerted anti-Hindu violence, and there is a realistic possibility that increased attention will result in further calls for retaliatory violence.

Typhoon Yagi kills almost 200 people in northern Vietnam.

Typhoon Yagi made landfall in northern Vietnam on 7 September as a Very Strong Typhoon with windspeeds of 149km/h. 199 people have so far been killed, with over 800 injuries and 128 people still missing. The death toll will almost certainly rise. The deaths were primarily caused by flash floods and landslides in the northwestern Lao Cai province, which borders China. One hamlet in Lao Cai, Lang Nu, was entirely swept away by a flash flood, leading to at least 42 deaths and 52 missing. On 9 September, the Phong Chau bridge in Phu Tho province collapsed. Flood waters from the Red River led to Hanoi neighbourhoods on its banks being flooded, with thousands being evacuated. Power and drinking water has been cut since 11 September. 

Solace Global Assessment: Yagi is the strongest typhoon in Asia this year, having earlier made landfall in Hainan, China on 6 September as a Super Typhoon. In Hainan, four people were killed and 95 injured, with an estimated USD 9.26 billion in total damages. While Yagi considerably reduced in strength before hitting northern Vietnam, the impact has been far greater. This is almost certainly due to the increased vulnerability of Vietnam, which results from architectural practices, resiliency and preparedness measures, and state capacity. Even weakened, Yagi was the strongest typhoon to hit Vietnam in three decades. The flooding in Hanoi is likely the worst in two decades, with warehouses and export-oriented hubs in the east of Hanoi closing. While Sapa, a popular tourist destination for trekking, is located in the worst affected province, Lao Cai, the area is a particularly impoverished part of Vietnam. This highly likely further increased the population’s storm vulnerability. The Australian Foreign Ministry has announced the provision of USD 2 million in humanitarian relief funding, and rescue operations are ongoing.

Kyrgyzstan removes Taliban from list of banned organisations.

The move follows a similar recent one by Kazakhstan. The Kyrgyz government likely has a security interest in normalising relations with the Taliban, as it likely assesses the survival of the current Kabul regime to have a positive effect on regional stability. Moreover Bishkek, like nearby Dushanbe, is almost certainly worried about the possibility of a power vacuum in Afghanistan resulting in a growing Islamist activity in the region.

While primarily active in Afghanistan, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has increased recruitment and fundraising activities beyond the country’s borders. Normalisation with neighbouring central Asian states will also likely be a prelude to similar developments in the Taliban’s relations with Russia and other key regional powers.

Anti-war demonstration in Melbourne, Australia, ends in dozens of arrests and injuries.

Approximately 3,000 protesters clashed with police while attempting to disrupt an expo for weapons manufacturers. Protesters reportedly threw Molotov cocktails and acid bottles at police, which responded with tear gas and stun grenades. At least 39 arrests were made on the day, and more than 100 people were injured.

Due to the violence and increased media exposure of the protest, there is a realistic possibility that it will lead to further cases of civil unrest in the city. Events such as the arms expo in Melbourne constitute high-desirability targets for protesters due to their extremely high visibility.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacks Shiites on pilgrimage in Afghanistan.

On the morning of 13 September, reports and footage emerged of an ISKP ambush on unarmed Afghan Hazara Shia pilgrims at the border between the provinces of Daikundi and Ghor. Reports indicate that the pilgrims were returning from Karbala, a key location in Shia history. The deliberate attack on pilgrims is likely meant to continue undermining Taliban claims that ISKP has been neutralised, and that Kabul retains full authority over the country. Moreover, although unconfirmed, reports indicate that, in the Ghor province, local Taliban offices have been comprehensively infiltrated by ISKP, with Taliban resources being redirected to train and equip Islamic State fighters.

Over 50 killed after Myanmar’s military bombs Arakan Army prisoner of war camp

On 8 September, Myanmar’s military bombed a prison camp in Maungdaw, killing at least 50 according to yet unverified reports released by the rebel Arakan Army (AA), which operates in Rakhine State. The AA claimed that junta have increased the volume of their bombing campaigns. Pro-junta forces likely see bombing rebel-held areas – including civilian targets – as a way to erode civilian confidence in rebel forces, and to disrupt local logistics.

With the junta continuing to lose territory to the better-motivated and increasingly larger rebel forces, there is a realistic likelihood of further increases in bombing campaigns.

North Korean state media disclose image of uranium-enrichment facility

The image marks the first public disclosure of a uranium-enrichment site since photos of the Yongbyon nuclear complex were released in 2010. North Korean authorities almost certainly saw releasing the image as a way to deter South Korea, the US, and their allies. However, the image may also assist Seoul and Washington in refining estimates of North Korea’s current nuclear capabilities, following satellite images in recent years that indicate significant expansions at the Yongbyon complex.

Tropical Storm Bebinca moving towards China in Philippine Sea.

Bebinca is currently a Severe Tropical Storm, with windspeeds of 110 km/h. The storm is forecast to strengthen into a Typhoon, or even a Very Strong Typhoon, before making landfall in densely populated eastern China on 15-16 September. Within the cone of uncertainty, which is the predicted possible paths the storm could take, are the Chinese areas of southern Jiangsu Province, Shanghai and Zheijiang Province (with the cities of Ningbo, Hangzhou, Taizhou and Wenzhou all liable to be potentially affected).

The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) predict that the storm could have a high humanitarian impact, which is based on the forecast maximum sustained wind speeds, exposed population and vulnerability.

Bebinca will likely enter the Philippine area of responsibility on 14 September and is expected to bring sporadic heavy rainfall or thunderstorms to Manila and other areas of Luzon.

On 15-16 September, the storm is predicted to go past or through the Japanese islands of Amami and Okinawa, with authorities warning of possible landslides and flooding. The area of China that will likely be most impacted is highly developed, with extensive state capacity as well as rigorous storm preparedness and resiliency measures. Nonetheless, Bebinca will likely cause widespread disruptions and impact.

Two hundred evacuated due to volcanic threat in the Philippines

Kanlaon Volcano is located in the centre of the Negros Island. Authorities issued alerts for the area in June, after initial seismic activity. On 11 September, further activity, including sulphur dioxide emissions and more than 300 minor volcanic quakes, prompted authorities to issue an evacuation order for nearby villages due to the risk of a serious eruption.

Volcanic activity could interfere with travel and economic activity elsewhere on the island. In June, flights to Bacolod-Silay International Airports were briefly interrupted due to the volcano’s activity.

Haiti expands state of emergency to cover entire country.

On 5 September, the Haitian government announced that it was expanding the current state of emergency to cover the entire country. Haiti’s Ouest department, home to the capital Port-au-Prince, was placed under a state of emergency on March 3 under former Prime Minister Ariel Henry due to escalating violence and mass prison escapes.

The emergency was extended to other areas, including Artibonite, Centre, and Nippes, which have also experienced severe violence. The announcement also follows widespread protests after the suspension of services at Haiti’s largest hydroelectric dam which has left huge swathes of the country without power.

Solace Global Assessment: Haiti’s expansion of the state of emergency has likely been timed to coincide with the arrival of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Blinken is set to conduct a diplomatic visit to Haiti on 5-6 September where he will meet with Prime Minister Garry Conille to discuss Haiti’s democratic transition. Conille has only been in power for three months and despite the recent deployment of a UN-backed Kenyan security mission, authorities have failed to make much progress in combating the criminal gangs that now control an estimated 80 per cent of the country.

The expansion of the state of emergency is likely aimed at attracting more foreign aid and assistance, with the US currently being the largest contributor. The Kenyan force, which was deployed in June, only consists of 400 police officers, and their effectiveness has been curtailed by salary payment issues. Moreover, the domestic security services are almost certainly underfunded, and overstretched and have been limited to only a few minor operations, with the gangs often outnumbering and outgunning the police.

Conille’s strategy is likely intended to convince Blinken to both increase US contributions but also to secure additional support from the international community. However, foreign assistance will likely be partially dependent on steps towards democratic transition, a process that currently appears unachievable with the gangs exerting so much influence across the country.

Judicial reform bill passed by lower house, despite escalating unrest.

On 3 September, protests led by striking judiciary workers took place outside the Mexican Supreme Court and Congress against the controversial judicial reform bill. The demonstrations blocked access to the Congress building, leading to lawmakers instead gathering in a gymnasium to start the voting proceedings. The Supreme Court additionally released a statement on 3 September that they would be joining the strike, following an 8-3 vote. Despite the protests, the bill was passed on 4 September by the lower house and will now go to the Senate.

Solace Global Assessment: The bill’s most controversial measures involve the direct election of approximately 7,000 judges, magistrates and Supreme Court justices, along with the removal and lowering of several requirements. Critics warn that the bill will politicise the judiciary, lessen the strength of checks and balances against the ruling Morena party, and enable organised crime to exert greater influence over the Mexican judicial system.

The Morena party is only one seat short of the required supermajority in the Senate, and it is highly likely that the bill will pass. President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum’s swearing-in ceremony will take place on 1 October, and she has indicated that the reform package will be one of the first priorities for her administration.

The indefinite nationwide strike by judiciary workers began on 19 August, and demonstrations have taken place in several cities across Mexico. The decision by the Supreme Court to join the strike is highly likely to lend further legitimacy to the protests, which are unlikely to subside in the coming weeks.

While the unrest has been generally peaceful thus far, the blocking of roads and access to Mexico’s congress is an escalation in the tactics employed by the demonstrators, likely indicative of increasing desperation to stop the bill. It is likely that as the legislation further progresses towards being signed into law, unrest will intensify.

Trucker protests paralyse Colombia’s transport network.

Widespread trucker protests have erupted across Colombia following the government’s decision to increase diesel prices. On 31 August, the government raised the price of diesel by 1,904 Colombian pesos or 45 US cents per gallon. In protest, truckers have cut off many of Colombia’s largest cities by staging roadblocks on the nation’s major highways. On 4 September, Colombia’s ombudsman stated that there were at least 127 demonstrations being held across 13 regions, with 42 of them consisting of total road blockades.

Solace Global Assessment: The almost 21 per cent increase in diesel prices by the government has been claimed as fair and justified on the grounds that the country has long subsidised prices. Prices have been held for four years at just over 9,000 pesos but the government has stated that this was fiscally unsustainable and was costing it over one trillion pesos a month.

However, truckers have argued that the immediate and high price increase is set to push their businesses to bankruptcy. Truckers have also likely been frustrated by the removal of subsidies as it has coincided with a huge increase in government spending elsewhere by Colombia’s leftist President Gustavo Petro.

Trucker protests have led to major supply chain issues, reducing the amount of food arriving at wholesale markets. If sustained, the trucker protests are likely to result in price increases and could spark unrest within major cities like Bogota, Medellin and Cali. Colombia’s largest state-owned oil and gas company, Ecopetrol, has also warned that the protests will affect the production of hydrocarbons and fuel supplies across the country.

This trend has been exacerbated by a spate of attacks on Colombia’s pipeline infrastructure in areas held by the National Liberation Army or ELN, following the end of a fragile ceasefire agreement.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to resume on US campuses.

Classes in multiple US colleges that were the epicentres of pro-Palestine protests, including Columbia University, began during this reporting period. It is highly likely that pro-Palestine groups will resume protests from the 6-8 September weekend, and that these will include attempts to start campus “encampments” and, more likely, disrupt local roadways and public transport.

First US presidential debate scheduled for 10 September.

Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump are set to participate in their first debate at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia on 10 September. Given the recent assassination attempt on Donald Trump and the degree of political division in the US, the debates will almost certainly involve heightened security measures and will likely attract large demonstrations in support of a range of issues, most likely the conflict in the Middle East.

Venezuela issues arrest warrant for opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez.

Gonzalez and co-leader of the opposition Maria Corina Machado are currently believed to be in hiding in Venezuela, while other prominent opposition members have either escaped or sought refuge in diplomatic offices in the country. The arrest order is almost certainly meant to reinforce the government’s legitimacy, and may be a prelude to more violent suppression of remaining opposition groups and individuals associated with Gonzalez. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that authorities are aiming to provoke the expatriation of Gonzalez and Machado, likely aiming to link their positions with foreign adversaries of the Maduro regime, while also reducing their ability to coordinate domestic protests at a later date.

US sailor detained by Venezuelan authorities.

According to Pentagon officials, a US Navy sailor was detained in Caracas on 30 August and is currently being held by the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). The detained US service member was reportedly not on approved leave or official travel, and his purpose in-country is currently unknown. On 2 September, the US Justice Department seized a plane belonging to Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, which will likely impede the sailor’s release. It is a realistic possibility that the detention is a result of Venezuelan hostage diplomacy. It is additionally, however, a realistic possibility that the detention relates to concerns from Venezuelan authorities regarding subversive anti-regime actions from US nationals, heightened since the failed 2020 coup plot Operation Gideon that was led by an ex-US service member.

Loggers killed by indigenous group in Peruvian Amazon.

On September 3, two loggers were killed and two others are missing after a clash with the Mashco Piro, an isolated indigenous community in Peru’s Amazon. The conflict occurred in the Madre de Dios region where loggers have been clearing a trail. Confrontations between loggers and indigenous tribes are like to increase as the logging, both legal and illegal, of the Amazon increases. The Peruvian government is investigating the incident, under pressure from local rights groups who claim that the government is failing to recognise indigenous territory.

Continued row between Brazilian judiciary and Elon Musk.

The judiciary of Brazil ordered the owner of X.com, Elon Musk, to uphold the country’s ban on the social network, which followed the platform’s refusal to comply with court orders regarding the removal of profiles spreading disinformation. Musk initially refused to comply with the latest order and has increasingly accused the Brazilian government of ideologically motivated censorship. Musk’s involvement in Brazilian politics has been praised by supporters of former President Bolsonaro, who have called for protests against the Supreme Court on 7 September.

Haiti’s main hydro-electric plant ceases to operate.

On 3 September, Haiti’s state-owned power company, Electricité d’Haiti (EDH), reported that output from the Peligre hydroelectric plant had ceased due to protests over power distribution, with protestors demanding that energy be redistributed beyond the capital, Port-au-Prince. The plant, which provides most of Haiti’s hydroelectric power, has been offline since 2 September, worsened by damage to two transformers and disrupted access due to gang control. Only 49 per cent of Haitians reportedly now have grid access, with the energy blackout likely to further exacerbate many of the country’s current issues, including crime, displacement and the humanitarian situation.

August worst month in two decades for Brazilian wildfires.

Satellite-derived data from Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (Inpe) has indicated that August was the worst month for wildfires in the country since 2010. The 38,266 fire hotspots identified in the Amazon in August were nearly twice the amount observed in the previous month. Warmer temperatures and drier vegetation have provided conditions conducive to the spread of wildfires, many of which are started deliberately to clear land for cattle pastures. Multiple investigations are currently underway looking into possible criminal involvement in the starting of wildfires. Furthermore, deforestation has decreased the rainforest’s long-term ability to maintain moisture, suggesting that future wildfires will increase in scale and frequency.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) wins first state parliamentary election in Thuringia.

In addition to winning 32.8 per cent of the votes cast in the central German state, the party also received the second most votes in Saxony, 31 per cent. The results represent the first time that a far-right party has won an election in Germany since the Second World War.

Solace Global Assessment: The AfD is unlikely to enter the state’s government, as the remaining parties are likely to adopt a strategy of alliances similar to that used by their French counterparts to prevent Le Pen’s National Rally from obtaining power. Still, the result is notable as it is the first time that the AfD has won a state election and is likely to have a significant impact on German politics.

Compared to other European far-right parties – for instance, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy or Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, which have moderated some of their positions in order to court moderate right votes – the AfD’s continued rise has not coincided with a notable change in its proposed policies. In Thuringia itself, the party is led by Björn Höcke, who was found guilty by German courts for using Nazi rhetoric twice. It is likely that the AfD’s victory will prompt civil unrest in Thuringia, Saxony, and in large urban centres in Germany.

There is a realistic possibility that increasing popular support for the AfD will be seized by far-right and identitarian groups to carry out demonstrations and symbolic disruptive action. Finally, the positive performance (15.8 per cent of the vote in Thuringia and 11.8 per cent in Saxony) of the new Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance party (BSW) is also notable. BSW was founded in January 2024 after breaking away from The Left party, and it represents a left-wing populist, socially conservative and nationalist formation that rejects Berlin’s support for Ukraine and the environmentalist policies of the rest of the left.

On 22 September, elections are scheduled for Brandenburg. Polls predict an AfD win (with more than 24 per cent of the vote) and show a realistic chance for BSW to come third or fourth. Another AfD victory, and continued BSW growth, are likely to seriously damage the current governing coalition’s perceived legitimacy. They may, furthermore, create questions about the viability of the SPD-CDU coalition.

Finally, it is important to note that there has been a rise in lone-wolf Islamist attacks in Germany, and media associated with groups like the Islamic State (IS) have called for further attacks following the Mannheim stabbing in late May. It is possible that the AfD victory, even if not directly resulting in the passing of new policies in the short term, will drive a rise in extremist activity in Germany.

Largest West Bank operation of the war ends, Hamas shares new hostage policy.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) declared, on 6 September, that their almost two-weeks-long raids in Jenin, Tulkarem and Tubas have ended. The large-scale operation, which has resulted in at least 33 deaths and 140 injuries, including the head of Hamas in Jenin, was described by Israeli authorities as a response to a growing number of attacks on Israeli settlers and citizens in the West Bank and Israeli territory. In Gaza, Hamas announced a new policy of killing Israeli captives if IDF forces approach areas where they are being held, following the recovery of six hostages’ bodies who had reportedly been shot by their guards, The policy reportedly dates back to June. The reports on the deaths of the six hostages prompted further protests in Israel calling for the Netanyahu administration to reach a ceasefire deal. Protests in Israel were particularly severe in Tel Aviv, with at least 550,000 demonstrators gathering in the city.

Solace Global Assessment: The question of the control over the Philadelphi corridor likely remains the main obstacle in the way of a ceasefire deal. On 4 September, Israeli officials stated that IDF positions at the border with Egypt would be assessed at the war’s end. For Tel Aviv, maintaining control of the Philadelphi corridor is crucial to depriving Hamas of lethal aid and degrading its capabilities. Hamas leaders are likewise highly likely aware of the general degradation of their fighting strength, and of the skills of the fighters that they are able to recruit from the Palestinian population – whose survivability rate has decreased in recent months.

The new hostage policy – which was notably only announced months after its first apparent implementation, likely reflects Hamas’ growing concern over its ability to hold and transfer hostages whilst under pressure from IDF operations. The tactic may also be indicative of a new strategy aimed at undermining Israeli resolve and applying pressure on the Netanyahu administration.

The executions will almost certainly fuel further unrest in Israel and could put pressure on Tel Aviv to accept ceasefire demands that are more favourable to Hamas. However, the often indiscriminate nature of the Israeli campaign to date would suggest that it is unlikely to cause a major shift in Netanyahu’s demands. Moreover, the hostages are Hamas’ main source of leverage. Executing them en masse would diminish this leverage and reaffirm Netanyahu’s stance that Hamas needs to be completely destroyed as a military and political force.

Rival Libyan legislatures jointly agree to appoint new central bank governor.

On 3 September, Libya’s two rival legislative bodies jointly signed a statement agreeing to appoint a central bank governor within 30 days. Previously, on 18 August, long-term governor Sadiq al-Kabir was unilaterally dismissed by the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), which increased tensions In Libya. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) is responsible for holding Libya’s oil revenues, with Libya’s oil reserves being the largest in Africa. The crisis at the CBL has had a wide-ranging impact on Libya’s economy, hampering the payment of state salaries and ordinary transactions.

Assessment: The agreement is likely to reduce tensions in Libya, which have in recent weeks been at their highest since the 2020 ceasefire between the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA, now the GNU) and the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA).

The LNA has been highly likely instrumentalising the flow of oil, causing shutdowns and reduced operations at several oil fields including Libya’s largest, the Shahara oil field. Mass LNA troop mobilisations in the west and southwest of the country, particularly in the vicinity of the strategically significant Ghadames Airport, have caused great concern that Libya is on the verge of renewed civil war.

While the agreement to resolve the crisis at the CBL will likely lessen tensions in the short term, and will likely alleviate the threat of economic crisis, it still remains a realistic possibility that renewed conflict could break out in Libya between the rival governments.

Over 100 killed in Islamist attack in northeast Nigeria.

On 1 September, approximately 150 armed militants suspected of belonging to the Islamist group Boko Haram conducted an attack on the village of Mafa, Yobe State in northeast Nigeria. The militants arrived on motorcycles armed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades and then began to indiscriminately attack locals and set fire to multiple homes and businesses. Original estimates put the death toll at just under 40; however, most revisions have now placed the death toll at over 100.

Solace Global Assessment: The attack took place in northeast Nigeria, where an Islamist insurgency primarily led by Boko Haram has lasted for 15 years and has taken the lives of approximately 40,000 people. It is almost certain that Boko Haram operates within this area with a high degree of freedom and is likely exploiting the increased destabilisation of the wider Sahel region to conduct increased cross-border operations. This attack closely resembles the recent Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) attack in Burkina Faso which killed as many as 500 people. Boko Haram has traditionally employed a range of tactics, including suicide bombings, mass kidnappings and raids or armed assaults.

However, there is a realistic possibility that the success of JNIM’s attack, the overstretching of Nigerian security services and the growing strength of Boko Haram have inspired it to transition towards more hit-and-run raids using motorcycles. These attacks enable Boko Haram to attack isolated villages and then swiftly withdraw before the military can be deployed to the area.

Additionally, by targeting small villages, Boko Haram may force military commanders to spread their resources thinly, making it challenging to allocate sufficient support to defend future potential targets. Of note, unconfirmed reports indicate that militants left the area and rigged the roads leading to it with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), highly likely in an effort to delay the arrival of the armed forces. The scale and sophistication of the attack likely indicate a growth in Boko Haram’s organisational and logistical capacity, which have likely been facilitated by the group’s alliances with regional bandits and ability to exploit safe havens in border areas.

These attacks are likely to continue and will undermine the government’s authority and its ability to provide security, a development that is likely to lead to civil unrest against the government in Nigeria’s north- a trend that has been witnessed throughout the region.

Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier appointed new French Prime Minister.

Barnier is a representative of the Gaullist right adjacent to the Republicans (LR). His appointment ends a two-month-long period of uncertainty that followed the National Assembly elections. The move is likely to be followed by concessions to the right, particularly Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), which will be crucial to surviving a no-confidence vote. Barnier’s appointment is almost certainly going to be received extremely negatively by the left-wing coalition, the New Popular Front (NFP), which had suggested Lucie Castets as a potential prime minister. The NFP was seemingly moving towards collapse due to tensions between its two main members, the Socialists (PS) and the populist France Unbowed (LFI). However, with Macron turning to the right rather than the PS, the left is likely to call for large-scale anti-Macron demonstrations in the coming weeks. As numerous far-left groups threatened violent action if LFI was kept from governing, there is a high likelihood of sabotage.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to increase in intensity in Western Europe.

It is likely that pro-Palestine protests will increase in intensity in September in European countries that have had major protest movements, especially in large urban centres. This is due to multiple factors: the beginning of the academic year, the overlap with multiple Palestine-related anniversaries (i.e. Black September, Oslo Accords), and the approaching one-year anniversary of the 7 October attack.

Volkswagen (VW) cost-cutting plans are likely to provoke civil unrest in Germany.

Senior representatives of the automotive industry giant, which employs about half of its 600,000 workers in Germany, have announced that they are considering cutting production in Germany to relocate plants to other more competitive markets, where labour costs are lower. The announcement is likely to translate into concrete policies, as VW has recently had a decline in profits and competitiveness, especially in the growing electric vehicle market. There is a high likelihood that further pressures will result in labour union reactions, including strikes and protests, in areas that host VW plants.

Major transport strikes organised across Italy.

A series of public transport and air travel strikes have been organised across Italy and are set to begin on 7 September. Strikes over worker conditions for ground operations workers, air traffic controllers and baggage handlers are set to cause major disruptions at Rome’s Fiumicino and Olbia, Milan Malpensa, Florence Amerigo Vespucci and Pisa Galileo Galilei airports. A nationwide rail strike organised for 9 September will be closely followed by a nationwide public transport workers’ walkout will almost certainly cause major disruption on Italy’s train, bus, tram and underground services.

Kosovo closes institutions that serve Serb minority.

On 31 August, Kosovar authorities closed five institutions in the north that served the ethnic Serb minority, a move that escalated tensions with Serbia. Kosovo’s local administration minister, Elbert Krasniqi, stated that these institutions violated Kosovo’s constitution and laws. US officials expressed worries that the move could destabilise the region, a concern that has likely been amplified by Russia’s recent attempts to sow division in the area, including treating Bosnia’s breakaway Republika Srpska as a recognised state. The head of Mitrovica Citizens’ Association, a Kosovar Serb group, has announced the blockade of all administrative border crossings with Serbia in North Kosovo in response to Kosovo’s actions.

Two US marines attacked by mob in Turkey.

Ten individuals were arrested for attacking two US marines in the centre of Izmir. The perpetrators were reportedly part of a nationalist and left-Kemalist (the ideology based on the ideas of Turkish 20^th century leader Ataturk) group known as the Youth Union of Turkey. The arrests have been challenged by the group, and there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory protests by the Youth Union in Izmir and other cities where it has a strong presence, including Istanbul. The actions may also lead to similar attacks on US personnel within Turkey.

Algerian President Tebboune likely to win re-election on 7 September.

The vote, which has been protested by the opposition for being rescheduled to September rather than the customary date in December, is likely to be affected by low voter turnout and government interference. Tebboune’s highly likely re-election could result in protests in Algiers and other cities, albeit these are unlikely to reach the severity of the 2019 protests.

Senegal likely to look to the West for counterterrorism operations.

The newly elected government of Senegal, which has espoused an overall anti-West rhetoric and has previously made diplomatic gestures in favour of the neighbouring Sahel junta states, asked for more international cooperation to tackle local jihadist groups during a visit by Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez. It is highly likely that the move is a response to the failure of the junta states’ counterterrorism operations, which are becoming increasingly reliant on Russian help which has yet to curtail the rate of extremist attacks. The Islamist groups operating in the Sahel likely aim to reach the comparatively richer coastal West African states, as part of growing ambitions to develop territorial entities.

Islamist lone wolf attack in Munich.

The attack occurred on 5 September, near the Israeli consulate and a Holocaust Museum. The attacker almost certainly carried out the attack to coincide with the 52^nd anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, where members of the Palestinian organisation Black September took hostages and killed 11 Israeli athletes. The Munich attacker was killed by police, and no other casualties were recorded. The attack is notable due to the use of a long-barrel rifle by the perpetrator as, in Europe, most lone-wolf attacks involve bladed weapons. According to police reports, the attacker was a self-radicalised 18-year-old supporter of the Islamic State (IS). In 2023, he had reportedly already been investigated by authorities for terrorism-related offences. The attack continues the trend of notably young lone wolves, likely underscoring the growing effect of online self-radicalisation.

Houthis reportedly attack two oil tankers in the Red Sea, including Saudi flagged vessel.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that the Houthis struck the Panama flagged MV BLUE LAGOON I and the Saudi flagged MV AMJAD on 2 September with two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and one one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV). Neither vessel was seriously damaged. The Houthis and Saudi Arabia, after being engaged in a seven-year conflict between 2015-2022, are participating in ongoing peace negotiations and have generally abided by a cessation of fighting since 2022. Both vessels were sailing in close proximity to each other, and it is likely that the Houthis accidentally struck the MV AMJAD. The AMJAD’s owner, Saudi shipping firm Bahri, “unequivocally affirm[ed] that AMJAD was not targeted”, and the Houthis omitted any mention of the AMJAD in their claim of responsibility. This highly likely indicates that both parties are keen to avoid jeopardising peace negotiations.

Prison break in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) results in more than 100 deaths.

The escape started after a riot broke out in the Makala prison of Kinshasa. Authorities responded violently and the resulting clashes killed at least 129 and injured 59. DRC prisons are highly overcrowded, and the government has recently sought to release some inmates convicted of low-level offences to alleviate the pressure. There is a realistic possibility that the combination of overcrowding and insufficient police resources will provoke further riots and prison break attempts.

Uganda opposition leader Bobi Wine shot by police.

Bobi Wine was initially elected as an independent but joined the opposition National Unity Platform party prior to the 2021 presidential election. In early 2024, he announced that he would again run in 2026, challenging Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda since 1986. The autocratic government of Uganda is characterised by a strong symbiotic relationship between government, the judiciary, and security forces, and there is a high likelihood that the shooting was a deliberate attempt on the opposition leader’s life. Due to Bobi Wine’s domestic and international popularity, it is likely that the case will spark significant unrest.

At least one tourist dead following flash floods in Mallorca, Spain.

The individual died while hiking in the area of the Torrent de Pareis, in the Tramuntana mountain range. Approximately ten other people were also trapped by the floods before being rescued. On 2-3 September, extreme weather, with severe showers and localised flash flooding, affected various coastal areas throughout the Mediterranean, including parts of Greece, central Italy and eastern Spain.

Protest bill approved ahead of planned demonstration by main opposition party.

On 5 September, the Pakistani Senate passed the ‘Peaceful Assembly and Public Order Bill 2024’ law. Pending further approval, the law is set to be implemented before a planned major 8 September demonstration by the main opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in support of the jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan. The proposed legislation will empower Islamabad officials to ban assemblies in designated areas, with participants in unauthorised protests liable to receive prison sentences of up to three years.

Solace Global Assessment: In 2023, large-scale civil unrest frequently occurred in Pakistan after attempts to arrest Khan. Initially, the protests were managed by police with riot control measures such as tear gas and water cannons. Later demonstrations led to military deployment and internet shutdowns. Critics view the bill as a government tactic to suppress opposition and the bill’s passage is likely to heighten tensions.

The 8 September demonstration had already been rescheduled from 22 August following the withdrawal of permission by officials, and it is likely that authorities will attempt to suppress the upcoming rally. It is highly likely that violent clashes will occur in Islamabad during the protest. The bill reflects the government’s unstable position following contentious elections in February 2024 and will likely exacerbate levels of violence in future protests that are not granted official permission.

Garment workers protest for higher pay in industrial areas.

Protests by garment factory workers in early September, mainly in key industrial areas such as Gazipur and Narayanganj, resulted in the closure of 130 garment factories. Their demands include higher wages, maternity leave and other concessions. The protesters vandalised factories and vehicles, as well as blocked roads, which resulted in the deployment of military and police forces. Although some workers continued to work throughout the protests, factories were forced to close in order to protect their employees from the violence. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) stated that unspecified “outsiders” were responsible for the violence. The protests initially focused on the demands of garment workers, but then reportedly escalated when outsiders joined the demonstrations, gathering outside factories demanding jobs and pressuring workers to join the protests. In response to the protests, the government has increased security in industrial areas, which allowed the factories to reopen on 5 September.

Solace Global Assessment: These protests are the first significant labour action in Bangladesh’s garment sector since the new interim government took office in August. Although there is increased security in the areas where protests took place, tensions are still likely to persist because a negotiated settlement between the garment workers and BGMEA has not yet been reached. The BGMEA has suggested that the unrest may be linked to the current political instability of Bangladesh, with tensions remaining high since the resignation of the prime minister on 9 August following weeks of deadly protests. Although an interim government has been established to restore law and order, it is likely that groups may be exploiting this to gain access and control of the garment market. On top of this, the ongoing mass floods across Bangladesh have meant factories have had to grapple with production stoppages. The political instability and financial strain the BGMEA are facing mean it is unlikely that the BGMEA will meet the demands of the protests, which would highly likely generate further unrest.In October and November 2023, garment workers’ strikes led to violent clashes with police, with at least three deaths and factories being set alight. There is a realistic possibility that equivalent levels of violence could occur again as a result of the ongoing industrial disputes.

Super Typhoon strength storm Yagi makes landfall in Hainan.

Tropical Cyclone Yagi made landfall in Hainan, China, on 6 September. The storm made landfall at Super Typhoon strength, equivalent to a category 5 hurricane, with maximum windspeeds recorded of 241km/h. Yagi had earlier impacted the northern Philippines on 3-4 September as Severe Tropical Storm Enteng, killing 16 people. Luzon was the most impacted. Yagi then moved past Hong Kong and Macau, causing disruptions.

The Chinese Central Meteorological Agency has issued a red typhoon warning for Hainan and Guangdong, the highest warning possible. Over 400,000 people were evacuated on the southern Chinese coastline.

Solace Global Assessment: Yagi is the second-strongest Tropical Cyclone to occur anywhere in the world in 2024. It is the largest storm to hit Hainan since 2014 when Typhoon Rammasun killed at least 88 people and caused over USD 6.25 billion in damages. Hainan is a tropical holiday destination, referred to as “China’s Hawaii”. In anticipation of the Super Typhoon, Hainan was brought to a standstill, with businesses, schools and transport being halted. While the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area was spared notably severe impact, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai bridge and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange were closed.

The impact in Hainan, where Yagi has made landfall as a Super Typhoon, is highly likely to be worse. Meteorologists have warned that the scale of damage in Hainan could be “catastrophic”. The rigorous preparedness measures by Chinese authorities will, however, significantly aid in mitigating the worst possible outcomes.

Yagi is forecast to weaken from a Super Typhoon to a Very Strong Typhoon once it moves past Hainan, before weakening further to Typhoon strength just before making landfall in northern Vietnam. Four airports have already been closed in northern Vietnam, including Hanoi’s Noi Bai International Airport. Despite Yagi’s greatly increased strength over southern China, it is a realistic possibility that Yagi will cause more fatalities in Vietnam due to Vietnam’s higher level of vulnerability.

Putin visits Mongolia despite ICC arrest warrant.

The state visit likely represents an effort by Putin to highlight that, despite its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia is not internationally isolated. The visit is also likely to reflect ongoing Russian efforts to begin transitioning from its reliance on Europe as the main market for its fossil fuels. Russia and Mongolia have continued talks regarding the construction of a pipeline connecting the two countries.

Pope Francis tours Southeast Asia.

Pope Francis has arrived in Indonesia as part of his 12-day tour of Southeast Asia where he will visit Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Indonesia. In Jakarta, the Pope and Grand Imam Nasaruddin Umar of Istiqlal Mosque pledged to combat religious violence and environmental degradation, highlighting interfaith unity through a symbolic event at the mosque.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) carries out suicide bombing in Kabul.

ISKP had previously carried out a suicide bombing in Kandahar, one of the Taliban’s main strongholds. Its attack outside a Kabul government office, which killed at least six, is likely meant to further demonstrate the group’s ability to strike the Taliban’s administrative centres. Taliban authorities have continuously minimised the threat posed by ISKP, which nevertheless continues to be the Islamic State’s most active and likely most capable “province”.

South China Sea confrontations continue at Sabina Shoal.

Manila and Beijing accused each other of deliberately ramming each other’s vessels in an incident on 31 August at the disputed Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. Aggressive confrontations between Chinese and Filipino vessels have occurred multiple times in recent months at the Second Thomas Shoal, and a deal was reached in late July that was hoped to de-escalate the situation. However, the new incident at the Sabina Shoal, in addition to a reported vessel collision there on 19 August, highly likely indicates that tensions remain high in the South China Sea with a new flashpoint for confrontations at the Sabina Shoal.

Monsoon rains cause deadly flooding in southern India.

Higher than average monsoon rains resulted in the deaths at least 33 people in southern India between 1 and 3 September. Significant flooding occurred as a result of the annual monsoon season since June. Forecasts indicate that the heavy rainfall will continue into late September. While the monsoon season is an annually recurring issue, this year’s monsoon will ultimately highly likely cause a greater level of impact than in previous years, exacerbated by La Nina weather conditions that will likely develop in September. Officials from the India Meteorological Department (IMD) indicate that the withdrawal of the monsoon season will likely be delayed as a result of developing La Nina weather conditions.

Military doctors deployed in South Korean hospitals due to ongoing strikes.

The measure was announced by the health ministry on 2 September to try to alleviate shortages in medical staff. Thousands of junior doctors have been conducting strikes since February 2024, in protest of government plans to drastically increase annual medical school admission caps. While authorities dispute claims by the national association of medical school professions that the medical system is on the verge of collapse, the deployment of military doctors is likely indicative of serious concerns that the staff shortage has drastically impacted the provision of healthcare.

Congressional commission approves controversial judicial reform bill.

On 26 August, a commission in the lower house of Mexico’s Congress approved a judicial reform package, enabling a final debate to take place in the newly-elected Congress next month. The ruling Morena party, who won a landslide victory in June, will hold a two-thirds supermajority in the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies and are only one seat short in the Senate.

The most controversial measure in the judicial reform bill involves a plan to have approximately 7,000 judges, magistrates and Supreme Court justices elected by popular vote. Additionally, the bill scraps a 35-year age limit, lowers experience requirements, and reduces the size of the Supreme Court. The overhaul of the judiciary is planned to be enacted in stages, with staggered judicial elections taking place in 2025 and 2027.

In reaction, both the US and Canadian embassies expressed serious concerns, which led to Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) announcing a pause in relations with these embassies on 27 August. Unions that represent many of the 55,000 judicial workers in Mexico previously launched an indefinite nationwide strike on 19 August, later joined by Mexico’s association of federal judges and magistrates, in protest against the potential reform package.

Solace Global Assessment: 

AMLO, the popular outgoing president who has enjoyed high approval ratings and will be replaced by his successor Claudia Sheinbaum in October, frequently clashed with the courts during his presidential term. The Supreme Court in particular, impeded the implementation of several of AMLO’s initiatives. In response, AMLO has frequently described the Mexican judiciary as corrupt. Proponents of the judicial reform bill argue that it will address endemic corruption in the judiciary. It is highly likely, however, that the bill will further empower the ruling Moreno party. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) held uninterrupted power for 71 years until 2000, effectively making Mexico a single-party state during this period. While constitutional reform has addressed some of these historic issues in Mexico’s democracy, critics of the judicial reform argue that its passage will give the Moreno party too much power without adequate checks and balances.

While purportedly intended to tackle corruption, the bill’s passage would likely enable organised crime to exploit judicial elections for their own ends. During Mexico’s elections, the cartels regularly assassinate candidates and engage in voter suppression. If judges are directly elected, it is highly likely that cartels will attempt to subvert the democratic process, undermining the strength of the judiciary in tackling organised crime. The strikes against the bill have temporarily weakened Mexico’s fragile justice system, and it is likely that the strikes will continue and potentially escalate if the bill passes through both houses.

Large wildfires continue in Brazil, authorities suspect criminal cause.

Record-breaking wildfires are ongoing across the Amazon, Cerrado savannah, Pantanal wetland and the state of Sao Paulo in Brazil. So far, two people have died as a result of the fires, in Urupes. 48 cities declared a red alert due to poor air quality. The smog has impacted cities such as Brazil’s capital, Brasilia, as well as Sao Paulo, Manaus, Porto Velho, Rio Branco and Sao Jose do Rio Preto. In Sao Paulo state, a crisis cabinet was set up to tackle the fires, and the Brazilian environment minister declared that Brazil is “at war” with the fires on 25 August.the paragraph.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Authorities suspect that organised crime gangs are largely responsible for the fires. While a federal prosecutor has stated that there is so far no conclusive evidence that the arson has been coordinated, there are several indications that criminal gangs are likely involved.

Firstly, of the 3,500 fire alerts in southeastern Sao Paulo state, over half were raised on the same day, 23 August. The State Agriculture Secretary later told media that the starting of fires in different locations at the same time indicates coordination and criminal intent. Secondly, according to Brazilian President Lula da Silva, no fires caused by lightning strikes were detected by Brazil’s national fire monitoring centre. Thirdly, Brazilian police have arrested four people linked to the fires, with two men caught on security cameras setting fires.

Some of the suspects have reportedly told police that the fires were set in retaliation against crimefighting efforts. It is likely that the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) gang, one of Brazil’s largest and most powerful organised criminal groups, are connected to the fires. Authorities have recently engaged in a campaign to tackle the PCC’s illicit adulterated fuels trade, which is the most likely trigger for retaliation by the PCC. In 2006, the PCC unleashed a wave of violence across Sao Paulo state which killed over 150 people.

While human involvement in Brazilian wildfires is not uncommon, mainly due to illegal deforestation and agricultural practices, the potential weaponisation of wildfires by criminal gangs is a concerning new development. With a relatively low number of resources, manpower and technical skill, the setting of wildfires can have a significant, highly visible and widespread impact that overstretches resources and capabilities.

The effects of the current fires are being felt in several major Brazilian cities, which are covered in smog. It is likely that if the fires are indeed the result of coordinated organised criminal actions, gangs will continue to deploy the tactic in future when the need for retaliation arises. There is a realistic possibility that gangs elsewhere in Latin America may be inspired by the weaponisation of wildfires and deploy the tactic themselves.

Honduras to end extradition treaty with the US.

On 28 August, Honduras announced that it would terminate its century-old extradition treaty with the US following US concerns over a meeting between Honduran and Venezuelan defence officials about drug trafficking. President Xiomara Castro condemned what she saw as US interference in Honduran politics. The treaty had facilitated the extradition of prominent figures, including former President Juan Orlando Hernandez, convicted in the US on drug charges. The treaty’s termination likely signals Honduras’ alignment with Venezuela and a deterioration in US-Honduran relations which could harm US efforts to combat drugs trafficking.

Protests and government crackdown continue in Venezuela.

Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado called for peaceful protests and international pressure to oust Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, on 27 August. This follows a 22 August decision by the Supreme Court of Venezuela, which is made up of Maduro loyalists, to certify the contested 28 July election result. The election result was highly likely rigged by the regime, with several indications that the opposition won a landslide victory. The regime has since launched a crackdown, and on 27 August, leading opposition figure and lawyer Perkins Rocha was allegedly “kidnapped” by security forces.  An opposition demonstration occurred in Caracas on 28 August, attended by Machado, which was smaller than prior protests. There had been a relative lull in unrest in the past fortnight, highly likely due to the impact of government suppression in arresting protest leaders and the threat of reprisals. While Machado’s call for a revival of anti-government protests is likely to temporarily increase unrest in Venezuela in the short term, it is likely that the extent of the regime’s crackdown will severely curtail the opposition’s organisational capability.

Haitian military starts recruitment drive to combat gang violence.

The Haitian government has launched a huge recruitment drive for its military in a bid to combat escalating gang violence, with gangs controlling 80 per cent of the country. Thousands of Haitian youth are seizing the opportunity, likely as it is one of the few sustainable sources of revenue in a country plagued by poverty and unemployment. However, after being disbanded in 1995 and only reinstated in 2017, it is likely that the military is ill-equipped to deal with the well-armed and organised gangs. Haitian forces have also initiated a joint operation with the recently deployed Kenyan police to oust gangs from one of Port-au-Prince’s most dangerous neighbourhoods. However, the Kenyan police have not yet been paid by the UN, which, if this continues, could impact the effectiveness of the intervention force.

US warns of increased violence in Culiacan, Sinaloa.

The US Embassy in Mexico issued a security alert on 29 August warning of violence and security concerns in Culiacan, Sinaloa province. The alert has warned of the potential for violence across the state but has not provided further details. The alert has likely been published in response to the recent arrest of the Sinaloa Cartel’s leader, “El Mayo” and the son of El Chapo Guzman which has created a power vacuum in Mexico’s most powerful organised crime group.

Central Bolivia struggles to contain wildfires.

The central Bolivian department of Santa Cruz is grappling with a severe environmental crisis, as over 27 wildfires rage, mainly in the Chiquitania region. These fires, exacerbated by extreme drought and strong winds, have devastated 26 of the department’s 56 municipalities and burned nearly 2 million hectares, surpassing the damage caused by the 2019 fires. The situation is particularly dire in municipalities such as San Ignacio de Velasco, San Matías, Santa Ana, and Concepción, where conditions remain favourable for further fire spread. Moreover, Bolivia lacks the personnel and resources to effectively curtail the spread of the fires and will likely be forced to ask for international aid. Fires have significantly worsened air quality, severely affecting vulnerable populations like children, the elderly, and those with respiratory conditions.

Brazilian state of Rondônia declares state of emergency.

The Brazilian state of Rondônia has declared a state of emergency for 180 days valid from 26 August due to the impact of forest fires. The number of fires has doubled compared to August 2023, with nearly 6000 so far in 2024. The fires have hugely disrupted agriculture, river navigation and the local economy. The state is also suffering from water shortages due to a prolonged drought, which is forecasted to last for the next 90 days. The major city of Porto-Velho has not recorded significant rainfall for three months. Water levels on the Madeira River, which runs through the states of Rondônia and Amazonas, have reached their lowest level since 1964 and will likely disproportionately affect riverine communities.

Widespread power outages reported across Venezuela.

Power outages were reported in at least 17 Venezuelan regions, including the capital Caracas on 30 August. The outages are similar to the ones in 2019 which began just before the presidential election and lasted for several months afterwards. The 2019 outages resulted in at least 43 deaths after disrupting the country’s healthcare facilities, transport, industry, and water services. President Maduro blamed both the 2019 and current outages on “sabotage”; however, the likelihood is that Venezuela has suffered a huge reduction in technical expertise following a brain drain of skilled workers.

Macron rules out appointment of prime minister from New Popular Front.

On 26 August, the office of French President Emmanuel Macron stated that following consultations, Macron has ruled out the appointment of a prime minister from the left-wing coalition New Popular Front (NFP).

The June and July snap legislative elections resulted in a hung parliament, with the NFP, Macron’s centrist Ensemble party, and the far-right National Rally (RN) parties winning most of the available seats. Of these, the NFP won the most seats. The RN stated earlier on 26 August that the party would block any prime ministerial appointment coming from the NFP. In reaction, the NFP has announced a refusal to engage in any new consultations unless they are to discuss the nomination of their candidate, Lucie Castets, as prime minister. 

Solace Global Assessment: The NFP is an electoral alliance between the far-left France Unbowed (LFI), the Socialists, the Greens and the Communists. Of these, Mélenchon’s LFI has the most seats. While Castets, is affiliated with the centre-left Socialist Party, it is likely that her confirmation that she would appoint LFI ministers led Macron to conclude that her appointment would be politically unworkable. This is due to the threat of no-confidence motions against a government with LFI ministers. In recent political history, since the establishment of the French Fifth Republic’s strong presidential system in 1958, coalition negotiations have not been a common feature of the French political process. The current stalemate is unlikely to be resolved with a stable, lasting solution. The NFP and NR are likely to both seek to exploit the political chaos to oust Macron, whose presidential term is set to end in 2027, via a call for an early presidential election, should the stalemate not be resolved. The LFI has called for large demonstrations on 7 September, a day before the end of the Paris Paralympic Games, and the Communists have called for a “big popular mobilisation” in the coming days. It is highly likely that civil unrest will increase in France, after a lull during the Olympic Games. Due to the high-security measures that will be enforced during the Paralympic Games in Paris, it is likely that demonstrations will be met with a vigorous police response, which would in turn likely lead to violent clashes.

Al-Qaeda-linked militants killed hundreds on road to capital.

On 24 August, the Burkinabe town of Barsalogho was targeted in a major militant attack. Current estimates assess that as many as 200-500 people were killed in the attack and hundreds injured, most of whom were reportedly civilians. The attack has been claimed by the al-Qaeda-linked Jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The military government was reportedly aware of an impending attack and ordered troops, Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) and civilians to hastily erect defences. JNIM ambushed the defenders in the open, firing indiscriminately on those within the defensive area until reinforcements of Burkinabe troops and the VDP managed to repel the attack.

Solace Global Assessment: The Barsalogho attack marks the worst terrorist attack in Burkina Faso’s history and clearly demonstrates how much the security situation has deteriorated since the expulsion of Western forces. Moreover, with the junta government’s expulsion of Western forces in neighbouring Niger and Mali, violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have been presented with favourable conditions to achieve their objectives. JNIM in particular have exploited the regional destabilisation to expand their operations across the Sahel. Whilst VEOs like JNIM do not typically govern territory in the same manner as a state, it is now assessed that JNIM controls approximately 40 per cent of Burkina Faso as well as huge parts of Mali and Niger.

The attack has almost certainly increased pressure on the junta government and forms part of JNIM’s strategy to target isolated government-held towns to undermine the junta’s authority. Barsalogho is strategically important because the next town is Kaya, located in north-central Burkina Faso, which hosts the last major government military base before reaching the capital, Ouagadougou.

JNIM is likely to continue to employ such brutal tactics to further undermine the regime and also to force civilians to flee as it advances towards Ouagadougou. The current Islamist insurgency, which involves multiple VEOs, has led to multiple coup attempts. This is likely to result in the junta prioritising regime security over counter-insurgency efforts, leading to greater instability and more attacks.

After the expulsion of Western forces, the junta has relied on external support from Mali under the recently formed Alliance of Sahel States and to a lesser extent Russian mercenaries. With Mali facing a similar situation, it is not in a position to send serious reinforcements without jeopardising its security. Russian forces are currently conducting more offensive operations in Mali with limited success. The junta may look to the Kremlin for additional support, although with the war in Ukraine, Russian forces are likely overstretched. If Burkina Faso fails to secure significant external support, it will likely set the conditions for VEOs to expand their operations into the northern parts of coastal West African states like Benin, Ghana and Togo.

Strike set for UK’s busiest airport.

On 31 August, more than 600 Border Force passport control workers at London Heathrow, the UK’s busiest airport, will go on strike for four days. This will then be followed by nearly three weeks of work-to-rule action where workers will do no more work than what is contractually obliged. The strike will almost certainly lead to significant disruption and could have knock-on effects for other UK-based airports.

State elections in Germany’s Thuringia and Saxony.

On 1 September, state elections will be held in Thuringia and Saxony. Recent polls indicate that the German far-right party, Alternative for Germany (AfD) is leading the race and has likely capitalised on the recent attack in Solingen. However, they are unlikely to win a majority, and the remaining parties will be highly reticent to form a coalition with the AfD. Another party polling well is Sahra Wagenknecht’s new Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) party, a left-wing nationalist, populist and Eurosceptic party. If both parties perform well, the remaining parties will face a challenging decision on coalition partners, as both parties advocate for agendas that significantly diverge from those of the central government.

Azerbaijan to hold parliamentary elections.

On 1 September, Azeris will go to the polls in parliamentary elections after President Ilham Aliyev dissolved parliament in June. Over fears of electoral fraud, nearly 300 election monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will observe the polls, an organisation that recently criticised the 2024 presidential election for its lack of transparency and choice. Aliyev’s New Azerbaijan party will almost certainly win the election and may increase its current majority.

CENTCOM kills al-Qaeda affiliate leader in Syria.

On 23 August, forces from the US Central Command (CENTCOM) killed the Hurras al-Din senior leader Abu-’Abd al-Rahman al-Makki in a targeted kinetic strike in Syria. Al-Makki was a Shura Council member of the al-Qaeda affiliate responsible for conducting terrorist operations in Syria. The killing could temporarily disrupt Hurras al-Din’s operations but may also inspire reprisal attacks on US forces in the region.

Israeli forces conduct largest operation in West Bank in months.

On 27 August, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) began an extensive military operation in the West Bank, launching raids in Nablus, Qabatiya, Silat al Khartia, al Fara refugee camp, Jenin refugee camp, and Nour al Shams refugee camp.

The operation has involved hundreds of personnel accompanied by drones, making the operation the largest in the West Bank for months. On 29 August, Israeli forces killed five alleged Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants, reportedly in a home next to a mosque in Tulkarm near the Nour al Shams refugee camp.

According to the IDF, one of those killed was Mohammed Jaber, known as Abu Shujaa, a commander of the local PIJ branch. Abu Shujaa is suspected to have been involved in several terror attacks, namely the June murder of an Israeli citizen in the city of Qalqilya, West Bank. Local media reports that at least 17 people have been killed in this week’s West Bank operation thus far.

The IDF has generally refrained from regularly conducting such large-scale operations in the West Bank, and the United Nations (UN) has issued a statement urging Israel to cease the operation. It is likely that such targeted operations in the West Bank will continue, due to its use as a base of operations for terrorist attacks against Israel. While the Fatah-controlled Palestinian National Authority (PA) in the West Bank are highly unlikely to react to the operation with any military response, it is likely that the relatively substantial IDF presence in the West Bank will generate civil unrest.

Egypt delivers arms to Somalia.

Egypt has delivered military aid to Somalia for the first time in over four decades in a move that will almost certainly escalate relations with Ethiopia. The move follows a recent security pact between Egypt and Somalia, partially motivated by Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland, which seeks independence from Somalia. Egypt has also offered to send troops to Somalia for a new peacekeeping mission, raising the risk of a proxy conflict between the two nations that have been at odds for years over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

AU and UN planning new Somali peacekeeping mission.

The African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) are planning a new AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia, set to replace the current mission which ends in late 2024. The AU endorsed this successor mission in June 2024, developed a strategic plan in August, and submitted it to the UN Security Council for approval.

This new mission, named the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), will maintain a similar force size to its predecessor, ATMIS, with around 11,911 personnel. AUSSOM will focus on ongoing peace-building efforts, such as providing security and countering al-Shabaab, while international partners and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) will handle state-building tasks. If the peacekeeping mission does not materialise, al-Shabaab and other militant groups will almost certainly be in an advantageous position to increase their attacks, expand their influence and undermine the SFG.

Torrential rain leads to major landslide near Naples, Italy.

A catastrophic landslide caused by torrential rain has killed at least two people near the town of San Felice a Cancello, located approximately 30 kilometres (19 miles) northeast of Naples, Italy. The area that collapsed had already been severely weakened by a wildfire that destroyed much of the vegetation. Southern Italy has been facing extreme temperatures and heavy rainfall, creating conditions ripe for flash floods, landslides, and other environmental disasters, which have been further worsened by deforestation.

World Food Program to launch investigation in Sudan.

The UN’s World Food Program (WFP) has launched an investigation into senior officials in Sudan for alleged fraud and for obfuscating the Sudanese army’s role in obstructing aid deliveries. Other allegations include mismanagement, misleading donors, and the disappearance of resources. Sudan is now facing its worst humanitarian crisis in decades as a result of the civil war. 80 per cent of health facilities are out of service, millions have been displaced and around 20 million are faced with food insecurity.

Dozens killed by bursting dam in eastern Sudan.

At least 30 people have been killed and hundreds missing in eastern Sudan after a dam burst which flooded at least 20 villages. Surging waters caused by torrential rain overwhelmed the Arbaat Dam on 25 August, just 40km north of Port Sudan, the country’s current de facto capital and home to the central government alongside international diplomats, aid agencies and thousands of displaced people. The dam was the main source of water for Port Sudan, which is also home to Sudan’s largest port and working airport, where most international aid is received. Flooding caused by the collapsed dam will almost certainly hinder humanitarian efforts which have already been greatly impeded by the civil war.

Houthis to allow assistance to damaged oil tanker in the Red Sea.

The Houthis have reportedly agreed to tugboats and rescue vessels accessing the stricken oil tanker SOUNION (IMO: 9312145) in the Red Sea. The Houthis are responsible for immobilising and damaging the Greek-flagged vessel during an attack on 21 August, and the tanker has since been abandoned. On 29 August, the Houthi media published footage showing Houthi militants boarding the abandoned vessel and detonating explosives on deck. Carrying 150,000 tonnes of crude oil, there are serious concerns that unless controlled, the leaking of oil could lead to a “potential environmental catastrophe”.

A major spill from the vessel could potentially be one of the largest vessel oil spills in history. The Pentagon has stated that the vessel appears to be leaking oil, however, Aspides, the EU mission in the Red Sea, has since stated that the area around the SOUNION is free of oil. If an oil spill occurred, Houthi Yemen would highly likely be impacted considering its dependence on fishing, which has highly likely motivated the Houthi decision to allow assistance to the vessel.

BLA conduct series of attacks under “Operation Herof”.

On 25 August, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched “Operation Herof” in the Balochistan region. The operation began with a complex attack that used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) at Bela Camp to gain access to the Pakistani military facility. This was followed by BLA squads entering the compound and killing 24 Pakistani soldiers with small arms fire. BLA militants then conducted a series of attacks across the region targeting Pakistan’s security services, and critical national infrastructure (CNI) including railways, and the seizure of major highways. The BLA’s Commander-in-Chief, Bashir Zeib Baloch, stated that the declared intent of the operation was to force the Pakistani government into ceasing its operations in Balochistan. The operation included at least 800 BLA militants, took place in 12 cities across nine districts, and according to the BLA, resulted in the deaths of over 100 Pakistani troops. The BLA established roadblocks and checked the identities of people on highways, shooting 23 identified as non-local migrant workers from the Punjab region.

Solace Global Assessment: The attacks began on the 18^th anniversary of the death of a Baloch nationalist leader, likely suggesting that the BLA are continuing a trend of conducting attacks on important Baloch dates. The series of BLA attacks was likely organised to demonstrate the group’s growing capabilities and ability to launch multiple coordinated complex attacks. The successful partial seizure of a Pakistani military camp and control of highways are further evidence of the BLA’s capabilities and will likely jeopardise Pakistan’s attempts to incorporate the region into China’s Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI). The targeting of essential elements of the BRI, such as roads and railways, was likely designed to deter foreign investment and to send a strategic message that the BLA will not allow the exploitation of local resources. The purported mass execution of Punjab labourers was also likely aimed at achieving these objectives. The central government is increasingly having to turn to labour imported from other parts of Pakistan due to Baloch resistance. High-profile BLA attacks on non-Baloch labour are highly likely to increase to deter future migration into the region. The overall success of the BLA attacks and its ability to provide real-time information about the attacks combined with sophisticated propaganda videos are likely to drive BLA recruitment and funding, further contributing to its operational capabilities.

Pro-democracy journalists charged with sedition.

On 29 August, two editors who led a pro-democracy newspaper, Stand News, were tried by a Hong Kong court and found guilty of sedition. Chung Pui-kuen and Patrick Lam, could now face up to two years in prison. The case marks the first ruling against journalists in Hong Kong since the territory’s handover from the UK to China in 1997. The ruling has been condemned by rights groups as a nefarious campaign against the freedom of the press.

Solace Global Assessment: The case forms part of a wider campaign in Hong Kong aimed at suppressing dissent, and freedom of speech and will likely serve as a precedent for future rulings as Beijing consolidates its control over the territory. Beijing’s ability to stifle the opposition in Hong Kong has been greatly augmented since the introduction of the controversial National Security Law (NSL), which has been in effect since 2020. The NSL was introduced under the justification of combating secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion of foreign forces, although Beijing’s interpretation of these acts likely differs vastly from many in Hong Kong. Whilst the NSL has been greatly successful at curbing dissent, the Stand News editors were actually charged under a colonial-era sedition law. Beijing’s tactic was likely an attempt to deflect from the NSL by adhering to existing legal frameworks but with the same outcome. The case and the wider effort to suppress dissent are unlikely to provoke civil unrest after the crackdown following the 2019-20 protests. However, it will likely damage Hong Kong’s reputation and contribute to deterring foreign investment in one of the world’s major business hubs.

Typhoon Shanshan makes landfall in Kyushu.

The strongest typhoon in the 2024 Pacific typhoon season thus far, Shanshan had maximum windspeeds of 213 km/h and average windspeeds of 157 km/h just before landfall. The typhoon made landfall on the southwestern Japanese island of Kyushu on 28 August. Over 5.2 million people were given evacuation orders.

At least four deaths and 45 injuries have been reported thus far, with three of the deaths being attributed to landslides. Kagoshima and Miyazaki Prefecture were the most severely impacted areas, with damaged residences, overturned cars, flooding, and landslides. Over 250,000 people were left without power, primarily in Kagoshima Prefecture.

Several major international companies suspended operations at their facilities in the area. No impact was reported at Sendai Nuclear Power Plant. In Oita Prefecture, level 5 emergency warnings, which indicate threat to life, were issued for the cities of Yufu and Usa, after the Miyakawa River burst its banks and possible flooding from the Yakkan River.

Solace Global Assessment: Authorities have described Shanshan as one of the strongest storms to ever hit Kyushu. After moving through Kyushu, Shanshan weakened into a tropical storm and is currently moving through Shikoku island. While the storm caused mass disruptions, the level of humanitarian impact has been low relative to the storm’s strength. This is due to Japan’s low vulnerability to tropical cyclones, as the country has comprehensive preparedness and resiliency measures.

The mass evacuation orders issued by authorities almost certainly significantly reduced the death toll.  The storm is forecast to further weaken into a tropical depression and continue moving eastwards over the weekend. While substantially weakened, authorities are concerned that the warm and moist air around the storm that caused heavy rainfall far from the main body in Kyushu will continue to cause adverse weather over the coming days.

On 30 August, tens of thousands were asked to evacuate Tokyo due to landslide warnings, with three Tokyo rivers, the Meguro, Nogawa and Sengawa being issued level 4 warnings. It is highly likely that torrential rain will continue across large areas of Japan over the weekend, disrupting travel and causing factory and office closures.

Myanmar junta commits to 2025 elections.

Myanmar’s military junta has promised to hold a general election in late 2025 but with voting to be staggered due to security concerns. However, junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has made the same promise since 2021 when the military ousted Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party remains disbanded. The announcement has been largely dismissed by the opposition who likely assess that it will be mired in fraud and only used as a mechanism to legitimise military rule. The junta is also likely using the promise of elections to deter the ethnic rebel forces that continue to seize territory from the military.

BJP strike paralyses transport in India’s West Bengal.

On 28 August in West Bengal, thousands of protesters, mainly Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) workers, blocked trains, halted buses, and forced shops to close in response to the brutal rape and murder of a trainee doctor. The BJP called for a 12-hour state-wide protest strike, following clashes with police who used tear gas and water cannons to disperse a recent march. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP party is in opposition in the state and may seek to conduct further protests to undermine the All-India Trinamool Congress coalition which leads the eastern state.

Thailand’s Pheu Thai to exclude military-backed party from coalition.

Thailand’s Pheu Thai Party will exclude the Palang Pracharat Party from its coalition in forming the next government after Palang Pracharat leader Prawit Wongsuwon’s absence from a key parliamentary vote. Despite this, Pheu Thai is confident of securing a strong coalition with over 300 seats. This decision underscores ongoing tensions with military-backed factions, reflecting deeper political rifts and potentially impacting the stability of the new government as Pheu Thai aims to consolidate power and distance itself from military influences.

Multiple attacks through Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

Throughout the reporting period, there have been multiple attacks and counter-terrorism operations throughout multiple districts in the Indian-administered union territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The territory is set to hold its first elections in over a decade starting in mid-September. Militant attacks are likely to increase in the run-up to the elections, with violent extremists’ intent on influencing the elections.

PLA to conduct military exercises on China-Myanmar border.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has initiated joint air-ground patrols along the border with Myanmar after property in China was damaged by cross-border artillery fire. On 27-29 August elements from the Southern Theater of the PLA conducted live-fire exercises, likely aimed at sending a message to rebel ethnic forces. China is likely becoming increasingly concerned over an overspill of the conflict and the war has decreased cross-border trade. Beijing’s ultimate objective is likely to pressure the warring sides into peace talks, a development that will likely increase its influence in the country.

Cholera warning across Nepal.

The Ministry of Health and Population in Nepal has advised all residents to boil water or purify it before use after identifying 22 cholera cases in the past two weeks. The real number is almost certainly higher as most of the country is not under active surveillance for the disease. The ministry has also warned of increased transmission rates as the dry season approaches due to the increased mixing of waster with decreasing water sources.

Mass flooding in Bangladesh causes devastation.

Heavy rainfall resulting from annual monsoon conditions has caused significant floods, with Noakhali, Cumilla, Laxipur, Feni, Chattogram and Moulvibazar being most impacted. Over 5.7 million people have been affected, with around 500,000 displaced. So far, at least 20 people have died. It is highly likely that the death toll will continue to rise, with rescue and relief operations are ongoing. Water from upstream rivers in India has worsened the floods, with Indian authorities releasing water from dams. Because of this, it is likely that anti-Indian sentiment will increase in Bangladesh, which could result in further attacks on Hindus.