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In the past weeks, multiple protests have been announced in the period between 5 and 10 October. This period is both highly visible and highly significant from a cultural and political perspective: it begins on the day following Rosh Hashanah, and will also end on the eve of Yom Kippur, thus occupying the space between the two holiest days of the Jewish religious calendar.

It would likely be incorrect to speak of a single cohesive international pro-Palestine movement, or of any specific ideology associated with it. Past protests and initiatives, as well as the ones scheduled to take place over the next weeks, have been planned by a series of diverse actors, including groups espousing ideologies that theoretically do not overlap with the Palestinian cause.

This high level of intersection between different local initiatives likely underscores a high level of transnational communication and planning, also facilitated by social and digital media.

In addition to numerous pro-Palestine protests, there also are a large number of pro-Israel demonstrations planned to coincide with the anniversary of the Hamas attack. More ideologically cohesive, these demonstrations have so far been overall smaller, although their volume and traction has heavily varied depending on local political landscapes.

Europe, and especially north and west Europe, likely is particularly at risk for civil unrest during the period. Protests have been scheduled to take place in multiple capitals and large cities, including London, Paris, Marseille, Rome, Bologna, Warsaw, Madrid, Amsterdam, Athens, Berlin, Vienna, Malmo and Istanbul.

In the Asia-Pacific region, likewise, protests are expected to take place in cities across Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea.

The United States will also highly likely be a hotspot for civil unrest around the anniversary of the start of the conflict. American universities spearheaded the global pro-Palestine movement, and almost certainly popularised certain forms of protests – including campus “encampments” – that were replicated by universities in Europe and Oceania.

The majority of these initiatives have been developed at the activist group and civil society level. However, the high political relevance of the anniversary has likely driven an uncommon degree of government and party involvement in the promotion (or opposition) to the event.

In particular, there are at least two notable cases of direct government intervention to prevent organised unrest from going ahead. In Australia, the police and government initially banned a solidarity “vigil” planned for 7 October in Sydney. The ban on the event – Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the planned demonstration “incredibly provocative” – was eventually overturned following an agreement between the organisers and police.

In Italy, the government did not grant permission for a planned gathering on 5 October in Rome, prompting a severe backlash from both the pro-Palestine activists (who have reiterated their intention to carry out the demonstration) and the left-wing opposition.

In addition to these government-imposed bans, other protests scheduled to take place on university campuses have been prohibited by academic administrators.

There is a high likelihood that there will be an increase in civil unrest in the 5-10 October period (and possibly beyond 13 October, the anniversary of the beginning of Israeli operations in Gaza). Further developments in the conflict, especially in the Lebanese front, could drive rapid changes in the volume and scope of civil unrest incidents.

European cities are likely to be particularly at risk. The choice to hold pro-Palestine protests overlapping with the anniversary of the 7 October Hamas attack in southern Israel will likely be perceived as a provocation and almost certainly result in an increased security risk level at the protest locations.

There is a high likelihood of pro-Israel counterprotest groups seeking to disrupt the pro-Palestine gatherings. Likewise, there is a high likelihood of clashes breaking out between protesters and police, especially in cities where clashes have previously occurred (such as Paris), and in those where the protests have not been approved.

The scope and high visibility of the demonstrations are also likely to result in an increased threat from lone-wolf terrorism, either targeting the protesters or high-visibility targets in protest locations, including government buildings and places of worship. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility of foreign actors seeking to leverage European open media spaces to encourage violence, also through the spread of disinformation, in a way similar to the recent Southport riots in the United Kingdom.

Conversely, the majority of protests throughout the Asia-Pacific region are likely to be comparatively more peaceful. Travel disruptions are still a realistic possibility in major city centres due to heightened security measures.

In addition to scheduled gatherings, there is a high likelihood of impromptu or not publicly announced protests being staged outside of the embassies and consulates of countries providing political and material support to Israel, such as the US, UK and France. These protests will likely have a greater risk of violence, and especially vandalism targeting diplomatic assets and offices.

Protests are also highly likely outside of Israeli embassies within the region and have previously been observed in Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines. In Pakistan, two of the country’s largest parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party have announced joint protests on 7 October that will cross the political divide. Protests are likely to develop outside US diplomatic buildings in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar.

The threat of clashes between government and police forces and protesters is particularly likely in countries where the executive is considered to be actively opposed to the protest movement. Again, the cases of Australia and, especially, Italy, are exemplary. In the latter, the recent government refusal to approve the demonstration planned for Rome is also compounded by broader legislative developments. In particular, the Italian lower chamber recently passed a new security law, which has been strongly criticised by the opposition for reportedly restricting freedom of protest. These two developments will likely drive significant civil unrest on 5 October and in the coming weeks in large Italian cities.

NAVIGATING CIVIL UNREST SAFELY

Explore our comprehensive Civil Unrest Guide, designed to equip travellers with essential strategies for navigating protests, riots, and civil unrest. Learn practical tips on how to stay informed, avoid high-risk areas, and respond effectively in crisis situations, ensuring safety and peace of mind while travelling.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FOR LEBANON CRISIS

With a highly dynamic and evolving security landscape, businesses operating in the region are likely to be considering the evacuation of their employees and/or securing their assets. Beirut’s airport remains operational, but safe travel options may become limited due to the rapidly changing situation on the ground.

Solace Global can help global organisations facilitate for the safe transportation of their people as Western governments prepare for potential evacuations. We offer emergency evacuation services designed to ensure your people’s safety during a crisis.

Hezbollah members have been using pagers for years, due to operational security concerns regarding Israeli tracking of cell phones. A speech by Hezbollah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah in February encouraged members to discard their cell phones, which led to more widespread adoption of pagers amongst the rank-and-file. As well as being used by Hezbollah members throughout Lebanon, pagers were distributed to members and allies in Iraq, Syria and Iran and the pager detonations injured at least 14 people in Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The attacks were highly likely conducted by Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency. Historically, responsibility has not been publicly claimed by Israeli officials for Mossad operations conducted abroad, therefore it is highly unlikely that an official claim of responsibility will be made for the attacks.

While there has been speculation that the attacks involved hacking into the devices to cause the batteries to explode, this is almost certainly untrue. While overheated lithium-ion batteries can combust and in rare instances, cause small explosions, the explosions were almost certainly caused by small quantities of military-grade high-explosives.

The model of pagers that detonated were mostly Gold Apollo’s AR924 model. Hezbollah had reportedly ordered over 5,000 pagers, before distributing them to members. Gold Apollo, a Taiwanese company, has stated since the attack that these models were manufactured on license by the Budapest-based company BAC Consulting. Gold Apollo additionally stated that they had encountered issues with remittances from BAC, and that payments had come through the Middle East. According to three intelligence officers briefed on the operation who spoke to the New York Times, BAC Consulting was an Israeli front posing as an international pager producer.

The walkie-talkies that detonated, meanwhile, were primarily IC-V82 models from the Japanese company ICOM. ICOM has stated that they ended production of the model 10 years ago. It is highly likely that Mossad similarly infiltrated the supply chain for the walkie-talkies.

If you’re navigating through high-risk regions and require expert journey management services, Solace Global is ready to assist. Our specialised team delivers tailored solutions to enhance your safety and security, ensuring you can operate with confidence in challenging environments. Reach out to us today to discover how we can provide the support you need for a secure and seamless journey.

Whilst Israel is widely expected to be behind the assassination it has refrained from commenting on the event and has stated that the Israeli military is conducting a situational assessment. An attack this deep into Iran and on such a sensitive target will be seen as a major embarrassment for Iran. Although the term “raid” typically implies a tactical operation with a physical presence within Iran, this is highly unlikely and the attack most likely involved some form of missile. Israel’s ability to strike so deep into Iran suggests major deficiencies in Iran’s air surveillance and air defence network.  

Reports also indicate that Haniyeh had only arrived in Iran on 30 July. Israel’s ability to locate, track and target Haniyeh within such condensed timeframes indicates a high level of Israeli intelligence penetration into Iran and significant weaknesses in Iranian counterintelligence. Israel’s attack on the Hamas leader has demonstrated that it can attack anywhere within Iran – a threat the regime will be cognisant of.  

Iran is also closer than ever to achieving a nuclear deterrent, one of the regime’s primary objectives. A major escalation with Israel will almost certainly see this project targeted, likely sending it back years. Iran’s new president is seeking a path towards reconciliation with the West after years of sanctions that have crippled the Iranian economy. A major escalation will jeopardise these attempts and invariably lead to Iran’s greater isolation, the imposition of more sanctions and increased internal pressure on the regime.  

While Iran has promised severe consequences and will likely have to show some level of force, Iran will need to factor in these variables before it decides to escalate. 

The immediate effect of Haniyeh’s assassination may be the collapse of current ceasefire negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Perceived as a moderating influence in Hamas, Haniyeh’s relative pragmatism was considered vital to diplomatic efforts. While he served as Hamas’ political leader, his de facto power over Hamas in Gaza was limited, with the more hardline Yahya Sinwar leading in Gaza. Sinwar, a battle-hardened militant, contrasts with Haniyeh, who acted more like a conventional politician.  

Although Haniyeh’s leadership was largely symbolic, he was pivotal in fostering and maintaining diplomatic channels with key regional actors, essentially serving as the face of Hamas’ international diplomacy. Based in Qatar, Haniyeh was a key influence in ongoing ceasefire negotiations between Hamas and Israel, brokered by Qatar, Egypt, and the US.  

While not directly engaged in day-to-day negotiations, his death is likely to jeopardise ceasefire talks. The Qatari prime minister has questioned the viability of the talks following Haniyeh’s killing, and Egypt’s foreign minister called the attack a “dangerous escalation” that undermines negotiations. It is a realistic possibility that Hamas may pull out of the negotiations entirely as a result of his death.  

Furthermore, it is likely that Haniyeh’s death will empower hardliners within the political wing of Hamas, and Haniyeh’s replacement as Hamas’ political leader is likely to be less willing to engage in peace talks – a development that would likely prolong the war in Gaza and sustain associated civil unrest throughout the globe.  

Haniyeh’s funeral will be held in Tehran on 1 August at 8 am local time before his body is transferred to the Qatari capital of Doha for burial on 2 August. Any coordinated response by Iran will likely occur after Haniyeh’s funeral.  

Iran’s attack in April consisted of an assessed 350 rockets, missiles and drones launched by both Iran and its proxy forces throughout the Middle East. This attack was in response to the killing of senior members of the IRGC’s Quds Force within Syria. An attack within Iran itself during a presidential inauguration will be interpreted as an attack on the country’s sovereignty and honour, a situation that will likely warrant a stronger response from Tehran. 

The assassination of Haniyeh also follows the recent decapitation strike on a senior Hezbollah commander, with indications that Hezbollah too will respond with force. The effect of these double assassinations will be to galvanise The Iranian-led resistance against Israel. 

The most obvious form of retaliation by Iran and its proxies will be to launch a similar attack to the one observed in April. This would consist of Iran and all of its proxy forces firing projectiles near-simultaneously at Israel and from as many axes as possible to overwhelm Israel’s advanced air defence network. Such an attack would likely prioritise the targeting of Israeli military installations rather than population centres. Tehran will likely attempt to conduct an attack that will fall below what it calculates is Israel’s threshold for a major escalation, while still large enough to demonstrate strength, intent and capability. 

However, debris from projectiles intercepted by Israeli air defence systems will pose a major risk to anyone in Israel and even in countries on the approach, such as Jordan, as evidenced by the April attack. In addition, the recent Hezbollah-linked rocket attack in the Golan Heights which killed 12 children, demonstrated the inaccuracy of unguided rocket systems which make up the bulk of Hezbollah’s arsenal. 

To avoid escalation, Iran may seek to rely solely on its proxy forces, especially Hezbollah as it knows it can hurt Israel from Lebanon. This approach provides Tehran with multiple advantages. Firstly, Iran can retain its own strategic military capabilities such as its ballistic missiles. Most importantly, by leveraging its proxy forces, Iran can maintain some degree of plausible deniability, thus reducing the chances of a direct conflict. Hezbollah’s current arsenal of some 150,000 rockets and missiles, its experience in guerilla warfare and its use of conventional and non-conventional tactics puts Hezbollah in an advantageous position to inflict losses on Israel at the behest of Iran.   

Another option available to Iran will be to target Israeli interests on the global stage. Iran has a legacy of attacking Israelis or Jews way beyond the borders of Israel and there have been examples of this since 7 October. In November 2023, authorities in Brazil uncovered an alleged plot linked to Hezbollah to attack Jews in the country. In 1994, 85 people were killed in Buenos Aires, Argentina when a bomb detonated at the Amia Jewish cultural centre – a terrorist act that Argentina claimed was carried out by Iran. These attacks indicate the scope of Iran’s reach and its willingness to conduct offset action on the global stage- an option that may be attractive as it provides a high level of plausible deniability and is unlikely to trigger a regional escalation. 

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On July 27, a rocket hit a football pitch in Majdal Shams, a Druze town in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, killing 12 children. Israeli authorities have blamed Hezbollah for the attack. Explore the possible responses Israel might take following this Hezbollah rocket attack, including military actions and potential retaliation scenarios.

While there was initial speculation that Hezbollah would open up a northern front against Israel, Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah has been distinctly cautious to avoid major escalation. Nasrallah likely determines that the risks of a major conflict with Israel are too great, and would jeopardise Hezbollah’s path to political legitimacy.

Following an IDF operation that killed a prominent Hezbollah commander on 11 June however, Hezbollah launched over 200 rockets into northern Israel on 12 June. Tensions rose dramatically, with Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz subsequently threatening all-out war and the IDF confirming on 18 June that operational plans for an offensive into Lebanon had been approved. In response, Nasrallah threatened war with “no rules” and “no ceilings”, even threatening to strike targets in Cyprus, however, this was largely viewed as a propaganda move intended to project strength and rally support, rather than as a feasible military strategy.

The 27 July rocket strike caused the highest civilian death toll in Israeli-held territory since the 7 October raid. The victims were members of the Druze community, an Arab minority group that adheres to an Abrahamic faith system separate from Islam, Christianity or Judaism. An estimated 150,000 Druze live in Israeli-held territory, primarily in the north, though many Druze refuse Israeli citizenship and identify as Syrian. Israel has occupied the Golan Heights since the Third Arab-Israeli War with Syria in 1967. The funeral held on 28 July was distinctly apolitical, and Druze leaders have called for de-escalation.

Despite Hezbollah’s denials, the rocket attack was likely conducted by the Lebanese militant group. On 27 July, an IDF operation killed four Hezbollah fighters, and Hezbollah subsequently claimed to have launched two rocket strikes in retaliation, with one using a Falaq-1 rocket targeting Maale Golani which is approximately two kilometres away from Majdal Shams. The IDF has since released images of Falaq-1 debris found in Majdal Shams and claims that the rocket was launched from southern Lebanon.

It is highly unlikely that the Majdal Shams football pitch was the intended target. Hezbollah have consistently attempted to avoid major escalation by responding to Israeli operations with what they calculate to be sub-threshold attacks, likely intended to deter further IDF operations while not giving Tel Aviv the pretext for a full-scale operation into Lebanon. However, unguided surface-to-surface rocket systems such as the Falaq-1 are unsophisticated and prone to inaccuracy.

In response, Israel has promised a “harsh” but contained response. Senior Israeli defence and diplomatic sources have indicated that Tel Aviv wants to avoid a full-scale war which could provoke a wider regional conflict. Similar sentiments have been briefed to the media by Hezbollah officials.

On 28 July, the Israeli Security Cabinet authorised Netanyahu and the Israeli Defence Minister to decide the “manner and timing” of military operations in retaliation to the 27 July attack. While the IDF conducted a series of strikes in eastern and southern Lebanon on 28 July, it is unlikely that this operation constitutes the extent of Israel’s response and it is likely that a more intensive military operation is forthcoming. Solace Global assesses the three following scenarios to be the most likely possible outcomes:

SCENARIO 1: Increased IDF strikes in Lebanon and Syria

The most likely course of action by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) will be to conduct air and drone strikes against strategic high-value targets (HVTs) in Lebanon and Syria. The IDF has already responded by conducting limited strikes on key Hezbollah figures within southern Lebanon and cross-border shelling on Hezbollah frontline positions.

However, previous IDF responses to major Hezbollah attacks have not been confined to southern Lebanon and have included strikes within Hezbollah’s strongholds in the suburbs of south Beirut and strikes on strategic targets within the north of Lebanon. Targets within Lebanon will likely include Hezbollah command and control centres (C2), weapons caches, logistic nodes and senior leadership to degrade and demoralise Hezbollah’s forces.

Targets within Syria will likely extend to sites linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). IDF targets in Syria will likely prioritise weapons depots and other targets associated with the facilitation of lethal aid into Lebanon. Early indications are that Hezbollah has begun to reposition many of its strategic weapon systems like precision-guided missiles to complicate the IDF’s targeting process in anticipation of IDF strikes.

SCENARIO 2: IDF Limited Ground Offensive

The IDF’s second most probable course of action is to execute a limited offensive into southern Lebanon up to or just beyond the Litani River. This operation would aim to clear Hezbollah positions and push their rocket sites further north, thereby creating a buffer zone and enhancing security in northern Israel by reducing the range from which Hezbollah rockets can be launched. However, current indications are that the IDF’s Northern Command has yet to be significantly reinforced which would be a key indicator and warning of a major offensive.

Most importantly, current ceasefire negotiations with Hamas have not yet reached an agreement. Failure to reach a ceasefire with Hamas will force the IDF to maintain significant resources in Gaza and any redeployment of forces north will almost certainly be exploited by Hamas. Western diplomats have urged Israel to de-escalate and Israeli officials have suggested that their goal is to “hurt” Hezbollah without dragging the Middle East into a regional war. Fears of a major diplomatic backlash and further international isolation may deter the Netanyahu administration from pursuing a large-scale offensive into southern Lebanon.

Israel will also be cognisant of the military challenges involved with an offensive into southern Lebanon. The 2006 conflict revealed significant challenges, including higher-than-expected casualties and an underestimation of Hezbollah’s strength and tactics. Hezbollah has only improved its military capabilities since then and entrenched its positions. A full-scale conflict with Hezbollah would also result in a major escalation of Hezbollah strikes into Israel, with some of the militant group’s more capable weapon systems able to target the entirety of Israel.

It would also be a trigger for an escalation in attacks from Iran’s Axis of Resistance throughout the Middle East, including the Houthis in Yemen and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) throughout Iraq and Syria. This would invariably include increased rocket, missile and drone attacks on Israel from multiple axes. While Israel was able to withstand the Iranian-led 13 April attack, Israel’s defence was hugely guaranteed with allied assistance. The attack also revealed certain limitations in Israel’s air defence network, issues that have been further highlighted by recent Houthi drone strikes. An Israeli-provoked major escalation may not be met with the same level of external assistance, especially from Arab nations, and will likely be larger than the previous attack on Israel.

There is a high likelihood that a major increase in Iranian proxy missile, rocket and drone attacks will lead to numerous casualties within Israel. Such a development will increase internal pressure on the Netanyahu administration which is already having to deal with episodic civil unrest- potential pressure that will likely make the option of targeted strikes more appealing.

SCENARIO 3: Hezbollah seek to de-escalate

A third and least likely development is that Hezbollah takes the initiative to de-escalate by withdrawing its military capabilities north of the Litani River, which runs approximately 30 kilometres north of the Israel-Lebanon border. This move would be in accordance with the United Nation’s Security Council Resolution 1701 which forbids the Shia paramilitary force from maintaining a military presence south of the Litani.

Hezbollah’s senior leadership has repeatedly stated that it does not want a major war and is likely only conducting limited attacks into northern Israel to project strength and undermine Israel. Hezbollah’s strategy in recent years has been characterised by attempts to remodel itself as more of a legitimate political force. Though withdrawing military capabilities may be interpreted as a sign of weakness, it would provide Hezbollah with the opportunity to maintain most of its military capabilities and Hezbollah would still be in a position to exercise considerable political influence within southern Lebanon.

This influence could be jeopardised if it engages in a full-scale conflict with Israel that would degrade both its military and political capabilities. According to Lebanon’s Foreign Minister, Abdallah Bouhabib, Hezbollah is ready to commit to this course of action, although these sentiments have yet to be echoed by Hezbollah itself. This move may also secretly be endorsed by Iran. Tehran has spent decades facilitating lethal aid to Hezbollah, helping it become Iran’s primary proxy force which serves as a strategic deterrent to Israel. It is estimated that Hezbollah’s arsenal now amounts to some 150,000 rockets and missiles. This capability poses a significant threat to Israel, and if Hezbollah’s arsenal were launched near-simultaneously and coordinated with other Iranian proxy forces, it would likely overwhelm Israel’s air defences and lead to substantial casualties. Iran is unlikely to relinquish this strategic deterrent until it can ensure its own security, which it anticipates will be achieved through the development of a nuclear weapon.

However, if Iran assesses that Israel’s most probable course of action will only involve targeted strikes rather than a full-scale military engagement, it may reconsider endorsing this strategy. This is because targeted IDF strikes against Hezbollah would limit the immediate threat to Iran’s strategic deterrent, reducing the urgency to de-escalate.

Although it is unlikely that a full-scale all-out war will break out between Hezbollah and Israel, tensions are at their highest since the 7 October attack and some form of expanded military action by the IDF in Lebanon is almost certain.

Many countries have issued or reiterated travel advisories to their citizens to avoid all travel to Lebanon and to evacuate immediately if they are already present in the country. These countries include the US, UK, France, Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark and Australia.

Due to the escalation in tensions, flight disruptions are ongoing at Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY). Several airlines, including Lufthansa, Turkish Airlines, Aegian Airlines, FlyDubai and Air France have cancelled flights scheduled to depart from BEY.

While most flights are still operating as of 30 July, it is likely that more significant flight disruptions would follow any significant IDF operation, threatening to leave travellers in Lebanon stranded. Even more limited military interventions that do not result in a No Fly Zone being enforced threaten to cause mass flight cancellations, due to the high costs of war risk insurance for airlines.

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In the early hours of 31 July, the head of the Hamas political bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, was killed in what has been described as “a treacherous Zionist raid on his residence in Tehran”, according to the Palestinian militant group. Iran vows retaliation. Discover the latest updates and potential impacts.

On July 2nd, the Barcelona Provincial Court granted amnesty to 46 national police officers who faced charges stemming from their role in quelling protests during the October 1st, 2017 Catalonian independence referendum. This decision contrasts sharply with the Supreme Court’s ruling the day before, July 1st, which denied amnesty to former Catalan President Carles Puigdemont and several other independence leaders. The Supreme Court justified its decision by arguing that the crimes these leaders are accused of, primarily embezzlement of public and European funds to support the independence movement, are not covered under the amnesty law.

Both cases fall under the recently approved and controversial amnesty law, passed by the Spanish Congress in late May and sponsored by Socialist Party leader and Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez. This law potentially grants amnesty to around 500 individuals involved in the 2017 protests, with exceptions for extreme cases. However, the Barcelona court’s decision to grant amnesty to police officers accused of severe actions like torture or inhuman treatment is seen as lenient and has sparked criticism.

The disparities between amnesty granted to police officers and denied to Catalan leaders are likely to provoke public unrest in Catalonia. The Supreme Court’s decision is viewed by many as politically motivated, especially given past protests following the sentencing of nine independence leaders in 2019, which resulted in widespread disruptions and clashes in major Catalan cities.

Following these developments, there are concerns about renewed civil unrest in Catalonia. Travellers should stay updated with local media for any announcements of protests or demonstrations in the region and exercise caution accordingly.

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What began as peaceful demonstrations on June 18th quickly escalated following heavy-handed police tactics, including the early use of tear gas and mass detentions. By early afternoon, over 200 protesters had been apprehended, marking a critical turning point as crowds gathered outside Nairobi’s central police station demanding the release of detainees.

The government’s response has included shutting down local internet services and using live ammunition against protesters, indicating a hardened stance that could prolong the unrest. The resulting casualties are expected to strain Kenya’s already stretched healthcare infrastructure, potentially necessitating increased support from international NGOs and humanitarian organisations.

Beyond immediate humanitarian concerns, the unrest poses significant implications for Kenya’s economy and security. The disruption of infrastructure and government functions in Nairobi and other affected areas could have direct economic repercussions, affecting businesses and travel across the country. Moreover, the government’s aggressive crowd control tactics and apparent failures to safeguard public assets raise concerns about further escalation and the potential need for military intervention, which could complicate the operating environment for foreign humanitarian organisations.

As the situation unfolds, the damage to infrastructure and ongoing disruptions to daily life underscore the precariousness of Kenya’s current state, with implications that extend far beyond its borders.

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Your duty of care doesn’t end the moment your people set foot in their destination – and neither does ours.

From transfers to ongoing security and emergency evacuations, our travel risk services always have you covered. 

Arm yourself with the knowledge to avoid a potential threat from turning into a crisis. Intelligence advisories give you tailored reports to anticipate possible disruptions, mitigate risk and help you make well-informed decisions, faster.

Give your people peace of mind when they travel for work, so they remain focused on the job at hand. We mitigate risks, manage incidents if they occur, and support your people with security advice or help in a crisis. 

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In 2024, LGBTQ+ rights face a dynamic landscape shaped by shifting politics, religious perspectives, and socio-cultural norms. Navigating this environment demands a nuanced approach to advocacy and policy-making that embraces complexity and diversity.

The alleged suspect, a 71-year-old writer and political activist, was detained at the scene. Authorities are investigating the motive behind the attack, which is widely believed to be politically motivated.

Fico, who secured office in October 2023 after a divisive campaign, has been a polarising figure. He is one of the few European leaders advocating for closer ties with Russia and has called for an end to the EU’s military support for Ukraine. Under his leadership, Slovakia has halted all arms deliveries to Kyiv.

Fico’s government has made controversial moves, including a proposal to abolish the country’s public broadcaster and weaken anti-corruption laws. These actions have sparked fears about media independence and democracy in Slovakia, leading to widespread protests. Some believe these tensions contributed to the assassination attempt, with Fico’s ruling SMER party blaming false narratives from the opposition.

The attack on Prime Minister Fico is expected to lead to heightened security measures across Slovakia. In the long term, this incident might be used to justify suppressing dissent and pushing through more contentious government proposals. Additionally, Russian-affiliated social media accounts have been spreading information suggesting Ukrainian or NATO involvement, with some posts inciting violence against European officials.

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has hinted that the attack could be linked to Fico’s stance on Russia. While the risk of terrorism in Slovakia remains low, there is a realistic possibility of targeted violence and harassment against pro-EU Slovakian officials in the coming weeks.

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The rise of both far-right and far-left political parties in Europe in recent years has significantly complicated and energised the political landscape in the continent. This trend is expected to persist into 2024.

This Wednesday, May 15, commemorates the 76th anniversary of the Nakba, an Arabic term meaning “catastrophe.” It signifies the expulsion and forced displacement of around 750,000 Palestinian Arabs during the 1947-1949 Palestine War, following the adoption of the UN’s Partition Plan for Palestine, which ended British mandate rule over the territory. This event is profoundly significant historically, marking the onset of the Palestinian diaspora and a pivotal moment in the formation of Palestinian national identity, which persists nearly a century later.

This year, the significance of the commemoration will be amplified due to the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip. The conflict has reached a critical juncture, especially with the recent deployment of Israeli troops into Rafah on May 6th. The conflict, which followed a surprise attack launched by the Gaza Strip-based Hamas terror group on 7 October, and resulted in the killing of approximately 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, has entered its seventh month. During this time, over 35,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, have lost their lives, and nearly two million have been displaced internally. Gaza is grappling with severe famine, a near-total collapse of infrastructure, and extensive destruction of local housing.

Nakba Day-related disruptions are expected to primarily impact large urban centres in countries that have seen significant pro-Palestine protests. These disruptions are likely to concentrate around government or academic institutions, limiting their scope. Avoiding these areas unless necessary should mitigate physical risks.

However, traffic disruptions, potentially affecting various modes of transportation, are less predictable and could have more widespread effects. While disruptions to airports and seaports are unlikely, protesters may attempt to block roads, particularly around targeted buildings and main traffic arteries leading into urban centres. Even brief disruptions could have lasting effects throughout the day.

To minimise such risks, it’s recommended to schedule travel outside of rush hour and to plan entry into large cities prone to protests for early morning hours. If traveling through city centres is unavoidable, consider alternative routes away from likely protest areas and avoid public transportation.

It’s crucial to stay informed through official channels regarding potential protests, disruptions, and violence. Familiarise yourself with local emergency contacts, including nearby police stations and emergency rooms. When planning business operations, establish clear communication procedures such as two-way messaging networks and GPS tracking to reduce risks to people and assets.

Additionally, having failover systems and strategic redundancies in place can mitigate the impact of severe localised disruptions on primary business operations, although such scenarios are unlikely.

Your duty of care doesn’t end the moment your people set foot in their destination – and neither does ours.

From transfers to ongoing security and emergency evacuations, our travel risk services always have you covered. 

Arm yourself with the knowledge to avoid a potential threat from turning into a crisis. Intelligence advisories give you tailored reports to anticipate possible disruptions, mitigate risk and help you make well-informed decisions, faster.

Give your people peace of mind when they travel for work, so they remain focused on the job at hand. We mitigate risks, manage incidents if they occur, and support your people with security advice or help in a crisis. 

Intelligence cut off time 15:00 GMT 12th of January 2024

On the 11-12 January, US and UK aircraft and warships conducted at least 70 strikes on multiple military targets in Houthi-controlled Yemen. Reports indicate that over 100 precision guided munitions were fired on at least 16 Houthi locations. This includes a military base adjacent to Sanaa airport, a military site near Taiz airport, a Houthi naval base in Hodeidah and military sites in Hajjah governorate. Houthi’s stated that five of the group’s fighters were killed in the strikes with six others wounded.

The Houthi Movement is an Iranian aligned group that controls much of Yemen after nearly a decade of civil war against a Western-backed and Saudi-led coalition. The two sides are currently observing a tentative ceasefire that officially ended in late 2022 but has remained in place to the current day.

Following the outbreak of the Hamas-Israel conflict, the Houthi’s emerged as a strong supporter of the Palestinian Islamist group. The Houthis began attacks on shipping between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in December 2023, claiming to target vessels linked to Israeli persons, businesses, and interests.

However, this route, which links Europe and Asia and Africa via the Suez Canal, accounts for roughly 15 percent of the world’s shipping traffic. The attacks have forced some shipping companies to limit transits through the waterway, or even cease operations altogether, instead taking the longer route around southern Africa. This has significantly disrupted international commerce, increasing delivery costs and time, stoking fears about a global inflation.

In response to the Houthi attacks, the US launched Operation Prosperity Guardian alongside several allies, which aimed to end the blockade and counter all threats by Houthi forces against international maritime trade. The operation was defensive in nature, destroying only missiles launched at vessels with no pro-active strikes conducted. The Houthis continued to fire at merchant vessels, as well as allied naval vessels, dismissing warnings from Washington and London. Then on 9 January, US and British warships shot down 21 drones and missiles, repelling the largest Houthi attack so far.

It is highly likely that the Houthi’s largest attack to date on 9 January was the trigger that surpassed the US-UK threshold. While international prices have yet to see a significant impact, Operation Prosperity Guardian was not working as a deterrent. It is highly likely that more extensive, continued Houthi action would force more merchant vessels away from the Red Sea, almost certainly disrupting maritime trade, therefore increasing consumer prices and shortages.

In the immediate aftermath, the Houthi’s are highly likely to increase their attacks on commercial and military vessels in the region in retaliation. However, it is likely that their ability to launch missiles and drones has been degraded. Should the Houthis sustain their attacks, it is almost certain that the US and UK will continue their strikes on targets within Yemen. It is also highly likely that the group will be re-designated as a terrorist organisation if they continue. This would have a significant impact on the peace process to end the Yemeni Civil War between the Houthi’s and the Saudi-led coalition, which has continued to progress despite regional tensions.

A breakdown of the process would almost certainly see a resumption of hostilities between the two sides, with locations within Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates likely becoming viable targets for the Houthi’s as evidenced by their previous attacks.

Across the Middle East, it is highly likely that Houthi’s allies and other Iranian proxies start to act in solidarity with the group. These groups will almost certainly view the attacks as Western support for Israel.

It is almost certain that Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq and Syria will continue to target US military bases across the region. It is also likely that the frequency and scale of these attacks will increase considerably. There is a realistic possibility that US military locations that have not been targeted yet in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, are targeted.

Hezbollah will likely continue to focus its attacks on Israel, however an attack on the US cannot be ruled out. While still unlikely, the US and UK strikes on Yemen have increased the likelihood of a wider conflict developing in the Middle East, as well as the West entering a proxy war with Iran. This eventuality would highly likely take focus away from the conflict in Gaza, almost certainly intensifying the humanitarian situation.