The final of the European Football Championship, between Spain and England, is scheduled to take place on 14 July, while the final of the Copa America, between Argentina and Colombia will occur on 15 July. Due to the nature of the events and their global reach, the matches may result in limited traffic disruptions.

The Islamic holiday of Ashura takes place on 16-17 July. The holiday is not a major one for Sunnis, while it has a particularly notable value for Shias, for whom it is associated with the death of Husayn ibn Ali and, in general, with martyrdom for the faith. Likely due to the sectarian differences linked with the holiday (and its importance to the development of Shia religious identity) attacks targeting Shia communities have occurred on Ashura, the latest taking place in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 2015.

Canada has announced plans to acquire up to 12 new submarines to strengthen its Arctic deterrence at the NATO 75th anniversary summit. Ottawa has cited the need to improve its submarine capabilities to covertly detect and deter maritime threats, to counter challenges from Russia and China in the region and to secure future shipping routes in the Arctic Ocean.

The Department of National Defence indicated that the Royal Canadian Navy’s current inventory of four ageing Victoria-class submarines is becoming obsolete and too costly to maintain. The new submarines will be diesel-electric rather than nuclear-powered and are capable of operating under the ice.

The acquisition also forms part of a broader effort aimed at increasing defence spending to 1.76 per cent of GDP by 2030.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of the procurement is likely an attempt to deflect from Canada’s sustained failure to meet NATO defence spending pledges of two per cent of GDP, a failure that may soon be emphasised under a potential Trump presidency who has historically lambasted NATO members for not meeting this requirement. However, Canada’s primary reason to improve and triple its current submarine fleet is to protect the hard-to-defend Arctic waters such as the Northwest Passage, with some estimates suggesting that climate change and retreating ice cover will turn the Arctic Ocean into the most efficient shipping route between Europe and East Asia by 2050.

Russia has long coveted the idea of a “Northern Sea Route” which China endorses as part of its “Ice Silk Road”. These maritime trade routes are considerably shorter than the Suez route and require less fuel expenses, currently entail no expensive transit tolls and face a negligible threat from piracy or militant groups. Moreover, Russia has competing claims with Canada in the Arctic, with both countries claiming the Lomonosov Ridge as an extension of their respective continental shelves. China, which hasn’t been so bold as to refer to itself as an Arctic power, published a 2018 White Paper wherein it claimed to be a “near-Arctic state”, citing its right to conduct scientific research and environmental protection.

The Arctic’s potential for trade, abundance in hydrocarbons, mineral wealth, fishing and potential military advantages is attracting both Moscow and Beijing, who tentatively support each other to counter the West. Both countries have also deployed civilian-flagged oceanographic research vessels to the area to collect important bathymetric and hydrographic data such as water column profiles, seafloor mapping, depth measurements, sound velocity profiles, ambient noise levels and much more. This data can inform genuine civilian scientific research but is likely “dual-purpose” research that can be used to expand and improve submarine operations.

In the long term, this may help them assert claims, protect shipping routes, improve their submarine-based strike capabilities, improve intelligence gathering and gain a strategic edge over NATO in an area that will almost certainly become increasingly important in a potential future conflict. Russia and China may also exploit Arctic access to better understand North American undersea critical national infrastructure such as internet cables and gas pipelines- the sabotage of which is highly deniable and likely features as part of their sub-threshold “grey zone” activity that can cause huge economic loss without triggering a kinetic response.

However, Canada’s decision to procure diesel-electric submarines will likely play into the hands of Russia and China. The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) and China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine fleets are becoming increasingly nuclear-powered, providing them a significant advantage in terms of stealth and endurance.

On 8 July, Jimmy “Barbecue” Charizier, leader of Haiti’s largest gang network “G9” and seen as a de facto spokesperson for the country’s criminal syndicates, declared that his group would initiate a “war” against the UN-backed “invaders” — referring to the 400 Kenyan police officers deployed to Haiti to help quell ongoing gang-related violence.

The Kenyan forces have begun carrying out the first series of operations in Port-au-Prince, retaking control of key buildings including the country’s largest hospital. Unconfirmed reports state that the gangs attempted a “counterattack” to retake the building on 10 July.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The gangs almost certainly maintain the strategic objective of extending the period of lawlessness in the country as it allows for them to carry out illegal actions, including running smuggling routes to the US and the Caribbean, without any credible opposition. It is highly unlikely that G9 represents or even seeks to represent a political alternative to the ruling government. Still, the somewhat “anti-imperialist” rhetoric used by the gangs may be an effort to gather popular support and possibly discourage collaboration with Kenyan forces.

In recent months, Haitian gangs have increased attacks on local institutions and on foreign humanitarian workers, including by carrying out targeted killings of American missionaries. Such actions are highly likely meant to force the civilian population to rely on gangs for the provision of basic goods and services.

The capture of the largest hospital in Port-au-Prince may indicate that the joint Kenyan-Haitian police operations are seeking to restore popular confidence in legal administrative rule through the symbolic creation of pockets of “normalcy”. The gangs will likely respond to such efforts by increasing attacks on institutions and individuals involved in humanitarian efforts, including foreigners, to deny the police an opportunity to carry out normalisation efforts.

“La Niña” is a weather pattern that can develop as part of multi-year cycles and follows El Niño. It is marked by cold temperatures in the eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean. Usually, the cycle involving El Niño, La Niña, and a neutral period (the cycle is known as ENSO, or “El Niño-Southern Oscillation”) lasts between two and seven years.

Solace Global Assessment: 

La Niña is associated with an increased frequency of hurricanes in the Caribbean. In South America, La Niña can cause heavier rains, possibly leading to floods in countries such as Brazil. However, the weather pattern has also important implications for the APAC region.

There is a realistic possibility that generally lower air pressures in the western Pacific will drive increased rain and flooding in northern Australia. In Southeast and South Asia, La Niña is likely to provoke a more prolonged and heavier monsoon season. While this may stimulate the local economy by increasing crop yields in India and neighbouring countries, increasing rains may also result in floods and landslides, especially in areas victims of deforestation or those with little drainage infrastructure.

La Niña’s positive impacts on South American and South Asian agriculture may reverberate in Africa, possibly resulting in a medium-term improvement in the influx of grain, rice, and other cereals to food-insecure countries. This, in turn, may lead to alterations in local risk profiles where there was previously food insecurity.

La Niña may also cause a decrease in rainfall volumes in the Pacific Islands, possibly leading to localised droughts. In addition, studying La Niña’s impact will likely allow researchers to better understand how the ENSO is impacting, and being affected by, climate change.

Biden Reaffirms 2024 Candidacy Amidst Health Speculations and Criticism

US President Joe Biden reiterated that he will be the Democratic Party’s candidate in the 2024 presidential elections amid speculation about his health. The statement, on 5 July, followed a poor performance at the first presidential debate with Republican opponent and former President Donald Trump and calls from party insiders to replace the incumbent Biden with another Democrat. On 11 July, Biden was further challenged after his poor performance at the NATO summit which was criticised by Democrat party members and supporters.

Argentine President Milei Skips Mercosur Meeting

Argentine President Milei skipped a Mercosur trade block meeting in Paraguay and instead headed to Brazil on 7 July, where he met former President Bolsonaro. Milei’s decision to attend an anti-Socialism event in Rio de Janeiro, instead of meeting current President Lula, is likely meant to continue rallying support at home. At the same time, Milei’s constant diplomatic insults towards the leftist president of Brazil risk resulting in tangible negative effects on the two countries’ relations.e as usual.

Argentina’s Inflation Rate Rises to 5% in June

Argentina’s monthly inflation rate marginally increased to 5 per cent in June, ending a five-month streak of decreases. The increase is likely a result of revisions in utility rates. The development, albeit likely not particularly relevant to Argentina’s broader economic outlook, is likely to be widely reported on by local media and may drive further anti-government unrest.

Cuba Foils US-Sourced Arms Smuggling Plot

On 8 July, Cuban authorities announced they had foiled a plot to smuggle arms and ammunition from the United States into Cuba, detaining nearly three dozen people involved in a scheme to destabilise the government. The plot was first revealed in December when a Cuban man arrived from the US by jetski with weapons to recruit others for acts of violence. According to the Cuban authorities, a seven-month investigation exposed a broader plan involving at least 32 Cuban residents connected to a US-based group, La Nueva Nación Cubana.

Havana has accused the US of allowing the accused to act with impunity in the US, with the US State Department responding by stating that it only prosecutes based on US law- a development that will likely further strain relations between the two countries.

Deadly Heatwave Hits Western US

In the United States, at least 28 people have reportedly died because of an ongoing heatwave in California, Oregon and Arizona. 14 of these cases were in California. Over the past week, temperatures have persistently exceeded 38 degrees Celsius across the American West, with multiple record highs recorded across the region. A record high of 48.8 degrees Celsius (120 degrees Fahrenheit) in Las Vegas was recorded on 7 July.

Officials have indicated that many of the victims were elderly or homeless and that the number of deaths is not exceptionally high for the region and therefore not yet a cause for alarm. However, in part aided by improved data collection and classification methods, heat-related deaths have been steadily increasing in recent years, a trend which is likely to continue as global warming increases both the intensity and regularity of heat waves.

Pantanal Fires Devastate Nearly 800,000 Hectares

Reporting from Brazil indicates that nearly 800,000 hectares have now been burned in the Pantanal, the world’s largest wetland and one of the most biodiverse areas globally. This region, spanning 16.9 million hectares and also encompassing parts of Bolivia and Paraguay, supports a rich diversity of flora and fauna, much of which is endangered.

The Pantanal is not only crucial for its biodiversity but also home to many indigenous communities who rely on the land and its resources. The recent fires have already claimed livestock, a vital asset for these communities, which may escalate tensions and unrest, potentially pressuring the central government for assistance.

Undisclosed US defence sources have reported that US military bases were recently placed on Force Protection Condition (FPCON) “Charlie,” indicating a high alert status. This response comes in light of credible threats suggesting potential sabotage attacks by Russian-backed actors. Intelligence sources indicated that Russian proxies were planning attacks against US military personnel and facilities across multiple European countries.

The planned attacks were purportedly designed to replicate a series of recent successful or disrupted attacks in the region. In April, two German-Russian nationals were apprehended for allegedly plotting arson and bomb attacks under Russian direction. Similarly, in March, several individuals were arrested and charged with conspiring with Russian intelligence to commit arson against a Ukrainian-linked warehouse. Additionally, there have been numerous incidents of suspicious fires and explosions in countries where Russian intelligence historically maintains strong influence, such as the Baltics, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

Solace Global Assessment: 

These attacks are almost certainly part of Russia’s broader strategy of “grey zone” or “hybrid” warfare against the West, motivated by its support for Ukraine. Despite significant military setbacks in Ukraine, Russia’s foreign intelligence agencies like the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) are likely operational and focused on identifying and targeting logistical support for Kyiv.

With kinetic strikes against facilities supporting Ukraine not feasible, Russia appears to be relying on proxy groups to carry out sabotage acts. This approach allows the Kremlin to maintain plausible deniability and reduce the risk of direct escalation. By leveraging proxy groups, nationalist elements in Europe, and potentially criminal networks, Russia aims to disrupt weapon deliveries to Ukraine, deter NATO support, and sow division within the alliance.

However, Russian proxy groups likely face challenges accessing highly secure military bases or weapons facilities. Therefore, they may target less secure infrastructure such as factories producing non-lethal aid, communication equipment, or vulnerable parts of Ukraine’s logistics network like railway lines.

As the conflict persists, Russia may escalate its asymmetric activities. This could involve intensifying disinformation campaigns to stoke divisions in the West, expanding maritime capabilities for deniable undersea sabotage against critical infrastructure, or increasing cyber operations.

Notably, Russia has refrained from conducting sabotage on US soil, potentially due to the risk of severe escalation. Yet, concerns arise from an influx of illegal Russian immigrants into the US, raising fears of Kremlin exploitation to establish networks capable of mimicking European-style asymmetric tactics. This could include targeting facilities associated with Ukraine on American soil if tensions escalate significantly.

In summary, Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics continue to evolve, leveraging proxies and asymmetric methods to achieve strategic objectives while managing international perceptions and minimizing direct military confrontation with Western powers.

US intelligence has stated that it discovered a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, the CEO of the major German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall. The assassination plot was reportedly in advanced stages and was part of a broader effort to target defence industry executives providing support for Ukraine’s military campaign against Russia. US intelligence reportedly warned the German security services which then protected Papperger.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Rheinmetall is one of the world’s largest arms producers which manufactures vital conventional weapon systems such as artillery shells, tank munitions and armoured vehicles. Rheinmetall’s arms have been used extensively in the war in Ukraine and the company has plans to establish factories within Ukraine’s borders, making the company a primary target for Russia.

The plot to assassinate Rheinmetall’s CEO was likely sanctioned by the Kremlin to deter privately-run arms companies from providing assistance to Ukraine and likely falls under Moscow’s wider hybrid warfare strategy. However, unlike Russia’s sabotage campaign, the Kremlin would unlikely be able to rely on proxy groups within Europe due to the sensitivity and complexity of such an operation.

Russian intelligence has a long history of assassinating Russian dissidents throughout Europe and has traditionally escaped with only minor repercussions such as the expulsion of diplomats, many of whom were suspected of being undercover intelligence agents. The assassination of a European executive would be a marked escalation but one Russia is likely willing to pursue given the circumstances and its potential to deter future assistance.

The Russian military has sustained huge losses on the battlefield, Kyiv has recently been authorised to conduct limited strikes into mainland Russia and the Kremlin is struggling to counter Ukraine’s ever-developing asymmetric capabilities such as drones and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs). Moreover, the success of sanctions on Russia has been questionable and has driven Moscow closer to the West’s adversaries, providing the West with few effective deterrents against Russia’s increasingly emboldened grey zone activity.

Private arms companies supporting Kyiv have frequently visited Ukraine, a detail widely covered by the media. If Russia is conducting an assassination campaign against private arms companies, there is a high likelihood that it will aim to target them in Ukraine, given the more permissive operational environment and the opportunity to attribute the attacks to a pro-Russian proxy involved in the war. 

Having been operational for only 20 days over the last two months, the US-built pier in Gaza is set to be dismantled in “short order”. Meanwhile, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has been conducting operations in Gaza City, particularly Shujaiya. On 10 July, the IDF urged all Gaza City residents to evacuate south.

Both Hamas and Israel have been accused of stalling ceasefire negotiations, and there have been reports that the Hamas political leadership is considering moving from Qatar to Iraq. In Lebanon, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah in a 10 July speech projected confidence against the potential of a major IDF offensive and indicated that Hezbollah would accept Hamas’ decision on the outcome of their negotiations, ceasing cross-border operations if a ceasefire is reached. On 11 July, drone strikes launched from Lebanon hit northern Israel, killing one IDF reservist.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The US-built and military-run Gaza humanitarian pier operation, which cost USD 230 million, has been plagued by two key challenges since it first started operating on 17 May. Firstly, inclement weather has resulted in operations being suspended at the pier multiple times. Secondly, the onshore distribution of the aid has been considerably hampered by what aid organisations consider to be intolerable security risks for its workers. In its two-month history, the pier has only delivered a single day’s worth of pre-war aid into Gaza. The pier was met with suspicion by both Israelis and Palestinians, the former due to the pier’s perceived role as a US reaction to endemic humanitarian concerns in Gaza, and the latter due to the US’s role as Israel’s primary military ally. Overall, it is highly likely that the pier, marred by problems, has failed in offsetting the Palestinian perception of the US as being fundamentally pro-Israel.

The IDF’s operations in Gaza City over the past week, in both Shujaiya and Tel al-Hawa, reveal the continued presence of Hamas in northern Gaza. The IDF has previously claimed such areas had been cleared of fighters. However, the current operations have been notably intense and this is only the second during the conflict that evacuation instructions have been leafleted across Gaza City. 250,000 people are estimated to be in Gaza City, and it is unlikely that the new evacuation orders will be followed en masse.  Most of the city’s previous population that were more willing or able to relocate have done so already, and some residents have indicated that would not feel any safer in the south, where Israel has allegedly ignored humanitarian zones. While ceasefire negotiations are ongoing in Doha, key issues remain divisive.

Supported by recent claims from Hamas spokespeople regarding the regeneration of combatants and materiel in previously “cleared” areas, Hamas likely remains confident that they are maintaining sufficient combat effectiveness across the Strip to continue pursuing its demands in the negotiations. Hamas has been resistant to any deal that does not commit Israel to a permanent ceasefire and full IDF withdrawal, while Israel has objected to terms which might enable Hamas to continue holding hostages and indefinitely halt IDF operations. The IDF will likely be unable to compel Hamas to accept Israel’s strategic objectives coercively with military force, as long as Hamas remains combat-effective across the Strip.

On 6 July, the three junta-led states of the Sahel region – Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso – signed a “confederation treaty” at the first summit of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). All three junta governments came to power after 2020, and, in January 2024, all three removed their countries from the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The regional bloc said it was “disappointed” by the lack of rapprochement and called for further “reconciliation” efforts.

Solace Global Assessment: 

All three juntas have adopted somewhat convergent foreign policies characterised by a rejection of ties with Western governments, and instead increased relations with Russia.

The three juntas are particularly plagued by a growing threat posed by Islamist insurgents, with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), among other fundamentalist groups, gaining considerable ground in areas where government control is tenuous (this is especially the case in Niger, where the eastern border region of the Chad basin continues to provide a sanctuary for insurgent groups).

The joint counterterrorism initiative launched by the three states in March is unlikely to pose a sufficient obstacle to the insurgents, and it is almost certain that the announcement of the latest agreement will be followed by further deals with Moscow.

The worsening in the relations between AES and ECOWAS, with the latter likely to impose further rounds of sanctions following the failure of the latest rapprochement efforts, may benefit regional violent extremist organisations (VEOs), which likely aim to destabilise the juntas to establish alternative administrative organs.

Still, ISWAP and other Islamist groups likely have a long-term strategic interest in establishing a presence in the comparatively wealthier coastal states that border the junta ones, including Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.

The completion of the withdrawal of US troops from a key base for counterterrorism in Niger overlapped with the AES’ announcement of the treaty. The withdrawal of Western troops could result in a more marked regionalisation of the Sahel region, with Washington likely seeking to increase efforts to court coastal powers.  

On 8 July, a UN report indicated that at least 3,000 Rwandan troops are directly fighting the DRC’s army alongside the M23 group, a militia operating in the eastern DRC that is led by ethnic Tutsis. Moreover, the report states that the Ugandan government is at least enabling M23 operations by granting M23 and Rwandan troops free access to its territory. The M23 group is mostly active in the North Kivu province which borders both Rwanda and Uganda and is rich in natural resources including gold, diamonds, coltan, and cassiterite.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The M23 militia likely represents a strategic asset for Kigali, as the group is directly involved in the informal trade of rare earth minerals and other resources to developed countries through its territorial control over DRC mining areas. Kigali, which responded to the report by accusing the DRC of funding ethnic Hutu insurgents, almost certainly exercises much control over the group, and the presence of large numbers of Rwandan troops in the M23’s ranks further demonstrates this point.

Possibly, the recent escalation is a reflection of Rwanda’s improving position on the international stage, marked by increasingly closer relations with Western states. Uganda’s seeming acquiescence to M23 troop movements is not necessarily proof of direct government support for the militia, but may rather reflect localised support, possibly of Ugandan officials benefitting from M23 operations, or a simple lack of administrative and security assets that would allow Ugandan forces to efficiently control their borders.

Much of the southern border area between Uganda, Rwanda and North Kivu is sparsely populated and characterised by rough and uneven terrain, with the border marked by a string of dormant volcanoes, and there is a high likelihood that militia troops moving in the direction of Goma can evade government forces with relative ease.

In late June, M23 seized the strategic town of Kanyabayoinga, North Kivu, which is a transport hub to northern DRC. Currently, DRC forces, which are also dealing with crises in the western border regions, as well as constant threats of disaggregation and rebellion (as testified by the recent failed coup) are likely worse equipped than M23 forces and are almost certainly unable to effectively prevent further advances.

The ongoing challenges faced by the DRC’s forces are likely driving the delay in the withdrawal of UN forces from the country. After asking the UN to fast-track the exit of peacekeepers from the country, the government asked, on 9 July, to pause the second phase of the withdrawal process, citing “Rwanda’s continued aggression in North Kivu”. Currently, the MONUSCO mission maintains a 17,000-strong contingent. On 25 June, its South Kivu region centre was disbanded.

There is a realistic possibility that the scaling back of the UN deployment will produce a localised power vacuum in the region, allowing for regional powers to more actively pursue their ambitions in the eastern DRC. So far, local Congolese rebel groups, mostly the Hutu-led Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), have controlled and allowed foreign access to mining areas, often to the benefit of Europe-based suppliers, or suppliers from regional powers including South Africa.

The M23’s advances could allow for powers with a lesser footprint in the area, including China, which is reportedly engaged in illegal gold extraction operations in the bordering region of South Kivu, to establish new informal extraction and shipping networks, possibly playing out broader geopolitical rivalries.

UK Labour Government Announces Moderate Agenda with National Wealth Fund and Policy Reversals

The new Labour government of the UK announced its first set of measures of its five-year legislature. They include the creation of a National Wealth Fund, the withdrawal of the controversial Rwanda deportation plan, and the scrapping of a ban on onshore wind farms.

The new Labour government has not promised particularly drastic reforms, instead concentrating on a growth-centric moderate plan marked by targeted spending. Early data suggests that the government’s start has been welcomed warmly by foreign investors, who are likely increasingly looking to the UK as more stable than its continental counterparts, and possibly the US, where the Trump campaign continues to gain traction.

Read our UK Election review here.

French National Assembly Elections: New Popular Front Wins Second Round, Coalition Government Uncertain

The second round of the French National Assembly elections was won by the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP), although they did not win enough seats to form a majority. Currently, the parliament is divided into three blocs, none of which have the seats to form a government.

There is a high likelihood of further protests as President Emmanuel Macron seeks to assemble a viable coalition. In particular, unrest is likely to be driven by the French Unbowed (LFI) party, which, despite receiving the highest number of votes among the NFP members, is unlikely to be included in a new coalition government.

Read our French Election Review here.

Catalan Independence Protest March Planned in Barcelona, 13 July

Activists affiliated with the Catalan National Assembly plan to conduct a protest march through central Barcelona on 13 July. The purpose of the demonstration is to condemn the Spanish application of the Amnesty Law and show support for Calalunya’s independence. There will likely be an increase in security forces within the vicinity of the demonstration and travel disruptions between Urquinaona Square and Saint Jaume Square are to be anticipated.

G7 Trade Ministers’ Meeting in Calabria: Security Tightened Amidst Protest Concerns

The G7 Trade Ministers’ Meeting will be held in Villa San Giovanni and Reggio Calabria in the Italian region of Calabria on 16-17 July 2024. The meeting will almost certainly involve heightened security measures and has the capacity to attract protest movements.

Russia Introduces Progressive Income Tax

The Russian government has passed new legislation introducing progressive income tax rates that will affect around 3.2 per cent of working Russians. The Ministry of Finance projects that the tax will boost its 2025 inflows by 533 billion rubles (USD 6 billion). The move likely reflects Moscow’s prediction of a protracted war in Ukraine, and Putin’s recent turn towards a more statist economic policy.

EU Suspends Georgia’s Accession Process Over “Foreign Agents” Bill

EU officials announced on 9 July that, following the approval of the controversial and authoritarian “foreign agents” bill, the accession process of Georgia has been suspended, leading to pauses in the provision of military aid through the European Peace Facility (EPF). The government in Tbilisi will likely use the announcement to redouble efforts to quash dissent and move the country closer to Moscow’s orbit.

Modi-Putin Summit Highlights India-Russia Relations Amidst Global Tensions

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the Kremlin on 9 July, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Despite Delhi’s historic commitment to non-alignment, Russia represents a vital supplier of cheap oil for India, more so after Russia’s trade with the West decreased due to the growing sanctions regime.

Moreover, Indian officials likely seek to appeal to Russia for a change of stance regarding the large influx of Indian “foreign fighters” joining Russian forces in Ukraine in exchange for promises of large pay, and sometimes even following coercion.

For Putin, the summit is highly likely a diplomatic success, as Russia continues to herald the BRICS group as a possible alternative to Western summits and claims to have resisted Western attempts to isolate it following its invasion of Ukraine.

Syrian Parliamentary Election Expected to Maintain Status Quo Under Assad’s Ba’ath Party

The Syrian parliamentary election is set to be held on 15 July with a victory for President Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’ath Party-dominated National Progressive Front almost certain after years of electoral reform and vote rigging that favours the incumbent government. With no major political change forecast it is highly unlikely that there will be any positive steps towards peace in Syria, which has now experienced over 13 years of civil war.

Moderate Candidate Pezeshkian Wins Iranian Presidential Election

The reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian defeated his hardline opponent in the second round of the Iranian presidential elections. Pezeshkian was likely aided by an increase in voter turnout in the second round, although overall participation remains lower than in past elections.

It is unlikely that Pezeshkian will usher in fundamental reforms of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. However, the new moderate candidate has already sent signals of willingness to negotiate with the West, including by choosing advisors who already participated in the Rouhani government, which saw the establishment of the Nuclear Deal.

Moody’s Downgrades Kenya’s Debt Rating Amid Political and Economic Uncertainty

Moody’s Ratings has further downgraded Kenya’s debt rating after protests forced the Ruto administration to abandon its tax hikes. The reversal of tax rises has resulted in a major decrease in violent demonstrations and looting.

However, President Ruto has warned of huge consequences for not managing the country’s debt and has not ruled out additional cuts or tax rise moves that are likely to fuel further unrest whilst tensions remain high.

Adding to the ongoing uncertainty, on 11 July Ruto dismissed almost the entirety of his cabinet, likely in a last-ditch effort to improve public support.

Rwanda Prepares for Elections Amidst Criticism and Predictions of Kagame’s Fourth Term

General elections are to be held in Rwanda on 15 July to elect the president and members of the Chamber of Deputies. Incumbent president Paul Kagame will likely extend his 23-year presidency by securing a fourth term and the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) retain its majority in parliament.

Kagame has faced criticism for leading a repressive state accused of widespread human rights abuses and the suppression of political opposition, evidenced by nine candidates being denied the opportunity to campaign.

The election results will likely trigger nationwide unrest, which could turn deadly, as seen during a crush at an election rally in June that resulted in one death.

Trump May Decrease Intelligence Sharing with European NATO Members if Reelected

According to a senior NATO official and three European officials, speaking to journalists anonymously, Donald Trump is considering decreasing levels of intelligence sharing with European NATO members, should he win the US presidential election. Under Biden’s administration, intelligence sharing between the US and NATO allies has increased – the provision of US intelligence is considered to have been vital in countering Russia in Ukraine, as well as foiling their clandestine activities in other European countries, and some senior former intelligence figures have expressed grave concern at the impact diminished intelligence sharing will have on European security.

Trump has long-standing frustrations with NATO members not meeting the 2 per cent of GDP defence spending guideline, as well as advocating a more isolationist foreign policy in general. There are, however, valid concerns regarding the level of Russian penetration in various European NATO member-states, as well as the reliability of partners such as Turkey and Hungary.

Additionally, it is unlikely that such limits on intelligence sharing would apply to NATO partners such as the UK and Canada, who engage in advanced intelligence cooperation through separate intelligence alliances such as Five Eyes.

Belarus and China Launch Joint Military Drills Near Polish Border

Belarus and China started joint military drills on 10 July near the Polish border under what is being termed as “Exercise Attacking Falcon”. The exercise will last until 19 July and is almost certainly strategic messaging aimed at NATO, which is concurrently holding its 75th-anniversary summit. The exercise comes after Belarus joined the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), suggesting an increasing military collaboration between the two authoritarian regimes and reflecting broader efforts by Beijing and Moscow to promote a multi-polar global order.

Houthis Resume Red Sea Attack

The Houthis conducted at least four attacks in the Red Sea over two days on 9-10 July after a ten-day hiatus of attacks. The brief cessation of attacks was potentially linked to the departure of the Nimitz-class USS Dwight D. Eisenhower aircraft carrier, which likely allowed the militant group time to regroup. The Houthis have been using a layered attack of drones and missiles to bypass coalition air defence and maximise success rates.

Of note, the US military also claims to have destroyed five uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) on 12 July, perhaps indicating an increased reliance on this capability due to its low cost, civilian profile and smaller radar cross-section which makes it harder to detect.

Iraq Sentences Wife of IS Leader al-Baghdadi to Death for Crimes Against Yazidis

On 10 July, an Iraqi court sentenced to death one of the wives of former Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for crimes against Yazidi women and girls captured and abused by the jihadist group. A court statement did not directly name the defendant but it is expected that she is Asma Mohammed, who was arrested in 2018 in Turkey and later extradited to Iraq. There is a realistic possibility that IS will conduct reprisal attacks against the Iraqi government in response to the ruling.

Ethiopia: Oromo Liberation Army Abducts 100, Including Students, for Ransom

Reports emerging on 5 July indicate that at least 100 people, including students, were kidnapped the previous week in the Oromia region of Ethiopia. Gunmen stopped three buses approximately 120km north of the capital Addis Ababa, forcing the victims to exit the buses before being abducted.

The attackers have been identified as belonging to the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) rebel group, which the UN has accused of targeted killings, property destruction and rape as part of their efforts to establish an independent Oromo state.

The abductions are likely part of a wider effort to obtain ransom to fund future operations against the Ethiopian government in the Oromo region, and if successful will likely inspire an increase in this tactic.

Wildfires in Attica, Greece Cause Evacuations and Property Damage

Wildfires broke out in Patras and Menidi, in the west of the Greek region of Attica, leading to evacuations and the destruction of at least one residential property and damage to a paediatric hospital. The fires reportedly started from uncleared plots of land, where flammable materials including dried wood and grass had accumulated.

Due to the currently hot and dry temperatures, fires tend to spread quickly and easily reignite even after being extinguished. While the current wildfire season in Greece has not yet reached the severity of last year’s, there is a realistic possibility of further episodes due to the prolonged extreme heat.

Burkina Faso Considers Criminalising Homosexuality, Stirring International Concerns

On 10 July, the Burkinabe military government reviewed a series of draft laws, including a proposal to criminalise homosexuality. Same-sex relations have been legal in Burkina Faso since its independence, with most former French colonies inheriting colonial penal codes that criminalised such acts. While this move is unlikely to face any significant domestic opposition from Burkina Faso’s conservative Muslim and Christian populations, it may provoke international backlash.

Cape Town Storms Destroy 1,000 Homes in Informal Settlements

Nearly 1,000 homes located in informal settlements of Cape Town, South Africa, have been destroyed following days of strong winds, caused by overlapping cold fronts, and the bursting of two riverbanks on 9 July.

A level 8 (out of 10) warning for disruptive rain was issued by local authorities for 10-11 July. The particularly severe impact of the storms is almost certainly linked to the lack of structural viability of many of the buildings in informal settlements, which, in Cape Town alone, house approximately 150,000 households.

Informal settlements, lacking proper drainage and sewage removal infrastructure, are especially at risk from waterborne diseases. Rain is set to continue for several days and authorities have warned of increased flooding, mudslides and rockfalls in the Cape Town, Drankenstein and Stellenbosch areas.

Rebel fighters belonging to the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) claimed to have conducted a series of attacks against the Taliban across Afghanistan during the reporting period. Multiple NRF attacks have occurred outside of the traditional areas of operations for the resistance group, including several attacks in western Afghanistan in the provinces of Nimroz, Farah and Herat. The NRF also carried out multiple attacks in Kabul, which has largely been considered a safe haven for the Taliban since its recapture in 2021.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The NRF, also known as the Second Resistance, emerged in 2021 in response to the Taliban’s rapid takeover of much of Afghanistan. The NRF’s main stronghold is in the Panjshir Valley, located northeast of Kabul, where the Taliban have historically been unable to assert control but the group also has an established presence throughout northeast Afghanistan.

The NRF is comprised of vestiges from the Northern Alliance and several smaller groups which together pose the main organised resistance to the Taliban and include substantial elements from Afghanistan’s minority groups like the Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. The NRF is largely non-extremist and is led by Ahmad Massoud, the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, who led resistance efforts against the Soviets and Taliban in the 1980s and 1990s.

After managing to survive the Taliban’s attempts to control the entirety of Afghanistan, the NRF was largely limited to operating in the provinces close to the Panjshir Valley and the predominantly Tajik regions of northeastern Afghanistan. Attacks against the Taliban typically increase during the spring and summer fighting season but recent attacks outside of their traditional stronghold may suggest an increase in the NRF’s freedom of movement and operational capabilities.

In recent months there has been a spate of attacks in Afghanistan’s western provinces but also dozens in Kabul, presenting a major challenge to the Taliban’s credibility. However, in most of these attacks, the NRF has not sought to directly engage with the Taliban due to their numerical superiority and abundance of advanced weapons seized after the US withdrawal. With no external support, the NRF attacks will likely limit their attacks to harassment operations.

Nevertheless, escalating attacks outside NRF strongholds, particularly in Kabul, will likely compel the Taliban to respond, which may ultimately be the NRF’s objective. The Taliban, whose rule is partially sustained through fear, would look weak for failing to respond. An escalation of fighting between the Taliban and NRF would likely yield several negative consequences.

Firstly, it would likely lead to more civilian casualties, displacement, economic hardship, curtail the freedom of aid agencies and result in the further degradation of an already severe humanitarian situation. Secondly, the Taliban have been the most effective force in containing the Islamic State’s most active branch, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which has increasingly expanded its focus outside of Afghanistan.

ISKP would likely seek to exploit the overstretching of Taliban resources and the continued destabilisation of Afghanistan to expand its operations, recruit disaffected individuals, fuel propaganda campaigns and potentially even seize territory. In the long term, this could increase the threat from Afghanistan to neighbouring countries and further afield. The VEO has expanded its networks westward into Iran, Turkey and parts of Europe, pivoting from regional operations to focus on external attacks.

This shift has already been evidenced by the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow alongside a series of thwarted attacks in Western Europe.

On 10 July, Pakistani officials authorised the country’s main spy agency, the military-run Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to tap telephone calls and messages. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s coalition government has defended the move, stating that these new powers will only be used in criminal and terrorism investigations. Furthermore, the government has stressed that anyone abusing the law will face action and that the application of wiretapping will not infringe on people’s lives and privacy. However, numerous critics have lambasted the move, citing it as unconstitutional and an attack on civil liberties.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Considering the significant influence of the Pakistani military in national politics, it is highly probable that extensive electronic surveillance was already in place, as indicated by past leaks of conversations involving Imran Khan and other members of his Tehreek-e-Insaf party.

However, the government’s formal recognition of these powers is likely to legitimise the practice and lead to greater abuse, likely resulting in increased electronic surveillance of the opposition and an expanded role for the military in politics.

Wiretapping could be exploited to justify the apprehension of the media, activists and opposition members, which in turn may incite civil unrest within the country, as seen during the arrest of Imran Khan.

For foreign entities operating in Pakistan, the decision will likely increase exposure to both direct and indirect electronic surveillance, potentially leading to heightened risks of corporate espionage and the compromise of sensitive information.

Pakistan Temporarily Halts Deportation of Afghan Refugees

Pakistan announced on 10 July that it is temporarily suspending the forced deportation of Afghan refugees, allowing almost 1.5 million Afghans to stay another year in Pakistan if they have proper documentation. The decision follows a recent visit by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which, alongside many other international observers, has condemned Islamabad for its often-violent anti-migrant crackdown which started in 2023. The crackdown has sparked fears over human rights abuses and increased rates of radicalisation within the Afghan border, a trend that could increase the threat of terrorism on both sides of the border.

India Plans Hydropower Expansion in Arunachal Prades

Indian government sources have stated that Delhi is planning to build 12 hydropower stations in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, a northeastern Himalayan region that is partly claimed by China. The move has an obvious economic rationale: India’s production of hydroelectric power has stagnated over the last decade, and the state has a large energy-generation potential. Nevertheless, the move is also highly likely intended to increase India’s security and administrative footprint in the region and decrease the chances of Chinese encroachment. There is a realistic possibility of diplomatic tensions between Delhi and Beijing if the plans are carried out.

Thailand Approves 200 New Senators

Thailand’s Election Commission has approved 200 new senators to replace the military-appointed upper house, potentially complicating governance for the ruling Pheu Thai party. Although the new senate won’t vote on the prime minister, it retains the authority to vet laws and appoint key officials, reflecting a shift towards conservative-royalist interests and signalling continued political polarisation within Thailand.

South Korea Reverses Decision on Striking Doctors’ Licences

The South Korean government reversed its plans to retract the medical licences of striking junior doctors. More than 10,000 doctors are currently on strike due to government plans to boost medical school admissions. The move is likely an attempt at enticing the striking doctors to return to work, but it is unlikely that it will succeed, as it fails to address their fundamental grievances.

Fatal Shooting in New Caledonia Amidst Unrest Over Electoral Changes

On 10 July, French police in New Caledonia fatally shot an alleged gunman, bringing the death toll to 10 following nearly two months of unrest in the French Pacific territory. Protestors have continued to block roads, commit arson and loot after fears that changes to the electoral roll would reduce the chances of the indigenous Kanak people to secure independence. However, in the French parliamentary elections, indigenous Kanak Emmanuel Tjibaou became the first pro-independence candidate to win a seat in nearly four decades, a development that may help to quell unrest.

Political Leader Killed in Tamil Nadu Sparks Controversy

In the Tamil Nadu region of India, a state leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) was killed by unknown assailants on 5 July. Early police reports claim that the killing was in retaliation for a crime-related dispute. BSP is a party advocating for the interests of Scheduled Castes – the disadvantaged groups that, combined, constitute India’s demographic majority. The party decided to run alone in the 2024 elections, and suffered a complete collapse, losing all of its seats. BSP activists have rejected the official version of events, and have instead alleged that the killing was a political act.

Balochistan Liberation Front Reports 108 Attacks in Occupied Balochistan

The Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) has released a report detailing its operations from January to June, highlighting 108 attacks across Pakistan-occupied Balochistan. The attacks targeted Pakistani forces, military installations, construction companies and a range of “collaborators”.  The BLF has vowed to continue its fight for Balochistan’s liberation and is likely using the report as a propaganda tool to undermine Islamabad as well as to bolster its recruitment efforts.

Baloch Liberation Army Releases Video Showing Attacks in Occupied Balochistan

Another pro-Balochistan independence group, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) released a 21-minute video on their official media channel, Hakkal, showcasing 25 attacks against the Pakistani Army and infrastructure in Pakinstan-occupied Balochistan. The video has likely been released to increase recruitment and also depicts attacks on gas pipelines and convoys transporting minerals extracted from within Balochistan and exported to the rest of Pakistan, a major grievance for the Baloch people. The video shows BLA militants with advanced US weaponry, likely indicating a relationship with the Afghan Taliban who acquired similar arms after the rushed US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Indian Security Forces Conduct Operations in Jammu and Kashmir

Indian security forces in the contested region of Jammu and Kashmir have been conducting search operations in the border areas near Pakistan following reports of suspicious movements. The operations follow a series of attacks on Indian security services within a 48-hour period which have killed several Indian soldiers and have largely been concentrated in the south of the region. Whilst the line-of-control between India and Pakistan has been successful at denying militants entry to the area, the redeployment of troops to the Line of Actual Control in Eastern Ladakh in the aftermath of the 2020 standoff with China has likely given militants more freedom of movement which they are now exploiting.

Myanmar Rebels Fund Offensives with Drug Trafficking Across Thai Border

Thai media reported on 8 July that Myanmar rebels are funding their offensive operations against the country’s junta by “flooding” the Thai border with narcotics. The Thai border force reported seized more than 151,000,000 amphetamine pills during this fiscal year, almost four times the amount of the previous year, and more than 1,300 kilogrammes of crystal meth. The increased flow of narcotics towards Thailand could damage the rebels’ hopes to gather further international support, to match their ongoing battlefield successes. In the short term, the increased volume of drug trafficking could destabilise the Myanmar-Thai border, and drive an increase in organised crime in Thailand.

South Korea Begins Mass Production of Low-Cost Laser Weapon to Counter Drones

On 11 July, South Korean officials announced that they would begin mass-producing a new low-cost laser weapon that has the potential to cheaply and reliably destroy small drones at short distances. The system, named Block-I, is the first of its kind to be officially mass-produced, although other countries, including the US and Israel, have developed equivalents. While unlikely to be practical or effective in combat between highly sophisticated contemporary conventional armed forces, laser systems likely have the highest potential in narrowing the cost differential when defending against low-sophistication drones and projectiles used by insurgencies and armed groups. Seoul also announced plans to develop a Block-II version, with greater power and reach.

Philippines and Japan Forge Military Alliance with Reciprocal Access Agreement

On July 8, the Philippines and Japan signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), allowing their armed forces to train and potentially operate together. This agreement, announced by Malacañang Palace, was witnessed by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., with Japanese Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko and Defence.

Minister Kihara Minoru present. The RAA, similar to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) but unique to the two countries, is likely aimed at enhancing military cooperation and enabling joint training and operations. The agreement comes amid rising tensions with China and represents Japan’s developing proactive security role in the Indo-Pacific, benefiting the Philippines’ security strategy. Japan has also announced that it is willing to deepen military ties with the United States and Australia under trilateral or quadrilateral security arrangements that may involve the Philippines, in a move that is almost certainly being designed to counter China.

Chinese Aircraft Carrier Sails Near Northern Philippines in Show of Force

On 10 July, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) responded to recent security developments made by the Philippines by sailing its Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, the SHANDONG, close to the northern Philippines. The carrier was joined by dozens of PLAN warplanes and was almost certainly strategic messaging to Manila aimed at communicating that China has the firepower to enforce all its claims in the South China Sea.

Deadly Floods Strike Nepal

At least 14 people have been killed by floods in Nepal, caused by monsoon rains which have also affected neighbouring South Asian countries. The monsoon season runs from June to September, but protracted rains and particularly severe weather events have driven increasingly high fatality rates, with a realistic possibility of increasing severity being linked to anthropogenic climate change.

Japan Issues Heatstroke Alerts as Temperatures Soar to 40°C

Japan’s meteorological agency has issued heatstroke alerts for 26 prefectures, advising residents to stay indoors, use air conditioning, and stay hydrated as temperatures soared to 40 degrees Celsius in multiple areas, marking the start of a severe summer heatwave. The extreme heat poses significant risks, particularly to the elderly and young children, with numerous cases of heatstroke reported across the country and several heat-related deaths already registered.

Severe Monsoon Causes Record Rainfall and Fatalities in South Korea

An unusually severe monsoon season has caused record rainfall in parts of central, southern and eastern South Korea, leading to at least four deaths and causing landslides. North and South Chungcheong, North Gyeongsang and Jeonbuk have been particularly affected. Multiple central regional train services were suspended, and the bullet trains ran at reduced speeds in particular areas. Heavy rains are forecast to continue following a brief intermission, and the Interior Minister has asked people to avoid underground parking, underpasses and streams during periods of heavy rainfall.

Deadly Mudslide at Illegal Gold Mine in Indonesia

On 8 July, a mudslide caused by heavy rains killed at least 8 workers at an illegal gold mine in the Suwawa district of Sulawesi Island, Indonesia. The incident was one of several taking place outside of the Indonesian rainy season (from November to February). It is highly likely that anthropogenic changes to the local environment, including the heavy deforestation of the country’s tropical forest, are contributing to making these episodes more frequent.

On July 2nd, the Barcelona Provincial Court granted amnesty to 46 national police officers who faced charges stemming from their role in quelling protests during the October 1st, 2017 Catalonian independence referendum. This decision contrasts sharply with the Supreme Court’s ruling the day before, July 1st, which denied amnesty to former Catalan President Carles Puigdemont and several other independence leaders. The Supreme Court justified its decision by arguing that the crimes these leaders are accused of, primarily embezzlement of public and European funds to support the independence movement, are not covered under the amnesty law.

Both cases fall under the recently approved and controversial amnesty law, passed by the Spanish Congress in late May and sponsored by Socialist Party leader and Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez. This law potentially grants amnesty to around 500 individuals involved in the 2017 protests, with exceptions for extreme cases. However, the Barcelona court’s decision to grant amnesty to police officers accused of severe actions like torture or inhuman treatment is seen as lenient and has sparked criticism.

The disparities between amnesty granted to police officers and denied to Catalan leaders are likely to provoke public unrest in Catalonia. The Supreme Court’s decision is viewed by many as politically motivated, especially given past protests following the sentencing of nine independence leaders in 2019, which resulted in widespread disruptions and clashes in major Catalan cities.

Following these developments, there are concerns about renewed civil unrest in Catalonia. Travellers should stay updated with local media for any announcements of protests or demonstrations in the region and exercise caution accordingly.

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An investigation conducted by the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) indicates that as many as 400 migrants who illegally entered the country in the last four years were enabled by a human smuggling network reportedly connected to the Islamic State (IS). The investigation has prompted an additional review of the identified individuals.

The report suggests that the primary objective of the network was to smuggle in people, and not to facilitate the entry of terrorists into the US. However, the smuggling network is assessed to have direct links to another network with established ties to the trans-regional violent extremist (VEO) group that expedited the entry of a group of Uzbek nationals.

The 400 migrants that will require further investigation are mostly from Central Asian nations, and the report has been released after an operation in early June by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) which arrested eight Tajik nationals with alleged ties to IS.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Reports of IS-linked groups smuggling migrants into the US will likely be used during the current presidential campaign to undermine President Biden’s record on border security and immigration. On 26 June, House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Mark E. Green released a statement suggesting that there is no one the Biden administration won’t allow into the country. The Republicans will likely exploit the timing of this report for political gain, with polls indicating most Americans trust Trump over Biden regarding border security and immigration.

The investigation has already resulted in the apprehension of over 150 migrants, but the whereabouts of at least 50 remain unknown, a development likely to evoke fear in the US. Currently, there is no evidence to suggest that the Central Asian migrants are planning on conducting attacks within the US, and the vast majority are likely economic migrants with no real connections to terrorism. The most likely threat posed by the operation is that it is being used by members of the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISKP) to generate money, which is then used to fund ISKP activity.

The ISKP is primarily based in Afghanistan, but its senior leadership is predominantly Tajik and is successfully recruiting Central Asians. Likely, elements of ISKP within Central Asia will also target the families of the smuggled individuals to extort a portion of their remittance payments. There is also a realistic possibility that some of the 400 are vulnerable to radicalisation after entry to the US and potentially susceptible to IS propaganda if struggling with isolation or economic hardship. However, the lack of current evidence regarding planned attacks is unlikely to blunt concerns in the US.

The report was released shortly after a resurgence in ISKP activity, characterised by an increase in external attacks in places like Russia, Iran, and Pakistan. Long-term, ISKP is likely to exploit funds through smuggling to consolidate its power within Afghanistan and increasingly so in neighboring countries like Pakistan, Tajikistan, and other Central Asian countries. This is likely to put it in a stronger position to conduct future external operations, which will likely include coveted Western targets and interests, with the group using the remote, mountainous, and destabilised parts of Afghanistan and Central Asia in a similar manner to how the Taliban did prior to 9/11.

Whilst this revenue stream will only play a minor part in ISKP’s financial operations, the fact that the US’ weak southern border is being exploited to fund its enemies’ activities is likely to be highly contentious and exacerbate political tensions during an already heightened time in the US.

On the afternoon of 26 June, the commander of the Bolivian Army, General Juan José Zúñiga, led an attempted coup d’état against leftist President Luis Arce. Hundreds of soldiers, equipped with armored vehicles, moved into Plaza Murillo in central La Paz, Bolivia’s capital. They then attempted to storm Casa Grande del Pueblo, the presidential palace, with an armored vehicle, reportedly slamming into the palace doors. Zúñiga publicly called for a restructuring of democracy and a change of government.

In the days prior, Arce had relieved Zúñiga of his post following threats allegedly made by Zúñiga to arrest former President Evo Morales should Morales run for president again in 2025. Arce personally confronted Zúñiga at the presidential palace, and Zúñiga was arrested shortly afterward. Along with Zúñiga, Vice-Admiral Juan Arnez Salvador, head of the navy, has also been arrested.

The attempted coup only lasted a few hours and was condemned by regional leaders in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, Chile, Venezuela, and the Organization of American States (OAS). The US, UK, and the European Union’s foreign policy chief also condemned the attempted coup. Zúñiga reportedly urged his troops to withdraw after it became clear the coup had failed, and newly appointed Army commander, José Wilson Sánchez, ordered soldiers to return to their barracks.

Solace Global Assessment:

Zúñiga cited dismay with Bolivia’s endemic issues as his motivation for the coup. However, it is likely that personal motivations served as the primary catalyst for the coup due to his recent dismissal by Arce. Alternatively, another key trigger may have been large-scale protests that have recently gripped La Paz due to growing economic insecurity.

Arce is presiding over a challenging period for Bolivia, with a financial crisis crippling currency reserves amid low gas exports and nationwide fuel shortages. In March, approval ratings for Arce were reported to be as low as 38 percent. There has been discontent from across the political spectrum. From the right-wing, there has been longstanding severe dissatisfaction with the far-left Movement for Socialism’s (MAS) return to power under Arce in 2020, after former president Morales’ removal from power in 2019. The right-wing former interim President Jeanine Anez, however, condemned the coup. A major contributing factor to the military coup’s failure was highly likely to be a lack of support from the political right.

From the left wing, there has also been considerable discontent and divisions arising within MAS. Morales has stated his intent to stand in Bolivia’s 2025 election, ousting Arce. It was Zúñiga’s threats against Morales in anticipation of this that reportedly sparked the general’s initial dismissal.

While very short-lived, the failed coup reveals the continued threat posed by the military and exposes fundamental weaknesses in Bolivia’s democratic system. Arce is likely to receive a boost in his ratings amid almost universal international condemnation of the coup. However, there has been speculation that the coup was actually organised by the government themselves to galvanise such support in the face of a political crisis. While the veracity of such claims is unclear, these claims are likely to be believed by a significant proportion of Bolivia’s anti-Arce groups.

The threat posed by civil unrest in Bolivia is likely to increase in the short-to-medium term, with disgruntled right-wing groups lamenting the coup’s failure and leftists being called to march in solidarity with the government. However, the coup’s critical failure is likely to bolster the government’s grip on power, although this is unlikely to persist in the medium to long term as Bolivia’s economic poor performance is almost certain to continue.

Argentina’s parliament, the National Congress of Argentina, has approved President Milei’s economic reform package after months of debate and revisions to the bill within the country’s upper and lower houses. Milei described his first real major legislative victory as the “greatest fiscal adjustment” in Argentine history and has castigated the opposition for delaying the bill.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This legislative victory essentially provides President Milei with the tools he has demanded for months to reform the Argentine economy. The legislation will enable him to introduce a raft of controversial right-wing policies aimed at incentivising investment, privatising state-owned entities, restructuring taxes, and cutting away at Argentina’s large public sector. Milei’s policies to date have helped reduce Argentina’s inflation and have brought about the country’s first fiscal surplus in years. However, they also have incited widespread civil unrest and resulted in many job losses.

Recent reporting indicates that Argentina has officially entered a technical recession in the first quarter of 2024, with GDP shrinking 2.6 percent from the previous quarter, marking the second consecutive contraction. Under Milei, the jobless rate has risen to 7.7 percent, resulting in 300,000 more unemployed people, and many services and goods have spiked in price. Spending cuts have halted infrastructure projects, causing significant job losses in construction, while triple-digit inflation and the recession have severely impacted consumers. Despite achieving a fiscal surplus that boosted markets, poverty and homelessness have increased, though Milei insists these measures are necessary as part of his long-term recovery plan.

However, the announcement of a technical recession will likely be interpreted as a failure of Milei’s austerity measures, and his impending implementation of further measures following his victory in parliament will almost certainly be a catalyst for further civil unrest.

The first US presidential debate was held on 27 June in Georgia, a key battleground state for the 2024 election. Observers have stated that, although Republican candidate and former President Donald Trump’s performance was marked by numerous false statements, incumbent President Biden almost certainly “lost”. In particular, Biden repeatedly seemed to lose his train of thought and gave somewhat incoherent responses to otherwise straightforward questions.

Some Democrat Party politicians informally raised the possibility of asking Biden to step down in favor of an alternative candidate before the party’s national convention. This remains a remote possibility, as replacing Biden would be incredibly challenging due to party rules and would likely result in a Trump victory. Still, it is highly likely that the debate largely improved the controversial former president’s chances.

The Honduran ex-President Juan Orlando Hernández was sentenced to 45 years in prison on 26 June. He was found guilty of accepting millions of dollars in bribes to protect US-bound cocaine shipments belonging to traffickers. The case likely illustrates the extent of corruption present in Honduras as individuals in government use their position of power for personal gain, neglecting the interest of citizens.

On 25 June, the first contingent of Kenyan police, numbering 400, arrived in Haiti following repeated delays. Much of the country is still under gang control, with rival groups increasingly targeting institutions likely in the hope of reducing officials’ ability to restore order to the country. The Kenyan mission, whose stability is already likely compromised by the severe protests currently taking place in Nairobi, will almost certainly face extreme logistical difficulties in its attempts to re-establish order in Port-au-Prince and the rest of Haiti.

There is a high likelihood that the UN-backed force’s first task will be securing key locations in the capital, allowing for a safer environment for the carrying out of humanitarian and governance operations. However, there is a high likelihood of retaliation from the well-armed gangs, many of which have decried foreign intervention as a fundamental threat to their interests.

Authorities in Colombia have started talks with a third guerrilla group that broke away from a 2016 ceasefire deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC). The Segunda Marquetalia faction, which reportedly has around 1,600 members, launched a new rebellion in 2019 and has yet to subscribe to President Petro’s “total peace” plan.

Successfully signing a peace deal would help stabilise the country, reduce violence, and improve national security. However, Petro has had mixed success with other groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN), and there are fears that rebel groups are using ceasefires to expand their influence, appropriate more territory, and recruit more members.

Research studying the 2023 wildfires that affected much of Canada revealed that the fires resulted in the release of 3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2), equivalent to the total emissions of the global airline industry for 2022. The 2023 fires were among the most severe ever recorded, with Canada alone accounting for more than a quarter of global tree cover loss over the year.

As the warmest months of the year begin, the Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) office warned of a “high probability” of above-average temperatures in July and August. Warm and dry conditions are especially conducive to exacerbating the severity of wildfires, highlighting ongoing concerns about climate impacts and the potential for further environmental and atmospheric consequences.

In Mexico City, thousands of citizens have been forced to evacuate their homes as storms and heavy rainfall continue. As of 21 June, the death toll had reached 30, including six children. Warnings have been issued for wind speeds up to 70 kilometers per hour and waves up to 3 meters around the Gulf and Caribbean coasts.

These extreme weather patterns are attributed to Storm Alberto, which has caused significant economic losses for Mexico due to widespread damage to infrastructure and the displacement of thousands of citizens.

28 June an earthquake of magnitude of 7.0 struck near the coast in southern Peru’s Arequipa region. No deaths have been reported, but eight people have been injured. Arequipa has been hit with four aftershocks of 4 to 4.6 magnitude, creating landslides on local roads. There’s the potential for further damage which will add additional pressure on the region’s infrastructure and the need for emergency response efforts.

On 23 June, six gunmen from the Islamic State Caucasus Province (ISCP) carried out a series of attacks in the cities of Derbent and Makhachkala in Dagestan. The attacks resulted in the deaths of at least 22 people, with more than 40 wounded, and significant damage to two synagogues and two churches. These incidents follow a rise in Islamist terror activities in the region and across Russia.

In late October, anti-Semitic riots occurred in Dagestan, including in the same cities targeted by ISCP. In March, the IS’ Khorasan branch (ISKP) carried out a deadly attack at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow, killing 145 people. More recently, supporters of the Islamic State staged a prison uprising in Rostov. Additionally, reports indicate that cooperation between Russia and Turkey led to the dismantling of an IS cell that was planning further attacks in Moscow.

These events underscore ongoing security challenges posed by Islamist extremist groups in Russia and the broader Caucasus region, prompting heightened vigilance and counterterrorism efforts by authorities.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The various branches of the Islamic State (IS) have likely identified the ongoing war in Ukraine as an opportunity to destabilise the Russian state. Russia’s internal security is primarily managed by the Russian National Guard, but many of its forces have been redeployed to occupied parts of Ukraine, border security, and protecting the Kremlin post-Wagner rebellion, leaving other areas of Russia less secure.

Russia’s extensive counterterrorism efforts in Syria, the broader Middle East, and through its Africa Corps in the Sahel have likely strained its security and intelligence capabilities, making Moscow a desirable target for Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs). Recent improvements in Russia’s relations with the Afghan Taliban regime, potentially nearing full diplomatic recognition, may further embolden groups like the IS Khorasan Province (ISKP) and IS Caucasus Province (ISCP) to target Russian civilians and assets.

The Caucasus region, with its history of Russian domination and conflicts such as the Chechen wars, coupled with economic stagnation and lack of socioeconomic progress, provides fertile ground for Islamist sentiments. The resurgent IS has found receptive audiences for recruitment in former Soviet republics, particularly Tajikistan, where local governments are viewed as oppressive toward Islam, echoing similar grievances in Chechnya and Dagestan.

The involvement of family members of a local government official in the attacks underscores the penetration of extremist ideologies among educated youth, possibly indicating growing social acceptance of violent forms of Salafi Islam among elites. The Russian government’s relatively muted response following the attacks, compared to previous incidents like the Crocus City Hall attack, reflects Moscow’s concern over public perception of its ability to prevent Islamist violence. The implication of a local government official in the attack adds to Kremlin embarrassment.

While some officials have attempted to shift blame for the attacks onto Ukraine or the West, claiming stable interfaith relations within Russia, tensions likely persist. Anti-Islamic sentiment in European Russia contrasts with growing sympathy for Islamist causes in the Caucasus, potentially fueling further disorder.

The aftermath of these attacks may embolden Christian Orthodox nationalists to perpetrate mob violence against Muslim communities in Russia and increase the likelihood of further lone-wolf attacks by radicalised individuals, particularly in major cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his administration have remarked that the phase of most intense fighting in the ongoing war in Gaza is approaching its end, and have increasingly shifted attention to the Israeli northern border, where Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah continue to trade a growing volume of tit-for-tat airstrikes. Most notably, on 21 June IDF airstrikes targeted a compound belonging to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran located in al-Bukamal, Syria. Defence Minister Yoav Gallant recently threatened to send Lebanon “back to the stone age”. The approval of a controversial draft bill, which allows for the state to force Orthodox Haredi Jews into partaking in a period of mandatory military service, has simultaneously resulted in demonstrations and growing discontent with the Netanyahu government.

Solace Global Assessment:

An Israeli offensive into Lebanon would most likely be extremely costly for Tel Aviv. Hezbollah is comparatively much better equipped than Hamas and has access to more solid positions, as well as clear support and logistics lifelines via its “Axis of Resistance” allies through Iraq and Syria. Despite this, the plan is viewed favourably by the more hawkish figures in the Netanyahu administration, which likely consider the continuation of a Hezbollah conventional threat at the border as an unacceptable long-term security vulnerability.

On the Axis of Resistance side, there likely is not a clear consensus on the possibility and desirability of a conflict with Israel. An outbreak of open conflict between the IDF and Hezbollah will likely be used by other Iranian proxies, such as the various Iraqi militias, to widen the conflict and target US assets in neighbouring countries, such as Jordan, with a broader aim of destabilising the region.

However, Tehran likely perceives this as risky, both due to the risk of the rise of Sunni insurgent groups, and due to that of rapidly worsening already tense relations with regional powers. Tel Aviv’s statement that the IDF has defeated the remaining Rafah battalion, and will therefore move to a stage of occasional raids and “management” of Hamas is highly likely premature. The Palestinian militant group likely still retains an ability to recruit new fighters, and manufacture or acquire weapons to replenish its arsenals, and will almost certainly continue carrying out re-infiltration operations in areas cleared by the IDF.

While it is unlikely that these actions will result in anything more than a manageable level of attrition for the IDF, the continuation of IDF deployments in Gaza is likely to become increasingly costly for Tel Aviv. Moreover, the Hamas leadership in Gaza continues to evade Israeli intelligence, and its survival is almost certainly politically unacceptable for Netanyahu, who has indicated the destruction of Hamas as his key objective of the war.

In the West Bank, Axis of Resistance groups are highly likely continuing their attempts to smuggle weapons to Hamas fighters and other Palestinian groups in the area with the intention of opening an additional front – a development that will become increasingly important if a confrontation in the north breaks out.

On 24 June, the Houthi Movement claimed to have used a “new” ballistic missile to carry out a direct hit on the Liberian-flagged vessel MSC SARAH V in the Arabian Sea, which it claims is linked to Israel. The vessel was targeted whilst heading to port at Abu Dhabi at approximately 04.45 hours UTC about 450 kilometres (246 nautical miles) southeast of Nishum, a Yemeni town near the Oman border.

The vessel’s operators claim that it was not hit by the missile but landed just 50m off the starboard side of the ship. The Houthis have stated that the missile used was the Hatem/Hadim-2, a domestically produced hypersonic missile which the militant group claims can reach speeds of up to Mach 8 (eight times the speed of sound).

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack on the MSC SARAH V marks one of the longest-range Houthi attacks on merchant shipping and was likely launched to coincide with the withdrawal of the USS Dwight Eisenhower-led carrier group that spearheaded allied efforts to combat the Yemeni group.

Whilst the Houthis claim that the missile was domestically produced, the Hatem-2 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) bears a strong resemblance to the Iranian “Kheybar Shekan” ASBM. Iran has a track record of providing its proxy groups with capable weapon systems so that Tehran can indirectly attack or influence its enemies with a high degree of plausible deniability.

Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the Houthi Movement have direct access to the technology or the domestic capability to produce an ASBM similar in nature to one of Iran’s most capable anti-ship systems. The Kheybar Shekan ASBM is purported to have a range of 1,450 kilometres (782 nautical miles); can reach altitudes of 135 kilometres; has a circular error probable (CEP) of under 20m; and according to some sources can reach speeds of up to Mach 8.

In addition, the missile uses a solid-propellant so doesn’t require fuelling before launch which would reduce the Houthis’ targeting cycle. Whilst it is unlikely that the Houthi variant is as technologically advanced as the Iranian model, if the Houthis have acquired some of this technology and are capable of proliferation, it will increase their ability to target international shipping.

The Houthis’ capability will be further augmented if their intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) are provided by Iran, allowing the proxy group to detect and track ASBM targets outside the ranges of their organic targeting assets.

The missile’s potential speed, ability to manoeuvre at speed if equipped with advanced control systems, and its parabolic trajectory may enable it to bypass coalition air defence and radars by reducing response times, creating unpredictable flight paths, and exploiting gaps in radar coverage.

This development could help to overstretch coalition naval assets currently providing air defence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and the weapon system will almost certainly be nominated as a high-value target for US and UK strikes.

On 25 June, the Parliament of Kenya was set on fire after being stormed by crowds of protesters, gathering in opposition to a finance bill proposed by the government, which would have increased taxes on a wide range of goods. Despite a heavy-handed and violent police response, civil unrest has continued, with crowds calling for the resignation of President William Ruto, despite the withdrawal of the bill.

More than 20 deaths and hundreds of arrests and injuries have resulted from the protests as of the time of writing. On 28 June, the Kenyan High Court barred the police from using violent crowd dispersal methods, including water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, following widespread cases of police brutality.

Solace Global Assessment:

The bill was proposed by the government of President William Ruto, who is trying to portray Kenya as a modern and stable African country and sees the reduction of the country’s USD 80 billion debt as vital to this end. Related to this is Ruto’s support for a UN-sponsored policing mission to Haiti to combat the recent wave of severe gang-led violence, as part of which 400 Kenyan police officers were deployed to the country last week.

The Ruto administration’s decision to increase taxes on a multitude of common goods such as bread, milk and sanitary towels, while pursuing the costly Haitian expedition, has almost certainly been the main trigger for civil unrest in a country where millions live below the international poverty line and are struggling to pay for basic commodities. The demonstrations are likely to continue and expand to other cities in Kenya’s south, beyond the epicentre of Nairobi.

Reports of cases of looting of assets owned by pro-government politicians in Nairobi and other cities highly likely indicate the important class dimension of the protests, and how the civil unrest is also linked to a broader dissatisfaction with the Kenyan political elite. The protests are likely to cause significant damage to infrastructure and result in a decrease in the government’s administrative capacity in the short term. This may create opportunities for further unrest and violence in the short-to-medium term, especially in the south.

There is a high likelihood of the protests impacting Kenya’s economy directly and indirectly, affecting business and travel within the country. The willingness of the government to employ violent crowd dispersal methods, and repeated failures of police forces to protect government assets, make it likely that the Ruto administration will have to deploy the military to curb the unrest. Such a scenario would likely further increase the risks faced by foreign humanitarian organisations operating in Kenya.

The suspension of internet services and damage to infrastructure will likely further complicate the provision of healthcare and limit opportunities to evacuate the country. Finally, the widespread reports of police brutality are likely to create important worries regarding the potential damages that the Kenyan police deployment may cause in Haiti, where conditions are even more chaotic than in their home country.

The repeated instances of police officers using extreme levels of brutality to target protesters likely demonstrate a significant and structural lack of oversight, which, if transferred to Haiti, could undermine the legitimacy of the UN-backed mission and bolster the gangs’ position and authority in the country.

Ursula von der Leyen was re-elected as President of the European Commission, and Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas was elected as the EU’s next foreign policy chief on 28 June. Portuguese former Prime Minister Antonio Costa was nominated as President of the European Council. These nominations were expected and received support from a cohesive coalition of the European People’s Party (EPP), the Socialists & Democrats (S&D), and the liberal Renew Europe group.

Von der Leyen will now proceed to the European Parliament to seek reconfirmation for her second term. The significant aspect of the vote was the abstention of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, leader of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, which von der Leyen had actively courted in recent months. The parliamentary vote is expected to compel the EPP-led bloc to either maintain its alliance with the S&D or risk losing support from the left in favor of Meloni’s ECR and other smaller right-wing groups.

The UK general election is scheduled to take place on 4 July. The Labour Party led by Keir Starmer is highly likely to win in a landslide. However, there is a realistic possibility of some minor demonstrations following the vote, especially from left-wing groups who feel disappointed by Starmer’s moderate policies and positions on the ongoing conflict in Gaza.

The first turn of the French National Assembly snap election will take place on 30 June. The right-wing National Rally (RN) is likely to win the most votes in the first round, with a broad left-wing coalition led by the France Unbowed party (LFI) likely securing the second spot. Both are considered radical and outside of the “traditional” French centre-right and centre-left spheres. Consequently, it is almost certain that civil unrest will continue, and likely intensify after the first round and into the Paris Olympics.

Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte was selected as NATO’s next secretary-general, scheduled to take over the post from Stoltenberg on 1 October. Rutte’s appointment, which was guaranteed after the Romanian candidate, President Klaus Iohannis, withdrew his candidacy, ensures a continuation of Stoltenberg’s status quo.

On 22 June, an estimated 30,000 Hungarians held a Pride rally in Budapest in defiance of the country’s anti-LGBTQ laws. The rally follows a joint statement by 44 embassies in the Hungarian capital protesting the Orban government’s restrictions on LGBTQ rights.

Moldova, Ukraine and the EU began membership talks on 25 June. The timing of the talks was likely arranged to predate the beginning of Hungary’s EU presidency on 1 July. The two countries’ candidacies for EU membership are almost two decades old, and, despite this step, there is a high likelihood that the timeline of their membership bids will continue to extend relatively far into the future. The announcement of talks is therefore likely a symbolic move, meant to respond to both Russophiles within the union, and to Russia itself, following Putin’s proposal of a “peace plan” which would have included major territorial concessions as well as Ukraine’s pledge to remain essentially isolated from the West. In Moldova, there is a high likelihood that pro-Russian separatist groups will intensify civil unrest and possible violence against institutions.

The parliament of Georgia passed the first reading of a new anti-LGBTQ law that emulates similar procedures passed in Russia. The ruling Georgian Dream coalition, which has faced massive protests due to its controversial “foreign agents bill”, is highly likely using “traditionalist” and anti-LGBTQ talking points to try to recuperate some support and embolden its conservative base. The law’s approval is likely going to further stoke anti-government sentiment and may open further space for violent police crackdowns on dissent.

Presidential elections will be held in Mauritania on 29 June. Incumbent President Mohamed Ould Cheikh Ghazouani is almost certain to win. Despite gradually moving in the direction of greater political pluralism, Mauritania remains unstable and there is a high likelihood that the vote will coincide with greater civil unrest and possible violence.

The Iranian elections’ first round is taking place on 28 June. Two hardline candidates dropped out on the eve of the vote, likely to bolster the victory chances of the two remaining conservatives aligned with Ayatollah Khamenei’s views. The one moderate that was allowed to run, Massoud Pezeshkian, remains unlikely to win. His candidacy was likely allowed to progress to bolster low voter turnout figures, which the Ayatollah sees as proof of the regime’s low popularity following years of protests.

The French Interior Ministry ordered the dissolution of multiple extremist groups, either associated with identitarian or Islamist movements, in the days before the election. These include the identitarian Groupe Union Défense (GUD), one of the major neofascist organisations in Paris. There is an increased likelihood that supporters of the groups will carry out actions to stoke violence during the elections.

An attack by an unspecified terrorist group in Tassia, Niger, resulted in the deaths of 20 Defence and Security Forces (FDS) troops and one civilian. The village, located in the Tillaberi region close to Mali and Burkina Faso, was targeted in a sophisticated attack, involving armed gunmen and suicide bombers. It is highly likely that the attack was perpetrated by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), whose fighters conducted another attack in Tillaberi in March. The EU will also end its military mission to Niger on 30 June, citing the country’s “grave political situation”, a move that will likely encourage further attacks and influence Niger to increasingly court Russian assistance.

On 21 June, Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) militants reportedly attacked a village in the province of Ituri, northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). CODECO is an armed militia with an ethnoreligious character and is linked with the Lendu tribe. It carries out frequent attacks especially targeting the Hema tribe. The Ituri province is rich in gold, and competition over mineral resources continues to be a fundamental driver of inter-ethnic conflict. The attack, which resulted in the deaths of more than 20 civilians, highly likely demonstrates the DRC government’s waning control over its eastern provinces. Rwanda and other international powers continue to more or less directly back armed groups operating in the DRC’s eastern border regions, with the aim of informally securing control over the area’s mineral deposits and controlling the smuggling of minerals out of the country.

On 24 June, Somalia’s ambassador to the UN accused Ethiopia of carrying out an “incursion” into the country’s territory. Ethiopia currently deploys 3,000 troops as part of the peacekeeping African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), aimed at containing al-Shabaab’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. ATMIS is committed to withdrawing by the end of 2024, and the Somali government has announced that it expects to be able to contrast the Islamist group. However, with al-Shabaab having recently made significant territorial conquests, these statements are likely far too optimistic. Mogadishu is likely experiencing far too excessive domestic pressures to mount a significant challenge to al-Shabaab. These include tensions with the breakaway regions of Puntland and Somaliland, as well as a host of other security and economic issues.

Bandits have conducted a series of attacks in Nigeria’s Katsina State. Multiple attacks have now occurred throughout June, forcing farmers to abandon their land which has resulted in higher food prices. The trend of attacks in Nigeria’s rural communities has been partially responsible for the country’s high inflation. Multiple commodities such as beans, beef, bread, rice and a host of vegetables have more than doubled in price during the last year, high food prices often sustaining periods of civil unrest throughout the country.

Senior leadership from the United State’s Africa Command (AFRICOM)  and NATO met with multiple African defence chiefs in Botswana from 24 to 26 June. The conference addressed multiple security issues confronting Africa and is being used to bolster defence relationships in a continent where the West continues to cede ground to Russia and China. Containing the spread of jihadist groups was almost certainly on the agenda and the US attendees were reportedly seeking new bases in West Africa after their prompt withdrawal from Niger.  

The UN has warned that Nitazenes, a group of synthetic opioids stronger than fentanyl, are spreading across Europe after previously circulating in the US. The UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated in its most recent World Drug Report that synthetic opioids have now been detected in the UK, US, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium and Canada, stoking fears over a new drug epidemic, strains on public health services and spikes in associated crime.

Wildfires in the Russian Arctic territories have caused the third-highest levels of emissions for this period of the year over the last two decades. Wildfires in carbon-rich soils such as the Russian tundra and boreal forest tend to be particularly damaging in terms of CO2 emissions. This year, the increase in severity in regional wildfires has been recorded weeks earlier than the usual peak of July and August, making it likelier that the warmest part of the summer will record even more severe statistics.

An outbreak of toxic strands of E. Coli bacteria, reportedly originating from grocery store products, has affected more than 200 people across the United Kingdom and killed at least one person. Symptoms of the infection include gastrointestinal issues and flu-like effects such as a temperature and headaches. Infection can be especially dangerous for individuals with pre-existing conditions.

At least one person was killed and hundreds were displaced after heavy rains caused flash floods in the southeastern Misox valley of the Swiss canton of Grisons. Weather conditions in Switzerland are variable, and forecasts indicate that the country may face a heatwave in the immediate aftermath of the floods.

On 23 June, crewmembers of a yacht in Greece were arrested after allegedly starting a fire by firing fireworks towards the island of Hydra, resulting in the destruction of 300,000 square metres (30 hectares) of pine forest. Greece faces a high threat from wildfires, most of which are started by humans, and exacerbated by the country’s summer dry and hot conditions. The incident is highly likely to cause increased scrutiny of over-tourism and luxury tourism in Southern Europe and may inspire acts of vandalism by environmental activists. For more information on the threat of “Ecotage” – or vandalism carried out by environmentalists – further information can be found here.

Also in Greece, the number of tourists reported as having died due to the ongoing heatwave affecting the country has risen to six. It is notable that June is not the hottest month in Greece, and that temperatures are likely to marginally increase in July. The climate change-related extreme heat affecting southern Europe, and Greece in particular, in recent years has exacerbated the severity of the risks faced by travellers to the country. There is a high likelihood that the threat from high temperatures will have impacts on Greece’s economy, especially damaging the tourism sector.

More than 400 people were reported to have died in Karachi between 22 and 25 June alone due to the extreme heatwave currently affecting the country. The Sindh province, where Karachi is located, had multiple consecutive days of above-40 degrees Celsius temperatures. In May, it, alongside regions of India, recorded a temperature of more than 52 degrees Celsius. Conditions in Karachi are worsened by the high levels of humidity.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The casualty numbers are likely understated, as they only account for identified bodies with clear causes of death assessed. Many of those who perished were homeless, complicating accurate reporting. The prolonged heatwave in Pakistan is expected to exacerbate health conditions, particularly impacting the poorer segments of the population disproportionately.

Additionally, the high temperatures have sparked fires and led to electrical failures, causing numerous power outages worsened by Pakistan’s inadequate energy infrastructure. This situation is likely to increase the use of diesel generators, contributing to additional pollution. Both India and Pakistan have experienced extreme heat over the past year, the hottest on record globally.

Factors such as poor sanitation, high humidity, overcrowded urban areas lacking green spaces, which help mitigate heat and lower nighttime temperatures, put the Indian subcontinent at heightened risk from extreme weather events. Apart from causing significant human suffering, heatwaves are also expected to adversely affect the economy by disrupting business activities and travel throughout the day.

With climate projections indicating a trend towards more frequent and severe heatwaves, countries like Pakistan face an escalating climate-related threat that demands urgent adaptation and mitigation measures.

In the first month of its third consecutive term, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi continued implementing policies aimed at targeting the country’s Muslim minority. In June alone, several Mosques were demolished, often on pretence of alleged encroachment, in Delhi alone. On 27 June, a severed cow’s head was found near a Hindu temple in Delhi, and a BJP local politician responded to the incident by threatening to “slaughter” 200,000 of the city’s Muslims.

Solace Global Assessment:

Inter-religious tensions have been a central element of the BJP’s electoral strategy, with elected officials frequently endorsing conspiracy theories portraying Muslims as foreign agents aiming to destabilise the Indian state. Some BJP leaders advocate for transforming India into “Bharat,” a Hindu nationalist non-secular state. However, the BJP’s underperformance in the 2024 parliamentary elections, where it failed to secure a simple majority and was unexpectedly forced into a coalition, suggests that this identitarian domestic focus may not be as popular as previously thought.

Despite this setback on the national stage, BJP politicians at the local level are persisting in efforts to curb Muslim influence and presence in society. There is a significant likelihood that the continuation, and even escalation in some instances, of anti-Muslim policies in places like Delhi reflects efforts by local BJP officials to regain public support following the party’s electoral setbacks.

This approach carries the risk of provoking inter-communal tensions and potentially sparking violence, particularly in major urban centers where communal fault lines are more pronounced. The prospect of such tensions erupting into severe clashes remains a realistic concern, especially amidst a backdrop of heightened political polarisation and societal divisions.

Mongolians will vote in parliamentary elections on 28 June, with the ruling party expected to retain its majority despite concerns over corruption, inflation, and the state of the economy. The Mongolian People’s Party, led by Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene, is likely to benefit from a booming coal sector, but major frustrations remain over economic inequality and corruption which were some of the main drivers of the 2022 protests.  

Vietnam has announced that is ready to hold talks with the Philippines over its overlapping claims in the South China Sea, in a diplomatic approach that contrasts with China’s assertive approach and use of grey zone tactics. Hanoi is responding to Manila’s submission to the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend its exclusive economic zone to 350 nautical miles, which has created rival claims in the Spratly Islands. If both nations settle the dispute diplomatically and in line with the rules established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it could help to undermine China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea, leading to international pressure for Beijing to follow suit.

Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, returned to Australia after more than a decade-long battle against extradition to the US, where he faced potential life imprisonment for publishing classified documents demonstrating that US troops committed crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as thousands of sensitive information and diplomatic cables. It is unlikely that the development will result in civil unrest.

Civil unrest has erupted again on the French territory of New Caledonia after seven pro-independence activists were arrested and flown to mainland France for detention, including the leader Christian Tein. The Indigenous Kanak people will likely interpret the moving of their leaders to France as “colonial tactics” and as a further challenge to their sovereignty, and may sustain unrest until those arrested are returned to New Caledonia.

On 29 June, Hindu pilgrims will head to Pahalgam in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir for the start of the annual Amarnath Yatra. The region has seen a spate of attacks against Hindu pilgrims in recent months and the pilgrimage has been targeted by Islamist extremists in the past, such as during the 2017 Amarnath Yatra massacre. It is almost certain that the pilgrimage remains a high-profile target for VEOs in the area and the Indian authorities will be forced to increase security during the event.

On 22 June, India and Bangladesh strengthened their defence relationship by signing agreements to enhance cooperation in maritime security, the ocean economy, space, and telecommunications during Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to New Delhi. India’s Prime Minister Modi celebrated Bangladesh’s decision to join the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative- a regional initiative aimed at enhancing regional maritime security, sustainable use of marine resources, and fostering cooperation among countries in the Indo-Pacific region, likely viewing this as a strategic move to draw Bangladesh away from China.

In Hwaseong, South Korea, a battery factory fire killed 23 workers. Surveillance video footage reveals that the fire followed the sudden explosion of multiple lithium batteries, which started a chain reaction that led to the destruction of much of the building. As of the time of writing, it is unclear what caused the batteries’ explosion, which resulted in a particularly destructive chain reaction. The incident is likely to spark significant security concerns, and possibly have important impacts on battery manufacturing in South Korea.

What began as peaceful demonstrations on June 18th quickly escalated following heavy-handed police tactics, including the early use of tear gas and mass detentions. By early afternoon, over 200 protesters had been apprehended, marking a critical turning point as crowds gathered outside Nairobi’s central police station demanding the release of detainees.

The government’s response has included shutting down local internet services and using live ammunition against protesters, indicating a hardened stance that could prolong the unrest. The resulting casualties are expected to strain Kenya’s already stretched healthcare infrastructure, potentially necessitating increased support from international NGOs and humanitarian organisations.

Beyond immediate humanitarian concerns, the unrest poses significant implications for Kenya’s economy and security. The disruption of infrastructure and government functions in Nairobi and other affected areas could have direct economic repercussions, affecting businesses and travel across the country. Moreover, the government’s aggressive crowd control tactics and apparent failures to safeguard public assets raise concerns about further escalation and the potential need for military intervention, which could complicate the operating environment for foreign humanitarian organisations.

As the situation unfolds, the damage to infrastructure and ongoing disruptions to daily life underscore the precariousness of Kenya’s current state, with implications that extend far beyond its borders.

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From transfers to ongoing security and emergency evacuations, our travel risk services always have you covered. 

Arm yourself with the knowledge to avoid a potential threat from turning into a crisis. Intelligence advisories give you tailored reports to anticipate possible disruptions, mitigate risk and help you make well-informed decisions, faster.

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In 2024, LGBTQ+ rights face a dynamic landscape shaped by shifting politics, religious perspectives, and socio-cultural norms. Navigating this environment demands a nuanced approach to advocacy and policy-making that embraces complexity and diversity.

The alleged suspect, a 71-year-old writer and political activist, was detained at the scene. Authorities are investigating the motive behind the attack, which is widely believed to be politically motivated.

Fico, who secured office in October 2023 after a divisive campaign, has been a polarising figure. He is one of the few European leaders advocating for closer ties with Russia and has called for an end to the EU’s military support for Ukraine. Under his leadership, Slovakia has halted all arms deliveries to Kyiv.

Fico’s government has made controversial moves, including a proposal to abolish the country’s public broadcaster and weaken anti-corruption laws. These actions have sparked fears about media independence and democracy in Slovakia, leading to widespread protests. Some believe these tensions contributed to the assassination attempt, with Fico’s ruling SMER party blaming false narratives from the opposition.

The attack on Prime Minister Fico is expected to lead to heightened security measures across Slovakia. In the long term, this incident might be used to justify suppressing dissent and pushing through more contentious government proposals. Additionally, Russian-affiliated social media accounts have been spreading information suggesting Ukrainian or NATO involvement, with some posts inciting violence against European officials.

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has hinted that the attack could be linked to Fico’s stance on Russia. While the risk of terrorism in Slovakia remains low, there is a realistic possibility of targeted violence and harassment against pro-EU Slovakian officials in the coming weeks.

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The rise of both far-right and far-left political parties in Europe in recent years has significantly complicated and energised the political landscape in the continent. This trend is expected to persist into 2024.

This Wednesday, May 15, commemorates the 76th anniversary of the Nakba, an Arabic term meaning “catastrophe.” It signifies the expulsion and forced displacement of around 750,000 Palestinian Arabs during the 1947-1949 Palestine War, following the adoption of the UN’s Partition Plan for Palestine, which ended British mandate rule over the territory. This event is profoundly significant historically, marking the onset of the Palestinian diaspora and a pivotal moment in the formation of Palestinian national identity, which persists nearly a century later.

This year, the significance of the commemoration will be amplified due to the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip. The conflict has reached a critical juncture, especially with the recent deployment of Israeli troops into Rafah on May 6th. The conflict, which followed a surprise attack launched by the Gaza Strip-based Hamas terror group on 7 October, and resulted in the killing of approximately 1,200 Israelis, mostly civilians, has entered its seventh month. During this time, over 35,000 Palestinians, mostly civilians, have lost their lives, and nearly two million have been displaced internally. Gaza is grappling with severe famine, a near-total collapse of infrastructure, and extensive destruction of local housing.

Nakba Day-related disruptions are expected to primarily impact large urban centres in countries that have seen significant pro-Palestine protests. These disruptions are likely to concentrate around government or academic institutions, limiting their scope. Avoiding these areas unless necessary should mitigate physical risks.

However, traffic disruptions, potentially affecting various modes of transportation, are less predictable and could have more widespread effects. While disruptions to airports and seaports are unlikely, protesters may attempt to block roads, particularly around targeted buildings and main traffic arteries leading into urban centres. Even brief disruptions could have lasting effects throughout the day.

To minimise such risks, it’s recommended to schedule travel outside of rush hour and to plan entry into large cities prone to protests for early morning hours. If traveling through city centres is unavoidable, consider alternative routes away from likely protest areas and avoid public transportation.

It’s crucial to stay informed through official channels regarding potential protests, disruptions, and violence. Familiarise yourself with local emergency contacts, including nearby police stations and emergency rooms. When planning business operations, establish clear communication procedures such as two-way messaging networks and GPS tracking to reduce risks to people and assets.

Additionally, having failover systems and strategic redundancies in place can mitigate the impact of severe localised disruptions on primary business operations, although such scenarios are unlikely.

Your duty of care doesn’t end the moment your people set foot in their destination – and neither does ours.

From transfers to ongoing security and emergency evacuations, our travel risk services always have you covered. 

Arm yourself with the knowledge to avoid a potential threat from turning into a crisis. Intelligence advisories give you tailored reports to anticipate possible disruptions, mitigate risk and help you make well-informed decisions, faster.

Give your people peace of mind when they travel for work, so they remain focused on the job at hand. We mitigate risks, manage incidents if they occur, and support your people with security advice or help in a crisis. 

The most powerful solar storm to hit the Earth in the last 20 years took place during this reporting period. Despite some worries about possible disruptions to power grids and satellite communications, the event did not have any major adverse effects on the general population but caused some degradation in the accuracy of some satellite-based services.

Nakba Day, the commemoration of the expulsion of 750,000 Arab Palestinians from the Palestinian territories during the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli War, occurred on 15 May. Protests were recorded across Europe, North America, and the Middle East, which focused on opposing current Israeli operations in Gaza.

On 21 May, Ireland, Spain and several other EU members will jointly recognise Palestine as a sovereign state. The move, is likely to result in civil unrest, and may prompt an immediate degradation in relations with Tel Aviv, also affecting Brussels. It was most likely prompted by domestic pressures.

Firefighters in western Canada are fighting the first major wildfires of the 2024 wildfire season. Thousands of residents have been ordered to evacuate the areas around the town of Fort Nelson, British Columbia, as an out-of-control wildfire approaches the area which has already burnt an estimated 20,000 acres. Reporting from the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre indicates that Canada is currently struggling to contain nearly 120 major wildfires, with most located in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta.

Solace Global Assessment:  Canada’s wildfire season typically runs from April to September or October when temperatures decrease, and precipitation increases. However, the extent of the current wildfires, in terms of both size and intensity, has prompted concerns that this year’s wildfire season will be worse than average. Unseasonably warm temperatures and drought have almost certainly shaped conditions favourable to the spread of wildfires. The current drought monitor map released by the Government of Canada highlights severe, extreme, or exceptional drought conditions across significant portions of British Columbia, Alberta, the Northwest Territories, and Saskatchewan provinces. Additionally, nearly half of the country is experiencing moderate drought, indicating a heightened risk of wildfires spreading rapidly across various regions of Canada. In 2023, nearly three-quarters of the Northwest Territories were forced to flee their homes, an area traditionally immune to wildfires. The fires have also highlighted the fragility of rural communities that often rely on limited infrastructure. Communities not directly affected by the wildfires have suffered from internet and phone blackouts with residents unable to contact emergency services, failed electronic payments, ATM failures and transport disruption, with some communities reliant on only one supply route. The scale of the wildfires has been attributed to climate change with experts warning that it will result in areas historically spared by wildfires being affected. There have already been calls for Canada to tighten its emission caps on the oil and gas sector – a contentious issue in a country where these industries contribute approximately 5-7 per cent of its GDP. As the wildfires continue to spread, there is a high probability that climate-motivated protests will increase across Canada.

A UNICEF report estimates that, so far in 2024, more than 30,000 children have traversed the dangerous routes that cross the jungle between Colombia and Panama, out of a total of 140,000 people. UNICEF predictions project that up to 800,000 migrants, 160,000 children, will travel through the area this year. The Darien Gap is one of the last completely undeveloped regions on earth, and traversing the thick jungle poses massive health risks, with chances of rescue almost non-existent. Panama’s President-elect José Raúl Mulino has vowed to shut down migration routes through the country.

Solace Global Assessment: So far, Panama has been a necessary stop for migrants seeking to reach the US from South America. The country’s governments have aided migration, providing busses to transport migrants from the edge of the Darien Gap to the country’s northern borders. Still, the Gap continues to represent a particularly perilous journey, but it is likely preferred by migrants who do not have the means to tackle maritime routes. Moreover, organised crime in Colombia has increasingly profited from helping migrants reach and cross the approximately 100 kilometres of jungle. Still, migrants paying smugglers face increased risks, including sexual assault, theft, and murder. Additionally, the increase in migrant inflows has likely favoured the development of local bandit networks, which carry out violent attacks and kidnappings on the transiting migrants. President Mulino, who will take office on 1 July, is likely responding to increasing pressure from the US government, which is increasingly trying to stifle migration at its southern border. With little border infrastructure currently in place, it is almost certain that efforts in this direction will be conducted through a massive deployment of security forces in and around the Gap, seeking to intercept migrants before they reach the inhabited parts of the country. However, such a measure would likely exacerbate humanitarian issues in the Darien Gap, possibly increasing transit times and therefore worsening health risks. Moreover, if it achieves its deterrent purpose, it will almost certainly result in an increased number of migrants undertaking the more perilous maritime routes, possibly creating broader regional consequences, as well as impacting maritime transport and activity in the Gulf of Panama. 

Solace Global Assessment:  The budget surplus is likely to further boost Milei’s claims that his unorthodox economic policies are working to change course on decades of economic stagnation. Coming from a period of severe protests, it may improve the president’s approval ratings, currently hovering at around 50 per cent. While praised by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for his reforms, Milei is still seeking to unlock further IMF funds, in addition to the USD 800 million that are part of the loan programme’s current schedule, and which are needed to repay interest on Buenos Aires past borrowing. After taking office, Milei simply warned that “there is no money”, and the statement, months into the administration, has taken a tangible form. On 10 May, a major train collision in the Palermo neighbourhood of Buenos Aires resulted in at least 90 injuries and has promoted a judicial enquiry. Early indications suggest that the copper cable used to carry power along the tracks had been stolen leading to a signal failure. Union leaders had been demanding that the stolen cables be repaired for ten days before the incident to which the government allegedly replied that there were no funds for spare parts. The incident will almost certainly be linked to President Milei’s economic austerity measures and refusal to invest in public infrastructure, and it may hint at a growing risk regarding public and private transport within Argentina. Declining infrastructural standards may have unpredictable adverse effects on business in the country, leading to disruptions and delays, as well as physical damages to individuals and assets. Further warning signals have also been recorded at the social level. Over the course of last week, three women died days after having been deliberately burned in a homophobic attack. On 6 May, a man reportedly threw a Molotov cocktail inside a boarding house room where two lesbian couples were staying. The only surviving victim remains at the hospital but is expected to survive as of the time of writing. Over the last few years, Argentina has become considered one of the most socially progressive South American countries. In 2010, Buenos Aires legalised same-sex marriage, and the country has introduced stricter legislation against identity-based discrimination. While Milei describes himself as an “anarchist” socially, civil society actors have raised alarms concerning the rise of hate crimes and discrimination in the country, seemingly encouraged by the president’s “anti-woke” rhetoric and actions. Activists have decried the abolition of state institutions providing resources for victims, and others monitoring incidents of violence and harassment. While these gestures could be construed as “cost-cutting” measures, Milei has also more directly engaged in anti-progressive discourse, for instance symbolically renaming, on International Women’s Day, the presidential palace’s “Hall of Women” into the “Hall of Heroes”. Furthermore, Milei’s increasingly violent repression of anti-government demonstrations has likely emboldened far-right voices within the country, possibly leading to an increase in the risk of civic violence and unrest.

The two candidates for the 2024 US Presidential elections have agreed on holding two presidential debates before the vote in November. Former President Donald Trump and incumbent President Joe Biden will meet to debate their platforms in Georgia, on 27 June, and in an unspecified location on 10 September. The Georgia debate, which will take place in an important swing state, will not be attended by a live audience, as the organisers likely worry about the extremely charged nature of this electoral season. The debates are almost certainly going to result in localised travel disruptions and may entail an increased risk of domestic, “lone-wolf”, terrorism.

On 15 May, Washington removed Cuba from its list of countries “not cooperating fully” against terrorism. The move is likely meant to signal the US’ openness to further improve diplomatic relations with the island state. In recent years, Cuba has improved security and intelligence ties with Moscow, and there is a high likelihood that Russian intelligence assets operate on the island from the Lourdes SIGINT station, which had already been used by their Soviet predecessors. While unlikely to result in any short-term changes, the announcement will likely be received warmly in Havana.

On 19 May, voters in the Dominican Republic will decide the country’s next president and members of Congress. All three of the leading candidates have promised to tackle illegal immigration from neighbouring Haiti which continues to be afflicted with gang warfare and a total lack of security. Incumbent President Luis Abinader has promised to finish constructing a border wall, a move that has been condemned by human rights groups due to the extent of violence in Haiti.

Observers in the United States have recorded an increase in the number of threats targeting New York Justice Juan Merchan and other individuals involved in the hush money trial of former President Donald Trump, following the latter’s online posts. Having been banned from X.com (formerly Twitter), Facebook, and other “mainstream” social media channels, Trump has increasingly been communicating with supporters through “Truth Social”, a Twitter-like site which has attracted almost exclusively pro-Trump users. The trial proceedings have increased the threat of lone-actor terrorist action in New York, and a verdict adverse to Trump’s camp may lead to a growing likelihood of ideologically motivated violent action.

In Canada, a fourth man was charged with killing Sikh leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar. Canadian officials are currently investigating possible connections between the alleged killers and the Indian government, claiming that Delhi organised the assassination of the leader to stifle the reach of the Khalistan independentist movement. The case will likely continue to affect tensions in Canada, and, in particular, regarding the country’s current immigration system.

Thousands of people in Canada’s British Columbia province have been evacuated due to the growth of a large wildfire in the province’s northeast. British Columbia is one of Canada’s main centres for the extraction of natural gas, and a hub for Canadian commerce towards Asia. Disruptions caused by the fire could negatively affect the local economy, and create shipping delays to and from Canada, were the phenomena to worsen. In 2023, Canada saw its worst wildfire season on record, as fires have become more severe due to drier and hotter weather conditions. This case is highly likely not to remain isolated, as the risk of wildfires will grow significantly in the coming months across Canada and much of North America.

Two people have died in Louisiana, and hundreds have been displaced due to tornadoes sweeping through the southern US. Power cuts and traffic disruptions have also been recorded, with the area of Baton Rouge particularly affected. Tornado season in the US takes place between March and June, and this spring has seen a high frequency of extreme weather events. In Texas, recent flooding has been compounded by severe hailstorms, which have damaged infrastructure, and particularly affected agricultural businesses in the area.

Authorities in the southernmost Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul have warned that flooding that has affected much of the state, including the metropolitan area of Porto Alegre, will take weeks to subside. Parts of the state have seen more than 630mm (25 inches) of rain already this month. Flooding has resulted in widespread supply chain disruption, killed almost 150 people and displaced over half a million, with further rain forecasted in the coming days.  

In the morning of 14 May, a prison van carrying a high-ranking drug cartel member from Marseille was ambushed at a highway toll booth in the Eure department, in the country’s north. Videos released online show at least three assailants, armed with submachineguns, open fire on the prison van and its police escort, after crashing an SUV into the lead vehicle to immobilise it. At the time of the attack, the van was transporting Mohamed Amra, reportedly a leader of a drug-trafficking syndicate based in Marseille who had been a suspect in various cases of homicide, armed theft, and attempted homicide. French authorities have launched a massive search to find the fugitive and the perpetrators of the attack.

Solace Global Assessment:  The ambush took place in the Eure district, which borders the region of Paris. In recent years, the city of Marseille has become a hotspot for drug trafficking in France and Europe, especially due to the arrival of large shipments of South American cocaine which have increasingly carved a larger portion of the European drug market. Gangs in Marseille have increasingly engaged in clashes for control within the city and in its outskirts, which have resulted in dozens of deaths. French authorities recorded 2023 as the deadliest year for drug wars in the city, with a reported 47 deaths and 118 injuries. The Macron administration has been haemorrhaging votes to its right-wing opposition and has increasingly sought to take a “tough on crime” stance to recover some lost support. This imperative has become even more important with the approaching Olympic Games, set to begin in July. In March 2024, the administration launched a major crackdown operation in Marseille, which led to almost 200 arrests. Still, it is unlikely that past operations have dented the pervasiveness of gang presence in the city, which is fuelled by socioeconomic inequalities and important levels of deprivation, as well as the existence of quasi-segregated peripheral quarters, where the French police exercise very little control. Importantly, these same parts of the city often see a strong Islamist presence, including by groups associated with Middle East-based Sunni radical organisations. In 2018, a radical Salafi preacher was expelled from France to Algeria after being reported for preaching sermons targeting Jews, women and Shiites in one of Marseille’s main mosques, and, in more recent years, local imams have launched appeals to Paris warning against the local penetration of Salafi extremist thought in the more deprived parts of the city. The high sophistication of the attack on the prison van is likely indicative of France’s drug gangs’ growing offensive capabilities and there is a realistic possibility that Islamist groups have access to much of the same assets due to their overlap with gang networks and the communities where they operate. With the Paris Olympics on the horizon, the ambush highlights the severe security risks that the Games will face.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico is in a serious but stable condition after being shot multiple times on 15 May. The attack occurred in the small town of Handlova while Fico was meeting with supporters outside a cultural centre. He was rushed to F. D. Roosevelt University Hospital in Banska Bystrica, where he underwent a five-hour surgery and is in intensive care at the time of writing. The alleged suspect, reportedly a 71-year-old writer and political activist, was detained at the scene.

Solace Global Assessment: The shooting of Prime Minister Fico was almost certainly politically motivated and is widely being reported as an assassination attempt. At the time of writing, however, no group has claimed responsibility for it, and it appears almost certain that the perpetrator acted alone. Fico secured office in October 2023 after running a divisive campaign marked by a populist agenda. He has been one of the few outspoken European leaders championing rapprochement with Russia and Slavonic solidarity, often calling for an end to the EU’s military support for Ukraine, with Slovakia halting all arms deliveries to Kyiv. Fico’s populist government has recently approved a proposal to abolish the country’s public broadcaster and replace it with a new body as well as weakening anti-corruption laws. These developments have generated fears regarding the independence of the media and the state of democracy in Slovakia, leading to widespread protests. Anecdotal reporting indicates that this may have been the motivation for the assassination, with Fico’s ruling SMER party also suggesting that false narratives propagated by the opposition have contributed to the shooting. The incident will almost certainly lead to heightened security measures in the country and, in the long term, it could be exploited to suppress dissent and push through some of SMER’s more contentious proposals. Finally, there have been reports of Russian-affiliated accounts on social media channels carrying out information operations alleging Ukrainian or NATO responsibility for the attempted assassination, with some posts calling for violence against European officials. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has contributed to this discourse, hinting at the theory that the attack was linked to Fico’s “reasonable” stance on Russia. While the risk of terrorism remains low, there is a realistic possibility of cases of targeted violence and harassment against Slovakian pro-EU officials and political figures in the coming weeks.

After launching the first phase of their offensive into the southern Gazan city of Rafah, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have re-entered the Jabalia, in the north, where they were met with heavy resistance from Hamas elements. With the invasion of Gaza so far having failed in its objectives to destroy Hamas and rescue the approximately 100 Israeli hostages still in Palestinian captivity, a rift opened, or came to the fore, in the Netanyahu administration as Defence Minister Yoav Gallant raised a public objection to the proposal of setting up an Israeli military government in Gaza after the end of hostilities.

Solace Global Assessment:  The IDF identified Jabalia as a stronghold of Hamas resistance in Gaza and conducted operations to neutralise it shortly after entering the Gaza Strip in October 2023. By late December 2023, IDF forces reported having destroyed three Hamas battalions following heavy combat in the Jabalia refugee camp. The recent restart of fighting there, the most severe increase in the north of the Gaza Strip since the Al-Shifa hospital raid, encapsulates the failures of the IDF to prevent the re-infiltration of Hamas elements in previously cleared areas. It is likely that Tel Aviv recognises that these difficulties are endemic. Despite significant casualties, Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups continue to retain enough assets to challenge IDF units in the Gaza Strip’s dense urban landscape. They are also still able to recruit from the hundreds of thousands of displaced Palestinians. Moreover, the Netanyahu administration likely realises the important political dimension of the conflict for its “survival” at home. Seven months into the conflict, having expended significant political capital at home and abroad, the Likud-led government finds itself in a political dilemma. On one side, its electoral base continues to support the war effort in a rather hawkish manner and is impatient due to the ongoing failures to achieve the war’s stated strategic goals. On the other, the remark by Gallant seems to indicate a growing realisation, or admission, that Gaza is essentially “unwinnable”: even if Sinwar and the other Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip are captured or killed, and the remaining Hamas elements neutralised, large numbers of IDF troops would necessarily need to remain stationed in the area to prevent the creation of new Hamas units or successor groups. Essentially, this would rewind the Israeli position on Gaza by two decades, likely, however, reigniting the same political pressures for the recognition of a Palestinian state that had expedited the decision for the 2005 troop withdrawal from the Strip (albeit without the added issue of the dismantling of settlements). The prospect of a protracted military occupation, which a reported leaked confidential paper puts at a cost of USD 5.4 annually, would also bring back memories from southern Lebanon, whose occupation after the 1982-1985 war proved economically and strategically unfeasible. However, it is unclear what other exit scenarios exist, even if Israeli goals are achieved. Among the plans being discussed in Tel Aviv, an appealing one likely sees local clan leaders and civilian parties create a joint government to manage the Gaza Strip, with limited but constant cooperation with Israeli forces, and possibly with the oversight of an Arab state. However, it is unlikely that Cairo, or any of the Gulf States, will seek to engage in a policy of management that would prove extremely unpopular at home – and would possibly expose it to diplomatic embarrassment were a successor of Hamas to gain traction in Gaza. Moreover, it is not clear if any such internal parties exist. Hamas’ killing of a Doghmush clan leader in March highlights the group’s keen awareness of its necessity to root out potential challengers, and it is likely that significant progress has been made in this direction. No matter how unlikely to succeed this scenario, and other ones, are, however, it is almost certain that the Netanyahu administration will try to avoid mentioning a clear alternative: the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces following the end of hostilities, and the return to a policy of isolating Gaza while carrying out occasional incursions to reduce the strength of a resurgent Hamas. This would amount to a political failure – and a self-inflicted one, due to Netanyahu’s continuous pledge to destroy Hamas – and will almost certainly represent the end of the current Likud administration.

On 15 May, Jordanian sources reported that the Kingdom of Jordan had foiled a plot by Iran to smuggle weapons into the country to arm anti-monarchy activists and members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood organisation. The plot’s dismantling reportedly dated back to March. The routes allegedly ran through Syria and were coordinated through connections between Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas elements. Iran has already been reported as running weapons smuggling operations into the West Bank, in an effort to arm Palestinian militants. Jordan is considered to be one of the most stable countries in the region, and the Kingdom contributed to the interceptions of Iranian drones and missiles during Tehran’s massive strike against Israel in April.

Solace Global Assessment:  Jordanian intelligence and security forces have likely been aware of Iranian arms smuggling efforts aimed at arming the Palestinians, and the timing of the crackdown suggests a likely growing worry in the Kingdom’s ruling circles. Jordan’s population is largely of Palestinian heritage, and almost wholly supportive of the Palestinian cause. The monarchy’s pro-Western stance is largely tolerated, but the ongoing Israeli offensive in Gaza has contributed to making anti-government dissent more vocal and bolder. The Hashemite family has responded to this situation by boosting its criticism of Israel, including by withdrawing their ambassador from Tel Aviv, in an effort to align itself more with popular feelings. However, the exacerbation of the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip has resulted in a growing number of particularly aggressive demonstrations, with protesters notably attempting to storm the Israeli embassy in Amman in late March. Iran, which has placed itself successfully at the head of the global pro-Palestine movement, likely sees the destabilisation of Jordan as particularly desirable to both reinforce its influence in the West Bank through a loosening of the frontier between the two territories and to reduce the American footprint in the region. By arming Muslim Brotherhood elements, Tehran possibly seeks to favour acts of terrorism targeting local authorities and security forces, or alternatively spark further protests more directly aimed at the government. A worsening of the political situation in Jordan would negatively affect the numerous NGOs and humanitarian organisations that operate in the country. In a worst-case scenario, it may result in a reduction of Western counterterrorism operations in neighbouring Syria and Iraq, creating a medium-term opening for a growing influence of Islamist groups.

The results of a series of studies carried out by the Russian ship Alexander Karpinsky in 2020 have revealed the presence of massive oil and gas deposits in the Antarctic territory claimed by Britain. Last week, the findings have sparked debate in the UK Parliament. Both Russia and the UK are signatories to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, which bans the exploitation of mineral resources in the continent.

Solace Global Assessment: The Alexander Karpinsky, which was formally in the region to conduct scientific research, was much more likely involved in Russian prospecting operations. The find, which dates back four years, is strategically extremely important. According to current estimates, the deposits, located under the Weddell Sea, would amount to around 511 billion barrels worth of oil, or ten times the output of the North Sea deposits over the last 50 years. The deposits fall not only under the UK’s claim but also under claims by Chile and Argentina, which partially overlap with the British one. The question of Antarctic sovereignty continues to be a grey area, as the 1959 Treaty clearly states its non-impact over signatories’ sovereignty claims, which remain pending. Moreover, while the treaty covers Antarctic land and ice shelves, it does not extend to the seas surrounding it, meaning that possible claims of exclusive interest would fall under customary and treaty law. While the treaties’ texts seemingly state that Arctic claims do not generate Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), claimant states have de facto repeatedly asserted their ownership of Antarctic maritime zones. The result of this situation is a status quo where the legitimacy of a specific state’s claims would necessarily rest only upon the acquiescence of other treaty signatories, a condition that is unlikely to materialise due to the, so far, perceived lack of meaningful incentives. The lack of clarity and coverage in the Antarctic treaties has already led to increased competition, especially with regard to the marine resources present in the area. Russia and China, in particular, continue to hinder efforts to extend protections to wildlife in the areas and conduct intensive fishing operations that are likely contributing to threatening the volume of krill and fish in Antarctic waters. In strategic terms, Britain’s Antarctic claim is bolstered by the UK’s overseas Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the Falkland Islands and the South Georgian and the South Sandwich Islands, all of which are disputed by Argentina, that claims the islands as part of its own sovereign territory. It is almost certain that the increase in Russia’s exploration and prospecting operations in the Antarctic follows from broader strategic imperatives. Even before the invasion of Ukraine, the Putin regime, whose attempts to effectively diversify Russia’s economy have failed, increasingly sought to maintain capital inflows and domestic government spending levels through the provision of cheap fossil fuels to China and other international partners. With the isolation that followed the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s interest in further oil and gas deposits has likely increased. In recent years, almost certainly due to the opportunities posed by the exploitation of fishing grounds, China has also seen its interest in the Antarctic increase. In February 2024, Beijing inaugurated its fifth research station on the continent, raising concerns about a possible increase in Chinese security and intelligence activities. The Russian discovery, as well as possible future ones, may reduce the stability of the precarious status quo that has so far “frozen” the various states’ claims, and lead to a much more unclear regional environment.

In Sweden, the nation’s largest labour union, Unionen, stated, on 14 May, its support for the Tesla workers currently engaged in a six-month-long strike. The strike concerns workers’ demands for collective bargaining. The announcement may result in an increase in the cases of sabotage of Tesla cars and assets by leftist and ecological activists.

The Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) has secured the most seats in the Catalan regional elections after independence parties lost support. Nationalist parties no longer control Catalonia’s regional parliament, a development that will almost certainly be deemed a major blow for the independence movement. The results will likely be sold as a vindication for Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s coalition tactics and controversial amnesty bill that has garnered opposition from the right and triggered unrest within Spain.

On 12 May, voters in Lithuania voted in the nation’s presidential elections. Incumbent Gitanas Nauseda won the first round in voting, winning 44 per cent of votes, just coming short of the 50 per cent required to automatically secure a victory. Nauseda will now go up against Prime Minister Ingrdia Šimonytė during a run-off election on 26 May. This repeats the 2019 elections where a run-off between these two were held. Early indications are that Nauseda will secure a re-election; however, the election highlighted growing anti-establishment sentiment, potentially signalling a move in favour of pro-Russian parties in the country’s upcoming parliamentary elections.

Unionised public sector workers belonging to the Greek Civil Servants’ Confederation (ADEDY) are set to conduct a nationwide 24-hour strike on 21 May over issues of pay and workers’ rights, with protestors set to convene outside the Ministry of Finance in Athens. The organisers of the strike have yet to announce which areas will be affected but there is a realistic possibility that the strikes will impact the transport and health sectors, leading to localised disruptions.

Renewed protests have taken place in the Armenian capital of Yerevan. Demonstrators have called on the government to reverse its decision to concede land to neighbouring Azerbaijan and the opposition is seeking ways to impeach the current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Protests have blocked major roads in and out of the capital and the security services have arrested hundreds of demonstrators. The demonstrations are unlikely to end soon with thousands calling for the resignation of Pashinyan and elements of the Armenia Apostolic Church endorsing the protests.

On 12 May, Tunisian protesters took to the streets in Tripoli to demand the release of imprisoned journalists and activists and a date for new elections. While his five-year term is set to expire in 2024, Tunisian President Kais Saied is yet to announce a date for the vote. At the same time, the country, at one point considered the only “success story” of the Arab Spring, has continued to experience significant authoritarian backsliding, with Saied concentrating significant powers under the presidency. The protests, which continue at the time of writing and are yet to reach severe proportions, may cause significant disruption, or violence, depending on the authorities’ response.

Three men in the UK have been charged with offences under the National Security Act, including assisting Hong Kong’s intelligence service and foreign interference. The men are accused of undertaking information gathering, surveillance, and acts of deception likely to aid a foreign intelligence service. The arrests were part of the Metropolitan Police’s counterterrorism investigations and follow a suspected Chinese hack of the UK Ministry of Defence’s payroll system, likely indicating the level of espionage China conducts within or against the UK. The Chinese embassy in London condemned the UK’s accusations, stating Hong Kong’s affairs are China’s concern.

In Rouen, France, a suspected terrorist was shot and killed by police forces after setting fire to the city’s Synagogue. The attack was likely linked to anti-Israeli sentiment. France is the Western European state with the largest Jewish population and has seen a massive increase in antisemitic attacks following 7 October.

Turkey has expanded its military operations against Kurdish militants in Syria with reports suggesting that Turkish forces, alongside the allied Syrian National Army (SNA), have been shelling villages and burning farmlands in the Manbij province, provoking concerns over food security in the area. Turkish forces have also prosecuted Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ankara is likely exploiting the withdrawal of Western forces from the region, the world’s preoccupation with Gaza and Iraq’s shifting stance towards the Kurds. After high-level talks between Iraqi and Turkish officials, Iraq announced the designation of the PKK as a banned organisation, a move that will likely invite more Turkish influence to the region. The Kurdish National Congress (KNK) has stated that President Erdogan is seeking to gain strategic and economically important territory after electoral setbacks, warning that such a policy could provoke a regional conflict.

European Union member states have agreed to end their military training mission to Mali after the mandate expires on 18 May. The EU cited the “evolving political and security situation”. The European bloc is likely unwilling to support a junta government that has stifled democracy and pivoted towards Russia. Jihadist groups may seek to exploit a lesser-trained military, but it is likely that the provision of military training will be undertaken by the Kremlin’s Africa Corps.

Overnight on 10 May, more than 100 people were kidnapped by gunmen during night raids in three villages, Gora, Madomawa, and Jambuzu, in Nigeria’s northwest Zamfara state. Kidnappings are a growing issue in Zamfara state with criminals almost certainly conducting them for ransom payments and those responsible have already demanded negotiations. Kidnappers are likely targeting remote villages and exploiting an overstretched security service in northern Nigeria that is having to contend with a host of Islamist groups. Security forces’ efforts to rescue the abducted may result in road closures and potentially armed clashes in the region.

On 10 May, an Italian vessel operating as part of the EU’s anti-piracy mission ATALANTA detained six Somalis suspected of having attempted to hijack an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden. The case likely illustrates the growing threat posed by Somali piracy, which has increased due to the Houthi’s campaign of Red Sea strikes. The ability of Somali pirates to target vessels at increasingly large distances from their coasts is particularly worrying and may further influence the shipping sector in the region.

As the South African electoral campaign nears its end, President Cyril Ramaphosa signed a bill into law that overhauls the country’s healthcare system. Currently, 84 per cent of South Africans access state-provided healthcare facilities, while the remaining 16 per cent can afford private care. The two-tier system contributes to fueling the country’s severe socioeconomic inequalities, which are some of the sharpest in the continent. The reform introduced the National Health Insurance (NHI), a system that provides funds for poorer South Africans to access private care. The opposition has warned that the policy will result in higher taxation and called it a ploy to bolster the ruling party’s chances in an election that is projected to be strongly contested.

On 16 May, China’s President Xi hosted Russian President Putin and a delegation of key officials and CEOs in Beijing, marking Putin’s second visit to China in the last year and his first state visit since being inaugurated for his fifth term. The two leaders praised their strategic relationship and suggested that it was not “opportunistic”. President Xi called for an urgent resolution to the war in Gaza and was praised by Putin for China’s efforts in attempting to resolve the Ukraine crisis with both leaders suggesting that there needs to be a political resolution to the conflict. The talks also covered Sino-Russian trade, energy and a shared view concerning the decline of the West.

Solace Global Assessment:  For Putin, Xi’s China has been a major economic lifeline since the imposition of hundreds of sanctions from the US and its Western allies and one of the closed-doors meeting talking points was likely how to effectively circumvent these sanctions. Putin’s visit comes as Russia has opened up a new front in Ukraine and is attempting to seize as much territory before the arrival of Washington’s latest USD 61 billion military aid package. Whilst China has not provided conventional arms to Russia, it has supplied a range of “dual-purpose” equipment and crude components. These have included semiconductor chips for precision-guided munitions, jet parts, ball bearings, motorbikes and all-terrain vehicles. These are considered “dual-purpose” as despite their obvious military applications, these systems and components can in theory be used for civilian purposes. Russia would invariably want to go one step further and secure finished military hardware from China to alleviate pressures on its military-industrial base and to get weapons onto the battlefield with reduced timelines. However, it is unlikely that Xi would authorise this as he attempts to balance opportunities with Russia against relations with the West. For China, the war in Ukraine has afforded it improved access to cheaper Russian oil and gas. In 2023, Russia was China’s largest supplier of oil, clearly showing that China knows it has the freedom to ignore US sanctions without facing any major reprisals. Russia has also become a major destination for Chinese imports after the West’s refusal to export to Russia, and Russian debt to China has increased significantly. Furthermore, public opinion in China is largely supportive of Russia or indifferent, with it being widely believed that Russia had to invade Ukraine to counter the expansion of NATO. With Western efforts doing little to deter China, economic opportunities abounding and domestic public sentiment not challenging China’s stance, there is little reason for Beijing to truly work towards ending the conflict. The continuation of the war in Ukraine is likely in Beijing’s interests given the economic opportunities it has exploited and the fact that Western support in Ukraine has put it in a weaker position to support Taiwan.

Authorities in the French territory of New Caledonia implemented a curfew on 14 May and prohibited public gatherings in the capital Nouméa following violent protests against proposed constitutional changes. During the clashes, businesses, including car dealerships and shops, were damaged. Flights were also cancelled, schools closed, and impositions placed on the sale of alcohol. These measures failed to curb the civil unrest and, on 15 May, French President Macron declared a state of emergency in New Caledonia. Ongoing violent protests have resulted in at least four deaths including that of a gendarme, over 300 injured, hundreds of arrests and damage estimated at several hundred million Euros. Macron also promised to meet the violence with an “unyielding response” with reports indicating that the French military would be deployed to the territory alongside four gendarmerie squadrons.

Solace Global Assessment:  New Caledonia has been deeply divided by proposals to increase the territory’s autonomy from Paris, with many calling for outright independence. However, recent referendums have rejected independence. In the 2018 and 2020 referendums, 56 per cent and 53 per cent of voters decided to remain part of France. During the 2021 referendum, 96 per cent decided to remain with France but only after a boycott by pro-independence groups. These developments have likely galvanised the indigenous Kanak people who broadly support independence and comprise an estimated 40 per cent of the territory’s 300,000 people, as well as some smaller ethnic groups. The current violence has almost certainly been triggered by lawmakers in Paris who recently made changes to voting rolls that indigenous people have claimed will dilute their political influence. Moreover, as the protests have been triggered by decisions made by France’s central government, they may result in a “domino effect” causing protests to spark in France’s other overseas territories. France’s measures to curtail the protests, such as the imposition of a curfew, banning of social media apps and the deployment of military and police units from the mainland, will likely be interpreted as a colonial power exercising its illegitimate authority over an indigenous people and are likely to antagonise the rioters and ultimately strengthen the independence movement. Local populations have also likely been provoked by the 1998 Nouméa Accord which promised to grant the territory more independence but also confirmed its existence as part of France, leading to 40,000 French people moving to the relatively small territory and further diluting indigenous influence. For Paris, New Caledonia holds strategic importance, and its loss would decrease French military and political influence in the Asia Pacific at a time when France is attempting to increase it. The island territory lies between Australia and Fiji, is host to a French air and naval base and has a large Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), contributing to France’s global power projection capabilities. France has maintained this network more successfully than other colonial powers by recognising them as part of France. However, the possible loss of New Caledonia could trigger a chain reaction of independence movements that would significantly decrease France’s international standing, suggesting that France will likely allocate substantial resources to quell the New Caledonian protests which may lead to more energised riots and deaths in the short term.

In Thailand, a 28-year-old monarchy reform activist charged with insulting the monarchy died on 14 May of cardiac arrest following a hunger strike. The activist had demanded a reform of Thailand’s lese majeste law which can lead to sentences of up to 15 years for insulting the monarchy. Her death may lead to student-led democracy protests like the ones which erupted in 2020. Thailand’s recent shock decision to re-criminalise cannabis just two years after it was legalised is also likely to lead to street protests, with some minor street protests being staged on 16 May.

Officials in Pakistan have stated their intent to speed up the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the most high-profile symbol of cooperation between the two countries. The call for urgency has been driven by a surge in attacks on Chinese nationals in the country, largely attributed to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other ethnic Baloch and Sindhi insurgent groups that strongly oppose the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). These groups argue that the CPEC disproportionately benefits other areas of Pakistan and will likely aim to intensify their attacks if the CPEC is accelerated.

China and Cambodia started their annual military exercise “Golden Dragon 2024” on 16 May. The 15-day exercise will include over 1300 personnel and 11 Cambodian vessels combined with almost 800 Chinese troops and three warships from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The exercise is almost certainly symbolic of developing military cooperation between the two countries and will further provoke fears over the establishment of a PLAN base on the Cambodian coast that will enable it to sustain more operations in the disputed South China Sea and further afield.

At least 300 people have been killed after flash flooding hit the north of Afghanistan. The floods also caused widespread economic disruptions, bringing to a halt the agriculture-based economy of the Baghlan, Takhar, and Badakhshan provinces. The Taliban government has increasingly had difficulties responding to the extreme weather events affecting the country, which are exacerbated by the combination of Afghanistan’s rough and mountainous terrain and its extremely poor infrastructure. Terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, firstly the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), may seek to intensify attacks on authorities in an effort to enhance the disruptions currently faced by Kabul to undermine the Taliban’s rule.

Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has warned that three heatwaves are set to hit several of the country’s major cities during late May and early June. The first heatwave is expected in cities including Umarkot, Tharparkar, and Bahawalpur, with temperatures reaching up to 40°C. A second heatwave, lasting four to five days, may occur later in May or early June, with temperatures rising to 45°C. The third heatwave is predicted for the first 10 days of June, affecting several cities in Sindh and Punjab. Additionally, the Punjab Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) cautions of increased temperatures and heavy rains in South Punjab from May 10 to 11, posing threats to crops.

In Mumbai, India, 14 people were killed and dozens more injured after a large billboard collapsed on a local gas station during a particularly intense storm on 13 May. At least 15 planes were diverted from the area due to the phenomenon’s severity. More extreme weather events remain a realistic possibility, as the North Indian Ocean cyclone season, which affects weather in much of the Indian subcontinent, enters its peak between May and November.

On 11 May monsoon rains and a major mudslide from a cold lava flow or lahar on Mount Marapi caused a river to breach its banks and tear through mountainside villages in four districts in Indonesia’s West Sumatra province. The floods have killed at least 40 people and damaged hundreds of homes, with relief efforts disrupted by damaged or blocked roads. With Mount Marapi being active since January, it is likely that further eruptions and heavy rain will lead to more landslides in the area.

Intelligence cut off time 15:00 GMT 12th of January 2024

On the 11-12 January, US and UK aircraft and warships conducted at least 70 strikes on multiple military targets in Houthi-controlled Yemen. Reports indicate that over 100 precision guided munitions were fired on at least 16 Houthi locations. This includes a military base adjacent to Sanaa airport, a military site near Taiz airport, a Houthi naval base in Hodeidah and military sites in Hajjah governorate. Houthi’s stated that five of the group’s fighters were killed in the strikes with six others wounded.

The Houthi Movement is an Iranian aligned group that controls much of Yemen after nearly a decade of civil war against a Western-backed and Saudi-led coalition. The two sides are currently observing a tentative ceasefire that officially ended in late 2022 but has remained in place to the current day.

Following the outbreak of the Hamas-Israel conflict, the Houthi’s emerged as a strong supporter of the Palestinian Islamist group. The Houthis began attacks on shipping between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in December 2023, claiming to target vessels linked to Israeli persons, businesses, and interests.

However, this route, which links Europe and Asia and Africa via the Suez Canal, accounts for roughly 15 percent of the world’s shipping traffic. The attacks have forced some shipping companies to limit transits through the waterway, or even cease operations altogether, instead taking the longer route around southern Africa. This has significantly disrupted international commerce, increasing delivery costs and time, stoking fears about a global inflation.

In response to the Houthi attacks, the US launched Operation Prosperity Guardian alongside several allies, which aimed to end the blockade and counter all threats by Houthi forces against international maritime trade. The operation was defensive in nature, destroying only missiles launched at vessels with no pro-active strikes conducted. The Houthis continued to fire at merchant vessels, as well as allied naval vessels, dismissing warnings from Washington and London. Then on 9 January, US and British warships shot down 21 drones and missiles, repelling the largest Houthi attack so far.

It is highly likely that the Houthi’s largest attack to date on 9 January was the trigger that surpassed the US-UK threshold. While international prices have yet to see a significant impact, Operation Prosperity Guardian was not working as a deterrent. It is highly likely that more extensive, continued Houthi action would force more merchant vessels away from the Red Sea, almost certainly disrupting maritime trade, therefore increasing consumer prices and shortages.

In the immediate aftermath, the Houthi’s are highly likely to increase their attacks on commercial and military vessels in the region in retaliation. However, it is likely that their ability to launch missiles and drones has been degraded. Should the Houthis sustain their attacks, it is almost certain that the US and UK will continue their strikes on targets within Yemen. It is also highly likely that the group will be re-designated as a terrorist organisation if they continue. This would have a significant impact on the peace process to end the Yemeni Civil War between the Houthi’s and the Saudi-led coalition, which has continued to progress despite regional tensions.

A breakdown of the process would almost certainly see a resumption of hostilities between the two sides, with locations within Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates likely becoming viable targets for the Houthi’s as evidenced by their previous attacks.

Across the Middle East, it is highly likely that Houthi’s allies and other Iranian proxies start to act in solidarity with the group. These groups will almost certainly view the attacks as Western support for Israel.

It is almost certain that Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq and Syria will continue to target US military bases across the region. It is also likely that the frequency and scale of these attacks will increase considerably. There is a realistic possibility that US military locations that have not been targeted yet in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, are targeted.

Hezbollah will likely continue to focus its attacks on Israel, however an attack on the US cannot be ruled out. While still unlikely, the US and UK strikes on Yemen have increased the likelihood of a wider conflict developing in the Middle East, as well as the West entering a proxy war with Iran. This eventuality would highly likely take focus away from the conflict in Gaza, almost certainly intensifying the humanitarian situation.

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Many Israeli climate organisations have stated that they will boycott COP28 and it is highly likely that Israel will be forced to withdraw from COP28 entirely due to security concerns.

However, COP28 will still attract thousands of Westerners, including many world leaders, diplomats and influential businesspeople. It is likely that COP28 represents an attractive target for terrorist actors due to the influx of foreigners and the international publicity of the event.

On 29 October, the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) issued a warning for British tourists visiting the United Arab Emirates (UAE), indicating an increased threat of terrorist attacks. The advisory warns of a very likely risk of terrorist attacks, which could be indiscriminate and may target places frequented by foreigners. While terror attacks within the UAE and rare and the Emirati counter-terrorist forces are heavily financed and well-trained, there is a realistic possibility that forces will be overstretched as a result of COP28 and that self-radicalisation within the region will increase as a result of the situation in the Gaza Strip.

In 2004, the Iranian-backed Houthi Movement, otherwise known as Ansar Allah (Supporters of God), rebelled against the Yemeni government with the aspiration of taking control over the entirety of Yemen. The conflict escalated in 2014 when Houthi forces seized Yemen’s capital, Sanna, and forced the Yemeni government into exile. This led to the deployment of a Saudi-led coalition in 2015 that seeks to establish full territorial control by the internationally recognised government within Yemen.

The Saudi-led coalition consists of predominantly Sunni and Arab nations such as the UAE, and is backed by Western powers including the USA, UK and France.

The UAE’s involvement in the coalition has involved a range of military and logistical support for the government of Yemen, including air strikes, the deployment of troops to Yemen and training local Yemeni militias allied to government forces.

The UAE’s involvement in the conflict has made it a target for Houthi forces who have developed an arsenal of long-range drones and missiles facilitated by Iran. Houthi forces have conducted numerous drone and missile attacks on the UAE, typically targeting strategic locations in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, such as airports, ports and oil facilities.

Since 2019, the UAE has significantly reduced its military footprint in Yemen, however it still projects power through its support of a number of militias allied to Yemeni government forces. The Houthis have conducted attacks on the UAE in response to successful military operations by pro-government militias supported by Abu Dhabi, which resulted in a series of high-profile attacks in 2022 against high-profile targets in Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

While the UAE maintains a sophisticated air-defence capability and has been able to shoot down the majority of projectiles within its airspace, it is likely that the Houthis have sufficient drones and missiles to overwhelm and penetrate UAE air defence.

The Houthi Movement have currently been in talks with Saudi Arabia and other local actors regarding a ceasefire.

There is a realistic possibility that the Israel-Hamas war destabilises the Middle East, and Iran exploits the situation to order its proxy forces to attack Israeli, Western and anti-Iranian forces and interests throughout the region.

Houthi forces have attempted drone and missile attacks on Israel in response to the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) military activity in the Gaza Strip, with all attacks to date intercepted by IDF or US air defence.

There is a realistic possibility that both Saudi and the UAE will be forced to respond to Houthi attacks which will invariably provoke retaliatory attacks from the Houthis. Moreover, there is also a realistic possibility that the Houthi rebels might seek to exploit the current situation in the Middle East to conduct attacks on the UAE.

In the event of a wider conflict involving Israel, the Houthi rebels could exploit regional tensions to launch missile and drone attacks, engage in cyber warfare, and employ asymmetric tactics against the UAE, aiming to distract or pressure the UAE due to its involvement in regional security initiatives and the Saudi-led coalition.

A further motivation for the Houthis, who are backed by Iran and reportedly allied to Hezbollah, would be to present themselves as defenders of the Palestinian cause and target the UAE for its recent normalisation of relations with Israel and ties to the West.

If the Israel-Hamas conflict is not contained and provokes a US retaliation, the Supreme Leader of the Houthi Movement has issued a statement declaring that they will respond with drones and missiles, and with the Al Dhafra Air Base located just to the south of Abu Dhabi, it is highly likely that Houthi forces will attempt to target the US military and US interests within the UAE.

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Intelligence cut-off time 11:00 GMT 17th of October 2023

Whilst it remains almost certain that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) will commit to a ground offensive in the Gaza Strip, this is unlikely to occur within the next 24-48 hours.

The main factor contributing to the postponement is the recent revelation of President Biden’s visit to Israel for discussions with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday 18 October. It is highly unlikely that the US will sponsor an IDF invasion while President Biden is within Israel due to the threat associated with Hezbollah retaliation from Lebanon, which will almost certainly be backed by the Iranian regime, or from one of the other militant groups operating out of the West Bank. It is estimated that Hezbollah alone has amassed a stock of over 150,000 rockets. While most of these rockets are crude and unguided munitions that range out only to 10-40km, Hezbollah also maintain a stock of more sophisticated Iranian-derived rocket and missile systems such as the Fateh-110 (250-300km), SCUD-B/C/D (300-550km) and the Zelzal 1/2 ballistic missiles (125-250km). Such weapon systems enable Hezbollah to target high-value targets such as Ben Gurion airport with a high degree of accuracy. While it is expected that Israel’s Iron Dome air defence system will detect and intercept the majority of rockets, there is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah could launch missile and rocket salvos large enough to overwhelm the air defence system.

Given the missile and rocket threat posed by Hezbollah and the fact Hamas have now likely fired the majority of their rockets, there is a realistic possibility that the IDF will be forced to reposition mobile elements of its Iron Dome system to counter the emerging threat in the north.

Iran has warned that its proxy forces will conduct “pre-emptive action” in response to Israel’s retaliatory strikes on Gaza, which will invariably include the use of Hezbollah forces. However, it is unlikely that Hezbollah will conduct any major attacks with President Biden in Israel for fear of a major US retaliation.

Moreover, it is more likely that Hezbollah and Iran will wait until Israel commits forces to Gaza as the IDF will have a considerable amount of its forces fixed in the south, offering a tactically advantageous position to open up a northern front that will almost certainly stretch IDF forces and complicate Israeli re-supply and sustainment. To counter Iran and its proxies’ threats, the US has moved its USS Gerald Ford led Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 12 into the Eastern Mediterranean and has deployed a second CSG led by the USS Eisenhower to the Mediterranean which is currently in the eastern Atlantic and is expected to enter the eastern Mediterranean in the next couple of days. The combined combat power of two US CSGs will provide Israel with overwhelming air superiority should the US enter into a conflict with Israel, with warnings already issued to Iran that the US will engage Iranian proxy forces. It is highly likely that Israel will delay a ground offensive until the USS Eisenhower is positioned in the eastern Mediterranean.

It is expected that Biden will discuss with Netanyahu the evacuation of civilians from the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing with Egypt. It is likely that Biden will demand that a humanitarian corridor is established before IDF forces enter Gaza, with Biden also forecasted to visit Egypt where he will likely use diplomatic pressure to demand the same from Egypt. It is likely that the IDF will want to commit forces sooner rather than later as any delay will afford Hamas and other militants to prepare defensive positions and mobilise forces. However, Israel is hugely dependent on US military aid which currently stands at approximately USD 4 billion per annum. It is unlikely that Israel has weapon stocks high enough to sustain military operations whilst maintaining enough weaponry to counter Hezbollah or deal with a wider conflict. Therefore, it is likely that Israel will have to submit to US requests in order to guarantee the delivery of future military aid and will not commit to a ground offensive until Biden has some reassurances from Tel Aviv.

Hezbollah, under orders from Iran will launch a pre-emptive attack on Israel prior to the arrival of President Biden. Such a move will provoke Israel into retaliating and committing to a ground offensive in Gaza before the Rafah crossing is opened and civilians are evacuated, causing an acute humanitarian crisis. This will undoubtedly provoke much international condemnation, resulting in anti-Israeli protests and rhetoric and potentially force the West to temper its support of Israel.

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