Solace Global Achieves World-Class NPS Score

We’re proud to share that we’ve achieved an NPS® (Net Promoter Score®) of 83 – a world-class rating that reflects our clients’ trust and satisfaction. But what exactly is an NPS® score, and why does it matter?

The NPS® is a widely used measure of customer loyalty and satisfaction. It’s calculated by asking clients a single question: How likely are you to recommend our services to others?

Our score of 83 places us among the top-rated companies in the risk management industry, indicating that our clients see real value in the services we provide.


Achieving a world-class NPS® score of 83 means we not only met but exceeded client expectations. Now, our commitment is to keep going beyond what’s expected.

Shari-Anne Bradnick, Customer Success Manager


For Solace, this score goes beyond numbers; it’s a testament to our dedication to delivering people-centred, reliable risk management. Across sectors – from corporate and government organisations to NGOs – clients rely on us for secure, seamless solutions, including corporate security, travel risk management, and journey management. We thank our customers

We are grateful for the continued trust of our clients – because together, we go further.


CASE STUDIES

Discover more from Solace Global

Security Support for Beirut Explosion, Lebanon

Medical & Security Soltions for Caribbean Hurricane

Low Profile Security for Documentary Crew

On the 4th August 2020 an explosion devastated Beirut, killing at least 220 people, injuring more than 6,000 and displacing over 300,000.

In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, Solace Global Risk, a leading provider of risk management solutions, identified the explosion before mainstream media, to promptly make security managers aware and confirm the safety of travellers within Beirut during this critical time.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, a catastrophic natural disaster, the Caribbean region experienced widespread disruption.

A British employee was deployed to the British Virgin Islands to assist in the recovery efforts, with Solace Global assisting with a comprehensive journey management plan, that included security vehicles and highly vetted close protection operatives to safeguard against local threats and disruption.

The production of the series Narco Wars, set across Central and South America, delves into the illicit narcotics trade and the individuals entangled in the drugs cartels. This ambitious project heavily relies on the presence of knowledgeable in-country “fixers” to facilitate smooth filming operations in complex and high-risk locations.

Understanding the inherent risks associated with filming in these challenging environments, Solace Global provided comprehensive solutions to enhance the safety and security of the media team.

Week 44: 25 October – 01 November

Global Intelligence Summary

abstract blue banner
  • A claimed assassination attempt on former Bolivian President Evo Morales will almost certainly exacerbate political tensions and help sustain nationwide unrest.
  • The Israeli retaliation strikes against Iran have likely severely degraded Iran’s integrated air defence system, highly likely enabling more effective hypothetical future operations by Israel.
  • The opposition’s call for a week of strikes and protests in Mozambique will almost certainly result in widespread demonstrations, major disruptions and violent clashes.
  • North Korea’s longest-ever ICBM test is likely indicative of its ability to strike the US mainland with nuclear-armed missiles and reflective of Russian technological cooperation.

AMER

Martinique: Unrest continues and curfew is extended

Bolivia: Former president targeted in assassination attempt as unrest continues

Uruguay: Presidential election has no winner and will head to a runoff

Spain: Storm DANA results in major flooding and multiple casualties

Georgia: Pro-European rally in Tbilisi ahead of upcoming election

Israel & Iran: Israel conducts strikes against Iran, primarily targeting military sites

Syria: US conducts series of strikes on ISIS targets in Syria

Mozambique: Opposition calls for week-long protests and strikes

Pakistan: Militants attack health centre to disrupt polio vaccinations

North Korea: Longest-ever ICBM launch conducted

Myanmar: Rebel forces to switch operations to central regions


Unrest in Martinique continues as French authorities have extended a curfew in five municipalities until 4 November, due to ongoing protests against the high cost of living. The curfew order will now only apply to the municipalities of Case-Pilote, Fort-de-France, Lamentin, Saint-Joseph and Schoelcher, from 00:00-05:00.

Disturbances during the past week have included the attempted erection of barricades in Fort-de-France, the blocking of roads with bonfires in Le Francois and Le Vauclin, and vehicles being set ablaze in Bellefontaine and Fond Lahaye. During the night of 25-26 October, at least one person was killed in La Trinite and four others were injured in multiple incidents of shootings across Martinique, and attacks against police and firefighters using Molotov cocktails and projectiles have continued.

The protests have also led to significant disruptions, such as the suspension of refuse collection in central Martinique and the closure of schools.

One of the main protest organisers, The Rally for the Protection of Afro-Caribbean Peoples and Resources (RPPRAC), released a statement on 27 October denouncing the violence, calling instead for peaceful marches and blockades.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Overall, the past week of disorder has highly likely been less intense than in weeks prior. The unrest that started in September was triggered by demands for price parity for basic goods with mainland France, with food prices, for example, being 40 per cent higher in Martinique.

The relative decline in the intensity of violent unrest likely suggests that efforts by authorities to quell the protests, including the curfews, are having an effect, in addition to the ameliorating impact of a deal signed on 16 October that promised to lower the cost of some food items by an average of 20 per cent.

Due to the extent of the commercial and tourism disruption, the President of the Executive Council of Martinique Serge Letchimy stated on 25 October that he had asked France’s Prime Minister, Michel Barnier, for emergency funding relief of EUR 100 million to support “disaster-stricken businesses” in Martinique. The French government, however, announced on 28 October an additional EUR 5.2 billion in national spending cuts, and French austerity will likely be a limiting factor in the level of financial aid available to the Department of Martinique.

Despite the public efforts of RPPRAC to restrain the violence of the protests in Martinique, it is unlikely that the organisation has strong enough influence over the violent fringes of the protest movement. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the unrest will reach the same scale and intensity as the May 2024 New Caledonia unrest, which precipitated the mass evacuation of foreign nationals. 


On 27 October, former Bolivian President Evo Morales’ car was fired upon by unidentified men while travelling in the Chapare region, a traditional stronghold for Morales’ supporters. Morales, who shared a video of the incident, has claimed that the attack was an assassination attempt orchestrated by the government of President Luis Arce Catacora.

The government has in turn claimed that the assassination attempt was staged by Morales to gain political traction before the next Bolivian presidential elections scheduled for August 2025.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Bolivia has been gripped by severe civil unrest since early October after prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for Morales accusing him of statutory rape and human trafficking. The allegations from both sides of the political divide have almost certainly significantly heightened political tensions in the country, with Morales supporters threatening to paralyse the country.

Roadblocks erected on major roads for over two weeks have disrupted the delivery of essential supplies like food and fuel across the country. Protests in cities like La Paz, Sucre, Santa Cruz and several smaller settlements have involved violent clashes with the police, resulting in multiple injuries and the deployment of tear gas.

President Arce has accused Morales of destabilising Bolivia for political gain and has demanded an end to the disruptions, indicating that it has already cost the Bolivian economy approximately USD 2 billion.

The country’s strained economy – characterised by declining natural gas production, dwindling foreign reserves, and rising inflation has only exacerbated tensions. As Bolivia approaches the 2025 presidential election, the convergence of economic hardship and polarised politics is likely to result in periodic unrest, potentially destabilising the country, undermining its democratic institutions and straining the economy.   


As no candidate secured a majority in the 27 October presidential election, a runoff vote will now take place on 24 November. The coalition Broad Front’s centre-left candidate Yamandu Orsi won the most votes, with 44 per cent, while the ruling National Party’s centre-right candidate Alvaro Delgado came second with 27 per cent.

The conservative vote was split, with the liberal-conservative Colorado Party candidate Andres Ojeda gaining 16 per cent of the vote. Ojeda has since pledged to back Delgado in the runoff election.

There were also two referenda, the first regarding a pension reform proposal and the second regarding enabling nighttime police raids across the country, with both being rejected by the electorate.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The election campaigns were markedly civil and the election in general is almost certainly indicative of the stability and relative lack of political polarisation in Uruguay compared to many other South American countries. There is a broad political consensus among all the leading candidates regarding the continuation of the pro-business policies of the current President Luis Lacalle Pou.

The turnout rate was 89 per cent, though this is almost certainly conditioned by laws that make voting compulsory in Uruguay. While Uruguayan politics has been primarily dominated by two big-tent coalitions, this election was notable in that Ojeda managed to secure 16 per cent.

With the centre-right vote split between Delgado and Ojeda in this first round, it is likely that the runoff election will be a tight contest between Orsi and Delgado.


Sikh separatist warns of Indian clandestine activity in US and Canada

The Sikh separatist and dual US-Canadian citizen, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, has warned of an established Indian intelligence network operating in the US and Canada. Pannun alleges that India is directly targeting Sikh separatists in North America, which includes attempted assassinations.

The accusations are likely to strain relations between India the US and Canada and have the potential to drive greater radicalisation of the Sikh community both within India and North America.

The Canadian signals intelligence agency, Communications Security Establishment (CSE) has also warned that the dispute is likely to lead to an increase in Indian cyber espionage targeting the Canadians.


Mexican government curbs power of the judiciary

Mexico’s lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, has approved a measure that bars judicial review of constitutional reforms, reinforcing changes advanced by the ruling party, Morena, and its allies. With Senate approval last week, the measure prevents the judiciary from challenging reforms, including the recent judicial overhaul. Opposition lawmakers have lambasted the move as authoritarian, over concerns regarding judicial independence. The latest reform has resulted in eight of eleven justices on Mexico’s Supreme Court resigning and is likely to lead to unrest in several parts of the country.


Argentina to champion diplomatic route to gain Falkland Islands

In response to the UK’s handing over of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, President Javier Milei of Argentina has stated that it is possible to gain control of the Falkland Islands via diplomatic processes despite UK claims that its sovereignty is non-negotiable. Argentina’s foreign minister has also stated that the conditions are now in place to resume flights between Argentina and the Falklands after four years of suspension, in a move that is likely reflective of a more conciliatory approach from Buenos Aires.


Island-wide power outage and unrest in Guadeloupe

Striking Electricite de France (EDF) workers caused an island-wide power outage in the French overseas department of Guadeloupe on 25 October after giving rise to an emergency shutdown at the Pointe Jarry thermal plant.

The outage had initially left the entire French Caribbean territory in darkness, disrupting water supply and internet access. By 26 October, power was gradually being restored, with 77 per cent of customers having electricity back by the evening, and full restoration was achieved by 27 October. The strike, which began in September, is unrelated to the more severe civil unrest in Martinique. However, there were reports of looting in Pointe-a-Pitre, and authorities imposed a curfew in ten municipalities in response to these incidents and the blackout.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Haitian gang attacks lead to US evacuations

The US is set to evacuate 20 embassy staff from Port-au-Prince, Haiti in response to escalating violence in the city. Criminal gangs have increased their assaults on the remaining areas of the capital outside of their control, with recent developments including opening fire on a UN World Food Programme (WFP) helicopter and attempts to target US embassy vehicles.

The WFP is becoming increasingly reliant on aircraft to complete its mission, with roads being deemed too dangerous due to gang attacks and the establishment of roadblocks. The gangs are likely attempting to attack all foreign entities assisting and disrupting aid deliveries to undermine the government and assert their influence over the country.

Increased gang violence is also likely indicative of Kenya’s failed intervention to reestablish law and order in the country.


Mexican authorities fail to curb cartel violence in Sinaloa State

A wave of cartel violence has continued in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, which Mexico is blaming on the US for the July arrest of cartel leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada. At least 14 people were murdered on 26 October alone, with most of the killings occurring in the state capital, Culiacán, where clashes between criminal groups have disrupted daily life and led to school and business closures.

Since 9 September, authorities have reported almost 200 fatalities and over 200 missing persons despite the mass deployment of troops from other parts of Mexico.


Argentina discloses head of Hezbollah operations in Latin America

Argentina’s Defence Minisiter Patricia Bullrich has publicly identified the head of Hezbollah operations in Latin America as Hussein Ahmad Karaki. She also alleged that he was responsible for the 1992 Israeli Embassy and 1994 Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) bombings in Buenos Aires, which collectively killed over 100 and injured around 500.

The accusations indicate that Hezbollah operations in South America are facilitated by Venezuela and that the Iranian-backed group had established direct ties to organised crime groups in the region, especially the Brazilian cartels Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho, which have reportedly become narco-terrorist networks under Hezbollah’s influence and have been responsible for much violence.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Mexico to celebrate Day of the Dead festival on 2 November

An estimated seven million people will take part in Mexico’s, Día de los Muertos, or Day of the Dead festival on 2 November, which will culminate in a major procession in central Mexico City. Almost 20,000 extra security personnel will be deployed, and major traffic disruptions are anticipated in the capital city. Whilst the festival is typically peaceful, it has sometimes led to impromptu protests and clashes with the authorities, with the recent judicial overhaul potentially serving as a catalyst for unrest.


On 29 October, an entire year’s worth of rain fell in just eight hours in parts of the Valencian Community (the political and administrative region), leading to severe flash flooding. The death toll across Spain is currently 158, although this is highly likely to rise in the coming days.

Almost all of the deaths occurred in the Valencian Community, although flooding also occurred in Castile-La Mancha, Andalusia, Aragon and Catalonia. The Valencia and Castellon provinces in the Valencian Community suffered the worst impact, particularly the towns of Torrent, Pairporta and Chiva, with rescue operations still ongoing.

Over 150,000 people lost power, and mass disruptions to transport were caused, with dozens of flight cancellations at Valencia Airport and the suspension of most train services in the region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

DANA is a Spanish acronym for high-altitude isolated depression. These storm systems develop due to the convergence of cold and warm air, which can form independently of polar or subtropical jet streams. Due to Spain’s location between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, the country is especially vulnerable to the formation of such storm systems, particularly in the east and south.

While it will take time to determine a definitive connection between this particular storm and climate change, the mainstream consensus amongst the scientific community is that climate change highly likely worsens both the frequency and intensity of these weather events.

With 158 deaths so far reported, the storm has caused the most flood-related deaths in Europe since the 2021 European floods, which caused over 200 deaths, primarily in Germany and Belgium. Storm system DANA has also highly likely caused one of the deadliest natural disasters in modern Spanish history.

There is a realistic possibility that backlash against perceived inadequacies in the preparedness measures of authorities will lead to incidents of civil unrest.

Firstly, criticism has been made regarding the inadequacy of accurate forecasts for heavy rainfall being solely sufficient to forewarn populations of the imminent threat to life.

Secondly, evacuation alerts were allegedly sent to people’s phones too late in multiple reported instances, having been triggered when substantial flooding had already occurred and reportedly leading to panicked fleeing evacuees being forced to abandon their vehicles and urgently seek refuge due to already severely rising floodwaters. Developed economies that regularly experience tropical cyclones, such as Taiwan, have developed rigorous preparedness and resiliency measures that mitigate against the worst impact of storm-related flooding. Due to the relative infrequency of such events in Europe, however, many European states do not yet have equivalently comprehensive disaster management procedures.


On 28 October, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) camps in the Badiya Desert in southern Syria. The strikes reportedly killed up to 35 ISIS insurgents, including senior leadership. CENTCOM has announced that the strikes will disrupt ISIS’ ability to “plan, organize, and conduct attacks against civilians, as well as U.S., allies, and partners throughout the region and beyond.”

Solace Global Assessment: 

The CENTCOM strikes are part of a wider trend of US and coalition forces targeting a resurgent ISIS throughout the region, which still presents a credible threat in both Iraq and Syria. The targeting of senior leadership will almost certainly help to deny ISIS’ resurgence, especially in the Badiya Desert on the Iraqi border where there is minimal coalition activity.

However, multiple regional and international developments are working in the favour of ISIS regrouping. Firstly, the war between Israel and Hamas has likely increased rates of radicalisation and a potential wider conflict has diverted attention and resources away from ISIS. Additionally, expanded Turkish operations in Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan have overstretched Kurdish forces, who were pivotal in the defeat of the caliphate.

Most importantly, the US is set to conclude a phased withdrawal of its 2500 troops from Iraq by 2026. If Iraqi forces are ill-prepared to deal with the ISIS threat, the terrorist group will likely exploit a reduced security presence and intelligence gaps to re-emerge in Iraq, enabling it to also regroup in Syria. This development could set the conditions where ISIS can recruit, raise funds and increase its attacks with the ultimate objective of destabilising the region and reasserting its influence. In the long term, a resurgent ISIS will likely be in a better position to plan and conduct external operations in places like Europe. Moreover, a stronger ISIS in the Levant may enhance its ability to coordinate efforts with the Islamic State’s network of affiliates such as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan, and a host of other affiliates spread throughout the world.  


According to the published 26 October parliamentary election results, Georgian Dream won almost 54 per cent of the vote, despite all exit polls aside from the one commissioned by the pro-government Imedi TV predicting victory for the combined vote of the opposition parties. The pro-Europe President Salome Zourabichvili refused to accept the election results and called for protests in Tbilisi. Tens of thousands gathered outside the Georgian parliament building on 28 October, contesting the election result and demanding a re-run.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Relative to both the scale and levels of violence in the protests against the “foreign agents” bill in March 2023 and April-June 2024, the post-election demonstrations thus far have been smaller and calmer. It is likely, however, that the civil unrest will grow in both size and intensity over the coming weeks.

Following President Zourabichvili’s refusal to accept the results and her call for protests, Zourabichvili was summoned to the Prosecutor’s Office to testify. While this is ostensibly due to possible evidence Zourabichvili has that is relevant to an investigation regarding the allegations of election fraud, Zourabichvili has indicated a refusal to comply, likely due to fears of institutional backlash against the Georgian opposition.

Meanwhile, international reaction has almost certainly further inflamed the stark political divisions in Georgia. Russian former President Dmitry Medvedev publicly called for the “puppet President of Georgia” to be impeached and arrested, the European Commission has stated that the election irregularities “must be clarified and addressed”, and US President Joe Biden expressed deep concern about “recent democratic backsliding”.

It is likely that political violence from Georgia’s far-right against the opposition will increase, and it is likely that further opposition demonstrations will involve violent clashes between protesters and security forces.


Following a large-scale missile attack by Iran against Israel on 1 October, Israel conducted retaliation strikes against Iran on 26 October. These strikes were primarily limited to military targets, particularly targets relating to Iran’s air defence and long-range fire capabilities. Over 100 aircraft, including  F-15s, F-16s, possibly F-35s and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), were used in the attack which has been codenamed by Israel as Operation Days of Repentance.  

Approximately 20 targets in the vicinity of Tehran and western Iran were struck, including three to four S-300 air defence batteries, air defence command-and-control sites, radars (including a sophisticated Ghadir early detection radar in Ahvaz), and defence industrial sites such as the Parchin and Khojir complexes near Tehran. Additionally, satellite imagery reveals damage to a storage unit at the Abadan Oil Refinery in Khuzestan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1 October attack against Israel, multiple possible scenarios of Israeli retaliation strikes were assessed to be plausible (and in some instances threatened by Israeli officials and politicians), each with varying degrees of potential escalatory impact. These included decapitation strikes against high-profile Iranian figures, strikes against Iran’s oil production facilities and energy infrastructure, and strikes against Iran’s nuclear program.

Overall, the strikes were ultimately primarily limited to military targets, which is highly likely one of the least escalatory scenarios that could have occurred. Nonetheless, the degradation of Iranian air defence capabilities has sent a strategic message to Tehran, highlighting Israel’s ability to penetrate Iranian air defence and likely setting the conditions that will increase the success rates of future Israeli operations against Iran.

Despite calls for strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, it was unlikely that such operations could have been anything more than symbolic, due to the requirement to use airframes carrying bunker-busting bombs that would need to penetrate deep into Iranian airspace and be highly vulnerable to air defence and interdiction. Nonetheless, the strikes on the Parchin complex are related, as the complex has likely been previously used for high explosives testing as part of its nuclear weapons development program, and traces of uranium were found at the site by international inspectors in 2015, although there is no indication that the site is currently used for Iran’s nuclear program.

However, by degrading Iran’s ballistic missile development and manufacturing capabilities, there is a realistic possibility that Iran’s nuclear ambitions have been hampered, as ballistic missiles would almost certainly serve as delivery systems for nuclear warheads. It is also likely that the Iranian supply of ballistic missiles to Russia and Axis of Resistance (the informal network of Iranian-backed and supported groups, ranging from Hezbollah to the Houthis) members will be disrupted as a result of the strikes, with the provision of ballistic missiles to Russia by Iran thought to be a particular danger to Ukraine due to the weaknesses in Ukraine’s air defence in intercepting ballistic missiles.

While damage has been reportedly confirmed at oil facilities in Iran, such as the storage unit at Abadan oil refinery, the main targets in the vicinity of Iranian energy infrastructure struck were air defence sites and it is unlikely that Iran’s oil production has been meaningfully impacted. This highly likely reduces the risk that retaliation by Iran and Iran-backed proxy forces will be against Western energy interests in the region, as was previously threatened by Iranian officials if Iran’s oil industry was significantly targeted. The attempts by various senior defence officials and politicians to characterise the strikes as “minor” may influence Iran to refrain from a major retaliation; however, threats of retaliation have still been made. Any response from Iran is likely to be limited and strategically designed to remain below the threshold that would provoke further significant Israeli operations.


Since Mozambique’s electoral commission declared that Daniel Chapo of the incumbent FRELIMO party had been elected president on 24 October, the country has struggled with civil unrest provoked by accusations of electoral fraud. On 29 October, the opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane called for week-long protests and strikes beginning on 31 October. Reporting from Mozambique is currently limited; however, there are indications on social media that protests are ongoing across many of the country’s largest cities, including Maputo, Beira, and Nampula.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

Mondlane’s calls for nationwide protests will almost certainly result in widespread unrest and violent confrontations with the security services. Mondlane is hugely popular with Mozambique’s youth who are primarily involved in the recent unrest which erupted in several major cities across the country.

However, the internet observatory group, NetBlocks, which monitors and reports on internet disruptions has warned that social media and messaging platforms in Mozambique have been restricted, making it challenging for external observers to accurately monitor the scale and nature of the unrest. These measures are almost certainly representative of the government’s attempt to disrupt the spread of unrest and obfuscate its violent handling of the protests.

Local medical groups have warned that the government’s previous crackdown on post-election protests involved the firing of live ammunition which resulted in at least ten deaths and 63 injured, although the real numbers are likely much higher. The government’s use of violence to suppress unrest has almost certainly increased tensions and will act as a catalyst for further unrest.

Aid workers have stated that the unrest has disrupted the delivery of humanitarian aid to the northern Cabo Delgado region where members of al-Shabab, a local Islamist group affiliated with the Islamic State, but distinct from the Somalian-based group, have been targeting local communities. There is a realistic possibility that militants will exploit the current unrest to conduct attacks on local communities and the security services.


UK Conservative Party set to announce new leader

Following Rishi Sunak’s resignation, the Conservative Party are set to appoint their new leader. The remaining candidates, Kemi Badenoch and Robert Jenrick, are both from the right of the party, potentially signalling a shift in policy towards more traditional conservative values to counter the Reform Party. Such a shift could help legitimise some of the ideas of the far-right, potentially leading to a more polarised UK, anti-migrant rhetoric and increased incidents of far-right violence.


Second round of Moldovan presidential runoff set for 3 November

Two weeks after the first round of a presidential election and EU accession referendum marked by significant Russian interference, Moldovans will go to the polls in the second round of the presidential election. Pro-Western President Maia Sandu, who secured the most votes in the first round, will go head-to-head with the pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. Russian disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks attempting to influence the election are likely and the authorities have also warned of Russian-backed criminal groups attempting to disrupt the electoral process.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Lebanon’s Hezbollah appoint Naim Qassem as new leader

Following the death of long-term leader Hassan Nasrallah in an Israeli airstrike, Hezbollah has appointed Naim Qassem as the new Secretary-General of the militant group. Israel has dismissed Qassem’s appointment as temporary and has almost certainly designated him as a tier-one target, and reports indicate he has sought shelter in Iran.

However, the assassination of Hamas’ Haniyeh demonstrated Israel’s reach, with a further assassination on Iranian soil likely to provoke Iran into retaliatory attacks. Early indications suggest Qassem may seek a more cautious approach than his predecessor, potentially opening the door for a truce with Israel.

However, there is a realistic possibility that his relocation to Iran and alleged poor leadership may jeopardise Hezbollah’s ability to maintain cohesion within the group.


JNIM claim attack on Nigerien military on outskirts of capital

On 26 October, the Islamist group and al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed an attack on a Nigerien army checkpoint just 10 kilometres from the capital Niamey. The attack purportedly killed one soldier and resulted in JNIM seizing weaponry and military equipment.

This incident marks the closest jihadist attack to Niamey since the military coup in July 2023, highlighting the growing threat posed by armed groups in the region and potentially a change in strategy. The attack follows recent JNIM attacks in the regional capitals Ouagadougou and Bamako, with militants likely attempting to destabilise the country and undermine junta governments by attacking their centres of authority which are also used by international organisations to coordinate humanitarian efforts.


Boko Haram attack kills 40 Chadian soldiers

At least 40 Chadian soldiers were killed on 27 October after the Islamist group Boko Haram attacked a Chadian Army garrison in the Lake Chad region. The attack has resulted in Operation Haskanite, the aim of which is to hunt down and root out the hundreds of Boko Haram militants responsible for the attack in the vast Lake Chad region, which the group have exploited as a safe haven. Boko Haram are almost certainly taking advantage of the wider destabilisation of the Sahel to conduct increased attacks, with attacks in Chad likely designed to undermine the Chadian government and to divert resources away from their traditional stronghold in northern Nigeria.  


Sudan’s RSF kill hundreds of civilians in El Gezira village raid

The paramilitary force known as the Rapid Support Forces has been implicated in one of the deadliest attacks of the Sudanese civil war after Al-Suhra village in El Gezira State was attacked. The raid is estimated to have killed at least 124 people, mainly civilians. The attack follows the recent surrender of a high-ranking RSF officer and is likely an example of a revenge attack on communities supporting government forces and is also likely an example of genocide. These attacks have increased rates of displacement in Sudan, with the UN indicating that almost 50,000 had been displaced within only the last week. The attacks have also included the mass rape of women and girls, leading to high rates of suicide. With the highly mobile RSF pressing on multiple fronts, the Sudanese Armed Forces are likely becoming increasingly incapable of defending rural communities.


Ghana rejects notion that it is safe haven for Sahelian militants

Ghana’s government has dismissed claims that Islamist militants from Burkina Faso are exploiting northern Ghana as a logistical and medical support base. The claims indicated that militant groups like Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) are using Ghana to sustain operations in the Sahel and has even established a de facto non-aggression pact with Ghana, a claim Accra refutes. It is likely that militants are currently refraining from conducting attacks in Ghana so as to not disrupt their supply lines into neighbouring Burkina Faso. However, if Ghana begins to change its strategy towards the militants, potentially in response to external pressures, it is likely that militants will adapt and seek to destabilise northern Ghana through direct attacks.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Storm Jacob to hit southern Sweden

As of 1 November, Storm Jakob has hit southern Sweden, causing major weather disruptions. Yellow weather warnings are in effect for northern Gotland and southern Svealand, signalling potential hazards and disruptions to daily life with several ferry services to Gotland already cancelled.


UK confirms first case of new Mpox strain

The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) has confirmed the first case of the Clade Ib variant of mpox (formerly known as monkeypox) in the UK. Detected in London, the authorities stated that the patient had recently travelled to Africa. However, the UKHSA has stated that the risk to the public remains low, with health officials tracing fewer than 10 direct contacts.


Mauritius bans social media access in run up to general election

On November 1, Mauritius’s communications regulator ordered a suspension of social media access from November 1 to 11, following a wiretapping scandal which involved the leaked conversations of politicians and other senior figures. Prime Minister Pravind Kumar Jugnauth’s office stated the restriction is necessary due to the publication of sensitive audio clips. However, the opposition and civil society groups have criticised the decision, stating that it will harm the economy and deny a fair democratic process. The denial of access to social media platforms has likely been done to limit the public’s exposure to the leaked audio and to disrupt the organisation of protests during the election.


On 29 October, militants attacked a health centre in Orakzai, a district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in western Pakistan, leading to the deaths of two police officers and three militants. The health centre was involved in an anti-polio campaign and health workers were attacked as they prepared to go on a door-to-door vaccination campaign, which is typically escorted by the police.

No group has claimed the attack; however, the location is within a traditional stronghold of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP).

On 1 November, at least seven people were killed after an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated near a girl’s school in southwestern Pakistan in the restless Balochistan province. The police claim that the intended target was police van which was going to pick up a polio vaccination team.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Whilst no militant group has claimed responsibility for the attack in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa , the location and nature of the attack indicate that it was likely conducted by the TTP. Islamist militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan have long held the belief that polio vaccination drives are part of a Western conspiracy to sterilise Muslim children, a belief that has been reinforced by years of propaganda and misinformation. This has resulted in Pakistan and Afghanistan being the only two countries in the world where the spread of polio has never been stopped.

A recent resurgence of polio cases in the region has prompted vaccination drives in both countries. The Taliban administration in Afghanistan has moved away from its previous stance on polio vaccinations and authorised the resumption of nationwide immunisation campaigns, including allowing female health workers to participate. However, it is likely that the TTP and many extremists still harbour the belief that polio vaccination campaigns are part of a Western conspiracy and that female health workers should not be allowed to participate.

The location of the IED attack in Balochistan may indicate that separatist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), who are most active in the area, have also adopted the belief that vaccinations are a Western conspiracy. The recent attack underscore these beliefs and indicates that militants throughout the region are likely to attack health workers and healthcare facilities linked to the immunisation programmes, attacks that will likely disrupt the programmes and hinder regional efforts to eradicate polio.


On 31 October, North Korea conducted a test fire of an upgraded intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in what Pyongyang has described as the “world’s most powerful strategic deterrent” and as a “warning to perceived enemies”. The missile, which can be nuclear-armed, was in the air for 87 minutes, reached an altitude of 7,000 kilometres and flew a distance of around 1,000 kilometres before falling into the Sea of Japan, approximately 200 kilometres west of Hokkaido, outside Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of North Korea’s ICBM test is likely aimed at the US and serves as strategic messaging before the 5 November presidential elections. The claimed performance of the ICBM suggests that North Korean ICBMs are now likely capable of reaching the US mainland.  Whilst the missile only landed west of Japan, it was fired at a lofted or high arc trajectory, ensuring it would land relatively close to North Korea. If fired on a more horizontal trajectory, the ICBM will likely be able to reach the US, a conclusion determined by the missile’s ceiling and time spent in the air.

The test is also likely an attempt to divert attention from North Korea’s recent controversial decision to deploy troops to Russia and Ukraine in support of the Kremlin. However, this development is likely indicative of increased military cooperation between the two countries. North Korea’s troop deployment may have been guaranteed in exchange for Russian assistance in developing ICBMs. The improved characteristics of North Korea’s ICBM may indicate improved access to Russian technology and expertise.

Closer cooperation with Russia has enabled North Korea to circumvent sanctions and there are early indications that North Korea is slowly being absorbed into a new, informal military alliance with China, Russia and Iran, colloquially referred to as “CRINK”. Such an alliance will likely allow North Korea to procure even more advanced weaponry, such as solid fuel propulsion and improved guidance systems. For Moscow and Beijing, an increasingly capable and aggressive North Korea serves as a strategic buffer to counter the US but will also likely force the West to reassess its military posture and alliances in the region, potentially affecting regional stability.


27 October marked the first anniversary of “Operation 1027”, an offensive launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA), a tripartite coalition of ethnic rebel groups including the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Arakan Army (AA), and the Ta’an National Liberation Army (TNLA). The TBA has since developed alliances with multiple other ethnic rebel groups, which primarily represent the ethnic minorities of the Karen, Kachin and Shan.

After a year of fighting, the rebel groups have seized large swathes or Myanmar, particularly in the northern and eastern parts of the country. To commemorate the anniversary of Operation 1027, Maung Saungkha, the leader of an ethnic Bamar resistance group, the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA). Has stated that it will shift its operations to focus on central Myanmar, with the objective of expelling junta forces from the Bamar-majority regions of Sagaing, Magwe, and Mandalay.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Established after Myanmar’s 2021 coup, the BPLA differentiates itself from most of the other rebel groups by representing the Bamar people, the ethnic majority in Myanmar, which is the main ethnicity of the ruling junta. The success of the other ethnic rebel groups has likely diverted junta resources to other parts of the country, providing the BPLA with the opportunity to conduct operations in what has traditionally been an area where the junta has consolidated power.

As Bamar rebels, the BPLA is in an advantageous position to coordinate with other Bamar resistance groups and to conduct guerilla warfare in the central regions. This operational shift could challenge the junta’s control over central Myanmar. If the BPLA succeeds in disrupting the junta’s supply lines or compels it to divert resources to defend major cities like Mandalay, this could work to the advantage of rebel forces in other regions, as the junta might be forced to withdraw forces from these areas.

This operational shift could occur as early as November, with the rainy season typically ending in late October or early November, marking the onset of drier conditions that facilitate military operations. However, operations in central Myanmar are likely to attract more international attention and could prompt external powers like China to provide more support for the junta. Central operations will also likely exacerbate the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region, especially if they threaten major population centres like Mandalay, with this likely leading to higher casualties, more internally displaced persons (IDPs), disruption of essential services and an increased refugee crisis in neighbouring countries like Thailand.


Protesters set fire to Jatiya Party’s office in Kakrail, Bangladesh

On 31 October, the central office of Bangladesh’s Jatiya Party in Dhaka was attacked and set on fire amid escalating tensions. The Jatiya Party, formerly allied with ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League, had announced plans for a rally, prompting opposition from groups critical of the previous administration. Protesters, under the banner “Anti-fascist students, workers, and masses”, marched with torches near the Jatiya Party headquarters in Kakrail. Clashes ensued when individuals from the party’s office allegedly threw bricks at the demonstrators, leading to vandalism and the subsequent fire. This underscores the ongoing political volatility in Bangladesh following Sheikh Hasina’s outsitting in August.


Japan’s ruling coalition fails to maintain its majority

On 27 October, Japan’s incumbent coalition suffered a surprise defeat and lost their majority in the Japanese parliament. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, failed to achieve a majority in the snap election, with voters likely indicating their disapproval of the government after corruption scandals and poor economic performance. The results have plunged Japan into a political crisis which could be exploited by China through increased intrusions into disputed Japanese territory.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Baluch separatists attack major infrastructure project in western Pakistan

On October 29, 2024, five people were killed in an attack by militants at a dam construction site in Panjgur, Baluchistan, in what is likely another Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) attack on infrastructure projects in the region. Baluch separatists have conducted multiple attacks on infrastructure and foreign interests in the region to disrupt projects which they deem are exploitative and only benefit the central government and their foreign backers like China.


Mass stabbing outside school in Beijing, China

On 28 October, a knife attack near a prestigious primary school in Beijing’s Haidian district injured five people, including three children, with the suspect arrested at the scene. However, this attack is part of a growing trend in China of mass casualty and largely indiscriminate stabbings, with strict guns laws forcing attackers to use bladed articles. These incidents are likely increasing as a result of several domestic issues including economic hardship, unemployment and an increase with mental health issues, with attackers often selecting high-profile targets like schools and shopping malls for maximum publicity.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Filipino authorities place the Metro Manila Department of Health on Code White

In the Philippines, The Department of Health in Metro Manila has placed all hospitals and health facilities in the National Capital Region on Code White alert from 31 October to 2 November. This alert level is a precaution to ensure that medical services are fully prepared to handle the anticipated increase in visitors to cemeteries and heightened travel during All Saints’ and All Souls’ Days.


Largest storm in 30 years leads to fatalities in Taiwan

Super Typhoon Kong-rey has heavily impacted Taiwan and is now affecting eastern China. As of November 1, the typhoon has resulted in two fatalities and 580 injuries in Taiwan, along with extensive damage, including power outages for 150,000 households and significant disruptions to public transport, notably the suspension of Taipei Metro services on overground lines. Cleanup operations are ongoing, and in Kaohsiung, approximately 370 people remain isolated due to flash flooding and landslides that have blocked access, with further landslides in the country likely.

In China, at least 282,000 people have been evacuated from Zhejiang Province as the storm moves northeast. Although Kong-rey has weakened into a tropical storm north of Taiwan, it continues to pose a threat with maximum sustained winds of 78 mph and is expected to bring heavy rainfall and strong winds. The Chinese government has issued an orange typhoon warning in anticipation of further adverse weather.


Week 43: 18 – 25 October

Global Intelligence Summary

abstract blue banner
  • There is a realistic possibility that violent unrest in Martinique will further escalate and if protesters target the airport again, significant flight disruptions would highly likely follow.
  • A suspected Kurdish terror attack in Turkey will almost certainly lead to a nationwide crackdown in Turkey and expanded strikes in Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan.
  • Allegations of election fraud and opposition calls for protest in Mozambique will likely sustain violent unrest and result in major disruptions.
  • A US terror alert for the Arugam Bay area in Sri Lanka highly likely indicates an imminent threat to life, with extremists almost certainly targeting Israeli tourists.

AMER

Cuba & The Bahamas: Hurricane Oscar makes landfall in eastern Cuba

Martinique: New wave of violent unrest across French Caribbean Island

Turkey: Attack leads to nationwide crackdown and strikes in Kurdistan

Georgia: Pro-European rally in Tbilisi ahead of upcoming election

Israel & Iran: Classified US intelligence shows Israeli preparations for strikes against Iran

West Africa & the Sahel: JNIM senior leadership confirms expansion attempts

Mozambique: Major protests in response to disputed election

India: Cyclone Dana makes landfall in Odisha state

Bangladesh: New government issues arrest warrant for former PM

Sri Lanka: US Embassy issues terror alert for popular tourist area


Hurricane Oscar initially formed north of Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic as a Tropical Depression on 19 October before strengthening into a category 1 hurricane with maximum windspeeds of 139 km/h.

On 20 October, the storm made landfall in eastern Cuba and caused at least seven fatalities, primarily affecting the towns of Imías and San Antonio del Sur in Guantanamo. The storm brought heavy rainfall, leading to major flooding, particularly in Baracoa, and resulted in blocked roads and additional damage in areas such as El Jamal. Cuban authorities responded by evacuating approximately 15,000 people from the most affected areas.

The storm also affected the Bahamas, prompting tropical storm warnings as Oscar moved through the central and southeastern parts of the archipelago. The National Hurricane Center (NHC) reported that Oscar’s strength diminished as it moved northeastward, with maximum sustained winds reducing to 56 km/h as of 22 October, leading to the discontinuation of all tropical watches and warnings in the Bahamas.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The impact of Hurricane Oscar has exacerbated the continuing energy crisis in Cuba, where nationwide blackouts have resulted from a power station failure in Matanzas combining with a wider energy crisis, with at least four major blackouts recorded.

While Cuban President Díaz-Canel reported that 70 per cent of electricity services have been restored, the country continues to face ongoing blackouts. The blackouts have triggered multiple demonstrations in Havana, leading to traffic disruptions. The government has partially laid the blame on the US for increased economic sanctions.

Further blackouts are likely across the country with the authorities prioritising the restoration of power to the capital.


Unrest which began in September continues to grip Martinique. Protesters launched a new wave of unrest over the high cost of living, leading to violent clashes and significant disruptions.

Protesters have established roadblocks on major highways, such as the N2 near Case-Pilote. At least seven barricades were set up overnight on 22-23 October by protesters in several areas, including Sainte-Luce, Case-Pilote, and Fort-de-France. These protests have seen aggressive actions against security forces, with the use of molotov cocktails, projectiles, and gunfire being reported. Video footage captured scenes of barricades on fire in the Fond Lahaye area of Schoelcher.

French authorities have responded by extending an island-wide 00:00-05:00 curfew until 28 October to curb the unrest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Food prices in the Caribbean French overseas department of Martinique are approximately 40 per cent higher than in mainland France. Key protest organisers, The Rally for the Protection of Afro-Caribbean Peoples and Resources (RPPRAC), are calling for price parity with mainland France.

On 16 October, the local prefecture signed a protocol with numerous local groups intending to reduce the price of basic goods by approximately 20 per cent. However, the RPPRAC has refused to sign the deal and has called for continuing unrest. The unrest has very likely been inflamed by the deployment of the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), elite riot police that have not been deployed in Martinique since the 1959 “Black December” riots. These resulted in three deaths being attributed to the CRS.

The current spate of unrest has been markedly violent, with at least one death being reported thus far due to gunfire during the looting of a shopping centre on 10 October. While the cause of the Martinique unrest is distinct from the May riots that broke out in the Pacific French overseas territory of New Caledonia (which were sparked by a local voting reform change) there is a realistic possibility that the Martinique unrest could develop to be as severe. In New Caledonia, the violent riots led to the declaration of a state of emergency and the deployment of the French army, with foreign nationals struggling to evacuate due to the closure of the main international airport.

In Martinique, the Aime Cesaire International Airport (FDF) briefly closed on 17 October after protesters stormed the runway. While the closure was only temporary (with the airport reopening on 18 October and Flightradar24 indicating normal operation currently) there is a realistic possibility that further escalating unrest and targeting of the airport by protesters could lead to airport closure. This would leave maritime options as the only way to depart the island.


Peru transport workers strike

On 23 October, bus drivers in Lima, Peru, went on strike for the third time in less than a month, protesting against violent attacks and extortion, with the strike leading to significant disruptions in the capital. In response, soldiers were deployed to maintain order, and the government closed schools. Despite a state of emergency declared last month, President Dina Boluarte promised to capture criminal leaders and announced increased surveillance of foreigners, linking Venezuelan migrants to the rise in insecurity.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Haitian gangs intensify attacks in capital.

Haitian gangs have intensified their attacks in areas not yet under their control, according to the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH). The BINUH warned the UN Security Council that violence has escalated, particularly from the armed gang alliance Viv Ansanm, spreading across the capital Port-au-Prince and surrounding regions. The gangs are likely exploiting the fact that only a fraction of the 3,000 troops pledged to support the Haitian police have arrived and are attempting to consolidate territory before their arrival. The attacks have compounded food shortages, with over five million Haitians facing food insecurity and have led to thousands more being displaced.


Security situation continues to deteriorate in Mexican state of Sinaloa.

Violence in parts of Mexico has continued to increase as a result of the power vacuum left following the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada of the Sinaloa Cartel. It is estimated that at least 200 people have been killed due to intra-cartel violence since early September. On 22 October a shootout near the Sinaloa state capital of Culiacan led to the deaths of at least 19 gang members after they fired on Mexican soldiers. The security state is currently classified by the US State Department as Level 4: Do Not Travel, due to the increased violence.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Tropical Storm Nadine causes significant damage in Central America.

Tropical Storm Nadine, which formed east of Belize City on 19 October, has caused significant destruction across Mexico and Central America. There were at least four deaths and flooding in 22 municipalities in Chiapas, Mexico, while Veracruz saw two fatalities and 3,000 homes flooded across 32 municipalities. Oaxaca also reported one death and several landslides that disrupted roads, with landslides also recorded in Puebla. The Mexican government has deployed 23,000 military personnel for relief efforts with the remnants of Nadine still causing issues.


Extratropical cyclone brings severe weather to Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil.

A rare extratropical cyclone has developed in the South Atlantic and has moved inland, affecting regions of Uruguay, northeastern Argentina and southern Brazil. The system has brought heavy rain, strong winds and severe weather conditions, resulting in at least three fatalities in southern Brazil. The severe weather is forecast to remain until at least 26 October and will likely spread to parts of southern Paraguay, likely leading to floods, landslides and property damage across the wider region.


On 23 October, the headquarters of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAS) near Ankara was attacked by a male and female militant. The small arms fire attack resulted in the deaths of at least five people and 22 injured. The attack has resulted in the Turkish authorities increasing security measures throughout the country, including at major airports. Initial observations indicate that at least one of the suspects was a member of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The Turkish military has responded with increased strikes against Kurdish targets in Syria and Iraq.

Solace Global Assessment: 

No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack; however, the involvement of a female militant indicates that the attack was highly likely conducted by a Kurdish militant group. The TUSAS headquarters was almost certainly attacked due to its involvement in the production of military equipment used in Turkey’s war against the Kurds, which expanded into Syria in 2019 following the US withdrawal.

Turkish intelligence officials have stated that retaliatory strikes have targeted military facilities, ammunition depots and energy infrastructure, the latter of which is not considered a legitimate military target unless certain conditions are met. Turkish strikes have targeted a gas plant in as-Suweyda, Syria, which was hit, causing extensive damage and disrupting gas production; a power plant in Kobani, Syria, where the airstrike led to significant power outages in the region; and a medical facility in Qamishli, Syria, which was allegedly used by militants.

The Turkish strategy appears to be similar in nature to Russia’s in Ukraine, targeting civilian critical national infrastructure (CNI) before the advent of winter. These strikes will likely have a major humanitarian effect and will likely result in retaliatory attacks by Kurdish militant groups. It is likely leveraging the fog of war in Syria, with regional instability creating a more permissive environment for Turkey to target civilian sites, a strategy that would highly likely receive greater condemnation if conducted in Iraq.

The Turkish authorities have also arrested 12 suspects linked to the  FETÖ organisation in Ankara, a group associated with the exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen who died on 20 October. Gülen had been implicated in the 2016 attempted coup against incumbent Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The Turkish government is likely exploiting this attack to crackdown on supporters of Gülen, the most influential and vocal critic of the Erdoğan administration.


Tens of thousands of demonstrators attended a pro-Europe “Georgia Chooses the European Union” rally in Tbilisi’s Freedom Square on 20 October. In attendance was President Salome Zourabichvili, who is a vocal opponent of the ruling Georgian Dream party. The rally was held in anticipation of the upcoming parliamentary election on 26 October, with the primary issue of the election being further geopolitical alignment with either the West or Russia.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the ruling Georgian Dream party denies that it is pro-Russia, it has pursued a neutral to pro-Russian agenda. The prospective passage of the “foreign agents” bill that was passed in May, which is similar to an equivalent law in Russia, led to considerable civil unrest marked by violent clashes in both March 2023 and from April to June 2024.

While polling indicates that 79 per cent of Georgians want to join the European Union, the opposition parties are highly disunited. Overall, however, available polling averages indicate that support for the various pro-European parties is 54 per cent compared to Georgian Dream’s 34 per cent. It is therefore likely that without significant electoral interference, pro-European parties will win at least a plurality in the upcoming election. Despite their disunity, it is likely that such a result would lead to efforts to form a pro-European coalition.

If Georgian Dream wins, it is likely that there will be accusations of vote rigging and calls for a recount, due to the use of a new electronic voting system that will be used by approximately 90 per cent of voters which has triggered concerns regarding vote rigging. It is also likely that if Georgian Dream wins, they will pursue closer relations with Russia, possibly seeking a deal regarding the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which would almost certainly inflame further unrest.

If the opposition wins, there is a realistic possibility that political violence targeting high-profile opposition leaders may be triggered, with far-right organisations such as Alt-Info having encouraged such violence in the past.


Documents attributed to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) showing classified US intelligence on Israel’s preparations for a potential retaliatory strike on Iran surfaced on social media on 18 October, although their authenticity remains unverified. The FBI has confirmed an investigation is being conducted into how the unauthorised release of Top Secret documents occurred.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the NGA documents are authentic, due to the reaction by US authorities. The reports indicate specific munitions the Israel Defence Force (IDF) is preparing for retaliatory strikes against Iran following the 1 October Iranian missile attack on Israel.

The primary weapon systems observed being prepared by the Israeli Air Force (IAF) for highly likely impending strikes against Iran, are long-range air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs), with the intelligence report claiming the IAF “has handled at least 16 Golden Horizon ALBMs, and at least 40 IS02 Rocks since 8 October, according to imagery analysis”. No activity relating to Israel’s almost certainly existing nuclear weapons program was observed, due to the lack of observed Jericho II medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) activity – which notably but unsurprisingly, against Israel’s official policy of deliberate ambiguity about its nuclear weapons program, is confirmation that the United States Intelligence Community (IC) is aware of the existence of Israel’s nuclear weapons.

Israeli retaliation strikes will highly likely be greater than the retaliation for Iran’s April attack against Israel, with concerns that further regional escalation could be triggered. While it is most likely that Israeli strikes will be limited to Iranian military installations and facilities, there is a realistic possibility that Israel could additionally target Iranian oil facilities, and while unlikely, Israel could also target Iranian nuclear facilities.


On 24 October, Mozambique’s electoral commission declared that Daniel Chapo of the incumbent FRELIMO party had been elected after reportedly securing 70 per cent of the votes, enabling FRELIMO to increase its seats in parliament to 195 out of 250, up from 184.

However, the relatively new PODEMOS opposition party and external observers, including a European Union (EU) mission had reported irregularities and incidents of electoral fraud from the 9 October election. Accusations of fraud and democratic backsliding have triggered unrest throughout the country, leading to dozens of arrests.

Tear gas and live ammunition were also used to quash violent confrontations, primarily between the supporters of PODEMOS and the police.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The official declaration of FRELIMO’s victory will unlikely stop the current unrest, with reports circulating that the ruling party, which has ruled for nearly 50 years, registered almost one million fake voters. Moreover, the opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane, has called for nationwide protests. Mondlane, who came second in the disputed election, is hugely popular with Mozambique’s youth, who are currently leading much of the protest action.

The scale and intensity of the protests have likely increased in response to government actions, particularly the use of live ammunition in isolated cases, external criticism from the EU and the country’s underlying economic conditions. On 19 October, Mondlane’s lawyer and a senior figure in PODEMOS were assassinated in the capital Maputo. This development has further energised the protests, with many alleging that the government was directly involved in the killings.

There is a realistic possibility that Mondlane’s call for nationwide protests could bring thousands onto the streets across Mozambique, with demonstrators likely attempting to block roads and shut down businesses. To counter the protests, the government is likely to introduce countermeasures like curfews, suspend communications, and deploy more forces, likely leading to violent confrontations and disruptions to transport and business operations.


In a rare interview, a senior leader and founding member of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the Emir of Katiba Macina (MLF) Amadou Koufa (also spelt Hamadoun Kouffa), answered several questions regarding JNIM’s activities and intentions in the Sahel and West Africa.

Koufa justified the pervasive violence against civilians conducted by JNIM in the region as part of a conflict with the rival violent extremist organisation (VEO) Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP). Koufa also stated that JNIM is “open” to negotiations with Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, as long as they occur within the framework of Sharia law.

Most notably, Koufa confirmed that JNIM are attempting to expand into the West African states of Ghana, Togo and Benin.

Solace Global Assessment: 

JNIM and other jihadist VEOs such as ISSP are highly active in the Sahel Junta states of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, which have each struggled to contain the insurgencies without the support of Western military forces which they have each expelled. There is a realistic possibility that one or more of these juntas could collapse in the next year.

The threat of VEOs in the Sahel poses a significant risk of spillover into the wealthier and more stable neighbouring West African states, and jihadist VEOs are launching attacks in the northern areas of such states with increasing frequency. For example, on 23 September JNIM released claims of responsibility for attacks against government forces in both Togo and Benin, claiming to have attacked a Togolese army patrol east of Kankanti with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and a Beninese army installation in Bangoun which led to the deaths of two Benin Armed Forces (FAB) soldiers.

The public statement of JNIM’s intent to expand into Ghana, Togo and Benin will almost certainly add to concerns amongst West African authorities about the increasing threat of jihadist VEOs, groups that are almost certainly able to leverage the expansive “ungoverned space” in the Sahel junta states as a base from which they can further expand operations into the wider region.

If a Sahel junta state completely collapses, or attacks in West Africa considerably escalate, it is likely that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), likely with Western support (particularly from the US and France), will be compelled to intervene with a military campaign against Sahel-based VEOs, which would in turn likely increase the risk of a wider conflict with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the rival confederation to ECOWAS formed by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.


Police shooting in Amadora, Portugal leads to unrest.

On 21 October, a police shooting of a suspect in the city of Amadora on the outskirts of Lisbon resulted in several consecutive nights of rioting. Violence escalated after rioters set fire to a bus, forcing the police to increase their presence in the area. Unrest spread to the Carnaxide area of Lisbon where the police deployed rubber bullets to disperse the rioters. There is a realistic possibility that the unrest will spread further across Lisbon and wider Portugal as a result of police action.


General election in Bulgaria to be held on 27 October.

It will be the seventh general election in just three years, with political crises having gripped Bulgaria since 2021. A recent poll published indicated that the level of public trust in the Bulgarian parliament is just six per cent, a record low, which is almost certainly reflective of widespread dissatisfaction with the political status quo in Bulgaria.

All elections since 2021 have failed to result in a single party winning enough seats to form a stable government, and it is highly likely that the upcoming election will once again produce a heavily fragmented parliament. There is a realistic possibility that continuing political dysfunction in Bulgaria will precipitate the rise of anti-establishment populist forces, such as There Is Such a People (ITN) who are polling at 5 per cent, and far-right ultranationalist formations such as Revival who are polling at 15 per cent.

Russia’s intelligence services (RIS) are highly active in Bulgaria, and it is almost certain that Moscow has attempted political interference operations, with the observed intensified distribution of pro-Russian and anti-West/Ukraine propaganda in Bulgarian online spaces. 


Election fraud alleged in Iraqi-Kurdistan parliamentary elections.

The semi-autonomous Iraqi region of Kurdistan held parliamentary elections on 20 October, resulting in a landslide victory for the incumbent Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). However, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), Kurdistan Justice Group (Komal), The People’s Front (Baray Gal), and the National Stance Movement (Halwest) have all alleged that there were multiple incidences of electoral fraud and violations, promising to release evidence in the coming days. Should the parties release credible evidence of fraud, there is a realistic possibility of unrest, further fuelled by the ongoing economic crisis and existing dissatisfaction with the current government.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Israeli airstrikes in Gaza amid imminent cease-fire talks in Qatar.

In Gaza, Israeli airstrikes targeting residential buildings and command centres, resulted in significant civilian casualties, with reports indicating at least 200 Palestinians killed and many more injured. Notable attacks occurred in the Al-Shati refugee camp and Rafah.

On 24 October, reports confirmed that Mossad Director David Barnea is set to attend talks in Doha over this coming weekend, concerning hostages and a potential ceasefire. The US is also involved, with CIA Director Bill Burns expected to join the discussions.

However, it is highly likely that the key issue of the Philadelphi Corridor will continue to act as a major obstacle to progress,  regarding its leadership following the death of Yahya Sinwar.


Saudi and Iran conduct first-ever joint naval drills.

The Royal Saudi Naval Forces conducted their first-ever joint naval drills with the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy in the Sea of Oman on 24 October in what almost certainly marks a significant development in the increasingly thawing relationship between Riyadh and Tehran. The two Middle Eastern powers only restored diplomatic ties in 2023 following a China-brokered agreement. Saudi still officially maintains a neutral stance concerning the war in the Middle East and is likely currently engaging with Iran as it fears that highly likely impending Israeli retaliation strikes against Iran could trigger the targeting of Saudi oil facilities by Iran and its proxies.


Reports indicate Russia provided targeting data to Houthis in Red Sea.

Unconfirmed reports indicate that Russia has been providing targeting data for the Houthis’ anti-merchant shipping campaign in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, which has involved the targeting of over 80 vessels. The report alleges Russia provided satellite targeting data to the Houthis which was then relayed to the Houthis via Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). The data has likely enabled the Houthis to more accurately target vessels and has been used by Russia to undermine the US, force resources to be dedicated to the region over Ukraine and increase oil and gas prices to Moscow’s benefit.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Germany records first case of new Mpox strain.

On 22 October, German health chiefs from the Robert Koch Institute (RKI) announced that they had identified the first confirmed case of the new clade Ib strain of the Mpox virus. The institute revealed that the carrier was infected abroad but released no further details. The virus, which is behind a major outbreak of Mpox in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), has now resulted in at least 1,000 deaths across Africa and has prompted a global health emergency alert from the World Health Organisation (WHO). However, the RIK has stated that the threat to the general population in Germany remains low after isolating this case.


Severe flooding in multiple Italian regions.

From 20 October, multiple regions across Italy, including Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, and Sicily, were severely affected by flooding, prompting a series of emergency declarations and evacuations. The flooding in Sicily has triggered a state of emergency and in Lombardy, troops have been drafted in to help with rescue efforts. The flooding has resulted in road and school closures and other forms of disruption. With rain forecasted for much of Italy, the situation is likely to deteriorate further.


Severe flooding in South Africa’s Eastern Cape.

At least ten people have been killed and over 3,000 displaced by severe flooding in South Africa’s Eastern Cape. The flooding has predominantly affected the Nelson Mandela Bay area, including the cities of Gqeberha and Kariega, causing widespread damage to homes, infrastructure, and disrupting daily life. The area is on high alert with further heavy rain forecasted.


Cyclone Dana made landfall in India’s Odisha state on 25 October at Very Severe Cyclonic Storm strength. The storm had maximum windspeeds of 120km/h in the Bay of Bengal, equivalent to a Category 1 hurricane, but made landfall with maximum windspeeds of 109km/h before further weakening.

Authorities evacuated 1.1 million people Cyclone Dana caused adverse torrential rainfall in Odisha and West Bengal state. In neighbouring Bangladesh, several houses collapsed due to strong winds in Kalapara, though no significant damage has been reported in other areas.

The Indian Meteorological Department had earlier suspended flights at Kolkata airport as a precautionary measure, and train services were cancelled in Odisha state, however, flight operations and most train services have now resumed.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As of the morning of 25 October, no deaths or major damage has been reported. However, this is highly likely to change. The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) assessed that Cyclone Dana could have a “high humanitarian impact based on the maximum sustained wind speed, exposed population and vulnerability”.

While India is assessed by GDACS as being highly vulnerable to the impact of tropical cyclones, Indian authorities effectively conducted mass evacuations before Cyclone Dana made landfall, with hundreds of personnel from the National Disaster Relief Force (NDRF) going door-to-door with loudspeakers. In 2019-2021, major cyclones such as Amphan, Yaas and Fani killed hundreds of people and caused billions of dollars in damages.

Last year was the deadliest North Indian Ocean cyclone season since 2017, with 523 deaths and GBP 2.3 billion in damages in India alone. It is highly likely that global warming is a key driver for measurably worsening storm seasons, increasing both the frequency and intensity of cyclonic storms, as well as the window for when storms are formed.


Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) has issued an arrest warrant for former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina for alleged involvement in mass killings during violent protests earlier this year. Student-led protests against job quotas escalated into widespread unrest, with her government’s violent crackdown leading to almost 200 deaths, including 32 children. In addition, over 60 complaints have been filed against Hasina and her Awami League party, accusing them of enforced disappearances, murders and extrajudicial killings.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hasina, who had ruled Bangladesh for over 20 years, fled to India in August after an interim government took control of Bangladesh following the unrest. Her government initially established the ICT, which has faced longstanding criticism from the UN and human rights groups for being used as a means to eliminate her political opponents.

With the ICT now being coopted by her rivals and likely used in a similar way, it is unlikely that India will execute the arrest warrant, with a refusal likely to result in strained relations. Moreover, after the breakdown of the Hasina government, which had traditionally been an advocate of secularism, there were multiple reports of attacks on Bangladesh’s Hindu minority.

If India’s Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party-led government refuses to acknowledge the arrest warrant, there is a realistic possibility of escalating sectarian violence in Bangladesh against the Hindus. Conversely, if India honours the arrest warrant and Hasina is returned for trial, there is a strong likelihood of civil unrest being instigated by her Awami League supporters. This could further destabilise the country, almost certainly leading to violent clashes between demonstrators and security forces.

Recent episodes of unrest in Bangladesh have resulted in widespread transportation disruptions, internet and mobile phone shutdowns, the introduction of curfews and major supply chain disruptions.


On 23 October, The US Embassy in Sri Lanka issued an alert relating to “credible information” of a plot to target tourists in the popular Arugum Bay surfing resort in the southeast of the country. The embassy has urged all US citizens to avoid the area until further notice.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The issuing of a terror alert by the US State Department is relatively rare and typically reserved for situations where credible intelligence indicates a significant and imminent threat. The Arugum Bay area has become popular with Israeli tourists and the alert is likely predicated on a threat directly targeting Israelis. However, forms of attack such as small arms fire or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) pose a serious and indiscriminate threat to anyone at the resort.

The last major terrorist attack to occur in Sri Lanka was the April 2019 Easter Sunday bombings, a coordinated series of suicide bombings targeting three churches and three luxury hotels across the country, including in Colombo, Negombo, and Batticaloa. These attacks killed over 260 and injured an estimated 500 people. The bombings were conducted by local extremists of the National Thowheeth Jama’ath militant group but with alleged links to the Islamic State (IS).

The war in the Middle East has almost certainly resulted in higher rates of local radicalisation, which was likely already exacerbated by a series of anti-Muslim policies introduced in the aftermath of the 2019 bombings, including a burqa ban and the forced closure of Islamic schools. There is a realistic possibility that the attackers may react to the issuing of a terror alert and adapt their plans. The terrorists could become more cautious to avoid detection or alter their attack plans, potentially targeting a less secure target to gauge the effectiveness of the security services or nominating a new target outside of the indicated area.


Bangladeshi students storm presidential palace.

On 22 October, students in Bangladesh began demanding the resignation of President Mohammed Shahabuddin after he made controversial comments over Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s resignation. Protestors attempted to storm the presidential palace in Dhaka, resulting in clashes with police, multiple injuries and many arrests. The demonstrators accuse the president of collaborating with Ms Hasina’s “fascist regime”, whose legacy continues to drive tensions and unrest in the country.


Japan to hold snap elections on 27 October.

Japan is set to hold snap general elections on 27 October after a series of political scandals and the resignation of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, creating a volatile political environment which may threaten the economy. Current indications are that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner Komeito, are likely to maintain their majority but could lose up to 50 seats. However, the LDP could benefit from increased tensions with China and North Korea, due to its traditionally stronger stance on defence.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

IED targets government office in Kabul, Afghanistan.

On 23 October, an improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated outside of a Taliban office issuing ID cards in the Pamir Cinema district of Kabul, leading to at least two deaths and multiple injuries. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack but the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has been behind similar attacks in Kabul since the Taliban took power in 2021, who are likely attempting to undermine the Taliban’s rule with increased attacks in the capital.


North Korean leader visits country’s missile bases.

In a further provocation to South Korea and its Western allies, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has visited the country’s missile bases to ensure that his forces are ready to conduct “strategic deterrence”, a term that almost certainly refers to North Korea’s developing nuclear capabilities. The dictator also warned of the US nuclear threat to his country which justifies North Korea’s force readiness. The visit comes amid heightened tensions, with North Korea recently demolishing infrastructure on the Korean border, increasing the readiness of its artillery, amending the constitution and deploying troop to Russia to assist with the war in Ukraine.


US approves military package for Japan.

The US State Department has approved a foreign military sale to Japan, which includes Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 2B Tactical Missiles and related equipment, estimated at USD 360 million. The package will enable Japan to bolster its area defence capabilities and protect critical air and sea lines of communication in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Japan’s procurement is almost certainly in response to increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea and to help counter the developing military alliance of North Korea, China, and Russia, the latter two of which have territorial disputes with Tokyo.


Taiwan President visits frontline islands.

President Lai Ching-te visited the Kinmen islands on 24 October to celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of Guningtou, which enabled Taiwan to retain the islands after the Chinese Civil War. The move will almost certainly be lambasted by China as a direct provocation given the island’s proximity to mainland China and the symbolic importance of the anniversary. The visit is likely a response to China’s large-scale war games around Taiwan but will highly likely provoke the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into conducting similar large-scale exercises, the frequency and scale of which are making it challenging to distinguish between routine military drills and what could be an actual invasion.


Chinese Coast Guard vessel twice expelled from Indonesian waters.

A vessel belonging to the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) was twice expelled from Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, some 1500km away from mainland China near the Natuna Islands. The vessel was likely attempting to disrupt a survey commissioned by the Indonesia state energy firm, Pertamina and follows the recent inauguration of President Prabowo Subianto. CCG incursions into Indonesian waters are relatively uncommon compared to their frequent activities in the waters of the Philippines and Vietnam. The CCG is primarily deployed to enforce Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea, and often acts aggressively in areas rich in undersea resources like oil, gas, and rare metals. A major Pertamina discovery will almost certainly result in an increase in CCG activity.  

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Severe flooding and disruption in Bengaluru, India.

On 23 October, the Indian city of Bengaluru suffered severe disruption as a result of unprecedented rainfall, estimated to be the heaviest in three decades. Widespread flooding has damaged much infrastructure, shut off roads and even resulted in a fatal building collapse. The extent of the flooding is almost certainly indicative of unplanned rapid urban development and environmental degradation, which includes the loss of almost 90 per cent of the city’s green space in less than four decades- a trend that has been mirrored across India.


Tropical Strom Trami causes at least 65 fatalities in the Philippines.

Tropical Storm Trami, known in the Philippines as Kristine, made landfall in northern Luzon, Philippines on 23 October. The storm resulted in at least 65 fatalities across the Philippines, primarily due to floods and landslides. 33 of the deaths occurred due to landslides in the Batangas province south of Manila. The storm affected more than 3.3 million people, with approximately 288,000 individuals still in government shelters as of 25 October. In the aftermath, over 400,000 households in regions including Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, and parts of Metro Manila remain without power, as efforts to restore electricity continue. Despite the storm’s exit from the Philippine Area of Responsibility on 24 October, it is likely that the storm will loop back next week.


Solace Global at CSO 360

We are excited to announce that we will be attending the CSO 360 Global Congress in Rome, where we will be participating in a key panel discussion focused on the future of risk management and security.

We’re thrilled to be joining top security professionals and industry leaders from around the world, engaging in conversations about the latest developments in global security and innovation.

OUR PANEL DISCUSSION

Join us for our panel discussion on “How CSOs Envisage Using AI, Machine Learning & Data to Support Future Risk & Security Management” and discover how Solace Global is at the forefront of integrating industry-leading technology into risk and security strategies.


Event details

When

December 4-6, 2024

Where

Rome, Italy


SECURE YOUR SPOT NOW

We’re offering an exclusive 50% discount on your CSO 360 registration. Use code SOLACEGLOBALROME50 at checkout to take advantage of this special offer.

Solace Global at CSO 360 in Rome

Week 42: 11 – 18 October

Global Intelligence Summary

abstract blue banner
  • It is highly likely that intermittent unrest will continue in Bolivia at least until the August 2025 election, and protests will highly likely imminently escalate if Evo Morales is arrested.
  • Israeli offensive operations in southern Lebanon are unlikely to be a prelude to a protracted occupation and are likely instead focusing on destroying Hezbollah infrastructure and units.
  • The killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza is almost certainly an important political victory for the Netanyahu cabinet. However, there is a realistic possibility of increased retaliatory attacks.
  • It is likely that China is seeking to normalise large-scale military exercises around Taiwan as a method of providing cover for any future hypothetical invasion.

AMER

Colombia: Government launches anti-EMC offensive

Bolivia: Roads blockaded by pro-Morales protesters

France: Flooding across southeast France

Israel & Lebanon: IDF forces continue advances despite Hezbollah resistance

Israel & Gaza: Hamas leader Sinwar killed in Rafah

North Korea & South Korea: Tensions further heightened at border

China & Taiwan: Major Chinese military exercise surrounding Taiwan


On 13 October, elements of the Colombian army launched an attack on the FARC dissident group Central General Staff (EMC), aimed at retaking El Plateado. At least 17 army personnel were reported to have been injured in the early stages of the operation, with multiple injuries caused by EMC’s use of cheap drones. El Plateado has been under EMC control for approximately five years and is a strategically important hub for drug trafficking in the country’s west.

Last week, the government and the central command of the EMC agreed on a truce in the Cali area for COP16, which Colombia will host between 21 October and 1 November. Earlier in 2024, the Colombian government of Gustavo Petro suspended its ceasefire agreement with elements of the EMC in the areas of Cauca, Nariño and Valle del Cauca.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The offensive into El Plateado is likely meant to exploit fractures within the complex network of EMC-affiliated groups, and to bolster the Petro government’s position before the summit. It nevertheless may result in an overall increase in tensions, possibly affecting Cali.

Moreover, the offensive highlights the Petro government’s continuing ambivalent strategy which combines ad hoc negotiations with limited coercive measures. This approach likely reflects the government’s understanding of its own limitations vis-à-vis the EMC and other regional armed groups, which retain significant assets as well as local support and sources of income.

Entering into ad-hoc ceasefire agreements with parts of the EMC is likely helping the government to divide the rebel group. The EMC, likely due to its rapid growth over the last decade, has evolved into a fractured organisation, made up of four national blocs and dozens of sub-structures, which operate in accordance with their own interests and local considerations while maintaining a degree of hierarchical cohesion.

For instance, in July, the government’s unilateral decision to suspend its ceasefire agreement with the main Cali branch of EMC, while retaining it with the group’s elements in Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Meta and Caqueta, reportedly resulted in significant internal disagreements among EMC’s leadership on the feasibility of continuing talks with the government. However, this strategy is likely to lead to the splintering of groups and may result in increased violence within the areas where they operate.


Following a 10 October announcement by a Bolivian prosecutor that confirmed an arrest warrant had been issued for former Bolivian president Evo Morales, after he did not appear in court on charges of human trafficking and statutory rape, Morales supporters engaged in a wave of unrest.

On 14 October, protesters initially blocked two major roads that connect the department of Cochabamba with the cities of Sucre and Santa Cruz. Following violent clashes with police forces, with the police deploying tear gas, a protest was dispersed in Parotani.

On 17 October, the Bolivian Highway Administration stated that the protesters have increased the number of blockades to 13, with blockades located at: Pongo-Confital, Bombeo-Pongo, Suticollo-Parotani, San Jacinto-Paracti, San Germán-Ichilo Bridge, Rodeo-Cruce Vacas, Obra-Rodeo, Lope Mendoza Bridge-Epizana, Epizana-Tiraque C, Copachuncho Bridge-Pojo, Aiquile Exit-Railroad Crossing, Arce Bridge and Tholapalca.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The unrest has arisen within a context of growing economic insecurity, dissatisfaction with current president Luis Arce, and democratic fragility following the failed June coup attempt. Morales was Bolivia’s president from 2006 to 2019, before resigning after unrest resulting from the contested 2019 election and going into exile.

Evo Morales has since stated his intent to stand again in Bolivia’s August 2025 election, against Arce who is in the same party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). The prospect of Morales standing was almost certainly a key trigger for the general Zúñiga’s failed attempted coup in June.

The unrest also follows violent clashes at protests in El Alto in September when Morales led supporters in a march from Caracolla to La Paz, leading to supporters of the rival MAS factions, the pro-Arce Arcistas and pro-Morales Evistas, clashing with firecrackers, improvised bombs, and stones. The Evistas have stated that the unrest will be indefinite, and it is highly likely that intermittent unrest will continue in Bolivia until at least next year’s election.  If Morales is arrested, as per the issued arrest warrant, it is highly likely that the current unrest will escalate even further.


Canada-India diplomatic row continues as Indian ambassador expelled

Canadian authorities claimed Indian embassy staff had been involved in the June 2023 killing of a Sikh separatist activist in British Columbia. India, in turn, expelled multiple Canadian diplomats. It is highly likely that India has intensified activities to exert influence over large diasporas abroad, including in Canada, the UK, Australia and the US, and has leveraged local communities to carry out intelligence operations. Canada’s tougher stance on India may be followed by the UK and other countries.


US Manhattan stock exchange protests

At least 500 individuals staged a sit-in on 14 October in protest to Washington’s policy of military support for Israel. Local authorities reported that 206 participants were arrested during the protests. The protest almost certainly was a response to the Israeli forces airstrikes in northern Gaza during the weekend, which killed at least 200 Palestinians, as well as the announcement that the US will provide Tel Aviv with a Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system following the Iranian 1 October missile strike. There is a high likelihood of further protests near US financial and political centres in the weeks before the presidential elections.


Another possible assassination attempt on Trump prevented in California, USA

On 12 October, a man was arrested near the location of a campaign rally of former President Donald Trump in Coachella, California. The man was allegedly in possession of an unregistered firearm, and multiple fake documents and had a vehicle with fake licence plates when he was stopped by police approximately 500 metres from the location of the rally after trying to enter with a fake VIP pass.

According to authorities, the suspect likely is a member of a right-wing anti-government group and runs a website where he espouses conspiratorial and anti-establishment narratives. If this assessment is accurate, it highlights how trends of copycat violent actions cannot be restricted to a single ideological profile.

There is a realistic possibility that continued copycat assassination attempts will inspire further lone wolves to target other US politicians.


Venezuela’s regime increasingly using passport restrictions against opposition

The Financial Times reported on 12 October that at least 40 civil society figures, mostly journalists and humanitarian workers, have had their passports annulled since the country’s last election in July. Reportedly, individuals had their passports confiscated by authorities while attempting to board flights from Caracas. It is highly likely that the government will continue to expand passport confiscations, as they offer a much lower political cost and visibility than incarcerations and killings.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Canadian Jewish girls’ school targeted by gunmen

The attack took place on the night 12 October, Yom Kippur, and resulted in no injuries as the institute was closed. The Toronto school had already been targeted similarly in May. The attack was almost certainly an intimidation operation by local radicalised elements. While the dynamic of the attack demonstrates that the perpetrators almost certainly sought to minimise the risk of being caught, there is a realistic possibility of further lone-actor attacks on Jewish individuals and institutions in Canada and the US in line with developments in the Middle East.


Governor of Sinaloa, Mexico announces troop deployments

Officials in Sinaloa, where a deadly gang war between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel continues to intensify, have announced the deployment of 300 extra personnel from the National Guard as well as a special forces company. More than 100 people were killed in Sinaloa between July and September, after the outbreak of violence following the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada in the US. 

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Peru has record wildfires in 2024

Data from the Global Wildfire Information System (GWIS) showed that Peru had more than 10,400 wildfires in 2024, which burned 2.5 times the amount of area of the previous most severely affected year, 2020. The most recent wildfires occurred in the country’s north. Climate scientists have argued that both anthropogenic and non-human factors have contributed to the high incidence of wildfires in Peru and neighbouring South American countries. These include low rainfall volumes and higher temperatures caused by El Nino, and by patterns of deforestation and intensive farming which have reduced local ecosystems’ resilience.


Through mid-October, widespread flooding occurred in France as a result of adverse weather, particularly affecting the southern and central regions. On 17 October, weather warnings were issued across affected regions, with the departments of Ardèche, Loire, and Haute-Loire placed on red alert. By the evening, six departments were on red alert, including the cities of Lyon and Cannes, and 33 others were on orange alert. Authorities closed roads and evacuated the most at-risk neighbourhoods.

By 18 October, the red alerts were lifted, but 18 departments remained on orange alert. The flooding caused significant disruption, including 186-mile delays on roads in the Ile-de-France region and public transport disruptions. One person was killed and two others injured in Paris when a tree fell on them during the heavy rains.

Emergency services conducted over 1,000 interventions on 17 October, including 25 flooding rescues. In Lyon, at least 480 evacuations and 520 emergency interventions were carried out.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The adverse rainfall resulted from the remnants of Hurricane Kirk moving across western Europe. The French Ecological Transition Minister described the current floods as “unprecedented”. The French floods follow the September central European floods from Storm Boris, which impacted Austria, Czechia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Moldova, Germany and Hungary, leading to at least 27 deaths and between EUR 2-3 billion in damages.

While France has resilient infrastructure and considerable emergency response capability, the significant disruption caused by the widespread flooding highlights the increasing threat of environmental risks in Europe which will highly likely continue to intensify as a result of climate change.

While emergency services remain active in managing the aftermath of the floods as of 18 October, no red alerts remain in place and the worst of the rainfall is forecast to be over.


Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units have continued to advance across multiple axes on the Israel-Lebanon border, occupying and clearing villages from Hezbollah assets and military infrastructure developed by the group. On 15 October, IDF channels announced that elements of a fifth division – the 210th Division – has begun operating in Lebanon. Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem described Hezbollah’s war against Israel in existential terms, and seemed to contradict previous hints by other officials that the Lebanon-based group would be willing to agree to a ceasefire deal with Tel Aviv that did not include Gaza.

On 15 October, the Biden administration warned Israel that it has “30 days” to implement measures to guarantee significant improvements to the humanitarian situation in Gaza, at the cost of interrupting military aid transfers. In September, the amount of aid entering Gaza was assessed as being the lowest of any month since the start of the war. In the north of the Gaza Strip, aid provision has been particularly affected by an ongoing IDF offensive in the Jabalia area, where Israeli forces assess Hamas has successfully begun restructuring some units.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israeli ground operations in south Lebanon are almost certainly aimed at creating a scenario in which Hezbollah units are unable to carry out further operations from territory adjacent to the Israeli border. Instead of a protracted deployment, IDF operations are highly likely focusing on destroying civilian and military infrastructure that Hezbollah could leverage following their withdrawal.

So far, combat in south Lebanon has proved costly for the IDF, which has faced stiff Hezbollah resistance without however achieving large-scale engagements that could result in high Hezbollah casualties. Hezbollah, in turn, has almost certainly acquired significant knowledge of Israeli tactics and defence capabilities, allowing the armed group to inflict significant attrition both in south Lebanon and north Israel.

During the last reporting period, a Hezbollah drone strike – which, according to reports, was conducted in a way that “disoriented” Israeli air defences – injured 67 IDF soldiers and killed four in a base near Haifa, the single highest-casualty event suffered by the IDF since 7 October 2023.


On 17 October, IDF channels reported that Yahya Sinwar, military chief of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and de facto head of the group since Ismail Haniyeh’s death, was killed in Rafah. Reports that no hostages were found in the building where Sinwar was killed highly likely indicate that the Hamas chief was killed in a raid by IDF troops, rather than an airstrike.

On 15 October, the Biden administration warned Israel that it has “30 days” to implement measures to guarantee significant improvements to the humanitarian situation in Gaza, at the cost of interrupting military aid transfers. In September, the amount of aid entering Gaza was assessed as being the lowest of any month since the start of the war. In the north of the Gaza Strip, aid provision has been particularly affected by an ongoing IDF offensive in the Jabalia area, where Israeli forces assess Hamas has successfully begun restructuring some units.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Sinwar’s death is almost certainly a politically relevant development. It follows multiple decapitation strikes on Hamas and “Axis of Resistance” members over the past months. Sinwar was the last major figure associated with the 7 October 2023 attack to survive in Gaza. After the death of Haniyeh, his succession as the political leader of Hamas represented a victory for the hardliners of the group against the moderate wing and the leaders outside of Gaza.

While other senior Hamas officials – namely Sinwar’s brother Mohammad – survive in Gaza and maintain some leverage over Israel in the form of the surviving hostages, the almost complete destruction of the group’s leadership is likely to hinder its ability to reform as a viable political force. The killing of Sinwar therefore likely further creates opportunities for Israel to develop an alternative political structure for Gaza which excludes Hamas, a task which can likely only be accomplished by leveraging surviving Gaza clans opposed to Hamas, Fatah, or both.

In the short term, the latest decapitation is unlikely to change the military situation in Gaza, where depleted Hamas units, who almost certainly already act with a high degree of independence from their leadership, will continue “hit-and-run” attacks on IDF forces.

Due to the extremely high visibility of Sinwar, it is likely that the attack will result in an increase in extremist messaging in the short term, and there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory acts of violence targeting Jewish communities in Israel and the West. In particular, Hamas has recently increased the volume of terror attacks in Israeli cities, targeting high-traffic areas such as shopping centres and transportation hubs. There is a high likelihood that Hamas-affiliated channels will seek to inspire lone wolf attacks in Israel. Moreover, as shown in the case of the recent terror attack in Munich, Germany – which coincided with the anniversary of the 1972 Olympics massacre – anniversaries and significant developments in the Israel-Palestine conflict are drivers of extremist action.


Government of Iceland collapses

Icelandic Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson called for parliament to be dissolved and for new elections on 30 November, over disagreements within the governing coalition. Benediktsson, the leader of the centre-right Independence Party, is currently allied with the Progressive Party, a centrist group, and the Greens. The government collapse is likely to boost the position of the opposition parties, especially the Social Democrats.


Various Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT)-linked demonstrations in northern Europe

The Dutch chapter of the Salafi group held a demonstration in Amsterdam on 13 October. Additionally, approximately 5,000 supporters of the Salafi group Muslim Interaktiv (MI) staged a march in Hamburg, Germany. MI is largely assessed to be a “rebrand” for HuT, which is banned in Germany, and shares considerable ideological elements with HuT, including calling for the establishment of a “caliphate” as a solution to a vast array of domestic and international issues. HuT, like other Salafi groups, has almost certainly leveraged the Palestinian cause to build international support for its political project. The MI protests in Hamburg will almost certainly be leveraged by the far-right and lead to further polarisation within Germany.


Le Pen trial begins in France

The leader of the far-right National Rally began her testimony in a trial over the alleged embezzlement of European Parliament funds on 14 October. If found guilty, Le Pen and her associates risk a fine of more than EUR 1 million, a prison sentence and crucially, a ban from running for public office, which would erase Le Pen’s ambitions for the 2027 presidential elections. The trial proceedings, which are expected to last until late November, are highly likely to result in increased civil unrest in France.


Left-wing wins Lithuanian elections

The opposition Social Democrats (LSDP) party won the largest share of votes (approximately 19.5 per cent) in the first round of the country’s parliamentary elections on 13 October, matching results predicted by polls. The SD will now almost certainly enter talks with the Farmers and Greens Union and the Democrats “For Lithuania”. The result is unlikely to change Lithuania’s foreign policy or to result in significant civil unrest. The second election round, on 27 October, will however likely be crucial to assess the composition of the new coalition.


Unrest continues in Albania

On October 17, tensions escalated as protesters set a fire outside the City Hall in Tirana during a demonstration against corruption, according to local media reports. The protests, which have been ongoing for several months, have seen increased confrontations between demonstrators and law enforcement. The unrest follows an incident in which Albanian Democratic Party deputy Flamur Noka claimed that a police officer pointed a firearm at him inside the parliament building, after protests last week. Last week’s unrest occurred on 7 October, with clashes between protesters and police near the parliament building resulting in injuries to at least seven protesters and 12 police officers. The police used tear gas to disperse the crowds, leading to multiple injuries among the demonstrators. It is likely that unrest will continue in Tirana, characterised by violent direct action. 


Large protest in Madrid, Spain, over high cost of living

More than 12,000 people marched through central Madrid on 13 October over high costs of living, and notably over the low availability of long-term rental. Protesters have notably sought to bring attention to the expansion of the number of “for-tourism” rental properties and platforms like Airbnb. Spain has had the largest anti-tourism protests in Europe. 


Clashes between protesters and police in Bahrain

On 11 October, Shia protesters clashed with police after Friday prayers outside the Imam Sadiq Mosque in Diraz. According to reports, the clashes occurred after attendees displayed pictures of recently killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Bahrain, like other Gulf States, has sought to prevent pro-Palestine protests and other forms of civil unrest, and authorities often deploy violent crowd control measures, including tear gas, to disperse protests.


FRELIMO wins Mozambique elections with reports of fraud

As expected, the party – which has ruled Mozambique since independence almost 50 years ago – won the majority of the popular vote. On 13 October, independent opposition candidate Venancio Mondlane threatened to call a nationwide strike accusing FRELIMO of doctoring the results. Other opposition figures associated with the Podemos party have stated that FRELIMO leaders doctored the result to grant RENAMO – the other major opposition party – the second-highest vote tally, to establish RENAMO as a controlled opposition. There is a realistic possibility that the various challenges to FRELIMO’s victory will result in civil unrest in Mozambique, with the capital Maputo being particularly at-risk. If protests break out, it is highly likely that the Republican Police (PRM) will respond violently.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Brother of Oklahoma election attack suspect arrested in France

Last week an Afghan national was arrested in the United States for reportedly planning an attack during election day in the name of the Islamic State (IS). French media has reported that the brother of the US suspect was arrested in Toulouse, under highly similar circumstances. According to French authorities, the individual – who was arrested following a joint US-French operation – intended to carry out an attack on a stadium or shopping centre. The case is interesting as it may offer analysts some more insight about patterns of cross-country radicalisation.


Mass-bomb threats to diplomats in Ukraine

On 14 October, more than 60 embassies and diplomatic offices in Ukraine received coordinated bomb threats, almost certainly from the same sources. The threats resulted in multiple offices temporarily suspending services to citizens in Ukraine. In total, more than 2,000 messages were reported as of 16 October. Indications that the messages originated from Russian IP addresses make it likely that they were part of a hybrid operations meant to cause confusion in Kyiv. However, their state provenance remains unclear, and it is possible that pro-Kremlin non-state actors may have been responsible for the operation. Notably, the messages included threats towards Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), which recently conducted an investigation on Russian sabotage operations in Ukraine.


USA Central Command continues to increase strikes in Syria

On 12 October, the US CENTCOM reported having conducted a “series” of airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) targets in Syria, including training camps. The attacks follow previous strikes during the past weeks. US forces have increased strikes on ISIS assets, which likely corresponds to the growing level of activity of ISIS. Notably, IS attacks in Syria since August have increasingly targeted security forces.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Italy bans surrogacy

The Italian Senate approved a law to extend a ban on surrogacy to couples that seek arrangements abroad. The bill has been a longstanding project of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and likely appeals to elements of the Catholic electorate in the country, and follows similar calls for a ban raised by the Vatican. The bill’s approval has been criticised by LGBTQ civil society groups in the country. There is a high likelihood of demonstrations being staged in Rome over the next week in protest to the bill. Importantly, the bill’s approval overlaps with the government’s new 2025 budget and is therefore likely to offer some political breathing room at a crucial time.


Moderately strong earthquake in the Eastern Anatolia region of Turkey

A magnitude 5.9 earthquake struck the Kale district of Malatya, Turkey on 16 October. The earthquake resulted in 94 injuries, primarily due to panic, according to the Governor of Malatya. Two buildings sustained heavy damage, and at least four people were rescued from a partially collapsed structure. The Turkish Interior Ministry reported that a total of 187 citizens were affected by the event. Shaking from the earthquake was felt across northern Syria and the Turkish regions of Diyarbakir and Elazig, prompting crews to be dispatched for damage assessment.


Tensions continue to heighten between North Korea and South Korea, following a series of developments – an announced increase in North Korean artillery readiness, the detonation of infrastructure, and an announced change in North Korea’s constitution.

On 13 October, North Korean state media reported that North Korea’s military had ordered its artillery units stationed near the border to “get fully ready to open fire”. This was followed by the detonation of two pairs of roads and railway routes on the edge of the military demarcation line (MDL) in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) by North Korea on 15 October.

On 16 October, the North Korean state newspaper Rodong Sinmun confirmed that a meeting last week to adjust the constitution in North Korea’s legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), resulted in South Korea being declared a “hostile state” in North Korea’s constitution.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The developments follow an increase in tensions between North and South Korea this year, following North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s order in January that North Korea will abandon the goal of peaceful unification and designate South Korea as the North’s “invariable principal enemy”. The announced constitutional amendment likely provides constitutional justification for the January order and was used in official announcements this week to validate the destruction of infrastructure in the DMZ.

Tensions have been further increased since May when North Korea started sending balloons into South Korea carrying detritus and faeces, with South Korean activists sending balloons into North Korea carrying US dollars, USB sticks downloaded with K-pop and K-dramas, and leaflets.

The key trigger for this week’s events has been accusations by North Korea that South Korea has used drones to drop propaganda leaflets in Pyongyang three times this month, which has been neither confirmed nor denied by South Korean authorities. There is a realistic possibility that these Pyongyang drone flights were conducted by private individuals in South Korea, due to the ease of access to such drone technology by the public, and the historical record of evangelical Christian groups, defectors and conservatives in South Korea using balloons to send propaganda into North Korea.

While North Korea has been conducting operations in the DMZ for several months, including the erection of anti-tank barriers and the laying of mines, it is unlikely that the destruction of infrastructure was part of general North Korean efforts to fortify the border. Instead, it is likely that the unused roads and rail lines were destroyed for their symbolic value – the infrastructure was primarily constructed with South Korean funds during the period of rapprochement between the two powers that occurred in the late 90s and 2000s.

Despite escalating tensions, it is unlikely that North Korea would launch a major pre-emptive operation against South Korea which would risk full-scale war, without an external extenuating factor such as China invading Taiwan, as a war would pose a significant risk to the survival of the North Korean regime. Instead, it is likely that increasingly bellicose North Korean behaviour is aimed at bolstering internal support and warding off South Korean influence.

There is a realistic possibility that such actions are additionally aimed at providing leverage for hypothetical future nuclear negotiations with the US.


On 14 October, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a large-scale military exercise named Joint-Sword-2024B in the waters surrounding Taiwan. The exercise was conducted with assets from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the China Coast Guard (CCG).

In a map issued by the PLA theatre command, two exercises occurred on Taiwan’s east coast, three on the west coast, one to the north and three in the vicinity of Taiwan-controlled islands off the coast of mainland China. Numerous warship surface action groups with air support took part in the war games, with a reported 17 warships (including a Lianoning aircraft carrier task force east of Taiwan) and 125 aircraft taking part, which is the most Chinese aircraft ever detected in a single day by Taiwan. Notably, four formations of CCG vessels entered the restricted waters off Matsu and Dongyin islands.

Joint-Sword-2024B was claimed by PRC military authorities to involve simulated missile launches, the opening up of “air assault corridors”, and long-range bomber missions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is likely that in terms of practicable military training benefit, the exercises were practising an island-wide blockade of Taiwan, the prevention of foreign force troop deployments and aid, and the closure of international shipping lanes. The significant role of CCG vessels in the exercise is a notable development, marking the first incursion by the CCG into the restricted Matsu island waters, which in addition to the continuous CCG’s use in contested waters in the South China Sea against Philippine vessels, almost certainly further indicates the utility of the CCG as a sub-threshold force for Beijing’s objectives.

The main purpose of the exercise was almost certainly as a follow-up to Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te’s National Day speech on 10 October. Lai, who has a reputation as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan’s independence” and who is considered by Beijing to be a pro-independence “troublemaker”, reiterated in his address Taiwan’s independence from the PRC and that the PRC “has no right to represent Taiwan”. Chinese military officials have stated that the drills were a “stern warning” to Taiwanese separatism. It is highly likely, however, that Joint-Sword-2024B was planned well in advance of the speech and would take place regardless of the content of the speech. Lai’s speech was relatively restrained, involving overtures of collaboration with Beijing on multiple issues including climate change. It is likely that if such major exercises continue to occur regardless of key triggers, they will lose their deterrent factor to coerce compliance and caution in Taiwan’s political leaders and officials.

Joint-Sword-2024B is the second major blockade simulation exercise to take place in 2024, after April’s Joint-Sword-2024A which followed Lai’s inauguration. It is likely that Beijing is seeking to normalise large-scale military exercises around Taiwan as a method of providing cover for any future hypothetical invasion of Taiwan, in a similar manner to how Russia conducted multiple exercises near Ukraine before the 2022 invasion. By making such exercises routine, it would complicate distinguishing exercises from genuine operations that require a kinetic response when observing considerable Chinese deployments.

However, a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan would highly likely have a significant observable military build-up, though likely under the guise of military exercises. This week’s exercise was more limited than April’s – it was only one day as opposed to two, and the PLA-denoted exercise zones were smaller. Additionally, the exercise involved no missile launches (unlike 2022’s exercises), no announcement of live-fire exercises, and no impositions of no-fly zones. A factor in the exercise’s relative limits likely was to avoid making Taiwan a key issue in the ongoing US presidential election campaigns.


Bangladesh government issues Hasina arrest warrant

On 17 October, Bangladeshi authorities issued an arrest warrant for the ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who fled to India in August during nationwide severe protests. The interim government of Bangladesh, headed by Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus continues to have to balance a precarious political situation.

The arrest warrant for Hasina is highly likely meant to appease radical opposition parties which now support the interim government but have ambitions to rule the country. So far, much of the interim government’s authority has been supported by a consensus to root out the remnants of the Awami League, Hasina’s party which had long-controlled most government institutions, and “fill the gaps” left by this process.


Subianto set to become Indonesia’s new president

On 20 October, Prabowo Subianto is set to be inaugurated as Indonesia’s new president. The former special forces commander, who has been linked to former regime abuses, has attempted to soften his image and has promised to unite the Indonesian people. However, given his previous record and controversial comments made regarding democracy, there are major concerns over what a Subianto presidency would look like. Human rights groups and likely many Indonesians fear an authoritarian leadership marked by an increase in the power of the military and less transparency. His forecasted aggressive approach to foreign policy may also jeopardise Indonesia’s traditionally non-aligned international posture.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Reports of mass-killings at Iran-Afghan border

On 17 October, Taliban officials stated that they were investigating reports of a large-scale attack on Afghan migrants by Iranian security forces. The attack allegedly took place on 13 October near the town of Saravan, in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan which is located on migration routes for Afghans trying to reach the countries further west. According to some reports, which are at the time of writing still unsubstantiated, the attack may have killed up to 250 migrants. The case has the potential to intensify tensions between Iran and Afghanistan, possibly leading to a security escalation similar to the one in May of 2023.


Indian states mandate controversial anti-Muslim policies

The Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh have introduced controversial new anti-Muslim laws that are likely to be emulated in other states. The laws require that workers at restaurants will have to publicly display their names. This has been interpreted as a measure designed to discriminate against Muslims by exposing their faith through their names. This will likely lead to the boycott of restaurants with Muslim workers by hardline Hindus and may also result in targeted attacks. The controversial law is also likely to result in the sacking of many Muslim workers, which in turn is likely to increase radicalisation and sectarian divisions.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Ongoing dengue fever season kills two more in Bangladesh.

According to Bangladesh’s Directorate of Health, two more deaths have been recorded within this year’s ongoing dengue fever epidemic season. The total number of dengue fever deaths this year in Bangladesh currently stands at 201. The mosquito-borne disease has been an annual issue in Bangladesh since the first outbreak occurred in 2000. The 2023 outbreak was the deadliest on record, killing approximately 1,705 people.

The 2024 outbreak has so far been far less deadly than in 2023, however, the general annual trend has been towards increasing dengue-related deaths, highly likely due to a confluence of environmental and viral host factors, but likely also due to failures in managing dengue patients by authorities.


Highly active Japanese volcano erupts multiple times.

The active stratovolcano Sakurajima located near the city Kagoshima in southern Kyushu, Japan has been notably active in the past week. On 13 October, an eruption at the volcano caused volcanic ash to spread towards Kagoshima city. On 18 October, a more explosive eruption occurred, sending ash 4,000 metres above Sakurajima’s crater, and triggering ash fall warnings in Kagoshima and Miyazaki. The eruption is the most significant at the volcano since 29 July, although no injuries or damage have been reported.

Sakurajima is the most active volcano in Japan and has near-constantly erupted since 1955. In 1914, a considerable eruption killed dozens. The authorities dedicate substantial resources to monitoring the volcano, due to its proximity to dense population centres, and have issued emergency warnings and evacuations due to the volcano’s activity in recent years.


Week 41: 04 – 11 October

Global Intelligence Summary

abstract blue banner
  • The recent gang attack in rural Haiti, which killed 70 people, likely demonstrates the continuing efforts by the gangs to terrorise the population and to hinder foreign efforts to restore order.
  • The MI5 chief’s rare report of growing terrorist and extremist activity in the UK highly likely reflects a growing primacy of online-based self-radicalisation.
  • Israel will almost certainly retaliate for Iran’s 1 October missile attack. Depending on the type of retaliation, there is a realistic possibility of further regional escalation.
  • It is highly likely that the security profile of Pakistan will deteriorate due to opposition civil unrest, intensified Baloch militant activity, and declining security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

AMER

USA: Hurricane Milton makes landfall in Florida

Haiti: Gang attack kills 70 in rural part of the country

UK: MI5 chief highlights growing IS domestic threat

Italy: More than 30 injured at pro-Palestine protest in Rome

Israel, Lebanon & Iran: Israel weighs retaliation options

Pakistan: Baloch militants kill two Chinese nationals in convoy bombing

Pakistan: Protesters clash with security forces


On the evening of 9 October Hurricane Milton made landfall near Siesta Key on the west coast of Florida. Hurricane Milton was initially a category 5 hurricane with maximum windspeeds of 287 km/h in the Gulf of Mexico, but weakened to a category 3 with maximum windspeeds of 193 km/h before landfall.

At least 16 deaths have so far been attributed to the storm, which is highly likely to rise, with four of the deaths being caused by tornadoes in St. Lucie County. Evacuation orders were issued in the Tampa Bay area, largely due to fears of a 4.5 metre storm surge (the rise in sea level caused by a storm, which can cause considerable flooding).

The hurricane destroyed at least 100 homes and left 3.4 million customers without power.

Solace Global Assessment: 

At its strongest while category 5 in the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Milton was the fifth most intense hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic. However, the storm weakened considerably before landfall and the predicted storm surge did not occur. Hurricane Milton ended up tracking south of Tampa, effectively sucking water out of Tampa Bay, instead of causing a 4.5 metre storm surge. A 2.4 to 3 metre storm surge was however still recorded in parts of Sarasota county.

It is almost certain that Hurricane Milton will be assessed as having caused fewer deaths than Hurricane Helene in late September, which caused at least 227 deaths, which made it the deadliest hurricane on the US mainland since 2005’s Hurricane Katrina. This is almost certainly due to the reduction in Milton’s reduction in strength before landfall, the lack of predicted storm surge, and the path the hurricane took – cutting straight through Florida from west to east rather than tracking north into other southeastern US states. Many of the deaths caused by Helene were caused in North Carolina, with at least 72 deaths recorded just in Buncombe County where the city of Asheville was devastated.

The cost of damages by Milton, however, may be similar to Helene – Helene is estimated to have caused up to USD 47.5 billion in damages, whereas estimates suggest that Milton could cost insurers USD 30-50 billion. Former President and Presidential candidate Donald Trump criticised the federal government response to the hurricane. Following the devastation caused by 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, George W. Bush’s ratings fell considerably and never fully recovered.

While it is highly unlikely that the federal response to both Helene and Milton will have a similarly significant political impact, disinformation and conspiracy theories regarding government manipulation of weather have been proliferated in response to Hurricane Milton, including by Republican Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, leading to condemnation by at least three other Republican Representatives. It is a realistic possibility that small-scale civil unrest may materialise directly as a result of the hurricane.

As of 11 October, Hurricane Milton has reduced into a Post-Tropical Cyclone and is tracking eastwards in the Atlantic, scheduled to track south of Bermuda on 12 October.


On 3 October, the Haitian gang “Gran Grif” launched an attack in Port-Sonde, in the country’s west. During this reporting period, information emerged reporting that the attack, carried out with firearms and bladed weapons, resulted in at least 70 deaths, as well as the displacement of 6,000 residents. The leader of the Gran Grif group, Luckson Elan, stated that the attack was in response to civilian apathy regarding gang members being killed by the police and a grassroots “vigilante” movement, known as “Bwa Kale”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is likely notable as the highest-severity violence in Haiti has been mostly concentrated in the capital, Port-au-Prince, where gangs continue to oppose the UN-backed and Kenya-led international police mission. Gangs lack an overarching strategy. However, their actions – including the violent attacks on civil society and institutions like churches and missions – signals a general aim to prevent the Haitian population from accessing other sources of welfare, thus keeping in place a system of coercion and reliance in areas under gang control.

The Haitian vigilante movement developed in April in Port-au-Prince, likely in response to the solidification of part of the gang front, and has carried out targeted attacks on gang members, as well as summary executions of suspected criminals. A report by a local NGO assesses that the vigilantes killed at least 160 suspected gang members in their first month of operations.

The gangs in the Bas-Artibonite region, where Port-Sonde is located, are allied to members of the capital’s powerful G-Pep alliance, which has, according to available information, sought to increase its influence in areas north of the capital where much of Haiti’s agricultural production is concentrated. G-Pep is one of the two main gang networks operating in the country, and was involved in a struggle with the rival G9 group.

In February 2024, G9 and G-Pep leaders announced the formation of Viv Ansanm, a coalition of gangs that has at times espoused “political” aspirations to influence the transitional administration of Haiti. The stability and actual functioning of Viv Ansamn is however unclear, especially outside of Port-au-Prince. In the capital’s informal settlement of Cite Soleil, divisions between the two groups were recorded at least until late July, when G9 and G-Pep agreed on the removal of roadblocks.

The Port-Sonde attack underscores the extremely severe internal security situation in Haiti, and almost certainly demonstrates the insufficiencies of current international efforts meant to restore order to the country. Currently, the almost totality of UN-backed efforts are focused in the capital. This is likely both a reflection of the mission’s overall interest in providing a stable administrative “centre” from which the new interim government can begin in-country operations, and of the significant shortfalls and deficiencies of the UN force’s assets.

The renewal of the police mission by the UN Security Council, on 30 September, is not likely to drastically change the situation in the short term. The UN mission currently operates with 410 personnel and is expected to eventually grow to a total manpower of 2,500.


Cost of living activists clash with police forces in Martinique

On 7 October approximately 50 cost of living activists clashed with police in Lamentin, Martinique, resulting in 11 injuries to police officers. Law enforcement employed necessary measures to disperse the unrest, resulting in five arrests. The unrest is a broader movement against the high cost of living, a continuing theme in the French West Indies, which was initiated in September by the Rally for the Protection of Afro-Caribbean Peoples and Resources (RPPRAC).

RPPRAC calls for food prices in Martinique to be aligned with mainland France, where prices are (according to French media) approximately 40% lower. As well as the cost-of-living protests, Martinique has seen a rise in urban violence, leading to the government imposing curfews in the capital Fort-de-France and the district of Lamentin to maintain public order.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Afghan lone wolf arrested in US over election day attack plans

The suspect was arrested by the FBI in Oklahoma, after leaving an online and financial trail that alerted authorities to his plans for an attack. The suspect, an Afghan national, reportedly planned to acquire semiautomatic weapons and carry out a mass-shooting on behalf of the Islamic State (IS).

The suspect is almost certainly a self-radicalised “lone wolf” and planned to carry out an attack on election day due to the event’. In the United States, the ease of accessing firearms almost certainly makes lone wolf attacks significantly deadlier than those that occur in Europe, which are mostly conducted with bladed weapons or vehicles.


New armed cartel founded in Mexico

The “Tabasco New Generation Cartel” (CTNG) reportedly operates in the municipalities of Jalpa and Macuspana in the Tabasco area. The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), one of the country’s largest, also operates in the area, as does another smaller group known as La Barredora. Alleged CTNG members released videos threatening government forces and other criminal groups in the area, although it is not clear if the group has already carried out any actions, beyond some alleged fires at commercial establishment in the area.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Brazil wins legal contest against Elon Musk’s X

On 8 October, the Brazilian Supreme Court allowed the social network X.com (previously Twitter) to resume service in the country after it agreed to comply with court rulings regarding content moderation that owner Elon Musk had previously rejected, as well as to pay fines. The development is likely a political victory for the administration of Brazilian President Lula. Musk has recently transitioned towards a more politically “visible” role in support of international right-wing politicians, most notably endorsing Donald Trump’s campaign for the US presidency. In April, former President Bolsonaro directly praised Musk for his opposition to the Brazilian Supreme Court’s rulings.  


Ken McCallum, the director general of the UK’s domestic security service MI5, provided an overview of current security risk trends faced by the UK during a rare threat update on 8 October. The speech was the first of its kind since 2022, and broadly covered topics including Iranian, Chinese and Russian espionage and hybrid warfare, as well as more specifically focusing on terrorism.

McCallum argued that, currently, UK intelligence and security services are facing an increased threat from Islamist Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs), and that the Islamic State (IS) is most active among them. McCallum also highlighted how MI5 resources are currently overstretched.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of the speech, two weeks before the UK’s Labour government is set to publish its 2025 budget plan, makes it highly likely that its primary objective is to secure increased funding for MI5. The highlighting of the threat from IS almost certainly reflects not only the return of the Islamist group to active planning of sophisticated terror attacks abroad – as in the case of the March Crocus Hall shooting in Moscow – but also the growing traction that the group’s messaging has in driving cases of self-radicalisation and lone wolf terrorism.

Despite suffering significant setbacks, the Islamic State almost certainly retains a strong online presence, via both “affiliated” and semi-official channels and international networks of supporters that use the group’s easily identifiable symbols and rhetoric (its “branding”). In July, the terrorism research platform GNET released a report highlighting IS’ use of sophisticated techniques to recruit and radicalise target audience members, for instance by seeking to “hijack” Islamic communities online or using “micro-influencers” to spread extremist propaganda and direct sympathisers to private channels – mostly on the Telegram app – where further radicalisation and planning can occur.

Notably, McCallum reported that, in the 2021-2024 period, MI5 analysts observed a threefold growth in the number of individuals under 18 involved in terrorism and extremist activity, meaning that underage individuals currently make up approximately 13 per cent of the total number of people involved in terrorism cases. This almost certainly reflects the growth in online radicalisation – likely favoured by increased isolation and social media usage during and after the COVID19 pandemic – which has benefitted propaganda efforts by VEOs like IS, as well as other Islamist and far-right extremist groups.


The demonstration – which had not been authorised by authorities – took place on 5 October in south-central Rome. The majority of the individuals that were injured were reportedly members of the police, which clashed with demonstrators as some groups tried to break through their lines. According to some attendees, the Italian Interior Ministry, and reporters, the violence was caused by groups of far-left “black bloc” activists.

Over the rest of the reporting period, further protests occurred in various European cities, with some university-based activist groups resuming occupations and other actions on campus. Clashes between university students and police were recorded in Paris, as police intervened to clear a demonstration at Sciences Po.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The high volume of protests is highly likely to continue over the next week, and to particularly increase on 12-13 October, the anniversary of the first entry of Israeli troops into Gaza which began a year-long ground operation. Further developments in Lebanon are highly likely to impact civil unrest in Europe, and particularly countries that have large Lebanese diasporas – firstly France. Moreover, the start of the new academic year in late September, nearly coinciding with the 7 October anniversary, is likely to further drive unrest episodes at European university campuses.

The Rome protests are likely to cause a political reaction from the Italian government, which is currently in the process of approving security legislation that the opposition denounced as “authoritarian” and expands penalties for unauthorised protests and road blockades – likely targeting environmentalist groups and far-left activists. OSINT analysis shows a significant deployment of security forces in key at-risk locations in Italy, including Jewish places of worship, religious schools and government buildings.


The reserve 146th division of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) joined the 36th, 91st, and 98th divisions in the Israeli ground operations in Lebanon, which are currently concentrating on the eastern part of the Israel-Lebanon border. IDF forces continue to carry out limited raids to destroy Hezbollah facilities near the border without reportedly seeking to retain control of the positions they take.

Fighting in south Lebanon is likely particularly difficult for the IDF due to both the terrain’s features and Hezbollah’s ground fortifications. On 10 October, reports emerged that Israeli troops fired at three UN peacekeepers’ positions, including the main base in Naqoura, injuring two peacekeepers. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has operated in Lebanon’s south for decades and received an enhanced mandate in 2006.

Tel Aviv is also currently considering options for retaliating for Iran’s 1 October strike, which may represent an escalation of the conflict. Likely options include: a strike on Iranian military targets, on oil infrastructure, or on nuclear plants.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Biden administration has likely sought to persuade the Israelis of carrying out a limited strike on Iran’s military infrastructure, as this would almost certainly pose the lowest risk of regional escalation. If Israel, instead, strikes Iran’s oil fields, refineries, or fuel shipping hubs, there is a realistic possibility of Tehran and its Axis of Resistance retaliating by targeting oil facilities in the wider region, and/or blocking the Strait of Hormuz, threatening region-wide economic and possibly military crisis. A strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities – while likely the preferred option of the Israeli government’s most hawkish components – is unlikely to succeed without direct US help, an option that the White House has already rejected. There is a high likelihood that the Israeli retaliatory strike will occur during the weekend.

Israeli operations in Lebanon are likely aimed at destroying Hezbollah structures in the south as part of a prelude to achieving the strategic objective of returning Israeli residents to the north border areas. Hezbollah, whose leadership has been significantly depleted over the past weeks, almost certainly continues to face difficulties at reconstituting a clear political chain of command, although its structure is highly likely flexible enough to not be impacted by Israeli decapitation strikes in terms of its battlefield operations.

Hezbollah, while still deeply influenced by Tehran’s decisions, almost certainly maintains retaining its political authority in Lebanon as a vital objective, and there is a realistic possibility that Israeli operations in Lebanon are partly aimed at eroding Hezbollah’s popularity and support base in order to coerce the Shia group into making significant and strategically valuable concessions.


New French government of Michel Barnier survives no-confidence motion

On 8 October, the French National Assembly failed to pas a motion of no-confidence put forward by the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP) coalition, which would have ousted the new Prime Minister Michel Barnier weeks after his appointment by Macron. Only the NFP supported the motion and, while the centre’s opposition was expected, it was the far-right National Rally’s (RN) abstention that was fundamental to the government’s survival.

The RN, which failed to achieve a major victory at the latest National Assembly elections, likely remains the only kingmaker in the current fragmented French parliament. The RN’s support for Barnier almost certainly remains conditional on the new government’s policy proposals. The tacit agreement between the Macron government and Le Pen’s RN will likely continue to be a driver of protests by the left in France.


Hungarians protest state television

On 5 October, the leading Hungarian opposition party TISZA organised a thousand-strong protest in Budapest, near the offices of the state broadcaster MTVA, over accusations of it functioning as a propaganda organ of Prime Minister Orban’s government. TISZA is a new political formation launched by former Orban ally Peter Magyar. It is a strongly personalistic and populist party and likely constitutes the major current challenge to Orban’s rule.

TISZA’s political strategy is likely aimed at challenging the base of Orban’s support by presenting an alternative – yet still “anti-establishment” – position. Further high-visibility protest actions are likely to take place in Hungary, especially targeting cultural and political institutions perceived as aligned with the Orban government.


Romanian Russophile candidate banned ahead of presidential election

Romania will hold presidential elections in two rounds on 24 November and 8 December. The polls are currently led by Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu and former NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana. On 5 October, the Constitutional Court ruled to remove Diana Sosoaca, leader of far-right, anti-EU and anti-NATO party SOS Romania, from the list of eligible candidates.

The court claimed that Sosoaca’s opinions made her unlikely to respect the presidential mandate to respect the constitution if elected. The ruling is likely to boost Sosoaca’s public image and will draw increased criticism of the country’s judiciary. There is a high likelihood of civil unrest in Bucharest, and especially near governmental buildings.


Saied predictably wins Tunisian elections

The current president secured a reported 91 per cent of the vote, with a low turnout of 29 per cent. Much of the opposition boycotted the vote, after numerous candidates were either imprisoned or prevented from running. The turnout levels, the lowest since 2011, likely highlight a continued voter apathy towards the political system of Tunisia, which has gradually become more authoritarian since Saied took power in 2019. Some civil unrest is likely to take place after the vote, but it is unlikely that it will result in severe disruptions or large-scale violence.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Norway raises terror threat alert level

The increase brings the country’s terror threat level to the second-highest level. Authorities justified the increase as responding to the broader situation in the MENA region. However, it is likely that Norwegian security services are also reacting to tangible threats targeting the Jewish community and Israeli assets and individuals in the country.

Norway has an overall low terror threat. However, an increase in radical activity and recruitment in northern Europe, especially notable since 7 October, has likely translated into a cross-border risk increase. The threat level increase results in police officers now being able to carry firearms nationwide, a precaution that almost certainly significantly increases their ability to respond to terrorist action.

The main terror threat in Norway highly likely remains that from lone wolves, self-radicalised terrorists, especially espousing an extremist Islamist ideology.  


Six wounded in Israel stabbing attack

The attack took place in the Israeli city of Hadera on 9 October. The alleged attacker was killed by responding security forces. It is highly likely that the attack was a lone wolf action, and there is a likelihood that it was a copycat attack inspired by the recent firearm and knife attack in Jaffa.


Wagner’s north Mali expedition ends with no clear outcome

A column of more than 60 Russian and Malian vehicles, directed towards the Tinzaouaten area near the Algerian border, returned to their base in Kidal without a major engagement with the Tuareg and Islamist groups that had inflicted a severe defeat on the group in July. The expedition, which was highly likely aimed to retaliate for the disastrous July ambush, was marked by considerable logistical difficulties, with the column reportedly being forced to abandon part of their equipment en route.

In addition to the considerable material expenses, the failure of the expedition will almost certainly be considered a political victory for the al-Qaeda-affiliated and Tuareg groups in the country’s north. It also highly likely represents an embarrassment for the junta – and Wagner – who promised a decisive military result after months of setbacks.


North Niger rebel group form alliance

The “Coordination of the Free Forces of Niger” was formed by four rebel groups based in the country’s north. The four groups are mostly comprised of Tuaregs, support the pre-junta government, and have carried out targeted operations, including kidnappings and assassinations, against junta officials. The Nigerien groups have also increasingly pursued closer cooperation with their Malian counterparts.


Clashes between army and al-Shabaab in south and central Somalia

At least 59 members of the Islamist group were killed, as well as four soldiers, in two separate operations in the Garilay area of Galgaduud region and in the Hawadlay area of the Middle Shabelle region. The operation is highly likely a success for government forces, whose offensive against al-Shabaab has stalled with the exception of few regions. Progress in Galgaduud follows the liberation of the town of Ali Yabal last week.


Peace talks continue between Armenia and Azerbaijan

In an effort to ease tensions in the South Caucasus region, the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments are actively pursuing a peace deal. This follows a year of tense negotiations that escalated after Azerbaijan militarily occupied the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September 2023, which led to thousands of Armenians fleeing the area.

The peace talks have been challenging, with both sides accusing the other of lacking a genuine commitment to end the decades-long conflict, which began following their respective independence from Russia in the 1990’s. In a significant development earlier this year, Armenia withdrew from several Azerbaijani villages it had controlled since the 1990’s as part of the peace process thus, allowing thousands of Azerbaijanis to return to the areas.

Armenian president Vahagn Khachatryan expressed cautious optimism of the peace deal being reached before the 29th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) scheduled from 11-24 November in Baku.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Rwanda begins Marburg vaccinations

The disease, a viral haemorrhagic fever that is similar to Ebola, was first detected in the country in late September. So far, around 50 cases have been reported and 12 casualties – this reflects the high fatality rate of the virus, which can be higher than 80 per cent. It is highly likely that the actual number of cases is higher, especially in rural areas. Uganda also has had outbreaks of the virus in the past, and there is a realistic possibility that the spread of the virus could impact countries neighbouring Rwanda, including Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).


On 7 October, a Chinese convoy travelling from the Port Qasim Electric Power Company, a joint China-Pakistan coal-fired power plant project, was attacked by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) near Jinnah International Airport (KHI) in Karachi. The attack was conducted using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), with the Pakistani Bomb Disposal Unit specifying that 80 kilograms of commercial explosives were used, destroying three vehicles and damaging 12. Two Chinese nationals were killed, with at least 10 injuries.

The Chinese embassy strongly condemned the attack and stated that they are working with Pakistani authorities and advised Chinese citizens to avoid travel to the southwest province of Balochistan and the northwest province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Baloch militants also conducted several other attacks during this reporting period, including a 5 October attack that allegedly killed three security personnel in Kalat district (claimed by BLA), an 8 October armed assault on military personnel in Mand Chokap, Kech which the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) claim killed two, an 8 October rocket attack against a military camp in the Tijaban area of Kech claimed by the BLF, and a 9 October attack against on a Sabakzai Dam checkpoint that reportedly killed one and injured 11 others.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack on a Chinese convoy follows multiple BLA attacks covered in the previous Global Intelligence Summary, including an attack against workers at a gas and oil exploration company site in Musakhail. In August there was a distinct spike in Baluch militant activity, with coordinated attacks killing over 70 people. It is highly likely that the intensification of Baluch attacks seen in recent months will continue, likely indicating a coordinated campaign. Balochistan is the poorest province in Pakistan, which is highly disproportionate to its considerable oil and mineral wealth. Since Balochistan’s accession to Pakistan in 1948, there have been multiple secessionist insurgencies. The political marginalisation and cultural suppression of the Baloch people, as well as the increasing economic exploitation in the region, are almost certainly key factors in sustaining Baloch militancy.

On 15-16 October, Pakistan will host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Islamabad, with representatives from Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran attending. In combination with recent violent protests in Islamabad in support of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, it is likely that the declining security situation in Balochistan (as well as in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where numerous Islamist militant groups are active) will raise questions about the security of Pakistan for the summit. It is a realistic possibility that the summit will be a high-value target for attacks and/or disruption by the various groups and movements that challenge Pakistan’s security.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPED) is the flagship project of Beijing’s grand strategic Belt and Road initiative in Pakistan, intending to connect Gwadar Port in Balochistan with the Xinjiang region in China with highways, railways and pipelines. Over USD 62 billion has already been invested in the project. Empowered by local grievances about the project, Baloch militants (primarily from the BLA) have consistently targeted Chinese nationals linked to CPEC projects since 2018. It is likely that increased Chinese involvement in local security will occur, however, it is unlikely that Baloch militancy against Chinese interests will decrease.


Tens of thousands of activists supporting the imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan clashed with security forces on the roads into Islamabad on 4-5 October. Overnight on 4 October, the chief minister of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Ali Amin Gandapur, led thousands of protesters to block the Islamabad-Peshawar highway. Riot police deployed teargas and baton charges against the demonstrators, cutting off mobile internet access and blocking roads into Islamabad. The Interior Ministry has stated that over 550 people were arrested, and over 80 police officers were injured in the clashes.

Imran Khan’s party, Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), has claimed that Gandapur has been abducted and unlawfully detained. Pakistani troops have been deployed in Islamabad-Rawalpindi and are scheduled to remain until 17 October, after the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit which will be held in Islamabad on 15-16 October. In Lahore, security forces also suspended cell phone and internet services, and blocked roads into the city with hundreds of containers, with clashes being reported near Lahore’s High Court on 5 October.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that unrest will continue in Pakistan, with PTI issuing a fresh call for a series of protests. Disruption to the SCO summit will highly likely present a high-value target for opposition forces in Pakistan. Imran Khan has been held in jail since August 2023, with over 100 charges relating to terrorism and corruption. In March 2023, following attempts by security forces to arrest Khan, large scale, widespread and violent unrest was triggered across Pakistan, leading to at least eight deaths.

Highly likely due to the success of government suppression in preventing protesters from entering major urban centres such as Islamabad and Lahore, PTI leadership figures have stated that the party will shift its protest strategy to instead focus on “district-level protests”, rather than solely concentrating on larger cities. Nonetheless, there are indications that the PTI is planning a nationwide call for a demonstration in Islamabad, pending discussion amongst the PTI leadership. There are currently protests scheduled in Multan and Sahiwal on 11 October, Gujranwala and Sargodha on 12 October, Dera Ghazi Khan on 13 October, and Lahore and Faisalabad on 14 October.

Pakistan’s security profile faces considerable challenges from three fronts: civil unrest in support of Imran Khan, an intensification of attacks by militants in Balochistan, and a deterioration of security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is highly likely that draconian government suppression over the past week is due to concerns over disruption to the SCO summit, however, it is likely that rather than reducing the threat from these three distinct issues, opposition forces will be driven further to increasingly violent methods.


Pakistan bans prominent Pashtun rights group

The Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) was founded in 2014 and advocates for the rights of Pakistan’s ethnic Pashtuns. Pakistan’s counterinsurgency against the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other militant groups in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has allegedly led to widespread oppression of Pashtuns. This week, following recent mobilisations, the PTM planned a three-day national gathering in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to oppose military abuses against Pashtuns and recent declining security amidst a marked increase in militant attacks in the past few months.

The PTM have been proscribed by Pakistan’s Interior Ministry under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which freezes the organisation’s assets, closes offices, prohibits publishing literature and enables the seizure of published material. PTM’s leader, Manzoor Pashteen, has gone into hiding, and hundreds of PTM members have been arrested. A PTM spokesperson has stated that the group still intends to undertake the three-day national gathering, despite efforts by security forces to violently prevent it.

The PTM likely operated as a political outlet for local Pashtun grievances, and it is likely that the group’s proscription will drive PTM members and supporters into more radical and violent actions.


One hospitalised in India during doctor hunger strike

A junior doctor was hospitalised after carrying out almost a week-long hunger strike in protest over the rape and murder of a trainee medic in a hospital in Kolkata, which resulted in widespread protests in August. The case continues to highlight the significant political impact of the attack, which protesters have argued demonstrated ongoing and widespread gender inequality and oppression in India. The latest hunger strike was motivated by doctors’ perceptions of insufficient government responses to their demands for greater security at hospitals. There is a realistic possibility that the hospitalisation of the junior doctor will spark further localised civil unrest in Kolkata.


Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wins in Haryana

The opposition Congress party’s alliance won the first elections in Jammu and Kashmir in the first vote after the border state was stripped of much of its autonomy. The BJP was projected to lose in Haryana, and the surprising result is likely to provide a significant domestic boost to Modi, after his party’s underwhelming victory at the past general elections. Congress officials challenged the vote results, claiming that the voting process was marked by irregularities. If Congress’ challenge of the results progresses, there is a realistic possibility that it will result in unrest and possible sectarian violence in the state.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

China and the Philippines clash over disputed territories in the South China Sea

Tensions between China and the Philippines have sharply escalated over disputed territories in the South China Sea, with reports of six aggressive incidents having occurred in August alone. Five of these incidents took place near Scarborough Shoal and Sabina Shoal, areas within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that China claims as its own. Hostile actions have included intentional boat rammings, uses of water cannons to target vessels, and other forms of physical confrontation.

China has characterised its relationship with the Philippines as being at a critical juncture, urging Manila to reconsider its future actions. This situation poses a potential risk of involving the United States, which maintains a mutual defence treaty with the Philippines and has pledged to support Manila in the event of armed attacks against Filipino forces.

Speaking at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 10 October, the president of the Philippines called for an urgent speed in negotiations to resolve the increasing tensions.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Sri Lanka issues red alert flood warnings to coastal regions in the south and southeast

Red alert flood warnings have been issued for the south and southeastern coastal regions of Sri Lanka. Local media have already reported images of flooding in Walagedara. The areas with the highest warning and risk are the coastal areas extending from Puttalam to Hambantota, via Colombo and Galle.

It is expected that wind speeds will reach 60-70 kph and naval and fishing communities are being advised not to venture out until further notice. Sri Lanka has been in an economic crisis following its meltdown in 2022 and although the new government has shown positive signs of improvement (with The World Bank confirming Sri Lanka is recovering faster than expected) it is heavily reliant on the country maintaining stability.


World Mental Health Day

Workplace Mental Health and Duty of Care

boat on a calm lake Workplace Mental Health and Duty of Care

This World Mental Health Day, the theme set by the World Federation of Mental Health is workplace mental health – with 15% of UK workers being estimated to have an existing mental health condition.

Last week, we had an insightful conversation with our partners at Charles Taylor Assistance, who work closely with us to provide the medical aspects of our services. 

During their latest visit, we discussed the evolving landscape of mental health, especially now that it is a more prevalent and openly discussed topic. We talked about how thorough preparation and due diligence can help prevent a mental health emergency—something that should be taken as seriously as any other security threat.


Proper planning and support aren’t just optional; they are essential for ensuring the wellbeing of teams working in challenging regions.”

Nadeem Sheikh-Ali, Charles Taylor


Workplace mental health and duty of care. Nadeem Sheikh-Ali, Charles Taylor

Mental Health Due Diligence is a must: Before sending employees abroad, conducting thorough risk assessments for both personal safety and mental well-being is essential. It’s important to recognise that in many remote locations, access to English-speaking mental health services is limited, if available at all.

It can be a challenging topic, particularly when some individuals may be reluctant to speak openly about their mental health, fearing stigma or concern about missing out on career opportunities. Therefore, it’s important for risk and security managers to go beyond the usual checklists for physical security risks.

Here’s how managers can take a more personal approach:

1. Check-In Regularly: Set up one-on-one conversations that go beyond work performance. Ask how your team members are really feeling about the environment they are in.

2. Provide Mental Health Resources: Connect employees with mental health professionals before and after assignments. Make sure they know there is a safe space to discuss concerns, especially in regions where services may be limited.

3. Debrief Beyond Security: When employees return, don’t just focus on physical safety outcomes. Mental debriefs can help identify those who might need support after working in challenging environments.

4. Encourage Peer Support: Sometimes the best resource is a colleague who’s been through the same experience. Create platforms where employees can connect and share their experiences openly.

Workplace mental health and duty of care. converstion in office

As we observe World Mental Health Day, it’s important for organisations to acknowledge the growing importance of workplace mental health and their duty of care to employees, particularly those operating in high-stress or remote environments.

At Solace Global, our combined medical and security services ensure that organisations are fully equipped to support their employees’ well-being, no matter where they are in the world. Our medical assistance services offer important support, including access to healthcare professionals, mental health resources, and evacuation in case of emergencies. With proactive planning and real-time assistance, we help safeguard both the physical and mental health of teams working in complex environments.


HOLISTIC RISK MANAGEMENT

Explore how Solace Global’s integrated medical and security solutions can help your organisation provide the best possible care for your workforce.


Week 40: 27 September – 04 October

Global Intelligence Summary

abstract blue banner
  • The security situation in Ecuador is unlikely to significantly improve, despite the extension and expansion of the state of emergency.
  • There is a high likelihood of the pro-Palestine rallies between 5-10 October in Europe causing disruptions, and a realistic possibility of violence in cities like Paris and Rome.
  • Israel will highly likely retaliate for Iran’s missile attack. Israeli forces will almost certainly continue ground operations and decapitation strikes in Lebanon against Hezbollah.
  • Attacks by Baluch militants on Pakistani government forces are likely to continue as Islamabad almost certainly lacks the security assets to deter them.

AMER

Mexico: Significant clashes between rival cartel factions in Sinaloa

Ecuador: State of emergency extended and expanded

Argentina: Student protests over university cuts

Europe: Pro-Palestine protests planned for 5-10 October

Austria: Far-right wins parliamentary elections

Israel, Lebanon, & Iran: Iran strikes Israel, ground offensive in Lebanon

APAC Region: Pro-Palestine protests around 7 October

Pakistan: Baluch militants increase attacks

Taiwan and Philippines: Typhoon Krathon makes landfall in Kaohsiung


Heavy fighting between two rival factions of the Sinaloa cartel is ongoing, primarily in Sinaloa’s state capital, Culiacan. Since the fighting initially broke out on 25 July, at least 132 deaths have been attributed to the cartel civil war, 20 of these civilians, and an additional 160 people have been reported missing or kidnapped.

On 29 September, approximately 1,500 residents marched through Culiacan demanding peace, organised by the civic group “Culiacan Valiente,” or Brave Culiacan. On 30 September, it was announced that the approximately 1,000-member local municipal police force had their firearms seized by the military, with soldiers, state police and National Guard taking over patrolling.

The state governor, Ruben Rocha, subsequently announced that local police will not return to duty until they retrieve their weapons.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Sinaloa cartel civil war stems from the July arrest of Sinaloa leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada by US authorities. El Mayo was lured onto a private plane by one of former Sinaloa leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman’s sons, Joaquín Guzmán López, which then landed in El Paso, Texas. The two rival factions are Los Chapitos, those loyal to the El Chapo’s other sons, and La Miyaza/Mayitos, who are loyal to El Mayo.

While Culiacan has historically been the epicentre of multiple outbreaks of cartel violence, such as the 2019 Battle of Culiacan, the current civil war has been notably intense. Firefights have broken out even in Culiacan’s downtown, as well as in upscale neighbourhoods. Cartel members have made barricades of burning buses and trucks to block the highways around Culiacan, which has led to security forces deploying five ‘anti-blockade’ units.

It is highly likely that the seizure of local police firearms has been conducted due to distrust of the local police force, rather than routine inspection of permits and serial numbers.

With the violence having already spilt over to other northern Mexican states, including Sonora, Baja California, Chihuahua, Zacatecas and Durango, there is a realistic possibility that a spillover of violence could manifest in US cities, particularly in California, Texas and Arizona. Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), the now former-President as of 30 September, partly blamed Washington DC for the surge in violence, a claim denied by the US ambassador to Mexico, Ken Salazar. It is likely that this has further increased diplomatic tensions, in addition to the recent spat stemming from comments made by Salazar criticising the planned judicial reform overhaul in Mexico.

The new Mexican president sworn in on 1 October, Claudia Sheinbaum, faces an immediate challenge in tackling the Sinaloa civil war. AMLO pursued a “hugs not bullets” policy towards cartel violence, intended to tackle the issue with job opportunities and training programmes rather than armed force. A record number of homicides were recorded during AMLO’s presidency, however. While Sheinbaum’s tenure as the mayor of Mexico City saw the homicide rate halve, with Sheinbaum implementing expanded surveillance and police monitoring policies, it is highly unlikely that such policies will be replicable nationwide.

While Sheinbaum has appointed former senior police officer Omar Garcia Harfuch as security secretary, which potentially indicates a change in security policy, Sheinbaum has publicly stated that she will continue AMLO’s policy platform.


On 3 October, the President of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, declared an extension to the current state of emergency which will last a further 60-day period. The extension will cover the same areas as the previous state of emergency which included the provinces of Guayas, home to Guayaquil, the most populated city in Ecuador, along with Los Ríos, El Oro, Manabí, Santa Elena, and Orellana, as well as the canton of Camilo Ponce Enríquez – a mining enclave in Azuay province, where criminal gangs have attempted to seize control of illegal mining operations.

However, the state of emergency will now cover the capital Quito, which has been justified within the presidential decree by “the intensification of hostilities, the commission of crimes and the intensity of the prolonged presence of organised armed groups”. The state of emergency will include a curfew from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. in areas with high crime rates and will temporarily suspend rights such as the inviolability of homes and freedom of assembly.

Despite this, the Constitutional Court is set to review the decision and has previously annulled similar measures.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Since coming to power in November 2023, President Noboa has sought ways to curb endemic gang violence within Ecuador which has been the main driver behind a fourfold increase in the homicide rate between 2018 and 2022. In 2023, alone there were an estimated 7,500 murders in a country of just 18 million, providing a murder rate of 44.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, behind only Jamaica in the Western Hemisphere.

In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele has reduced the murder rate to 2.4 in 2023 as part of his “guerra contra las pandillas” or war against the gangs. This has involved multiple states of emergencies, expanded powers, the suspension of constitutional rights and the arrest of over 80,000 suspected gang members. President Noboa has attempted to emulate these tactics in Ecuador. However, early indications are that these policies have not been successful and there has been an increase in crime.

Unlike in El Salvador, Ecuador’s gangs are not unorganised or poorly funded street gangs. Ecuador’s gangs include well-organised, well-armed and heavily financed outfits associated with the Mexican and Colombian cartels, both of which have expanded their power in the country since the demobilisation of the FARC group which used to control much of the cocaine trade. These cartels are unlikely to submit to Noboa’s policies due to the strategic significance of Ecuador, which sits between the major cocaine-producing countries of Peru and Colombia, and its ports have been key exit points for cocaine shipments.

The prison system is another critical point of failure in Noboa’s crackdown. The major cartels control operations and recruit new members within the prison system, enabling them to establish stronger networks, leading to more violence both within and outside of the prison. The militaristic strategy of the Noboa administration may still yield short-term reductions in crime; however, by underestimating the power of the cartels and failing to address some of the other underlying conditions that have driven violence, the security situation in Ecuador is unlikely to significantly improve and will likely remain trapped in a cycle of state of emergencies.


On 3 October, thousands of students marched in multiple Argentine cities including Buenos Aires and Rosario against planned government education budget cuts. The marches unfolded mostly peacefully, although some cases of violence towards counter-protesters were recorded. Hours before the demonstration, President Javier Milei had threatened to veto a law that would guarantee university funding for the academic year.

The protests represent the second instance of large-scale civil unrest driven by student groups within the past six months, following significant demonstrations in late April over budget cuts. The protests occurred only weeks after Milei published the government’s 2025 budget bill, which predicts a continuing surplus and shrinking inflation, as well as the further devaluation of the Argentine Peso.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The socioeconomic situation in Argentina continues to remain extremely precarious and is almost certainly exacerbating political divisions. Despite the Milei government’s success in reducing inflation to its lowest levels in decades, cutting the government’s spending deficit, and beginning to replenish foreign currency reserves, these policies have also led to a sharp rise in poverty and a drop in consumer spending. This has placed severe pressure on key economic sectors, with small- and medium-sized businesses suffering the most.

Milei’s popularity levels have remained consistent for much of the past year, despite experiencing a relative decrease in September. However, despite relatively high popularity rates, Milei’s continuous attacks on the public sector and welfare state have continued to drive large-scale protests, led by the country’s unions, left-wing parties, and student groups. Recent estimates indicate that poverty rates under Milei have soared to over 50 per cent as a result of Milei’s austerity measures.

With poverty rates this high, Milei’s popularity is likely to decrease and larger segments of the population will likely become susceptible to unrest, leading to increased disruption, instability and potentially political violence.


US Supreme Court tackling of sensitive cases likely to drive civil unrest

The conservative-leaning Supreme Court began its new nine-month term on 1 October, as part of which it is scheduled to review a series of cases on highly contentious political issues, including gun control and LGBTQ rights. There is a high likelihood that decisions made by the legislative branch will play a key role in the political system of the US in the coming weeks, especially due to the high likelihood of legal challenges being raised prior to and after the elections.


Claudia Sheinbaum sworn in as Mexico’s first woman President

Sheinbaum takes power while Mexico is struggling with multiple issues. As highlighted in her inauguration speech, the president’s main priority in the immediate term will be to reassure foreign partners and civil society regarding the highly controversial judicial reform bill passed by her predecessor. Moreover, the first test faced by the government will be the budget, which has a deadline of 15 November.

More broadly, Sheinbaum inherits a precarious domestic security situation, marked by increasing violence between the two main cartels present in the country, the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation which have been fighting since the arrest of the former’s senior leadership.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Dominican Republic to deport “10,000” Haitians a week

The Dominican government announced on 2 October that it will start mass deportations of Haitian migrants in the country, citing an exponential growth of migrant numbers, almost certainly due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in its neighbouring country. In 2023, the Dominican Republic deported more than 170,000 people, almost all Haitians, and expelled at least 65,000 in the first half of 2024. The announcement and implementation of the plan is likely to translate into an increase in civil unrest, as the opposition continues to criticise the government of President Luis Abinader for its harsh treatment of Haitian migrants.


Mexican soldiers fire on migrants near Guatemalan border

On October 1, 2024, Mexican soldiers shot at a truck carrying migrants near Huixtla, Chiapas, resulting in six fatalities. The military claimed the truck was evading personnel and followed by vehicles linked to criminal groups, prompting the soldiers to open fire after hearing gunfire. This incident underscores the ongoing violence and risks faced by migrants in Mexico, exacerbated by increasing enforcement measures likely influenced by US policies. Critics have argued that militarisation in immigration enforcement endangers migrants, making their journey to the US even more dangerous.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

At least 200 deaths attributed to Hurricane Helene in US

Hurricane Helene, which had initially made landfall in the Big Bend area of Florida as a category 4 storm on 26 September, caused at least 200 deaths across the Southeast US. Deaths have been reported in the states of Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee and Virginia. North Carolina was particularly affected, with at least 72 deaths reported in Buncombe County alone. Buncombe County’s city of Asheville was devastated by flooding.

By the morning of 30 September, over two million customers remained without power. With the death toll highly likely to continue to rise, Helene is one of the deadliest hurricanes to impact the mainland US in 50 years, and the deadliest since 2005’s Hurricane Katrina.


The demonstrations have been organised by local groups and are meant to commemorate one year since the start of the conflict. Protests have been scheduled to take place in multiple large cities and capitals, including London, Paris, Rome, Warsaw, Madrid, Amsterdam, Athens, Berlin, and Istanbul.

Some of these planned gatherings have not been approved by authorities, including the event scheduled to take place in Rome on 5 October – although organisers have still called for the event to go ahead. In addition to its overlap with 7 October, the scheduled period of protests begins on the day following Rosh Hashanah, and will also end on the eve of Yom Kippur, thus occupying the period between the two holiest days of the Jewish religious calendar.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The choice to hold pro-Palestine protests overlapping with the anniversary of the 7 October Hamas attack in southern Israel will likely be perceived as a provocation and almost certainly result in an increased security risk at the protest locations. There is a high likelihood of pro-Israel counter-protester groups seeking to disrupt the pro-Palestine gatherings. Likewise, there is a high likelihood of clashes breaking out between protesters and police, especially in cities where clashes have previously occurred (such as Paris), and in those where the protests have not been approved.

The scope and high visibility of the demonstrations are also likely to result in an increased threat from lone-wolf terrorism, either targeting the protesters or high-visibility targets in protest locations, including government buildings and places of worship.

The case of Italy is likely to be particularly affected by the latter dynamic. The government’s refusal to grant protesters a permit to demonstrate has been met with severe backlash by the opposition. Moreover, the Italian lower chamber recently passed a new security law, which has been strongly criticised by the opposition for reportedly restricting freedom of protest.

These two developments will likely drive significant civil unrest on 5 October and in the coming weeks in large Italian cities.


On 29 September, Austria held legislative elections to elect the 28th National Council, the lower house within Austria’s bicameral parliament. The far-right FPÖ party won more than 29 per cent of the vote, almost doubling its vote share from the last elections in 2019. The centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and Green Party both saw an important decline in the number of votes, while the Social Democrats (SPÖ) held their 21 per cent vote share.

The results’ announcement quickly translated into some civil unrest. On 30 September, protests took place near the parliament building in Vienna.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The vote is highly likely a historic result for the Austrian far right, and further emphasises some visible trends from across Europe: a collapse of the Green parties – marked by a shift among young voters towards more established left parties, or the populist right – and a decrease in the traction of establishment centre-right parties. The FPÖ’s success was almost certainly achieved through its ability to tap into a range of concerns shared among large sections of the Austrian electorate. The party’s main source of success has been its ability to leverage concerns over immigration and national identity.

The FPÖ has championed policies and concepts that include the “remigration” of immigrants and the creation of a more homogenous Austria. However, what sets the party apart from some of its European far-right counterparts is its attempts to appeal to Turkish-origin voters, a demographic estimated to be as many as 500,000. This tactic has involved framing Turkish-origin voters as well-integrated compared to migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and other Muslim nations. It is currently unclear as to how successful this tactic has been. However, early indications are that it has proven reasonably successful with the Turkish youth.

Moreover, by appealing to well-integrated Muslims, this tactic helps the FPÖ distance itself from accusations of being racist, nationalist, or exclusively Christian. In the long term, this tactic, which has been disparaged as opportunistic, may be emulated by other members of the European far-right if deemed successful. This form of selective inclusion, whilst also championing policies like remigration and deportations, is likely to stoke divisions within the Muslim diaspora, potentially undermining social cohesion and potentially leading to incidents of unrest or violence that strengthen the FPÖ’s core narratives.|

It is currently unclear as to whether or not the FPÖ will become part of a ruling coalition. To achieve this, the FPÖ will require a coalition partner. The only prospective “kingmaker” is the centre-right ÖVP. However, the ÖVP’s leader and current Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer, has ruled out entering a coalition if the FPÖ leader, Herbert Kickl, insists on becoming Chancellor. A potential outcome would be the mirroring of the 2023 Dutch elections, where a coalition was formed only after far-right leader Geert Wilders agreed not to be prime minister.

An FPÖ-ÖVP coalition with the ÖVP nominating a Chancellor is assessed as the most likely development. Both parties have some ideological overlap over issues like immigration, however, if the FPÖ is forced to give up the Chancellery, it will likely demand support for stronger policies over immigration. There is a realistic possibility that the advancement of immigration policies like stricter border controls and increased deportations, could create an environment where violence is more likely to occur, as well as strain the relationship between migrant communities and the government.

The only real viable alternative to an FPÖ-ÖVP coalition is a coalition between the ÖVP and the centre-left SPÖ. However, this coalition will likely be interpreted as an attempt to establish a firewall around the far-right, similar to the tactics observed in Germany, and has several issues. Firstly, a centre-right-centre-left coalition will likely be ungovernable and both parties will likely risk alienating their base by betraying their respective values. There is a high likelihood that such a coalition will collapse, leading to early elections where the FPÖ could extend its vote share. Secondly, a firewall around the  FPÖ could play into the party’s hands by reinforcing their narrative of being outsiders persecuted by the political establishment, thereby increasing their appeal to voters who feel increasingly disenfranchised by mainstream politics.


On 27 September, a large-scale Israeli strike in southern Beirut killed the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, as well as other high-ranking officials of the Lebanese militant group. Shortly after 23:00 local time on 30 September, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) launched what they described as a “targeted and delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon”, aimed against “terrorist targets and infrastructures of Hezbollah”.

As of the time of writing, available OSINT shows that IDF operations have been limited, with no attempts at penetrating deep into Lebanese territory. Israeli ground operations in Lebanon have so far been mainly carried out in the two directions of Odaisseh and Maround al Ras. On the first day of operations, the IDF reported that 8 soldiers had been killed in combat.

On the afternoon of 1 October, Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack on targets throughout Israel, with reportedly at least 180 missiles being used. Israeli missile defence forces, as well as IAF and allied American and Jordanian air force units, contributed to the interception of the majority of the Iranian projectiles. Nevertheless, this attack was likely more successful at penetrating Israeli defences that the previous large-scale strike in April.

The attacks resulted in only one confirmed casualty, a Palestinian civilian who was killed by debris near Jericho, in the West Bank.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The IDF’s ground offensive has likely been timed to exploit the current lack of command and control (C2) within Hezbollah which has been achieved through a series of decapitation strikes on the group’s senior leadership. In September, the Netanyahu administration added the return of Israeli citizens to settlements near the Israel-Lebanon border to their list of stated war aims.

The significant degradation of Hamas forces in the Gaza Strip following a year of conflict has also almost certainly allowed Tel Aviv to shift its focus to the north. Israeli officials almost certainly assess that a reduced ground force, combined with a constant threat of airstrikes, will be sufficient to prevent Hamas from reforming units capable of significantly threatening IDF forces in Gaza.

IDF operations are highly likely aimed at destroying Hezbollah assets in the south of Lebanon and preventing the group from targeting north Israel. While Hezbollah maintains some long-range weapons systems, much of the group’s arsenal has a maximum range of ~40km. IDF operations will highly likely seek to force Hezbollah to retreat north of the Litani River, as per the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

It is unlikely that the IDF will commit to a long-term occupation of southern Lebanon, which would entail high political and economic costs as well as a high rate of casualties.

The latest attack by Tehran is likely to allow Israeli forces the political justification to increase strikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as strikes on other regional Axis of Resistance members. Israeli forces may seek to capitalise on the recent decapitation strikes to significantly degrade Hezbollah’s manpower and, especially, weapons stocks as a prelude to a UN-mediated deal on its northern border.

An Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal, remains, as of now, highly unlikely to occur imminently, especially due to the approaching 7 October anniversary, whose political significance makes such a deal unthinkable for the Israeli leadership.

Israeli forces will almost certainly retaliate for Iran’s attack. However, it is likely that retaliatory strikes targeting Iranian assets or territory will be limited to avoid further escalation and meant at re-establishing deterrence. There is a realistic possibility that Israeli forces will opt to strike Iranian officials and assets in Iraq or Syria, including IRGC members.

Moreover, Israeli strikes could also target military targets, including missile launch sites and air defence stations, in Iranian territory, as well as strategic objectives like oil extraction facilities and refineries. Finally, there is a realistic possibility of Israeli strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, which would likely only be symbolic due to the impossibility of causing genuine damage to Iran’s largely underground nuclear facilities with long-range fires and the necessity to conduct such an operation with airframes penetrating deep into Iranian airspace carrying bunker buster bombs.

While such a course of action has been advocated by “hawkish” elements of the Israeli government, as well as some allied political figures, such a move would highly likely be opposed by London, Washington, and Brussels, as it poses an obvious threat to the possible resumption of nuclear negotiations, which Pezeshkian has repeatedly called for in his recent speech at the UN General Assembly.


Growing unrest following general strike call in France

Starting on 1 October, major French unions have called for a general strike, with 180 events taking place across the country. Not all major unions have supported the appeal, with some citing that it is still “premature” due to the Barnier government having only recently been installed. Students have also joined the strikes, with multiple high schools in Paris and other major French urban centres being occupied.

There is a realistic threat of political violence during the strikes. In Lyon, on the night of 30 September, reports indicate that local far-right groups staged impromptu demonstrations and “patrols” in residential areas.


“Ecotage” action targets Flamanville nuclear power plant, France

The plant is the newest to be commissioned in France (in 2007), and, after years of delays and significant cost increases, is set to become operational in the next months. On 30 September, anarchist activists claimed responsibility for targeting an electricity pylon supplying energy to the site.

The action did not result in any notable damage. However, the case continues to highlight the risk that ecotage (sabotage carried out by radical environmentalists, often targeting energy infrastructure or vehicles) poses to high-visibility targets and industries.


Around 3,000 march in Portugal against “uncontrolled immigration”

The demonstrations, which took place in Lisbon on 29 September, were organised by the right-wing populist CHEGA party. In 2024, CHEGA, which was only founded in 2019, won 50 seats, becoming the third-largest political force in the country. The latest protests were notable as participants deliberately marched through areas of Lisbon with large migrant communities. Moreover, reports indicate that members of neo-Nazi and far-right groups, including the Grupo 1143 – a former hooligan club reconstituted into a militant formation – attended the event.


FRELIMO almost certain to win Mozambique elections

General elections are scheduled to take place in Mozambique on 9 October. The vote will serve to appoint the president and 250-member Assembly of the Republic for a five-year term. Mozambique has been governed by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) since independence from Portugal in 1975. FRELIMO has gradually drifted towards authoritarian rule and recent elections have been likely doctored to ensure its victory. FRELIMO will almost certainly win the elections, which will likely be fraught with irregularities.

There is a high likelihood of civil unrest following the vote and a realistic possibility of violence against government officials and police. While all the major RENAMO-originated armed groups have been largely neutralised, some anti-government cells likely remain operational and will seek to stage anti-government action.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Two teenagers arrested over suspected bomb attack at Israeli embassy in Denmark.

The two teenagers, both reportedly Swedish citizens, were arrested on 3 October, the day after two early morning explosions occurred near the embassy compound in Copenhagen. It is highly likely that the attack was a botched attempt at targeting Israeli diplomatic personnel.

It is likely that the case will bring further attention to the crime and extremist action threat in Denmark originating from neighbouring Sweden. The reported use of “hand grenades” during the attack is likely a demonstration of the overlap between radical networks and organised crime groups in northern Europe, with the former increasingly having access to more sophisticated weaponry, including explosive material.


At least 31 wounded in arson, vehicle, and machete attack in Essen, Germany.

An individual, reportedly wearing a keffiyeh and Palestinian flag and identified as a Syrian national, set fire to multiple buildings in Essen, North Rhine Westphalia and then drove a van into local storefronts, before exiting the vehicle and trying to attack bystanders. The motive of the attack is still unclear as of the time of writing, but authorities have claimed that the most likely reason is related to mental health. Still, the attackers’ choice to wear items associated with the Palestinian cause will almost certainly be used by anti-Palestine channels, and will likely increase far-right sentiment within Germany.


US Central Command kills 37 ISIS and Hurras al-Din fighters in Syria.

The two strikes, on 16 and 24 September, are among the largest conducted by US forces in the past year, and were reportedly successful in killing a Hurras al-Din local commander and at least four Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leaders.

ISIS and other Islamist groups have increased the volume of attacks in Syria and Iraq, especially targeting oil and gas facilities. On 3 October, ISIS channels released information concerning a large-scale attack on Iraqi security forces in Anbar, which reportedly resulted in eight government casualties.

Militant groups are likely exploiting regional tensions, with coalition forces currently concentrating their efforts on Iranian proxy forces such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). This has likely provided Islamist groups more freedom of movement and groups like ISIS have likely been emboldened by the recent announcement that the US will withdraw its forces from Iraq.


Terror attack in Jaffa, Israel kills seven.

On 1 October, two individuals carried out a gun and knife attack in Jaffa, south Tel Aviv, killing seven and wounding at least eleven. The perpetrators were killed by responding security forces. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack, although the credibility of this claim is uncertain. While the dynamic of the attack remains partly unclear, there is a high likelihood that it will result in spontaneous retaliatory violence in the West Bank, perpetrated by both the IDF and Israeli settlers.


Yemen’s Houthis exchange strikes with Israel and attack two vessels in Red Sea.

After Yemen’s Houthi militants launched a ballistic missile towards Israel on 29 September, reportedly targeting Ben Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv and intercepted by Israeli air defence, Israel’s military conducted air strikes on Hodeida and Ral Isa, Yemen.

The Houthis then claimed they launched several one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) toward Eilat and Tel Aviv, Israel. Their claims that the OWA-UAVs largely bypassed air defence systems, are however likely untrue.

Additionally, the Houthis attacked two vessels in the Red Sea on 1 October, after an almost month-long lull in Houthi anti-merchant shipping attacks. One of the vessels, the Panama-flagged  CORDELIA MOON (IMO: 9297888), was struck by an uncrewed surface vessel (USV), puncturing a ballast tank.

The CORDELIA MOON is reportedly part of Russia’s “dark fleet”, vessels trading under opaque ownership that allow Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, despite an agreement between Russia and the Houthis that exempts Russia-linked vessels from being targeted.


Islamic State Somalia Province (ISSP) reported to have “doubled” in size since 2023.

The group is particularly active in the country’s north. While ISSP is comparatively smaller and less active than other branches of the Islamic State (IS), it benefits from being a hub for the rerouting of funds originating from supporters in Africa, and from its geographical closeness to IS Yemen Province (ISYP).

Reports indicate that the leader of ISSP – Abdulqadir Mumin – is a key figure in the global organisation of IS, and likely acts as the de facto leader of IS’ external operations. Some reports have, moreover, identified Mumin as the current Caliph of IS (the group’s figurehead is currently only known via their nom de guerre). However, this is unlikely as IS has its “heartland” in Iraq and Syria and has heavily emphasised its belief that a “rightful” Caliph should come from Prophet Mohammed’s Quraish tribe – and therefore be ethnically Arab.

ISSP almost certainly remains too small to threaten Mogadishu, other regional powers, or the much larger al-Shabaab. However, ISSP may be following al-Shabaab in exploiting the Somalian state’s current weakness and the rifts between Mogadishu and the breakaway northern region of Puntland, to accelerate recruitment.


Iranian separatist group attacks police forces in Khash.

Militants from the Jish al-Adl group, a Baloch and jihadist separatist militant group which operates in the Iran-Pakistan border area, conducted twin attacks on 1 October in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province. The attacks are estimated to have killed six Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Islamic Republic law enforcement personnel, including a local IRGC commander. Despite Iranian efforts to curtail the activities of militant groups in the Baluch region, groups like Jish al-Adl remain highly operational and are likely capitalising on the continued destabilisation of Afghanistan, where they can easily procure weapons and seek refuge. Moreover, Baluch groups have likely been emboldened by the recent surge of attacks by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Pakistan.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Marburg disease potentially identified in Germany.

A platform was cordoned off at Hamburg Central Station on 2 October over concerns that train passengers were infected with the Marburg virus. A medical student and his partner developed flu-like symptoms after returning from Rwanda where there is a current outbreak of the disease. The Marburg virus, which is transmitted through contact with infected bodily fluids, can cause severe illness with symptoms such as fever, headaches, vomiting, and diarrhoea, and has a mortality rate of approximately 50 per cent according to the World Health Organisation (WHO).


Wildfires in Corinthia, Greece kill two people.

In northwestern Corinthia, approximately 35km northeast of Corinth, two people died as a result of a wildfire that began on 29 September. Two firefighters were also injured. An estimated 11,791 hectares of land were in the burned area. The Greek fire service stated that the fire was suspected to have started accidentally by a beekeeper smoking out hives. Due to its climate, Greece annually experiences significant wildfires. However, due to abnormally severe summer heatwaves, drought, and higher-than-average spring temperatures, 2024 has seen a record number of wildfires in Greece. While wildfires typically primarily occur during the summer months, many wildfires, such as this week’s Corinthia fire, took place earlier or later than normal. This is likely due to the impact of climate change, and the trend will likely continue.


UN calls for increased donations for Yemen due to cholera outbreak.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for Yemen has pleaded for more donations for Yemen due to the spread of cholera in the country. The agency assesses that there are over 186,000 suspected cases and there have been almost 700 associated deaths since March 2024. The outbreak has almost certainly been compounded by heavy rains and years of conflict, which together have strained resources, resulted in poor sanitation and provided the conditions conducive to the spread of waterborne diseases. The outbreak, which has been ongoing since 2016, is estimated to have killed almost 4,000 people, with Yemen accounting for 84-93 per cent of all cholera cases in the world.


Pro-Palestinian demonstrations are expected to occur throughout the Asia-Pacific region during October, particularly around the anniversary of the Israel-Hamas conflict on 7 October. Several protests have already been scheduled throughout the region.

In Australia, a pro-Palestine rally will be held on 7 October near Victoria Barracks. In India, left-wing parties have called for nationwide gatherings on 7 October to demand a ceasefire, and in Indonesia, protests have been organised outside the US Embassy. Protests have also been organised on 7 October or on the preceding days in Malaysia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The vast majority of protests throughout the Asia-Pacific region are likely to be relatively small and peaceful, although travel disruption is forecasted in major city centres due to heightened security measures. However, Australian police have attempted to ban protests on 6-7 October due to the higher likelihood of violence.

Australia is an ally of Israel and has a relatively large Jewish population (c. 100,000), who are expected to hold vigils on 7 October, which are likely to be coveted targets for acts of terrorism. There is also the potential for violence between protestors and counter-protestors in Australia and to a lesser extent in New Zealand.

Impromptu or not publicly announced protests are likely to occur outside of the embassies and consulates of countries providing political and material support to Israel, such as the US, UK and France. Protests are also highly likely outside of Israeli embassies within the region and have previously been observed in Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines.

In Pakistan, two of the country’s largest parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party have announced joint protests on 7 October that will cross the political divide. Protests are likely to develop outside US diplomatic buildings in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar. There is a realistic possibility that militants may seek to attack large gatherings to undermine the government in Pakistan.


The attacks took place on 28-29 September, in the Panjgur and Musakhail districts of Balochistan, and were reportedly carried out by multiple, coordinated groups of militants. As part of the operations, militants attacked a gas and oil exploration company site in Musakhail. In late August, another major attack took place in Musakhail, as gunmen killed 23 individuals, mostly workers from Punjab, after pulling them out of their civilian vehicles. The August attack, as well as other recent raids across the province that resulted in a total death toll of more than 50, were claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA).

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the latest attacks were also carried out by BLA militants. The BLA maintains the strategic objective of eliminating what it sees as “foreign interests” from Balochistan, as part of a broader effort to destabilise the central Pakistani government and pave the way for the creation of an alternative local administration.

Attacking workers and targeting isolated plants and other industrial hubs is likely an attractive strategy to BLA militants due to its relatively low risks – with authorities almost certainly unable to effectively prevent raids – and high political and economic impact. Baloch militants have especially sought to target Chinese interests and workers engaged in projects in Pakistan as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative.

During the Summer, Beijing has increased appeals to Islamabad to allow a greater Chinese security involvement in the country to protect its interests and, in late September, a growing number of reports indicated that the two countries are likely close to agreeing to a deal to create joint security companies. Such a deal would, for the first time, allow Chinese forces to operate as security providers in Pakistan.

Notably, available information indicates that the division of responsibilities is being decided in order to minimise Chinese forces’ “visibility”. This is most likely meant to avoid a backlash that would play into the hands of the BLA and other independentist movements, as well as, possibly, Islamist groups.


Typhoon Krathon made landfall over Kaohsiung on 3 October at typhoon strength, with maximum windspeeds of 160 km/h. The typhoon had weakened, previously reaching category 4 super typhoon strength in the Luzon Strait on 30 September with maximum windspeeds of 241 km/h. While tracking north of the Philippine’s northern Luzon island, the typhoon caused at least 2 deaths and displaced thousands in the Philippines.

In Taiwan, the typhoon caused at least two deaths, with several people still missing, and over 120 injuries. The typhoon caused significant torrential rainfall, with landslides being reported even in far north-east Taiwan. Schools, offices and shops were closed, and 170,000 households were initially left without power, reducing to 51,000.

All domestic flights were cancelled, in addition to 242 international flights, and considerable rail disruption occurred, including the north-south high-speed rail line which suspended services between the central and southern regions. Also on 3 October, a hospital fire killed 9 people at Pingtung County Hospital outside Kaohsiung – the fire is suspected to have been started by an electrical fault, not the typhoon, but response efforts were complicated by the typhoon conditions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Krathon, called Typhoon Julian in the Philippines, was unusual in that firstly, the storm moved slowly, hovering off Taiwan’s coast for an unusually long period before making landfall. Secondly, Taiwan’s west coast is typically not directly hit by typhoons. The last significant storm to cause major casualties in Kaohsiung was Typhoon Thelma in 1977, which caused mass devastation and killed 37 people. Fears that a similar level of impact would occur with Typhoon Krathon did not materialise, almost certainly due to Taiwan’s considerably improved storm resilience and preparedness measures.

38,000 troops were placed on standby for disaster response, sandbags and water pumps were widely distributed, and 10,000 people in high-risk areas were evacuated. Disruption was still widespread, however, and Taiwan’s stock exchange shut for two days for the second time this year after July’s Typhoon Gaemi killed 11 people in Taiwan. The storm has quickly weakened into a tropical depression post-landfall, however, adverse rainfall is forecast to highly likely continue over the coming days in eastern and southern Taiwan.


Anti-judicial reform protests organised in Pakistani capital

From 4 October, schools have been closed and roadblocks established in Islamabad in preparation for a major protest led by former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. The PTI are protesting constitutional amendments that they view as attempts to undermine the independence of the judiciary, a claim denied by the incumbent government.

The government is expected to suspend mobile phone services and issue Section 144 orders that restrict public gatherings. Section 144s have already been issued throughout the Punjab province, including in the cities of Bahawalpur, Faisalabad and Mianwali. The protest in Islamabad is anticipated to draw large crowds to the capital, leading to widespread travel disruption. Furthermore, the police have deployed significant resources to the main protest site near D-Chowk, with recent protests often involving clashes between the security services and the protestors.


Bangladesh interim government pursues constitutional reform

The new government, led by Nobel prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, formed a constitutional reform panel, in a move that was justified by the executive as an effort to prevent a return to authoritarian rule. Moreover, initial reports indicate that the government may pursue constitutional reform prior to calling for a new election. Although such a decision is likely intended to bolster the state’s stability before the upcoming vote, implementing a vertical reform could lead to a resurgence of civil unrest, particularly fueled by militant factions within the post-Hasina coalition.


Japan’s incoming Prime Minister calls for elections in October

Shigeru Ishiba, who is set to replace Fumio Kishida as Japan’s prime minister after winning the leadership vote of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), almost certainly called the vote to re-establish the party’s political legitimacy and to accrue political capital. While Japan has free and fair elections, the LDP has ruled Japan almost uninterruptedly since the end of the Second World War, and the party is highly likely to win the vote. It is, likewise, highly likely that Ishiba also called the vote in order to ensure political stability prior to the 5 November US elections.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Mass-stabbing before China National Day highlights a unique security threat

On 30 September, the eve of the national celebration, a man launched a stabbing attack in a shopping centre the Songjiang district of Shanghai, killing three and injuring at least 15. According to initial reports, the man had been involved in a financial dispute, and was not likely driven by a specific ideology.

Seemingly “random” stabbing attacks have increased over the past year in China – some involving the targeting of foreigners. Chinese authorities have likely sought to underplay these events, with little information, beyond descriptions of attackers being affected by “mental health issues”, being briefed to local and international media. There is a realistic possibility that the growing trend of mass stabbing attacks follows a dynamic comparable to that of “Mudjima” (“don’t ask why”) stabbings in South Korea.

Both countries’ cases often occur in highly trafficked areas – including shopping malls and markets – and are seemingly committed by ideologically “unaligned” individuals. Perpetrators, instead, are often reported as dealing with financial issues or declare themselves as feeling “resentful”, and portray their actions as a way to attack society as a whole. These attacks, moreover, are dissimilar from the “lone wolf” attacks that take place in the West, in that they do not focus heavily on obtaining high visibility – instead maximising the number of casualties – and lack many of the distinctive elements of lone wolf terrorism, such as perpetrators sharing “manifestos” or other media to explain and broadcast their actions and beliefs.


Cambodia invites US Navy to use Chinese-made naval base

Cambodia has stated that the US Navy will be allowed to make port calls at the Ream Naval Base in the Gulf of Thailand. The base, which is being constructed with the help of China, has raised concerns over a permanent People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) outpost adjacent to the southern parts of the contested South China Sea. However, Cambodia’s invitation to the US is likely a deflection from the underlying reality that the base is likely to serve as an obfuscated permanent outpost for the PLAN which is reflective of Phnom Penh’s strategic realignment with China.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Flooding continues in northern Thailand

The economic impact of flooding in Thailand this year has been estimated to be as high as USD 1.4 billion USD, 0.27 per cent of Thailand’s GDP. Torrential rainfall, worsened by the tropical cyclones Typhoon Yagi and Tropical Storm Soulik in September, has led to significant flooding and landslides across northern Thailand, with Chiang Rai province being the hardest hit.

Adverse weather conditions continued in the past week, with weather warnings being issued for all provinces in the North, Northeast and Central Plain, including Bangkok. Thailand’s Prime Minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, stated that Bangkok will not experience substantial flooding like the city did in 2011, due to major dams still having spare capacity.

Although flooding is common during the annual monsoon season, which runs from July to October, authorities indicate that this year has seen the worst flooding in decades, highly likely conditioned by La Niña conditions in the Pacific Ocean.


Protests Expected Amidst Israel-Hamas War Anniversary

Major Cities Prepare for Potential Disruptions as Protests Loom

Intelligence cut off: 11:00 GMT 4th of October 2024

On 7 October 2023, the Palestinian group Hamas launched an offensive from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel, killing 1200 – mostly civilians – and taking more than 200 hostages. The attack represented the start of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. As of October, Israeli troops have been carrying out protracted operations within the Gaza Strip to destroy Hamas and free the hostages that remain in Hamas captivity. More than 41,000 Palestinians – a majority being civilians – have died over almost a year of conflict, and much of Gaza’s residential and public infrastructure has been destroyed or severely damaged, leading to a severe humanitarian crisis.

In late September, the conflict in the Middle East entered a new stage. Following a series of decapitation attacks – which resulted in the death of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other key “Axis of Resistance” figures – which were preceded by a (likely) sophisticated Mossad operation involving the detonation of thousands of communication devices used by Hezbollah members, Israeli forces launched a limited ground offensive into southern Lebanon. On 1 October, Iran – a key Hezbollah ally – responded by launching a barrage of approximately 200 ballistic missiles against Israel. Currently, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units continue operations in Lebanon.

The war has driven a significant increase in international attention towards the broader Israel-Palestine conflict and has been a fundamental motivating factor for numerous cases of civil unrest, as well as political violence and terrorism. With the anniversary of the start of the conflict, and its recent expansion to southern Lebanon, further large-scale unrest is scheduled to take place in dozens of capitals and large urban centres.

In the past weeks, multiple protests have been announced in the period between 5 and 10 October. This period is both highly visible and highly significant from a cultural and political perspective: it begins on the day following Rosh Hashanah, and will also end on the eve of Yom Kippur, thus occupying the space between the two holiest days of the Jewish religious calendar.

Diverse Movements Fueling Global Protests

It would likely be incorrect to speak of a single cohesive international pro-Palestine movement, or of any specific ideology associated with it. Past protests and initiatives, as well as the ones scheduled to take place over the next weeks, have been planned by a series of diverse actors, including groups espousing ideologies that theoretically do not overlap with the Palestinian cause.

This high level of intersection between different local initiatives likely underscores a high level of transnational communication and planning, also facilitated by social and digital media.

In addition to numerous pro-Palestine protests, there also are a large number of pro-Israel demonstrations planned to coincide with the anniversary of the Hamas attack. More ideologically cohesive, these demonstrations have so far been overall smaller, although their volume and traction has heavily varied depending on local political landscapes.

Civil Unrest Risks Across Europe, Asia-Pacific, and the Americas

Europe, and especially north and west Europe, likely is particularly at risk for civil unrest during the period. Protests have been scheduled to take place in multiple capitals and large cities, including London, Paris, Marseille, Rome, Bologna, Warsaw, Madrid, Amsterdam, Athens, Berlin, Vienna, Malmo and Istanbul.

In the Asia-Pacific region, likewise, protests are expected to take place in cities across Australia, New Zealand, India, Japan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea.

The United States will also highly likely be a hotspot for civil unrest around the anniversary of the start of the conflict. American universities spearheaded the global pro-Palestine movement, and almost certainly popularised certain forms of protests – including campus “encampments” – that were replicated by universities in Europe and Oceania.

Government Responses and Restrictions on Protests

The majority of these initiatives have been developed at the activist group and civil society level. However, the high political relevance of the anniversary has likely driven an uncommon degree of government and party involvement in the promotion (or opposition) to the event.

In particular, there are at least two notable cases of direct government intervention to prevent organised unrest from going ahead. In Australia, the police and government initially banned a solidarity “vigil” planned for 7 October in Sydney. The ban on the event – Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the planned demonstration “incredibly provocative” – was eventually overturned following an agreement between the organisers and police.

In Italy, the government did not grant permission for a planned gathering on 5 October in Rome, prompting a severe backlash from both the pro-Palestine activists (who have reiterated their intention to carry out the demonstration) and the left-wing opposition.

In addition to these government-imposed bans, other protests scheduled to take place on university campuses have been prohibited by academic administrators.

There is a high likelihood that there will be an increase in civil unrest in the 5-10 October period (and possibly beyond 13 October, the anniversary of the beginning of Israeli operations in Gaza). Further developments in the conflict, especially in the Lebanese front, could drive rapid changes in the volume and scope of civil unrest incidents.

Increased Security Risks in European Cities

European cities are likely to be particularly at risk. The choice to hold pro-Palestine protests overlapping with the anniversary of the 7 October Hamas attack in southern Israel will likely be perceived as a provocation and almost certainly result in an increased security risk level at the protest locations.

There is a high likelihood of pro-Israel counterprotest groups seeking to disrupt the pro-Palestine gatherings. Likewise, there is a high likelihood of clashes breaking out between protesters and police, especially in cities where clashes have previously occurred (such as Paris), and in those where the protests have not been approved.

The scope and high visibility of the demonstrations are also likely to result in an increased threat from lone-wolf terrorism, either targeting the protesters or high-visibility targets in protest locations, including government buildings and places of worship. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility of foreign actors seeking to leverage European open media spaces to encourage violence, also through the spread of disinformation, in a way similar to the recent Southport riots in the United Kingdom.

Asia-Pacific Region: Comparatively Peaceful Protests

Conversely, the majority of protests throughout the Asia-Pacific region are likely to be comparatively more peaceful. Travel disruptions are still a realistic possibility in major city centres due to heightened security measures.

Potential for Unannounced Protests and Violence

In addition to scheduled gatherings, there is a high likelihood of impromptu or not publicly announced protests being staged outside of the embassies and consulates of countries providing political and material support to Israel, such as the US, UK and France. These protests will likely have a greater risk of violence, and especially vandalism targeting diplomatic assets and offices.

Protests Outside Israeli Embassies and in Pakistan

Protests are also highly likely outside of Israeli embassies within the region and have previously been observed in Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines. In Pakistan, two of the country’s largest parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party have announced joint protests on 7 October that will cross the political divide. Protests are likely to develop outside US diplomatic buildings in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar.

Government Responses and Legislative Developments

The threat of clashes between government and police forces and protesters is particularly likely in countries where the executive is considered to be actively opposed to the protest movement. Again, the cases of Australia and, especially, Italy, are exemplary. In the latter, the recent government refusal to approve the demonstration planned for Rome is also compounded by broader legislative developments. In particular, the Italian lower chamber recently passed a new security law, which has been strongly criticised by the opposition for reportedly restricting freedom of protest. These two developments will likely drive significant civil unrest on 5 October and in the coming weeks in large Italian cities.


NAVIGATING CIVIL UNREST SAFELY

Practical Strategies for Ensuring Safety During Protests and Riots

Explore our comprehensive Civil Unrest Guide, designed to equip travellers with essential strategies for navigating protests, riots, and civil unrest. Learn practical tips on how to stay informed, avoid high-risk areas, and respond effectively in crisis situations, ensuring safety and peace of mind while travelling.


Alert Plus: IDF Launches Ground Offensive in Southern Lebanon

Escalation in the Israel-Lebanon Conflict: Ground Operations and Airstrikes

Intelligence cut off: 12:00 GMT 2nd of October 2024

Shortly after 11:00 pm (local time) on 30 September, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched what they described as a “targeted and delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon”, aimed against “terrorist targets and infrastructures of Hezbollah […] that pose an immediate and real threat to Israeli settlements on the northern border”. The 98th division, which was previously deployed in Gaza and was recently moved to the Israeli-Lebanon border, is spearheading the operations. On the morning of 1 October, IDF officials issued an evacuation order for 25 villages in southern Lebanon. The order includes a call for residents to move north of the Awali River, approximately 50km north of the international border. As of the time of writing, available OSINT shows that IDF operations have been limited, with no attempts at penetrating deep into Lebanese territory.​

Israeli Air Force (IAF) strikes on Beirut and other parts of the country have continued, prompting severe transport disruptions and hundreds of casualties since mid-September. IDF units are currently also engaged in operations to clear Hezbollah tunnels near the Israel-Lebanon border. The high volume of strikes has also caused a mass displacement of Lebanese residents, with some government figures assessing that up to a million individuals have been internally displaced.​

On the afternoon of 1 October, Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack on targets throughout Israel, with reportedly at least 180 missiles being used. Israeli missile defence forces, as well as IAF and allied American and Jordanian air force units, contributed to the interception of the majority of the Iranian projectiles. Nevertheless, this attack was likely more successful at penetrating Israeli defences that the previous large-scale strike in April. Geolocated footage shows multiple missiles impacting areas near sensitive military targets, including the Mossad Headquarters, although no significant damage has been reported as of 2 October 11:00 (BST). The attacks resulted in only one confirmed casualty, a Palestinian civilian which was killed by debris near Jericho, in the West Bank.​

Around the time of the reports of the first wave of missiles, two individuals carried out a gun and knife attack in Jaffa, south Tel Aviv, killing six and wounding at least seven. The perpetrators were killed by responding security forces. No Palestinian or international groups have claimed responsibility for the attack.

IDF ground offensive in South Lebanon map

South Lebanon


Areas of Past Notable Strikes in Beirut, Lebanon Map

Areas of Past Notable Strikes in Beirut


SOLACE GLOBAL COMMENT

The ground operations follows weeks of asymmetric warfare, cross-border exchanges and airstrikes in Lebanon. On 17-18 September, the simultaneous explosion of thousands of pagers and other communication devices, highly likely orchestrated by Mossad, injured or killed at least 3,500 Hezbollah members and was likely shaping activity prior to a wider offensive. ​

From 23 September, the IAF targeted thousands of Hezbollah facilities, assets and units throughout Lebanon, including in Beirut and in the group’s northern stronghold, the Bekaa Valley. On 27 September, a massive IAF strike in the Dahieh area of south Beirut killed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Ali Karaki, the commander of Hezbollah’s southern front, other members of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Abbas Nilforoshan.​​

Before the invasion, Israeli officials rejected a 21-day ceasefire deal proposed by the US, France, and other regional powers. The operations in Lebanon have been accompanied by further statements concerning the Netanyahu administration’s commitment to continuing operations until its strategic goals are reached.​

The Iranian strike also follows a period of escalation. The large missile and drone barrage in April was carried out in response to highly likely Israeli strikes on Iranian diplomatic assets in Damascus, which resulted in the death of senior IRGC officials. Tehran vowed to retaliate after the wave of decapitation attacks carried out by Israel in the late summer, which killed key “Axis of Resistance” leaders, among them Hamas political bureau chairman Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in a likely Mossad operation in Tehran. However, newly elected Iranian President Pezeshkian initially stated that Iran would refrain from attacking Israel while ceasefire negotiations continued.​

Israeli officials have threatened to retaliate for the Iranian strikes. IDF forces at the Lebanon border have increased since the strikes, with elements of the 36th division also being deployed, likely in support of future operations.​


SOLACE GLOBAL ANALYSIS

The IDF’s ground offensive has likely been timed to exploit the current lack of command and control (C2) within Hezbollah which has been achieved through a series of high-profile strikes on the group’s senior leadership.

In September, the Netanyahu administration added the return of Israeli citizens to settlements near the Israel-Lebanon border to their list of stated war aims. The significant degradation of Hamas forces in the Gaza Strip following a year of conflict has also almost certainly allowed Tel Aviv to shift its focus to the north. Israeli officials almost certainly assess that a reduced ground force, combined with a constant threat of airstrikes, will be sufficient to prevent Hamas from reforming units capable of significantly threatening IDF forces in Gaza.

IDF operations are highly likely aimed at destroying Hezbollah assets in the south of Lebanon and preventing the group from targeting north Israel. While Hezbollah maintains some long-range weapons systems, much of the group’s arsenal has a maximum range of ~40km. IDF operations will likely seek to force Hezbollah to retreat north of the Litani River, as per the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701. On 1 October, the IDF announced that it had destroyed at least 700 Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon as part of a previously undisclosed series of covert operations. The latest operations are highly likely meant to expand these efforts, by employing conventional assets.

It is unlikely that the IDF will commit to a long-term occupation of southern Lebanon, which would entail high political and economic costs as well as a high rate of casualties. The IDF’s main objective is likely to clear Hezbollah forces and weapons from areas immediately adjacent to the border. However, deeper raids and strikes aimed at high-value targets like ammo depots, C2 posts,  logistic nodes and launch sites are highly likely.

There is a realistic possibility that part of the Israeli efforts will be aimed at arming and supporting Lebanese militias – particularly Christian ones – that are opposed to Hezbollah. Over the past year, sectarian tensions between Shias, Sunnis, and Maronite Christians have increased in Beirut, and Israeli special operations may seek to leverage these to decrease Hezbollah’s political influence in Lebanon.

The latest attack by Tehran is likely to allow Israeli forces the political justification to increase strikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as strikes on other regional Axis of Resistance members. Israeli forces may seek to capitalise on the  recent decapitation strikes to significantly degrade Hezbollah’s manpower and, especially, weapons stocks as a prelude to a UN-mediated deal on its northern border. An Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal, remains, as of now, extremely unlikely, especially due to the approaching 7 October anniversary, whose political significance likely makes such a deal unthinkable for the Israeli leadership.

Israeli forces will almost certainly retaliate for Iran’s attack. However, it is highly likely that retaliatory strikes targeting Iranian assets or territory will be limited to avoid further escalation and meant at re-establishing deterrence. There is a realistic possibility that Israeli forces will opt to strike Iranian officials and assets in Iraq or Syria, including IRGC members. Moreover, Israeli strikes could also target military targets, including missile launch sites and air defence stations, in Iranian territory, as well as strategic objectives like oil extraction facilities and refineries.

Finally, there is a realistic possibility of Israeli strikes targeting Iranian nuclear programme facilities. While such a course of action has been advocated by “hawkish” elements of the Israeli government, as well as some allied political figures, such a move would highly likely be opposed by London, Washington, and Brussels, as it poses an obvious threat to the possible resumption of nuclear negotiations, which Pezeshkian has repeatedly called for in his recent speech at the UN General Assembly.

On 1 October, at approximately 10:00 (BST), Israeli officials reported that IDF forces have intensified raids in the West Bank, and especially Hebron, in response to the Jaffa terror attack. While the dynamic of the attack still remains partly unclear, there is a high likelihood that it will result in spontaneous retaliatory violence in the West Bank, including in violence involving Israeli settler groups.


Travel Risk Advice: Lebanon and northern Israel

  • ​Avoid all non-essential travel to Lebanon and northern Israel. ​
  • Familiarise yourself with local bomb shelters or reinforced structures.​
  • Avoid all sites and facilities likely deemed as legitimate military targets, such as military installations, government buildings and key infrastructure such as bridges and power plants.​
  • If operating within Israel, ensure that you have downloaded the Red Alert, the Home Front Command and/or Tzofar applications that provide real-time situational awareness regarding rocket, missile and mortar attacks into Israel.
  • Closely monitor announcements from local authorities and media sources for any developments that may severely impact the local security environment.​
  • Ensure that you contact and register with your local embassy or consulate if stuck within Israel or Lebanon.​
  • Always follow all instructions and orders from security forces. 
  • Civil unrest and demonstrations are likely within Lebanon. Travellers are advised to avoid all areas of unrest and to not voice opinions. There is a realistic possibility of sectarian tensions within Lebanon.​
  • Have emergency contact numbers saved on your phone. These should include the local authorities, medical facilities and any consular support. Ensure that mobile phones are charged in case of any losses in electricity. ​
  • Evacuations and internal displacement will lead to widespread travel disruption and congestion on major roads. Ensure vehicles are fuelled, consider alternative routes and ensure that vehicles are loaded with additional fuel, water, food and other critical supplies.​
  • Ensure you have an emergency kit/grab bag with essentials for up to 72 hours, including food, water, flashlights, medications, phone chargers, power banks and first aid supplies.
  • Monitor the Solace Secure platform and trusted local media for relevant updates.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE FOR LEBANON CRISIS

Evacuation Services for Escalating Tensions in Lebanon

With a highly dynamic and evolving security landscape, businesses operating in the region are likely to be considering the evacuation of their employees and/or securing their assets. Beirut’s airport remains operational, but safe travel options may become limited due to the rapidly changing situation on the ground.

Solace Global can help global organisations facilitate for the safe transportation of their people as Western governments prepare for potential evacuations. We offer emergency evacuation services designed to ensure your people’s safety during a crisis.


Week 39: 20 – 27 September

Global Intelligence Summary

abstract blue banner
  • There is a realistic possibility that without diplomatic off-ramps, Israel will launch a limited ground offensive into southern Lebanon.
  • Two JNIM attacks in Togo and Benin on the same day are highly likely reflective of ongoing efforts by Islamist groups to increase their presence in coastal West Africa.
  • Sri Lanka’s newly elected Marxist-leaning president will likely struggle to implement an anti-austerity agenda due to the terms of the IMF bailout.
  • Chinese military exercises conducted near Taiwan were likely practising area denial to prevent Western assistance to Taiwan in the event of a full-scale war.

AMER

USA: Hurricane Helene makes landfall in Florida as category 4 storm

Mexico: Hurricane John causes severe damage on Pacific coast

Sweden: Iran reportedly linked to Quran burnings SMSs

Israel and Lebanon: Israel-Hezbollah conflict significantly escalates

Togo and Benin: Two JNIM attacks in one day in coastal West Africa

Sudan: Government forces launch offensive in Khartoum

Sri Lanka: Marxist-leaning candidate wins presidential election

China and Taiwan: China conducts military exercises and ICBM test


Hurricane Helene made landfall late 26 September in the Big Bend area of Florida. Just before making landfall, the storm was a category 4 hurricane, with maximum sustained wind speeds of 225 kmph. The storm rapidly weakened into a tropical storm as it moved overland.

However, over one million people in Florida were left without power, rising to over two million when including those in Georgia and the Carolinas. Floridian authorities issued evacuation orders, warning that the storm was “unsurvivable” for those in at-risk coastal or low-lying areas. States of emergency were declared in Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, Virginia and Alabama.

The hurricane caused a storm surge, with water levels being recorded as almost two metres higher than the mean average at Clearwater Beach and Cedar Key, with official warnings that this could increase to 4.5-6 metres in Florida’s Gulf Coast. So far, three deaths have been attributed to Hurricane Helene, one in Florida and two in Georgia.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hurricane Helene is the joint fourteenth strongest hurricane to hit the US since records began, and the seventh strongest in Florida. The storm is the eighth named storm of the current Atlantic hurricane season, which the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) forecast would highly likely be an above-normal hurricane season. This was due to the high temperatures recorded in the Gulf of Mexico.

The Gulf of Mexico, where Hurricane Helene formed, has had record-breaking ocean temperatures recorded over the past few years, almost certainly due to climate change. Climate change is highly likely causing more destructive storms, according to climatologists, because of greater moisture evaporation from warmer seas and the simultaneous impact of warmer air retaining more moisture.

So far, however, the NOAA prediction has not occurred – predictions of 17-24 named storms and 13 hurricanes have not materialised with only nine storms and six hurricanes thus far, trending below average, which has confounded the hurricane forecasting community.

While Hurricane Helene has significantly weakened since making landfall, it is highly likely that the death toll will increase once the true extent of the storm’s impact is assessable in its aftermath.


The category 3 hurricane – which had maximum sustained wind speeds of 190 kmph, hit Mexico’s Pacific coast on 23 September, near Punta Maldonado, killing two. On 25 September, the hurricane weakened into a tropical storm, though still had significant record wind speeds of up to 90 kmph.

On 26 September, new forecasts indicated that the storm was once again strengthening over the Pacific Ocean, and could be expected to again become a hurricane and make landfall near the southwestern city of  Lázaro Cárdenas during the weekend. When it did, on Friday, it resulted in another three deaths in Guerrero state.

Hurricane John’s first landfall resulted in widespread disruptions, including the loss of power to at least 100,000 homes on the Pacific coast. The second resulted in less material damage.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the storm’s recorded wind speeds have considerably reduced, adverse rainfall highly likely threatens a continuing risk of flash floods and landslides. In 2023, Hurricane Otis devastated the area, the severity of the damage almost certainly being exacerbated by the lack of modern infrastructure and sufficient rescue resources. Hurricane Otis killed more than 50 people and caused an estimated USD 15 billion in damages.

Initial data suggests that there is a realistic possibility that Hurricane John could result in damages comparable to those caused by Otis. By the end of 24 September, the storm had resulted in more than 10cm of rainfall in parts of Guerrero and Oaxaca. These two states are two of the poorest in Mexico, and further impacts from the storm are likely to be particularly severe. Damages to infrastructure and housing in the region are likely to have important secondary effects. Internal displacement of thousands of individuals is a common driver of civil unrest, and a lack of security presence following the disaster could be leveraged by organised criminal groups to increase smuggling, extortion and trafficking operations in the area.


Argentina’s USD deposits increase

On 23 September, the central bank of Argentina reported that, since December 2023, foreign currency deposits have increased USD 8 billion. While libertarian President Javier Milei has likely abandoned plans to “dollarise” the Argentine economy, at least in the short-to-medium term, his administration has emphasised the need to drastically expand foreign currency reserves which have been depleted by years of crisis.

The latest figures have likely been reached due to a generous amnesty plan, in place until 30 September, which encourages residents to transfer funds held outside the national banking system. While Milei and his supporters will almost certainly hail the news as a triumph of the government’s drastic reforms, the political situation in the country remains unstable.

As recently as 12 September, protesters clashed with police outside the Congress building in Buenos Aires, after Milei vetoed an opposition bill to increase pensions, with further unrest almost certain.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Haiti UN police mission deadline near, as no resolution to conflict in sight

The 12-month mandate of the Kenya-led police mission in Haiti is set to expire in early October. However, the country continues to be plagued by the conflict involving powerful gang networks, which control much of the capital Port-au-Prince as well as nearby rural areas.

Fighting between gangs and the coalition of government and international forces has been particularly heavy in recent weeks, especially near the international seaport of the capital, a key entry point for essential imports. Gangs reportedly opened fire on approaching vessels, and recently allegedly kidnapped two Filipino seamen.

By attacking civilian vessels and thus delaying or blocking the delivery of vital goods, gangs likely aim to become the only welfare provider for the local population, ensuring protracted control.


Increased Hezbollah activity in Latin America a realistic possibility

Due to the recent escalation in conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, it is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah activities in Latin America will increase. In 1994, a Hezbollah-linked bombing at a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, Argentina killed 85 people. Hezbollah has a notable presence in South America, particularly in the “Tri-Border Area” between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, countries that each have sizable Lebanese diasporas.

Hezbollah’s activity in the region over the past decade has primarily been fundraising, with accusations of possible connections to local organised crime groups. As recently as in November 2023, however, Hezbollah was accused of plotting attacks against Jewish communities in Brazil, with two Hezbollah-linked individuals being arrested by Brazilian police.


One dead in attack on Peru gold mine

Authorities have connected the attack, which occurred in the province of Pataz, on the Amazon border, to criminal groups carrying out illegal mining activities in sites used by recognised companies. Since 2022, at least 30 people have been killed in attacks targeting Peruvian gold mines. In December 2023, a raid on a mine in the same province killed nine workers.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Government of St. Lucia reports Dengue fever outbreak.

The announcement follows a reported increase in the number of cases detected since August. At least 205 cases have been identified since January 2024. While reported cases are especially prevalent in the island’s north, particularly Castries and Gros Islet, there is a high likelihood that they will continue to increase across St. Lucia’s territory in the short term.  


On 23 July, Swedish authorities claimed that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sent at least 15,000 SMSs to Swedish Muslims encouraging them to take revenge over Quran burnings in the Summer of 2023. While Sweden permits the desecration of religious texts as part of its constitutional commitment to free speech, the episodes have greatly affected Stockholm’s international position and increased threats to Swedish interests and nationals abroad. In July 2023, a planned Quran burning resulted in the Swedish embassy in Baghdad being attacked by a mob. In October, an Islamic State (IS) sympathiser in Brussels, killed two Swedish football fans.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of the reported messages is likely highly relevant. In 2023, Sweden was still in the process of joining NATO, and facing Turkish opposition – with Ankara also citing the Quran burnings, an increasingly common form of anti-Islam protests in Scandinavian countries, as a reason to deny Swedish entry. Iran therefore likely had a significant incentive to accelerate polarisation in Sweden by encouraging sectarian issues. However, the action was also highly likely linked to broader ongoing Iranian efforts to leverage Muslim communities in Sweden to pursue its global interests. In May 2024, Swedish authorities accused Tehran of taking advantage of organised criminal networks in the country to target Israeli and Jewish individuals and assets.  

Iran is almost certainly not the only country leveraging sectarian divisions in Europe to increase polarisation and divide societies. Russian hybrid operations in Europe have targeted both “sides” of the religious divides, in efforts aimed not at boosting Moscow’s position – but rather at destabilising rival nations. For example, in November 2023, French and Moldovan authorities identified several Moldovan citizens as having been recruited by Russian intelligence to paint dozens of stars of David on multiple buildings in Paris – likely in an effort to stoke both antisemitism and Islamophobia.

While hybrid operations require a level of coordination and expenditure, social media has increasingly enabled authoritarian regimes to carry them out. First, the mostly open media spaces in democracies allow for the easy propagation of inflammatory material and disinformation, including disingenuous calls to violence. Secondly, and more subtly, open media environments where users share their identities and opinions also allow authoritarian states to identify potential supporters and sympathisers, enabling the recruitment of internal actors.


The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted extensive airstrikes across Lebanon, reportedly killing at least 600 people. The strikes have primarily hit targets in southern Lebanon south of the Litani River and the Beqaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, but also Beirut.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, regularly launched rocket and missile attacks at targets in Israel. These strikes have been primarily targeted at northern Israel, including both civilian and military targets including a Rafael Advance Defence Systems complex near Haifa which has been targeted numerous times, as much of Hezbollah’s weapon arsenal has a maximum range of ~40km. Hezbollah also attempted to strike the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv with a longer-range ballistic missile, but this was intercepted.

The US and France proposed a 21-day temporary ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, however, this has so far been dismissed by the Netanyahu administration. IDF leadership informed Israeli troops that operations are being conducted to prepare for a possible ground offensive into Lebanon.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the aftermath of the 17 and 18 September remote detonations of Hezbollah tactical communication devices (highly likely conducted by Mossad), the extensive IDF airstrikes and increased Hezbollah rocket attacks mark a further significant escalation in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip have evolved into low-intensity counterinsurgency operations, with Hamas brigades likely assessed by the IDF as defeated (no longer able to function as cohesive military units, although still able to conduct opportunistic attacks) in large sections of Gaza, and the IDF has been moving units to northern Israel over the last two months. The return of the approximately 60,000 residents to northern Israel, who left due to the threat of Hezbollah rocket attacks, has been made an official war goal for Israel.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, has engaged Israel over the past year in what Hezbollah leadership highly likely calculated were sub-threshold attacks in solidarity with Palestine, to pressure Israel with multi-front attritional warfare to force it to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza that would allow Hamas to remain as a viable political and military force.

Without diplomatic off-ramps, even further escalation is currently likely. This is firstly because the Israeli war goal is only achievable with a cessation of Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel, which is militarily highly likely only achievable with a ground offensive. Secondly, Hezbollah likely cannot cease their rocket attacks without losing all credibility.

The 2006 Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah exposed several limitations in the IDF, which were too reliant on airpower and did not have the required public support to justify the predicted level of troop fatalities for a major ground offensive into Lebanon.

If the IDF conducts a ground offensive into Lebanon, it would most likely consist of a limited offensive in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. Israeli officials have cited UN Security Council Resolution 1701, issued after the 2006 war, which calls for the removal of Hezbollah forces south of the Litani River, as justification for a possible ground offensive.

Hezbollah, however, has a much stronger force than Hamas, with an estimated 50,000 fighters and 150,000 rockets and missiles. It is likely that an IDF ground offensive would incur a relatively high number of casualties, which may in turn increase domestic political and public pressure in Israel against the war.

There is an additional risk of regional escalation, as groups in Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’, the informal coalition of Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, may intensify attacks against Israel as part of the ‘Unity of the Arenas’ strategy – the coordination of Axis of Resistance forces to necessitate a multi-front war. Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds in Iraq have both called for increased attacks against Israel. Iran, meanwhile, has yet to carry out retaliation strikes against Israel for the 31 July assassination of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, which has been repeatedly vowed by Iranian military and political figures.


On 23 September, the al-Qaeda aligned Islamist group, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) released claims to have attacked government forces in both Togo and Benin. In Togo, JNIM operatives reportedly used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack a Togolese army patrol to the east of Kankanti, in the north of the country. In Benin, JNIM claimed to have attacked a Beninese army installation in Bangoun, close to the border with Niger, killing two soldiers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs), like JNIM and other groups aligned to the Islamic State (IS) are especially active further north, in the three junta states of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, it is highly likely that they are pushing to obtain a presence closer to the coast. Coastal states, like Togo, Benin, and Ghana, are comparatively richer, and VEOs likely aim to leverage their resources to both strengthen their operations in West Africa and to support their associates abroad. Moreover, by forcing West African nations to divert resources internally, VEOs will likely achieve more freedom of movement in the Sahelian states. Increased attacks may also enable VEOs to increase their funding, propaganda and recruitment, especially in the northern regions of West African states where there are often disenfranchised local populations.

The ongoing tensions between the junta states and the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are likely to play into the hands of the Islamist groups, by preventing meaningful cooperation on counterterrorism operations. Despite the attempts at mediation by Senegal’s government, recent developments continue to highlight the overall decay in ECOWAS-AES states. On 23 September, the same day as the JNIM attacks, Burkina Faso’s ambassador to Ghana was reportedly sacked following the junta’s accusations that Ghana’s government is sheltering groups seeking to oust the Burkinabe leader Ibrahim Traore.


The Sudanese military lost most of the capital to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) at the beginning of the conflict in April 2023. The latest stage of fighting, which has quickly resulted in major early gains for the government forces, began with airstrikes on 26 September. Government forces are pushing southeast from the city of Omdurman, which is separated from Khartoum by the White Nile. Reports from local media have indicated that the fighting has already resulted in “hundreds” of casualties, although it is extremely difficult to assess its impact as of the time of writing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The offensive is highly likely intended to push RSF forces south of the capital, and possibly at gaining control of the entire Khartoum region. Importantly, the operation in Khartoum is likely also meant to relieve some pressure from al-Fasher, in north Darfur, where government forces are besieged by the RSF.

Currently, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) forces have almost certainly taken control of key bridges over the White Nile to the northwest of the city centre, and have highly likely obtained a bridgehead in areas of Khartoum previously under RSF forces. Securing tenable positions in Khartoum would allow government forces to solidify control over neighbouring Omdurman, where SAF clearance operations have been concentrated during the summer.

In August, operations focused on neighbourhoods adjacent to the river, as well as to the city’s west. It is almost certain that these advances in Omdurman were a prelude to the ongoing offensive into Khartoum. Retaking Khartoum is a fundamental political objective for the Sudanese authorities, and the launching of the attack was highly likely planned to coincide with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 26 September.

Urban fighting in Khartoum is likely to be extremely costly and will highly likely pose a severe threat to civilians present in the city. While initial reports of SAF advances may indicate that RSF units were unprepared to meet the offensive over the river, there is a realistic possibility that the frontlines will gradually solidify south of Khartoum’s city centre. Both sides continue to heavily rely on artillery to support operations, and it is highly likely that artillery fire will intensify as the SAF’s advance slows, which continues to be one of the main drivers of civilian deaths in the conflict.


France’s new Prime Minister unveils government

Centre-right politician Michel Barnier, appointed by President Macron to try to resolve months of political crisis following a stalemate at the recent National Assembly elections, assembled a cabinet which has been widely described as drastically tilting the executive to the right.

The new cabinet members are from Macron’s centrist coalition, as well as from the Republicans (LR), Barnier’s party. Some of them, like new Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau, are considered to be part of the right-wing of LR. It is likely that the appointments are meant to obtain at least the informal support of the far-right National Rally (RN), led by Marine Le Pen.

Still, it is highly likely that the new government remains unstable. In particular, the left is highly likely to increase action against Macron, possibly calling for protests.


Significant civil unrest likely in Paris during the weekend

Multiple protests have been scheduled to take place in Paris (and other major French cities) starting on 27 September. The increase in civil unrest is likely to be driven by the increase in Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon, by the appointment of a new, right-leaning government, and by the ongoing “impeachment” procedure against Macron, which is scheduled to be reviewed by the National Assembly on 2 October. There is a realistic possibility of clashes between left-wing protesters and police. Finally, as highlighted by cases from Lyon and Paris, there is a remote possibility of groups of far-right militants attacking left-wing demonstrations to disrupt them and injure participants, especially in urban centres with a large far-right presence.


German government narrowly survives Brandenburg elections

Following the first victory for a far-right party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), in a German state since 1945, the elections in Brandenburg were narrowly won by the Social Democrats (SPD) in what was almost certainly a crucial boost for the unstable coalition government. The AfD still finished second, winning 29.2 per cent of the vote (compared to the SPD’s 30.9 per cent).

Despite multiple controversies, the AfD has made important gains, especially among younger demographic groups. The result in Brandenburg will highly likely give Chancellor Olaf Scholz greater room for political manoeuvre in the short term. However, with the rise of the AfD, it is highly likely that the SPD, as well as the other major parties – the Greens and the Christian Democrats – will be increasingly forced in local-level “cordon sanitaire” deals to keep the far-right away from power.

The Greens have performed particularly poorly in recent elections – also due to important losses among their traditionally younger base of voters – and, following the vote in Brandenburg, party leaders Omid Nouripour and Ricarda Lang resigned.


Austrian right likely to win elections

The legislative elections will be held on 29 September. The vote is for the National Council, the lower Austrian chamber. According to the latest available polling data, the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) is on track to win the most votes (forecasts indicate it may win 25-27 per cent of the vote). The centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) is in a narrow second place, with 25 per cent of the vote according to polls. The Social Democrats (SPÖ) are assessed as having 21 per cent of preferences.

The current vote split presents a very divided situation, with no clear majority in sight. The ÖVP is currently in a coalition with the Greens, who are however likely to perform significantly worse than in 2019. There is a realistic possibility of an FPÖ victory leading to the formation of a FPÖ-ÖVP alliance, with the latter in a junior position.

Such an alliance would almost certainly result in the (at least partial) implementation of some of FPÖ’s more draconian policies, likely increasing the overall risk of civil unrest in Austria.


Burkina Faso claims to have stopped coup attempt

The junta of Burkina Faso announced that it stopped a “Western-backed” coup attempt. The Burkinabe junta, in power since 2022, has been greatly destabilised by a growing Islamist insurgency, with Islamist militants carrying out multiple attacks on government forces and civilians essentially at will. On 24 August, JNIM militants killed hundreds of civilians who were building defences for the town of Barsalogho.

The junta accused the West, as well as multiple ECOWAS states, of planning a coup to pursue their interests. These accusations highly likely reflect a growing internal worry about the police of a government collapse, or a palace coup, which was made increasingly likely by the repeated failures of junta forces. Junta leader Ibrahim Traore has notably limited his diplomatic trips in recent months, almost certainly due to the threat of a palace coup.

Finally, on 25 September, an AES “special judicial unit” opened an investigation on a France24 journalist who reported on the August attack in Burkina Faso and other Islamist operations in the region. Attempts to stifle foreign and domestic oversight on junta military failures are likely to increase as the juntas’ situations worsen. Junta governments across the Sahel are likely to prioritise regime survival over the protection of citizens, providing VEOs more opportunity to conduct attacks.


Benin arrests three suspected putschists

On 25 September, authorities announced the arrest of three officials, including a presidential guard commander, for allegedly planning a coup. The action was reportedly planned for 27 September, and would have likely entailed the removal of President Patrice Talon. Talon’s second term ends in 2026, and one of the putschists has declared his intention to contest the presidency at the next vote.


Son of Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni says he will not run in 2026, endorses father

Muhoozi Kainerugaba is Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, and is largely seen as a possible successor to his father, who has been in power since 1986. Uganda is an authoritarian state, and the regime maintains control both via the armed forces and via a system of clientelism with local armed groups that maintain a degree of independence from Kampala. The 2026 elections are almost certain to be neither free nor fair and are highly likely carried out to further bolster the regime’s claim to authority. Museveni is currently 80, and, while his son is likely the main candidate to replace him, there is a realistic possibility of a succession crisis arising from Uganda’s fragmented internal security structure.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Russia revises nuclear doctrine

On 25 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted changes to the country’s nuclear weapons doctrine during a meeting of the state’s Security Council. The changes most notably include a provision that, if a non-nuclear state attacks Russia “with the participation of a nuclear state”, then the action will be considered a “joint attack”. It is likely that this point is in connection to ongoing discussions by NATO members on whether to allow Ukraine to use Western-supplied weapons to strike deep inside internationally recognised Russian territory.

It is, however, highly unlikely that this note departs from Russia’s broader “nuclear sabre-rattling” practice, which has been ongoing since the beginning of the conflict. In fact, Ukraine’s ongoing operations in the Kursk Oblast – which includes NATO-procured equipment – likely already meet the threshold that would justify Russian nuclear retaliation, according to their revised doctrine.

Russia is more likely to increase elements of its hybrid doctrine against the West, including increased incidents of espionage, sabotage, disinformation and cyber-attacks.


Third reported Islamic State (IS) prison riot in Russia

On 24 September, reports emerged that a group of individuals associated with IS were detained while trying to break out of a detention facility in the Novgorod region of Russia. In August, four people were killed when four IS detainees launched an attack inside another prison in Volgograd, while in June a prison riot occurred in Rostov, where six IS inmates were killed by responding special forces. The latest case in Nizhny was reportedly stopped in its earliest stages, and no casualties have been reported. As of now, it is unclear if the individuals were radicalised in prison or were arrested for associating with IS.


Junta and Wagner forces likely to launch another offensive in Kidal, Mali

On 23 September, satellite imagery identified at least two separate convoys – likely consisting of combined junta and Wagner forces – moving north towards the stronghold region for the Tuareg rebels. Early reports suggest that the buildup could be aimed at an offensive towards Tin Zaouatine, at the Algeria-Mali border. It is highly likely that the operation is linked to the repeated setbacks suffered by the AES juntas and by their Russian security providers over the last few months, especially the disastrous ambush in Mai’s north in July, and the more recent attack in Bamako.

A successful military operation would allow Wagner forces to save face at home after the recent setbacks, which have added to ongoing worries about the viability of the group’s current operational approach and calls to accelerate the group’s transition to being fully controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defence as the ‘Africa Corps’. They would also provide important political capital to the Malian junta, which has faced significant domestic backlash following the Bamako attack.

In August, Malian and Burkinabe forces conducted drone strikes near Tin Zaouatine, resulting in multiple civilian deaths and likely no significant military progress. It is highly likely that large-scale Wagner-Malian operations would result in high civilian casualties in the area. Finally, even if the operation against the Tuaregs succeeds, it is unclear whether it would have any adverse impact on IS and JNIM, the latter posing the main threat to Bamako.


Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) carries out attack on Nigerien forces in Inkiwan

According to video and photo evidence, at least 30 Nigerien troops were killed in the attack, and ISSP forces also captured significant quantities of military equipment. The position of the Nigerien junta is likely as unstable as Burkina Faso’s junta, and the recent attack continues to reflect the general unpreparedness of local militaries to combat the growing insurgency. Out of the three AES members, Mali likely benefits from the greater presence of Russian troops, although the military government remains unstable.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Belarussian authorities restrict forest access due to risk of wildfires

The fire season in the country usually begins much earlier in the year. However, a red alert was declared in mid-September in the three regions of Gomel, Mogilev and Brest, and fires have continued throughout the month. Significant parts of Belarus’ area, like Canada’s, are marked as peatlands. However, only one-third of local peatlands are reported to be at a “natural” or “nearly natural” state, the rest having been drained for agricultural use. Drained peatlands are particularly conducive to wildfires. Moreover, peatlands store large amounts of carbon dioxide, which is released via combustion.


Egypt warns of possible cholera outbreak

The Egyptian health minister has carried out water testing in the Aswan region, following an increase in hospitalisations with stomach flu symptoms, which have driven worries of a possible spread of cholera from neighbouring Sudan. Reports from 25 September indicate that more than 430 people died from the illness in Sudan in August alone, with the ongoing conflict almost certainly creating severe difficulties in obtaining treatment.


The tightly contested election took place on 21 September. The leader of the far-left Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party Anura Kumara Dissanayake won, contesting the election as part of the leftist National People’s Power (NPP) coalition. The election was the closest in Sri Lanka’s democratic history. Sri Lanka uses a limited ranked voting electoral system where voters preferentially rank candidates and the winner requires over 50 per cent. Dissanayake won on the second count, the first case since presidential elections began in 1982. Dissanayake dissolved Parliament and called a parliamentary election for 21 November. The NPP only had 3 seats in parliament. While the president can issue executive orders, Dissanayake will need the support of parliament to pass laws.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The primary issue that influenced the result of the election likely was the ongoing economic crisis in Sri Lanka. The economic crisis has consisted of chronic inflation, shortages of essential goods and considerable international debt. In 2022, the crisis led to mass power outages, and fuel shortages led to the disruption of public transport and even medical transport. Following mass unrest across the country, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country. The economic crisis was at least in part, highly likely due to structural issues with the Sri Lankan economy. Following the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009, the government focused on the provision of goods domestically, rather than international trade – this limit of exports led to the economy becoming disproportionately import-focused, which resulted in Sri Lanka essentially running out of foreign currency reserves.

Rajapaksa’s replacement, Ranil Wickremesinghe, declared a nationwide state of emergency after coming into power. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has given Sri Lanka a USD 2.9 billion bailout, with conditions regarding the implementation of substantial austerity measures. The austerity measures implemented by Wickremesinghe have generated mass discontent and Dissanayake’s defeat of Wickremesinghe has highly likely been enabled by this. Dissanayake ran on an anti-corruption and anti-austerity platform and has promised to renegotiate the IMF deal.

The JVP party, which Dissanayake leads, conducted armed insurrections in the 1970s and 80s. While still Marxist-leaning, Dissanayake has moderated the more extreme far-left tendencies of the party. A comparison can be made with the 2015 election in Greece, where the far-left Syriza coalition was elected to power following the imposition of austerity by the ‘Troika’, which the IMF was part of. Like in Greece, where Syriza ultimately capitulated to the demands of the IMF, it is likely that Dissanayake’s far-left coalition will have to equally make significant concessions, which may in turn generate unrest.


On 25 September, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) announced the detection of 43 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and eight People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels around Taiwan. According to the MND, 34 of the aircraft “crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait”, entering Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ). Chinese aircraft, including J-16 fighters and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), reportedly flew through the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan and then up past Taiwan’s eastern coast. On 26 September, the MND announced the detection of a further 29 Chinese aircraft patrolling with warships. The aircraft did not enter Taiwan’s territorial airspace. Additionally, on 25 September, China conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test, launching the missile into the Pacific Ocean.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The military exercises were likely to practice area denial to “stop foreign assistance” during a China-Taiwan war, in addition to air superiority and air refuelling. In the event of a major war in Taiwan, it is highly likely that the PLA would enforce a naval blockade and no-fly zones. Unlike Ukraine, where NATO members have been able to continually supply and resupply the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) across Ukraine’s substantial land border with friendly nations, Taiwan would effectively be cut off from the rest of the world in the event of a full-scale invasion.

In this scenario, evacuation options would be extremely limited without the provision of internationally agreed evacuation corridors. A full-scale invasion of Taiwan, however, would likely require the largest amphibious operation in military history, dwarfing the WWII Normandy landings in scale. Because of this, such a scenario would most likely be preceded by a significant and observable military buildup by the PLA, likely under the pretext of being “military exercises”, with the movement of considerable blood supplies and other key medical supplies being an especially notable development that would suggest imminent invasion.

An alternative scenario, that could precede a wider offensive, would be China seizing the Kinmen islands, a small group of Taiwan-controlled islands just off the coast of Fujian province in southeastern China – this would test the will of US-led international support for Taiwan in honouring defence obligations. Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels regularly sail into Kinmen’s restricted waters, 42 times this year and twice just on 26 September.  

The ICBM test conducted by China on 25 September was likely a display of China’s strategic nuclear deterrence against Western intervention, in addition to the practical testing value. Chinese authorities notified the US of the test, and warned the Japanese Coast Guard about “space debris”. Such a test is rare, in that Chinese ICBM tests are generally conducted unannounced in isolated provinces like Inner Mongolia rather than in the Pacific Ocean.

The ICBM was highly likely launched from China’s Hainan Island in the South China Sea, indicating that it was launched from a road-mobile platform such as a DF-31 or DF-41, instead of an inland static silo. The launch’s location in the increasingly contested South China Sea likely further adds to the test’s value as demonstrative deterrence, while the launch platform indicates the continuing diversification and advancement of China’s nuclear capabilities.


Protests in India over labour codes.

On 23 September, thousands of protesters gathered in multiple large cities in India, including Kolkata, New Delhi and Lucknow. The unrest is linked to demands to repeal labour codes which local unions consider to be skewed in favour of large multinational corporations.

The nationalist government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been marked by policy reforms meant to make India more competitive as a manufacturing hub, with a particular focus on high-demand sectors like microchip manufacturing. Modi’s bid to compete with China and Southeast Asia states hinges on maintaining low labour costs and a lax bureaucratic environment.

Lack of pay increases, however, combined with poor safety standards and increased economic inequality, especially notable in large urban centres, is increasingly driving civil unrest. The recent protests are highly likely to be contextualised alongside the ongoing labour strike at a Samsung plant near Chennai, in the country’s south.


Japan’s ruling party leadership vote to replace Prime Minister Fumio Kishida

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has ruled Japan for much of its post-war history and remains uncontested despite significant scandals, including a recent corruption probe. Fumio Kishida announced that he would resign in August. Former Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba narrowly won the contest after a runoff vote and is scheduled to replace Kishiba in October. It is unlikely that the appointment will have drastic consequences for Japan’s domestic politics and economics. However, the appointment is likely to be relevant from a foreign policy perspective, as Ishiba is widely considered to offer a bolder strategic outlook than some of his competitors for the position. Ishiba will almost certainly continue to deepen Japan’s cooperation with the US and South Korea, regardless of who is elected to the White House in November.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

New “anti-Taliban” group announces first attack in Afghanistan

A newly-established group, called Jibhat al-Ribat, claimed responsibility for assassinating a Pakistani Taliban (TTP) leader in the Paktika province of Afghanistan. While this is the first claimed operation by the group, its existence was already reported by pro-Taliban channels in August, with claims that it was “created” by the government of Pakistan to combat the Taliban. No corroborating evidence for this claim is available but the targeted assassination of a TTP commander across the border – and its reporting in the group’s propaganda as the killing of a “terrorist” – likely demonstrates that the group maintains a clear anti-Taliban position.


Japanese warship transits the Taiwan Strait

It is the first time since the Second World War that a Japanese warship – destroyer “Sazanami” – transited the contested passage. The 10-hour transit was conducted alongside Australian and New Zealander vessels and resulted in a complaint by Beijing. The move is likely highly symbolic and highlights the continuation of Japan’s transition towards a more confrontational stance towards China. The transit, moreover, was almost certainly a response to the recent passage of a Chinese aircraft carrier near the Japanese island of Yonaguni, located east of Taiwan.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Mpox clade 1b variety identified in India.

At least one case was reported in Kerala, affecting an individual travelling to India from the UAE.

Clade 1b was first identified in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and is characterised by a higher transmission rate than other strains, as well as more severe symptoms. The high population density that characterises Indian urban centres entails a realistic possibility that more Mpox cases could be identified in the coming weeks.


Week 38: 13 – 20 September

Global Intelligence Summary

blue abstract background
  • The ELN’s attack on a Colombian army base will almost certainly derail the peace process between the government and the militant group.
  • The operation detonating thousands of Hezbollah communication devices in Lebanon will almost certainly escalate regional tensions.  
  • JNIM’s attack on a Malian military airport in Bamako is almost certainly the most severe defeat suffered by the junta, and has likely damaged the junta’s stability.
  • The first conviction under the new Hong Kong security law almost certainly signals the advancing progress of Beijing’s control over the business hub.

AMER

USA: Trump targeted in another assassination attempt

Martinique: Large-scale urban violence breaks out

Colombia: ELN attacks army base

Central Europe: Storm Boris floods large parts of Europe

Lebanon: Thousands of Hezbollah communication devices detonate

Jordan: Technocrat prime minister appointed after Islamist electoral gains

Mali: JNIM attacks Bamako military airport

China: Two tropical cyclones hit Shanghai in one week

Hong Kong: First citizen convicted under new security law


On 15 September, US Secret Service agents opened fire at an individual at the golf club owned by former President Donald Trump in West Palm Beach, Florida. The individual – later identified as a 58-year old US citizen – reportedly was spotted by agents as he aimed a scoped rifle through the perimeter fence of the golf club. After being fired at, the individual escaped on foot and was subsequently arrested uninjured.

According to available reports, the individual, who intended to assassinate Trump, never had the former President in his sights and did not fire any shots. Trump claimed that the rhetoric used by his Democrat Party opponents is a major factor in driving targeted violence against him.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The suspect has a large online and legacy media footprint, as well as a criminal record, including a charge for possessing a “weapon of mass destruction” in 2002. On his various social media profiles, he shared pro-Palestine, pro-Taiwan content, and had reportedly carried out efforts to encourage US citizens to move to Ukraine to join foreign units fighting for Kyiv.

It is almost certain that the most recent assassination attempt was inspired by the first one that occurred in Butler, Pennsylvania, in July. The dynamic of the latest attempt – with the shooter waiting in an easily-accessible area of the golf course’s perimeter – suggests a low degree of organisation and sophistication. Nevertheless, some elements – including the Go-Pro wearable camera retrieved on the scene – suggest that the suspect sought to either livestream his action or boost its visibility via online broadcasting.

It is highly likely that this incident will further contribute to the polarisation of the ongoing electoral campaign, and there is a realistic possibility of further copycat actions targeting US politicians or government officials. Moreover, the scope of possible security threats is likely to extend beyond the US – due to the extremely high visibility of former President Trump, attempts on his life may drive copycat actions in third countries. Finally, as in the previous case, the assassination attempt resulted in the widespread online sharing of conspiracy theories, some likely meant to instigate lone wolf terrorist attacks on specific private companies or individuals. It is highly likely that this rhetoric will continue to be spread on social media in the weeks prior and immediately after the election.


Overnight on 16 September, major urban violence occurred in the Saint-Therese neighbourhood of Fort-de-France. A group of individuals set up barricades on the road and targeted police officers and vehicles with gunfire and Molotov cocktails. The unrest lasted for much of the night and at least seven police officers and one rioter were injured.

Authorities responded aggressively, with allegedly more than 300 tear gas canisters being used on the night in attempts to quell the unrest. As a result of the unrest, looting and vandalism occurred at the port of Fort-de-France. Only two arrests were reported.

On 18 September, an overnight curfew was announced in the Dillon and Jambette areas of Fort-de-France between the hours of 21:00 and 05:00.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This violence follows a recent trend in Martinique of police officers being targeted by gunfire. On 2 September six police officers were shot and injured during unrest in Fort-de-France and, on 6 September, the Fort-de-France police station was targeted with gunfire by two suspects, causing no casualties.

The recent unrest is occurring in parallel with protesters demanding that retailers align their prices with those charged in mainland stores. There have been multiple calls for nationwide protests until demands are met. It is highly likely a higher number of police officers will be deployed to deter future unrest, particularly in the Saint-Therese neighbourhood.

Further outbreaks of violence remain likely until the government responds to the protests. A general strike is also a realistic possibility. In 2009 a strike occurred in the Fort-de-France with an estimated 11,000 people involved, paralysing the capital. The strike action in 2009 was successful in its aims to get the minimum salary increased, and so it is possible the government agree to the protesters’ demands as an attempt to stop the protests and violence.


The National Liberation Army (ELN) attacked the installation in the northeastern Arauca province on 17 September. Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated that the attack “practically closes” peace talks. The ceasefire in place between the ELN and the Colombian government expired in August. The government has simultaneously pursued separate peace talks with ELN splinter groups.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Both sides accused the other for the failure of the ceasefire agreement. In August, government officials stated that the military would resume operations against the ELN, likely reflecting Colombia’s government assessment of a better strategic position to combat the group. The ELN, which is assessed as having 6,000 active members, has strongholds in the departments of Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Arauca, with a smaller presence in more than a dozen other Colombian departments.

Moreover, the ELN operates transnationally and has a sanctuary in Venezuelan territory, where it maintains friendly relations with pro-regime forces. The recent ELN attack is likely a reflection of ELN’s leaders’ confidence in the group’s ability to conduct protracted armed struggle against the government while retaining its main drug-related sources of income. Moreover, it is likely an attempt at destabilising the government’s parallel efforts to strike a ceasefire with rival splinter groups in disputed regions, such as the Comuneros del Sur, in Nariño.

Contrary to the assessment that the ELN has improved its position, President Gustavo Petro claimed that the ELN is “stagnant”. This assessment, however, appears untenable, as it both contradicts official government assessments of ELN growth and does not provide a clear explanation for the group’s decision to directly attack the military.


Haiti’s transitional administration sets up electoral council

As of the time of writing, there is no clear exact date for the elections, which are scheduled to be held by 2026. The gangs, which still control much of the country despite the arrival of a Kenya-led, UN-backed police contingent, are likely to continue attacks against officials, as part of their likely strategy to delay the creation of alternative administrative bodies that could challenge their authority.


Venezuelan authorities claim arrested Americans were planning coup

On 15 September, Venezuelan channels released more information about six American citizens, including a former Navy SEAL, arrested in the country in August. According to pro-regime sources, the six were planning a coup to oust Maduro.

It is highly likely that the Venezuelan regime is increasing efforts to provoke a domestic “rally round the flag” effect to minimise the risk of further post-election protests. Detaining foreigners – especially US citizens – allows the Maduro regime to bolster its claims of being under attack from abroad, while also granting greater leverage for future negotiations in the form of political prisoners.

It is highly likely that the regime will take advantage of further opportunities to arbitrarily detain foreign travellers to the country.


Evo Morales supporters clash with counterprotesters in Bolivia

The former president called for his supporters to join a “March to Save Bolivia” from Caracollo to La Paz. The march was initially peaceful but was reportedly attacked by supporters of current President Luis Arce. The two sides then clashed using improvised bombs, among other weapons. Tensions have remained high in Bolivia since the attempted coup in late June. Morales has announced plans to run in the 2025 presidential election, and will likely continue stoking unrest to retain a central position in the country’s politics.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

At least 30 killed so far in Sinaloa, Mexico in cartel clashes

Heavy fighting in Sinaloa state between two rival factions of the powerful Sinaloa cartel, formerly led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, started on 9 September. Clashes have been particularly severe in the state capital, Culiacan. In July, Sinaloa leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada was arrested by US authorities after being reportedly lured onto a private plane by one of El Chapo’s sons, Joaquín Guzmán López, which then landed in El Paso, Texas.

Since then, it is almost certain that a power struggle has broken out between those loyal to El Chapo’s other sons, the “Chapitos”, and those loyal to Zambada. This is highly likely the primary cause for the clashes, effectively a cartel civil war.

While 2,200 personnel from the military and National Guard have been sent to Sinaloa, it is unlikely security forces will be able to quell the violence without substantial reinforcements. The outgoing Mexican President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), has adopted a policy of “hugs not bullets” against the cartel, seeking to resolve Mexico’s endemic crime problem with job opportunities and training programs, a policy that will highly likely be continued by his successor Claudia Sheinbaum.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Brazilian wildfires continue

Severe droughts are exacerbating the strength and spread of wildfires in Brazil, as authorities continue to struggle to combat a particularly intense wildfire season in the Amazon this year. On 15 September, the Supreme Court authorised the lifting of spending restrictions for wildfire and drought response in the Amazon and Pantanal regions.

It is highly likely that, while the drought conditions continue, authorities will struggle to contain the fires. In addition to the widespread agricultural impact and threat to residents in the Amazon and Pantanal regions, air quality has been considerably lowered in the major cities of Sao Paulo and Brasilia, which has led to flight disruptions and school closures.


At least 24 people have been killed by large-scale flooding in multiple European countries, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Romania, Hungary, Germany, and Italy. The flooding was caused by a low-pressure storm which stemmed from a Genoa low, a relatively rare weather system which develops south of the Alps, and which was favoured by extremely high surface water temperatures in the Mediterranean Sea. After affecting Central Europe, where it caused more than EUR 1 billion in damages according to early reports, the storm moved southwards to Italy, where it caused widespread flooding in the region of Emilia Romagna.   

Solace Global Assessment: 

Researchers have predicted that the damages from storm Boris will reach the EUR 2 billion threshold by 20 September. Indirect damages from the floods will highly likely be much higher – the 2023 floods in Emilia Romagna alone caused damages of EUR 8.5 billion – and especially notable in regions that have lower flood-resilient infrastructure. The European Union has already pledged EUR 10 billion from the emergency “cohesion funds”. Infrastructural damage will almost certainly have short-term consequences for travellers and residents in the affected areas.

It is highly likely that the storm’s severity was affected by climate change. In 2024, extremely high Mediterranean Sea surface water temperatures were recorded, with season highs of above 31 degrees Celsius. Protracted high temperatures allow a greater level of atmospheric humidity, and therefore likelier severe precipitation events. Researchers have also argued that climate change also favours a phenomenon known as “atmospheric blocking”, whereby lack of movement between high- and low-pressure zones favours persistent weather conditions in the summer, with high-pressure areas experiencing protracted clear weather, possibly leading to drought, and low-pressure areas being at risk of considerable heavy rainfall.


On 17 September thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah members simultaneously detonated across Lebanon. At least 12 deaths were reported, including the son of a Hezbollah MP, and approximately 3,000 injuries, including Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon. Then, on 18 September, thousands of walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah members detonated, with unconfirmed reports that other devices such as home solar energy systems and biometric fingerprint scanners also exploded. 20 deaths were reported, with 450 injuries. Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed retribution for the attacks in a 19 September speech. During the speech, Israeli warplanes flew low over Beirut, and the Israeli military conducted over 52 strikes across southern Lebanon soon after the speech.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the 17 September pager detonations were more widespread, the 18 September walkie-talkie blasts were more powerful and deadly. The attacks were highly likely conducted by Mossad, but an official claim of responsibility is highly unlikely. Speculation that the attack involved hacking into the devices to make the batteries explode is almost certainly untrue, the detonations were almost certainly caused by remotely detonated small quantities of military-grade high explosives. The pagers that detonated were Taiwanese company Gold Apollo models, mostly AR924s. Hezbollah reportedly ordered over 5,000 pagers before distributing them to members throughout Lebanon, as well as to members and allies in Iraq, Syria and Iran – at least 14 people were injured in Syria.

Gold Apollo have since stated that the pagers were manufactured on license by the Budapest-registered company BAC Consulting, that they encountered issues with remittances from BAC and that payments had come through the Middle East. It is highly likely that BAC Consulting was an Israeli front posing as an international pager producer. It is highly likely that Israeli intelligence similarly infiltrated the supply chain of the walkie-talkies that detonated, primarily IC-V82 models from the Japanese company ICOM, with ICOM stating that they ended production of the model 10 years ago.

The most likely reason for the specific timing of the attack is that the capability was about to be exposed – a case of “use it or lose it”. It is likely that the operation was originally intended to be conducted as an immediate prelude to a wider operation into southern Lebanon by Israeli forces, but the potential imminent discovery of the device tampering expedited the operation.

On 16 September, the Israeli security cabinet made the safe return of residents to northern Israel an official war objective, and the defence minister Yoav Gallant stated after the device detonations that Israel is “opening a new phase in the war”, as Israeli forces reorient to the northern front against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

It is highly likely that Hezbollah will attempt to retaliate, due to the extent of the operation and the humiliation caused, however their operational effectiveness has almost certainly been degraded and Hezbollah will not wish to give the Netanyahu administration an excuse to launch a major IDF offensive into southern Lebanon.

Additionally, the at least 52 IDF strikes across southern Lebanon were almost certainly pre-emptive, as they largely targeted rocket launchers, further degrading Hezbollah’s capability to retaliate. Nonetheless, it is likely that Hezbollah will launch further retaliation strikes to the limited attacks already made, which will most likely consist of rocket and missile attacks against targets in northern Israel within range of the majority of their weapon systems, or about 40 kilometres.


King Abullah II of Jordan appointed the Harvard-educated palace aide Jafar Hassan as prime minister on 15 September, replacing former diplomat and palace advisor Bisher Khasawneh who had served as prime minister since 2020. The appointment followed the resignation of Jordan’s government, which conventionally occurs after legislative elections, with a parliamentary election having earlier taken place on 10 September.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

While Jordanians elect representatives to Jordan’s lower house of parliament, the House of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwwāb), as they did on 10 September, Jordan’s king holds all substantial powers within Jordan’s political system, with ultimate authority over the executive, legislative and judiciary. In this regard. the appointment of the technocrat and loyalist Jafar Hassan is almost certainly a continuation of the status quo. In addition to pervasive economic issues, namely unemployment and declining tourism because of regional conflict, Hassan will need to wrestle with increasingly Islamist (political Islam) sentiment in Jordan.

The political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist Action Front (IAF) made significant gains in the parliamentary election, winning 31 seats out of 138, their best result in 35 years. This makes the IAF the largest political grouping in parliament, although pro-government independents and tribal factions are still overall dominant. The result came about firstly due to electoral reform in Jordan which allocated an increased number of seats to party lists. Political parties have previously only had a limited presence in Jordan’s legislature. Secondly, the aforementioned economic issues and a general “climate of disillusionment” have driven discontentment with the political system, benefiting the Islamists. Thirdly, and most notably, the ongoing Israel-Hamas war in Gaza has led to widespread protests in Jordan and increasing popular support for Islamism.

Compared to 2020 where polls indicated that 44 per cent of Jordan’s population expressed a positive view of Hamas, in November and December 2023 polling showed a rise to 85 per cent. The IAF has regularly organised protests, particularly in Amman, with common protest slogans including “we are all Hamas” and “Yahya Sinwar is our leader”. Between 50-70 per cent of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin, and the Israel-Hamas War has highly likely generated the greatest political shift in Jordan, a key military ally for the US, in decades.


On 17 September, the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), attacked the military airport in Bamako, Mali. JNIM claimed that the attack was in retaliation for recent joint operations involving Malian forces and Russian Wagner group operatives. The group also claimed that the attack killed up to 100 junta troops and destroyed dozens of military vehicles including six aircraft. There are reports that, following the attacks, lynch mobs formed in Bamako and killed uninvolved residents of the Fulani – also known as Peul – ethnic group, which have often been singled out as “allies” of the Islamists in local discourse.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is highly significant for multiple reasons. First, it likely represents the greatest direct security failure experienced by the Mali junta, and the first attack of this kind in Bamako since 2016. The attack likewise further demonstrates the junta’s growing inability to cope with a growing Islamist insurgency and follows other significant losses and setbacks – most notably, the loss of at least 100 Mali and Wagner troops in a joint Tuareg-JNIM attack in the country’s north in July.

Second, JNIM operatives likely aimed to obtain maximum political leverage out of the attack. The attack solely targeted a military installation – unlike many  other JNIM attacks which target civilians indiscriminately. The Mali junta, as well as its allies in Niger and Burkina Faso, are likely increasingly unable to respond to a growing insurgency, which is also emboldened by the evident security vacuum in the Sahel following the withdrawal of Western counterterrorist assets and their replacement with more brutal but likely less effective Wagner forces operating under the Russian Defence Ministry-run Africa Corps.

Botched counterinsurgency operations by the juntas have resulted in civilian casualties, with cases of arbitrary and brutal treatment of civilians – including reported summary executions of even children – being leveraged by Islamist groups to bolster recruitment operations. As a return to cooperating with the West is highly unlikely due to the extremely high political costs, it is likely that the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) will further rely on extremely violent – and likely less strategically effective – counterinsurgency operations.

Currently, Islamist groups almost certainly have the capacity to strike Ouagadougou and Bamako at will, and will likely soon have the capacity to directly strike Niamey. Further attacks in major urban centres are likely to increasingly put pressure on the top junta leaders, making palace coups and replacement of current junta heads likely in the coming months. There is a realistic possibility of the complete collapse of one or more juntas in the medium term.


Eight migrants die in attempted English Channel crossing

On 14 September, 801 people arrived on small boats to the UK from France, the second highest daily number this year. The increased volume of crossings is almost certainly dependent on multiple days of relatively mild weather at the beginning of September. The deaths reportedly occurred near the French coast, as the vessel carrying migrants struck rocks near Ambleteuse.


Georgia parliament passes “family values” law

The law is largely seen as an anti-LGBTQ bill mirroring similar legislation in Russia. The law is highly likely to be understood as part of the broader process of alignment with Moscow that the current Georgian government has undertaken, most notably via the controversial “foreign agents” bill. The law is likely to drive further protests, and, as in Russia, it is highly likely that the law will allow Georgian authorities to further attack civil society and NGOs under the pretext of “defending family values”.


Armenian officials say they thwarted a Russian coup attempt

On 18 September, the Investigative Committee of Armenia stated that, earlier in 2024, Moscow attempted to carry out a coup via a trained network of at least six insurgents. The extent and scope of the alleged plan are still unclear.


Protests in Tunisia before Presidential elections

The vote will take place on 6 October and will highly likely be won by current President Kais Saied, who has concentrated significant power and reduced the freedom of independent election commission officials. In the last weeks, Saied’s government accelerated its campaign of arrests of political opponents, including detaining 97 members of the opposition party Ennahda on 12 September. It is highly likely that protests will continue in the coming weeks before the vote, and that Tunisian authorities will respond to them violently.


Elections in South Sudan postponed by two years

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir unilaterally announced the extension of the transitional period by two years, postponing elections for the second time – the first postponement having occurred in 2022. South Sudan’s government transition period started with the 2018 peace deal which ended five years of civil war. The decision to postpone the elections was largely expected, but it is unlikely that government forces will manage to solve all the issues that Kiir highlighted – including the lack of a constitution and widespread insecurity – before the end of the new two-year extension period.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Islamist knife attack in the Netherlands

On the evening of 19 September, a man carried out a stabbing attack on Erasmus Bridge in Rotterdam, killing one and wounding at least another. Information available so far indicates that the perpetrator, which was overpowered by a witness and then arrested, likely was a self-radicalised lone wolf Islamist terrorist.


Two explosions in Cologne, Germany, in less than a week

On 17 September, a second explosion in three days occurred in Cologne, Germany. Both blasts occurred in the city centre, outside residential buildings. The blasts are still unexplained, but observers have indicated that detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is a common intimidation tactic used by gangs in the Netherlands, which borders Cologne’s state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The blasts are therefore likely linked to drug trafficking routes from the Netherlands towards central and eastern Europe.


Eight Azeri troops killed in clashes with Islamist group

Local media reported that the troops were involved in counterterrorism operations in the Qusar district of north Azerbaijan. In August, an Azeri public official was reportedly killed by unidentified “Salafi” militants in the area. Residents in Qusar have reported ongoing counterterrorism operations for the past two weeks. The IS-affiliate an-Naba magazine claimed that IS was responsible for the attack on Azeri forces. If these claims are true, then it is highly likely that the militants were affiliates of the Caucasus Province of IS (ISCP), the branch of the group that was responsible for the 23 June attack in Derbent and Makhchkala, Dagestan.


Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) authorities sentence 37 to death after failed coup

The prisoners include three American citizens, a Belgian, a UK citizen, and a Canadian. They were captured following a suspected coup in May, which involved an attack on the home of a government ally. The attack was almost certainly carried out by the “New Zaire Movement”, a group linked to Christian Malanga, a DRC politician who was killed in the attack and had previously lived in political exile in the US. The DRC allows the death penalty, but had a moratorium on it for two decades, which was only lifted in March, making executions in this case likely to occur. There is a realistic possibility of international involvement affecting the sentences faced by the six dual citizens.


Comoros President stabbed, attacker found dead in cell days later

Comoros President Azali Assoumani was stabbed during a funeral procession and received minor injuries to his hand on 14 September. Days later, the suspect that had been arrested in connection with the stabbing was found dead on the cell where he was being detained. The alleged perpetrator of the attack was a 24-year-old soldier, with no clear personal or ideological motive.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Three firefighters dead due to Portugal wildfires

At least 50 wildfires are currently active in the country, and approximately 5,300 firefighters have been deployed to combat them. The fires have caused multiple roadway and railway closures, and are likely to have significant protracted effects on the mainland. Despite the end of the hottest months of the year and a higher volume of precipitation than usual, temperatures in Portugal and Spain continue to be around 30 degrees during the warmest part of the day, which facilitates the outbreak and spread of fires.


Kenya invests more resources to combat Mpox

Kenyan officials committed USD 52 million on 15 September after five cases of Mpox were confirmed in Taita Taveta, Busia, Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru. It is highly likely that the actual number of cases is much higher. The rapid transnational spread of Mpox has led the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention to declare its first-ever Public Health Emergency of Continental Security.


On 16 September, Typhoon Bebinca made landfall in Shanghai as a category 1 storm with maximum recorded windspeeds of 151 km/h. 400,000 people were evacuated, 56,000 rescue workers were deployed, and 30,000 homes lost power. Bebinca caused severe travel disruptions, with mass flight and train service cancellations, and widespread business closures occurred as Shanghai authorities issued a weather alert at the highest level. Considerable port disruptions also occurred in Shanghai and Ningbo, with vessel bunching at the ports disrupting departures from container terminals. One injury was reported in Shanghai.

Typhoon Bebinca eased into a Tropical Storm, moving into Jiangsu province, causing two deaths in Zhoushi Town after a high-voltage power line fell. Then, on 19 September, a second named storm hit Shanghai, Tropical Storm Pulasan. Pulasan twice made landfall, first in Zheijiang Province and then in Shanghai later in the day. The storm caused torrential rainfall, with local precipitation records being broken in parts of Shanghai. While some parts of Shanghai experienced notable flooding, no reports of serious damage or casualties have been reported thus far as a result of Pulasan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Bebinca is the most powerful tropical cyclone to hit Shanghai in over 70 years, since the 1949 Typhoon Gloria. Tropical Storm Pulasan, meanwhile, is the 14th named storm in the Asia Pacific region this year, with the highly powerful Typhoon Yagi having recently caused significant damage, disruptions and deaths in the Philippines, China, Vietnam and Myanmar.

Disruptions in Shanghai over the past week have been extensive, however, the level of damage and casualties has been remarkably low, almost certainly due to Shanghai’s very high level of development, the substantial state capacity afforded to response operations, and the rigorous preparedness and resiliency measures deployed.

Climate change is highly likely a significant factor in conditioning the measured worsening of annual tropical storm seasons internationally, as warmer seas highly likely cause stronger storms. China is the world’s biggest carbon emitter, though the United States has a significantly higher per capita emission rate. Some studies suggest that predicted levels of climate change could lead to large portions of the most populated and developed region of China, in and around the North China Plain, experiencing severe habitability challenges by 2100 on current trajectories. This is due to the threat posed by “wet-bulb temperatures”, the phenomenon where both humidity levels and temperatures are so high that evaporative cooling via sweating in humans is limited to the extent that humans will very quickly die from hyperthermia.

China has made substantial investments into renewable energy and now has more renewable power capacity than any other country in the world. It is highly likely that these policy decisions have been made due to China’s particular vulnerability to climate change. It is likely that Beijing will make increasingly strong diplomatic efforts to make combatting climate change an international priority as climate change continues to worsen.


A man was sentenced to 14 months in prison for “sedition” after pleading guilty to wearing a t-shirt with the slogan “liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times”, associated with the 2019 protests. The individual is the first person to be charged, convicted and sentenced under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), the new national security law in effect since March 2024.

Solace Global Assessment: 

At least 12 other people have been arrested for sedition since the SNSO was enacted. The new legislation is almost certainly aimed at nullifying the possibility of further anti-Beijing protests, and is part of broader Chinese efforts to diminish civil society and opposition forces in Hong Kong. The recent crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong has likely de facto ended most aspects of the “one country, two systems” framework in place since the UK handed over the territory in 1997.

It is highly likely that, in addition to its political implications, the strict implementation of the SNSO will also increasingly affect Hong Kong’s competitiveness as a global hub for finance and business. Combined with high US-China tensions, Beijing’s growing influence and oversight over the city has likely contributed to accelerating the exodus of foreign companies to other business-friendly locations in Southeast Asia. Between 2019 and 2021, the number of global companies that had their regional headquarters in Hong Kong decreased by approximately 13 per cent, many having relocated to Singapore.

At the same time, however, much of this decrease has been compensated by an influx of Chinese companies, likely contributing to maintaining Hong Kong on an upward economic trajectory in 2023 and 2024.


Presidential election in Sri Lanka set to take place on 21 September

The election has been tightly contested, with the economy being the key issue, and the outcome will likely be close. After collapsing in 2022, Sri Lanka’s economy has struggled to recover with inflation rates almost reaching 70 per cent. With 38 candidates running, the front runners are the incumbent President Ranil Wickremesinghe, the leader of the opposition Sajith Premadasa, and Anura Kumara Dissanayake.

Wickremesinghe became President in 2022 after his predecessor was forced to flee Sri Lanka due to widespread unrest stemming from the economic crisis and is a centre-right liberal conservative. Premadasa is a centrist who wishes to change some conditions in the International Monetary Fund’s USD 2.9 billion bailout programme. Dissanayake is contesting the election as part of the National People’s Power (NPP) coalition, a left-wing coalition that includes the far-left People’s Liberation Front, which Dissanayake leads.

Sri Lanka uses a limited ranked voting electoral system where voters preferentially rank candidates. Almost every presidential election since 1982 has resulted in a candidate winning a majority in the first count. This election, however, is likely to go to second or even third counts. Polling indicates that Dissanayake is the most likely to win the first count, although the accuracy of Sri Lankan polling is unreliable. With the first preference centre and centre-right vote split between the other two frontrunners, it is likely that Dissanayake will fare worse in any additional counts.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

North Korea conducts multiple missile tests

South Korean and Japanese authorities have reported that North Korea conducted missile testing twice in one week, on 18 and 19 September. The missiles were primarily short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), with North Korean state media (KCNA) claiming that they were new Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5) designs with “super-large warheads”. KCNA additionally claimed a test of a “strategic cruise missile”. The new missile design is highly likely an iterated Hwasong-11 (KN-23) design with a larger warhead. Hwasong-11s have highly likely been used by Russia in its war against Ukraine, according to Ukrainian state prosecutors who examined missile debris, though Moscow and Pyongyang deny this. The missile tests are likely part of North Korean efforts to speed up the development of the new missile variant to sell to Russia.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Taliban suspends Polio vaccinations in Afghanistan

The decision was taken despite the increase in polio cases recorded in Afghanistan, 18 in 2024, up from six in 2023. Taliban officials did not provide an explanation for the move, which was announced days before the scheduled beginning of a September immunisation campaign. The lack of immunisation is likely to not only affect Afghanistan, but also neighbouring states and especially border regions in Pakistan, due to the high influx of Afghan migrants and refugees.


Tropical Storm Soulik makes landfall in northern Vietnam

At approximately 14:00 local time on 19 September, Tropical Storm Soulik made landfall in Quang Tri province, northern Vietnam. Expected to follow a similar trajectory to the recently devastating Typhoon Yagi, the storm has prompted mass evacuations in both Quang Tri and Binh provinces. While Soulik’s strength is far weaker than Yagi, the lingering devastation from Yagi’s recent impact will likely exacerbate the storm’s impact on northern Vietnam and neighbouring Laos.


Flooding from Typhoon Yagi kills at least 226 people in Myanmar

Although Yagi, which had earlier hit Hainan, China and northern Vietnam, was significantly weakened, Myanmar is highly vulnerable to the impact of flooding. The ongoing civil war in Myanmar means that a third of Myanmar’s population already required humanitarian aid, and many of the worst impacted regions are difficult to access for already highly limited rescue operations. The major cities of Naypyidaw and Mandalay also experienced significant floods. Shan State, which has had considerable heavy fighting during the civil war, was also particularly impacted. The rebel forces that control most of Shan State are almost certainly under-resourced to deal with the floods, exacerbating the impact.


Hezbollah’s Communication Device Attacks

Hezbollah Pager and Walkie-Talkie Explosions Across Lebanon: What Happened?

Intelligence cut off: 11:00 GMT 19th of September 2024

On 17 September, thousands of pagers that were used by Hezbollah members detonated simultaneously across Lebanon. At 15:30 local time, the pagers reportedly beeped for several seconds after receiving a message ostensibly from Hezbollah leadership, before detonating. At least 12 deaths were reported, with approximately 3,000 injuries. Amongst those killed was Muhammad Ali Ammar, the son of Hezbollah MP Ali Ammar, and Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amini, who was wounded. 

Then, on 18 September, thousands of two-way walkie-talkie radios used by Hezbollah members detonated. Unconfirmed reports suggest that home solar energy systems and biometric fingerprint scanners may have also exploded. Some of the radios detonated during the funerals for Hezbollah members who had been killed in the pager attack a day prior. 20 deaths were reported, with 450 injuries. While the 17 September pager detonations were more widespread, the 18 September walkie-talkie blasts were more powerful and deadly.

Hezbollah members have been using pagers for years, due to operational security concerns regarding Israeli tracking of cell phones. A speech by Hezbollah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah in February encouraged members to discard their cell phones, which led to more widespread adoption of pagers amongst the rank-and-file. As well as being used by Hezbollah members throughout Lebanon, pagers were distributed to members and allies in Iraq, Syria and Iran and the pager detonations injured at least 14 people in Syria, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

The attacks were highly likely conducted by Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency. Historically, responsibility has not been publicly claimed by Israeli officials for Mossad operations conducted abroad, therefore it is highly unlikely that an official claim of responsibility will be made for the attacks.

While there has been speculation that the attacks involved hacking into the devices to cause the batteries to explode, this is almost certainly untrue. While overheated lithium-ion batteries can combust and in rare instances, cause small explosions, the explosions were almost certainly caused by small quantities of military-grade high-explosives.

The model of pagers that detonated were mostly Gold Apollo’s AR924 model. Hezbollah had reportedly ordered over 5,000 pagers, before distributing them to members. Gold Apollo, a Taiwanese company, has stated since the attack that these models were manufactured on license by the Budapest-based company BAC Consulting. Gold Apollo additionally stated that they had encountered issues with remittances from BAC, and that payments had come through the Middle East. According to three intelligence officers briefed on the operation who spoke to the New York Times, BAC Consulting was an Israeli front posing as an international pager producer.

The walkie-talkies that detonated, meanwhile, were primarily IC-V82 models from the Japanese company ICOM. ICOM has stated that they ended production of the model 10 years ago. It is highly likely that Mossad similarly infiltrated the supply chain for the walkie-talkies.

The attacks have firstly highly likely caused a significant impact on Hezbollah’s operational capability. As well as the deaths, a substantial number of members are now wounded, with many injuries from the attack including maiming and blinding. It is highly likely that their command structure is significantly disrupted. Internal communications are almost certainly also disrupted.

Secondly, the psychological impact on morale is almost certainly profound. Such a large-scale infiltration into Hezbollah’s supply chain is a major breach of security. Questions will be raised not just among Hezbollah, but also in Iran and Tehran’s other proxy forces of the extent to which their supply chains could be compromised. The use of commercially available products and parts by Iran and its proxies is commonplace. The attacks will almost certainly stoke paranoia regarding the potential danger posed by any electrical device.

The most likely reason for the specific timing of the attack is that the capability was about to be exposed and possibly nullified. According to “high-level regional intelligence sources” who briefed Al-Monitor, the decision to detonate the pagers was expedited by the discovery of device tampering by two Hezbollah operatives. While one of the operatives was “neutralised”, the pager attack was carried out in anticipation of the other operative alerting authorities, according to these sources.

Furthermore, three US officials told Axios that the pager operation was done now due to potential discovery, with one describing it as a “use it or lose it moment”. It is highly likely that the walkie-talkie detonations, meanwhile, were activated due to concerns that the remaining tampered devices would be discovered following the pager attack.

According to a “former Israeli official with knowledge of the operation”, the pager operation was originally intended to be conducted as an immediate prelude to a wider operation. It is a realistic possibility that such an operation could still occur, however, the lack of an Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) operation thus far likely further indicates that the tactical communication devices attacks were conducted early to avoid the capability being compromised.

The pager attack happened just one day after Israeli authorities announced that the Israel Security Agency, Shin Bet, had foiled a Hezbollah plot to assassinate a former senior Israeli security official using a remotely detonatable anti-personnel mine. It is possible, therefore, that retaliation for this plot was also a factor in the attacks.  

On 16 September, the Israeli security cabinet made the safe return of residents to northern Israel an official war objective. Due to the threat of Hezbollah drone, missile and rocket attacks, many Israeli residents have fled northern Israel close to the border with Lebanon. Israel’s defence minister, Yoav Gallant, has stated that the only available method to return residents to northern Israel “is via military action”. On 18 September, following the pager and walkie-talkie detonations, Gallant stated that Israel is “opening a new phase in the war” and that “the centre of gravity is shifting to the north”.

The attacks, therefore, are highly likely part of an Israeli campaign to degrade Hezbollah’s operational capability as Israeli forces reorient to the northern front.

Hezbollah has vowed to respond to the attacks, issuing a statement saying that Israel will get “just retribution”. Lebanon’s foreign minister, Abdallah Bou-Habib, has also said that “Hezbollah are definitely going to retaliate in a big way”. Hezbollah’s leader, Nasrallah, is set to deliver a speech on 19 September at 17:00 local time, the content of which will likely indicate the extent of Hezbollah’s retaliation. The IDF has issued a statement asserting that “preparation for defensive operations on all fronts” has been reviewed, and that Israeli civilians should continue exercising “alertness”.

Hezbollah maintains an arsenal of some 150,000 rockets and missiles, and are estimated to have a fighting force of around 50,000 fighters. Hezbollah has sophisticated systems such as the Iranian-derived precision-guide Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) with a range of 300km, and the SCUD B/C/D SRBM variants with a range of 500km, which give Hezbollah the capability to accurately strike targets anywhere in Israel if air defence is penetrated. However, the vast majority of Hezbollah’s arsenal consists of unsophisticated and unguided systems such as “Katyusha” variants which have effective ranges between 4-40km.

On 4 July, Hezbollah launched over 200 rockets and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-USVs, or ‘suicide drones’) into northern Israel, in retaliation to the killing of a senior Hezbollah commander. It is likely that the Hezbollah leadership will feel compelled to retaliate with either a similarly large or greater retaliation attack, due to both the sheer extent of the pager attack and humiliation. On the other hand, however, Hezbollah will not want to give Israel’s Netanyahu administration an excuse they can use as a pretext for a major IDF offensive into southern Lebanon.

It is most likely that Hezbollah’s retaliation strikes will involve strikes, primarily against military installations in northern Israel, within range (~40km) of most of their weapon systems. There is a realistic possibility that Israeli settlements within range, as well as Haifa which is 30-35km from the border, will also be targeted.

An additional risk is that Hezbollah’s retaliation could be folded into a wider Iran-led operation as part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance. Iranian officials have repeatedly vowed retaliation for the 31 July assassination of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran. This retaliation would most likely involve a layered coordinated attack against Israel from Iran, its proxy forces in Iraq and Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Yemeni-Houthis. Most recently, on 16 September, a senior Iranian military commander told Chinese state media that Iranian retaliation is “certain”, but that Tehran will “choose the right moment.”


Security Services across the Middle East

If you’re navigating through high-risk regions and require expert journey management services, Solace Global is ready to assist. Our specialised team delivers tailored solutions to enhance your safety and security, ensuring you can operate with confidence in challenging environments. Reach out to us today to discover how we can provide the support you need for a secure and seamless journey.


Week 34: 16 – 23 August

Global Intelligence Summary

blue abstract background
  • There is a realistic possibility that fighting will resume in Libya between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), after four years of ceasefire.
  • Iran continues to indicate that an attack on Israel is imminent but has likely delayed to evaluate ceasefire progress and to reassess the nature and timing of an attack.
  • The Ruto administration’s decision to reintroduce elements of June’s controversial tax bill will highly likely provoke civil unrest across Kenya.
  • Protests across Indonesia will almost certainly resume if the government re-attempts to reverse the decision of the Constitutional Court’s reform before local elections.

AMER

Canada: Bomb threats sent to over 100 Jewish institutions

Nicaragua: Government expands NGO bans

Argentina: Plot to attack Jewish community thwarted

Libya: Chaos at central bank inflames tensions amidst troop mobilisations

Israel, Palestine Lebanon: First Hamas suicide bombing since 2008

Israel and Iran: Tehran continues to indicate attack on Israel is imminent

Red Sea & Gulf of Aden: Houthi attacks intensify after a week of inactivity

Kenya: Ruto plans to reintroduce elements of controversial tax bill

Pakistan: State cracks down on information space

Indonesia: Protests as government attempts to limit opposition


Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has opened an investigation after an e-mail was sent to 125 Jewish-linked organisations on 21 August. The e-mail stated that bombs had been planted on their premises and that they would be detonated that day. No bombs have been identified by the RCMP with investigations still underway. The e-mail was sent to Synagogues, Jewish schools, Jewish community centres and other Jewish-linked institutions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly unlikely that there is a genuine bomb threat and that this is part of a wider campaign to instil fear and disrupt the lives of the Jewish community. The e-mail is reported to be very similar to one sent to at least 100 hospitals, companies, shopping centres and government institutions in India. This suggests a coordinated effort and early investigations are attempting to identify the sender’s IP address.

Canada has likely been targeted for its Jewish diaspora, estimated at 400-450,000 and India for its staunch support of Israel, and there is a realistic possibility that the sender has connections to both countries given the large Indian diaspora in Canada. Whilst there may be no direct threat to life from the incident, it almost certainly indicates a rise in antisemitism in Canada that is also reflected in many other Western countries.

Several Jewish schools in Canada have been targeted in shootings that were likely designed to scare the Jewish community rather than kill as they were often done at night. These trends will almost certainly continue in parallel to developments in the Middle East and are likely to increase in severity with ceasefire talks showing little promise and the situation in Gaza rapidly deteriorating.


On 19 August, the official gazette of the government of Nicaragua published a list of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) whose activities would be banned. Additionally, the government announced that it would move to confiscate assets owned by the groups. Most of the banned NGOs are religious groups, and the move thus continues the policy of widespread government crackdowns on local Church authorities. However, other humanitarian organisations, including the Red Cross, are also banned.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In total, the government has so far shut down approximately 5,000 civil society groups. The Catholic Church has been a particularly prominent target, likely due to its continuing importance for Nicaragua’s largely Christian population and its role as a mediator in past anti-government protests.

The Nicaraguan government has been headed by Daniel Ortega for almost half a century. The Ortega regime faced one significant challenge in the waves of protests between 2014 and 2019 but has almost certainly managed to significantly decrease the opposition’s viability and traction in the country, forcing the majority of leaders into exile. The latest wave of bans, which also interests cultural institutions (such as chess clubs), is highly likely meant to accelerate a shift towards the complete government oversight of civil society actors, with surviving NGOs forced to establish formal ties with government departments that highly restrict their freedom of operations.

The Ortega regime has also recently increased its efforts to establish intelligence and policing partnerships with Russia, approving in March the establishment of a Russia-funded police training centre in Managua, which highly likely provides a stable foothold for Russian intelligence to operate in the country. In late June, suspicions of Russia increasing intelligence activity in Nicaragua were raised by American observers, who reported on possible Russian-Nicaraguan cooperation to create a signals intelligence (SIGINT) base in the country similar to the (likely) one in Lourdes, Cuba. Ortega is likely to continue increasing moves to coup-proof the regime, including increased intelligence cooperation with Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela.

In the immediate term, the latest wave of bans is almost certain to significantly decrease the security of foreign travellers and humanitarian workers in Nicaragua, increasing the threat of violence and arbitrary detention by local police. Most importantly, the disappearance of foreign humanitarian organisations is highly likely to worsen the extremely precarious conditions faced by the Nicaraguan people, nine out of ten of whom are estimated to live in poverty.


The Argentine Federal Police (PFA) announced the arrest of seven individuals allegedly part of a network of Salafi extremists, ideologically inspired by the Islamic State (IS) and other violent extremist organisations (VEOs), planning attacks in the country. The arrests occurred in Mendoza, and shortly after the 30th anniversary of the bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, which was however carried out by Shia extremists.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While South America likely remains a low-priority target for transnational Islamist extremist organisations, it is highly likely that Argentina’s risk profile is higher than that of its neighbours. This is due to structural factors as well as recent political developments. First, Argentina has the largest Jewish community in South America, assessed as numbering slightly less than 200,000. Jewish institutions and religion have a comparatively large prominence in Argentina’s social fabric, and, relatedly, the Argentine Jewish community has strong links to Israel. Due to the country’s long-standing economic woes, Argentinian Jews have migrated to Israel (the practice of “Aliyah”) in large numbers, especially since the early 2000s, and there are now around 50,000 Argentine Jews and descendants in Israel.

Second, the presidency of Javier Milei has resulted in the country’s adoption of a highly internationally visible pro-Israel policy, and Milei has also reportedly raised the possibility of converting to Judaism. In the context of the ongoing war in Gaza, these elements almost certainly make Argentina a high-profile possible target for Islamist VEOs.

It is highly unlikely that the arrested individuals’ relationship with IS went beyond mere “admiration”, as there are currently no credible indications that the group has directly sought to form cells in the country. However, Islamist VEOs have long exploited the tri-border area (TBA) between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to conduct illicit activity and generate funds for operations. There is a realistic possibility that independent (and possibly more radical) groups are taking advantage of the lack of state presence in the area to pursue similar activity.

The arrests are relevant as they are likely to have an impact on Argentina’s domestic security approach to counterterrorism. Earlier in August, Defence Minister Luis Petri filed a bill that would allow the military to take over some policing operations in situations of “terrorism”. Domestic NGOs and government opponents have criticised the bill on the basis that it does not define the threat, and that it grants the armed forces too much influence over domestic policing. The arrest of the group may increase the chances of the bill passing in parliament.


Canadian rail union dispute shuts down major railroads

On 22 August, Canada’s top railroads, Canadian National Railway (CN) and Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC), locked out over 9,000 unionised workers, leading to a major rail stoppage. The dispute arose from failed contract negotiations, with both the railroads and the Teamsters union blaming each other for the impasse.

The work stoppage poses a significant threat to North American supply chains and could result in billions of dollars in economic damage, with Moody’s estimating daily costs of over CAD 341 million. The Canadian government has urged the parties to resolve the conflict but has not yet intervened.


US House Republicans publish report accusing Biden of impeachable conduct

The report alleges that the President committed offences that meet the bar for charges of abuse of power and obstruction, with some allegations dating back to his vice-presidency. Similar reports have historically resulted in Congress impeachment votes. However, the Republican Party lacks the votes to impeach the President, and therefore the report can highly likely be considered a political move in light of the upcoming election, and of Republican candidate Trump’s own past impeachment and ongoing trials.


US Supreme Court blocks Biden administration rule on gender identity-based discrimination

The ruling prevents the federal administration from implementing the rule, which focuses primarily on education institutions, against state wishes, and can be considered a victory for the conservative camp, which maintains a majority in the judicial branch. There is a realistic possibility that anti-transphobia protests will be staged in Washington D.C. and in Republican-led states in response to the ruling.


Mexican federal court employees strike over proposed reform

The legislation was proposed by outgoing President Obrador, who leaves office in late September and would force judges to stand for election, also removing established barriers preventing inexperienced graduates from immediately becoming judges. While Obrador justifies the proposed reform as a way to combat corruption, opponents worry that it would remove the judiciary’s independence and open opportunities for clientelism and to reduce the executive branch’s accountability.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Las Vegas teenager indicted of planning IS-inspired lone wolf attack

The individual was arrested in November 2023 after a tip was sent to authorities about one of his posts on the online platform Element – an encrypted messaging app – where he announced the planning of an attack. The case continues to highlight the shift, also seen in Europe, towards increasingly younger lone wolves planning attacks. Las Vegas, due to its visibility, famous nightlife scene, and notoriety as a gambling hub, is likely a particularly desirable target for Islamist terrorists. IS unsuccessfully tried to claim that the perpetrator of the 2017 Las Vegas shooting had been affiliated with the group.


Leaked US Nuclear strategy document emphasises Chinese, Russian, North Korean threat

The document dates to March and highlights the rapidity in the growth and diversification of China’s nuclear weapons stockpile. The document also called for the establishment of a revised strategy called “Nuclear Employment Guidance”, to be reviewed every four years, which focuses on the possibility of coordinated challenges from Russia, North Korea and China. It is likely that the policy reflects the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea.


Leader of the Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartel (CJNG) arrested in Mérida, Mexico

Adrian Miguel Jarquín, alias “El Chaparrito,” was arrested on 19 August after being a fugitive for two years. Jarquín is considered to be one of CJNG’s main leaders and is allegedly particularly involved in the group’s smuggling operations based in the port of Manzanillo, a key hub for the entry of narcotics in Mexico. In 2022, Jarquín was released from prison and allowed to continue his trial without precautionary detention and subsequently escaped. The arrest has a realistic possibility of decreasing CJNG’s operational capacity in Manzanillo and may create a power vacuum in the area, possibly favouring an increase in inter-gang violence.


Third prison break in a year in Haiti results in 12 prisoners killed

On 16 August, prisoners broke out of a detainment facility in the coastal town of Saint-Marc. The breakout was reportedly caused by an escalated internal protest. However, it is almost certain that gangs played a role in favouring the breakout, or at least in arming the detainees, 12 of whom died in firefights with intervening authorities. The case highlights the continuing security and policing vulnerabilities in Haiti, which remain likely still severe despite the arrival of hundreds of Kenyan troops as part of a UN-backed mission.


US sanctions former Haitian president for drug trafficking

The US government has imposed sanctions on Haiti’s former president, Michel Joseph Martelly, over allegations of drug trafficking. Martelly, who served as president from 2011 to 2016, has been accused of abusing his influence to exploit the current chaos in Haiti to profiteer from the narcotics trade. Martelly is thought to have established connections to multiple Haitian gangs that are involved in the smuggling of cocaine, much of which ends up in the US.

The US government has also accused him of being involved in money laundering at the behest of the gangs. Martelly is not the first Haitian senior politician to be accused of such criminal enterprises and their involvement has significantly contributed to the current destabilisation of Haiti. This endemic corruption at the highest levels of office continues to undermine governance and will make it difficult for the country to achieve stability.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Hurricane Ernesto makes landfall in Bermuda

The hurricane made direct landfall over Bermuda on 17 August, causing mass power outages. While the category 1 storm was projected to cause potentially deadly flooding and notable damage, the British Overseas Territory was relatively unscathed, with the Minister of National Security reporting no injuries or major incidents. This was highly likely conditioned by Bermuda’s strong hurricane preparation and resiliency measures.

Ernesto, which moved past Newfoundland, Canada on 20 August, eventually weakened into a post-tropical cyclone. The storm’s remnants caused unseasonably high rainfall and increased wind speeds in parts of the UK and is forecast to likely contribute towards a low-pressure system that will bring further poor weather in the UK next week.


Oil spill affects Morrocoy National Park in Venezuela

The oil spill originated from the El Palito refinery operated by the state-owned oil company PDVSA, which has important ties to the Venezuelan armed forces. It is highly likely that the spill will result in increased discontent with the Venezuelan authorities and may result in an increase in sabotage actions against PDVSA assets. The company’s operations have historically been characterised by extreme levels of corruption, and the delayed response to the spill may result in greater environmental impacts within the Golfe Triste area.


Brazil to establish action plan to tackle forest fires in Amazon and Pantanal regions

The Brazilian federal government has developed a joint action plan with state governors to tackle forest fires in both the Amazon and the Pantanal wetlands. The plan will involve establishing Inter-Federal Multi-Agency Fronts, which will unite agents from various public institutions to collaborate with state and local authorities in preventing new fire outbreaks. Forest fires, which have been exacerbated by human activity and climate change, have led to over two million acres being burned in the Pantanal in 2024.


On 18 August, the head of the information technology department at the Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL), Musaab Muslamm, was abducted by an “unknown party”. This led to the crucial entity, responsible for holding the revenues from Libya’s vast oil reserves, temporarily shutting down operations.

The Government of National Unity (GNU), the Tripoli-based authority which contests sovereignty over Libya with the Libyan National Army (LNA), then unilaterally fired the central bank’s governor, Sadiq al-Kabir. Al-Kabir, a powerful figure who has led the bank since 2011 when Gaddafi was overthrown, rejected the decision and stated that he would continue in his role as normal. Muslamm was released on 19 August, leading to a resumption of operations at the CBL.

Additionally, the LNA engaged in fighting with armed Chadian groups near gold mines at the Chad border on 18-19 August, and National Oil Corporation (NOC) engineers claimed on 19 August that the Shahara oil field’s production has resumed limited operation following an earlier shutdown following significant LNA troop movements earlier in August.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the context of substantial LNA mobilisation and the movement of several LNA battalions to southwest Libya near the Algerian border and the Shahara oil field, the upheaval at the CBL will likely further inflame tensions in Libya. The GNU (formerly GNA) and LNA agreed to a ceasefire in 2020 after the LNA failed to take Tripoli, ending a six-year civil war. For the last four years, despite sporadic clashes between armed groups, Libya has enjoyed relative calm. In early August, LNA forces led by Saddam Haftar, the son of the LNA’s leader Khalifa Haftar, mobilised en-masse in Fezzan, southwestern Libya. This led to the Shahara oil field, Libya’s largest oilfield, being taken offline. Libya controls Africa’s largest oil reserves, and the flow of oil from Shahara is highly likely being instrumentalised by the LNA to exert pressure on Tripoli.

The LNA troop movements have multiple possible strategic objectives. The LNA claims that the mobilisation is aimed at border security, however, this is unlikely. It is likely that the LNA wish to secure Ghadames Airport, which holds vital strategic importance. Full control of Ghadames and its surroundings would allow the LNA to isolate the northwestern GNU territory centred around Tripoli from southern GNU forces, facilitate control of border crossings with Niger, Algeria and Tunisia, and ultimately fulfil the LNA desire to fully control the entire south of Libya, from east to west. The Ghadames crossing between Algeria and Libya is closed, despite agreements in recent years for its reopening. Algerian military forces have been placed on high alert as a result of the LNA buildup around Ghadames.

Concurrently, full control of southwestern Libya will allow the LNA to implement with greater effect a recently signed trade agreement with the junta in Niger, which highly likely involves the transfer of weapons for oil. The operations against Chadian armed groups are highly likely due to this trade deal, which currently relies on Nigerien weapons coming to Libya via Chad.

It is highly likely that recent August events have generated the most severe tensions in Libya since the 2020 ceasefire. In response to the recent tensions, the embassies of France, Germany, Italy, the UK and US have issued a joint statement expressing significant concern. On 13 August, the LNA-aligned House of Representatives unanimously approved a motion that the GNU is illegitimate and now out of power, which has no de facto legal consequence but gives the LNA a legitimising cause to renew hostilities. It is a realistic possibility that heavy fighting between the GNU and LNA will soon resume, focused on control around Ghadames.


On 18 August, a botched suicide attack in Tel Aviv injured a civilian. Both Hamas and PIJ claimed responsibility for the action. The attack was the first Hamas suicide bombing since 2008, and the group has threatened more attacks. In Gaza, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) operations are ongoing, with fighting reported in Khan Yunis. On 20 August, IDF units retrieved the bodies of six hostages.

Ceasefire talks have continued in Cairo after last week’s round in Doha. The US and Israeli delegations have expressed some cautious optimism, especially after Egypt dropped its demands for a clear timeline for the IDF’s withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor, and after Iranian officials stated that they will “delay” retaliation while negotiations are ongoing. Hamas representatives have rejected the latest round of talks, stating that Israel has advanced unacceptable conditions.

In northern Israel, Israeli forces launched airstrikes in the Bekaa Valley following a Hezbollah strike in Western Galilee which killed an IDF soldier.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The suicide bombing carried out by Hamas is likely an important development in the conflict. Suicide bombings are almost universally condemned by the international community and a successful attack targeting civilians could weaken Hamas’ negotiating position and potentially influence Israel to withdraw from ceasefire talks. The length of the conflict and scale of the destruction are likely to contribute to increased radicalisation and provide Hamas with volunteers willing to conduct suicide attacks. This methodology may also indicate a decrease in Hamas’ combat capabilities and capacity to conduct more complex attacks outside of Gaza, with Israel recently claiming that Hamas’ Rafah Brigade has been completely defeated.

Cairo’s recent acceptance of Israel’s demand for a sustained IDF permanence at the Gaza-Egypt border likely represents an important diplomatic defeat for the Palestinian militant group. Allowing the IDF to remain in the Philadelphi Corridor will dislocate Hamas from its main facilitation route for lethal aid, reducing its ability to sustain combat operations and enforce its authority. Long-term, Hamas’ reduction in strength is likely to provide opportunities for alternative administrators in Gaza, such as the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Iran’s statement about waiting until the end of ceasefire talks to retaliate for Israel’s assassinations, or potentially refraining entirely if a deal is reached, is likely to further increase pressure on Hamas. Hamas’ likely reaction is to refuse to accept the current ceasefire conditions and to pressure Iran and its proxies to adopt a more aggressive stance towards Israel. Hamas will intend to set the conditions to persuade Israel to accept ceasefire terms that are more favourable to itself.


Iran has continued to produce rhetoric and conduct actions indicating that it is planning on conducting a direct attack on Israel. Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials have repeatedly signalled their intent to retaliate on Iranian state media but have stressed that it will happen “at the suitable time and place” and that Iran’s retaliation will be larger than the previous attack. Iran’s Permanent Mission to the UN has even suggested that Iran’s Axis of Resistance could conduct a ground offensive into Israel. Conversely, Iranian officials have also indicated that an attack could be delayed if progress is made in ceasefire negotiations.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly unlikely that Iran will sponsor a ground offensive into Israel, and this is the most likely trigger for a regional escalation that Tehran cannot afford. Such a scenario would involve Iran’s most capable proxy force, Hezbollah, invading Israel from the north. Currently, Hezbollah serves as one of Iran’s primary deterrents against Israel and Iran has spent decades facilitating lethal aid into Lebanon. A Hezbollah ground attack will almost certainly result in an IDF offensive into southern Lebanon, expanded air strikes and would significantly degrade Hezbollah’s military capabilities. Tehran cannot afford this whilst it is still attempting to produce a nuclear deterrent, especially as Hamas has been severely degraded.

Iran’s most likely course of action is still a coordinated rocket, missile and drone strike with its proxy forces but has delayed retaliating for several reasons. Firstly, it does not want to jeopardise current ceasefire negotiations despite a high likelihood of collapse. Secondly, Iran is likely trying to exert psychological terror on the Israeli public. Lastly, Iran is delaying for reasons relating to planning and logistics. Iran is attempting to reassert its deterrent but without escalating. This will demand a carefully planned attack that penetrates Israeli air defence, demonstrating Iran’s ability to directly attack Israel, but without resulting in heavy civilian casualties. However, the delay has allowed the US to enhance its force posture in the region, likely forcing Tehran to reassess the nature and timing of an attack. Should Iran decide that a direct attack on Israel without escalating is too hard to achieve, it may seek to target Israeli interests via alternative means. This could include attacks on Israeli “secret bases” in third countries like Iraq, or the assassination of Israeli


After a week-long lull in Houthi attacks against merchant shipping, the Houthis attacked two vessels in one day on 21 August. The first was against the Greek-flagged oil tanker SOUNION (IMO: 9312145), 77 nautical miles west of al-Hudaydah, Yemen. Initially, two skiffs approached the merchant vessel, resulting in a brief exchange of small arms fire. Later, three unidentified projectiles struck the vessel, causing a fire onboard and disabling the engine. The vessel was abandoned on 22 August and is now adrift.

Secondly, the Houthis attacked the Panama-flagged bulk carrier SW NORTH WIND I (IMO: 9514004), 57 nautical miles south of Aden, Yemen. The vessel reported a total of five explosions in close proximity to the vessel, with no damage reported. Then, on 22 August, the vessel came under renewed attack west of al-Hudaydah, Yemen. Whilst being followed by two skiffs, an uncrewed surface vessel (USV) struck the vessel on its portside beam and detonated, resulting in minor damage without breaching the hull.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The SW NORTH WIND I’s security team failed to destroy the USV with small arms fire, highly likely attempting to replicate the PUMBA’s successful deployment of this countermeasure on 20 July when small arms fire ostensibly detonated a Houthi USV before it could make contact. It is likely that this countermeasure will not be consistently replicable, due to the accuracy and luck required.

Commonalities between these two new incidents highlight the likely increasing role of skiffs in carrying out Houthi intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to fix and track merchant vessels to increase the accuracy of subsequent attacks. Houthi ISR capabilities have likely been significantly degraded due to merchant vessels disabling their automatic identification systems (AIS) broadcasts, and the withdrawal of the Iranian spy ship BEHSHAD in April.

The persistence of these Houthi attacks, particularly on the SW NORTH WIND I, which was separately attacked over multiple days, is also notable, likely suggesting that the Houthis are increasingly concentrating force against individual target vessels. These attacks also likely point towards the increasingly layered nature of Houthi anti-vessel operations which now integrate skiffs conducting ISR and armed with RPGs, anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and USVs.

It is likely that the successful disabling of the SOUNION will embolden the Houthis to increase their rate of vessel attacks in the coming weeks, reflecting earlier patterns.


The Kenyan government has announced plans to reintroduce certain tax measures that had been previously scrapped on 26 June in response to deadly protests. The finance minister, John Mbadi, stated that not all taxes will return. However, certain measures, including an eco-levy on most goods, are necessary to fund essential government expenditures such as teachers’ wages. On 20 August, the Supreme Court of Kenya overruled an appeal that declared the finance bill unconstitutional which will pave the way for the government to introduce elements of the contentious tax bill.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The reintroduction of the tax bill, even if limited, will likely reignite civil unrest across the country with a high likelihood of violent incidents. Previous civil unrest resulted in the deaths of at least 50 people, hundreds of arrests and widespread disruption. Critics of the bill are already suggesting that it will target basic goods that will increase the cost of living, with the original bill targeting goods like bread, cooking oil and other commodities.

Moreover, the protests have primarily been youth-led, many of whom are unemployed and capable of quickly organising protests via social media. After repealing the original tax bill, President Ruto fired much of his cabinet but has remained in power despite widespread calls demanding his resignation. Many Kenyans likely hold him personally responsible for the deadly protests and for failing to address many of the underlying issues such as the cost of living, unemployment and corruption.

Future demonstrations are likely to take on a distinct anti-Ruto character which could unify and energise various factions that oppose his rule, leading to larger and more sustained protests. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is backing some form of economic reform programme in Kenya, which is being described as necessary to secure more funding. This indicates that the Ruto administration is under external pressure and has no option but to reintroduce elements of the controversial tax bill.


Anti-Islam protests scheduled for 24 August in Sweden

Anti-Islam protests have been organised in Stockholm, Gothenburg, Orebo and Kristianstad for the 24 August. Heightened security measures will be in place and there is a high likelihood that the demonstrations will attract counter-protests, potentially leading to incidents of violence.


French far-left leader threatens Macron with impeachment, causes rifts in coalition

Jean-Luc Melenchon, the leader of the far-left populist part France Unbowed (LFI) reiterated appeals to President Macron to appoint his coalition’s candidate, Lucie Castets, as the country’s new prime minister. The appeal also contained a threat of starting an impeachment procedure if Macron does not comply with LFI’s demands. Melenchon’s appeal was rejected by the other parties of the coalition, including the Socialists (PS). LFI activists have called for civil unrest if Castets is not selected, and there is a high likelihood that, if the left-wing coalition cracks due to disagreements over relations with Macron’s executive, LFI-linked activists will seek to stage large and disruptive demonstrations to force a decision, possibly resulting in violence and vandalism.


Anarchist activists claim vandalism of Northvolt offices in Hamburg, Germany

As part of an ongoing campaign of direct action by anarchist against the building of the North Bothnia Line railway project in Sweden, anarchists claimed they vandalised the Northvolt offices in Hamburg on 19 August. The protestors claim they injected butyric acid through the office door and then glued the doors. Butyric acid, made from rancid butter, has historically been used by anti-whaling activists due to its highly unpleasant odour.

The North Bothnia Line is contentious due to its planned location in the indigenous Sami people’s area of northern Sweden. Earlier on 9 August, activists vandalised an Implenia AG office in Vienna, Austria using spray paint. Both Northvolt and Implenia AG are involved in the North Bothnia project.

The transnational nature of this direct-action campaign highly likely indicates a concerted and well-organised effort by multiple different anarchist groups cooperating across national borders. It is likely that companies associated with the North Bothnia project will continue to be targeted in the coming weeks.


Multiple Neo-Nazi demonstrations in Saxony

On 17 August, around 400 Neo-Nazi activists tried to disrupt an LGBTQ event in Leipzig, in the German state of Saxony. On 10 August, a crowd of approximately 700 activists marched through the town of Bautzen, also in Saxony.

The groups that are reported to be associated with the protests in Saxony include “Deutsche Jugend Voran” (DJV, a name taken from a division of the Hitler Youth), Jung und Stark (JS), as well as a banned far-right group known as “Division 45”. Saxony remains a stronghold of far-right groups in Germany, and statistics on right-wing violence in Saxony for 2023 report an approximately 20 per cent increase compared to 2022.

In Germany, as in other Western European states, a trend can be observed of far-right groups seeking greater territorial control in areas where they already have a footprint, while staging more symbolic demonstrations in cities that have a higher visibility. Areas and cities including Lyon in France, Verona and Rome in Italy, and Madrid in Spain have a particularly high activity from local far-right groups.


Demonstrations scheduled in Berlin and for 24 August

The scheduled demonstrations, which will take place in front of the Chancellery, follow the closure of the Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg (IZH). IZH was a Shia Muslim centre in Hamburg which authorities closed over deep ties to the regime in Iran. Counter-demonstrations are also scheduled to take place. Due to the nature of the event, and the overlap with the demonstrations in Sweden (see beginning of section), there is a realistic possibility of disorders and violence breaking out.


Belarus deploys a third of its army to Ukrainian border

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that the deployment is in response to increased Ukrainian activity at the border, a claim that appears highly likely unsubstantiated. It is almost certain that the deployment of Belarusian troops near the border is meant to warn Kyiv’s Western allies against providing further help to Ukraine – including by relaxing constraints on the use of Western-procured munitions in Russia – by threatening regional escalation of the conflict.


Ukraine bans Russia-affiliated religious organisations, including the Orthodox Church

The draft law approved by the parliament prohibits the religious activities of groups associated with Russia. While the Russian government has successfully coopted the Russian Orthodox Church as an instrument of propaganda and legitimisation of its offensive in Ukraine, the Moscow Patriarchate continues to have significant influence among the Russian minorities of Ukraine. The decision will likely spark domestic unrest in Ukraine, and Moscow will leverage the development to launch information operations targeting Orthodox Christians in Europe, the Middle East and North America.


Suspected Kenyan serial killer escapes from police station

On 20 August, the individual, who is allegedly responsible for dozens of murders, escaped from a police facility in Nairobi alongside 12 Eritrean nationals. The high domestic media profile of the case makes this police failure particularly significant, and it will likely contribute to inflaming already high anti-government and anti-police sentiment.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

CIA Director in Bosnia due to secessionist concerns

CIA Director William Burns visited Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina on 20 August to address concerns over the “worrying secessionist rhetoric and actions” from Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Serb entity, Republika Srpska, led by pro-Russian President Milorad Dodik. Dodik has refused to adhere to Western sanctions on Russia and has threatened secession for decades. A separate conflict in Europe would almost certainly play into the Kremlin’s hands by diverting attention and resources from Ukraine. Dodik has visited Russia multiple times and in recent visits, Russia has used the Republika Srpska’s flag rather than that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, suggesting Moscow’s support for its secession.


Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) ambushes Red Cross convoy in Niger

The targeted attack took place in the region of Diffa and killed 14 of which at least eight were Red Cross staff. ISWAP and other branches of the Islamic State (IS) commonly attack humanitarian organisations as part of their strategy to force the local populations to become reliant on them for welfare. ISWAP has recently increased its operations in Niger and, although it remains relatively weaker than Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, it has multiplied efforts to gain a territorial presence, by imposing “taxes” on controlled villages and conducting da’wah (proselytising) activities.


Sudanese military to send a delegation to Cairo discussions

After the Transitional Sovereign Council, the ruling government in Sudan on behalf of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), did not attend US-led peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland, they have stated they will send a delegation to Cairo to have discussions with US and Egyptian officials. The SAF’s absence from the Geneva talks had generated major doubts about the prospects for a peace settlement to the Sudanese Civil War between the SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has now been ongoing for 16 months.

The delegation to Cairo, however, likely indicates that the SAF is considering a willingness to participate in future negotiations should certain conditions be met. The main points of contention raised by SAF officials have been the lack of implementation of the Jeddah agreement, which entailed RSF forces withdrawing from civilian areas, and the United Arab Emirates’ presence at the talks, who have highly likely supported the RSF.

As recently as 16 August, RSF forces reportedly attacked several villages, according to local media. In recent months, the momentum of the civil war has been on the most part favourable to the RSF, and it is likely that continuing RSF advances have coerced the SAF leadership to not rule out future peace negotiations.  

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Large fires in Madeira, Portugal

The fires have consumed 5000 hectares by 19 August, or approximately 5 per cent of the island’s total surface area. Due to dry and hot weather conditions, fires on the island have spread rapidly and posed extreme difficulties to firefighters, with authorities stating that they expect the fires to subside “after running out of fuel”. Increasingly common and severe fires are likely to continue having severe economic impacts on residents and businesses in southern European maritime tourist destinations.


First Polio case identified in the Gaza Strip after 25 years

The disease is particularly dangerous for children under five. It spreads via aerosol, faeces or contamination, and progressively affects the nervous system causing paralysis. Currently, much of the sewage disposal infrastructure in the Gaza Strip has been destroyed, favouring the accumulation of waste in areas that are extremely densely populated. The WHO and other international organisations have called for a vaccination campaign to begin in late August. However, this is highly likely dependent on the approval of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas.


For weeks, the internet in Pakistan has been extremely slow, with the government blaming the high number of domestic users for overburdening domestic capacity. Activist groups have instead increasingly raised warnings of a growing threat of government efforts to build a “firewall” to separate Pakistan from global online information spaces, thus imitating China and other states in Asia. Since the 2023 riots linked with former Prime Minister Imran Khan last year, the Pakistani government has increasingly curtailed access to social media platforms. Earlier this year, a new law allowed the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) a much greater reach in intercepting private citizens’ communications.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The growing efforts by the Pakistani government to curtail the local information space while granting ISI greater reach are highly likely reflections of self-perceived growing instability. Outside of its long-standing socioeconomic issues, Pakistan’s security environment is deteriorating due to a greater traction of regionalist movements – such as the Baluch independence movement – and ongoing tensions with neighbours in India and Afghanistan, the latter continuing to provide a safe haven for Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs).

Moreover, the continuing popular support for Khan, as well as the anti-foreigner sentiments linked with growing Chinese operations in the country, likely represent important worries for Islamabad. Faced with these popular and regionalist movements, the Pakistani government may seek to follow the Chinese lead in building a highly controlled information space. In doing so, however, Islamabad is likely to encounter a fundamental obstacle in its inability to provide indigenous online alternatives, including an independent digital infrastructure, capable of meeting public demand.

In turn, it may therefore be forced to rely on China-sourced assets and platforms to offset some of the economic costs, thus contributing to a regionalisation of Asia’s information spaces. A growing opacification of the Pakistani information space is highly likely to have extremely adverse consequences for humanitarian operators in the country. A decreased flow of information, combined with Pakistan’s extremely precarious security situation, may multiply the risks of humanitarian actors operating in at-risk regions, for instance by decreasing their capacity to respond to security incidents in a timely manner.


On 22 August, tens of thousands of protestors amassed in the former capital, Jakarta, as well as other major cities, including Padang, Bandung, Surabaya, Makassar, Yogyakarta and multiple other locations. Protestors attempt to storm the Indonesian parliament, and the House of Representatives, forcing the police to use tear gas and water cannons to disperse crowds. The protests were triggered by parliament’s decision to overturn a Constitutional Court ruling which reduced the threshold for local legislative seats needed by parties to field candidates for regional elections. Parliament postponed the amendments in response to the unrest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The proposed law change involved raising the threshold for parties to nominate candidates in regional elections. Previously, the Constitutional Court had lowered this threshold to below 10 per cent from the original 20 per cent. The Constitutional Court’s original ruling would have effectively allowed smaller parties or coalitions with fewer seats in local parliaments to field more candidates at the regional level. The ruling government, which is dominated by supporters of the outgoing President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), would have seen this as a mechanism to increase the influence of the opposition. The change opened the door for opposition figures like Anies Baswedan, a critic of the government, to run for influential positions such as the Jakarta governor.

Parliament’s decision to reverse this change has almost certainly been seen as a manoeuvre to maintain its power and reduce the voice of the opposition. Moreover, it has likely sparked fears over a constitutional crisis between the executive and the judicial branches, by eroding the checks and balances in Indonesia’s democratic system. It is also part of a broader strategy by Jokowi and his supporters to consolidate power, which has led to accusations of authoritarianism, corruption, and nepotism. These moves have galvanised activists, students and even celebrities against the government, with protests rapidly mobilised on social media.

Whilst the government has responded by postponing its amendment, it is currently unclear whether parliament will reconvene before the start of regional elections on 27 August. If parliament attempts to hastily pass the law before the local elections, it is almost certain widespread and sometimes violent protests will erupt across the country.


Taliban ban UN special rapporteur from entering Afghanistan

The Taliban have barred the UN-appointed special rapporteur Richard Bennett from entering Afghanistan, after accusing the UN of spreading propaganda. Bennett, appointed in 2022 to monitor Afghanistan’s human rights record, has been critical of the Taliban’s treatment of women and girls. The Taliban’s decision to deny Bennett a visa reflects their growing resistance to international scrutiny, particularly concerning human rights. This move could further isolate Afghanistan diplomatically and complicate efforts to address human rights violations, especially against women, under Taliban rule.


Protesters attempt to storm Pakistan’s Supreme Court over blasphemy ruling

On 20 August, thousands of protestors attempted to storm Pakistan’s Supreme Court in Islamabad over a ruling in a blasphemy case, forcing the police to use crowd dispersal methods like tear gas. The protest was organised over the granting of bail to Mubarak Sani. Sani had been accused of blasphemy in 2019 for distributing pamphlets advocating for his Ahmadiyya religious beliefs- a messianic Islamic movement often persecuted by the Sunni majority. The incident likely reflects the sensitivities of blasphemy laws in the country, which can often lead to huge and sometimes violent demonstrations.


Pakistani opposition schedules nationwide strike for 28 August

The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party has called for a nationwide shutdown strike on 28 August to protest alleged misgovernance, economic issues, rising electricity prices, and endemic load shedding. The protests are likely to only cause moderate disruption, and the authorities are likely to issue Section 144 orders in areas with a high turnout.


India PM Modi to visit Ukraine and Poland

The diplomatic visits will take place starting on 21 August. Modi’s recent visit to Russia attracted considerable criticism from Western observers, and the Indian leader likely sees meeting Zelensky as an opportunity to outwardly demonstrate the continued foreign policy “non-alignment” espoused by India. At the same time, the visit to Poland may offer an opportunity to further India-EU talks, especially in crucial strategic areas such as technology-sharing and security cooperation.


India doctors resume work but protests continue

After a trainee doctor was raped and killed by a hospital security guard in Kolkata, widespread doctor and nurse strikes paralysed much of India’s healthcare system. This resulted in the suspension of most non-emergency procedures and major protests across the country. After reassurances from India’s Supreme Court to improve safety measures at hospitals, doctors have resumed work. However, some protests are still ongoing and there are backlogs within India’s healthcare system after 11 days of strikes.


Thai opposition criticises Constitutional Court and vows to continue

The former leader of the recently dissolved Move Forward Party (MFP), Pita Limjaroenrat, who has been banned from Thai politics for a decade has vowed to continue his agenda and demanded that Thailand reform its judiciary. MFP’s dissolution was followed by the Constitutional Court removing the then prime minister, Srettha Thavisin, within the same week and resulted in 134 Thai academics and legal experts releasing a statement suggesting that the court had overstepped its jurisdiction and damaged the public’s trust.

Thailand’s new Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the daughter of controversial magnate Thaksin Shinawatra, was then sworn in on 18 August. Whilst her premiership may partially placate the reformist camp, the Shinawatra family’s continued domination of Thai politics will likely aggravate the conservative establishment.


Loyalist to outgoing Indonesian president appointed leader of Golkar party

On 21 August, the Golkar party appointed Bahlil Lahadalia as its leader. Bahlil is a loyalist to outgoing president Joko Widodo, commonly known as Jokowi. Jokowi has consistently held high approval ratings but is scheduled to leave office in October 2024 due to presidential term limits.

It is likely that Jokowi has attempted to implement a political dynasty, and a Constitutional Court ruling in 2023, chaired by Jokowi’s brother-in-law, lowered minimum age limits which will allow Jokowi’s eldest son to become the vice-president in October. Efforts to make his youngest son the deputy governor of Central Java, however, have been thwarted by a 21 August Constitutional Court decision to not change minimum age limits for regional elections. The appointment of Bahlil will highly likely contribute towards Jokowi maintaining a high degree of political influence once he leaves office.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Pakistan imposes Section 144 Punjab due to terror threat

On 21 August, Pakistani authorities implemented Section 144 in the Punjab province which bans all public gatherings and protests. The order will last until 24 August and has been imposed over the threat of terrorism. However, Section 144 is often used to deny public assembly and stifle the opposition and has likely been implemented to disrupt rallies organised by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.


Chinese and Philippine vessels collide in disputed South China Sea

China and the Philippines have traded accusations after vessels from their respective coast guards were involved in a collision near the disputed Shabina Shoal in the South China Sea. Beijing has suggested that the Philippines vessel purposefully collided with the Chinese vessel. Manila has accused the Chinese Coast Guard of aggressive manoeuvres, a tactic it has become notorious when reinforcing its maritime claims. The repeated confrontations threaten to further escalate tensions in the South China Sea, potentially drawing in external powers like the US which has recently increased defence cooperation with the Philippines.


Indonesia to host major multi-national military exercise

Indonesia’s Super Garuda Shield 2024, starting on 26 August, will involve joint military exercises with at least 19 countries, including the US, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Originally launched in 2009, this annual exercise aims to “safeguard a free and open Indo-Pacific region” and has become one of the largest multinational military exercises in the area, with significant US participation. While China likely perceives the exercise as a challenge to its regional influence, Indonesia and China maintain friendly relations and have conducted joint military exercises. However, a recent treaty signed between Australia and Indonesia may indicate a gradual shift away from non-alignment.


Australia and Indonesia sign treaty-level defence agreement

On 20 August, Australia and Indonesia signed a treaty-level defence cooperation agreement which allows their militaries to operate in each other’s countries. This agreement likely signals a thawing of relations over Australia’s historic support for East Timor and potentially a strategic shift by Indonesia away from non-alignment. The agreement, which follows from the AUKUS alliance, will likely be interpreted by China as yet another development designed by the West to counterbalance its influence in the Indo-Pacific. Canberra may seek to develop further bi-lateral defence relationships or strengthen existing ones as it aims to contain an increasingly assertive China.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

At least nine Bangladesh districts at risk of major flooding

Bangladesh’s Ministry of Water Resources has issued emergency flood notices for the districts of Feni, Sunamganj, Moulvibazar, Habiganj, Comilla, Noakhali, Chittagong, Laxmipur and Khagrachari. 12 rivers are currently above the danger line due to heavy rains further north in India. Increased rainfall is likely to result in widespread flooding that will impact millions of people.


Thailand identifies first case of new mpox strain

Authorities in Thailand have reported that they have identified the first case of the new strain of mpox, Clade 1b, in the country. The case involves a European man working in an unnamed African country where there is an ongoing outbreak. Thailand’s Department of Disease Control has tracked down over 40 people who are thought to have been in contact with the patient, who will now be monitored for 21 days. However, the patient flew to Thailand via a Middle Eastern country and a thorough contact trace is highly unlikely.


Landslide kills several in Thai tourist resort Phuket

At least eight people have been killed in the popular tourist resort of Phuket after heavy rain triggered a landslide which crashed into a luxury villa. Rescue efforts are ongoing, with as many as 50 buildings affected by the landslide and multiple people assessed as currently trapped. Monsoon rains have battered much of Thailand with further landslides highly likely.


Week 33: 09 – 16 August

Global Intelligence Summary

blue abstract background
  • The African CDC has declared the current Mpox outbreak as a continent-wide emergency, with early indications suggesting it is likely to spread further afield.  
  • Iran is likely delaying its attack on Israel until the conclusion of ceasefire talks and for issues relating to planning, coordination, logistics and operational surprise.
  • Baloch separatists intensify attacks in western Pakistan, likely to undermine the central government during Independence Day celebrations.
  • There is a realistic possibility that the Thai Constitutional Court’s dismissal of the prime minister following the recent dissolution of the Move Forward Party will trigger unrest in Thailand.

AMER

Panama: Migrant repatriation flights from Panama to start this month.

Venezuela: Opposition calls for global protests.

Denmark and Sweden: Relations strained over cross-border gang activity

Middle East: Ceasefire talks underway as Iran continues to promise to retaliate

Africa-wide: Africa CDC declares Mpox continent-wide emergency

Pakistan: Baloch militants conduct wave of attacks in western Pakistan

Myanmar: Chinese foreign minister visits to offer support for elections

Thailand: Court dismisses prime minister and Shinawatra nominated


US President Joe Biden stated on 14 August that the government of Panama is planning to start repatriating migrants that cross into the country via the southern Darien Gap, a tract of extremely dense jungle which is unavoidable for South American migrants seeking to reach the US via land.

The first major policy undertaken by the new government of Panama, led by President Jose Raul Mulino, was to strike a deal with the US, whereby Panama would carry out repatriations on US-funded flights. More than 500,000 migrants crossed the Darien Gap in 2023.

Solace Global Assessment: 

For Washington, the deal with Panama is part of a broader effort to decrease land-based flows of migrants via Central America, which is increasingly being used by migrants from other parts of the world. US diplomats are also trying to strike a deal with Costa Rica, which is expected to be similar to the one with Panama. By pushing for multiple deals with friendly regional governments, US officials are highly likely trying to put in place a stronger deterrent to migrants, while simultaneously accounting for border control failures.

The Darien Gap remains an extremely dangerous stretch of land, with extremely little infrastructure, that is for the most part controlled by organised Colombian gangs, such as the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces. This, alongside widespread corruption at the Colombia-Panama border, means that efforts to police the gap will likely only be partially successful even with increased funding and manpower. Still, increased border controls may make the land-based route less attractive.

The alternative, which is considerably more expensive and risky, is likely to be a sea-based route between the Colombian island of San Andrés and the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. The maritime route to Nicaragua is also likely to increase in attractiveness if a second deal with Costa Rica is approved, as it would bypass both countries.

An increase in maritime migration is likely to pose further risks. First, the crossings from San Andrés are often attempted on small vessels, which often capsize leading to mass drownings. Smugglers operating the crossings often overload the boats, greatly increasing the chance of sinking, and a growing volume of departures from San Andrés may result in a proportional increase in the number of deaths.

Second, the maritime route is assessed to cost each migrant more than three times as much as the Darien Gap route, and therefore is likely to further increase the chances of migrants being exploited by traffickers, potentially leading to increased rates of forced labour, sexual abuse, debt bondage and other forms of exploitation.


Edmundo Gonzalez, Maria Corina Machado, and the other leaders of the Venezuelan opposition have issued a call for global protests to take place on 17 August. The announcement comes weeks after the results of the Venezuelan elections were published, granting a third term to President Maduro. The results – which have been contested by domestic and international observers – caused almost immediate protests, which were met with violent repression by authorities, the clampdown being nicknamed “Operation Knock Knock” by regime supporters.

As of the time of writing, more than 1300 people have been arrested in Venezuela, and the opposition leaders, who recently have become objects of a criminal investigation, remain in hiding.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The announcement is likely a reflection of the worsening domestic position of the opposition, following the Maduro regime’s success in quashing the protests that broke out after the electoral results were announced. Despite the large international support, the opposition has likely failed to gain traction with the military and other government-backed militia which constitute the backbone of the regime’s security apparatus.

The call for protests is likely to result in large-scale disruptions in countries that have a large Venezuelan diaspora. Notable demonstrations are likely to take place in Colombia, especially in Bogota, where large pro-opposition protests already occurred on 3 August. Other likely hotspots for demonstrations include the United States, particularly the state of Florida, where most of the US Venezuelan diaspora is concentrated, and in Spain where there are almost 500,000 Venezuelans.

There is a realistic possibility that smaller demonstrations will occur within liberal democracies and will be staged outside Venezuelan diplomatic missions. There is a high likelihood that actors friendly to the Maduro regime will carry out actions meant to undermine or disrupt the protests – for instance deploying agitators or provoking police intervention – or launch information operations to discredit the opposition.

Inside Venezuela, the regime will highly likely use the protests as a pretext to accuse the opposition of being backed by foreign powers. This will take the form of increased nationalistic messaging meant to provoke a rally around the flag effect, and possibly executive measures meant to further curtail the space for dissent. Importantly, accusations of foreign collaboration and meddling may be used by the regime to further restrict the activities of foreign NGOs in the country.

In January, the Venezuelan parliament began discussing a law that restricts NGOs’ ability to receive funds, imposing a series of bureaucratic hurdles that are almost certainly meant to disrupt their operations.


Large-scale rail strikes threaten Canadian exports

Canada’s two largest railway companies, Canadian National Railway (CNR.TO) and Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CP.TO), could simultaneously stop operations due to a deadlock between them and the Teamsters labour union over scheduling and wages. The rail companies have threatened to lock their employees out of their workplaces on 22 August if a deal is not reached.

A similar stoppage was prevented earlier in the year following government intervention, and this earlier resolution has ignited current calls by grain shippers and other industry groups for the government to intervene again. Annually, Canada’s railways transport around CAD 380 billion worth of goods. Consequently, a halt would almost certainly cause losses of tens of millions of dollars and spillover effects across Canadian markets.

Moreover, the stoppage could have an adverse impact on Canada’s trade relationship with the USA, as 75 per cent of Canada’s goods exports head south of the border. Most US cereal imports originate from Canada, and strike-driven supply chain disruptions are likely to impact market prices in the US.


US Democratic Convention to be held in Chicago

On 19 August, the Democratic Party will hold its National Convention in Chicago where it will officially unveil Vice President Kamala Harris as its presidential candidate. The convention is anticipated to attract 50,000 supporters and will include high-profile figures such as former president, Barack Obama and the Clintons.

Strict security measures will be in place, especially after the attempted assassination of Donald Trump, and police have warned that they will not tolerate any rioting or major demonstrations, with pro-Palestinian protests likely to exploit the publicity of the event for their movement.


Peruvian government pass law preventing prosecution for crimes against humanity.

The legislation prevents prosecutions of alleged crimes committed prior to 2002. The measure is almost certainly meant to appease senior military officials and former President Alberto Fujimori. Fujimori was allegedly implicated in the use of death squads to quash the Shining Path – the rebel Communist Party of Peru – in the 1990s. The measure is likely to result in protests and widespread international condemnation.


Brazil plans to strengthen ties with China.

The President of Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, has said he will discuss a “long-term strategic partnership” when he meets with the President of China, Xi Jinping, after the G20 leaders’ summit in November. Lula has confirmed that he doesn’t want Brazil’s relationship with the USA to be jeopardised due to new links with China, but is eager to strengthen the economy and improve diplomatic ties.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Trump campaign hacked

On 10 August, former US President Donald Trump’s staff said that their campaign had been targeted by hackers, leading to insider documents being leaked to the press. The campaign accused “foreign sources hostile to the United States” of carrying out the attack. Although Iran was not named directly, it is clear that, following reports that a plot to assassinate Trump was launched by Tehran, the Shia regime is likely the prime suspect.


Mass shooting in Clarendon, Jamaica

On 12 August, eight people were killed and eleven injured after a mass shooting in the Clarendon area of Jamaica. Jamaica’s prime minister has urged anyone with information to come forward and a national security council meeting was convened on 13 August. The incident is likely related to an ongoing feud between rival gangs but has raised concerns over a bloody gang war in the area.


Colombian President Petro claims rebel plot to assassinate him

According to the president, Ivan Mordisco, the commander of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), a breakaway group of the rebel Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), had hired a drug trafficking group to carry out the targeted assassination. While no independent verification of the claims was released, the case highlights the continuing decrease of relations between the government and units of the EMC, after a ceasefire between the two broke down in July due to ongoing violence.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Canada’s first “State of Wildfires” report underscores climate change impact

The report is the first of a planned series covering yearly wildfires globally. The report found that, while the total number of acres burned in 2023-2024 was slightly below the average of previous seasons, wildfire-related carbon emissions increased by 16 per cent. This increase was almost certainly due to the severe wildfires in Canada, whose Boreal forests emit larger quantities of stored carbon when burned.

The report also assesses that the probability of “extreme fire seasons” has increased “significantly” due to anthropogenic climate change, with regions such as Canada and Amazonia particularly affected.


Hurricane Ernesto impacts Caribbean and heads towards Bermuda

Hurricane Ernesto formed in the Atlantic Ocean 300 miles east of Antigua on 5 August. The hurricane passed over Antigua and the Leeward islands, causing 4-6 inches of rain, before clearing the islands on Tuesday morning and heading towards Puerto Rico, where around half of the population was without power. Furthermore, more than half a foot of rain had fallen, interrupting water filtration processes, leaving 120,000 water customers without drinking water.

The hurricane hit the Virgin Islands leading to 28,000 people left without power. Ernesto changed course northwards and is currently heading towards Bermuda. Hurricane warnings have been issued for Bermuda, with warnings that it could become a Category 3 storm by the time it gets to the island. Residents of Bermuda are being urged to prepare for the worst.

The storm is not expected to pass over mainland USA, but warnings of life-threatening surf and rip currents on the east coast have been issued as far north as Canada.


Denmark has placed pressure on Sweden to restrain the growing cross-border gang violence, following the arrest and charging of 10 Swedes in the country for crimes including attempted murder and weapon possession. In recent years, policing cooperation between Nordic countries has increased. The Danish government has particularly called for joint efforts to strengthen border controls with Sweden to tackle the issue.

Solace Global Assessment: 

More than half of the individuals arrested in Denmark are minors. This almost certainly underscores the established practice by Denmark and Sweden-based gangs to employ underage individuals to carry out violent and drug-related offences. Minors are less likely to receive harsh jail sentences and are more difficult to detect and track when conducting cross-border operations. Moreover, minors are likely more vulnerable to being groomed by gang members. Sweden-based gangs are known to target vulnerable children, at times breaking them out of youth homes with promises of desirable and status-enhancing rewards, such as clothes, money, and drugs.

The Danish government has increasingly sought to secure its borders, and the attempts to crack down on cross-border gang operations are likely a reflection of a broader approach meant to avoid the spillover of crime trends within Danish borders. There is a realistic possibility that the implementation of stricter measures by Danish officials will result in domestic civil unrest, as well as have diplomatic consequences within the EU. At the same time, an internationalisation of the gang networks of Sweden could affect Sweden’s relations with its European neighbours.

Finally, the use of minors by gangs may increase rates of radicalisation. While still not conclusive, recent data seems to show that, since the COVID-19 pandemic, the average age of “lone wolves” in Europe has decreased, with more than a dozen individuals under 20 years of age arrested in connection with terrorist plots in Europe in 2024 alone. As gang and extremist networks often overlap, with multiple lone wolves having previously engaged in gang-related activity, the greater participation of minors in organised crime groups may result in more radicalisation. As these groups tend to have access to firearms and other weapons, there is a realistic possibility that this trend could lead to more severe or sophisticated attacks.


Iran has rejected recent calls for restraint from several Western nations regarding a retaliatory attack on Israel for the assassination of Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah, Ali Khamenei, has stated that Iran must respond and that it would face “divine wrath” for failing to do so, a sentiment which has been echoed across Iranian media.

The US has continued to enhance its force posture in the region by accelerating the deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG) which is equipped with F-35C fighter jets, and publicly declaring that it has deployed a nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN) to the region. Hezbollah has continued its drone and rocket attacks on northern Israel and the Golan Heights with multiple attacks a day. The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has mobilised more forces in northern Israel near the Lebanon border and IDF have conducted military exercises at the Haifa Naval Base to simulate defence and attack scenarios in northern Israel, including the maritime space.

Ceasefire talks in Doha, Qatar scheduled for 15 August are set to continue through to at least 16 August. Ceasefire talks have included US, Egyptian, Qatari and Israeli officials but have not included Hamas who have refused to attend on the grounds that Israel is deceiving to prolong the war and even expand it to a regional conflict.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The most likely course of action for Iran is a layered drone, missile and rocket attack coordinated with its proxy forces throughout the Middle East. However, Iran has likely delayed its attack for numerous reasons. Firstly, Tehran will want to observe how successful the current ceasefire talks are, with Hezbollah also indicating that a ceasefire could delay or even cancel its retaliation for the assassination of one of its senior commanders. However, with Hamas refusing to attend, ceasefire talks are unlikely to produce any significant progress.

Moreover, accepting a ceasefire will not be tolerated by the more extreme elements of Netanyahu’s coalition, with far-right leader Ben Gvir threatening to leave the coalition if a ceasefire is agreed upon before the destruction of Hamas, an unlikely and hard-to-qualify situation. Iran has likely been forced to delay due to issues regarding logistics, planning and coordination, especially if it has to supply proxy forces throughout the region. The delay will also have a psychological effect on Israeli citizens and will likely help Iran achieve some degree of operational surprise, increasing its chances of penetrating Israeli air defence.

Lastly, Iran is set to deliver hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia for its war in Ukraine. Russia may be pressuring Iran to delay until it secures delivery of these and withdraws its personnel from Iran who are currently training on these systems. Iran’s delay has enabled the US increase to its force posture in the region, which may influence the scale of Iran’s expected attack. The CSG, which involves escorting destroyers, combined with the SSGN, has not only increased the US air defence capability in the region but also hugely increased its air and sea-launched cruise missile capability in the region. This is likely to influence Tehran’s decision-making process and serve as a deterrent to a major escalation.

There is a realistic possibility that Israel’s enhanced force posture in the north is shaping activity for a future offensive into southern Lebanon. This course of action will likely be triggered by mass casualties from a Hezbollah attack, with the IDF’s most probable limit of advance the Litani River not to provoke hostilities with wider Lebanese society. However, this would likely be supported by expanded air strikes in northern and central Lebanon against Hezbollah high-value targets.


The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) has declared the “monkeypox” or “Mpox” outbreak a public health emergency across the continent, particularly due to its severe impact on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Limited reporting indicates that since January, Africa has recorded at least 38, 465 Mpox cases and almost 1,500 deaths.

The continent-wide warning has been issued in response to the Clade Ib strain, a subtype of the virus, spreading to at least 16 countries, including Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, the DRC, South Africa, Uganda and Kenya.

On 15 August, the Swedish government confirmed the first case of the new Mpox variant outside of Africa, with one person diagnosed in the Stockholm area.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Africa CDC’s declaration marks the first time it has used its continental security powers, granted in 2022, to address a major outbreak. The declaration underscores the CDC’s assessment that a coordinated and proactive approach across the continent is required to curtail the spread of Mpox. However, the provision of medical services in Africa is hugely dependent on foreign aid. Without foreign intervention from organisations like the World Health Organization (WHO), it is unlikely that the spread of the virus will be effectively managed, likely a motivating factor for the Africa CDC to declare it a continent-wide emergency.

The disease, which is characterised by a range of symptoms, including fever, muscle aches, skin lesions, rashes, headaches, fatigue and swollen lymph nodes typically has a global death rate of three to six per cent. However, the new Clade Ib strain is assessed to be more virulent and have a higher death rate. Early estimates indicate that the death rate may be as high as five per cent for adults and ten per cent for children, making it the most deadly strain of Mpox currently identified. Most new cases of Mpox are sexually transmitted but there is also evidence to suggest that the new strain can spread between people more easily than previous strains. These factors have led to concerns that the virus will spread beyond Africa, especially if the new strain can spread without symptoms, a key factor which can determine the severity of an epidemic.

The Africa CDC is currently assessing that 10 million Mpox vaccines are needed in Africa and is currently negotiating for 200,000 from international partners. However, there are major shortages and delays due to regulatory approvals and logistical demands. Moreover, if the virus continues to spread outside of Africa, there is a realistic possibility that vaccines will be diverted to other regions, with Europe previously managing the 2022-23 outbreak through rapid vaccinations.


Latest UK gas-fired powered station approval likely to drive environmentalist unrest

On 14 August, the London High Court dismissed a legal challenge against a BP-backed project to create a gas-powered power plant, to be constructed in the Teesside area of northeast England. The legal challenge had been supported by environmentalist groups.

As environmentalist groups in the UK have increasingly sought to cause business and transport disruptions in response to adverse legislative and judicial developments, there is a high likelihood of “retaliatory” action following the latest setback. Activist groups’ protests are likely to take the form of road blockades and symbolic gestures, although there is a realistic possibility of sabotage action targeting energy infrastructure. This latter course of action presents a much lower chance of arrest and detection, and it may become more popular following the increasing number of harsh sentences given by UK courts to environmentalist activists who participated in road blockades and other high-visibility actions.

The EU and Elon Musk engage in row over hate speech online

The EU’s digital commissioner Thierry Breton warned X.com owner Elon Musk not to amplify “harmful content” online, after Musk conducted an interview with Republican candidate Donald Trump on 12 August. The interview, which was marred by technical problems, was singled out by Breton as a possible driver of disinformation and violent speech in the EU.


The EU previously sanctioned X.com in January 2024 for failing to respect its social media laws. Under Musk’s ownership, X.com has increasingly become a hotspot for the spread of disinformation, as well as extremist content. There is a realistic possibility, also considering the recent disinformation-fuelled riots in the UK, of further EU action targeting X.com. This, in turn, may have important spillover effects for European information spaces.


YouTube bans Portuguese far-right party’s channel

On 13 August streaming giant YouTube banned the channel of the Portuguese ultranationalist group, Grupo 1143 due to violations relating to hate speech unearthed by an enquiry by the New York Times. Grupo 1143, which is named after the year Portugal became a sovereign nation, has organised anti-immigration and anti-Muslim protests throughout the country and its leader, Mario Machado, has served time for assault and racial discrimination.

There is a realistic possibility that the banning of the group’s YouTube channel could lead to organised protests or reprisal attacks, with Grupo 1143 linked to attacks on Portugal’s immigrant community.


Thousands of Slovaks protest government’s democratic backsliding

On 12-13 August, almost 20,000 Slovaks took to the streets of Bratislava to protest recent government actions that they see as undermining the rule of law and democratic freedoms. The opposition is urging Brussels to hold the Slovak government accountable.

Frustrations with Prime Minister Robert Fico’s coalition, including the ultranationalist Slovak National Party, have intensified after several controversial developments. These include the dismissal of the directors of the Slovak National Theatre and National Gallery by Culture Minister Martina Šimkovičová, the release of former special prosecutor Dušan Kováčik following an appeal by Justice Minister Boris Susko, and Fico’s plans to disband the National Crime Agency.

Opposition leaders and European lawmakers from Progressive Slovakia warn that these actions represent a systemic erosion of democracy, with protests expected to continue. The European Commission has yet to respond but faces growing pressure to address Slovakia’s democratic backsliding.


Controversial Bulgarian anti-LGBT law set to pass

Bulgarian President Radev has refused to veto an anti-LGBT law passed by the country’s parliament, indicating that it will be passed into law. The law is an amendment to the Pre-School and School Education Law, which bans “non-traditional sexual orientation” education in schools.

The law has already provoked demonstrations on the streets of Sofia and in the major port city of Varna. Further protests against the law are likely and the government’s endorsement of anti-LGBT sentiment could embolden far-right counter-demonstrations, which may lead to violent confrontations.

The passing of the law may also strain Bulgaria’s relationship with the European Union, which upholds principles of equality and non-discrimination.


Opposition leaders arrested in Tanzania

On 12 August, police arrested the leaders of the main opposition party CHADEMA as they prepared to attend a meeting in the country’s southwest. Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who came to power in 2021, has supervised some progress towards democratisation, including lifting bans on political rallies. However, this “liberalisation” has remained extremely constrained, and the government almost certainly remains determined to quash local opposition.

Along with the party’s leaders, dozens of youth wing members were also arrested. The party’s leaders were released on bail on 13 August. There is a realistic possibility of the crackdown resulting in civil unrest, possibly leading to further police intervention.


Woman left paralysed after being shot by the Iranian religious police

According to reports, an Iranian citizen was shot by the religious police for not complying with the country’s strict religious dress laws. The religious dress laws are largely unpopular with the Iranian population, and cases of spontaneous protest and non-compliance have continued following the brutal crackdown of the 2022 unrest that followed the police’s killing in custody of Mahsa Amini.

There is a realistic possibility of further protests being caused by the latest case, albeit these are unlikely to match the severity of those in 2022. The government’s response to the shooting may provide a signal of the extent to which reformist President Pezeshkian intends to challenge the influence and control of the hardline religious police.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Guards open fire to deter migrant crossings in Poland

A video was shared on social media reportedly showing Polish officers opening fire to deter migrants from storming the border fence at the Poland-Belarus border. The incident, dated 11 August, is possibly the first case of implementation of a law, passed last month, that allows border guards to fire live bullets if threatened. The case did not result in any fatalities.

However, further incidents may drive protests in Poland and other European countries. In the medium term, increasingly harsh policing at the Polish borders could drive migrants to attempt to reach the EU via the Baltic states, further north.


White supremacist lone wolf attack at Mosque in Eskişehir, Turkey

At least seven people were wounded on the morning of 13 August as an 18-year-old individual, armed with a knife and an axe, attacked bystanders at a park near a local Mosque before being arrested. The attacker published a manifesto online before the stabbing and live-streamed the terror attack on X.com via a body-worn camera.

The content of the manifesto, the use of body-worn livestreaming, and multiple neo-Nazi symbols worn by the attacker make it almost certain that the individual espoused a white supremacist ideology and sought to imitate the 2019 Christchurch Mosque shooter. Copycat attacks by white supremacists have regularly taken place over the last decade. As almost all of the attackers are radicalised online, their actions share important similarities, namely “performative” elements – such as live streaming the attack or writing a manifesto – the selection of high-visibility targets, and the promotion of an ideology that combines racist imagery and themes with online subcultures, including non-terror-related ones.

The attacker’s manifesto called for copycat actions, and there is a realistic possibility of further attacks. Finally, the attack is notable as it is the first lone wolf attack in Turkey to explicitly draw inspiration from the Christchurch one, which emphasises the global reach of online white supremacist subcultures.


Iran Central Bank (CBI) targeted in cyberattack

On 14 August, the computer systems of CBI and other banks in the country went offline, with disruptions among the largest ever caused by a cyberattack targeting the Iranian public sector. Responsibility for the attack remains unclear, but there is a realistic possibility that it was carried out by anti-regime hacktivist groups.

In March, a hacker group – known as “API” – infiltrated the Iranian state railway company, resulting in a confidential documents leak. In December 2023, the regime accused the Israeli “Predatory Sparrow” group of carrying out a cyberattack on the country’s fuel stations.


Sudanese rebel group declares famine in southern states

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) has warned of a hunger catastrophe in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains and parts of Blue Nile state, with 20 per cent of families facing severe food shortages and 30 per cent of children suffering from malnutrition. The potential famine is being attributed to the ongoing civil war and poor harvests. The population in these regions has swelled to almost four million due to displacement from other parts of the country. The war between the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has exacerbated food insecurity, with both sides accused of humanitarian access and destroying food infrastructure.


Turkey mediates dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia

Ethiopia and Somalia have made significant progress in resolving a dispute triggered by Ethiopia’s agreement with the breakaway region of Somaliland, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Tension originally arose after Ethiopia signed a memorandum with Somaliland, under which Ethiopia would lease a 20-kilometre stretch of Somaliland’s coastline to guarantee port access and increase trade, in exchange for recognising Somaliland’s independence. Somalia has stated that the deal is a violation of its sovereignty and has gone as far as threatening war.

Turkey’s mediation efforts have focused on ensuring Ethiopia’s sea access while respecting Somalia’s territorial integrity, with a third round of talks is scheduled for September.


Sierra Leone court hands out tough sentences for those involved in 2022 coup attempt

A military court in Sierra Leone has sentenced 24 soldiers to prison terms ranging from 50 to 120 years for their roles in a failed coup attempt against President Julius Maada Bio’s government in November 2022. The soldiers were part of a group of 27 men court-martialled for attacking military barracks, prisons, and other locations, leading to over 20 deaths and the release of around 2,200 inmates. A military jury found most of the accused guilty on charges including mutiny, murder, and theft.

The sentencing follows earlier severe convictions of civilians and security personnel involved in the coup attempt and has likely been orchestrated to deter future coups in a region where they are becoming more frequent.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Germany investigates possible sabotage at military barracks near Cologne

On 14 August, a German military base near Cologne airport was sealed off, and thousands of soldiers were advised not to drink tap water due to potential contamination after a possible act of sabotage. The Cologne-Wahn base, which houses 4,300 service personnel and 1,200 civilian employees, is being investigated by police, military police, and German intelligence agencies. The base is also home to military aircraft used by the German government. Authorities have refused to comment and water samples have been taken away for further analysis.

The potential act of sabotage follows a wider European trend with incidents of sabotage reported at military or arms facilities in Poland, the UK, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and several other countries. While there are no indications as to who may have unlawfully accessed the Cologne base, NATO has recently cautioned about a series of hostile actions orchestrated by Moscow, including sabotage and cyberattacks. However, recent low-sophistication sabotage attacks across Europe have highlighted their effectiveness and the high level of plausible deniability involved, indicating that various actors hostile to the German state could be responsible for this incident.


Germany issues arrest warrant for Ukrainian Nord Stream suspect

German authorities have issued an arrest warrant for a Ukrainian diving instructor “Volodymyr Z.” over the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea near the island of Bornholm in 2022. He is suspected of carrying out the attack with at least two others, also believed to be Ukrainian citizens. The pipelines, key conduits for Russian gas to Europe, were damaged by explosions in September 2022, leading to international investigations.

While the suspect was last known to be living in Poland, authorities believe he has since fled to Ukraine. There is currently no evidence linking the suspects to the Ukrainian government, although it is unlikely that ordinary citizens would have been able to conduct such a complicated attack without state help. If Ukraine refuses to help, it may undermine Germany’s support for the war effort.


Greece struggles with record heat and wildfires near capital

Hundreds of firefighters have been battling a massive wildfire in the northern suburbs of Athens, which began in the northeastern Attica region on 11 August. Thousands of residents were evacuated as the fire spread to schools, hospitals, and fuel stations, with multiple explosions reported. The first fatality of the summer wildfire season was confirmed when a woman’s body was found in Vrilissia.

In response, Greece activated the European Civil Protection Mechanism, seeking assistance from EU countries. With containment efforts ongoing, the extent of the damage remains unclear, and Greece is facing what could be its hottest summer on record with further wildfires almost certain.


Dozens killed in garbage landslide in Kampala, Uganda

On 10 August, a garbage landslide in Kiteezi in Uganda’s capital, Kampala killed at least 30 people and dozens remain missing. The garbage landslide followed heavy rains that triggered extensive flooding across East Africa. The landslide occurred in the middle of the night and buried informal homes whilst their occupants slept. The Kiteezi waste dump serves as Kampala’s only landfill, a city with a metropolitan population of 6.7 million.

Residents have long complained over the hazardous conditions but the collection of rubbish serves as a major source of income for many of the area’s residents. There is a realistic possibility that the increasing death toll and lack of government regulation or accountability could trigger localised unrest.


Throughout the reporting period, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has intensified its attacks against Pakistani forces and infrastructure across Balochistan.

On 14 August, the BLA targeted a rally organised by the Pakistani military in Mand Soro with a remote-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED), but avoided civilian casualties through the timing of the attack. On the same day, BLA fighters conducted an attack on Pakistani positions in Sepin Tangi, Harnai, killing two soldiers and injuring three.

The previous day, on 13 August, the BLA attacked a Pakistani military post in Shah Mardan, Kalat, using rockets and small arms fire, causing both casualties and financial losses. In Rakni, Harnai, BLA fighters disabled a mobile spy tower installed by Pakistani military and intelligence agencies by setting fire to it.

In Gwadar, the BLA executed a series of attacks on 14 August, including a remote-controlled bomb explosion in Pishukan that injured two Pakistani personnel. The day also saw bomb explosions in Jiwani and Pasni and the discovery of additional bombs in Panwan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

BLA attacks have almost certainly been timed to coincide with Pakistan’s Independence Day on 14 August to maximise the publicity of the attacks and subversion of the central government. Whilst these attacks have been publicly attributed to the BLA, there is a high chance that they have also involved other Baloch groups such as the Baloch Liberation Front. These attacks may set a precedent for future waves of Baloch attacks which could be designed to coincide with other important dates such as 27 December or the “Baloch Martyrs’ Day” which honours Baloch fighters who have died in the struggle for independence.

BLA attacks have largely been coordinated against targets associated with the security services and are almost certainly being designed to minimise civilian casualties. This strategic approach is likely to help the BLA maintain legitimacy and support among Baloch communities, ensuring that their struggle is seen as a targeted effort against perceived oppressors rather than a direct threat to innocent civilians.

These attacks continue to disrupt Pakistan’s plans to get the Gwadar International Airport fully operational by 14 August. The airport is an integral part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a 3,000km corridor and the main component of China’s Belts and Roads Initiative. Detering Chinese investment and operations in Balochistan is one of the BLA’s and BLF’s primary objectives. Baloch groups have accused Pakistan and China of resource exploitation, economic marginalisation and environmental damage. Chinese workers are one of the few civilian demographics targeted by Baloch militants.

China has publicly criticised Pakistan for its inability to protect Chinese workers and interests. This has led Beijing to demand widespread counterterrorism operations by Pakistan and also a request to deploy Chinese security personnel to Pakistan, which so far Pakistan has refused. The recent surge and scale of Baloch attacks may force Pakistan to reconsider. However, the deployment of Chinese security personnel to Pakistan will likely justify the Baloch narrative, provide propaganda material, increase recruitment and potentially lead to more frequent and complex attacks on both Chinese and Pakistani security services.


On 14 August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks with the leader of the Myanmar junta in Naypyidaw after months of revel offensive have strained relations between the neighbouring countries. Border security was one of the main topics discussed and Wang publicly expressed China’s opposition to the war, with much of it occurring near its border China has promised to provide technical support and aid to the junta in exchange for a national election.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Beijing’s increased involvement in the Myanmar civil war is almost certainly being driven by the destabilisation of the areas that border China. It follows the rebel’s recent capture of Lashio, a major trading town in Shan state that forms part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, the proposed election will almost certainly be dismissed as a sham by Western nations after the disbandment of multiple parties by the junta.

Moreover, there is a high likelihood that many of the ethnic rebel groups will refuse to take part in a national election after seizing the initiative in the war. Many of their parties have been disbanded and their ultimate aim is likely greater autonomy or outright separation, suggesting a truce will be hard to secure. The continuation of the war is creating a dire humanitarian situation in Myanmar and there are also increasing reports of war crimes committed by all sides involved but primarily the junta forces.

Furthermore, both the junta and some of the rebel forces are likely exploiting the fog of war to target the predominantly Muslim ethnic Rohingya. In one recent drone and artillery attack, up to 200 Rohingya were killed and 300 injured as they were attempting to flee the country to Bangladesh from Rakhine state. One of the largest rebel groups, the Arakan Army has blamed the junta for the massacre, with the junta blaming the rebel group. This attack forms part of a wider picture which has included the torching of Rohingya homes and the forcible recruitment of Rohingya men for frontline operations.

The attacks will almost certainly force the displacement of the Rohingya creating a surge in internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Myanmar and a further deterioration in the humanitarian situation. It may also lead to a refugee crisis in Bangladesh, with its largest refugee camp, Cox’s Bazar struggling to cope with around one million refugees. As conditions worsen, more Rohingya may attempt to flee by sea to neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. These journeys are incredibly dangerous, place the Rohingya in a position to be exploited by criminal gangs and smugglers and in many cases they are not accepted by the destination countries.


On 14 August, Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin was dismissed from office after Thailand’s Constitutional Court ruled that he had breached ethics regulations for appointing a cabinet minister who had a criminal conviction. Srettha, who was in power for less than a year, is now the fourth Thai prime minister in 16 years to be removed by a verdict from the Constitutional Court.

The ruling coalition, which holds 314 out of 493 seats in the Thai House of Representatives and is dominated by the Pheu Thai Party, was then provided two options to nominate for prime minister. The first choice was, Chaikasem Nitisiri, a former attorney-general and justice minister. The other choice was Paetongtarn Shinawatra, the 37-year-old daughter of the ousted former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra- a man who has spent decades challenging Thailand’s conservative establishment and royalist military.

On 16 August the coalition decided to nominate Paetongtarn.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The dismissal of Prime Minister Srettha is likely further evidence of Thailand’s democratic backsliding after the recent dissolution of the reformist Move Forward Part (MFP). The removal of Srettha not only demonstrates the establishment’s almost unchecked power but could signal an end to the uneasy truce between it and Pheu Thai.

It is unlikely that the establishment will be able to block the Pheu Thai coalition from nominating a prime ministerial candidate as they control a majority in parliament. However, mechanisms exist to enable the establishment to block a candidate’s appointment. The Senate, which is largely appointed by the military, must also endorse parliament’s decision. The Constitutional Court can challenge the legality of the nomination, and the election commission can challenge the eligibility of Thai members of parliament. Should the establishment leverage any of these options after removing Srettha and dissolving MFP, there is a high likelihood of disruptive protests in Thailand- demonstrations that could evolve into a wider pro-democracy movement like those observed in 2020-21.

Conversely, the appointment of another Shinawatra will almost certainly be interpreted as Thaksin running Thailand from behind the scenes. Paetongtarn ‘s nomination will likely galvanise the establishment’s base and lead to accusations of corruption and nepotism. Several protests have erupted in the past relating to the Shinawatra family, most notably the 2006 anti-Thaksin protests championed by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or “Yellow Shirts”- movements that typically provoke a reaction from the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or “Red Shirts”.


Doctors protest following rape and murder case in Kolkata, India

More than 8,000 Indian doctors and other healthcare professionals have launched a strike, paralysing non-emergency services across multiple states including West Bengal, Maharashtra, Goa, and Uttar Pradesh. The doctors are protesting unsafe working conditions, after one of their colleagues, a 31-year-old trainee medic, was raped and killed at a public hospital.

Moreover, some reports have emerged indicating that the victim’s college initially tried to cover up the murder, telling her family that she had “committed suicide”. These have further inflamed public outcry, with doctors calling for strikes at a national level. Gender-based violence continues to be an extremely severe issue in India, which continues to rank among the most affected countries globally.

Moreover, healthcare workers are at a disproportionately higher risk of violence, and a study from 2023 assesses that up to 75 per cent of health workers in India have been victims of physical or verbal abuse at some point in their careers.


Japan’s Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, stands down

The 14 August announcement ends the prime minister’s three-year tenure, which was marked by a major corruption scandal and the decline of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) popular support. The LDP has remained in power for much of the past 70 years but has faced a significant decline under the current administration.

No opposition party likely has enough traction to challenge LDP as of now. However, Kishida’s resignation could have important implications for the 2025 elections. An increasingly unstable LDP could further discourage foreign investors and have negative impacts on Japanese markets.


Indonesia set to open new capital in Nusantara

The inauguration of Indonesia’s new capital is set to take place on 17 August. The new capital, which is far from being completed, will be located in the province of East Kalimantan on the island of Borneo.

The construction of a new capital has been contentious and plagued with environmental concerns, especially deforestation and a loss of biodiversity. It also threatens to displace indigenous people and costs are anticipated to spiral out of control.

The creation of a new capital underlines the vulnerability of Jakarta, which is mired by overcrowding, pollution, congestion but most importantly is sinking, with 40 per cent of the metropolis now assessed as being below sea level.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Taliban celebrate three years of rule in Afghanistan

On 14 August, the Taliban marked the third anniversary of their return to power, which included a military parade outside a former US air base near Kabul.

The Taliban have consolidated their grip on power in that time, imposed harsh restrictions on women and girls, detained hundreds of journalists and presided over economic decline. The Taliban government are yet to be formally recognised by another government and is plagued by internal divisions. Its continued control will almost certainly lead to further human rights abuses and severe humanitarian issues.


Anti-Hindu sectarian violence on the rise in Bangladesh

Following the collapse of the Hasina government and the prime minister’s escape to India, the transition government of Bangladesh has noted the increase of sectarian violence against Hindu temples and private property, as well as reported cases of lynchings and mob attacks.

The government’s collapse has almost certainly opened a security vacuum that domestic and Islamist groups are seeking to fill. These include both well-established groups, like Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJeI), and smaller Islamist formations that have so far had little impact on Bangladeshi society. For instance, a small branch of the Islamic State, known as the Bengal Province (ISBP) was formed in 2014 and has remained active, especially via online propaganda. The government’s collapse, combined with broader trends within IS including its shift away from its historic centre in Syria and Iraq, may present an opportunity for ISBP to intensify operations, including by carrying out attacks and recruitment campaigns.

Moreover, the increased prominence of sectarian violence in Bangladesh may have spillover effects outside of the country. Sectarian violence involving Hindus and Muslims in the Indian subcontinent has at times drive unrest in countries that have a large south Asian diaspora, such as the UK and Canada. The most notable example is the 2022 Leicester riots, however, the Bangladesh protests have more recently driven unrest in the UK, with clashes recorded in July in the Whitechapel area of London.


Taiwan to conduct military exercises

Taiwan is set to hold military exercises off its eastern coast on 20 August. The exercises will involve the live-firing of multiple air-launched missile systems by Taiwan’s air force along the east coast and near Orchid Island. The exercise is likely aimed at countering Chinese attempts to encircle the island and enforce a blockade, and will likely to be met with a major Chinese demonstration of strength.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

More than 100 people dead in India due to heavy rains and landslides.

The death toll surpassed 100 on 12 August. Authorities have also closed more than 220 roads, including four national highways, due to landslides, in the state of Himachal Pradesh. The floods that have affected the north Indian state since the past weekend have likely been exacerbated by the poor state of local infrastructure, with multiple reports of river banks collapsing, as well as the mountainous local terrain, which concentrates water flows towards valley settlements and complicates rescue efforts.


North Korea announces it will reject foreign aid after severe floods.

Regime officials reportedly rejected offers by South Korea, although it is unclear if they will also turn down Russian offers to provide help. The approximately 15,000 people displaced by the floods in Sinuiju will be moved to Pyongyang. Due to North Korea’s extremely strict government control, public unrest remains highly unlikely.


New Zealand charity distributes sweets contaminated with methamphetamine.

Authorities in New Zealand are racing to recover sweets distributed by the homeless charity Auckland City Mission after it was discovered that several of the sweets were contaminated with the drug methamphetamine. Preliminary reports indicate that the sweets contain as much as 300 times the lethal dose of the synthetic stimulant.

The sweets have already hospitalised three people and are wrapped in the label of the Malaysian brand Rinda. Disguising narcotics as sweets is a common cross-border smuggling tactic and the current assessment is that the sweets were donated to the charity by accident.

 However, only 16 sweets have been recovered and the authorities are unaware as to how many have been distributed. The full recovery of the sweets is highly unlikely, with each one reportedly worth around USD 600.


Week 32: 02 August – 09 August

Global Intelligence Summary

blue abstract background
  • Protests and counter-protests in the UK will likely continue on the weekend but have likely been subdued by the government’s use of severe penalties and rapid sentencing.
  • Iran has continued to promise retaliation against Israel, with the most likely course of action a layered missile, rocket and drone attack coordinated with proxy forces.
  • Early indications are that Hasina’s resignation has likely lessened anti-government unrest in Bangladesh. However, there is increasing evidence suggesting extremists are exploiting the chaos to target the Hindu minority.
  • There is a realistic possibility that the dissolution of the reformist Move Forward Party in Thailand will result in protests and possibly a wider pro-democracy movement.

AMER

Haiti: Kenyan forces make some progress but gangs still in control

Venezuela: Maduro further quashing dissent, military pledges loyalty

United Kingdom: Government begins accelerating arrests, as riots continue

Israel and Iran: Tehran and Hezbollah promise retaliation for assassinations

Somalia: Al-Shabaab conduct complex attack on Mogadishu beach resort.

China: Multiple extreme weather events occur across China

Japan: Megaquake warning issued following 7.1 magnitude earthquake

Bangladesh: PM escapes the country following mass unrest

Thailand: Popular reformist party dissolved by Constitutional Court


The UN-backed peacekeeping mission to Haiti, led by Kenyan police forces, has made some very limited progress in its efforts to take back control of the country from the gangs that continue to fuel ongoing chaos and violence.

In late July, Kenyan forces started shifting from their initial strategy of taking control of key points – including hospitals and police stations – in favour of an area-based approach. While gangs have conducted some frontal assaults on police forces during the initial stages of deployment, especially in Port-au-Prince, they have reportedly increasingly switched to a strategy of hit-and-run attacks on Kenyan officials.

At the same time, gangs continue attacking the few remaining operational welfare providers, with an assault on a Church-run children’s institute – resulting in looting – reported on 7 August. On 2 August, a UN report called for a greater deployment of international forces to Haiti. The report included data signalling that, despite the arrival of foreign troops, crime levels in Haiti remain extremely severe, particularly rates of homicide and sexual violence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the Kenyan forces have encountered significant limitations in meaningfully securing areas previously under gang control. While some reports of Kenyan forces taking over settlements on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince have emerged, no evidence signals that Kenyan police are carrying out “government-building” operations there, and there is a high likelihood that gangs are able to re-infiltrate areas that the UN mission previously cleared.

Consequently, it is almost certain that the main success of the mission so far has been the re-taking of important logistical and government buildings, ensuring some service provision to residents. Gangs’ capacity to attack police stations and other institutions has likely not been affected by the deployment of Kenyan forces, whose “permanent” presence likely only deters operations in some parts of Port-au-Prince.

While trying to inflict some attrition on the Kenyan forces, gangs’ main efforts are likely still aimed at retaining control of the local population to ensure reliance on their criminal networks. Recent gang efforts (led by a group called “400 Mawozo”) to take control of the Ganthier area, near the border with the Dominican Republic, likely illuminate the gangs’ interest in controlling the flows of refugees towards their neighbours.


Government forces in Venezuela have cracked down on protests with increasing brutality and success. At least 2,200 people have so far been arrested since the vote, and hundreds have been injured, with at least 24 deaths recorded according to human rights groups in the country.

On 8 August, the Maduro regime announced that in-country access to social media platform X would be cut for ten days. Two days prior, the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB), the country’s military, reiterated its “absolute loyalty” to Maduro, rejecting appeals from the opposition leaders to topple the regime.

Government officials have also opened criminal proceedings against opposition leaders including Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez, on charges of inciting insurrection.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As covered in last week’s assessment, it is highly unlikely that the military would defect and join anti-regime forces. This is due to the regime’s effective coup-proofing measures, including fostering an environment of uncertainty and insecurity among the highest echelons of the armed forces, pushing for greater oversight of Cuban intelligence, and playing the military against other government militias. It is also due to the opposition’s failures to address the military’s main incentive to back the regime – the direct economic benefits they receive from having a direct stake in oil export operations.

Two weeks after the election, there likely is no realistic path for the opposition to take power. In the short term, it is highly likely that repressive measures will successfully reduce the severity of public demonstrations. This will, in turn, highly likely result in severely increased threats for humanitarian workers and travellers in the country.

Still, it is likely that the regime will need to grant some concessions to reduce the wave of civil unrest that followed the vote. These are almost certainly going to be targeted inducements aimed at satisfying the middle class and bureaucratic intelligentsia. In order to accomplish this, the regime is likely to increasingly look to deepening ties with Russia and China, and to take precautions to reduce the impact of the further wave of sanctions that is highly likely to be imposed by the EU and US on Caracas in the coming weeks.


Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest

US Vice President and Democratic candidate Harris picks running mate

Minnesota Governor Tim Walz was not initially considered to be the likeliest candidate for the position. However, Walz was likely selected due to his relative appeal (compared to other potential nominees like Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro) to the left wing of the party, with no notable controversies that could upset progressive voters and a strong record on green issues. Moreover, the Democrat presidential candidate likely sees in Walz a chance to win over some moderate Republican voters disillusioned with Trump.


In Chile, mass blackouts disrupt flights, cause civil unrest

On 6 August, power outages affecting up to 1.2 million people were recorded in Chile, after severe weather damaged energy infrastructure. The blackout resulted in large demonstrations, with protesters clashing with police and blocking roads leading to airports in Pudahuel and Santiago, as well as other urban centres. Large blackouts have become somewhat common in Chile, with one in June affecting 400,000 people, and are often linked to severe weather conditions. Further protests could disrupt travel and business across the country, resulting in larger economic costs.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Multiple clergy members arrested for criticising Nicaraguan regime

The Nicaraguan government has illegally detained at least 13 priests, deacons, and members of religious congregations, the most significant instance of persecution against the  Catholic Church in 2024. Most of these arrests have targeted clergy from the Diocese of Matagalpa, whose Bishop is exiled from the country.

The Catholic Church remains one of the few organisations in Nicaragua that openly criticises the regime of President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo which has expanded its crackdown on civic institutions since 2018 in an attempt to silence the opposition. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that Nicaragua has ordered the expulsion of the Brazilian ambassador, due to the Lula administration’s criticism of the government’s repression of the Catholic Church


Costa Rican authorities crack down on US-bound international human trafficking network

On 6 August, Costa Rican authorities raided 18 sites linked to an international human trafficking network operating between Ecuador and the US. The operations were coordinated with the US and Panama, leading to the arrests of 21 people. Gangs were charging an average of USD 14,000 to illegally smuggle migrants from Ecuador to the US. Most migrants were Ecuadorian but many were also from further afield, including from Africa and Asia.

Costa Rica is now considering a similar deal to the one recently agreed between the US and Panama, whereby Washington will fund the deportation of US-bound migrants from the host country. Organised and violent crime groups in the region are increasingly turning to human trafficking due to the high profit margins, high demand and lower risk of detection and prosecution.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

US avocado demand leads to violence and environmental damage in Mexico

Mexican authorities have indicated that as many as 80 per cent of the avocado orchards in the state of Michoacán have been established illegally and their increased cultivation is being driven by US demand. The illegal expansion of avocado orchards and circumvention of Mexico’s environmental regulations are leading to high rates of deforestation, damage to the local ecology, depletion of local water resources and exacerbating drought. High profits have attracted the involvement of the cartels, who have employed violence and intimidation to suppress dissent, displace local communities and extort payments from farmers.


Brazilian farmers attack indigenous activists in Mato Grosso do Sul state, injuring 11

The attack took place on 5 August, as the activists sought to retake land scheduled to be cleared for farming operations. The farmers’ reportedly set fire to tents where some of the activists were staying and fired rubber bullets. Increasing numbers of clashes between farmers and indigenous people have been recorded as pro-farmer lobbies are currently seeking to amend Brazil’s constitutional provisions that grant indigenous groups claims to their ancestral lands.


The UK government, led by newly-elected Prime Minister Keir Starmer, has begun implementing stricter measures, including arrests for incitements to violence online, to curb the sectarian violence that has affected much of northern England, as well as cities in southern England and Northern Ireland, following the stabbing of multiple children at a dance class in Southport, which killed three.

On 9 August, a 28-year-old man was arrested for encouraging rioters to attack a hotel housing asylum seekers in Leeds via social media. At the same time, the government has also put in place measures to expedite the sentencing of rioters. As of 8 August, UK police assessed that more than 480 arrests had been made in connection with the riots, and at least 150 charges had been brought forward, and stated that both numbers are rapidly rising.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the intensity of the protests has decreased during the week, there is a realistic possibility of a further increase during the weekend. The harsher measures put in place by the government are likely to lessen the scale of the unrest, as they place a deterrent on further riots while simultaneously dismantling spaces for online organisation.

While the initial protests that followed the stabbing were community-driven, the increase in tensions has allowed extremists, mostly online-based, to gain a prominent role in fuelling the violence. A possible indication of social media’s prominent role is the notably young age of many of the rioters. According to British police, more than a quarter of people charged so far are under 21 years of age, with some of the individuals arrested as young as 11.

Still, it is unclear to what extent the Starmer government will be able to effectively reduce the impact of online radical discourse. Much of the extremist material currently fuelling the riots is produced outside of the United Kingdom, mostly by users based in continental Europe or the US, and it is unlikely that Westminster will be able to create a legislative framework that is able to deal with these channels without compromising the openness of the British information space in the immediate term. Moreover, the threat posed by social media-based extremist discourse will almost certainly extend well beyond the current crisis, with a high likelihood of commentary regarding the riots continuing to drive radicalisation among UK-based youth. While the deterrents put in place by the government may discourage large gatherings, there is a realistic possibility of a change in the nature and scope of sectarian violence in the medium term, entailing a movement towards targeted, lone-actor violence.


Iran has repeatedly conducted actions and promulgated narratives indicating that it will take this course of action, including the issuing of multiple Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMs) aimed at communicating an aerial attack is imminent. On 7 August, the Iranian armed force-run media outlet Defa Press suggested that Iran should target Israel from multiple directions to disperse Israeli assets, thereby exposing targets.

Iran has also published information relating to what targets it has already decided to strike, although this may be disinformation. The list includes Israeli military bases and government sites like the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, the Israeli Knesset building in Jerusalem, and eight airbases spread across Israel. Iran also named civil infrastructure sites like airports, gas fields, and power plants throughout Israel.

Iran’s most powerful proxy force, Lebanese Hezbollah, has also vowed to retaliate for the assassination of one of its senior commanders, Fuad Shukr. On 7 August, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah, warned that Israel should prepare for any scenario and that Hezbollah is poised to strike Israel either as part of a wider Iranian-sponsored attack or independently of Tehran.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The US, Russia and other external actors are championing diplomatic efforts in order to de-escalate the situation and avert a wider conflict. There is a realistic possibility that Iran seeks a peaceful resolution, with reports indicating that Tehran may relinquish its plans to attack Israel in exchange for a ceasefire in Gaza. However, after the assassination of Haniyeh and the appointment of the more militant Sinwar as Chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau, Iran will likely struggle to persuade Hamas to accept a ceasefire at this time.

Iran’s most likely course of action is to conduct a similar attack to the layered missile, rocket and drone attack in April. However, it is assessed that 99 per cent of the threats heading to Israel were either intercepted by Israeli air defence or US, UK and Jordanian jets. Iranian proxies have probed Israeli air defence for several months to identify weaknesses or gaps in coverage. Furthermore, Iranian media’s repeated discussion of the attack and the release of potential targets spread across Israel has been designed to disperse Israeli air defence. However, the US has increased its force posture in the region and is likely in a better place to intercept threats- a course of action it will almost certainly pursue to manage escalation.

To effectively penetrate Israel’s air defence, Iran may be forced to leverage its proxy forces more to strike Israel. Threats launched from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq will provide less early warning and reaction time for both Israel and collation forces. However, if Iran is too successful it may inadvertently escalate.

Iran’s primary goal is likely to effectively penetrate Israeli air defence with multiple ballistic missiles as these could be nuclear-armed in the future, suggesting that Iran’s main effort is not to kill Israeli citizens, only to demonstrate capability and bolster its deterrence. For this reason, Iran will likely prioritise military sites over population centres.

However, if Hezbollah adopts a divergent path, many of its crude and indiscriminate rocket systems will pose a credible threat to settlements in northern Israel, including population centres as far south as Acre, Haifa and Nazareth. Hezbollah attacks will almost certainly provide the Netanyahu administration the pretext to severely degrade the militant group on Israel’s border. This would almost certainly involve expanded strikes in northern and central Lebanon against high-value targets, but depending on the scale of a Hezbollah attack could trigger a limited ground offensive into southern Lebanon by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).


On 2 August, the al-Qaeda aligned Somalia-based jihadist group, al-Shabaab (AS) conducted a mass casualty complex attack at the popular Lido beach in Mogadishu. The assailants targeted the area late on a Friday when residents of the city typically congregate at seaside restaurants and cafes. A suicide bomber detonated his device, which was then followed by several gunmen opening fire on civilians. It is currently estimated that at least 37 people were killed in the attack and over 200 injured, marking one of the most deadly attacks in Mogadishu in 2024. On 5 August, hundreds of Somali citizens gathered near the attack site to protest AS and to show that they had not succumbed to the group’s attempts to intimidate.

Solace Global Assessment: 

AS, which has now been fighting an insurgency against the Somali government for almost 20 years, has targeted the Lido area multiple times before. The area is an upmarket area of Mogadishu with enhanced security protocols, often frequented by foreigners, international diplomats as well as Somali government and military staff. An AS attack here clearly demonstrates AS’ capability to target any part of the capital and serves to undermine the authority of the central government.

In 2022, a Somali government offensive against AS resulted in the group ceding much territory to government forces backed by international support from the African Union (AU), local clans and drone strikes by the US and Turkey. Initial optimism fuelled by the offensive’s success led Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to announce that AS would be defeated within months or reduced to just a few isolated pockets of influence. However, as an insurgent force, AS does not rely on holding territory and has been able to continue its operations by transitioning to guerrilla tactics and blending into civilian populations.

In recent months, AS has managed to reclaim ground from the government in its traditional strongholds in central and southern Somalia, likely providing it with more freedom of movement and greater capacity to conduct operations. To compound the current situation, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is set to end in late 2024, with responsibility for all security operations set to be transferred to the Somali National Armed Forces. The AU’s drawdown will almost certainly lead to an overstretching of government forces who are also having to contend with other militant groups, Puntland and Somaliland separatist movements and the looming threat of war with Ethiopia.

Moreover, it is unlikely that the government can independently deal with the financial costs or logistical demands to combat AS and has also become over reliant on fragile clan support. A resurgent AS will almost certainly seek to exploit these conditions and exact revenge by reclaiming lost territory and by increasing attacks within Somali government-held territory, with Mogadishu being the most coveted target.


Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest

Catalan separatist leader Puigdemont evades capture after appearance in Barcelona.

Former Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont defied his Spanish arrest warrant by returning to Barcelona and appearing at a pro-independence rally on 8 August. The separatist leader addressed thousands of supporters, calling for the revival of the Catalan independence movement. In 2017, large-scale unrest and an independence referendum that was not recognised and deemed illegal by Madrid, led to a significant political crisis in Spain. Puigdemont has been in a self-imposed exile from Spain since 2017, wanted for alleged embezzlement.

It is suspected that Puigdemont evaded capture from authorities with the assistance of a police officer. It is likely that civil unrest will increase in Barcelona from pro-independence protestors, galvanised by Puigdemont’s surprise appearance. It is also likely that anti-independence protests will increase across Spain, especially in Madrid, with criticism of authorities for failing to capture Puigdemont likely to be a major theme.


Turkey bids to join South Africa’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Israel.

The lawsuit accuses Israel of committing the crime of genocide in Gaza. The move follows from previous anti-Israeli gestures and statements by the Turkish government. It is highly unlikely that this development will affect the war in Gaza, and Ankara likely sees it as a way to increase its domestic support.


Provincial governor of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suspends Chinese mining.

China has important economic interests in the DRC. The northeastern Haut-Uélé province has the Kibali Gold Mine, one of Africa’s largest, and is rich in rare earth materials. DRC authorities claimed that the suspension was caused by non-compliance with standards for the prevention of environmental degradation. However, Chinese mining practices are well-known, and it is more likely that the ban is part of larger re-negotiations of mining terms, with local officials seeking a bigger share of the profits.


Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba to visit Malawi, Zambia and Mauritius.

The diplomatic trip follows the collapse of Ukraine’s relations with the Sahel junta states and is almost certainly an attempt to counter Moscow’s growing diplomatic clout in Sub-Saharan Africa. Kuleba’s efforts are highly likely to mostly cover grain exports from Ukraine to Africa – especially Malawi and Zambia, who have growing populations combined with extreme economic deprivation – and will likely not focus on minerals (which remain Russia’s main focus in the continent). Mauritius, the most economically competitive country in Africa, may be of particular interest to Kyiv due to its potential in the context of post-war reconstruction.


Controversial South Africa healthcare reform goes ahead despite opposition.

The legislation overhauls the healthcare system by limiting private provider’s ability to restrict access to care and set their own prices. President Cyril Ramaphosa signed the bill before the May election, highly likely in an unsuccessful attempt to increase electoral support for his African National Congress (ANC) party. The ANC’s main government ally, the pro-market Democratic Alliance (DA) is strongly opposed to the bill. The bill’s rollout could lead to intra-government tensions, possibly having an impact on civil unrest in South Africa.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Three Taylor Swift concerts in Vienna cancelled due to fears of Islamic State (IS) attack.

Authorities arrested two individuals in connection with a possible plot to attack venues hosting the concerts in Vienna. However, the concerts were still cancelled due to fears of additional IS affiliates still undetected. The two suspects are 18 and 19, and pledged allegiance to IS online. This highly likely continues to highlight the global trend of Islamists managing to radicalise younger individuals, using social media as a primary tool.

IS has increased efforts to target Western cities, and this international outlook is line with its growth in the Sahel, Somalia, and Afghanistan. High-visibility events, such as the Olympics or large cultural and sporting events, are likely desirable targets. By seeking to target a Taylor Swift concert, the suspected terrorists were almost certainly aiming to replicate the media effect of the Manchester Arena bombing of 2017.

The arrests were featured heavily in propaganda by the Austrian chapter of the far-right group Generation Identity (GI). GI is likely seeking to expand its political influence after a period of relative decline.


A stabbing in Holon, Israel, kills two and injures two more.

Lone wolf attacks remain a major threat in Israeli urban areas. There is a realistic possibility that the profile of the victims – two senior citizens – will result in retaliatory mob violence, especially against Israel’s Arab population.


Russia cancels Houthi arms supply.

Reports indicate that the Kremlin has cancelled its plans to arm the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. Initial indications suggested Russia was seeking to arm the militant group in response to the Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to attack mainland Russia with US-derived weapons. The delivery would have included capable anti-ship weapon systems such as anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), a development that would increase the Houthis’ ability to conduct attacks in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden.

Pressure from the US and more importantly, Saudi Arabia likely persuaded Russia to abandon these plans, fearing it would lose influence in Arab countries. However, unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian military advisors have visited Yemen, likely to train and advise the Houthis on how to use their existing weapon systems more effectively against international shipping.


UK Foreign Office issues urgent travel alert for Djibouti.

The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has issued an urgent travel alert for the East African country of Djibouti, warning of the “very likely” threat of terror attacks. The alert warns that transport hubs; hotels, restaurants and bars; shopping areas; religious events; sporting events; and military bases are likely targets, with the US, France, China, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all maintaining a constant military presence in the highly strategically placed country.

Few details are specified in the alert, which is likely predicated on credible but classified intelligence. However, Djibouti’s involvement in counter-al-Shabaab operations under the African Union has likely made it a coveted target for the al-Qaeda-aligned group.


US forces complete withdrawal from Niger.

US forces have completed their withdrawal from Niger after leaving their Air Base 201 in Agadez, northern Niger. 800 service personnel had already withdrawn in early July, with 200 following on 5 August, after the junta demanded US forces leave over a year ago. The base was primarily being used to operate US drones against al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups throughout the Sahel region.

The loss of this strike and intelligence capability will almost certainly degrade Nigerien forces’ ability to counter these threats but has opened the door for greater Russian involvement. The US has also cited concerns over Iran wanting to access Niger’s mineral wealth, most notably its vast uranium reserves which Washington believes it is wanting to use in its nuclear programme.


Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) kidnaps two Russians in Niger.

A video was shared by the al-Qaeda affiliated group on 3 August, showing the two who are identified as being employees of a Russian mining company. The case highlights the ongoing security vacuum in Niger, with neither Russia or the military alliance between the three neighbouring juntas likely able to contrast a growing Islamist presence at this time. Extremists will likely continue to target foreign nationals, especially those associated with the mining industry, which is attracting foreign influence to the region.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Torrential rainfall in Yemen results in at least 40 deaths.

Heavy rainfall in Houthi-occupied western Yemen led to at least 40 deaths as a result of flooding.

On 7 August, humanitarian organisations announced that they had begun deliveries of vital aid to affected areas. It is likely that the impact of the floods is worsened firstly by the poor record of basic service delivery by the Houthi administration, and secondly by the challenging threat environment for aid workers. There have been multiple reports of aid workers being abducted by Houthi authorities, due to suspicion of espionage.

While reduced, rainfall is forecast to continue through next week. It is likely that even moderate rainfall will pose challenges, due to the lack of adequate drainage and flood-resistant infrastructure in a region that historically has not had much rainfall.


Zimbabwean government assesses that cholera outbreak has ended.

Zimbabwe originally declared a state of emergency in November last year, after 7,000 suspected cases were reported, and dozens of deaths. The severity of the 18-month-long outbreak was almost certainly worsened by the 2022 shortage in cholera vaccines, which forced the International Coordinating Group (ICG) to temporarily change the vaccine regime from the usual two doses to one. Moreover, as cholera is transmitted via contaminated water or food, countries with less robust water infrastructure are at a much higher risk of outbreaks. The latest estimate of the outbreak’s impact is a total of 34,550 suspected cases (of which 4,200 confirmed), 631 suspected deaths, and 88 confirmed ones.


Amid heavy rainstorms across southern China, flash floods occurred in areas of the Sichuan. The floods affected 265 households and damaged multiple power lines. Eight people were killed and at least 19 are missing. Moreover, north China is suffering from a heat wave, with fears of drought, triggering concerns about farm production. While severe weather has become more common, there have been calls from Chinese policymakers for better disaster prevention in preparation for more severe weather conditions, including both droughts and floods.

Solace Global Assessment: 

China’s flood season lasts predominantly between May and September, peaking from mid-July to mid-August. Over the last two months, multiple severe environmental events have been recorded, with landslides and flooding killing over 150 people. The Chinese government has said that the rainfall and subsequent flooding have led to a doubling of the economic losses caused by natural disasters in July from the previous year, amounting to a total loss of CNY 76.9 billion (USD 10.1 billion) from natural disasters, an estimated 88 per cent of this being due to the heavy rain and floods.

In total, extreme weather events are assessed to have affected around 26 million people across China, with an estimated 1.1 million relocated, 12,000 houses destroyed, and 157,000 damaged, as well as 2.42 million hectares of crop affected in July alone. Severe and protracted damage from extreme weather events may increasingly become a driver of popular dissatisfaction towards local and national governments. Civil unrest has the potential to occur across affected regions in response to perceived government inaction or unpreparedness for the floods.

Other ongoing social issues may also contribute to a general dissatisfaction towards Beijing’s ability to provide welfare. The central government is currently debating plans to raise the retirement age by an average of five years, a decision which has been met with widespread dissatisfaction. Broader political developments could further drive local grievances with the government, adding to pre-existing discontent. Protests erupted in multiple cities at a similar time last year after the government channelled water from swollen rivers to populated areas, to prevent Beijing from flooding. The inhabitants of the area flooded, Zhuozhou in the Hebei Province, protested the measure, and were met with a harsh response from the police. The 2023 episodes may serve to deter protests linked to the current floods. In addition, the Chinese government may have learned from their previous mistakes and has this year allocated flood relief funding for five provinces, which may be able to settle and reassure the public.


On 8 August a 7.1 magnitude earthquake occurred off the coast of Kyushu, Japan. Tsunami warnings were issued and strong shaking was felt in Miyazaki. A small number of residential buildings were damaged, with one collapsing, in areas such as Osaki town in Kagoshima prefecture.  At least 16 people were injured. No major damage or deaths have been reported, and nuclear power plants were unaffected. While the 7.1 earthquake’s impact was relatively minimal, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) issued an advisory warning that the probability of a megaquake occurring in the Nankai Trough is several times higher than usual

Solace Global Assessment: 

The warning indicates an increased likelihood of a megaquake, which typically refers to magnitude 8 and above earthquakes. However, the advisory has almost certainly been issued as a precaution, rather than a definitive prediction. The Nankai Trough, located south of Japan, hosts a significant fault, the Nankai megathrust. Megathrust earthquakes, such as the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, which was magnitude 9.1, pose a significant risk. Worst-case scenario estimates predict that over 200,000 people could be killed as a result of a Nankai Trough megaquake. The most at-risk areas are on Japan’s southern Pacific coast.

In the next 30 years, seismologists estimate that there is a 70 to 80 per cent chance of a Nankai Trough megaquake occurring. Although the JMA are not able to accurately predict exactly when and where the earthquake will occur, they have urged residents on Japan’s Pacific coast to reaffirm their preparedness and take precautions over the next week. Japan has rigorous earthquake preparedness measures. The use of advanced earthquake-resistant technologies, infrastructure resilience, stringent building codes, and thorough disaster response plans all contribute towards making Japan highly resistant to the impact of earthquakes. However, extremely powerful earthquakes such as the 2011 earthquake are still capable of causing widespread damage and large numbers of fatalities.

As a result of the warning, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has cancelled a scheduled 9 August visit to central Asia, which almost certainly indicates a high level of concern. Multiple companies are taking precautionary measures, such as reviewing business continuity plans and conducting drills, and major utility companies are preparing their communication networks and readiness protocols. It is almost certain that the elevated state of earthquake preparedness will continue over the next week.


On 5 August, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Skeikh Hasina fled to India and resigned after weeks of widespread civil unrest, ending 15 years of her rule. Bangladesh’s president dissolved the parliament on 7 August, clearing the way for new elections. Thousands of protesters defied a military curfew, storming her official residence and setting parts of it on fire.

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, currently in Paris, has agreed to lead a transitional government. However, Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman has announced that an interim government would be formed, with the military set to govern the country until the next round of elections. The military has stated that it will lift the current curfew, address the injustices of the Hasina administration and restore normalcy.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The resignation of Hasina and the promise of new elections will almost certainly end much of the current unrest. Recent unrest was triggered by a High Court’s decision to reimpose a controversial jobs quota system, and authorities employed high levels of violence to curb civil unrest, leading to the deaths of at least 300 people. The most likely outcome is that a new government is formed in which the military, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the recently banned Islamist party, share posts.

However, while major unrest directed towards the government is likely to significantly decrease, there are early indications that there may be a new wave of civil unrest emerging in Bangladesh. Hasina’s Awami League party championed secularism and Hindus in Bangladesh are largely thought to have voted for the party. Hindus, who make up approximately eight per cent of the population, have frequently been targeted in the past when the Awami League has lost power. Reports on social media suggest that violent mobs have attacked and looted Awami League offices and Hindu properties and temples throughout the country, leading India to evacuate most of its non-essential embassy staff.

The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, which represents the country’s religious minorities, claims that as many as 300 Hindu homes and 20 temples have been damaged in the attacks. If the attacks continue to escalate, there is a realistic possibility that sectarian violence will spread throughout the region, with Hindu nationalists in India or further afield, targeting the Muslim population in reprisal attacks.


On 7 August, Thailand’s Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the Move Forward Party, (MFP) the party which received the largest amount of votes in the 2023 election but whose leader at the time, Pita Limjaroenrat, was blocked from his attempt to become prime minister. The court also banned the party’s executive committee from participating in Thai politics for ten years. The court’s decision follows a ruling in January which stipulated that MFP’s pledge to reform Thailand’s controversial lèse-majesté laws was unlawful. Pita stated that the movement would continue by establishing a new party with new leadership.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Thailand’s courts have dissolved political parties and banned popular politicians several times in the past in order to prevent reformist movements from challenging the country’s conservative establishment, which has consolidated its power after a military coup in 2014. In 2018, the Future Forward Party (FFP), a progressive party similar to the MFP, was established. The FFP emerged as the third-largest party in the House of Representatives after the 2019 elections. The FFP was subsequently dissolved and its leaders barred from politics in 2020 after accusations of violating election laws, with many believing these charges had been manufactured by the conservatives.

The dissolution of FFP led to widespread protests in Bangkok and several other major cities, largely driven by the Thai youth who accused the government and judiciary of colluding together to suppress political opposition and undermine democracy. The initial protests evolved into a wider pro-democracy movement that attracted tens of thousands of participants to multiple protests. Protestors demanded constitutional reforms, the resignation of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, and a reduction in the monarchy’s power, which persisted into late 2021. Protests were often marked by violent clashes with the police, resulting in at least four deaths, over 150 injuries, hundreds of arrests, the closure of public services, and disruption to transport.

The most likely course of action for MFP and its supporters will be to reconstitute the party under a different name and with new leadership. However, there is a realistic possibility that the MFP’s dissolution will spark protests across the country that could evolve into a wider pro-democracy movement.


Politics, Economics and Civil Unrest

Pakistani Islamist party Jamaat-i-Islami announce end of sit-in protest in Rawalpindi.

The Islamist political party Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) announced on 9 August that it is ending its two-week sit-in after negotiating an agreement with the government. The deal includes the establishment of a task force to tackle issues with independent power producers (IPPs), reduce electricity bills, and the lowering of certain taxes. The sit-in involved thousands of participants occupying a road at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi. JI leaders insisted, however, that the sit-in would resume if the government does not fulfil its promises.


Fijian Prime Minister to visit China.

Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka will visit China from August 14 to 21 in a move aimed at strengthening their strategic ties amidst growing geopolitical competition in the Asia-Pacific region. The visit follows Fiji’s decision to maintain a policing cooperation deal with China, which has raised concerns in Australia, highlighting the broader contest for influence between China and the United States in the region.

The visit also coincides with important regional discussions at the Pacific Islands Forum, underlining the broader context of regional security and strategic planning. This visit could potentially elevate Fiji-China relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership, reflecting China’s ongoing efforts to deepen its influence in the Pacific over the US.

Security, Armed Conflict and Terror

Australia raises terror threat level.

The Australian government has raised its terror alert from “possible” to “probable” citing the concerns of security officials regarding a major increase in extremist views online. The probable category is level three out of five and indicates that officials believe that the probability of an attack is over 50 per cent. Sources from the country’s main domestic intelligence agency Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) indicated that extremism has increased across “all ideological spectrums” and that the current Israel-Hamas conflict has been a major driver in the rise of extremism.


Three explosions detonate in Thailand’s Patani province.

On 9 August, three bombs exploded in the vicinity of a police station in Muang Patani, Patani province. The first bomb was detonated near a fishing pier and was followed by two subsequent blasts close to the original explosion. One person was injured and has been taken to hospital. Patani province is one of Thailand’s four primarily Muslim provinces where many people speak Malay as a first language and are seeking separation from Thailand. The group most active in Pattani, is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which has led an insurgency for several decades and has carried out multiple attacks throughout Thailand.

Environment, Health and Miscellaneous

Severe floods in Nepal kill more than 160, displace hundreds.

Nepal and its neighbours’ monsoon season occurs between June and August and is marked by torrential rain that can easily damage poorly erected informal settlements. In Nepal, at least 167 people have died, and more than 4,000 households have been displaced. Nepal’s uniquely mountainous topography almost certainly contributes to making search and rescue efforts more difficult, and to leaving affected communities at a higher risk of isolation from authorities.

There is a high chance of La Nina conditions, marked by the cooling of the middle Pacific Ocean’s surface, developing this year by September. La Nina tends to coincide with more severe monsoon seasons which, although boosting agricultural yields, are likely to further exacerbate damage in the Indian subcontinent.


North Korea offered humanitarian aid by Russia.

Severe rainfalls and floods have caused damage and disruptions in North Korea’s northwest, reportedly isolating more than 5,000 residents and damaging up to 4,000 homes. The Russian offer of aid further demonstrates the growing security and diplomatic partnership between the two countries which has largely been characterised by the exchange of military technology.