Mexico’s unprecedented extradition of cartel members to the US is almost certainly anattempt to appease the Trump administration and will likely involve an increase in counter-cartel operations.

Nicaragua’s withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council is almost certainly indicative of a broader effort to limit foreign oversight of human rights abuses and government repression.

Russia will almost certainly exploit the US decision to suspend military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine by increasing the scale and frequency of its long-range attacks.

Significant armed clashes in Syria are likely indicative of a nascent insurgency, which would highly likely receive support from Iran.

The US government has almost certainly rejected the Arab League’s Gaza plan. Washington’s pressure on Hamas, as well as the ongoing blockade in Gaza, are likely to destabilise the ceasefire.

Terror attack highly likely in Mogadishu amid an ongoing al-Shabaab offensive in Somalia.

Ghanaian MPs’ resubmission of a controversial anti-LGBT bill is likely to be passed by parliament and will likely result in increased violence and repression of the LGBT community.

Reprisal attacks by ISKP highly likely in Pakistan after regional commander arrested in joint US–Pakistan operation.

An investment deal between the US and Taiwan’s TSMC is highly likely indicative of a strategic priority for the Trump administration to mitigate against the potential impact of Taiwan’s invasion.

In an unprecedented move, Mexico City has authorised the extradition of 29 high-ranking cartel members to the US, many of whom are alleged to have committed serious crimes, including murder. The most high-profile extradition was that of Rafael Caro Quintero, or the “Narco of Narcos”, who allegedly ordered the kidnap, torture and killing of DEA special agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena in the 1980s which placed him on the FBI’s most wanted list until his capture in 2022. If convicted, many of those extradited could face the death penalty, according to the US Department of Justice. The extraction follows the designation of several Mexican drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) by US President Donald Trump in January.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Mexico’s compliance with US demands was almost certainly a reaction to the threat of economically devastating tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. However, Trump imposed tariffs on Mexico on 4 March and declared a “war” on Mexican cartels the same day. These moves likely indicate that Trump’s war against the cartels has only just begun, and his administration will leverage tariffs to exert pressure on Mexico City to sustain its commitment to counter-cartel operations.

In a recent visit to the southern border, US Vice President JD Vance dismissed the idea of the US military “invading” Mexico. However, US strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) airborne assets, such as the RC-135 “Rivet Joint”, have continued to fly missions close to the Mexican border. This likely suggests that the US military has intensified its surveillance of the cartels. The US may also be sharing some of this intelligence with Mexico to support Mexican counter-cartel operations, which could explain a series of recent high-profile arrests of major cartels designated as FTOs.

Reporting indicates that the cartels, especially the notorious Sinaloa cartel, have been significantly impacted by the recent government crackdowns, which have involved arrests, drug seizures and raids on fentanyl labs. This has forced the Sinaloa cartel to scale back fentanyl production and move labs to other parts of Mexico. Anecdotal reporting from cartel members indicates that they have linked this to increased US operations, especially drone surveillance. Cartels are beginning to invest in drone-detection technology and have expressed that they genuinely feared arrest or death for the first time in years.

However, cartel members have also suggested that they are unlikely to cease operations and will not go down without a fight, especially when confronted with the prospect of extradition and the death penalty. Sustained pressure from both the US and Mexican governments is likely to result in a shift in cartel operations.  Cartels are likely to employ more violence to deter the Mexican government, and increased arrests could result in the splintering of cartels, posing the risk of greater competition and more violence.  If the cartels start to view US involvement as an existential threat, there is a realistic possibility that cartels might deliberately target US citizens and interests. This could include attacks on American businesses, kidnappings of US citizens, or attempts to increase narcotics shipments to the US.

Nicaragua has announced that it will withdraw from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) following a UN report which urged the international community to address human rights abuses committed by the government of President Daniel Ortega. The UN report alleged that the Ortega regime had engaged in a systematic crackdown on human rights, democratic norms and had increased its repression of religious groups.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Nicaragua’s withdrawal from the UNHRC was quickly followed by an announcement that it will also quit the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). These withdrawals likely indicate a broader trend of Nicaragua attempting to reduce foreign oversight of its abuses, which have been preceded by several major reforms that have enabled Ortega and his family to consolidate power in the country. These have included changes to the constitution that have expanded presidential powers, allowing him to exert more control over the judicial and the legislative branches of government, more control over the police and military, and more state control over the media.  

These moves indicate that Ortega is further isolating Nicaragua from international scrutiny and consolidating his grip on power. This will almost certainly result in increased oppression of NGOs, civil society groups, independent media, the Catholic Church and other organisations critical of the regime.

In August 2024, Ortega banned approximately 1,500 NGOs in Nicaragua that were deemed to be hostile towards the government, which included the Nicaraguan Red Cross and several charities associated with the Catholic Church. Future repressive measures will likely involve arbitrary detentions, expulsions and the use of state-sponsored physical and psychological violence, including threats, beatings, solitary confinement and even extrajudicial killings.

This repression and reduction in foreign assistance will almost certainly lead to a deterioration of humanitarian conditions and likely increase migration flows out of Nicaragua.

US tariffs on Canada and Mexico go live, then get postpone

Tariffs of 25 per cent on goods entering the US from Mexico and Canada took effect on 4 March, only to then get rolled back on 6 March, following direct calls between Trump and the leaders of Mexico and Canada.

In addition to driving significant market fluctuations, the moves are likely to have a political impact on the two US neighbours. In Canada, Trump’s adversarial stance has “resurrected” the ruling Liberal Party’s 2025 electoral bid, with the centre-left party gaining 10 points in the polls in little more than a month and planning to elect a new party leader on 9 March.

In Mexico, Washington’s crackdown on migration at the southern border has been a driver of unrest. Further unrest in large Canadian and Mexican cities in response to future US trade policy shifts remains a realistic possibility.  

Police clash with protestors in Argentine capital over pension reforms

On 6 March, protestors clashed with the police in Buenos Aires after attempting to march around the Argentine Congress to demand higher pensions and a reversal of medication cuts. The protests were organised in response to austerity measures introduced by President Javier Milei, who has overseen sweeping reforms aimed at reducing public expenditure, debt and inflation.

However, reports from February suggest that Milei’s reforms have drastically cut Argentina’s inflation, reducing it to a five-year low, likely indicating that further controversial reforms and cuts are on the horizon.

Major protests are likely to be organised on 8 March to coincide with International Women’s Day. The “Ni Una Menos” (“Not One [Woman] Less”) movement typically organises protests in the capital and other cities to protest issues like femicide, gender-based violence and women’s rights. The protests are likely to attract more protestors than usual due to Milei’s views on topics like abortion and in response to some of his reforms which have negatively affected childcare subsidies, women’s labour rights and the dismantling of organisations within government such as the Ministry of Women, Genders, and Diversity.

Haitian police increasingly using drones to fight gangs

During this reporting period, Haitian police forces in Port-au-Prince have carried out multiple successful strikes on gang members using first-person-view (FPV) drones. On 4 March, a police FPV drone reportedly injured the leader of the 5 Segonn Gang, “Izo”, during a Carnival celebration. The use of drones is likely to allow Haitian police, and possibly the international police forces supporting them, to carry out more effective decapitation strikes on high-ranking gang members, particularly in areas where the large presence of gang members makes ground operations risky. However, as previous cases illustrate, there is a realistic possibility that such strikes will result in retaliatory actions by gangs, including the indiscriminate targeting of the civilian population.

Guyana accuses Venezuela of entering oil block in Guyanese waters

On 1 March, Guyanese President Mohamed Irfaan Ali accused a Venezuelan coast guard patrol of entering Guyanese waters. The vessel allegedly approached an offshore oil facility in an oil block operated by Exxon Mobil and sent out a message claiming the Guyanese output vessel was in “disputed international waters”. In response to the incident, Ali summoned the Venezuelan ambassador and instructed Guyana’s embassy in Caracas to file a formal protest with the government. He also deployed air assets and the country’s coastguard to ward off the threat. This constitutes the latest incident in a diplomatic spat whereby Venezuela claims the Essequibo region, which comprises approximately two-thirds of Guyana. Further tensions are highly likely amid ongoing brinkmanship by Venezuela.

Windstorm-fuelled wildfires in south and central Texas

Windstorm-fuelled wildfires have broken out in south and central Texas. The latest reports indicate that the Twin Oryx Fire in La Salle County is 60 per cent contained, covering approximately 900 acres. The Onion Creek Fire in west Buda is 80 per cent contained at about 190 acres, with a containment line established. Additionally, the Duke Fire in Bexar County has been fully contained across 244 acres. The Welder Complex Fire in Sinton is at 75 per cent containment and spans an estimated 785 acres. Evacuation orders in Sinton have been lifted after the wildfire destroyed at least 20 homes. A red flag warning has been issued for critical fire weather conditions across parts of Texas and neighbouring states.

Widespread power outages across Honduras

Honduras experienced widespread power outages impacting multiple regions and major cities, including Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, on 1 March. The outages were initially reported without a known cause. The Honduran energy minister ruled out a failure at the El Cajon hydroelectric dam; it was later confirmed that the outages resulted from a ‘temporary and atypical failure in the interconnection between Honduras and Nicaragua.’ The outages also affected regional energy lines connected to neighbouring countries, but no widespread outages were reported outside of Honduras. All power was restored later on 1 March.

On 4 March, US President Trump suspended all military aid to Ukraine with the reported aim of pressuring Ukrainian President Zelensky into agreeing to a ceasefire agreement with Russia. The suspension reportedly includes any further drawdown from the most recent USD 3.85 billion of military aid approved by Congress under former President Biden and a halt in deliveries already approved by Biden, inclusive of aid currently in transit or pre-staged in Poland. The decision to suspend military aid was followed by a ban on US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, which extended to US-derived intelligence being shared via third parties like the United Kingdom.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Trump administration’s decision to suspend both military aid and intelligence sharing is almost certainly a mechanism to exert pressure on Zelensky to agree to ceasefire terms that would significantly benefit the US, especially regarding favourable terms for US access to Ukrainian mineral resources. Should Zelensky acquiesce to Trump’s demands, there is a realistic possibility that the US will reverse these decisions in order to apply renewed pressure on Russia to agree to terms that align with US strategic interests.   

The suspension of military aid and intelligence sharing will almost certainly result in an increase in Russian long-range missile and UAV strikes on Ukrainian population centres, critical national infrastructure and high-value targets in rear areas. Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian aerial threats, particularly ballistic missiles, relies heavily on US aid and intelligence.

The US-derived Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) system is Ukraine’s most capable air defence system and Kyiv’s European allies are unable to support Ukraine with a comparable system that can provide as effective an air defence umbrella. Russia will almost certainly exploit current developments to deplete Ukraine’s Patriot missile stocks by increasing its layered, near-simultaneous long-range aerial attacks on multiple axes.

A critical shortage in Patriot interceptors will almost certainly make Ukraine more vulnerable to long-range Russian attacks, severely degrade its ability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles, and enable Russian air with more freedom of movement. Kyiv will likely be forced to prioritise its remaining air defence resources to defend major cities like Kyiv, leaving smaller cities, rear areas and frontline positions more vulnerable to Russian attack.

The suspension in intelligence sharing will further expose Ukraine to Russian aerial attacks. The US provides Ukraine with satellite reconnaissance, radar tracking, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) to detect missile launches and drone movements. This allows Ukraine to issue air raid alerts, prepare air defence and increase its ability to intercept incoming threats.

A loss of this vital intelligence will degrade Ukraine’s situational awareness, reduce reaction time, overwhelm air defence and likely force Ukraine to adopt a more reactive rather than proactive air defence strategy. Ukraine will also likely be forced to rely more on its own air defence radars to compensate for the loss of early warning.

These radar systems are high-value targets (HVTs) for Russia. If forced to radiate for extended periods, Ukrainian radars will be more detectable to Russian SIGINT and thus easier to target, jam, deceive or map out, further degrading Ukraine’s aerial defences.

Ukraine’s frontlines are unlikely to be immediately affected by the suspension of military aid. 90 per cent of US-derived weapons and munitions are already in-country, and Ukraine has increased the domestic production of UAVs, which it is using extensively for frontline operations.

Assessments in late February indicated that Ukraine could maintain its current operational tempo until approximately mid-2025 (around June), provided that the US continues delivering the aid previously agreed upon under the Biden administration’s planned schedule. However, if the suspensions on military aid and intelligence are sustained, Ukraine’s ability to defend its frontlines and the effectiveness of its counteroffensives will almost certainly be severely degraded.

Ukraine is still heavily dependent on US-derived long-range systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the Army Tactical Missile System) (ATACMS) to target Russian dynamic HVTs in rear areas. Whilst Ukraine still has access to these systems, it lacks the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to effectively find, fix and finish Russian HVTs in the deep battlespace.

Without this targeting capability, Ukraine’s ability to strike Russian logistic nodes, command and control centres (C2), force concentrations, ammunition depots and other HVTs will be severely degraded, further allowing Russia to seize the initiative on the ground.

At least 70 people were killed during a series of armed clashes between security forces and Assad-loyalists between 4 and 6 March, including at least 13 Syrian security officers. The fighting was most intense in the northwestern coastal governorates of Latakia and Tartus, and in the Daraa Governorate in southwestern Syria. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that clashes took place in Homs and Aleppo.

These mark the deadliest attacks against the security forces of Syria’s new Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led interim government since the December 2024 overthrow of the Assad regime. The clashes followed operations targeting Assad-regime remnants, with armed groups in many cases ambushing security forces.

Anti-government protests took place in the port cities of Latakia and Tartus, with authorities imposing curfews which are ongoing as of 7 March. Moreover, supporters of the HTS-led government participated in demonstrations in numerous cities, including Damascus, Manbij and Idlib.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In addition to the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), a nexus of sectarian militias and decentralised armed groups supported the Assad regime. Following the HTS-led lightning advance that toppled the regime, the SAA collapsed with many personnel and senior officers going into hiding or fleeing into neighbouring Iraq. HTS has highly likely taken a “carrot and stick” approach, by offering clemency for lower-level officers and soldiers if they hand in their weapons to the state, while simultaneously conducting combing operations to root out armed remnants and higher-level officers that are implicated in war crimes. It is highly likely that many units have simply gone underground and integrated into local militia groups.

It is likely that the clashes are indicative of a nascent insurgency by these groups, which would highly likely receive support from Iran. The loss of Syria has been a critical strategic defeat for Tehran. In the past week, an official declaration was made for the creation of a new group named the “Islamic Resistance Front in Syria”, which is highly likely an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked project. It is likely that Iranian support for regime remnants groups and insurgent activity will operate primarily out of Iraq, which can be used as a staging post for the infiltration of Shia militia fighters and the smuggling of arms. It is likely that clashes will continue to occur in response to combing operations, particularly in the Alawite stronghold governorates of Latakia and Tartus.

The 4 March Arab League summit in Cairo produced a new, three-stage plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. The plan envisions a three-year reconstruction period, and the creation of a Palestinian Authority (PA)-backed “technocratic government” supported by an Egypt- and Jordan-trained police force. The Gaza Strip is currently undergoing a week-long aid blockade, which has resulted in worsening conditions for the civilian population and growing fears of collapse in the ceasefire.

The US has so far ignored the Arab League plan and remains committed to the controversial “Riviera” plan, which envisions the displacement of Gaza’s population. Washington has, for the first time since 1997, established direct communication channels with Hamas and increased pressure on the group, pledging to collapse the ceasefire if all remaining Israeli hostages are not released. At the same time, US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff has renewed calls on Israel to respect the ceasefire at least until his visit to the region.

Israel Defence Forces (IDF) operations in the West Bank, which started on 21 January, have continued. More than 50 Palestinians have been killed during the ongoing operations. IDF units are continuing to demolish homes in the Nur Shams refugee camp and to carry out raids in Tulkarm, Tubas, and Jenin. Israeli settler groups have attacked Palestinian villagers in the Masafer Yatta area.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Arab League peace plan likely contains important concessions to Tel Aviv and Washington. It effectively sidelines Hamas by vesting authority in PA technocrats and possibly establishes a deterrence in the form of a local police force trained by Egypt and Jordan. At the same time, however, the plan clashes with US calls to displace, likely permanently, Gaza’s civilian population, which is almost certainly unacceptable to Cairo and Amman, as well as other Arab states. The US’s approach towards Hamas likely combines inducements and, more importantly, threats.

While the direct channel of communication offers Hamas a way to negotiate a deal bypassing Israel, the renewed threats of collapsing the ceasefire are almost certainly deepening the group’s worries about its future after losing its main source of political leverage on Tel Aviv, the hostages. The impasse is likely to further destabilise the ceasefire, particularly if Hamas leaders in Gaza feel that their negotiating position is unrecoverable.

In the West Bank, the continuation of Israeli operations likely reflects Israeli assessments of Washington’s support. The Trump administration removed sanctions on Israeli settler groups and has made important overtures to the Israeli far-right. Most notably, on 6 March, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, leader of the ultra-nationalist Religious Zionism party, met with his American counterpart in Washington. This represents a notable shift from the Biden administration, which had refrained from inviting Smotrich for bilateral talks. Further Israeli operations and settler violence are highly likely to further damage the already precarious position of the PA in the West Bank.

A group of ten Ghanian members of parliament have resubmitted a controversial bill that, if signed into law, will impose strict restrictions on LGBT rights and the LGBT community. The bill will impose a three-year jail term for individuals who identify as LGBT and five to ten years for promoters or advocates of LGBT rights. The bill passed a parliamentary vote in 2024 but was not signed into law by former President Nana Akufo-Addo, who cited legal challenges, and was then dropped following the dissolution of parliament in 2024 ahead of the general election.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The initial legal challenges against the bill have been dismissed by the Supreme Court of Ghana, clearing the way for the bill’s resubmission and likely approval. The majority of Ghanaian political parties, including the National Democratic Congress (NDC), which controls parliament and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which constitutes the largest opposition party, have expressed support for the bill, suggesting that it is highly likely to pass. If passed, the bill is likely to be part of a wider and more sustained attempt to suppress LGBT rights which has attracted widespread support in Ghana. Moreover, politicians in Ghana have expressed that they no longer need to fear economic sanctions in response to the bill, likely assessing that the current geopolitical climate favours conservatism and that Western nations are likely reticent to jeopardise relations with Ghana over a domestic issue.

The bill is likely to legitimise anti-LGBT views in Ghana and result in a significant rise in violence against  LGBT individuals, particularly outside of Accra. This was observed in 2022 when the bill was originally drafted. This involved higher rates of physical attacks, arrests, police extortion and incidents of “corrective rape”. By criminalising advocacy for LGBT rights, the bill will almost certainly result in the closure of support centres and other resources for the LGBT community. While the majority of these attacks will likely target local nationals, there is a high likelihood that foreign workers or travellers in Ghana may also become targets, particularly if suspected of promoting LGBT rights within the country.

On 2 March, the Somali National Army, alongside international partners, killed at least 40 al-Shabaab members in the Biya Cadde region of Hirshabelle State. The successful operation comes amid strategic gains by al-Shabaab, who launched an offensive on the Middle Shabelle and Hiraan regions on 20 February, recently encircling Jowhar, a town 91 kilometres north of Mogadishu and the capital of Hirshabelle State. On 4 March, Somali forces clashed with al-Shabaab in Middle Shabeele, repelling an attack in the Boos-Hareeri area of the Aadan-Yabaal district, which the Somali government has held for several years. Aerial strikes, highly likely conducted by the US, reportedly targeted al-Shabaab forces in Al-Kowthar, a town in Middle Shabelle that was seized by al-Shabaab militants last week. Ceelbaraf, an important transportation hub in the region, fell to al-Shabaab militants, despite being targeted by aerial strikes.

On 4 March, the US embassy in Somalia issued a security alert claiming that it is ‘tracking credible information related to potential imminent attacks against multiple locations in Somalia including Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport.’ The warning stated that attacks may target ‘airports and seaports, checkpoints, government buildings, hotels, restaurants, shopping areas, and other areas where large crowds gather and Westerners frequent, as well as government, military, and Western convoys.’ The intelligence spurred the US embassy to cancel all personnel movements; Turkish Airlines and EgyptAir have suspended all flights to Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The renewed al-Shabaab offensive has killed at least 60 pro-government forces and aims to recapture areas taken from the insurgent group after the Somali government’s counteroffensive from 2022 to 2023. By launching an offensive, al-Shabaab highly likely aims to take advantage of the security gaps in the region caused by inter-clan fighting and Burundi’s lack of participation in the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Despite joint US counterterrorism efforts almost certainly slowing al-Shabaab’s ongoing offensive, al-Shabaab will highly likely continue to make territorial gains.

Since President Donald Trump took office, the US has participated in air strikes against al-Shabaab, the latest supporting Somali forces in their 2 March operation. While the embassy statement did not accuse a specific group, the intelligence was highly likely linked to al-Shabaab, who have conducted several bombings and shootings in Mogadishu in recent years. By targeting Mogadishu, the group likely aims to undermine public confidence in the Somali government and divert resources from counteroffensive capabilities to shoring up security in the capital. Furthermore, the group will likely also particularly target US personnel in an attempt to retaliate against US counterterrorism efforts and raise the profile of the attacks. While al-Shabaab are the most likely culprit, there is a realistic possibility that the intelligence was linked to Islamic State Somalia (ISS), who are currently being pushed back by Puntland forces and US air strikes.

Germany’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) to start coalition talks

The return to a “Grand Coalition” between the two main centre-right and centre-left parties was made almost certain by the failure of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) to enter parliament.

The talks will highly likely result in a workable coalition, especially as, on 5 March, the two parties overcame a significant disagreement over reforming the “debt brake”. While the decision to create a EUR 500 billion infrastructure fund and to overhaul borrowing limits was hailed by the CDU/CSU as a necessary decision due to Washington’s shift in Ukraine, it likely represents an SPD victory.

As the opposition (comprised of the far-right and far-left) will only acquire its “blocking” privileges following the creation of a new government, the next SPD-CDU/CSU moves are highly likely forced: the two parties will begin talks on 7-9 March, submit the debt brake proposal for a vote early next week, and announce the coalition following that. There is a realistic possibility that the manoeuvre will drive a response from the left, including protests in Berlin and other major cities.

General strike planned for 7-8 March in Italy

Several public and private sector labour unions have announced strike action to coincide with International Women’s Day. Striking workers include railway and airport personnel. The strikes are almost certain to result in severe traffic disruptions throughout Italy starting on the evening of 7 March. On 8 March, authorities agreed with airport workers on two periods of activity, where flights will go ahead, between 07:00 and 10:00 and between 18:00 and 21:00 local time.

Flares and tear gas released in Serbian parliament

On 4 March, opposition coalition lawmakers, led by the Serbian Progressive party (SNS), discharged flares and tear gas on the first day of parliament. Three lawmakers were injured, with one experiencing a stroke and in critical condition. The incident occurred during a vote on a bill to increase university funding and was in support of the student-led anti-corruption protests, which have been ongoing since November 2024 after the Novi Sad railway station roof collapsed, resulting in 15 fatalities. This highly publicised incident will highly likely have an invigorating effect on the protests, which constitute a significant threat to President Aleksandar Vucic’s power.

Greek government faces no-confidence vote over fatal train crash

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ government is facing a no-confidence vote over the 2023 railway disaster that killed 57 people, with opposition parties accusing the government of shielding officials from accountability. Major nationwide protests erupted on 28 February to mark the second anniversary of the train crash. However, protests have continued in major Greek cities, including in Athens and Thessaloniki, resulting in clashes with the police and the use of tear gas and other crowd dispersal methods. Failure of the government to take action is likely to sustain protests, which may intensify on the weekend.

Tunisian opposition members tried on terrorism charges

On 4 March, a mass trial of around 40 members of the Tunisian opposition, including lawyers, journalists, and politicians, began in Tunis. Many of the defendants have charges such as “belonging to a terrorist group” or “plotting against state security”. Human rights and civil society groups have claimed that the trial is politically motivated and aims at silencing opposition voices. The trial almost certainly represents part of President Kais Saied’s broader efforts to sideline and silence opposition and civil society voices. There is a realistic possibility that the trial will drive protests in Tunis, and other urban centres.

Refugee clashes with Kenyan police amid food ration protests

On 4 March, clashes broke out between refugees and security forces in Kenya’s Kakuma refugee camp following the imposition of food and water rationing, which left many struggling to obtain essential resources. Four people were injured after security forces used live ammunition to disperse protesters. The camp is one of the largest in the world and houses approximately 200,000 refugees from various countries, including South Sudan, Ethiopia, Burundi, and the DRC. The rationing was imposed amid shortages triggered by USAID cuts, which have reportedly contributed to rising insecurity in the camp. Further unrest at refugee camps is likely amid further humanitarian aid shortages. There is a realistic possibility that it will contribute to anti-US sentiment in towns and cities close to the refugee camps.

At least 16 protesters injured during march in Maputo, Mozambique

On 5 March, security forces shot and injured at least 16 protesters during a march in Mozambique’s capital, Maputo. Opposition figure Venâncio Mondlane was leading the demonstrations, which took place hours before the controversially elected President Daniel Chapo signed a political agreement with opposition parties which would end the post-election protests. Mondlane’s current whereabouts is reportedly unknown.

Despite the winding down of the unrest that has so far led to at least 353 deaths since October and Mondlane’s agreement to engage in opposition via political means, the continued demonstrations reflect the continued frustration with the government. Security forces’ use of live ammunition has typically triggered unrest to spiral into clashes and the well-publicised incident will likely trigger further anti-government demonstrations. Given Mondlane’s involvement in this protest, there is a realistic possibility that supporters will view this as an attempt to assassinate Mondlane, also spurring further unrest.

Car-ramming attack in Mannheim, Germany, kills two, wounds dozens

On 2 March, a car-ramming attack occurred in the southwestern German city during a Carnival parade. The perpetrator of the attack was a 40-year-old German citizen who has previously been fined for a hate speech offence in 2018. Local authorities have not disclosed a possible motive for the attack as of the time of writing.

The attack follows multiple similar car-ramming attacks that have occurred in Germany over the past few months. These have been inspired by different ideologies, from Islamist extremism (as in the case of the February attack in Munich) to far right and anti-Islam ideology (as in the attack at the Magdeburg Christmas market).

Moreover, OSINT shows a rise in extremist calls for attacks on German Carnival events in the days prior to the recent attack, including from Islamic State-linked media. There is a realistic possibility that, even if not ideologically aligned, the Mannheim attacker was influenced or inspired by notable past car-ramming attacks.

Cyberattack at Poland’s Space Agency (POLSA)

On 2 March, unauthorised access to POLSA’s IT infrastructure was detected by Polish cybersecurity, who secured the affected systems. While the perpetrators have not yet been identified, there is a realistic possibility that foreign political actors perpetrated the attack. Poland’s digital minister, Krzysztof Gawkowski claimed in January that Poland is the most frequently targeted country for cyberattacks in the European Union, having doubled since 2023, with Russia allegedly perpetrating most attacks. POLSA was highly likely targeted due to space agencies’ collaboration with military and intelligence agencies; sensitive security data was likely targeted. Further attacks on Polish cyber infrastructure are highly likely in the coming months.

Russian security kills Islamic State militants near Moscow and in Dagestan.

The Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on 3 March the killing of a Russian national who had allegedly been planning attacks on the metro service in the Russian capital, as well as on Jewish places of worship. The man had allegedly been planning to travel to Afghanistan for training. This, alongside the pro-Islamic State (IS) propaganda and the IS flag found at his apartment, make it highly likely that the man was planning his attack on behalf of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

On 5 March, Russian security forces also killed four alleged ISKP militants in Dagestan. According to state reports, the four were planning to conduct a bombing attack on a regional interior ministry branch. The two cases continue to highlight ISKP’s efforts to expand its attacks to Russia and replicate its 2024 Crocus Hall attack.

ISKP sees Russia as a desirable target as it likely assesses that its security services are overstretched due to the war in Ukraine. Moreover, ISKP continues to successfully radicalise Russian citizens from the Caucasus region, as well as citizens of central Asian states who can enter Russia with relative ease as migrant workers.

Turkish forces continue to target Kurdish militants despite disarmament calls

Turkey’s Defence Ministry has stated that it has killed almost 30 Kurdish militants in Iraq and Syria in the week following calls to disarm by Abdullah Ocalan, a key leader within the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Turkey considers the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG/J) and the Iraqi Peshmerga as extensions of the PKK and has warned that military operations will continue if disarmament efforts fail to progress. However, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which includes the YPG, has distanced itself from the PKK and Ocalan’s call, indicating that Turkish offensive operations in Syria are likely to continue regardless of developments on the domestic front.

One killed after stabbing attack in Haifa, Israel

The attack occurred on 3 March at a bus and train station. In addition to one death, the attack resulted in at least four injuries. The perpetrator was reportedly an Israeli citizen of Druze Arab origin, who recently entered Israel from Germany. The motive of the attack was not officially disclosed by authorities, but it is highly likely that it was linked to Israeli operations in Gaza, the West Bank, and Syria. Low-sophistication, “lone-wolf” attacks continue to pose a significant security threat in Israel. As other recent cases have highlighted, perpetrators frequently target high-traffic locations, including transport hubs.

Jordanian border forces clash with smugglers

On 6 March, Jordanian border forces clashed with smugglers attempting to cross into the kingdom from Syria, resulting in the deaths of four smugglers. The smugglers were attempting to exploit poor weather conditions to enter Jordan illegally, and large quantities of weapons and narcotics were seized. The incident follows recent meetings between the King of Jordan and Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who have agreed to bolster border defences to combat arms and narcotics trafficking. Syria has been a key producer of captagon, while Jordan serves as a transit route for narcotics destined for the Gulf and beyond. Efforts to combat smuggling are likely aimed at preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State, which has historically profited from the trade.

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) ends blockade of Lere, Mali

On 3 March, the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM ended the blockade of Lere. The blockade lasted approximately three months and disrupted supply routes and movement in Timbuktu. Lere is a significant crossroad town in the region and serves as a market as well as a base for humanitarian groups operating in the region. Residents faced significant resource scarcities and those travelling from Timbuktu were forced to take a detour via Douentza and Mopti.

Despite the lifting of the blockade, residual effects are highly likely in the coming months as seasonal economies including agriculture can be negatively affected by blockades, impoverishing families for years. Siege tactics have increasingly been deployed by insurgent groups in Mali to disrupt local economies and restrict access to humanitarian organisations. Furthermore, blockades aim to force local militias to disarm and undermine local governance to create a security vacuum, which armed groups aim to fill.

Opposition party figures arrested in South Sudan after being accused of allying with militia

On 4 March, Petroleum Minister Pout Kang Chol, General Gabriel Duop Lam, and several other Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) members allied with First Vice President Riek Machar were arrested in their homes. Military personnel were also deployed around Macher’s residence.

An SPLM-IO spokesperson has labelled the act a “grave violation” of the fragile 2018 peace agreement that ended the civil war by establishing a power-sharing arrangement between rival factions. The arrests follow significant fighting in Nasir between national forces and the White Army militia, who are mostly made up of the Nuer ethnic group in common with Machar.

Information Minister Michael Makuei, in justification for the arrests, accused Machar loyalists of collaborating with the White Army to attack Nasir on 4 March. This incident marks a significant escalation in internal tensions and increases the likelihood of a renewed civil war.

Puntland forces continue to make gains against the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS)

The armed forces of the breakaway territory of Somalia continued their offensive in the Cal Miskaad mountain range. Puntland forces took the stronghold of Dhasan and completed the “second phase” of “Operation Hilaac”, as the offensive has been named. The high presence of foreign nationals, especially from the Arab Peninsula, among ISS forces continues to be noted by advancing Puntland forces.

The offensive, which has been ongoing for weeks, has likely significantly damaged ISS’s capabilities in the area, and there are reports that ISS forces have split in three groups, retreating towards the mountainous Karinka Qandala area, Tog Miraale and Tog Curaar respectively. US and UAE airstrikes have almost certainly played a fundamental role in the successes of the operation so far.

The airstrikes are likely to help prevent ISS units from reforming in more remote areas where the ground-based Puntland units are likely to find considerable logistical and operational difficulties. ISS controls the al-Karrar office, one of IS’s nine regional offices and increasingly a key hub for the financing of IS affiliates in Africa and Afghanistan.

Isolated Depression at High Levels (DANA) causes heavy rain and flooding in eastern Spain

Eastern Spain continues to grapple with severe weather conditions as a DANA, a high-altitude isolated depression, persists, bringing heavy rain and flooding to several regions. The lowest level emergency alert has been issued for residents living along the Hozgarganta River in Andalusia due to anticipated heavy rainfall.

Additionally, Madrid is under a yellow alert for heavy rain expected between 18:00 and 21:00 local time. The Canary Islands have reported around 20 vehicles affected by floods, while flight operations at Gran Canaria Airport have resumed normality after being disrupted by floodwaters.

An orange alert remains active for heavy rain in Valencia, Castellón, and Almería, with yellow warnings for areas including Albacete and Navarre. The Spanish authorities have also initiated a “pre-emergency phase” of the flood plan in Andalusia. Flooding has already impacted infrastructure, with at least 11 roads affected in Castellón and Valencia, and the road between Alcalà de Xivert and Coves de Vinromà entirely cut off.

Flooding in greater Johannesburg, South Africa

Flooding in greater Johannesburg on 5 March has caused significant disruptions. A bridge on Platina Street in the Jukskei Park area of Randburg has suffered considerable damage due to the overnight flooding. The local utility company has reported power outages in the Hurst Hill neighbourhood and indicated that restoration efforts are hampered by the ongoing weather conditions. Emergency services have shared videos of roads inundated by floodwaters in the Newlands area, advising motorists to exercise caution. The Klein Jukskei River has overflowed, leading to at least one vehicle becoming stranded. The flooding has predominantly affected the Randburg area, with several low-lying roads being impacted and reports of structural damage in residential neighbourhoods.

On 2 March, the Mohammad Sharifullah, or “Jafar”, a regional ISKP commander, was charged by the US with “providing and conspiring to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization resulting in death.” The charge comes after Pakistani security forces captured Sharifullah along the Pakistan-Afghan border region in late February before transferring him to the FBI for extradition. US President Donald Trump thanked the Pakistani government for their cooperation, stating, “I want to thank, especially, the government of Pakistan for helping arrest this monster.”

According to an interview with the FBI on the same day he was charged, Sharifullah admitted to helping plan the August 2021 bombing in Afghanistan, also known as the Abbey Gate attack, which killed 170 Afghans and 13 US troops. Sharifullah reportedly scouted a route to the airport for the attacker and checked for law enforcement and security checkpoints, giving the all clear to the attacker. Sharifullah also admitted to conducting surveillance to prepare the suicide bomber behind the 20 June 2016 attack on the Canadian embassy in Kabul as well as sharing instructions on how to use weaponry to the 22 March 2024 Crocus City Hall attackers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

If Sharifullah is convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. The arrest is hailed as a major victory against ISKP, Sharifullah being ‘the top terrorist responsible for that atrocity’ (referencing the Abbey Gate attack), according to Trump. US officials have announced that Sharifullah was one of two members involved in the planning of the bombing. Sharifullah’s arrest marks a symbolic victory for the Trump administration, who likely wants to portray his counterterrorism operations as a continuation of the hardline approach that led to the territorial defeat of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019.

The arrest and extradition of Sharifullah are likely indicative of renewed cooperation between the US and Pakistan over counterterrorism. In response to Trump’s comments regarding the government of Pakistan, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif emphasised that ‘we will continue to partner closely with the United States in securing regional peace and stability’. This is highly likely because of pressure from the US to increase counterterrorism operations and will likely trigger ISKP reprisal attacks in Pakistan.

The operation follows a period of limited bilateral cooperation since 2021, stemming from US concerns over Pakistan’s alleged support for the Afghan Taliban, which Pakistan denies. The Pakistani government’s cooperative role in the operation, which involved the CIA and FBI, was almost certainly a signal to the Trump administration, indicating that Islamabad wants to strengthen counterterrorism relations. If bilateral cooperation increases significantly, this will almost certainly bolster Pakistani security forces’ counterterrorism capabilities and assist in their counterinsurgency operations in the restive Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions.

On 3 March, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced a deal with US President Donald Trump to invest an additional USD 100 billion into the US, with plans to build five additional chip fabrication plants. The TSMC chief executive CC Wei stated that the deal will mean that TSMC will produce the most advanced chips on US soil. A Taiwanese government spokesperson, however, promised that Taipei will ensure that the most advanced manufacturing processes will be kept in Taiwan.

On 4 March, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defence reported that 19 sorties of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, five People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels and three “official ships” were detected operating around Taiwan. 11 of the 19 PLA sorties are claimed to have crossed the median line, entering Taiwan’s southwestern Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Solace Global Assessment: 

TSMC produces approximately 90 per cent of the world’s most advanced semiconductor chips, which are critical for technologies such as smartphones and artificial intelligence (AI). A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would highly likely cause a global economic crisis, with some estimates predicting a loss of approximately ten per cent of global GDP, significantly worse than the 2008 global financial crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. With major US companies such as Apple and Nvidia so critically dependent on TSMC semiconductor manufacturing, in addition to advanced military technology, it is highly likely a strategic priority for the Trump administration to increase chip fabrication on US soil to mitigate against the impact of Taiwan’s potential invasion or blockade.

For Taiwan, the monopoly on advanced semiconductor manufacturing is almost certainly a key strategic deterrence against a Chinese invasion, with the US being economically motivated to contribute to Taiwanese deterrence with security guarantees. This highly likely explains Taipei’s desire to restrict the production of the most advanced chips in US facilities. The Trump administration, however, has likely compelled TSMC’s compliance with the threat of tariffs, with Trump stating that the deal will mean that TSMC will be excluded from industry-wide 25 per cent tariffs.

The regularity of PLA exercises around Taiwan is increasing. In February, 480 PLA aircraft and 223 PLAN vessels were detected around Taiwan, a 40 per cent increase from January. The exercises are also becoming increasingly complex, with warnings from senior Indo-Pacific US military commanders that PLA activity now often resembles rehearsals for an invasion involving multi-domain operations. In addition to the training benefits for the Chinese military, the exercises are highly likely intended to make it more difficult to discern between drills and a genuine invasion of Taiwan, complicating response. There is also a realistic possibility that the recent increase in exercises is due to a desire in Beijing to test Donald Trump’s willingness to defend Taiwan, with the US’s reliability as a military ally likely brought into question by Trump’s more isolationist foreign policy posture.  

Crime soars in Bangladesh due to widespread insecurity

Several reports have indicated that crime rates in Bangladesh have noticeably increased in late 2024 and early 2025, with the country recording the highest number of robberies in six years in January 2025. Moreover, there are increasing reports of police corruption, as well as security forces’ growing inability to deal with both petty and violent criminality. These trends have likely been partly worsened by the administrative and political instability that followed Sheikh Hasina’s ousting in August 2024. While nominally independent, the Bangladeshi police, alongside other state institutions, had been previously controlled by Hasina’s Awami League (AL), and the parties that support the post-Hasina government are currently seeking to purge it of pro-AL elements. This, in turn, has likely weakened the police and has opened more space for institutional corruption.  

15 injured in accidental bombing by South Korean air force jets

On 6 March, eight bombs were dropped by two jets on the civilian district of Pocheon, South Korea, injuring 15 and damaging several houses and a church. The bombs were mistakenly dropped during military exercises near the demilitarised zone along the border with North Korea. The accident reportedly occurred because the pilot entered the incorrect coordinates. Further live-fire exercises have been suspended until a review of the incident has taken place. Residents in the area have protested the exercises for years; demonstrations will likely take place as a result of this incident.

President Putin hosts Myanmar junta leader at the Kremlin

On 4 March, Putin held talks with General Min Aung Hliang, the head of Myanmar’s junta government, to discuss increased cooperation amid sanctions and isolation from the West. Russia remains a major supporter of Myanmar and one of the country’s primary arms suppliers. Russian-made fighter jets and other weapon systems have been used extensively by the junta in attacks on rebel forces and the civilian population across Myanmar. While many of the topics discussed centred on economic cooperation, it is likely that military and security collaboration were also key areas of discussion. Russia is expected to continue supplying Myanmar with advanced weaponry, including aircraft, air defence systems, and other military technology in exchange for a strategic foothold in Southeast Asia and improved access to the Indian Ocean, especially if it senses that an end to the Ukraine war is drawing closer. Russian military aid to the junta will likely prolong the current civil war and result in higher rates of civilian casualties.

Severe weather causes avalanche in northern India

On 28 February, an avalanche hit the town of Badrinath in India’s Uttarakhand state. Rescue operations concluded on 2 March with the recovery of the last missing person from the avalanche site. The final death toll stands at eight, while 46 individuals have survived the incident. The avalanche initially left several people trapped, prompting a large-scale search and rescue effort. In addition to the avalanche, severe weather conditions, including heavy snow and rain, have caused further disruptions in the region, such as landslides blocking highways and flash flooding damaging homes and infrastructure in Himachal Pradesh.

On the east coast of China, unusual weather conditions cause snowfall and heat waves

During the 1-3 March period, severe blizzards and snowfall were recorded in the province of Shandong, south of Beijing. The severe weather caused widespread travel and business disruptions, including office and school closures and multiple red alerts. At the same time, the area of Shanghai reported record heat for this time of the year, with temperatures of up to 28.5 degrees Celsius. Last year was reported as being the hottest on record in China.

Flooding in Indonesia’s Western Java Island

Recent severe weather in Indonesia has triggered flooding in West Java. Flooding has been widespread across western Java, with significant impacts reported in East Jakarta, Tangerang, and Depok City, where evacuations were underway. On 3 March, two bridges collapsed in Cisarua due to rising river levels, though no injuries were reported.

The flooding has also affected Baureno in Bojonegoro Regency, preventing residents from leaving their homes. On 4 March, flash floods in Cisarua, Bogor, resulted in one fatality and affected over 300 people. On 7 March, a landslide in Sukabumi City killed at least one person, with seven others missing.

Flooding in Simpenan, Sukabumi Regency, led to one death and injured seven others, with around 200 people displaced in shelters. Severe flooding in Bekasi submerged areas with waters reaching up to nearly 10 feet, prompting evacuations. Further flooding and disruptions are highly likely.

Cyclone Alfred approaching landfall on Australia’s east coast

Cyclone Alfred is set to make landfall on Australia’s east coast on 8 March at approximately 00:00 UTC with sustained wind speeds of approximately 80 km/h. The cyclone caused significant disruptions and damage across parts of Australia, particularly in New South Wales and Queensland. More than 38,000 homes and businesses in New South Wales and 56,000 customers in southeast Queensland are without power due to the cyclone’s impact. Emergency crews are working to restore power where it is safe.

Residents in areas such as Moreton Island, Redland City, and the Gold Coast have been advised to take shelter due to heavy rain and winds. Evacuations have been ordered in several locations, including Kings Point Park in Macksville and Belongil Beach, due to flooding concerns. One person is reported missing after being swept into floodwaters near Megan, Australia.

Supermarkets and distribution centres in Queensland are gradually closing as the cyclone approaches Brisbane. Additionally, public transport from Noosa to the New South Wales border will be closed.

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The recent attacks by the Viv Ansanm gang coalition in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, highly likely demonstrate the vulnerabilities of the Kenya-led multinational police force in terms of manpower and resources.

In Colombia, the ELN’s continued offensive has almost certainly resulted in a collapse of President Petro’s total peace plan, and the government’s response will likely result in increased attacks across Colombia.

The is a realistic possibility that Islamic State-affiliated media calling for attacks on festivals in Germany and the Netherlands will inspire lone-wolf attacks during the carnival season.

The release of a damning report on the eve of the Tempi train crash disaster anniversary has almost certainly intensified anti-government protests in Greece that have resulted in multiple arrests and violent clashes.

The approval of a draft minerals agreement between the US and Ukraine likely increases Trump’s interest in supporting Ukraine but is highly unlikely to satisfy Kyiv’s key objective of security guarantees.

The deployment of IDF tanks to the West Bank is almost certainly indicative of a long-term operation that will likely jeopardise ceasefire negotiations, increase the terror threat in Israel and draw Iranian attention.

Syria’s National Dialogue Conference was highly likely rushed and HTS-dominated. The exclusion of SDF representatives likely increases the risk of a confrontation between Syria’s Kurdish factions and Damascus.

There is a realistic possibility that Israeli operations in southern Syria will further expand by exploiting Druze divisions and dissatisfaction with Syria’s HTS-led authorities.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) will highly likely cement control over Sudan’s Darfur region after forming a parallel government and losing territory around Khartoum.

Unrest likely following Cyclone Garance’s landfall on the French territory of Réunion.

Pakistani authorities are on high alert after the release of credible intelligence indicating that extremists are likely to kidnap foreign nationals during the ICC Champions Trophy cricket tournament.

On 25 February, gangs reportedly associated with the coalition Viv Ansanm launched an attack in the Delmas 19 and Delmas 30 neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, killing at least 15 civilians. Further clashes in the previous days resulted in one policeman of the international Kenya-led mission being killed, as well as two local soldiers. On 27 February, Viv Ansanm members launched a further attack in the Rue Chavannes area of the capital. According to UN sources, more than 6,000 people have been forced to leave the areas of Kenscoff and Delmas in recent days.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Viv Ansanm coalition of gangs likely remains the strongest criminal group in the capital. While the group’s leaders have at times called for its recognition as a political party, the gang continues to adopt a terror-focused strategy which is likely aimed at ensuring the breakdown of all administrative authority in Haiti, thus forcing civilians to rely on them for support. The recent gains and offensives made by the gangs are likewise highly likely indicative of the continuing difficulties of the international policing mission. The Kenya-led contingent currently has about 1,000 officers, less than half of the 2,500 initially planned. Moreover, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has ruled out the deployment of a military peacekeeping mission to Haiti and has instead proposed increasing the amount of non-lethal UN support to the police force. This is likely a direct rejection of the recent Human Rights Watch report calling for the UN to establish control over the mission.

After initiating an offensive against government forces in January, the National Liberation Army (ELN) is close to securing full control of the Catatumbo region in the department of Norte de Santander on the border with Venezuela. The area is a major cocaine production hub and lies on vital smuggling routes. The ELN’s campaign has resulted in the near-total destruction of its last major rival in the area, the 33^rd Front, a dissident group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). As part of a wider offensive against both government forces and rival armed groups, the ELN has conducted attacks in other parts of Colombia. In Cúcuta, the capital of the department of Norte de Santander, a 48-hour curfew was imposed on 23 February following a series of violent attacks by the ELN that injured several people.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The scale of violence in Colombia almost certainly represents an end to President Petro’s policy of total peace and the championing of ceasefire agreements. Political rivals have indicated that armed groups have simply exploited the peace talks to regroup, rearm and consolidate power and control over illicit activities. This has placed armed groups like the ELN in a much stronger position to challenge the government’s authority and take on government forces. The scale of violence has almost certainly left the Petro administration with no choice but to confront the ELN and other armed groups with force, with external pressure also likely coming from the Trump administration which has called for an aggressive crackdown on drugs and criminal groups in Latin America.

Currently, the violence is primarily concentrated in the border regions. However, the ELN has a major presence across multiple departments in Colombia and has demonstrated its ability to conduct attacks in major cities like Bogotá, Cali, Medellín and Barranquilla. As the government deploys more troops to counter the ELN in the border regions, the ELN will likely increasingly target Colombian cities. These attacks have traditionally involved IED attacks against Colombian police and military installations, with previous attacks also resulting in high levels of civilian casualties. Furthermore, there is already evidence that other armed groups are exploiting the current destabilisation of Colombia to stage attacks and exert control in other areas, which has prompted a warning from the UN Human Rights Office. On 24 February, a bomb injured 17 people, including several children, in the town of Morales in the Cauca department in Colombia’s southwest. This attack has been attributed to the Central General Staff (EMC) – a splinter group of the FARC that rejected the peace agreement.

As the violence increases, the ELN are likely to impose more “armed strikes” and the government are likely to introduce more curfews. These will almost certainly involve restrictions on movement, disruptions to essential services and shortages in critical goods. ELN armed strikes have traditionally involved strict penalties for anyone not complying with their rules, including executions, which can extend to individuals with non-combatant status including healthcare workers and aid workers. They have also involved attacks on key infrastructure, such as bridges, electricity, and communication networks, designed to hinder the government’s ability to restore order but also result in further disruptions and shortages. In Norte de Santander department alone, it is now estimated that the violence and displacement have left over 122,000 people in critical need of humanitarian aid, with 36 per cent of surveyed shelters reporting no health services available.

New round of 50501 protests to coincide with State of the Union Address in US

50501 (“50 states, 50 protests, one day”) is a decentralised protest movement which originated on the social network Reddit and has received considerable support from mainstream Democrat Party figures. The group staged protests in February and has announced a new round of unrest to occur on 4 March, the day US President Donald Trump is scheduled to deliver a speech at a joint session of Congress. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) indicates that multiple protests are organised to occur in the proximity of state capitol buildings in multiple cities. As of the time of writing, protests are scheduled to occur at 43 state capitals. Moreover, further demonstrations are scheduled to occur in Vancouver and other cities in Canada, also on 4 March.

US threatens 25 per cent tariffs on EU imports

US President Donald Trump stated on 26 February that the US is planning to impose cross-sector tariffs of around 25 per cent on EU imports. Trump singled out carmakers as a potential target and remarked that the EU bloc was formed to “screw” the US. Brussels has pledged to impose immediate retaliatory sanctions if Washington proceeds with the threats. According to US media, French President Macron tackled the issue of tariffs during his meeting with Trump on 26 February. Trump’s statement may result in further anti-US demonstrations in EU capitals, with some having already occurred following the US change in its policy towards Ukraine and Russia.

Senior Sinaloa cartel member arrested in Mexico

The Mexican army said it had arrested Jose Angel Canobbio, the head of security for one of the sons of jailed drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, in Culiacan. The arrest is likely an important political victory for the Mexican government, which is almost certainly in the process of taking a harder stance towards the cartels to appease the demands of the US government. During this reporting period, Mexican authorities made further gestures towards Washington, including allowing the extradition of H-2 cartel leader Jesus Ricardo Patron Sanchez to the US. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has maintained a more balanced public rhetoric, stating that she would support a constitutional reform to reinforce Mexico’s sovereignty in response to US drone flights in Mexican airspace, and pledging to scrutinise US weapons manufacturers, due to their firearms reaching Mexican criminal organisations.  

Texas records first US measles death in more than a decade

US health authorities have recorded an outbreak of measles in West Texas, with at least 130 cases reported as of the time of writing. The child, who died on the night between 25 and 26 February, was reportedly not vaccinated against the disease. According to US media sources, the disease outbreak has primarily affected “under-vaccinated” Mennonite communities in the Gaines County area. Measles has a mortality rate of between one and three per 1,000 cases on average according to the US Centres for Diseases Control and Prevention (CDC). Due to the disease’s high transmissibility, further cases are likely to occur.

Blackout in Chile affects 90 per cent of the population

On 25 February, Chile experienced a major blackout that affected over 90 per cent of the population, disrupting critical services, industries, and infrastructure across the country, impacting 14 out of 16 regions. The outage was caused by a malfunction in the protection systems of ISA Interchile, a subsidiary of the Colombian state-owned company ISA. This led to the disconnection of a key high-voltage transmission line, triggering a nationwide power failure. Power was restored to 94 per cent of households by 26 February, however, millions of people still remain without power.

German police have stated that they are on high alert ahead of the annual pre-Lent carnival season, in response to social media content linked to the Islamic State (IS) calling for attacks on revellers. A German-language propaganda site purportedly associated with IS published an image which encouraged supporters to “choose your next target” next to a listing of carnival events in Germany and the Festival of Love event in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Germany is set to hold major carnival festivals from late February to early March in Cologne, Nuremberg, Düsseldorf, Mainz and multiple other locations across the country. While no specific plot has been identified, German and Dutch police have stated that security will be enhanced and that they are monitoring the situation. Munich has cancelled its carnival after the recent car-ramming attack.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There is a high likelihood that the propaganda image published has no direct association with IS and is instead an attempt by sympathisers or unaffiliated extremists to spread fear and disruption. However, in the aftermath of the German election, which was characterised by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party achieving its greatest-ever result, strong anti-migrant rhetoric and policies as well as a series of high-profile Islamist-linked attacks, the terrorist threat in Germany is likely significantly higher than usual. Even if the image is not directly linked to IS itself, the effect it may have cannot be discounted given the heightened tensions across the country. The carnival, with its historic links to Catholicism, provocative symbolism, and large, often inebriated and vulnerable crowds, would almost certainly be viewed as a high-profile and coveted target for extremists.

Previous carnivals, such as the 2015 carnival in Braunschweig, Bavaria, have been cancelled due to concrete evidence of a planned terror attack, and previous carnivals in Cologne and Düsseldorf have enhanced security measures in response to credible threats. There is a high likelihood of further material being disseminated online in both public and private channels before the events. As a result, the threat is likely to be taken seriously by the authorities and will almost certainly result in enhanced security measures involving stricter crowd control measures, increased screening, an increased law enforcement presence and potential transport disruptions.

Protests have been organised across Greece on 28 February to mark the two-year anniversary of the Tempi train crash that resulted in the deaths of 57 people and 85 injuries. Almost 400 protests have been organised, with at least 262 planned in Greece and 121 planned internationally. In Athens, the focal point for the protests will be Syntagma Square. Greek transport workers have declared a 24-hour strike, which has already left ships docked, train services suspended, and several flights cancelled. Public services, healthcare facilities, schools, cultural institutions, restaurants, shops, and other businesses will be shut down or run at limited capacity. Security measures have been heightened in Athens, including the deployment of over 6,000 police officers and the use of drones and helicopters to bolster surveillance.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The primary catalyst for the protests has likely been the release of a 180-page report on 27 February, which identified that the Tempi train crash was the result of human error, which routed the train onto the same track as an incoming freight train. Independent investigators also identified that poor training, staff shortages, and infrastructural issues such as a lack of modern safety controls plagued Greece’s railway system. However, the most controversial element has likely been the release of an audio recording, which indicates that 30 of the fatalities survived the original crash but were then killed by either asphyxiation or an explosion caused by chemical solvents illegally transported on the freight train. This has almost certainly eroded trust in the government, with many Greeks expressing the belief that the government has not done anything to achieve justice for the victims. Recent polling even indicates that over 80 per cent of Greeks feel that the Tempi train disaster was one of or the worst issues in Greece, with the vast majority also expressing that they were dissatisfied with the investigations into the incident.

The convergence of the anniversary and the release of the report and the audio recording, combined with wider discontent with the government, will almost certainly energise the current round of protests. Earlier demonstrations culminated in one of the largest protest movements in Greek history, attracting an estimated 2.5 million people in Greece and within the Greek diaspora around the world. Multiple clashes between protestors and the police were observed, particularly in Athens and Thessaloniki, resulting in the use of tear gas and stun grenades to disperse crowds. While this round of protests is unlikely to attract as many participants, the heated nature of the demonstrations will likely result in violent clashes, especially as the protests have been organised on the weekend. On 1 January, Greek police were forced to use tear gas and stun grenades after protestors threw Molotov cocktails and demanded a fresh inquiry into the disaster after the release of the audio recording, demonstrating the potential for the movement to generate violent unrest. If the government fails to conduct a thorough investigation or hold anyone accountable for the disaster, there is a strong likelihood that the protests will escalate, particularly if supported by the country’s powerful trade unions.

Amid ongoing bilateral US-Russia talks which exclude Ukraine, US President Donald Trump stated on 26 February that the US and Ukraine have agreed to a minerals deal. Following two weeks of negotiations, the Ukrainian justice, economy and foreign ministers have reportedly approved a draft agreement. A previous US demand for rights to USD 500 billion of potential revenue has been dropped from the agreement. The draft agreement calls for the establishment of a jointly managed ‘Reconstruction Investment Fund’, with Ukraine contributing 50 per cent of all revenues earned from the future monetisation of all state-owned mineral, oil and gas resources (excluding current sources of revenue). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Washington late on 27 February, scheduled to meet Trump on 28 February and sign the deal.

Ahead of the meeting, Trump appeared to backtrack on previous comments calling Zelensky a “dictator”, responding to a journalist by saying, “did I say that? I can’t believe I said that”. Trump also suggested that the US would endeavour to reclaim for Ukraine many of the “sea areas” occupied by Russia in negotiations, almost certainly in reference to the occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia Oblast and Donetsk Oblast, including Mariupol and Berdiansk.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The deal will need to be approved by Ukraine’s parliament (Verkhovna Rada), with opposition MPs having already indicated substantial concerns. However, it is likely that if Zelensky’s government continues to support the deal, the Verkhovna Rada will approve it given both the majority held by Zelensky’s Servant of the People party and the pressing need to appease Trump.

The Trump administration almost certainly has two key strategic objectives in mind with the deal. Firstly, Trump has repeatedly condemned the expenditure of US support to Ukraine and wishes to recoup the losses and gain transactional benefits for the US economy. Secondly, Trump wishes to challenge China’s dominance of the global supply and processing of rare earth elements (70 and 90 per cent, respectively), which are essential components in many modern technologies. The actual quantity of efficiently accessible rare earth elements in Ukraine is, however, highly contested. Much of Ukraine’s mineral resources are also currently in Russian-occupied territory. The draft agreement refers to projects in areas “temporarily occupied by [Russia], in the event such areas are de-occupied.” There is a realistic possibility that this has conditioned Trump’s comments regarding the possibility of reclaiming some of these areas for Ukraine through negotiations, though it is highly likely that the Kremlin would never agree to give up currently occupied territory.

The deal notably only contains one phrase referencing security guarantees, saying the “US will support Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees”. Trump’s suggestion that US access to the minerals would be “automatic security” for Ukraine is highly unlikely to satisfy Kyiv’s key strategic objective of security guarantees that can deter future Russian aggression. Zelensky likely calculates, however, that by giving Trump economic interests in Ukraine, the White House will be more amenable to Kyiv’s strategic goals.

On 23 February, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) deployed armoured units, including main battle tanks, to the West Bank, marking the first time it has deployed tanks to the area in over 20 years. Tanks and armoured personnel carriers were first deployed to the Jenin refugee camp in the north of the West Bank and have since been deployed to other Palestinian refugee camps. It is estimated that 40,000 Palestinians have been displaced from the refugee camps in Jenin, Tulkarem, Nur Shams and Farea, which are now reportedly “empty of residents”. There are also reports that the IDF is destroying roads, imposing curfews, blocking access points to towns, arresting people and commandeering properties for military use. Israel’s Defence Minister has stated that the IDF will remain there for the coming year to degrade Iranian-backed groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). PIJ have claimed that the Israeli incursions are part of a broader effort to annex parts of the West Bank.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The IDF regularly raids the West Bank to kill or capture militants but normally withdraws its forces almost immediately. The use of tanks and other armoured vehicles likely signals a shift in strategy characterised by longer IDF deployments to suppress Palestinian militancy. Israel has likely partially justified its expanded operations in the West Bank after a failed terror attack on the Tel Aviv bus network. The attack was quickly attributed to militants in the West Bank by Israeli intelligence. Moreover, Iran is reportedly attempting to establish a separate front against Israel by funnelling weapons into the West Bank through its remaining supply lines. The recent escalation likely suggests that Israel is not only targeting immediate militant threats but also aiming to disrupt long-term efforts by Iran to establish a credible military threat in the West Bank.

However, Israel’s operations in the West Bank are likely to have several negative ramifications. A prolonged IDF presence and the displacement of Palestinians will almost certainly be interpreted as shaping activity for the annexation of parts of the West Bank and increased Israeli settlements. Discussions are ongoing regarding the approval of nearly 1,200 new settlement units, some of which are planned for construction deep within the West Bank. These developments are likely to provoke more settler violence, especially when emboldened by an increased IDF presence. Operations in the West Bank are also likely to fuel further militancy, which is likely to increase the threat of terror attacks within Israel, with a likely terrorist attack already occurring in Haifa on 27 February. Ongoing ceasefire negotiations with Hamas are also likely to be jeopardised, with Palestinians viewing Israeli operations in the West Bank as part of a broader effort against Palestinian resistance. Long-term, this may risk bringing Iran and its proxies more into the fight and Israeli attempts to annex the West Bank will likely energise pro-Palestinian protest movements around the globe. 

On 25 February, hundreds of participants (with thousands attending remotely) took part in a two-day National Dialogue Conference held in Damascus. The Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led interim government advertised the conference as being an initial step towards the drafting of a new Syrian constitution, intended to hear the views of representatives from Syria’s highly diverse communities. At the end of the conference, a final statement made non-binding recommendations including Syrian territorial unity and sovereignty, the acceleration of government formation, the preservation and respect for minority rights, and immediate Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Syria, currently led by interim president and HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, is set to have a new transitional government formed on 1 March. There are several key issues facing the new HTS-led authorities in Damascus, including the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which control northeast Syria and are actively engaged in conflict with Turkish-led forces, continuing resistance from Assad regime remnants and the status of the Alawite minority group, and the Israeli incursion in the south with recently intensified aerial strikes.

The conference was a key opportunity to engage with these issues. The conference, however, was highly likely rushed, HTS-dominated and lacking in transparency. Many attendees were reportedly invited only one to two days earlier, with some only seven hours earlier. Of the seven-member preparatory committee, five were HTS members or HTS-aligned, with no Druze or Alawite members. Only a low number of Alawis ultimately attended the conference. Crucially, no members of the SDF or the Kurdish-led autonomous administration were invited, which was justified by organisers as being due to the exclusion of armed groups. Following the fall of the Assad regime, HTS made overtures to Kurdish groups, differentiating themselves from the Turkey-led Syrian National Army (SNA) rebel group, who continue to launch operations against the SDF with conventional Turkish air support.

However, the proposed state monopoly on arms likely poses a perceived existential threat to the continued existence of autonomous Kurdish-controlled Syria, called Rojava (Western Kurdistan), in the face of Turkish-led aggression. There is a realistic possibility that if Kurdish authorities continue to be excluded and attempts are made to forcibly disarm the SDF and the People’s Defence Forces (HPG), Kurdish groups will attempt secession, which would almost certainly lead to an escalation in conflict.

On 23 February, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, demanded the complete demilitarisation of southern Syria in the provinces of Quneitra, Deraa and Suweida “from the forces of the new regime”, further adding that no threat would be tolerated “to the Druze community in southern Syria”. This was followed by a series of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) airstrikes on 25 February, reportedly targeting former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) division bases close to Damascus and in Daraa Province. Israel’s Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that the strikes were conducted “as part of the new policy we have defined as pacifying southern Syria”. Katz added that any attempts by Syrian forces to “establish themselves in the security zone in southern Syria will be met with fire”. As a result of the developments, relatively small anti-Israel protests took place in Damascus, Aleppo, Quneitra and Daraa provinces.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the rapid Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led advance that toppled the Assad regime in December 2024, the IDF launched an incursion into the UN-patrolled buffer zone in southern Syria. The IDF also conducted a significant series of aerial strikes targeting Syrian Arab Army (SAA) assets, which destroyed the majority of Syria’s sophisticated weaponry. The decades-long ceasefire between Syria and Israel is partly predicated on the buffer zone established by a 1974 UN Security Council resolution. The incursion is likely intended by Israeli authorities as strategic messaging to the new HTS-controlled Syrian government, described by one analyst as “don’t mess with us”. The move has been criticised, however, as a provocation that will generate further insecurity on Israel’s borders.

Since their ascent to power, HTS spokesmen, as well as interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa have made a distinct effort to evade questions about Israel. This week’s National Dialogue Conference did, however, conclude with demands for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria. Al-Sharaa almost certainly wishes to present the new Syrian authorities as peaceful and does not wish to antagonise the US Donald Trump administration. However, domestic pressures demanding a greater level of resistance against Israel will highly likely increase, with anti-Israel protests likely to grow.

Additionally, Israeli leaders are almost certainly instrumentalising southern Syria’s Druze population to justify the incursion. Israel has the world’s third-largest Druze population, and in the past week launched a pilot program allowing Syrian Druze to work in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. There are likely growing divisions between Syrian Druze leaders. The spiritual leader of Syria’s Druze community, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajri, expressed dissatisfaction with the National Dialogue Conference. On 23 February, a group of formerly pro-Assad Druze fighters formed the Suwayda Military Council, with the stated goal of uniting Druze militias and integrating into the new national army of the Syrian state. Al-Hajri, however, has denounced the group and called them “separatists”. There is a realistic possibility that Israel will exploit these divisions and Druze dissatisfaction with HTS governance to extend their control in southern Syria, under the stated purpose of protecting Syrian Druze.

23 February, the RSF signed a charter in Nairobi with allied groups to form a parallel government. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) broke the El-Obeid siege imposed by the RSF on 23 February, which had been ongoing since April 2023. Sudanese Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim has declared that the lifting of the siege would allow the delivery of humanitarian aid to Kordofan. In Central Sudan, the SAF made significant gains in the capital, Khartoum, pushing RSF forces out of Khartoum, Khartoum Bahri, and Omdurman.  On 24 February, the RSF announced a new assault on El-Fasher, the provincial capital of North Darfur, which has been under siege since April 2023. Intense fighting around the city has impacted the Zamzam camp, which houses approximately 500,000 displaced people, making it too dangerous for Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders (MSF) to operate.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent SAF gains constitute a strategic shift in the conflict, with the SAF steadily asserting control over the capital city. There is a realistic possibility that this latest offensive will lead to the SAF retaking the entirety of Khartoum for the first time since the conflict began. Breaking the siege at El-Obeid constitutes another significant victory for the SAF since it connects RSF-controlled western and southern regions of Sudan to Khartoum. The SAF will almost certainly use the strategic city as a launchpad into the RSF-controlled western regions, primarily in Darfur. The two-year siege led to significant shortages of food, water, and medical supplies for the city’s population. Lifting the siege will enable the SAF and humanitarian groups to provide much-needed relief to the population.

The RSF’s formation of a parallel government was highly likely spurred by their territorial losses in Khartoum and the weakening of their position at El-Obeid. Rumoured internal divisions within the paramilitary group have reportedly led to several high-level RSF commanders defecting to the SAF, which have likely contributed to the group’s recent territorial losses. The signing of the charter indicates that the RSF are choosing to entrench their rule over regions under their control to maintain their legitimacy amid territorial losses. By presenting themselves as a governing body, the RSF are legitimising their territorial control in a way that they are unable to do militarily by defeating the SAF.  

To further legitimise its control of Darfur, the RSF will almost certainly make the seizure of El-Fasher its primary military objective, as the largest city in North Darfur and a key transport hub that will help it consolidate power over the region.

On 28 February, Tropical Cyclone Garance made landfall near Saint-Andre on the French territory of Réunion. The cyclone, which has maximum wind speeds of approximately 155 km/h, has caused significant disruptions, with approximately 30 per cent of the population, or 145,000 people, experiencing power outages and 82,000 lacking access to drinking water. The highest level, Purple Alert, was issued just before landfall. After landfall, the alert was downgraded to Red, and a videoconference by the Prefecture of Réunion is scheduled to provide updates. Over 100 people are currently in evacuation centres, and 137 emergency accommodation centres have been established. In Mauritius, on the outskirts of the cyclone’s path, authorities have warned of potential storm surges and flooding, urging citizens to avoid beaches. The island’s airport remains closed due to the cyclone warning.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the aftermath of the cyclone, it is likely that significant unrest will occur. In Mayotte, a French overseas territory to the West of Madagascar, damage caused by Cyclone Chido in December 2024, which left many residents without basic necessities, triggered protests over the perceived inadequate and delayed response from the French government. While Réunion is a wealthier island and has stronger infrastructure and emergency response capabilities, it is directly in the path of the cyclone. Furthermore, the island is a popular holiday destination for French citizens and will likely receive significant media coverage; France24 has an article covering the cyclone as the top news story of 28 February.

Réunion has a history of demonstrations voicing frustrations against the French government. In November 2018, widespread violent demonstrations occurred over the cost of living as part of the “Yellow Vest” movement in France. More recently, in September 2024, protests and strikes occurred over the high cost of living. With the recent unrest in Mayotte and history of unrest in Réunion in mind, the French government will likely make a show of reacting quickly to the anticipated devastation on the island.

German elections end in Christian Democratic victory, far-right gets best ever result

The German parliamentary elections saw the Christian Democrats union parties (CDU/CSU) secure 28.5 per cent of the vote, while the incumbent Social Democrats (SPD) fell to 16.4 per cent. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won across eastern Germany and obtained 20.8 per cent of the total vote, becoming the second force in parliament. Minor parties, like the liberal FDP and the populist-left BSW, narrowly failed to enter parliament. The far-left Die Linke unexpectedly won 8.8 per cent of the vote, likely thanks to a surge in youth support. The election results are positive for the CDU/CSU, which will almost certainly form a coalition government with a weakened SPD. The AfD, while unlikely to enter government, will likely seek to attack the CDU/CSU from the right and will seek to continue its rise as the main anti-establishment force in German politics.

Austrian coalition talks reach a deal

The talks between the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), the Social Democrats (SPÖ), and the liberal Neos party reached a positive conclusion, Austrian media reported on 27 February. The talks were the third attempt at forming a workable coalition government following the legislative elections in September 2024. Despite the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) winning the most seats, the ÖVP was tasked with leading the first round of talks, which involved both SPÖ and Neos. The first attempt by the three parties to form a coalition failed because of unresolvable disagreements. While the new talks involved the same three parties, their success was likely ensured by the risk of provoking new elections, where the FPÖ would have almost certainly increased its vote share. As part of the deal, the ÖVP is set to get the chancellorship, which will go to Christian Stocker, and the SPÖ’s Andreas Babler will be appointed vice-chancellor. To be finalised, the deal will need the approval of the Neos party, whose members are set to vote on it on 1 March.

Romanian presidential candidate Calin Georgescu arrested in large-scale operation

Georgescu was briefly detained by authorities on 26 February. Prosecutors stated they launched an investigation into Georgescu over a series of accusations, including campaign funding fraud, hate speech, and anti-constitutional acts. In addition to detaining Georgescu, Romanian security forces raided 47 properties used by the candidate’s associates, including a former French Foreign Legion member who owns the security firm providing security to Georgescu. Here, authorities reportedly found hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash, as well as a cache of heavy weapons, including grenade launchers. Some small-scale protests by Georgescu supporters were recorded after the arrest, and there is a realistic possibility of more intense unrest during the weekend.

Bosnian court sentences separatist Bosnian Serb President Dodik to one year in prison

A Bosnian court has sentenced the pro-Russia Bosnian Serb president, Milorad Dodik to one year in prison and has banned him from politics for six years for defying the top international envoy overseeing Bosnia’s peace. President Dodik has been accused of separatist actions, including an attempt to force the secession of the Republika Srpska, the Serb-run half of Bosnia, and unite it with Serbia. Dodik, who is backed by Russia, Serbia and Hungary may avoid prison by fleeing the country. However, the ruling will almost certainly aggravate ethnic tensions, potentially inciting unrest in the Republika Srpska and could potentially provoke inter-ethnic clashes. The ruling will also have geopolitical tensions, with Serbian President Vuciv calling an emergency session on 26 February.  

Anti-Eurozone protests erupt in Bulgarian capital

Since 22 February, protests have been organised by supporters of Bulgaria’s far-right Vazrazhdane party in response to the country’s plans to join the eurozone. On 26 February, protestors gathered in front of the Bulgarian parliament in Sofia to voice their opposition. Previous protests have resulted in altercations with the police and multiple injuries and arrests. On 22 February, thousands of protestors demanded the government scrap the plan to join the euro, and some threw Molotov cocktails at the local office of the European Commission.

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader calls on the movement to disarm

On 27 February, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK who has been imprisoned on Turkey’s Imrali island since 1999, issued an appeal to the group to disarm and transition to a democratic process to resolve the long-standing conflict in Turkey’s southeast. The appeal was read by members of the Kurdish-majority Dem party. The appeal is almost certainly a response to the recent overture made by Turkish government allies, who noted that clear steps towards ending the conflict could be supported by Ankara. While certainly historic, it is likely still too soon to assess whether the announcement will result in lower tensions in Turkish Kurdistan. Sections of the PKK still distrust Ankara, and there is a realistic possibility that they will split from the position of their jailed leader. Moreover, it is also unclear if Ocalan’s appeal will impact PKK affiliates in Syria. So far, the Syrian wing of PKK, PYD, stated they agree with the statement in principle but have not yet committed to a shift in their posture.

Ugandan opposition figure charged with treason

On 21 February, opposition politician Kizza Beslgye was charged with treason. The court rejected pleas from Beslgye’s lawyer that he be transferred to a hospital following his attempted hunger strike. The court ruling comes after Beslgye’s case was moved to a civilian court after Uganda’s Supreme Court barred the government from trying civilians in military courts. Despite the change of court, Beslgye was kept in military detention, triggering his hunger strike. In the aftermath of the verdict, minor protests broke out demanding the release of Beslgye. A video went viral on X depicting large protests marked with the description “Yoweri Museveni is playing with fire. Dr. Kizza Besigye’s detention will trigger a revolution in Uganda. It is getting started!” While the video itself actually depicted a protest from 2023, its virality may spur further solidarity protests against Museveni’s repressive leadership.

Islamist lone wolf attack in Mulhouse, France, highlights Paris-Algiers rift

On 22 February, an Algerian citizen carried out a knife attack in the town centre of Mulhouse, killing one civilian and wounding five police officers. The attacker reportedly suffered from mental health issues and had espoused extremist Islamist ideology. French channels noted that the attacker had been under an obligation to leave French territory, but that Algerian authorities had refused multiple French attempts to repatriate him. Senior French politicians, including Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau, have called for the establishment of Europe-wide sanctions on Algeria and other countries that refuse to cooperate with the repatriation of non-EU nationals. A month ago, another high-profile diplomatic spat between Paris and Algiers occurred when the latter rejected the repatriation of an Algerian national who had called for targeted violence against a France-based anti-government activist.

Two arrested in France over firebombing of Russian consulate

On 24 February, two individuals allegedly threw multiple Molotov cocktails at the Russian consulate building in Marseilles. The attack, which occurred during the day, only caused limited material damages and did not result in any injuries. It is almost certain that the attack is linked to anti-Russian sentiment driven by the Russian invasion of Ukraine as it occurred on the three year anniversary of the invasion and on the eve of French President Emmanuel Macron’s meeting with US President Donald Trump at the White House.

US considers shutting down base in Alexandroupolis, Greece

The facility is an important logistical hub for US-NATO operations in southeastern Europe, and for the delivery of supplies to Ukraine. While technically not a US “base”, it is a Greek facility that the US military can access under the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement. There is a realistic possibility that the cessation of US usage of the facility is a diplomatic gesture towards Moscow and Ankara, the latter having repeatedly called for its closure. Moreover, the move likely reflects Washington’s drive to reduce commitments in Europe to instead prioritise the Pacific theatre.

Islamic State (IS) supporter arrested over attack plan in Turkey

Turkish authorities have arrested an Uzbek citizen who had allegedly been planning attacks at a synagogue and Jewish schools in the city of Istanbul. IS-linked or -inspired attackers have previously targeted non-Muslim places of worship in Istanbul. Most notably, in January 2024 two gunmen attacked a Catholic church in the city and killed one worshipper. IS later claimed responsibility for the attack. Authorities have stated that the Uzbek suspect had received “orders” to carry out the attack and that they identified him by infiltrating online channels where other IS supporters used “coded” language and “encryption” to carry out attack planning. This level of sophistication is indicative of IS’ renewed efforts to carry out attacks in third countries outside of its primary areas of operations. Turkey likely remains a desirable target for IS due to its participation in counterterrorism operations, its NATO membership, its relations with Israel, and its geographical proximity to the “core” IS territories of Syria and Iraq.

France withdraws from last remaining base in Ivory Coast

France has officially handed over control of its last military base in the Ivory Coast, although a small contingent of 80 troops will remain in the country in an advisory capacity, indicating that the two countries will still maintain a military relationship. The Port-Bouet base was under France’s control for almost 50 years and housed the largest remaining contingent of French forces in the region since its forced withdrawal from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger. France’s withdrawal and the loss of key military capabilities will likely place extra pressure on Ivorian forces to arrest the spread of militantism from the neighbouring Sahel region. Extremist groups have sought to expand into and destabilise coastal West African countries, including in the Ivory Coast’s more restless northern regions.

Puntland forces continue anti-IS advances in Cal Miskaad region of Somalia

The breakaway territory’s forces continued their advances in the highly mountainous region which serves as the stronghold of the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS), taking on 23 February the village of Shebaab, and entering Dhasaan two days later. US and UAE airstrikes have continued, likely preventing ISS forces from reorganising. Pictures from the newly captured villages show how ISS forces had been constructing infrastructure, including water wells and bakeries, indicating the group’s efforts to establish parallel governance structures and win “hearts and minds”. Puntland advances are now likely to continue towards the next ISS stronghold of Wangable.

Explosions in Bukavu, South Kivu in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

At least 11 were killed and 60 injured in an explosion in Bukavu on 27 February. The blast happened during an AFC/M23 rally in Independence Square, where a large crowd was gathered. In the panic immediately following the blast, shooting reportedly started. President Felix Tshisekedi blamed ‘a foreign army illegally present on Congolese soil’, almost certainly alluding to AFC/M23 and Rwanda. AFC/M23 have rejected responsibility, instead accusing Kinshasa of being behind the attack, claiming the grenades used were the same type used by Burundian forces. Two people have been arrested. While the origin of the blast is unconfirmed, there is a realistic possibility that it was perpetrated by AFC/M23, who will likely use it as an example of government atrocities against the DRC’s population to be used as a pretext for advancing into Uvira, near the Burundian border. Before the blast, Corneille Nangaa Yubeluo, leader of the AFC alliance, vowed, “I promise you that in two days, we will be at Uvira to restore security.” Burundian military forces have deployed along the N5 Highway leading from Bukavu to Uvira in anticipation of the group’s advance.

At least 50 deaths in the Democratic Republic of the Congo due to unidentified illness

At least 415 cases of a yet-unidentified illness have been recorded in the northwestern DRC since it was first recorded in three children on 21 January. According to medical reports, the illness’ symptoms include fever, vomiting, and internal bleeding, and the interval between their onset and death is around 48 hours. The symptoms resemble those of haemorrhagic fevers caused by viruses such as dengue, Ebola, yellow fever, and Marburg. However, tests have so far shown that the illness is not caused by these. Some of the samples tested did, however, return a positive result for malaria.

Widespread power cuts in South Africa

On 22 February, South Africa’s national energy operator Eskom implemented large scale power cuts, amounting to approximately 3,000 megawatts, following failures at the Majuba and Camden power stations. Saturday’s Stage 3 power cuts were subsequently raised to the highest level, Stage 6, as Eskom reported that 6,000 megawatts would be taken offline. It is the first time Stage 6 is reached since February 2024. Eskom’s progress over the past 12 months has been driven by significant repairs being carried out at the country’s coal-fired power plants, which supply most of South Africa’s electricity. However, the recent failures likely demonstrate ongoing issues, including obsolescent infrastructure and lack of funding. Power cuts in South Africa often lead to civil unrest and increased crime rates. While no large-scale protests have been recorded as of the time of writing, there is a realistic possibility of unrest being triggered if large-scale load shedding continues.

Authorities in Pakistan are on high alert after obtaining credible evidence that violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have plans to target the 2025 International Cricket Council (ICC) Champions Trophy. Pakistan’s intelligence bureau has issued a high alert, which has warned security forces about a possible plot to target foreigners at the ICC event, which will be held in Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi. The alert specifically names the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), and Balochistan-based outfits such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). The threat reportedly includes the kidnapping of foreign visitors for ransom. In response, Pakistan’s security forces have increased protection for teams and players.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Pakistan’s hosting of its first major international cricket tournament since the 2009 terror attack on the Sri Lankan national team almost certainly remains a highly coveted target for VEOs attempting to undermine the central government. Direct attacks on stadiums or other high-profile targets like international hotels or training grounds cannot be discounted, especially as VEOs have consistently demonstrated their ability to attack targets outside of their usual area of operations.

However, the latest intelligence alert may indicate that VEOs are not seeking to directly attack the tournament as a result of the government’s increased security posture. Alternatively, VEOs may be seeking to target softer targets, such as kidnapping foreign nationals in less secure and monitored parts of the host cities of Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi. This could include the kidnapping of foreign nationals in less secure accommodations or entertainment venues like restaurants in less central parts of the cities with a decreased police presence and a reduction in CCTV coverage.  

Anti-Hasina student group forms political party in Bangladesh

Leaders of the student group Students Against Discrimination (SAD), which was crucial in leading the protests that led to the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, announced on 23 February that they would transition the group into a political party. The announcement follows clashes last week where SAD members were injured by students from the youth wings of other opposition parties, including the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). On 25 February, local media reported that the house of one of SAD’s secretaries in Kumarkhali was attacked and vandalised by a large crowd, likely consisting of JI members. The case continues to highlight how, with Hasina and the previously hegemonic Awami League (AL) removed from power, opposition groups continue to clash to fill the political vacuum. The creation of a SAD party is likely to destabilise the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, as the new political entity is likely to call for elections earlier than the stated date of “early 2026” in order to capitalise on its momentum.

Crypto exchange hack labelled the largest ever theft attributed to North Korea

The FBI have stated that North Korean hackers are responsible for the theft of approximately USD 1.5 billion of cryptocurrency from the Dubai-based ByBit crypto exchange company. The heist has been described as the world’s largest ever theft. The operation was likely conducted by the Lazarus Group, a hacker group that is almost certainly run by the North Korean state. The Lazarus Group are thought to be responsible for the high-profile hacking of Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014. As a heavily sanctioned rogue state, North Korea has invested considerable resources into illicit means of acquiring capital, largely to fund its military and nuclear program. The Lazarus Group has highly likely proven itself to be the most effective of these endeavours. Previously, targets have included banks such as the Bangladesh Bank in 2016. Cryptocurrency exchanges now, however, are likely the most desirable target, due to perceived vulnerabilities in the rapidly expanding sector and the lack of traceability in cryptocurrency.

Explosion at seminary in Akora Khatak, Pakistan

On 28 February, an explosion caused by a suspected suicide bombing occurred at the Darul Uloom Haqqania seminary. The blast reportedly occurred in the front row during Friday prayers. At least four people were killed and 12 seriously injured. Hamid Ul Haq Haqqan, head of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Sami with connections to the Taliban, was killed in the blast. Given that the blast occurred in the front row, it is highly likely that he was the target. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack. Police have cordoned off the surrounding area while they investigate the blast.

China conducts live-fire exercises in Gulf of Tonkin

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) began live-fire military exercises in the Gulf of Tonkin on 26 February, following Vietnam’s announcement on 23 February of a new map defining its territorial waters and exclusive economic zones in the region. The Chinese drills focused on the Beibu Gulf area closer to China’s side and are almost certainly part of an aggressive policy to assert its territorial claims in the disputed waters. China will likely adopt this practice in other disputed waters. The drills have previously not been declared in advance and have resulted in flight diversions at short notice.

Taiwanese authorities detain vessel over suspected undersea cable sabotage

On 25 February, an undersea cable connecting Taiwan and Penghu, an island in the Taiwan Strait, was severed. Taiwanese authorities subsequently detained the crew of a Togolese-flagged cargo vessel manned by Chinese personnel which was suspected of having intentionally damaged the cable. The damage to the cable did not result in major disruptions as communications between Taiwan and Penghu were rerouted using alternative infrastructure. If proven to be intentional, the case would further highlight the growing threat of highly deniable underwater sabotage conducted by authoritarian states like China and Russia. China is likely severing Taiwanese underwater cables in order to incur costs on Taiwan, assert dominance, assess international reactions, and to ascertain Taiwanese response times, which could provide vital intelligence in the case of a future war.

Southern Thai insurgents attempt to undermine former prime minister’s visit

On 22 February, a bomb exploded in front of a convenience store in Bannang Sata, Yala Province, injuring over ten people, including seven police officers and four civilians. The bomb detonated while security forces were patrolling the area. Then, on 23 February, a car bomb detonated at Narathiwat airport in Narathiwat Province, another one of Thailand’s restless southern provinces. The airport explosion occurred just before the plane carrying former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was set to arrive at the airport. Authorities have suggested that both bombs were planted by Islamist separatists and were designed to undermine Shinawatra’s first trip to the southern provinces in 20 years, while his daughter Paetongtarn, the current prime minister of Thailand, attempts to achieve long-lasting peace in the region.

Dozens of people killed by heavy flooding in Afghanistan

Save the Children reported on 27 February that at least 29 people, including four children, had been killed by floods following heavy rain in the provinces of Kandahar, Farah, and Kunar. In the former two provinces, the flood also caused significant infrastructural damage, destroying dozens of houses and displacing hundreds. In Afghanistan, significant deforestation, obsolescent infrastructure, and the severe damages sustained in decades of war make flash floods particularly damaging. Taliban officials have avoided commenting on the floods, and it is highly likely that Kabul lacks the means to provide significant relief to the affected areas.

Strong earthquake in Kathmandu, Nepal

On 28 February, the Bhairab Kunda in the Sindhupalchok District of Kathmandu was hit by a magnitude 6.1 earthquake, according to Nepal’s National Earthquake Monitoring and Research Centre. The epicentre was close to the Himalayan Mountain range bordering Tibet. Other meteorological readings, including from the German Research Center for Geosciences and the U.S. Geological Survey place the earthquake at a magnitude 5.6 and 5.5, respectively. There have been no reports of damage or casualties. However, aftershocks are highly likely in the coming days and weeks.

Severe Tropical Cyclone Alfred due to make landfall in Australia

Severe Tropical Cyclone Alfred has intensified into a category 3 storm off the coast of Queensland, Australia, as it continues its southward trajectory towards land. The Australian Bureau of Meteorology reports that Cyclone Alfred is strengthening over the Coral Sea, but its path remains highly uncertain. The cyclone, which initially formed on 23 February, is currently located off the coast and may move closer to Queensland by 2 March. Authorities are monitoring the situation closely as the storm progresses.

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The deployment of US airborne intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets to Mexico is almost certainly indicative of the Trump administration’s strategic priority to counter the cartels.

The ELN’s imposition of an “armed strike” in Colombia’s Chocó Department will almost certainly disrupt the provision of essential services and increase pressure on the central government.

The upcoming German elections will highly likely result in the Christian Democrats winning the most votes, but will likely be followed by a period of instability due to a fractured parliament.

The beginning of bilateral US-Russia talks that exclude Ukraine, and the public dispute between President Trump and President Zelensky, likely puts the Ukrainian president in a lose-lose situation.

The ceasefire in Lebanon is holding, however, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will challenge the terms of the ceasefire, assessing that other parties are in too weak a position to retaliate.

A suspected failed terror attack in Israel will almost certainly be used to justify expanded IDF operations in the West Bank.

There is a realistic possibility that increased IDF operations in the West Bank are shaping activity for increased settlement, a development that could undermine the ceasefire and fuel unrest.

The detention of two British nationals in Iran under charges of espionage is highly likely an example of hostage diplomacy, reaffirming the threat posed by arbitrary detention in adversarial states.

AFC/M23 rebels are highly likely to continue their advance in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which could trigger further unrest in Kinshasa.

Pakistan’s hosting of its first international cricket tournament since 2009 is almost certainly a coveted target for multiple terrorist groups operating in the country.

In Bangladesh, both the arrests of Awami League supporters and the clashes between student groups are almost certainly driven by ongoing power struggles for political primacy post-Hasina.

There is a realistic possibility that student-led protests in Indonesia could evolve into a wider movement if joined by other sections of society, potentially leading to violent clashes with the police.

Since early February, the US military and intelligence community has significantly increased its surveillance of Mexican cartel activity. This has primarily been achieved by deploying a range of tactical to strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) airborne assets to monitor cartel activity.

The US Navy has deployed P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft to identify vessels of interest, monitor surface activity and intercept communications. Assets from the US Coast Guard have supported US Navy missions.

The US Air Force (USAF) has deployed RC135 Rivet Joint, a dedicated signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft capable of intercepting, geolocating, and classifying electronic emissions. The USAF has also deployed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, primarily for wide-area imagery intelligence collection.

Neither the Pentagon nor the White House have confirmed the deployment of RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. However, US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has stated that 140 military intelligence personnel have been assigned to the border mission. Their role includes full-motion video analysis, counter-network analysis, and Spanish language translation in support of the US Border Patrol Office of Intelligence.

Reports also indicate that US military operations are being supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is reportedly flying unarmed MQ-9 Reaper uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) ISR missions directly over Mexican airspace.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The use of strategic military assets like Rivet Joint against the cartels is an unprecedented shift which has likely been authorised following President Trump’s 20 January executive order to designate several of the cartels as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs), which came into effect on 19 February.

The designation has likely permitted other forms of more covert intelligence collection, such as directed surveillance, which is hard to identify in the open-source domain. The use of strategic assets combined with the scale and frequency of US ISR missions over Mexico, the US-Mexico border and maritime approaches indicates that this activity is unlikely to be simply strategic messaging towards the cartels.

SIGINT platforms will be able to provide US intelligence with information relating to phone signals, radio transmissions, encrypted devices, satellite signals, radar emissions from vessels, and other electronic communications.

When layered with imagery collection and other forms of intelligence collection, such as human intelligence (HUMINT), this data will allow for a comprehensive understanding of cartel operations. When analysed, US intelligence will likely be able to uncover cartel patterns of life, identify key locations such as fentanyl labs, trace drug trafficking routes, map cartel networks and leadership structures, identify enablers, track financial operations, and gather other critical insights into cartel activity.

How this intelligence will be used remains unknown. The CIA has conducted ISR missions against the cartels in the past, but this has often been done with authorisation from the Mexican authorities. Moreover, it is unlikely that the US will be operating within Mexican airspace without approval from the Mexican government.

Trump has posited the idea of using US special forces to conduct targeted operations against the cartels, a policy that is unlikely to require congressional approval. However, the most likely scenario is that the US is fulfilling a sophisticated intelligence capability that Mexico currently lacks. By delivering surveillance, signals intelligence, and analytical support to Mexican authorities, the US is likely enhancing Mexico’s ability to more effectively target cartels and disrupt their operations as part of a partnered operation.

This has likely placed enormous pressure on Mexico to adapt its strategy towards the cartels or face a reaction from the Trump administration, such as tariffs.

However, such a shift could precipitate a change in the security environment in Mexico which may threaten US interests. The cartels may be forced to alter their tactics, which could involve more sophisticated counter-surveillance measures, more innovative ways to smuggle illicit goods into the US or an escalation in violence.

If the cartels perceive increased US involvement as an existential threat to their operations, they may respond with a range of retaliatory actions to deter further intervention. There is a realistic possibility that this could include increased cartel violence on the border, attacks on Mexican security services and assassinations of high-profile civilian targets such as politicians and journalists.

A more extreme response could involve cartels deliberately targeting US interests in Mexico or beyond. This might include attacks on American businesses, kidnappings of US citizens or deliberate attempts to flood the US with higher volumes of narcotics and potentially more lethal varieties.

On 17 February, members of the National Liberation Army (ELN) declared that a three-day “armed strike” would be enforced in the Chocó Department. The strike began on 18 February at midnight and is set to end on 21 February at midnight.

Under the terms of the strike, no public activities will be allowed to take place, public transportation will cease to operate, no one will be able to travel on public roads, and civilians will be forced to remain indoors for the entire period. The ELN has stated that the strike has been imposed in order to expose collusion between the state, military forces and mercenary groups operating in the region.

This is the ninth armed strike that the ELN have imposed but is considerably larger than the previous strikes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ELN’s imposition of an armed strike likely serves several purposes. The ability to impose an armed strike largely unchallenged will almost certainly be perceived as a direct challenge to the government, likely weakening public confidence in state security forces.

Public confidence in the government will be further tested if the ELN can expose collusion between the state and other armed groups, such as the Gulf Clan. If the ELN succeeds in these efforts, it will likely increase pressure on the Petro administration to concede to more favourable terms in the ongoing peace negotiations.

If successful, it is highly likely that the ELN will impose similar armed strikes in other parts of Colombia, with the group having a major presence in departments such as Norte de Santander, Arauca, Cauca, and Nariño, where it has long-established control and influence. The armed strikes will likely disrupt the provision of essential services, including food, medicine and health care, especially if they increase in scale and duration. Furthermore, anyone contravening the ELN’s orders is likely to be apprehended or executed, including individuals who are typically afforded protection, such as healthcare professionals and humanitarian workers.

The government claims that the ELN is using the armed strike to limit traffic on the area’s roads and waterways. This strategy will enable the ELN to transit illicit goods such as cocaine and illegally mined materials out of the region, ultimately helping to fund future operations. In response, the Colombian government will likely increase military and police deployments in key areas and along major transport routes in an attempt to restore order, interdict smuggling, and prevent the ELN from expanding its influence. However, given the ELN’s entrenched position in the rural Chocó Department and its preference for asymmetric warfare, it is unlikely that government forces will be successful in dislodging the ELN from its area of operations.

Former Brazilian president charged over coup attempt

Brazilian prosecutors have charged former President Jair Bolsonaro over an alleged coup plot to poison his successor, current President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and to kill a Supreme Court judge. The prosecutor general stated that Bolsonaro and 33 others were complicit in the plot.

Bolsonaro has rejected the accusation, labelling the incumbent government as an authoritarian regime. The former president still commands significant support in Brazil and is attempting to rekindle his political career, despite being banned from holding public office until 2030.

Bolsonaro is unlikely to be arrested before his trial, but his future arrest or any major developments in the case are likely to provoke major unrest, with many of his supporters previously attempting to storm government buildings in the capital, Brasilia, after his defeat in the 2022 presidential election.

Argentine President Javier Milei receives backlash following crypto scandal

On 14 February, Milei posted a link to a website selling the cryptocurrency $Libra, leading to it quickly appreciating in value before suddenly dropping, losing up to USD 4 billion, after early investors sold their coins. The main opposition coalition, led by the Socialist Party, has accused Milei of fraud and has called for the start of impeachment proceedings.

Milei defended his actions stating that he did not advertise the coin, shared it from his personal account, and that investing in crypto is like gambling, so he is not responsible for investors’ losses. Milei’s seeming promotion of the little-known cryptocurrency follows similar actions by other politicians. On the eve of the inauguration, US then-President-elect Donald Trump launched a personal crypto coin and was shortly followed by First Lady Melania Trump.    

Six Guyanese soldiers injured in suspected gang attack across Venezuela’s border

On 18 February, armed men on the Venezuelan side of the Cuyuni River opened fire on soldiers on a resupply mission along the Guyana side, injuring six. While there was an exchange of fire, it is unclear whether any attackers, who were suspected gang members, were hit.

Guyana’s defence force has released a statement claiming that it ‘remains committed to protecting its borders and will take all necessary measures to address any threats to national security’. The incident is expected to raise tensions between the two countries and is the latest in a diplomatic feud over the shared border.

Venezuela has claimed that it has been cheated out of the mineral rich Essequibo region, which makes up two-thirds of Guyana, and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has threatened to forcefully annex the region. Protests are likely in Guyana’s capital Georgetown amid public anger at Venezuela’s actions.

Colonel killed in likely cartel-mandated assassination in Ecuador

Colonel Porfirio Cedeño was shot and killed in the town of Guayaquil. According to local media, “multiple” gunmen ambushed the colonel’s vehicle as he was en route to a military ceremony in Manta. Cedeño was the leader of a special armed forces unit, the Special Operations Group, tasked with carrying out operations against drug traffickers in the country. The shooting, almost certainly mandated by local cartels, is the latest in a series of high-profile assassinations of figures within the Ecuadorean government.

Brazilian forces launch large-scale operation against illegal logging

Brazilian forces seized at least 5,000 truckloads of timber during Operation Maravalha, a series of large-scale raids targeting illegal logging in the states of Para, Amazonas, and Rondonia. In addition to the seizures, authorities closed multiple sawmills.

The Lula government has made some considerable progress in curbing illegal logging in the Amazon rainforest, with levels of illegal deforestation falling since the 2022 elections. Deforestation, including logging and deliberate wildfires, is mostly carried out to turn portions of the rainforest into pastures, making them more profitable.

While the government raid, the largest in five years according to government sources, is a notable win for the Lula government, Brasilia likely continues to face significant difficulties in curbing illegal deforestation, which is both widespread and difficult to monitor.

Dengue cases continue to rise in Brazil

On 19 February, the government of São Paulo declared a state of emergency due to a significant rise in dengue cases, with 124,000 infections and 113 deaths reported since the beginning of the year. While the numbers are lower than last year, the state is nearing the epidemic threshold set by the WHO. Almost one-third of Brazil’s dengue cases have been identified in São Paulo, which has necessitated the allocation of more resources to the area. At least five people have also died in the state of Minas Gerais since the start of 2025, which has also recorded over 13,000 cases. One of the primary drivers of the case increases has been the low uptake in vaccinations, which has prompted the Ministry of Health to expand vaccine eligibility and allow doses close to expiration to be administered to a wider population.

On 23 February, German citizens vote to elect the 630 members of the Bundestag. Currently, the Christian Democratic sister parties CDU/CSU are leading the polls with an estimated 29 per cent of overall public support. The incumbent Social Democrats (SPD) are far behind with 16 per cent support. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is second in the polls, at around 21 per cent.

The electoral campaign in Germany has been extremely tense and has attracted significant international attention. Most notably, the AfD, which was previously endorsed by presidential advisor and the world’s richest man Elon Musk, also recently received a less vocal endorsement by US Vice President JD Vance, who met AfD leader Alice Weidel in Munich. Large-scale anti-AfD rallies have occurred with some regularity in Berlin as well as other large urban centres.

The campaign has also been characterised by several cases of violence. Multiple terror attacks inspired by Islamist ideology have occurred in Germany in recent months, including in Munich, Solingen, and Mannheim. A further mass casualty attack, a vehicle ramming attack on a Christmas market in Magdeburg, was carried out by a Saudi national who espoused anti-Islam and anti-government extremist beliefs. These attacks have made migration one of the key issues of the campaign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The elections will highly likely see the Christian Democrats emerge as Germany’s main force in parliament. The AfD will highly likely be the second-largest party in the Bundestag, securing their best-ever result.

However, the leader of the CDU/CSU, Friedrich Merz, is likely to uphold the “firewall” against the AfD, despite having previously sought the far-right party’s support to pass legislation. Instead, the CDU/CSU will likely look to the left for support in forming a government. This would likely take the form of a Merkel-era “Grand Coalition” with the SPD.

This development would almost certainly result in short-term uncertainty and potentially long-term instability, with the coalition likely to have fewer seats than previous Grand Coalitions due to the forecasted success of the AfD.

This scenario, with the AfD more powerful than ever but still exiled from government, would almost certainly aggravate and embolden the far right, which may have material impacts on Germany’s risk environment. A stronger and more visible AfD is almost certainly going to result in more civil unrest. Alternatively, If Merz tries to pass further laws with the AfD’s support, more protests like those recently seen in Berlin and other cities are almost certain to occur. Alongside civil unrest, there is a realistic possibility of increased political violence, including attacks on politicians and activists, as well as acts of vandalism and sabotage.

It is notable that the AfD is now both openly endorsed by elements of the US administration and American-based pro-Trump channels, as well as Russian information operations. These efforts raise a credible risk of sabotage and activist violence against US businesses in Germany, driven by perceptions of US backing for the far-right. Last year’s sabotage of the Tesla “Gigafactory” near Berlin likely represents an early case of US politics driving activist sabotage in Germany, likely serving as inspiration for similar future actions.

On 18 February, the US and Russia engaged in bilateral talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The US delegation was headed by the Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was joined by national security advisor Mike Waltz and Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. The Russian delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, joined by Vladamir Putin’s advisor Yuri Ushakov.

The meeting, mediated by senior Saudi officials including the foreign minister, discussed conditions for a possible Trump-Putin summit and agreed to start negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The talks notably excluded any Ukrainian representatives. President Zelensky had been scheduled to also visit Saudi Arabia but has postponed the visit to 10 March as Kyiv does not want to give legitimacy to the US-Russia talks.

In response to Kyiv’s concerns about being excluded from the talks, US President Donald Trump told reporters that Ukraine should have never started the war and Zelensky’s popularity ratings are as low as four per cent. Zelensky then publicly stated that Trump is “living in a disinformation space” created by Russia. Trump subsequently posted on social media that Zelensky, a “modestly successful comedian”, is a “Dictator without Elections” and “has done a terrible job”. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the initial bilateral US-Russia talks, briefings to the press from both Russian and American delegation members give some early indications of possible core principles and red lines for peace negotiations. Waltz specified that a peace deal would require a permanent end to the war, security guarantees for Ukraine, and will have to include talks on territory. The latter condition almost certainly refers to the ceding of Ukrainian territory to Russia, namely Crimea, the Donbas and highly likely the occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts. This would be an immediately offered concession to Ukraine’s stated strategic objectives of full Russian withdrawal from internationally recognised Ukrainian territory.

Lavrov, on the other hand, stated that any deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine, “even under other flags”, would be unacceptable. This condition was almost certainly set in the context of proposals for NATO-member peacekeeping forces that could serve as a security guarantee for Ukraine, with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stating that he is “ready and willing” to deploy British troops as peacekeepers, with French President Macron making similar pledges in the past.

It is highly likely that peace negotiations, with the aforementioned core principles, already have built-in issues. While the US delegation expresses a desire for security guarantees sufficient to make peace permanent, the Kremlin has so far not expressed any indications of possible concessions that could enable this.

One possible scenario that Moscow would be more amenable to may be the deployment of forces from a non-NATO member such as China, although it is unlikely this would provide a sufficient guarantee against future Russian re-invasion.

Fundamentally, while Ukraine (and European partners) have been excluded from these talks thus far, Kyiv would need to accept any proposals for them to be effective. If determined, however, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration could force Kyiv to accept an imposed peace due to a threat of total defeat without any US support.

Zelensky is likely in a lose-lose situation, with any statements against Trump leading to a severe backlash, but silence enabling the imposition of an unfavourable peace.

The ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, reached in November 2024, has largely held despite notable challenges and incidents. On 18 February, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) units withdrew from positions along the southern border, with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) units moving in to replace them. However, IDF troops remained stationed on five strategic hills, where they have established observation posts.

On 19 February, an Israeli drone strike in the town of Aita al-Shaab resulted in one fatality, marking the first casualty since the IDF’s withdrawal. Both the UN and the Lebanese government have condemned the continued IDF presence at these locations as a violation of the ceasefire terms. However, Tel Aviv maintains that the deployments are temporarily necessary to ensure border security.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The continuation of the ceasefire agreement, despite Lebanon’s protests and Israeli strikes, is largely due to the positions of the three main parties involved: Israel, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese government.

Israel is likely pursuing two main objectives. Firstly, Israel is attempting to facilitate the return of 60,000 residents to northern Israel, the failure to do so has placed significant pressure on Tel Aviv. Secondly, Israel almost certainly wants to maintain a ground presence in Lebanon to monitor Hezbollah in case it attempts to reestablish a military presence south of the Litani River.

The threat of a sustained and likely destabilising IDF presence in Lebanon is also likely placing pressure on Beirut to adopt a more proactive role in containing the militant group.

Hezbollah, severely degraded after IDF operations and the loss of its Syrian supply lines likely has little choice but to accept Israel’s presence or risk a collapse of the ceasefire and renewed IDF operations. The Lebanese government has demonstrated an increased willingness to contain Hezbollah. However, with political and economic challenges, and a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) ill-equipped to directly challenge Hezbollah, the central government will likely have to accept the IDF’s continued presence within its borders.

Given Israel’s position of strength and the relative weakness of other parties involved, it is likely that it will continue to challenge the terms and push the boundaries of the ceasefire agreement. Israel will likely calculate that it can continue to strike at targets of opportunity within southern Lebanon, assessing that any major retaliation is unlikely.

On the night of 20 February, three bombs detonated on empty buses on the wider Tel Aviv bus network. Two explosions occurred in Bat Yam, a city south of Tel Aviv, while a third was reported in the nearby town of Holon. At least one additional explosive device was discovered on another bus in Holon. No injuries were sustained during the blasts.

Israeli police have stated that the bombs were detonated with a timer and were non-standard explosives. The police also commented that the bombs looked similar to those engineered in the West Bank. Israel’s Shin Bet internal security agency stated that it was taking over the investigation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing and placement of the explosive devices strongly suggest that they were intended to detonate during rush hour traffic, likely aiming to cause mass casualties. Furthermore, bus bombings have been a recurrent tactic used by Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups during past hostilities.

A group on Telegram, claiming to be a branch of the Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, based in the northern West Bank city of Tulkarem stated “We will never forget to avenge our martyrs as long as the occupation remains on our land.” This could suggest that the failed attack was Hamas’ revenge for Israeli operations in Palestine or potentially indicative of an internal split within Hamas, both of which are likely to undermine ceasefire negotiations.

However, the failure of three separate explosive devices to detonate at the correct time, coupled with the fact one device reportedly carried a message declaring “Revenge from Tulkarm”, is likely to generate suspicion and fuel speculation that the attack was a false flag operation. Many will likely believe that Israel engineered the incident to undermine ceasefire negotiations and justify continued Israeli military operations in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Regardless of the attack’s origins, when combined with Hamas’ recent public display of deceased Israeli children, it will almost certainly be used as justification for expanded Israeli operations in the West Bank and will likely be widely supported. Early indications suggest that Israel’s Defence Minister has already instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to intensify operations in the West Bank, especially in the Tulkarem refugee camp.

This escalation is likely to jeopardise ceasefire efforts and provoke further retaliatory attacks from the West Bank into Israel, increasing the risk of a broader cycle of violence. If sustained, there is a realistic possibility that it will draw Iran further into the conflict, with senior figures within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recently renewing threats towards Israel.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has increased the tempo of its operations in the West Bank, conducting multiple raids as part of its operation “Iron Wall” which started on 21 January. Raids intended to target militants and dismantle “terrorist infrastructure” have taken place in major Palestinian refugee camps, including in Jenin, Nur Shams, and Nablus and have also been conducted in smaller settlements near Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem. Some raids were reportedly conducted by Israeli settlers supported by the IDF.

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA’s) Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Information Nabil Abu Rudeineh denounced the international community for remaining silent about Israel’s plans for “racist annexation and territorial expansion,” and called on the US to intervene to stop Israeli aggression, warning that failure to do so would only embolden Israel and lead to an uncontrollable escalation in violence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israel has likely been emboldened by the initial steps of the new Trump administration. Trump has sanctioned the International Criminal Court for its issuing of an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu; proposed the US control and redevelopment of Gaza; increased military support for Israel; and has threatened to unleash “hell” unless Hamas releases the remaining hostages. Israel is likely exploiting a more favourable White House and the current Gaza ceasefire to expand operations in the West Bank. Tel Aviv will also almost certainly exploit the recent failed terror attack and Hamas’ treatment of deceased Israeli hostages as a pretext for increased operations in the West Bank.

The primary objective of Operation Iron Wall is to dismantle militant networks that are likely receiving increasing support from Iran, which is attempting to establish another front against Israel, an objective that has almost certainly been prioritised since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. However, there is a realistic possibility that the increase in operations and consequent displacement of Palestinians, especially in areas near East Jerusalem, are shaping activity for an expansion of Israeli settlements. The previous Trump administration shifted US policy towards Israeli settlements, no longer viewing them as inconsistent with international law, a policy that is likely to provide Israel with diplomatic cover for continued expansion. For example, on 17 February, Israel issued a tender for the construction of nearly 1,000 additional settler homes in the Efrat settlement near Jerusalem.

The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is likely to jeopardise ceasefire agreements, undermine hostage exchanges and increase both radicalism and militancy throughout Palestine. Militant groups like Hamas are likely to exploit settlement growth as a justification to abandon talks with Israel, making negotiations and any long-term solution much harder to achieve. Increased settlement is also likely to severely undermine the PA’s credibility. The PA is already struggling with declining legitimacy and a weakened security apparatus, which it has often used to suppress Palestinian militancy, developments that will ultimately play into the hands of the militant groups. Despite a lull in fighting in Gaza, intensified Israeli operations and settlement expansion in the West Bank will likely fuel anti-Israeli sentiment and global protests. Perceived US backing for Israel is also likely to drive anti-US protests, especially in the Middle East, potentially increasing security risks for American citizens and interests abroad.

On 18 February, two detained British nationals were charged with espionage by Iranian authorities. According to a judiciary spokesman, the couple had “entered Iran under the guise of tourists” and “collected information in several provinces of the country”. The British couple, Mr and Mrs Foreman, were on a worldwide motorbike trip.

The couple intended to stay in Iran for five days, having crossed into Iran from Armenia on 30 December, having earlier admitted that they were ignoring warnings from the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) not to travel to Iran. In January, the couple were arrested in the city of Kerman. The FCDO has stated that they are providing consular assistance to the couple and are in contact with Iranian authorities.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The case is highly likely an example of ‘hostage diplomacy’, the practice of a state using arbitrary detention for geopolitical purposes and to gain transactional rewards. In recent years, numerous British nationals have been arrested in Iran. In a high-profile example, the British-Iranian dual national Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe was arrested in 2016 by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at Imam Khomeini International Airport (IKA) in Tehran after visiting Iran on holiday. Zaghari-Ratcliffe was detained for six years, only being released once the British government agreed to settle an outstanding GBP 400 million debt that dated back to the 1970s.

Due to the likely increasing phenomenon of hostage diplomacy, there is almost certainly a severe risk of arbitrary detention posed to nationals travelling to countries hostile to the West, such as Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Russia. On 7 February, a US citizen was detained in Russia due to allegedly possessing cannabis-infused marmalade. With the talks being conducted between Russian and US officials in Saudi Arabia regarding Ukraine, the Russian government released the US citizen in what has been perceived as a gesture of goodwill. Such events are indicative of how travellers can be subjected to detention in adversarial states, with their continued imprisonment or release being then subject to globally significant geopolitical developments.

On 14 February, AFC/M23 entered the outskirts of Bukavu after capturing the airport in Kavumu, the second major airport to fall to the AFC/M23. On 16 February, AFC/M23 took full control of the provincial capital. Following minimal resistance in Bukavu, AFC/M23 continued south along the N2 Highway, capturing Kamanyola on 18 February. In North Kivu, AFC/M23 militants reportedly captured the city of Kitsumbiro on 20 February, approximately 27 kilometres from the centre of the Lubero region. Having attempted to push along the N2 Highway to Lubero but facing resistance, the group strategically diverted East to Kipese on 20 February.

Uganda’s military has confirmed that its forces entered Bunia in the Ituri region of North Kivu after consulting with FARDC leadership. Their purpose in the town is reportedly to “avert evolving genocide” amid alleged killings by armed groups along ethnic lines. This is likely linked to the ongoing intercommunal conflict between the Lendu farming community and Hema pastoralists. The DRC government has reportedly requested military support from Chad to assist against AFC/M23.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the capture of Kamanyola in South Kivu, AFC/M23 now controls all three border crossing points between the DRC and Rwanda. It is highly likely that group will continue to push south towards the city of Uvira, enabling them control of the border crossing between the DRC and Burundi. Burundi, whose government is hostile to Rwanda and AFC/M23, will almost certainly see this as a security threat, risking an escalation of the conflict.

Following AFC/M23’s capture of Kitsombiro in North Kivu, they will highly likely push on to the mineral-rich Butembo, approximately 70 kilometres north. There is a realistic possibility that the capture of more major regional cities will result in further unrest in Kinshasa, which has, so far, remained relatively quiet since 29 January.

AFC/M23 increasingly threaten to encroach into regions where Ugandan forces are operating. Beni, 55 kilometres north of Butembo, has been the site of intense counterinsurgency efforts by Ugandan forces against the ADF Islamist rebel group in recent years. Uganda’s deepening involvement is almost certainly linked to the widening security gap along the Congolese border due to the diversion of FARDC resources to combat AFC/M23 militants.

Because of the importance of its military presence in Eastern DRC, Kampala would likely be reluctant to antagonise Kinshasa. An AFC/M23 advance on Beni would highly likely test Uganda’s tentative backing of the rebel group, which has so far been fragmented with senior military figures voicing support while government figures have been muted. There is a realistic possibility that if AFC/M23 do not directly threaten Ugandan troops or their ongoing counterinsurgency against the ADF, Uganda will assume a mediating role.

Fears of M23’s advancement have led to repeated reports of approaches towards Kinshasa. On 17 February, rumours claimed that M23 rebels had established a presence in the Kindu region and that the FARDC abandoned the airport. On 19 February, rumours proliferated that AFC/M23 members had been arrested in Kinshasa, something that was denied by FARDC. On the same day, a FARDC commander released a statement denying rumours that AFC/M23 rebels have a presence in Kisangani or the Tshopo province, significantly west of their current area of operations. Given the prevalence of inaccurate claims of AFC/M23 presence west of Kivu, the disinformation is likely deliberate but could influence public opinion, placing pressure on the government or triggering unrest.

Lebanese government scraps recognition of Hezbollah from yearly ministerial statement

The document, the first to be issued by the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, usually formally recognises the role of “armed resistance” to Israel as a legitimate part of the Lebanese political framework. Its omission is likely an important symbolic show of the government’s willingness to take advantage of Hezbollah’s post-conflict (and post-Assad) weakness to diminish the Shia militia’s political and military clout.

Beirut continues to face significant pressures domestically and from abroad; it is not only looking to improve ties with the Gulf states and the new administration of Syria but also aims to secure a new agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Hezbollah nevertheless remains a powerful force and is unlikely that Beirut will tackle it head-on. Instead, there is a realistic possibility that the government is pivoting towards a long-term strategy, meant to “starve” Hezbollah in both material and political terms.

The funeral of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, killed by Israeli strikes in September 2024, is set to be held on 23 February, and will likely be used by the group as a show of force and political legitimacy.

Ethiopia and Somalia hold first round of technical talks in Turkey

On 18 February, Ethiopian and Somalian diplomats held the first round of talks aimed at resolving a dispute over Ethiopia’s access to Somaliland’s port. Somaliland agreed to lease access to its port to the landlocked Ethiopia after Addis Ababa agreed to become the first country to formally recognise its independence on 1 January 2024. Mogadishu, viewing the breakaway Somaliland as illegitimate, has viewed Addis Ababa’s deal with the regional government as infringing on Somalia’s sovereignty and integrity, threatening a regional conflict. The talks aim to reach a potential agreement upholding Somalia’s territorial integrity while granting Ethiopia access to its port. The second round of talks is set to take place in March.

Four charged in Sweden over Islamic State links

The four individuals had been arrested in Tyresö last March, during a raid at a local Islamic cultural association. According to prosecutors, the four, two of whom are brothers, were radicalised during visits to Somalia, where the Islamic State (IS) has a growing branch (the Islamic State Somalia Province, or ISS). Moreover, prosecutors note how the cultural association had become a vehicle of radicalisation, with local preachers espousing pro-IS rhetoric. The suspects’ sentences reflect a 2023 law on terrorism, which more heavily sanctions individuals convicted of participating with a terrorist organisation. The case further highlights the threat posed by transnational IS ideology and how smaller IS branches are leveraging connections to foreign diasporas to recruit and plot external operations.

Attempted “Incel” lone wolf attack in Annecy, France

On 16 February, a 17-year-old tried to carry out a knife attack in the central square of the French town of the Haute-Savoie department. The attacker, who was shot and wounded by responding police before he could injure anyone, reportedly tried to livestream his attack on TikTok and stated that he intended to target women. The attack is almost certainly tied to “Incel” (or “involuntary celibate”) ideology, a set of beliefs characterised by extreme sexism and misogyny, which has in the past driven multiple lone wolf attacks. In France, another possible Incel attack was thwarted in May in Bordeaux, where an individual was arrested for planning an attack during the relay of the Olympic flame.

Deadly shooting at Brussels Metro highlights growing organised crime threat

On 15 February, a 19-year-old was shot and killed in a shooting at Clemenceau metro station in the Anderlecht district of Brussels. The attack is the latest in a series of violent incidents linked to drug-related territorial conflicts, which have escalated in recent weeks and resulted in two deaths. The brazen nature of these attacks likely indicates that organised crime groups feel emboldened, with the heavily trafficked metro system being exploited for the attacks and as an escape route. Belgian officials have called for stricter measures, with an emergency meeting scheduled with federal police.

IS-inspired knife attack in Villach, Austria, kills one

The attack occurred on 15 February in the main town square of Villach. The attacker was a 23-year-old Syrian national, who targeted random pedestrians, injuring five and killing a 14-year-old. According to security sources, the attacker became self-radicalised online within only three months, espousing IS ideology. IS channels have claimed responsibility for the attack, despite no known direct communication between the attacker and the group.

The case likely further proves the point made by MI5 head Ken McCallum, that lone wolf attackers are becoming radicalised increasingly quickly, making it harder for authorities to prevent attacks. There is a realistic possibility of further copycat attacks following the stabbing, as well as “retaliatory” violence against Muslim communities in Austria. Indeed, an early example of a copycat attack was likely thwarted by Austrian authorities on 19 February, as they arrested a 14-year-old who was planning to carry out a knife attack at the Vienna train station on behalf of IS.

Another large-scale Moroccan raid on IS cells highlights growing threat from the Sahel

On 19 February, reports emerged of multiple raids by Moroccan special forces, in at least eight cities, aimed at dismantling IS-affiliated networks. Authorities secured explosive materials, bladed weapons, and firearms. Local media also claimed that security forces found improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted at sites just outside Rabat. The raids, which follow multiple counterterrorism operations in recent weeks, have been linked to the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which is increasingly attempting to expand its areas of influence. Moroccan authorities have expressed growing concerns over the ISSP’s attempts to establish operational cells within the country, particularly as instability in the wider Sahel region provides a fertile ground for jihadist recruitment and cross-border operations. Moreover, the sophistication of the recent plots suggests coordinated planning and guidance, rather than isolated groups.

Wagner/Africa Corps forces massacre Tuareg civilians in Mali

On 17 February, reports from pro-Azawad channels indicated that a convoy of Russian mercenary and Malian government forces, departing from Gao towards the Algerian border, massacred at least 20 civilians in the Tilemsi region. According to reports, the convoy opened fire on two civilian vehicles, killing the occupants. The case further highlights the contradictory and brutal, and so far, ineffective, counterinsurgency tactics used by the Wagner-supported Malian forces in the predominantly Tuareg northern regions of the country. It is highly likely that the case will further drive local opposition to the junta government.

Sahelian militants attack army post in northern Benin

A militant attack on an army post in northern Benin on 17 February killed six soldiers and 17 militants. This follows a deadly attack in January that claimed the lives of dozens of soldiers in the northern Alibori department, a region bordering Niger and Burkina Faso, which are struggling to contain Islamist insurgencies. The attack likely underscores the growing threat of armed extremist groups expanding from the Sahel into coastal West Africa, with Benin and neighbouring Togo increasingly targeted. Violent extremist organisations like the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and are likely attempting to destabilise the northern region of these countries, fuel an insurgency, expand recruitment, and force national governments to divert resources internally rather than conduct operations in the Sahel.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) escalate attacks after Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) advances

The SAF is currently dislodging the RSF from its positions in the capital Khartoum, forcing the paramilitary group to retreat west towards Darfur where it controls much of the region. However, the SAF is targeting the route out of the capital with drones and fighter jets, which is resulting in high rates of collateral damage.

In response to the SAF’s progress, the RSF has increased its attacks on the civilian population. The RSF reportedly killed 200 unarmed civilians in a cluster of villages in El Geteina in the White Nile State.

Attacks have also intensified in Darfur, with the RSF attacking the Zamzam camp, Sudan’s largest refugee camp, apparently turning it into a “killing field”. Attacks on civilians have likely become a deliberate RSF tactic and are expected to escalate as the group retreats west to Darfur. This strategy appears aimed at undermining the Sudanese government by instilling fear, destabilising communities, and disrupting governance structures in regions where the RSF maintains influence.

Turkey conducts nationwide operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Turkish police have detained almost 300 individuals accused of having ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group designated by Turkey and many of its allies as a terrorist organisation. The arrests have included journalists, politicians, academics, and members of other pro-Kurdish groups. The arrests, which occurred over five days in 51 provinces, coincide with a wider effort to curb Kurdish influence. This has involved the removal of pro-Kurdish mayors and major military action against allegedly related Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria.

The arrests have received criticism from human rights groups, journalists, and Kurdish groups, who characterise them as authoritarian and likely to undermine peace talks. There is a realistic possibility that the arrests will provoke protests in major Kurdish settlements and could incite attacks on Turkish security services.

Magnitude 6.0 earthquake in Ethiopia causes light shaking in Addis Ababa

Late on 14 February, a strong magnitude 6.0 earthquake at a shallow depth of 10 kilometres struck 6 kilometres northeast of Metahāra. Approximately 120 kilometres east of Addis Ababa, the earthquake caused light shaking in the capital. Despite the earthquake’s strength and shallow depth, however, the tremblor highly likely only caused minimal impact due to limited population exposure near the epicentre.

Since late September 2024, Ethiopia has experienced a series of earthquakes that have raised concerns about volcanic eruptions being triggered. In early January, authorities announced the evacuation of 80,000 people in the Afar, Oromia, and Amhara regions due to the increased risk. Additionally, a task force was set up to assess the risk of seismic activity to Addis Ababa and bolster disaster preparedness.

While Addis Ababa has not historically suffered from significant earthquake damage, the ongoing earthquake “swarm” likely increases the risk of such an event.

Over 40 killed in mine collapse in western Mali

On 15 February, over 40 people, most of whom were women, were killed after an artisanal gold mine collapsed near the town of Kenieba in western Mali. The individuals had reportedly climbed down into open-pit areas left by industrial miners to look for scraps of gold when the earth collapsed around them. This is Mali’s second major mining accident in three weeks, following a flooded tunnel collapse in late January that killed at least 10 miners.

Unregulated artisanal mining of abandoned mines has increased as a result of foreign mining companies leaving Mali due to security concerns, political instability, and the junta targeting foreign companies in revenue disputes. Accidents are likely to increase as international gold prices continue to increase while domestic economic conditions deteriorate, further driving the demand for gold extraction in dangerous and unregulated mines.

Major flooding across Botswana

Botswana is experiencing severe flooding across multiple regions, including the capital, Gaborone, and the Ghanzi District. The flooding has caused widespread disruptions, leading to the closure of all public schools until 24 February. President Duma Boko confirmed that heavy flooding continues in Gaborone and surrounding areas, with at least one reported death. In the Ghanzi District, local media report that hundreds of residents have been displaced. Additionally, the airport in Ghanzi has been closed due to the extreme weather conditions.

Widespread flooding in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal

Heavy rainfall has resulted in major flooding and landslides in several parts of South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province. As of 21 February, at least three fatalities have been confirmed due to the adverse weather conditions. Flooding and landslides have disrupted businesses, forced the closure of schools and caused major traffic disruptions, particularly along the M4 highway in Durban. Further rainfall is predicted, with the South African Weather Service (SAWS) issuing two weather warnings for KwaZulu-Natal, predicting rainfall between 40mm and 100mm.

Pakistan will host the ICC Champions Trophy 2025 from 19 February to 9 March, with the tournament taking place across four venues. The National Stadium in Karachi, the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore and the Rawalpindi Cricket Stadium in Rawalpindi will host games played within Pakistan. Any matches involving India will be played at the Dubai International Cricket Stadium, with India refusing to play in Pakistan due to security concerns.

This will be the first major international cricket tournament held in Pakistan since the 2009 terror attack on the Sri Lanka national cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan. During the attack, 12 gunmen armed with AK-47s, RPGs, and hand grenades attacked the team while they were en route to the stadium. Six members of the Sri Lankan team were injured, and six Pakistani policemen and two civilians lost their lives. The attack was believed to be conducted by the violent Islamist extremist group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which has links to al-Qaeda and other militant groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hosting a successful international cricket tournament in Pakistan would be a huge victory for the government for several reasons. It would not only signal a return to normalcy after years of security concerns but would also bolster Pakistan’s global image, economy, and internal stability. This will almost certainly make it a coveted target for terrorist groups seeking to undermine the government and gain international publicity, especially if they can successfully attack international cricket teams or sites frequented by foreign nationals.

Pakistan is currently contending with border skirmishes with the Afghan Taliban, sectarian violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and a resurgence in militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the restive Balochistan region. The authorities have stressed that the violence is nearly entirely limited to the remote border regions, far away from the stadiums. However, militant groups have demonstrated their ability to strike way beyond their primary areas of operations. As recently as October 2024, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed two Chinese nationals and one Pakistani in an attack near Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, demonstrating the BLA’s ability to attack areas that typically have a heightened security presence.

While security has been increased to protect the tournament, with so many groups likely seeking to conduct an attack, combined with the overstretching of Pakistan’s security services, the hosting of a major international event will invariably be a significant challenge. Moreover, if internal security is diverted to protect the tournament, this may present an opportunity for militant groups to escalate attacks in the border regions or other areas with less security oversight.

Operation Devil Hunt, a series of raids by police and security forces across the country, resulted in 532 reported arrests in only 24 hours. Most of the arrested were members or supporters of the Awami League (AL). The operation was reportedly triggered by clashes in Gazipur on 7 February, the city being considered a stronghold of the party of ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Hasina has recently attacked the interim government of Muhammad Yunus from her exile in India, accusing it of releasing “terrorists” and refusing to punish perpetrators of the violence that accompanied the July-August 2024 protests.

On 19 February, more than 150 students were injured in clashes in Khulna. The violence erupted while student supporters of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) were carrying out recruitment efforts and were confronted by supporters of the Students Against Discrimination group, one of the key formations that led the anti-Hasina protests in August 2024.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Political forces and vigilante groups supporting the new government have continued to carry out attacks on AL members or perceived supporters, as well as on local religious minorities. The AL sought to stage large-scale protests in early February, the first since losing power, but these plans have likely been crushed via a joint government and mob intervention. The latest arrests are likely part of the interim government’s efforts to displace AL from local institutions and positions of influence.

The clashes in Khulna likely showcase the tense, violent, and unstable state of the Bangladeshi political system at the present moment. BNP channels have blamed the clashes on members of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), while other student groups retaliated by staging anti-BNP demonstrations in Dhaka. Parties that were previously members of the opposition, like BNP or JI, likely continue to compete to fill the vacuum left by the overthrow of AL, including the control of local police, academic institutions, and bureaucracy. With the Yunus government unable (and likely unwilling) to intervene due to its dependence on the opposition’s political support, this competition is highly likely to continue taking the form of mob violence and targeting of political opponents. The arming of student groups – the groups that clashed in Khulna were armed with machetes and other bladed weapons – is likely to make universities particularly at risk for severe violence.

Student-led protests have erupted in multiple cities across Indonesia in response to President Prabowo Subianto’s budget cuts and policies. The protests, which have been given the moniker “Dark Indonesia”, have been organised over fears that the budget cuts will weaken social support systems in favour of supporting the president’s policies such as a new school lunch programme. Protests were organised on 17 and 18 February by the All-Indonesian Students’ Union (BEM SI) and were observed in Jakarta, Medan, Yogyakarta, Denpasar, and several other cities across multiple Indonesian islands. The Civil Society Coalition has called for civilians to demonstrate on 21 February following Friday prayers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

These are the first major protests to occur under President Subianto and have so far remained relatively peaceful, with only a handful of arrests and injuries reported. However, the attendance and geographical spread of the protests likely indicate a wider dissatisfaction with the incumbent government’s austerity-laden economic policies. The movement has also called for the removal of the military’s role in civil posts, with many Indonesians likely fearing that the president’s former role as Minister of Defence and military career has disproportionately benefitted the military over ordinary Indonesians.

Students have promised to continue to protest the budget cuts but the real litmus test for the government will be on 21 February. If large sections of society join the demonstrations, it could indicate broader public discontent beyond the student movement. Given President Subianto’s strong approval ratings, the government is unlikely to make significant concessions unless protests escalate in size or intensity. However, if the protests continue to gain momentum, there is a high likelihood of clashes with the police. Under such circumstances, the Indonesian police will likely use tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons to disperse protests, especially if violent or causing major disruptions.

Afghanistan pulls out of the International Criminal Court (ICC)

On 20 February, Taliban channels issued a declaration that the 2003 decision by their predecessor governments to join the ICC was illegal and that Afghanistan would subsequently be outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. Kabul notably quoted the fact that ‘many of the world’s major powers are not signatories’, likely referencing the US and Russia, which, although being signatories to the Rome Statute, have not ratified it. In January, the ICC stated it was seeking arrest warrants for senior Taliban leaders, including Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada over persecution of ‘Afghan girls and women’, citing the extremely strict rulings and bans on social participation that the Taliban government has issued. The move is likely to further damage Afghanistan’s government’s chances of re-establishing ties with Western powers and improve its international legitimacy.

Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte asks for impeachment to be thrown out

On 18 February, Duterte’s lawyers asked the Supreme Court to revoke her impeachment ruling and block a Senate trial. Duterte was impeached on 5 February after being accused of plotting to assassinate the president, engaging in corruption, and misusing confidential funds. Lawyers argued that the impeachment was sent to the Senate too quickly to be studied and ‘was procedurally defective, constitutionally infirm, and jurisdictionally void.’ Duterte will highly likely be convicted in the Senate trial, which would bar her from holding public office.

Beijing pens new agreement with the Cook Islands

The Pacific nation, the Cook Islands has released details regarding its new strategic partnership deal with China. Under the terms of the deal, Beijing will contribute more funding towards infrastructure and educational projects and will cooperate with seabed mineral mining. The deal has provoked a diplomatic dispute with New Zealand, Cook Island’s primary benefactor and military ally. Unlike other deals Beijing has signed in the region, the agreement does not include security cooperation. However, the growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific is raising mounting concerns, as it points to an expansion of China’s economic presence and potential future military footprint in the region, which could destabilise the area and lead to increased militarisation.

Attack on aid convoy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

On 17 February, at least 20 gunmen attacked a convoy of aid trucks carrying food supplies to Parachinar in the Kurram district, killing a truck driver and security escort and injuring seven. The attackers also ambushed a paramilitary reinforcement unit, setting three border force vehicles on fire and killing four soldiers. In total, six people were killed and 15 people were injured. The Pakistani military deployed helicopter gunships to target mountain hideouts in the region after the attack. The military reported the militants to be from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Evacuation orders have been issued for residents in four villages of Lower Kurram due to the recent violence. Approximately 250 people have been killed in the region since July 2024, according to local officials. Numerous truces have failed to quell the violence.

Tajik court sentences 30 individuals in poisoning plot linked to Islamic State

A court in Tajikistan has sentenced over 30 individuals to prison for attempting to poison attendees of a Nowruz festival in 2023. Authorities have linked the plot to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the primarily Afghanistan-based offshoot of the Islamic State. In 2024, there were three ISKP-linked attacks in Tajikistan and the security services thwarted at least two other attacks. These trends likely allude to an expansion of ISKP’s operations, with the group increasing its influence in Central Asia and Russia. ISKP is likely attempting to position itself as more of a transregional organisation, a development that will enable it to spread its propaganda, increase recruitment, and conduct attacks beyond its traditional area of operations.  

Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) outbreak in Maharashtra, India

The GBS outbreak in Maharashtra, India, has resulted in 11 deaths, the first one on 26 January. The rare neurological disorder causes the body’s immune system to attack the peripheral nervous system, causing muscle weakness, paralysis, or death. The state has confirmed four cases and is investigating seven suspected cases. The outbreak has spread to Mumbai, with the first death reported there involving a 53-year-old patient. Overall, the region has detected 197 cases, with Pune being significantly affected. In response, authorities have shut down 30 private water supply plants in Pune and advised the public to consume clean and boiled water and avoid stale or partially cooked food. Investigations into the cause of the outbreak are ongoing, with water contamination being a potential factor.

Cyclone Zelia causes flooding in Western Australia

Cyclone Zelia has caused severe flooding in remote areas of Pilbara, Western Australia, particularly affecting cattle farms. The cyclone, which made landfall near Port Hedland on 14 February, initially brought destructive winds and heavy rains, leading to emergency warnings and evacuations in the region. Ports in Dampier and Varanaus Island have since reopened after the cyclone passed through Pilbara. Authorities have been actively managing the situation, with evacuations conducted in areas like Warralong. The De Grey River catchment has experienced rising water levels, prompting warnings of potential isolation for residents.

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Further unrest is likely in Panama after major union clashes with security forces in Panama City over a government bill.

Chilean authorities indicate that some of the current wildfires were likely intentionally ignited. A trend of wildfires being weaponised for political or criminal goals will likely grow across South America in 2025.

A car-ramming attack in Munich, has almost certainly increased fears of political violence and terrorism ahead of the German election, with anti-migration rhetoric high and the far-right polling strongly.

Trump’s push for immediate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine will likely be exploited by the Kremlin to divide Ukraine’s allies. It is unlikely that an imposed peace on Kyiv could deter future Russian aggression.

Israeli and Hamas officials have likely agreed on a path for future hostage releases, but tensions in Gaza remain high. US President Trump’s “Gaza plan” comments are likely to further destabilise the already precarious truce.

The suspension of NGO operations in the Sahel are highly likely part of a wider attempt to curtail foreign oversight and will almost certainly exacerbate an already dire humanitarian situation.

SAF advances in Khartoum will likely set the conditions for offensives in western Sudan. However, further advances will highly likely result in high civilian casualties and compound the humanitarian crisis.

The offensive by Puntland forces in the Cal Miskaad mountain range, if successful, is highly likely to be a major blow to the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). The intensity of the clashes will likely intensify in the short term.

The ISKP bombing at a bank in Kunduz, northern Afghanistan, highly likely demonstrates the group’s ability to strike at will on Afghan territory and likely underscores growing security issues at the Afghan-Tajik border.

On 12 February, protests broke out among members of the Single National Union of Construction and Similar Workers (SUNTRACS) in Panama City. The demonstrations began as the National Assembly deliberated Law 163 which would reform the Social Security Fund (CSS), raising the retirement age and reducing pension amounts.

The protests also served to honour the memory of Al Iromi Smith Renteria, who was killed by the police on 12 February 2008, denounce Donald Trump’s statements regarding the Panama Canal, and protest the pro-US attitude of President Jose Raul Mulino’s government.

Protests escalated into clashes with Crowd Control units after they attempted to reopen the roads. The protesters threw projectiles at officers, injuring 16. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters and arrested at least 480 demonstrators, injuring at least 100.

Closures occurred across Panama City, including on Balboa Avenue, Via Tocumen, Howard, Via Espana, Transistmica, Ricado J. Alfaro, Centenario, Cincuentenario, and Brisas del Golf.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the wake of the protests, President Mulino declared that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic will audit SUNTRACS’s funds from different government entities.

Mulino called for a stop to collaboration with SUNTRACS, calling it a ‘terrorist union organisation.’ He also claimed that the government would ‘not allow pseudo-union anarchy in this country.’ Reforming the CSS has constituted a long-term ambition for Mulino to ensure its financial sustainability and he will likely not back down in the face of union unrest.

SUNTRACS is one of the largest trade unions in Panama, with approximately 40,000 members. The union is known for its militant class war unionism and leads Coordinadora de Unidad Sindical (CONUSI), the most radical major union federation in the country.

The union has coordinated several major protests in recent years, including a general strike in March 2024. Recently, SUNTRACS protested against the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s arrival in Panama in the wake of President Trump’s comments regarding the Panama Canal.

Other organisations including Coordinadora de Unidad Sindical (CONUSI) and the National Front for the Defense of Economic and Social Rights (FRENADESO) have denounced the government reforms.

SUNTRACs have demanded the release of the detained workers, claiming that ‘we will defend our comrades to the last consequences.’ Given SUNTRACS’s militancy, recent history of significant unrest, and likely unfulfilled demands, further demonstrations and clashes with security forces are likely.

On 8 February, the President of Chile Gabriel Boric declared a state of emergency in the regions of Ñuble and Maule and imposed a 22:00-06:00 curfew in 12 communes of Araucanía due to the threat of wildfires. Large-scale efforts to combat the wildfires are ongoing, with 22 wildfires still active and 55 under control. Wildfires have impacted several regions, including Araucanía, O’Higgins, Bio Bio, Ñuble, and Maule. The fires have led to at least one death (in Maule), three injuries, and 28 destroyed homes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In February 2024, Chile’s wildfire season caused widespread devastation with an estimated 137 deaths, 1,100 injuries, 14,000 destroyed structures, and USD 4.39 billion in damages. The 2024-2025 Chilean wildfire season has not been nearly as severe due to comprehensive efforts made by authorities to control the fires. Authorities have suggested that a large part of the fires affecting La Araucanía are intentional, with President Boric stating they have well-founded reasons to believe so, with 14 people already arrested. The intentional starting of fires could be related to territorial grievances within indigenous Mapuche areas.

Intentionally ignited fires, exacerbated by dry conditions and high temperatures, is highly likely an increasing threat across South America. Widespread fires which caused large-scale destruction and disruption in Brazil in 2024 were, in many cases, highly likely intentionally started by criminal networks to clear land for illegal logging and agricultural purposes. In some instances, particularly Brazilian wildfires were suspected to have been intentionally started in defiance of local government crackdowns. This weaponisation of large-scale fires for political and criminal purposes is a trend that is likely to grow in 2025. 

Nicaragua continues to crack down on Catholics

On 9 February, the Nicaraguan foreign ministry released comments describing the Vatican as “depraved” and “paedophilic”, following a televised interview with Bishop Rolando Alvez, currently living in exile after being imprisoned for more than a year.

The regime of Daniel Ortega has targeted Catholic priests with arrests and deportations in the country since the local church supported large-scale student protests in 2018. Other Christian groups, including Evangelicals, have also been persecuted. The comments will likely be followed by further measures targeting local Catholic churches and communities.

The Vatican likely has few avenues to respond to the Nicaraguan regime’s policies and to incite change. Pressuring Washington to act may be one. However, while US Foreign Secretary Marco Rubio has recently criticised Nicaragua as an “enemy of humanity” alongside Venezuela and Cuba and has also threatened to block its participation in the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, Washington’s concern is mostly directed at the issue of migration.

Moreover, relations between the Trump administration and the Vatican are cold, after Pope Francis criticised Trump’s deportation plan and Washington appointed Brian Burch, an outspoken critic of Francis and Catholic charities aiding Latin American migrants, as its ambassador to the Holy See.

Ecuador presidential election heads to runoff

Ecuador held the first round of its presidential elections on 9 February, with incumbent President Daniel Noboa seeking re-election. However, the election resulted in a near tie with neither candidate securing an outright majority.

A second run will take place on 13 February, with Noboa hoping that his adoption of militarised security policies will help him secure the presidency. During the first round, Noboa ordered an increased security presence at all Ecuadorian ports of entry and temporarily closed the country’s land borders to prevent attempts to destabilise the election from armed groups.

There is a realistic possibility that similar measures will be introduced in the second round.

Stabbing at anti-Trump protest in Los Angeles leaves one wounded

A mass brawl reportedly broke out at a rally to protest President Trump’s mass deportation plan in downtown Los Angeles. The protest, on 7 February, followed six consecutive days of unrest.

According to witnesses, the attacker was not part of the demonstration but was instead “yelling incendiary things” at the protesters. Law enforcement has not yet confirmed the motive behind the attack, but given the political nature of the protest and the assailant’s reported behaviour, there is a realistic possibility that the stabbing was politically motivated.

Further attacks at similar rallies remain possible as tensions over the deportation plan continue to rise.

Colombian Defence Minister resigns in response to escalating violence

Colombia’s Defence Minister, Iván Velásquez, has resigned amid escalating violence, marking another high-profile departure from President Gustavo Petro’s cabinet as his government struggles to contain the spread of guerilla and narco-related violence.

Community leaders in the eastern Catatumbo region, where the National Liberation Army (ELN) first initiated its offensive, have been murdered and over 50,000 remain displaced.

Fighting has recently intensified in the western region of Chocó, where the ELN and Clan del Golfo are fighting over drug routes on the Pacific Coast and into Panama. The expansion of fighting is likely to continue and will likely overstretch the underfunded Colombian military which has suffered major budget cuts under the Petro administration, resulting in the grounding of critical aerial platforms like helicopter gunships, which have been vital in combating armed groups in the harsh terrain of the Colombian jungle.

Winter storms hit US Midwest, Great Lakes, Northeast and southeast Canada

Large parts of the US and Canada have been hit by a series of disruptive winter storms that have led to the issuing of winter weather alerts and hazardous conditions.

Winter Storm Harlow first brought significant ice accumulation to parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, causing downed trees and power lines. Harlow was followed by Winter Storm Iliana, which is currently bringing snowfall to the Great Lakes, the Northeast and parts of Canada, with hail affecting the Appalachians.

The heaviest recorded snowfall was 28 cm (11 inches) in Lowden, Iowa, while parts of Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa have seen 8-15 cm (3-6 inches). Milwaukee has recorded over 18 cm (7 inches). Southern Ontario and Quebec are also experiencing snowfall and icy conditions.

Winter Storm Jett will follow Iliana, bringing more snow to the Plains, Midwest, Northeast, and Canada, as well as heavy rain and potentially severe thunderstorms in the South. Multiple winter weather alerts have been issued warning of hazardous travel conditions.

Magnitude 7.6 earthquake in the Caribbean Sea briefly triggers tsunami warnings

On 8 February, the most powerful earthquake recorded globally since 2023 occurred approximately 202 kilometres southwest of the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean Sea, with a magnitude of 7.6 at a depth of 10km.

The earthquake briefly triggered numerous tsunami alerts or advisories for the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Honduras, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands, all of which were later rescinded. Despite the earthquake’s magnitude, the impact was ultimately minimal with little to no tsunami threat and only light shaking felt in the Cayman Islands.

Regional experts warn that the threat of a significant tsunami impacting the Cayman Islands is low but not zero. In some highly unlikely but possible modelled scenarios, it is deemed possible that Grand Cayman could suffer a tsunami wave impact up to approximately three metres following a high-magnitude earthquake emanating from nearby fault lines. While not comparable to the 30-metre tsunami that devastated parts of Japan in 2011, such a tsunami could still cause significant damage due to Grand Cayman’s low elevation.

Most of the Cayman Islands’ risk modelling and earthquake impact forecasting is funded by USAID. While modelling work in the Cayman Islands continues as of the time of writing, it is likely that the Trump administration’s efforts to defund USAID and make substantial cuts to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), if successful, will have a considerable impact on not only the efforts of earthquake modelling in the Cayman Islands but worldwide.

On 13 February 2025, a car ramming incident in Munich, Germany left at least 28 people injured, including children. The suspect, a 24-year-old Afghan asylum seeker, drove a white Mini Cooper into a crowd of demonstrators near the city’s central railway station during a trade union protest. German counter-terrorism police have assumed responsibility for the investigation and the authorities suspect the incident was a targeted attack. The suspect was apprehended at the scene, with police firing a shot at the vehicle during the arrest. The investigation into the motives is ongoing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There are indications of an extremist connection with some sources suggesting that the suspect posted jihadist material on social media before the attack. The attack also occurred ahead of the  Munich security conference, hours before the US vice president and the Ukrainian president were set to arrive in the city, which has likely raised the profile of the attack. The suspect had his asylum application rejected, but his deportation was suspended, which was likely a significant factor contributing to radicalisation and a motivation for the attack.

The attack has almost certainly contributed to heightened fears of political violence and terrorism in Germany, with the federal elections approaching on 23 February. Tensions over immigration and asylum policies are high, with many Germans fearing the growth of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. This has recently intensified after the centre-right Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) collaboration with the AfD.

On 31 January CDU leader, Friedrich Merz, sought support from the AfD to pass a bill known as the Influx Limitation Act, aimed at tightening asylum rules in Germany by implementing such measures as permanent border controls and turning back asylum seekers. This has been perceived as a breach of the “firewall” or “cordon sanitaire” strategy aimed at alienating the far-right, with widespread fears such a shift in strategy has legitimised the far-right.

This has sparked major protests across Germany with over 160,000 people demonstrating in Berlin on 2 February and more than 200,000 in Munich on 8 February. However, the growing popularity of the far-right has forced mainstream parties to promise to introduce stricter immigration and asylum policies, with increased deportations often being promised.

As the election approaches, the risk of political violence and terrorism will likely increase across Germany. Anti-far-right protests, counter-protests from far-right groups, and clashes with police are likely to continue, mirroring the violent confrontations seen during previous election cycles. The threat of terrorism, both far-right and extremist Islamist in nature, is likely to increase anti-migrant sentiment, calls for deportations and cancelled asylum statuses, with the Munich attack almost certainly exacerbating pre-existing tensions which will invariably be exploited by the far-right.

On 12 February, US President Donald Trump announced that talks to end the war in Ukraine would begin “immediately”, after a “lengthy” phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The announcement followed US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth telling European allies at a defence summit in Brussels that a return to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders was “unrealistic” and ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine.

Beijing has also reportedly proposed to hold a summit between Putin and Trump to end the war in Ukraine. Trump has stated that he expects to meet Putin in Saudi Arabia, although no date has yet been set.

European leaders and NATO officials have so far reacted with concern, broadly commenting that Europe must be a full participant in any talks, rejecting an imposed peace on Ukraine, and stressing that any peace agreement must be long-lasting with provisions to ensure that the conflict could not easily recommence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Moscow’s strategic objectives in Ukraine are the ceding of Ukrainian territory (including the Donbas, Crimea and the land bridge which connects Crimea to mainland Russia) and permanent Ukrainian neutrality. At the start of the full-scale 2022 invasion, Russian war goals highly likely also included even more maximalist demands including the “denazification” (likely meaning the overthrow of the Kyiv government and the imposition of a rump puppet state in the east) and demilitarisation of Ukraine.

Kyiv’s strategic objectives include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all internationally recognised Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, as well as NATO membership or equivalent security guarantees to deter further Russian aggression.

The Trump administration’s objectives, while less clear, highly likely involve the ending of the Ukraine war as soon as possible (even with significant Ukrainian concessions and only weak security guarantees that are likely inadequate to deter further Russian aggression), the cessation or a significant reduction of US-expenditure on Ukraine, and access to USD 500 billion worth of Ukraine’s rare earth mineral deposits. The latter desire is almost certainly reflective of Trump’s broader agenda of transactional diplomacy.

While Trump stated that Ukraine has “essentially agreed” to hand over the mineral rights, Zelensky has reportedly not yet signed an agreement presented by the US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in Kyiv on 12 February.

It is likely that the Kremlin will actively seek to portray Russia as pursuing peace, while simultaneously escalating military operations in Ukraine to press for its more maximalist demands. Peace talks could serve as a strategic tool for Moscow to sow further division within Ukraine and amongst Ukraine’s allies to reduce military aid to Kyiv.

Nonetheless, with US military aid being a fundamental centre of gravity for Ukraine’s defensive efforts, Trump could force Kyiv to accept terms far short of its strategic objectives. The ceding of the territory south of the Dnipro River between the Donbas and Crimea, in addition to only limited security guarantees, would likely be the most difficult potential peace treaty conditions for Kyiv to accept.

With only limited security guarantees, there would be a substantial threat of Russia recommencing the war to achieve the Kremlin’s even more maximalist objectives after consolidating its position and reconstituting its forces.

Fears regarding the stability of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas have increased following delays in the planned release of Israeli hostages by the Palestinian militants. Israeli officials threatened the restart of hostilities on 10 February, and again on 14 February, putting in place a deadline for the release of further hostages by 15 February. The Hamas delegation in Cairo has stated its willingness to abide by the deadline and has scheduled three hostages to be released on 15 Saturday, but tensions in the Gaza Strip remain high, with occasional Israeli airstrikes reported.

On 12 February, at least one person was killed in an airstrike in Rafah that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated was targeting a weapons-smuggling effort. Hamas had justified the postponement of hostage release due to claimed Israeli violations of the ceasefire.

In Washington, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly reiterated his plan for the Gaza Strip, centred on the resettlements of residents to Jordan and Egypt and a US-led effort to rebuild and “control” the area. The White House’s plan has been widely rejected by regional and global powers. Jordanian King Abdullah rebuked the plan during a summit with Trump in Washington on 11 February, while Egypt’s President al-Sisi postponed a planned visit to the US in protest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent developments likely pose a considerable threat to the viability of the ceasefire. Hamas is highly likely currently facing a dilemma: its leaders likely consider it realistic that Israel will resume hostilities if they relinquish their main source of leverage, the remaining hostages. If they choose to do so, however, they likely assess that Israel is highly likely to use it as a casus belli (cause for war) to again intervene in Gaza.

In this situation, Hamas must almost certainly rely on credible guarantors of the pact to deter further Israeli intervention. Washington is the only power that can achieve this. However, Trump’s recent comments have almost certainly reduced its reliability for this role and therefore make it likelier that Hamas will choose to renege on the agreement.

In addition to threatening the stability of Gaza, recent developments have also threatened the stability of Jordan and Egypt themselves. While ostensibly allied to Washington, both Amman and Cairo have largely pro-Palestinian populations that oppose any plans for the resettlement of Palestinians. Both states are moreover targets for destabilisation operations by regional competitors and transnational extremist groups.

In the (so far, unlikely) case that Trump’s plan was to be implemented, Egypt would find itself bordering a US-controlled territory. This would almost certainly result in a significant increase in anti-US sentiment and likely boost Islamist factions and groups in Egypt. In the Sinai Peninsula, there is a realistic possibility that greater US involvement in neighbouring Gaza would embolden groups like the local branch of the Islamic State (IS-Sinai) to resume their low-intensity insurgency, which al-Sisi declared had ended in 2023.

On 9 February, the junta government in Niger announced the closure of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s operations in the country. The junta has justified the action in response to reports that the ICRC was allegedly not adhering to regulations stipulated by the government. The move follows statements made by the Nigerien authorities in November, which expressed concerns about the European Union’s unilateral distribution of humanitarian aid to NGOs, which included the ICRC. According to the junta, the distribution of aid was ‘in disregard of the principles of transparency and good collaboration.’

On 10 February, Burkina Faso’s junta followed suit, imposing a blanket ban on all NGO activity operating without government permission. The directive follows concerns over security risks regarding unregulated NGO activity.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The decision to ban the Red Cross in Niger and NGOs in Burkina Faso comes at a time when the countries are struggling with dire humanitarian situations caused by conflict with jihadist and separatist groups, as well as increasing international isolation. In Niger, the ICRC has provided medical care, food and other forms of support for decades and is assessed to have directly supported almost 150,000 people between January to June 2024.

In Burkina Faso, NGOs have also played a significant role in addressing humanitarian issues. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) helped over 130,000 individuals in 2023 with education, food security, shelter, protection, and water programs; Caritas Burkina Faso assisted 1.5 million individuals in 2018 with agriculture, emergency assistance, microfinance, food security, and access to social services programs.

These decisions to cease ICRC and NGO operations are likely a move to curb foreign influence and independent voices in both countries. The move comes amid reports that NGOs have been utilised by France to exert influence in the Sahel region. While this is disputed, the perceived historic involvement of Western countries in the Sahel makes it likely to be believed and may increase anti-Western sentiment in the region.

The move is almost certainly part of a wider trend, with the Sahel junta governments limiting the influence of foreign mining companies, militaries, and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This trend has likely grown for several reasons. The juntas likely perceive the operations of foreign organisations, as contributing to the legitimacy of criticisms from hostile groups, including violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and rival factions. More importantly, foreign entities provide oversight of government actions, often documenting and reporting on human rights violations, mismanagement, and the impact of conflict on civilians.

By expelling these groups, the juntas likely hope to diminish external scrutiny of their actions and incompetence. However, the expulsion of NGOs will almost certainly exacerbate humanitarian crises, increase internal scrutiny, and ultimately play into the hands of the VEOs. Extremist groups are likely to exploit the worsening conditions to expand their influence, recruit disaffected individuals, and position themselves as alternative providers of aid and security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has achieved rapid advances in the capital Khartoum, capturing key strongholds previously held by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The SAF is reportedly on the verge of controlling all of northern Khartoum, however, the RSF still maintains control of vital ground such as the Soba Bridge on the River Nile.

The UAE, an alleged backer of the RSF, has called for a Ramadan ceasefire to be observed from 28 February to 30 March. However, Sudan’s Sovereign Council President has rejected talks with the RSF unless they lay down their arms, while army officials have dismissed ceasefire proposals unless the RSF retreats. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aligned with the SAF, has proposed a roadmap to end the civil war, including the formation of a civilian-led government and free elections. The proposal has been submitted to the African Union (AU), the United Nations, and the Arab League for support.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recapturing of Khartoum would serve as a major military and political victory for the SAF. However, the SAF’s advance has been enabled by a heavy use of airstrikes and artillery resulting in high rates of collateral damage. With the SAF advancing, the RSF are likely to withdraw from the east bank of the River Nile and consolidate their forces in the west of the city, with the UAE proposal for a ceasefire providing more time to regroup.

The RSF’s regrouping coupled with their control of vital ground will likely slow the rate of the SAF’s advance and lead to higher rates of civilian casualties and displacement, with the SAF likely to conserve manpower through leveraging long-range fires.

Advances in Khartoum suggest that the SAF has seized the initiative which has likely been enabled by Russian support. On 13 February, Sudan and Russia finalised a long-standing agreement for a Russian naval base at Port Sudan. The base is almost certainly a strategic priority for Russia. Access to Port Sudan will enable Moscow to facilitate operations in Africa and achieve a permanent naval presence on the Red Sea, a critical sea line of communication with two strategic choke points that could be blocked in a time of war.

The capture of Khartoum and increased Russian support will almost certainly set the conditions for an SAF offensive aimed at defeating the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. During such an offensive, the RSF is likely to commit to a fighting withdrawal. This will likely involve indiscriminate attacks on civilians, especially as the SAF has ruled out negotiations, a precedent already set by the RSF.

SAF reprisal attacks on the civilian population are also likely. Reports indicate that activists, human rights defenders, and humanitarian workers are being accused of collaborating with the RSF. Lists have reportedly been circulated, identifying politicians, activists, medical professionals, public prosecutors, and members of protest groups as “partners of the RSF.”

The current civil war in Sudan has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with over 30 million people in need of aid. The establishment of a government in the capital would likely be beneficial for facilitating humanitarian aid into Sudan and its distribution across the country. However, future SAF offensives in western Sudan are likely to exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the short term by disrupting the delivery of aid, damaging vital infrastructure and increasing displacement.

Furthermore, the Trump administration’s 90-day freeze on foreign aid, which may be extended, has already severely impacted Sudan’s humanitarian efforts, leading to the Closure of 742 community kitchens serving over 816,000 people, with USAID providing 75 per cent of the funding. Civilian-led Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), which operate on a volunteer basis, have had to halt operations, leaving millions without access to essential food and medical supplies.

Large-scale clashes which resulted in approximately 100 deaths were recorded on 11 February as Puntland forces advanced deeper into the Cal Miskaad mountain range, where ISS’s main strongholds are located. ISS forces reportedly attacked Puntland forces’ positions using at least 15 person-borne IEDs (PBIEDs) and one vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) on 11 February alone. At least 30 suicide bombings have been reported since the beginning of 2025.

The UAE and US have offered limited support to Puntland units, conducting airstrikes around Dhasaq on 10 February. Puntland sources continue to note the large presence of foreign fighters in ISS units, especially among the perpetrators of suicide bombings. Accounts of ISS’s total manpower vary considerably, from minimum estimates of 400 to maximums of over 1,000 fighters.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The intensification of ISS’s suicide bombings makes the latest campaign reminiscent of larger-scale battles in Mosul and Marawi. In both cases, Islamic State (IS) forces opted to resort to more PBIEDs and VBIEDs to defend vital areas. The recent trends in Cal Miskaad likely reflect the mountain range’s importance for ISS. The large presence of foreigners among ISS units almost certainly showcases the Somali branch’s adoption of tactics used by larger IS branches as well as its close ties to the “core” of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The recent advances by Puntland forces have been successful, with considerable casualties recorded on ISS’s side. Nevertheless, the attrition faced by the attacking force is likely to increase in the short term as Puntland forces continue to advance towards more fortified positions. There is a realistic possibility of a stalemate, with ISS retaining some control in the area and looking for opportunities to reform.

If ISS were to lose Cal Miskaad, the group would highly likely suffer a significant setback, which may have impacts on IS’s global network of branches. ISS, while smaller than other “provinces”, is a key hub for IS’ international flows of funds and fighters, particularly in Africa and the Arab Peninsula.

Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) walks away from coalition talks, deepening crisis

The FPÖ, led by Herbert Kickl, was tasked with forming a government after the centre-right People’s Party (ÖVP) failed to do so. Both major right-wing parties, therefore, have now been unsuccessful in their attempts to form a workable coalition.

President Alexander Van der Bellen now has the option of either calling for new elections or tasking the ÖVP with trying to form a government with the left. In both scenarios, the FPÖ is likely to benefit. Since the 2024 general election, where it finished first with 29 per cent of the votes, the FPÖ has increased its polling to around 35 per cent, meaning that another vote would likely see it increase its numbers in parliament.

On the other hand, the ÖVP has lost considerable public support and is now polling behind the Social Democrats (SPÖ), so, even if it were to form a cordon sanitaire with the left to keep the Freedom Party out of government, it would do so from an extremely weak position and would be exposed to FPÖ’s attacks.

Romania’s president resigns due to significant pressure from opposition

Klaus Iohannis announced his resignation on 11 February amid an impending parliamentary impeachment vote. Senate President Ilie Bolojan has replaced Iohannis and will act as the interim head of state.

Romania is currently undergoing a period of extreme political uncertainty after the second round of the presidential elections in December 2024 was cancelled by the constitutional court over alleged Russian involvement. The first round had unexpectedly been won by Calin Georgescu, a pro-Russia, anti-EU outsider with little political experience.

The unprecedented decision has almost certainly boosted Romania’s anti-establishment parties, particularly the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), which threw its weight behind Georgescu prior to the vote, and SOS Romania, whose leader Diana Sosoaca was barred from running at the elections.

AUR and other populist formations are highly likely to continue pushing for early presidential elections, possibly sooner than the government’s proposed dates in May.

First major blackout in Nigeria in 2025

On 12 February, Nigeria suffered its first major power outage of 2025, after recording 12 consecutive grid collapses in 2024. The Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company reported that the system outage affected all its customers, especially in Lagos, Abuja and Osun due to a line tripping on this axis, which disrupted many businesses and essential services.

The government has implemented several measures to improve the grid, including the privatisation of the power sector and increasing investment in infrastructure. However, inadequate maintenance, corruption, antiquated infrastructure, vandalism and extremist attacks on the grid have hampered major improvements.

Nigerians have expressed their discontent on social media, with historic blackouts fuelling civil unrest and resulting in higher rates of crimes, especially in urban areas when blackouts disrupt lighting and security systems.

Russia claims Ukraine is preparing for false flag attack against vessel in the Baltic Sea

Russia has claimed that Ukraine, with Western support, is preparing a provocation in the Baltic Sea by using Russian-made sea mines to destroy a foreign vessel. The aim, according to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), is to blame Moscow for the explosion, creating a pretext for NATO to intervene and potentially block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which would almost certainly heighten tensions.

This accusation likely serves several strategic purposes.- to sow distrust between NATO and Ukraine, to justify Russia’s own military actions in the Baltic, and to frame Ukraine as an unpredictable actor willing to escalate the conflict. Russia is also likely seeking to undermine peace efforts by portraying Ukraine’s leadership as desperate and willing to provoke further violence rather than seek a resolution.

Russia thwarts Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attack in Pskov

On 13 February, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) stated its agents had discovered and neutralised an ISKP cell planning a large-scale attack on the local train station. Pskov is a medium-sized city located near the Russian border with Estonia and far from ISKP’s Caucasus recruitment hotspots like Dagestan or Chechnya.

The discovery of an ISKP cell in Pskov is likely reflective of the group’s increasing focus on Russia as a desirable target. ISKP leaders almost certainly assess that the war in Ukraine has made Russia vulnerable to attack. Further ISKP operations in Russia remain highly likely and these will likely include both lone-wolf attacks, but also group-level, more sophisticated actions.

Stabbing in Dublin, Ireland, injures three

Multiple stabbing attacks occurred at several locations in north Dublin on 8 February. Authorities arrested one man, a Brazilian citizen, for allegedly carrying out the attack. As of the time of writing, no motive for the attack has been revealed. Due to the suspect’s migrant background, there is a realistic possibility that retaliatory violence and protests will occur in the short term in Dublin and other Irish cities. Mass riots have occurred in the capital following similar incidents involving migrants, or Irish citizens descended from migrants, most notably in November 2023 following a stabbing incident.

Grenade attack in Grenoble, France, injures 12

The incident occurred on the evening of 12 February at a bar near the Olympic Village quarter. Authorities have excluded a terrorism-related motive for the attack and have instead tentatively linked it to a “settling of scores”. Grenoble is near Marseilles, close to the Italian border, and is a hub for organised crime linked to drug trafficking, especially cocaine, in France. Violence associated with drug trafficking has increased significantly since the summer of 2024, following police operations and inter-group fighting that have created opportunities for violent competition between local groups.

Fitness influencer arrested in Spain for spreading Islamic State (IS) propaganda

The individual reportedly used his social media presence to spread IS content, often mixed with otherwise harmless workout and fitness material, to more than 100,000 followers across different social media platforms. The case likely illustrates a trend already seen in other cases of radicalisation and extremism of extremists’ efforts to “hijack” online communities and to weaponise them as tools to encourage violence and terrorist activity.

Major anti-Mafia operation in Palermo, Sicily

Italian authorities arrested 183 people during a large-scale raid on 10-11 February, which reportedly involved over 1,200 Carabinieri (Italy’s gendarmerie). Most of the arrested are accused of collaborating with Cosa Nostra, the Italian mafia in Sicily.

According to Italian media, the raid led to the discovery of Cosa Nostra operatives’ use of increasingly sophisticated logistics and communications, including encrypted messaging channels and sophisticated equipment. Those arrested include both older leaders and a large number of younger members of local mafia groups, almost certainly showcasing how organised crime in Sicily continues to recruit from younger and more disadvantaged demographics.

Compared to other “mafias” in Italy, such as the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta and the Campania-based Camorra, Cosa Nostra has been on the back foot for years due to multiple large-scale anti-crime operations and has shifted to “less visible” sectors like online gambling. The latest raid is likely to further weaken the organisation.

Small Yemeni-flagged fishing boats seized off the coast of Eyl, Somalia

On 9 February, a suspected pirate attack occurred against a Yemeni-flagged dhow off the coast of Eyl in northern Puntland. While the incident is still under investigation, a separate report indicates that suspects may have hijacked three small boats.

Hijacking small boats including skiffs and dhows is a tactic utilised by well-armed pirate groups to travel deeper into the Indian Ocean and target larger vessels. Most piracy in Somalia stems from Puntland, where economic opportunities are scarce, and Somali security forces are combatting the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab.

The large-scale clashes between Puntland forces and ISS in recent weeks have highly likely provided a vacuum for armed piracy groups to resume operations. The increase in counter-insurgency operations will highly likely enable local fishermen to carry out further attacks and hijackings on vessels.

Ebola cases continue to rise in Uganda

As of 14 February, the number of confirmed Ebola cases has risen to nine, with one confirmed death, since Uganda declared an outbreak of the disease in late January. Seven cases are being treated in Kampala and one in Mbale.

265 people who have been identified as having contact with the confirmed cases have been quarantined. Given that Ebola symptoms can take up to 21 days to appear, more confirmed cases will likely be announced in the coming weeks.

This latest outbreak is driven by the Sudan strain of Ebola, which has no approved vaccine. While there are currently approximately 2,400 vaccines in Uganda, they are for the Zaire strain behind outbreaks in the DRC. Furthermore, communication deficiencies from authorities and resistance from businesses have made tackling the outbreak more challenging.

On 11 February, an ISKP militant detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) in front of a bank in Kunduz, where a large crowd of civilians and the Taliban were gathered waiting for their salary distribution. The blast killed the attacker, with reports varying on the number of other fatalities, ranging from five to over 25. In March 2024, ISKP carried out a suicide bombing with the same methodology in Kandahar.

On 12 February, reports emerged that ISKP attempted another suicide bombing, this time in Kabul, but that the attack was thwarted by local security.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is the second notable ISKP operation in the north of Afghanistan in recent weeks, the other being the (disputed) assassination of a Chinese citizen in Takhar, a region that borders Kunduz Province to the east. ISKP’s primary area of operations has traditionally been within Kabul and the eastern provinces like Kunar and Nangarhar. The attack therefore highly likely demonstrates ISKP’s improving reach, and how the group increasingly sees the north as a key area where to expand its presence.

Tajikistan, while not having had any recent large-scale terror attacks, has a growing domestic extremism problem. Factors including a lagging economy, combined with an extremely authoritarian government that has sought to neutralise and control religious institutions, have almost certainly created an environment that is extremely receptive to pro-IS radical propaganda. The border area with Tajikistan, which is poorly policed, remains a key entry point for foreign fighters seeking to join ISKP in Afghanistan.

With the Taliban preoccupied with cross-border tensions, as well as domestic rebel groups, ISKP is likely exploiting a weaker Taliban in peripheral regions.

In political terms, the choice of target likely also matters. ISKP propaganda accuses the Taliban government of being propped up by Western funds, which makes banks symbols of both Taliban rule and Western intervention.

The attack in Kabul is likely to undermine the Taliban’s ongoing assertion that they have defeated ISKP. There is a realistic possibility of further ISKP operations in the north in the medium term. More broadly, ISKP is highly likely to continue taking advantage of an overstretched Taliban, carrying out opportunistic attacks on civilians and Taliban forces to undermine Kabul’s tenuous hold on power.

UN suggests former Bangladeshi government complicit in crimes against humanity

A report by UN human rights investigators has accused the former Awami League government under ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of being complicit in crimes against humanity. The report indicates that the government’s brutal response to the student-led protests in 2024, which killed an assessed 1400 people, involved “an official policy to attack and violently repress anti-government protesters”.

The report also suggests that senior members of the government, including Hasina, were aware of and involved in serious offences. The report is likely to validate many of the narratives pushed by opposition groups, who have long accused the former government of authoritarianism, repression, and human rights abuses.

There is a realistic possibility that this will result in unrest and political violence targeting Awami League supporters, government-affiliated institutions, and religious minorities such as Hindus, who have historically been associated with the party.

South Korean president to face insurrection charges

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol will face his first preliminary hearing on 20 February on insurrection charges, while impeachment proceedings against him continue. His impeachment followed a failed attempt to declare martial law in December 2024, with the legislature removing him for constitutional violations. In January, he was arrested on separate criminal charges of insurrection.

The Constitutional Court is overseeing the impeachment process, while the Seoul Central District Court is handling the criminal trial. Impeachment proceedings are progressing rapidly, with some legal experts anticipating a verdict by mid-March.

However, Yoon’s legal team may seek to pause the impeachment by invoking a constitutional act due to the parallel criminal trial. The trial against Yoon will likely provoke several protests, with thousands of demonstrators continuing to rally across South Korea, both in support of and against the president.

First US Navy ship transits Taiwan Strait under Trump administration

On 10 February, the USS Ralph Johnson, a guided-missile destroyer, and the USNS Bowditch, a survey ship, conducted a north-to-south transit through the Taiwan Strait. The transit marks the first US Navy passing of the Taiwan Strait since President Trump assumed office in January and likely served as a strategic message to Beijing, stressing the US’ right to exercise the freedom of navigation and its sustained support for Taipei.

China’s Eastern Theatre Command stated that it had monitored the passage and criticised the US action for sending “the wrong signals” and increasing “security risks in the region.

Almost 200 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) detected in western India

As of 12 February, at least 197 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) have been detected in the Indian state of Maharashtra, with the outbreak concentrated within the Pune region. The death toll is currently assessed at eight, with the first death in Mumbai recorded on 12 February.

GBS is a rare neurological disorder which affects the nervous system, leading to muscle weakness, numbness, and, in severe cases, paralysis. The disease can affect all people but typically follows a viral or bacterial infection. The death rate is generally low (3-7 per cent), however, in severe cases, complications such as respiratory failure, infections, or blood clots can be fatal. Authorities in the region have advised the public to drink boiled water and avoid the consumption of stale or undercooked food.

Island-wide power outage in Sri Lanka

On 9 February 2025, Sri Lanka experienced a nationwide power outage after a monkey came into contact with power lines at a substation in Panadura. The blackout caused widespread disruptions, including railway gate and warning system malfunctions, and the government issued an advisory urging water conservation.

Power was restored to most of the country within hours, however, the authorities had to introduce load-shedding on 10 and 11 February. However, the incident has almost certainly triggered major concerns over the vulnerability of Sri Lanka’s power grid to external disruptions and highlights a major lack of investment in the nation’s infrastructure.

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Key Topics at CSO 360 Americas

At approximately 10:30 (local time), a car ramming occurred in the centre of the Bavarian city of Munich, at the intersection of Dachauer Strasse and Seidlstrasse.

According to witnesses, an individual drove a vehicle into a crowd of members of the Verdi labour union, who had gathered for a rally in the Königsplatz area. Other witnesses reportedly stated they heard some gunshots, but these testimonies could not be corroborated by authorities at the time of writing.

At least 28 people were injured in the attack, with “several” in critical condition. No deaths have been reported as of the time of writing.

The police arrested the perpetrator on the scene. According to local German media, the suspect is a 24-year-old Afghan national, who was known to local police for previous non-terror-related offences. Available information suggests that the perpetrator of the attack acted alone.

While the police blocked traffic in the area immediately adjacent to the site of the ramming, no reports of widespread traffic closures or disruptions were identified as of the time of writing. The Munich Security Conference, which will be attended by numerous world leaders and high-profile figures, is scheduled to be held in the centre of the city between 14 and 16 February

Mexico’s deployment of 10,000 troops to its northern border is almost certainly a reaction to the US tariff threat. There is a realistic possibility that Mexico’s actions will escalate tensions with the well-armed cartels.

There is a realistic possibility that Argentina’s designation of a radical Mapuche group as a terrorist organisation could escalate tensions resulting in more attacks on state and corporate interests.

The deadliest shooting in Swedish history, which occurred in the town of Orebro, is likely a case of lone-wolf terrorism inspired by far-right ideology. Further attacks remain possible as more information is released.

Russian intelligence’s alleged sponsoring of a sabotage campaign targeting private vehicles in Germany is likely part of a broader attempt to polarise society and influence the upcoming elections.

A new Russo-Belarusian security pact will almost certainly be ratified by Russia’s parliament, and will likely significantly increase the threat of Belarus joining the war against Ukraine.

Turkey’s proposed involvement in counter-ISIS operations in Syria is likely a pretext to expand its operations against the SDF and Kurdish people in anticipation of a US withdrawal. 

Iran’s rapid advancement of its nuclear weapons programme is almost certainly a response to the degradation of its conventional deterrents and a development that could decrease regional stability.

Record-breaking levels of snowfall in northern Japan will almost certainly continue to impact daily life and result in severe transport disruptions.

The ambushing of Pakistani troops by Baloch separatists is likely indicative of overstretched security services and a rapidly deteriorating security situation.

This is the paragraph. Paste as uOn 3 February, the White House announced that it would pause the imposition of planned 25 per cent tariffs on Mexican goods after reaching a deal on the US-Mexico border. The deal calls for the deployment of at least 10,000 Mexican soldiers to the border, in efforts to stop cross-border flows of migrants, as well as smuggling of narcotics and firearms.

The deal occurs at a time of growing violence at the border. On 3 February, multiple gun battles occurred in the Mexican border city of Nuevo Laredo following the arrest of a local cartel leader, which resulted in the US consulate and airport briefly pausing operations. In the past weeks, there have been multiple cases of US border patrol officers exchanging fire with suspected cartel members near the border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The deployment of 10,000 troops is almost certainly a reaction to Trump’s economic coercion, and will highly likely have some impact on Mexico’s overall approach to combating organised crime in the country.

President Claudia Sheinbaum was elected on a platform similar to that of her predecessor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), which called for a “hugs not bullets” strategy for the cartel problem. This approach emphasised improving economic opportunity and reducing social issues in at-risk regions, rather than directly attacking the cartels. AMLO had remained a staunch supporter of this policy despite Washington’s appeals to change course.

Sheinbaum has, instead, gradually signalled a willingness to take a tougher line, also because of a significant reported increase in the number of murders and kidnappings during the president’s first months in power.

However, even if the deployment of 10,000 troops has an important political value, and has successfully paused the threat of US sanctions, it will not necessarily alter the situation at the border. The protracted threat of US economic sanctions will almost certainly force Mexico City to take measures to ensure an increase in narcotics and weapons seizures. This may result in an increase in clashes with local cartel units.

If the threat of government measures becomes unacceptable for the cartels, it could result in escalating violence targeting civil sector workers and politicians. Mexican cartels can in some cases match the firepower of state security forces, and recent trends highlight a growing militarisation of their units. For instance, cartels are increasingly producing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and deploying them via drones, using tactics that match those by armed militias and rebel groups in conflicts such as those in Myanmar and Syria. In states like Michoacan and Jalisco, cartels like the Jalisco Nueva Generation (CJNG) have systematically deployed drone-dropped IEDs to attack police forces and buildings.

ThOn 4 February, Argentine National Security Minister Patricia Bullrich stated that she would designate an indigenous Mapuche group a “terrorist organisation” in response to the group allegedly starting numerous intentional fires in the Patagonia region.

The announcement follows a local media report in which the leader of the Mapuche Ancestral Resistance (RAM), Facundo Jones Huala, declared that sabotage is a legitimate form of struggle for the Mapuche people and claimed responsibility for several arson attacks in the Chubut region, at a time when Argentina is struggling with a series of wildfires, many of which are suspected to be deliberate. Huala also reportedly denied the existence of the Argentine state and called for an armed struggle against the Milei government.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Mapuche are an Indigenous people of South America, primarily living in Chile and Argentina, particularly in the regions of Araucanía, Los Ríos, and parts of Patagonia. Mapuche groups have raised long-standing demands for the return of their ancestral lands from the state or private companies. These demands typically take the form of political activism.

However, in the last two decades, elements of the Mapuche movement have become far more militant. In Chile, the Mapuche have been waging a renewed war against the government since the 1990s after Chile’s return to democracy.  The Mapuche conflict in Chile has entailed arson attacks, sabotage and violent clashes with the Chilean police and military.

In response, Santiago has deployed military forces and special police units to suppress Mapuche groups and has used counterterrorism laws from the Pinochet era to detain key Mapuche figures.

In Argentina, there is a realistic possibility that the declaration of RAM as a terrorist organisation could energise the Mapuche movement and exacerbate tensions with the indigenous community. RAM only emerged in the early 2000s and is likely still in its infancy.

The use of counterterrorism laws, potential human rights violations, freezing of assets, expanded surveillance and a potential increased military presence in Patagonia could easily work in favour of RAM, enabling it to recruit more from an increasingly alienated Mapuche community. If mismanaged, the Mapuche movement in Argentina may adopt a more militant character, as observed in neighbouring Chile.

This could include arson attacks, sabotage against critical infrastructure, and destruction of forestry plantations, agricultural estates and even native forests, which the Mapuche have been known to target as a symbolic act against state and corporate interests.

Trump sanctions International Criminal Court (ICC)

On 6 February, President Trump signed an executive order to authorise economic and travel sanctions targeting ICC staff and family members, if they are determined to be involved in investigations or prosecutions targeting US citizens or allies, namely Israel. The move has been condemned by the organisation, of which the US is not a member.

The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, alongside a leader of Hamas, in November 2024. Trump condemned the simultaneous issuing of these arrest warrants as immoral and baseless, suggesting that the Israeli PM should not be held in the same regard as the leader of the militant group. The ICC has stated that the sanctions are likely to undermine its work.

The decision follows the renewal of US aid packages for Israel and Trump’s controversial comments over US control of Gaza. The convergence of these developments is likely to galvanise pro-Palestinian demonstrations across the globe, viewing it as an endorsement of the Netanyahu administration’s handling of the Gaza conflict, who may seek to organise protests outside US embassies, Trump-owned businesses or other locations associated with US interests could also be targeted.

Greenland tries to “Trump-proof” itself

The government of Greenland has passed a series of measures designed to reduce the likelihood of foreign influence on its internal affairs while simultaneously calling for cross-parliamentary unity. On 5 February, Prime Minister Mute Egede called for snap elections, which would be held on 11 March, likely in the hope of giving his independentist party a stronger mandate to negotiate with Copenhagen and Washington. Coinciding with the call for new elections, the Greenlandic parliament passed laws to ban anonymous foreign contributions to electoral campaigns, as well as legislation to restrict the purchase of land to Greenlandic and Danish citizens and long-term residents only.  

Argentines protest President Javier Milei’s Davos speech

Thousands of protesters gathered in central Buenos Aires on 2 February in response to the president’s remarks. During his speech at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, Milei rallied against “wokeism” and described a global struggle between free market capitalist and socialist forces, also praising US President Donald Trump and his billionaire ally Elon Musk.

Milei has repeatedly used international summits and events as opportunities to build positive relations with key right-wing leaders, particularly those in Washington and in European countries led by the right, such as Italy. It is likely that Milei adapted the speech’s rhetoric, which is directly borrowed from the American right’s domestic political messaging, to accompany Trump’s own speech at Davos, the first since he returned to the White House. A self-proclaimed “anarcho-capitalist”, Milei has often espoused conservative social rhetoric, despite it being ideologically contradictory to libertarian principles. On 5 February, the Milei administration announced that it, like the US, would also withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), a further development that is likely to energise unrest in Argentina.

US aid freeze threatens UN-backed mission in Haiti

The Trump administration has notified the United Nations that it is freezing some of the funding allocated to the Kenyan-led international task force in Haiti. The US has been the largest contributor to the UN-backed mission, which was launched in 2024 and was already struggling with funding. The aid freeze will present a major threat to the success of the mission and could shape the conditions for the gangs to assume almost full control of the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, where they already control an assessed 85 per cent. Criminal gangs are likely to be emboldened by this development and will likely respond with increased attacks on Haitian and international forces. In recent days, the Viv Ansanm gang coalition has been going door-to-door in one of the capital’s more prosperous neighbourhoods, attempting to target the country’s elite while indiscriminately killing civilians.

ELN warns Colombian government that it will not surrender

After launching an offensive against rival non-state groups in Colombia, which resulted in the deployment of government troops to the regions affected, the National Liberation Army (ELN) has vowed that it will never accept submission or surrender. The statement follows weeks of increased violence in the conflict-ridden parts of Norte de Santander and a gesture from President Petro which involved him pointing at an ELN base displayed on classified satellite-derived imagery. The gesture, which was accompanied by verbal threats, almost certainly indicates a major shift in the Petro administration’s policy of “total peace” and the championing of dialogue. The renewed conflict is likely to trigger a wave of attacks across Colombia, The ELN has a major presence in multiple departments of Colombia, especially in the border region, and is likely to stage attacks against the government, rival guerilla groups, organised crime groups and even the civilian population.

Ecuador to close borders and militarise ports of entry during election

President Daniel Noboa of Ecuador has ordered the closure of all borders between 8-10 February during the country’s presidential election. Noboa also ordered the immediate militarisation of all ports of entry in Ecuador and an increased military presence on the border. The orders have purportedly been issued in response to intelligence indicating that “narco-terrorists” are preparing to destabilise the country during the election, with regional cartels likely seeking to undermine Noboa after his administration introduced measures like those introduced by President Bukele of El Salvador, including mass detentions, states of emergency and increased security patrols.

Flooding in Recife, Brazil, threatens at-risk communities and informal settlements

Heavy rain, which started on 3 February, has resulted in local authorities issuing a maximum alert level on 4 February. According to the Pernambuco Water and Climate Agency (APAC), more than 110 mm of rain fell on parts of Recife in 12 hours. At least one person has been killed due to the severe weather event. Local schools closed and widespread traffic disruptions were recorded due to the floods. The risk of flooding in Recife is particularly high in informal settlements, or favelas. There are an estimated 295 favelas in Recife, where 360,000 people live, or approximately 24 per cent of the population. These are often located on hillsides, with poor drainage infrastructure, meaning that floods can result in buildings collapsing and severe mudslides affecting thousands of residents. The cramped layout of the settlements also makes evacuation and search and rescue operations extremely difficult.

On 4 February, a gunman opened fire inside an adult education centre in the Swedish town of Orebro, located approximately 200 kilometres from Stockholm, killing 11 people. The perpetrator, who was found dead at the scene, was a 35-year-old Swedish national with no criminal history who had reportedly previously been a student at the school. The shooting is the deadliest in Sweden’s history and has sparked a debate over Sweden’s gun laws.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Swedish authorities have not released a possible motive for the attack but have not ruled out the possibility of an ideological motive. There are multiple elements, however, that the shooting in Orebro shares with recent cases of lone actor terrorism.

First, the shooting occurred at a school that primarily caters to migrants. Second, it follows the high-visibility case of an Iraqi, Sweden-based anti-Islam activist, who was recently killed on the eve of his trial. Third, the perpetrator reportedly changed into a “military uniform” prior to carrying out the shooting, according to witnesses. It is notable, here, that multiple perpetrators of far-right terrorist actions, including the Christchurch and Buffalo shooter, as well as the more recent perpetrator of the Eskisehir mosque stabbing attack, wore makeshift “uniforms”. Fourth, elements of the shooter’s profile resemble those of other “lone wolves”, including a history of social isolation. Finally, testimonies (and possible audio) exist of the shooter reportedly shouting anti-migrant slogans during the attack, although, as of the time of writing, these remain unverified by Swedish authorities.

These elements, taken together, make it likely that the shooting was a case of far-right and identitarian extremist violence, similar to other notable cases of lone wolf terror attacks. There is a realistic possibility of copycat attacks, as well as retaliatory violence, as more information regarding the shooting is released.

On 5 February, Der Spiegel released a report claiming that Russian intelligence hired German residents to carry out a deliberate sabotage operation targeting private vehicles in December. According to the report, more than 270 cars were found to have been damaged in Berlin, Brandenburg, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg by having sealant foam sprayed in their exhausts. The vehicles were also tagged with stickers promoting the German Green Party. German authorities reportedly arrested three German residents from Serbia and Bosnia, who confessed to having been recruited by Russian intelligence via the messenger app “Viber”, with the promise of EUR 100 for each sabotaged car.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The operation is almost certainly a clear example of Russian intelligence’s use of “disposable” local agents for unsophisticated acts meant to sow confusion and disruption in target societies. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has established a de facto “gig economy” for sabotage across Europe. Russian sympathisers or people hostile to the state in which they live are identified online, often through social media analysis. Russian intelligence can then recruit them through a decentralised online network, utilising applications such as Viber. Disenfranchised individuals, often those with far-right tendencies, are then recruited to conduct acts like sabotage and arson at the behest of the Kremlin in exchange for remuneration via secure online payments of cryptocurrencies. These acts are then often conducted in a manner that seeks to attribute blame to another group. This strategy has provided Moscow with a low-cost and highly deniable method of disrupting or undermining target countries, without risking its intelligence operatives and demanding only minimal organisation.

Russia’s objective in orchestrating this sabotage campaign is likely to destabilise the German political landscape by sowing confusion and influencing the upcoming 23 February elections. The Greens are currently polling at 13 per cent, and their vote share may become fundamental in shaping a possible government coalition in an increasingly fractured German electorate. The aim was likely to tarnish the image of environmentalists and Green supporters by emulating acts that the more extreme elements of these groups have done before, such as sabotage of a Tesla gigafactory and vandalism of electric cars. If successfully attributed to the green movement, this could gain traction with the German far-right and continue to polarise the country. The destabilising effect of this one operation is likely to be limited. However, the aggregate effect of multiple Russian influence operations in both the physical and virtual world that have yet to be exposed in the open-source domain, is likely far more significant and likely to increase as the federal elections approach.

On 5 February, a security pact between Russia and Belarus was presented to the Russian parliament (the Duma) for ratification. The pact, that was signed between Minsk and Moscow on 6 December 2024, has three key stipulations: The inclusion of Belarus under Russia’s protective ‘nuclear umbrella’ (meaning Russia will hypothetically use nuclear weapons to protect Belarus against external aggression), allowing the deployment of Russian military bases on Belarusian territory, and according to an independent Belarusian media outlet, the potential recruitment of Belarusian citizens to fight against Ukraine so as to defend “Russia’s territorial integrity”. Additionally, on 3 February, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced the start of ‘combat readiness checks’. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (SBGS) stated that while underway, the combat readiness checks do “not pose any threat to Ukraine” as no movement of equipment, personnel or strike formations along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border has been detected.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The treaty has been given priority status by the Duma, and will almost certainly be ratified. Having won every presidential election since 1994, the president of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko won yet again another election on 26 January in a political system that is almost certainly highly undemocratic (Belarus has a low performance across all of the Global State of Democracy Initiative’s categories). Russia and Belarus have de jure been in a Union State since 1999, although de facto maintain independence from one another – the new security pact’s initial signing coincided with the 25^th anniversary of the Treaty on the Creation of the Union State.

While Belarusian armed forces have not as of yet taken part in the war against Ukraine, the Kremlin used Belarus as a staging post for an offensive against Kyiv in the initial stages of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While this offensive was successfully repelled, it is almost certain that the Ukrainian military establishment has significant concerns about the threat posed by any further offensive from Belarus, enabled by the involvement of Belarusian armed forces. Such an offensive would likely severely overstretch Ukrainian forces, whose main efforts are currently the defence of the eastern front and holding the Kursk salient in internationally recognised Russia. Russia struggles with manpower shortages of its own, with North Korean troops being withdrawn from the front lines in the Kursk salient due to considerable casualty rates, so the potential addition of Belarusian troops is almost certainly highly desirable for the Kremlin. On 5 February, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned in a news conference with the UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Russia will deploy further forces on Belarusian territory later this year and that the Kremlin will “pull Belarus into the war”. Lukashenko’s position in Belarus is highly likely more fragile than Putin’s in Russia, and while Lukashenko has endeavoured to limit Belarus’ involvement in the war thus far, the inclusion of Belarus into Russia’s nuclear protection zone would likely significantly increase the chances of their direct involvement, especially if Russia has made guarantees to protect the Lukashenko regime domestically.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has stated that Turkey will join forces with Syria, Iraq and Jordan to combat the remnants of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also suggested that Turkish operations would allow the US to sever its ties with Kurdish militants in Syria, a relationship that Ankara strongly opposes. Fidan also stated that the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), which form the spearhead of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), had only been guarding ISIS detainees in SDF-run prisons and have contributed little else to counter the resurgent threat of ISIS. Ankara has also reiterated its view that the SDF should be absorbed into the new conventional Syrian military.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Turkey has long opposed the SDF, which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey and its allies. Turkey is also currently engaged in an offensive against the SDF in northern Syria, backed by its proxy force the Syrian National Army (SNA). Ankara is likely concerned that the SDF’s influence in Syria could bolster or embolden separatist movements within Turkey, threatening its national security. There is a realistic possibility that Turkey is using anti-ISIS operations as a pretext to increase its force posture in Syria, with its true objective being the suppression of Kurdish forces and the consolidation of control over key areas in northern Syria close to Turkey. In parallel, Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are currently discussing a potential defence pact that could result in Syrian forces being trained by Turkey and the establishment of Turkish airbases in central Syria. If agreed, Turkey will benefit from Iran’s loss of influence in Syria, be in a much stronger position to project strength into the Middle East and will be in a stronger position to counter Kurdish forces in Syria.

Using anti-ISIS operations as a pretext would likely appeal to the Trump administration. Trump has suggested that the US may entirely withdraw from Syria, where CENTCOM currently has approximately 2,000 troops to counter ISIS. Turkish involvement in a regional counter-ISIS coalition would likely be endorsed by Trump and help him facilitate a US withdrawal. However, ISIS has already demonstrated the early signs of a resurgence, with increased and more brazen attacks. If Turkey’s true goal is to suppress Kurdish forces under the cover of anti-ISIS operations while the US withdraws from both Iraq and Syria, it could inadvertently create an opportunity for ISIS to regroup. Ultimately, increased Turkish military presence in Syria could pressure the SDF into disbanding as a military organisation and integrating into the new Syrian forces, a shift that would weaken Kurdish forces in Syria, align with Turkey’s objectives, and simultaneously avoid alienating the SDF’s Western backers..

Reports indicate that Iran is expediting its development of a nuclear weapon, which could potentially enable it to acquire the capability in a matter of months. A secret team of engineers and scientists purportedly linked to the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (SPND), has been involved in the process, an organisation that was pivotal in Iranian nuclear weapons research before 2003. This approach could shorten the time required to convert weapons-grade uranium (enriched to 90 per cent) into a nuclear weapon. The report states that Iran currently holds uranium enriched to approximately 60 per cent, considered near weapons-grade.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As a result of the conflict in the Middle East, Iran has been left considerably weakened and lacks an effective deterrent. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has effectively defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip, significantly degraded Hezbollah in Lebanon and demonstrated its capability to strike Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The IDF also demonstrated its capability to strike deep within Iran, whilst also degrading much of Iran’s strategic air defence and ability to produce ballistic missiles. Furthermore, Tehran has lost a key ally in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. This development has also fractured part of Iran’s Shia Crescent, disrupting ground lines of communication to Hezbollah, which was its main deterrent against Israel. With its conventional deterrence severely diminished, Tehran has likely calculated that its only viable option is to pursue a nuclear deterrent, which may lead to the Supreme Leader revoking his fatwa on nuclear weapons. Such a development is likely to raise the chances of escalation between Iran and not just Israel, but also the Gulf States, potentially triggering an arms race in the Middle East.

However, US officials have stated that Iran’s new approach to developing a nuclear bomb would only enable it to build an older-style nuclear weapon, commenting that such a warhead would not fit on a ballistic missile and be far less reliable than a modern nuclear weapon.  This limits Iran’s ability to deploy such a weapon, with aerial delivery the most likely method. However, Israel and the Gulf States possess superior air and air defence capabilities, which are likely sufficient to intercept Iranian aircraft before they reach their intended targets. The main advantage of the new process is that it would significantly reduce the time that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have to detect Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear bomb, which could provide Iran with a window to strike before the development of the capability is widely known.

The Trump administration has expressed that it will reinstate “maximum pressure” on Iran, specifically threatening Iranian oil exports. Trump has also expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations, but his primary objective is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Renewed sanctions will almost certainly exacerbate Iran’s already fragile economy, which is characterised by deep-rooted structural issues including mismanagement, corruption, nepotism, limited diversification, inflation, and high unemployment. Iran may be seeking to develop nuclear weapons for strategic leverage, viewing them as a means to enhance its deterrence and strengthen its position in any future negotiations. However, such a strategy may backfire if it provokes an aggressive response from an unpredictable White House, leading to further economic degradation. Such a scenario would likely intensify the pressure on the Iranian regime, potentially triggering greater anti-regime social unrest within the country. Alternatively or additionally, the ‘moderate’ president Masoud Pezeshkian was elected on a mandate to tackle the economic crisis by reducing sanctions. If Pezeshkian fails to do this, there is a realistic possibility of a radical backlash against his more moderate foreign policy posture, empowering the more hawkish anti-West military and theocratic establishment.

Far-right activists protest in London

At least six people were arrested on 1 February, during large-scale protests in central London by supporters of far-right figure Tommy Robinson. Robinson is currently serving an 18-month jail sentence for breaching a 2021 High Court injunction. Isolated clashes were reported as protesters entered the designated area for counter-protesters. The protests follow broader signals of a growing popularity of the far-right in UK politics, with early February polls projecting Nigel Farage’s Reform Party as the most popular party in the UK, having overtaken both the Conservatives and the ruling Labour Party. Farage and Reform have disavowed Robinson and his supporters to win Conservative Party voters; however, both sides have adopted similar political discourses and have received common endorsements. Most notably, Elon Musk endorsed and has reposted Reform with some regularity since mid-2024, only to then call on Farage to step down as party leader following the latter’s disavowal of Robinson. In turn, Musk then demanded Robinson’s release.

Protests against Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and Alternative for Germany (AfD)

An estimated 50,000 people gathered in Vienna after the FPO was formally tasked with trying to form a government with the conservative People’s Party (OVP). While the FPO and OVP have previously been government partners, the FPO’s victory at the past elections makes it almost certain that if a deal were to be reached the far-right party would occupy a senior position in the coalition. The possible FPO-OVP deal follows the collapse of previous OVP-led talks with other “cordon sanitaire” parties, and has been under negotiation since early January. The latest wave of protests has likely been influenced by developments over the border in Germany, where tens of thousands of protesters continue to oppose the rising Alternative for Germany (AfD). On 3 February, an estimated 160,000 people rallied in Berlin in protest of a migration reform advanced by the Christian Democrats (CSU/CDU) with the AfD’s votes. While the bill failed to pass, further protests are likely to occur before the elections scheduled for 23 February.

Kosovo to hold parliamentary elections on 9 February

Kosovo’s parliamentary elections on 9 February will see 27 political groups competing for 120 available seats, with 20 reserved for minority representatives, including Serbs, Bosniaks, Turkish and Roma communities. However, tensions remain high between the central government and the Serb-majority communities in northern Kosovo, after Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s attempts to dismantle Serb-run parallel institutions. A victory for Kurti and his Self-Determination Movement party is likely to increase tensions with both Kosovo’s Serb communities and with neighbouring Serbia, potentially leading to unrest in the north of the country.

Uganda’s president to continue to prosecute civilians in military tribunals despite court ruling

On 1 February, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni declared that the government would continue to prosecute civilians in military tribunals. The declaration comes after a court ruling banned the practice on 31 January, declaring it unconstitutional, and ordering ongoing cases to be continued in civil courts. Museveni claims to be reluctant to abandon military tribunals given their use in pacifying Uganda’s restive northeastern Karamoja region. Uganda’s military courts have tried hundreds of civilians including opposition politicians and government critics. Kizza Besigye, the opposition leader, is facing the death penalty after being abducted in Kenya in November 2024 and tried in a military tribunal in Kampala. Museveni’s reluctance to shift power over to civil courts is almost certainly to retain a hold on power and prevent formal opposition blocs from forming. There is a realistic possibility that Museveni’s refusal to adhere to the court ruling will be used as a catalyst for unrest targeting perceived government corruption.

Azerbaijani forces carry out anti-Islamic State (IS) operation in Qusar

The raid’s target is the same northeastern district where an IS cell was discovered “by accident” in the late summer of 2024. At least eight IS fighters were reportedly killed. The operation is part of growing efforts by Baku to disrupt the Islamic State Caucasus Province (ISCP) from establishing a foothold in the country. IS’ operations in Azerbaijan are likely part of IS’ broader drive to improve its position in the Caucasus, especially in Dagestan, which Qusar borders. Azerbaijani reports identified the fighters as “Forest Brothers”. This term indicates members of the Dagestan-based Derbent Jamaat group, and may highlight a growing interplay between pre-existent Islamist groups in the area and IS (although, it may be a political move by Baku to avoid recognising the existence of IS on its territory). It is highly likely that the operation in Qusar will be followed by further counterterrorism efforts in the north. Given the strain of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russian forces are increasingly vulnerable to threats from IS. There is a realistic possibility that Moscow will pursue joint counterterrorism operations with Baku to combat the transregional terror group.

The US conducts airstrikes conducted on Islamic State Somalia (ISS)

The airstrikes took place in the Puntland region of Somalia, where security forces have been battling a jihadist insurgency since 2015. Sanctioned by President Donald Trump, the strikes targeted cave systems used by ISS militants and reportedly killed multiple jihadists, including senior leadership. After the strike, Trump took to Truth Social, stating ‘The message to ISIS and all others who would attack Americans is that ‘WE WILL FIND YOU, AND WE WILL KILL YOU!’ Occurring shortly after Trump’s inauguration, this is almost certainly a statement of intent for the administration after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appealed to Trump to not pull advisors from Somalia. While Trump has generally opposed direct US military involvement in conflicts, he has typically relied on airstrikes as a tool for counterterrorism, increasing their number significantly during his first administration. He will almost certainly utilise similar tactics during this administration as he seeks to withdraw US personnel from Syria.

Somali Puntland forces strike IS positions

Counterterrorism forces of the Somali breakaway region of Puntland have launched an operation targeting strongholds of the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) in the al-Miskaad mountain range. Puntland sources reported the killing of at least 57 ISS members in the operation, which likely constitutes a major escalation in the conflict against ISS. Coinciding with the operation, US airstrikes and joint US-UAE aerial surveillance operations were reported, likely indicating Washington’s growing concern for Somalia as a staging ground for IS operations. ISS has long been considered a “small” branch of IS. However, ISS has disproportionately grown in importance as a key transit hub for IS operations in the Middle East and South Asia from Africa, under the leadership of Abdul Qadir Mumin, who also likely acts as a leader in IS’ global operational planning. Puntland sources reported that “all” those killed in the recent raids were foreigners. While possibly exaggerated, it is highly likely that ISS’s growth has benefitted from inbound flows of fighters from the Arabian Peninsula, particularly from Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Intense fighting continues in the eastern DRC despite a unilateral ceasefire

On 3 February, a unilateral ceasefire effective from 4 February was announced by the AFC/M23 militant group which seized the city of Goma in North Kivu in late January. The ceasefire has almost certainly failed to end the heavy fighting in the eastern DRC. The government has denounced the ceasefire as “false communication”, and AFC/M23 advances have almost certainly continued along the main road toward the South Kivu capital of Bukavu, despite the ceasefire’s claim that they had “no intention of taking control of Bukavu”. AFC/M23 forces are reportedly now just 50km north of Bukavu. Fighting on 5 February was reportedly intense around Nyabibwe, and the DRC assembly president Vital Kamerhe stated that AFC/M23 forces reached the town of Ihusi after taking Nyabibwe. It is almost certain that significant developments in the conflict, such as the fall of Bukavu, will trigger violent unrest targeting foreign interests in Kinshasa and other major population centres.

Al-Shabaab gunmen abduct five officials in northeast Kenya

On 3 February, five chiefs were kidnapped by al-Shabaab gunmen in Mandera County, near the border with Somalia. The officials were reportedly travelling from Wargadud to Elwak town as they were abducted. The attack was likely carried out by Jaysh Ayman, al-Shabaab’s Kenyan wing responsible for several significant attacks in Kenya in recent years. This is the latest in a series of attacks by the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab in northeastern regions of Kenya, which aims to destabilise the region and undermine local governance. The persistent threat is also partially in retaliation to Kenya’s military presence in Somalia as part of the African Union’s peacekeeping missions, the latest being the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which ended on 31 December 2024, replaced by African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Despite the persistent activity in Kenya’s border regions, Kenya is highly unlikely to withdraw from AUSSOM, with the mission recently being endorsed by Kenyan President William Ruso, which will likely inspire further al-Shabaab activity in Kenya.

Locals evacuated after a wave of earthquakes hits Greek island Santorini

A series of earthquakes have impacted the Greek Aegean region, particularly impacting the islands of Santorini and Amorgos. The seismic activity, which began with over 200 earthquakes in late January, has led to significant disruptions, including the evacuation of at least 11,000 people from Santorini. The recent earthquakes, some reaching magnitudes as high as 4.9, have prompted authorities to close schools and restrict access to certain areas due to the risk of landslides. The situation remains dynamic as officials work to manage the impact of the ongoing seismic activity. Emergency services continue to urge the public to stay alert and heed safety warnings as the region navigates through this challenging period.

Niger bans Red Cross from operating on its territory

Orders to cease activities were issued to the Red Cross and other NGOs providing humanitarian aid to the Sahel country on 4 February. Nigerien authorities did not provide a reason for the decision, but it is highly likely that it is a further move against what the government perceives as “foreign influence”. The expulsion of Red Cross staff is highly likely to have a negative impact on the civilian population. In Niger, the Red Cross has played a fundamental role in guiding responses following severe environmental events, such as the September 2024 floods in Agadez, Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabery, which affected up to one million people.

Since 4 February, record-breaking snowfall has occurred in northern Japan. The snow has severely impacted everyday life and resulted in major transport disruptions. Japan’s second-largest island, Hokkaido, has been hit hardest by what the authorities are describing as “the strongest cold wave of the season,” forcing the authorities to issue snowstorm warnings for parts of the island. However, the situation is not limited to Hokkaido. Parts of northern Honshu have also received extreme levels of snowfall. The town of Shirakawa in Gifu prefecture received 129cm (47 inches) of snowfall in less than 48 hours, with multiple other locations reporting similarly high levels.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Unstable atmospheric conditions in the area will likely cause significant snowfall in the coming days, leading to further disruptions. Major airports in Hokkaido, including Obihiro Airport and Kushiro Airport, have been forced to close their runways due to heavy snow accumulation, causing delays and cancellations. With more snowfall anticipated, additional airports in both Hokkaido and Honshu may be forced to suspend flights, further disrupting domestic and international travel. Furthermore, the knock-on effect of cancellations is affecting airport operations in parts of Japan less affected by snowfall. On 6 February, it was reported that All Nippon Airways was forced to cancel two per cent and delayed 22 per cent of flights out oof Tokyo International Airport (Haneda).

Other forms of transport have been severely disrupted and will likely remain so for the coming days. Thousands of snow ploughs have been deployed across the impacted areas but are unlikely to keep up with demand. As initial layers of snow freeze and become buried under fresh snowfall, hazardous travel conditions are likely to develop. Concealed ice on roads will increase the risk of road traffic accidents and delay bus and coach services. Rail travel will also likely be severely impacted, with ice accumulation on the tracks reducing traction, leading to delays and potential derailments. Ice accumulation on power lines coupled with strong winds may also cause lines to snap leading to power outages, which are likely to be exacerbated by an increased electricity demand for heating.   

On 31 January, insurgents of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed 18 unarmed soldiers belonging to the Frontier Corps paramilitaries after ambushing their vehicle near the town of Kalat, near the Afghanistan border. Approximately 70-80 BLA militants ambushed the soldiers when they were attempting to dismantle a roadblock which had reportedly been erected by the BLA. Pakistani security forces responded quickly to the incident, killing 23 BLA militants in a series of subsequent operations in the region that were described as some of the heaviest fighting in Balochistan in recent years. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s office in Islamabad condemned the violence and the Pakistani Army stated that “sanitisation operations” will continue until the perpetrators are brought to justice.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The number of militants involved in the attack suggests it was a planned assault, and the ambush of security forces attempting to remove roadblocks could be a developing tactic, technique, or procedure employed by the BLA, designed to maximise casualties of exposed and vulnerable targets. Acts of extreme violence, such as ambushes, are likely to become an increasingly common tactic for the BLA, given their effectiveness in generating compelling propaganda, attracting new recruits and undermining the perception of security in Balochistan. There is a realistic possibility that the BLA knew that the paramilitary soldiers were unarmed, which may indicate that the BLA has penetrated the Pakistani armed forces to some degree, enabling it to obtain vital intelligence. In response to the ambush, the Pakistani armed forces will almost certainly expand their operations against the BLA and other Baloch separatist groups.

However, with widespread social unrest, sectarian violence and militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and periodic clashes with the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani military is likely already overstretched. This may explain the deployment of lesser-trained and less experienced paramilitary forces to Balochistan. Moreover, an expansion of Pakistani military operations in the area will almost certainly inspire a wave of reprisal attacks in Balochistan, which may migrate into other parts of Pakistan. Pakistan’s prime minister is currently conducting a state visit to China and it is almost certain that issues like the revitalisation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project will be high on the agenda. China has pledged support to Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts and has conducted military drills within the country. If the security situation continues to deteriorate, Beijing will likely pressure Islamabad to approve the deployment of Chinese security forces to protect Chinese works and assets linked to the Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI).

Taliban deputy foreign minister flees Afghanistan after speech in favour of women’s education

Mohammed Abbas Stanikzai reportedly relocated to the UAE for “health” reasons. However, his departure followed an order by Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada to arrest him. The deputy foreign minister had recently given a speech in which he decried the Taliban government’s ban on women’s education, and reportedly privately criticised Akhundzada. The episode represents a rare but likely notable public spat between Taliban officials. It is highly likely that Akhundzada, whose hold on power faces significant domestic and foreign threats, will continue to respond harshly to perceived internal political threats. International pressure on the Taliban is likely to increase in the short and medium term. Notably, the interruption of USAID projects in the country, which amounted to more than USD 740 million in 2024 (and USD 3.7 billion since 2022) is highly likely to have severe humanitarian impacts and may result in widespread discontent directed towards the Taliban regime.

Modi’s Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) on track to win assembly elections in Delhi, India

The elections were held on 5 February, and the final results are scheduled to be released on 8 February. Early results show the BJP comfortably ahead of the incumbent Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). If these were to be certified, it would be the first BJP victory in the capital in 27 years. Moreover, they would represent a significant reversal of the 2020 results, where AAP won 62 seats out of 70. For Modi, the victory likely represents an important political result, as it gives the BJP further momentum following last year’s general elections which were won by the Hindu nationalist party but not as decisively as its leaders would have hoped. The AAP is a reformist and anti-establishment party, that came to power in Delhi in 2015 on a wave of anti-corruption sentiment.

Bangladeshi protesters attack Awami League assets

Civil unrest was recorded in Dhaka and other cities on 5-6 February, following ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s calls to her supporters, the Awami League (AL) party, to oppose the interim government. Protesters torched Hasina’s father’s former house in Dhaka and continued to attack suspected AL supporters. AL recently called for a two-week-long period of protests against the interim government, the first major protest appeal since the party was removed from power in August 2024. The vandalism by anti-Hasina activists was almost certainly a case of “bulldozer justice” (the protest had been called a “bulldozer procession” by some local activists), a form of mob violence that especially targets opponents’ physical assets, and often poses a threat to uninvolved bystanders.

Islamic State (IS) supporters start prison riot in Tajikistan

At least five inmates were killed and three guards injured in a riot on 3 February at the prison of Vahdat, Tajikistan. The riot was reportedly launched by a group of IS-affiliated inmates. The case continues to highlight how Tajikistan is a growing recruitment ground for IS. Not only is Tajikistan located close to some of the countries where IS already operates (Afghanistan), has carried out attacks (Russia), or aims to expand (China), but the highly repressive government, which has significantly curtailed freedom of worship, has likely been a key driver for radicalisation. Multiple notable recent attacks, including the Crocus Hall attack, were perpetrated by Tajik IS militants.

Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) commander assassinated in Kabul, Afghanistan

A stabbing attack occurred in Kabul on 2 February, which resulted in the death of “Kohi”, nom de guerre of the commander of the BLA’s Majeed Brigade. Sometimes described as a “suicide” brigade, the Majeed unit is responsible for carrying out suicide attacks in Pakistan and is assessed as one of the more elite units within the BLA. The attack was likely a targeted killing of an important BLA unit linked to significant militant activity in Pakistan. Whilst no group has claimed responsibility for the killing, the BLA will likely assess that Pakistan was in some way behind the killing, which is likely to provoke BLA reprisal attacks in Pakistan.

Further IED attack on Thai security forces

On the morning of 7 February, four Thai police officers were injured when an improved explosive device (IED) detonated near a police booth in the Nong Chik district in the restless Patani province. There are currently no indications as to who planted the IED and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers were examining the area. However, there have been a series of often underreported IED attacks on the Thai police in the far south of the country, with Islamist separatist groups like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) most commonly suspected. The frequency of the attacks may indicate a gradual resurgence of the South Thailand insurgency, likely fueled by internal divisions within the insurgency and systemic failures of peace efforts.

Widespread disruption after cold front brings heavy snow across South Korea

A cold front in South Korea has caused widespread disruption and is expected to last until at least 9 February, with icy temperatures recorded nationwide. Heavy snowfall has resulted in major transport disruptions, flight cancellations and multiple road accidents, including a 30-car pileup on the Sunchon-Wanju Expressway. The Korea Meteorological Administration has warned of continued snowfall in mountainous and inland regions, predicting up to 8 centimetres of additional snow in these areas and temperatures falling to as low as minus 17 degrees Celsius.

Flooding causes widespread disruptions in Queensland, Australia

Northern Queensland, Australia, is experiencing severe flooding due to a low-pressure system that has brought heavy torrential rains. Emergency warnings have been issued for fast-moving floods in Georgetown, with dangerous conditions prompting urgent advisories. At least two fatalities have been reported due to flood-related incidents since the onset of the severe weather. Authorities have also issued flood advice for the Burdekin region and urged residents in Hinchinbrook to conserve water as the flooding has disrupted power and water supplies. In Townsville, residents who had previously evacuated from areas such as Rosslea, Hermit, and Railway Estate have been allowed to return home. However, the region continues to face challenges, with water supply disruptions in Charters Tower and widespread internet and phone outages in Far North Queensland. A highway bridge between Ingham and Townsville collapsed, severing a critical access point for some towns.

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On the morning of 5 February at approximately 06:15 local time, at least two individuals armed with Kalashnikov-style rifles opened fire at the entrance of the Clémenceau Metro station, located to the southwest of Brussels’ city centre. No injuries were reported during the shooting as of the time of writing, and suspects then reportedly fled inside the metro tunnel network. CCTV images captured the shooting, showing two people firing multiple bursts at an unidentified target.

As of the time of writing, the suspects remain at large. Belgian authorities have shut down Clémenceau station, as well as the nearby Brussels-Midi station, which serves as the terminal for the Eurostar train. Metro lines 2 and 6 have been shut down between Troon and Weststation, tram lines 4 and 10 have been interrupted between Noordstation and Churchill, and trams 51 and 82 have been interrupted between Anderlechtsepoort and Zuidstation.

Authorities have advised commuters to use alternative metro lines but have so far ruled out a complete shutdown of the metro system. Authorities have likewise created a response post at the Anderlecht town hall, located west of Brussels.

The new Trump administration’s crackdown on migration and other controversial policies is almost certain to result in protests across the United States.

In Colombia, Venezuela’s alleged support of the ELN offensive is likely to sustain the guerilla group’s operations and lead to a deterioration in the security environment.

Alternative For Germany (AfD) support for Christian Democratic Union (CDU) proposals in the Bundestag is almost certain to trigger unrest in Germany in the run-up to elections.

The resignation of the Serbian PM and mayor of Novi Sad are unlikely to curb current demonstrations, with protestors driven by broader concerns over corruption and government accountability.

Russia’s current main effort in Ukraine is almost certainly Pokrovsk, the capture of which will set the conditions for advances north and west and provide Moscow with more bargaining power.

A thwarted terror attack in Morocco likely indicates the growing ability of Islamic State affiliates to project influence across the continent.

Further unrest in Democratic Republic of the Congo capital Kinshasa in highly likely as M23 militia capture Goma and attempt to expand into South Kivu.

The discovery of large quantities of explosives near Sydney, Australia is almost certainly linked to growing cases of extremism, self-radicalisation, and antisemitic hate in the country.

Pakistan’s new amendment to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) bill will almost certainly be exploited to curb dissent and suppress the opposition.

President Donald Trump has vowed to take an extremely restrictive line on migration. On day one of his presidency, Trump signed multiple executive orders targeting the US-Mexico border, including declaring a “national emergency” and ceasing some of the previous administration’s policies meant to allow migrants opportunities to more easily claim asylum in the US.

Trump also signed orders expanding the powers of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain undocumented migrants. On 29 January, Trump achieved the first legislative victory of his administration, with the approval of a law that allows ICE agents to detain migrants charged with an offence regardless of their immigration status.

In response to the administration’s policies, multiple protests have already occurred in large US urban areas, especially in southern states. Protests are likewise scheduled to occur on 1 and 2 February in multiple locations in Texas, including Arlington, Dallas and Houston, as well as in others states including Arizona, Oklahoma, California, Kansas, and New York.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests scheduled for the weekend of 1-2 February are likely to represent the first major wave of unrest in the US since the inauguration. These protests are likely to be peaceful overall, although there is a realistic possibility of gatherings resulting in episodes of violence and vandalism, especially if co-opted by other protest movements such as the pro-Palestine movement.

The high visibility of Trump and some of his political allies, as well as some of the controversial policies enacted by the administration, are highly likely to be major drivers of unrest in the medium-to-long term.

In the United States, threats of “mass deportations” are likely to be met with considerable activism, including possible protests targeting transportation hubs such as airports. Other contentious policies not directly aimed at the southern border are likewise highly likely to draw unrest.

For instance, Trump signed an executive order on 29 January pledging to combat antisemitism, including by deporting foreign nationals deemed to have endorsed proscribed terrorist organisations. Pro-Palestinian groups in the United States have stated that the order is an attempt to silence their criticism of Israel’s policies in Gaza and the West Bank. If this order is implemented, there is a realistic possibility of it resulting in increased civil unrest, especially at large and politically active university campuses.

Diplomatic tensions between Bogota and Caracas have deteriorated in response to Colombian accusations that the Maduro regime sponsored the recent National Liberation Army (ELN) in northeast Colombia.

The ELN launched an offensive in mid-January in the Catatumbo region against rival guerilla factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and organised crime groups to secure control of lucrative narcotic production and smuggling routes. The offensive has involved attacks of rival factions and civilians, has killed an assessed 100 people, displaced around 50,000 and has overwhelmed local morgues and healthcare facilities.

The Colombian government has suggested that Maduro, who was recently re-inaugurated for his third term, either green-lit the operation or played an active role in planning it to establish indirect control of the cocaine-producing region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ELN has operated within Venezuela for decades, originally in exchange for cocaine profits. However, the recent accusations imply that the Maduro regime is now using the ELN as a proxy force to establish control of the region.

Venezuela has also deployed around 2,000 troops to the border, ostensibly to aid displaced Colombians but critics have suggested the troops are supporting the ELN and securing drug trafficking routes. If true, Venezuelan support could help sustain ELN operations with funds and arms, increasing the likelihood of a protracted conflict.

President Petro has already declared a state of emergency for the Catatumbo region and multiple other municipalities, and has deployed government forces to combat the ELN- moves that have almost certainly jeopardised his previous plans for “total peace” through dialogue and negotiations.

The Petro administration has also offered a USD 700,000 reward for information on ELN leaders, signalling a shift towards a more aggressive security policy. However, given the ELN’s entrenched presence in the jungle and potential Venezuelan backing, military efforts are unlikely to dismantle the group’s operations. Conversely, the government’s strategy could trigger a wave of reprisal attacks across Colombia.

The government is engaged with the ELN in other parts of the country and there have been a series of improvised explosive device (IED) detonations throughout Colombia. Although attributing these attacks directly to the ELN is challenging, many have taken place in areas where the group has a well-established presence. If a ceasefire remains elusive, Colombia is likely to achieve its worst year for violence since the 2016 ceasefire agreement, with January 2025 already being marked as the worst month for violence since Petro assumed office.

Escalating violence is likely to result in the displacement of thousands more people, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, a rise in assaults on aid workers and healthcare professionals, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and the overstretching of local services. The ELN and other armed groups may also increase the kidnapping of foreign workers and tourists to raise funds, a tactic employed extensively in the past.

US pauses foreign aid programs for 90 days

The US State Department issued a “stop-work” order for all existing foreign assistance programs and paused new aid, following directives of one of President Donald Trump’s day-one executive orders. Waivers were issued for military financing to Israel and Egypt.

The pausing of aid is likely part of the new White House’s foreign policy that is characterised by transactional diplomacy, with the withdrawal of aid, or the imposition of sanctions, used to renegotiate international partnerships or to coerce compliance.

The aid freeze will likely have short-term implications in countries that rely on US shipments of medicine, food, or other humanitarian aid. This may allow China and other international competitors to bolster their relations with key partners in strategic regions.

Protests break out in Culiacan, Mexico, after children killed in attempted carjacking

Large-scale civil unrest erupted in the capital of Sinaloa state on 23 January and has continued, following the killing of two children and their father during an attempted carjacking. The recent incident has likely become a catalyst for local resentment against increasing cartel crime, and for authorities’ lack of success in fighting it.

Protesters in Sinaloa have particularly targeted Governor Rocha Moya, who has pledged not to resign. Increasing cartel violence, which is especially severe in states like Sinaloa, continues to be a major issue for the Mexican government.

With the US increasing diplomatic pressure, including via threats of coercive military and economic measures, on Mexico to deal with the cartels, there is a realistic possibility of President Claudia Sheinbaum choosing to move towards a harsher policing approach than her predecessor Lopez Obrador’s “hugs not bullets” policy.

Wave of copycat threats at US schools following Antioch Shooting

The shooting occurred on 22 January and resulted in one death. The perpetrator had published material online prior to the shooting praising various mass killers and espousing far right and white supremacist ideology and attempted to livestream the attack.

According to local media, at least eight other students, some as young as 12, have been arrested since the 22 January shooting for threatening to carry out copycat attacks. The shooting likely represents a notable incident as it highlights perpetrators’ symbiotic relationship with social media as well as the use of paradoxical and self-contradictory violent ideology; the attacker, a black student, repeatedly used white supremacist and Neo-Nazi imagery.

Kenyan police launches operation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Clashes between the international UN-mandated police force and gang members broke out on 27 January in the peripheral area of Kenscoff, located outside of Port-au-Prince at the foothills of the Chaine de la Selle mountain range. The operation was reportedly launched in response to an offensive from gangs originally from Carrefour, a town approximately 10 kilometres south of Port-au-Prince.

Local media reported that at least 20 gang members were killed. The attack in Kenscoff is notable as the area occupies a strategic position controlling the southern approach to Port-au-Prince, and as a link between the West and Southeast departments. Moreover, local media reported that the route via Kenscoff has become more important as it is an alternative to the gang-controlled National Road 2.

Two separate wildfires broke out near La Jolla, northwest of San Diego, on 23-24 January. The fires were fuelled by strong winds. While the La Jolla fires were contained relatively quickly, other blazes erupted in the following days, with one (the “Border 2” fire), adjacent to the US-Mexico border, burning more than 500 acres.

The White House and the state government of California continued to clash over responsibility for the fires’ severe damage. President Trump signed an executive order on 24 January to direct federal agencies to “override” California water management rules in order to combat wildfires. Critics of the executive order, including environmentalist groups, have accused the administration of trying to secure greater control over water resources in north California to benefit the agricultural industry in the area.

Winter storm causes widespread disruption in Hawaii, US

The winter storm that began impacting Hawaii on 29 January has caused significant disruptions across the state. The National Weather Service (NWS) has issued flash flood warnings for several islands, including Maui, Molokai, and Oahu, affecting over one million residents. The flash flood warning for Maui has been extended until 00:30 local time.

Severe thunderstorms and strong winds have resulted in widespread power outages, with over 54,000 Hawaiian Electric customers without power on Oahu, Hawaii Island, and in Maui County. Restoration efforts are ongoing, but Hawaiian Electric has urged customers to prepare for the possibility of extended outages.

In response to the severe weather conditions, several schools in Maui County will be closed on Friday ahead of the predicted peak of the storm. Meanwhile, on Kauai Island, the Kauai Island Utility Cooperative has reported that customers in Wainiha and Haena will remain without power until at least Friday morning due to limited access to transmission towers caused by the weather.

Residents are advised to remain vigilant and adhere to safety advisories as the storm continues to impact the region.

The German parliament is set to vote on 31 January on a new and highly contentious immigration law known as the “influx limitation law”. The law has been advanced by the centre-right and conservative Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) bloc.

The law could pass through the Bundestag if supported by the controversial far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. The bill follows a recent controversial motion that passed recently which was advanced by the CDU/CSU bloc and passed with the support of the AfD. This motion was non-binding and proposed establishing permanent border controls and immediately detaining individuals who are required to leave Germany.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The passing of the CDU/CSU motion with AfD support marks a major shift in the political landscape in Germany. It marked the first time that a motion in Germany’s Bundestag was passed with the backing of the AfD. This represents a break from the longstanding strategy of establishing a “firewall” against AfD collaboration and has resulted in significant criticism of current CDU leader Friedrich Merz, especially from the left-wing Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens.

Should the CDU/CSU law pass with AfD support, it will almost certainly provoke fears that the AfD is gradually being normalised within German politics, a trend that will almost certainly trigger large-scale demonstrations across Germany before the country’s general elections on 23 February.

The CDU strategy has likely been to move further right to counter the AfD, with current polls indicating that the far-right party is set to achieve a record 20-21 per cent of the national vote. However, this strategy has potentially backfired, as it has alienated many Germans, including within the CDU’s traditional base, already leading to protests across Germany.

The CDU’s drift to the right and greater participation of the AfD, is also likely to increase the threat of political violence and terrorism. The far-right are likely to feel emboldened by these trends and may interpret it as a legitimisation of their views. Furthermore, the increased measures and rhetoric aimed at migrants are likely to increase the risk of terrorism in Germany, with a series of recent attacks linked to the cancellation of asylum statuses or threats of deportation.

On 28 January, Serbian Prime Minister Milos Vucevic resigned after months of student and civic protests that have gradually increased in size after originally being triggered by the November 2024 collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy, which killed 15 people. Alongside Vucevic, the Mayor of Novi Sad, Milan Djuric, also resigned, citing the desire to prevent further unrest and division within society.

At the protest’s height, an estimated 55,000 protestors amassed in the capital Belgrade, with students establishing a blockade on the Autokomanda junction, a major intersection that links several key roads and motorways in the capital.

Human rights groups have warned of the government’s use of repression, indiscriminate force and mass arrests in response to the protests.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests, initially sparked by the Novi Sad incident, almost certainly expanded into a broader movement condemning widespread corruption in Serbia. This movement gained support from students, universities, civil society groups, and various other segments of the population. Some estimates suggest that over 60 per cent of Serbians have endorsed the protests, which has likely increased in reaction to the government’s use of force.

The resignations of the prime minister and the mayor of Novi Sad were likely designed to curb the protest movement and were probably ordered by President Aleksandar Vucic; however, it is unlikely that the protests will subside in the near future. President Vucic has maintained an iron grip on power since assuming office in 2017 and has been accused of decreasing civil liberties and freedom of the press, and of fostering an illiberal regime.

The grassroots protest movement likely holds him partially accountable and views the current resignations as insufficient, with many demanding a complete change of government. President Vucic could call early elections to arrest the development of further protests. However, these will likely be boycotted by the opposition, a move that would undermine the legitimacy of his government.

In the short term, President Vucic will likely appoint a new prime minister, a move that is unlikely to quell the protests or address the broader dissatisfaction with his leadership.

Russian ground forces in Donetsk Oblast are setting the conditions for an encirclement and the ultimate capture of the strategic city of Pokrovsk. Russian strategy has shifted away from costly frontal assaults to a gradual encirclement of Pokrovsk from the west, after bypassing Ukrainian defences.

On 30 January alone, Ukrainian forces claim to have repelled over 70 attacks in the Pokrovsk direction, with Ukrainian commanders complaining about insufficient manpower to defend the front lines, despite conducting a series of counterattacks.

Russian forces have also initiated smaller-scale attacks across multiple frontline sectors, including near Kharkiv, Chasiv Yar and in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Current battlefield observations suggest that Russia’s current main effort is to seize Pokrovsk prior to any proposed negotiations. Pokrovsk is a major logistics node, the capture of which would almost certainly set the conditions for future Russian advances north towards Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, two of Ukraine’s major strongholds remaining in the Donbas.

Kramatorsk and Sloviansk are major industrial cities that both hold military and logistical significance. Both cities serve as critical logistics centres for Ukrainian forces defending the Donbas, both cities form part of Ukraine’s defensive lines, and Kramatorsk currently serves as the administrative centre of the Donetsk Oblast.

The fall of these cities would be a major blow to Ukrainian morale, would hugely disrupt Ukrainian defensive operations and would enable Russia to consolidate control over the Donbas.  The capture of Pokrovsk would also enable future Russian advances west into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, where Ukraine has rushed to improve its defences.

Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is not one of the oblasts currently claimed by Russia. However, future Russian advances on this axis could ultimately help lead to Russia advancing towards the River Dnieper, a natural defensive barrier. This could help sever Ukraine in two and is likely one of the initial strategic objectives of the Kremlin.

The collective threat to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk, combined with the lack of assurances from the Trump administration, is almost certain to intensify pressure on the Zelensky administration to pursue negotiations, particularly as Ukraine continues to face manpower shortages and dwindling Western military aid.

Any further Russian territorial gains would significantly strengthen Moscow’s bargaining position, allowing it to dictate terms in future negotiations and potentially press for broader territorial concessions from Kyiv. Ukraine will likely be forced to divert considerable resources to the defence of Pokrovsk. However, as already demonstrated, Russian forces are likely to increase pressure across the line of contact, launching intensified attacks on multiple sectors. This strategy is aimed at overstretching Ukrainian forces, exploiting their manpower shortages, and preventing them from effectively consolidating their defensive positions.

On 26 January, Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (BCIJ) announced the arrests of four individuals in Had Soualem, a town in the Casablanca-Settat region, who had reportedly been planning to carry out an attack in Casablanca. According to authorities, the four had pledged allegiance to IS and had carried out advanced preparations for a coordinated attack at multiple locations, including scouting possible sites and obtaining material that could be used to make explosives. Moreover, authorities claim that the group was planning to travel to the Sahel to receive further training.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Moroccan security has carried out multiple operations targeting Islamist extremist cells in the country in recent years. In August 2024, 50 suspected extremists were arrested in a joint operation across multiple cities.

The recent arrests are notable as the suspects seem to not have only been inspired by IS but have purportedly received online training from the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP)- a group they could have joined post the attack. The growing use of Morocco as a gateway to IS affiliates further south is likely further evidenced by the recent arrest of a US citizen, who had intended to travel to Morocco via France before heading south to join ISSP.

Morocco likely remains a desirable target for IS terrorists. The country has strong relations with neighbouring European states and is an important destination for Mediterranean tourism and business. Moreover, it has considerably improved its relations with Israel in recent years and has gradually liberalised, resulting in a considerable disenfranchised and conservative population receptive to radicalisation.

Finally, Morocco is strategically located on the northwest African coast with access to both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic and acts as the key transit point in the western Mediterranean migration route to Spain and onwards to other parts of Europe. ISSP’s alleged involvement in the failed attack likely indicates a strategy of projecting IS’ influence outside of its current main area of operations in West Africa and the Sahel.

Transregional attacks are likely to increase IS propaganda campaigns, helping it attract recruits and funds in areas both under its influence and areas where it has little influence via online channels. IS’ long-term objective may also be to force countries like Morocco to focus counterterrorist operations internally, a strategy that could help it consolidate power and influence in the heavily destabilised Sahelian and West African states.

Following days of fighting after the Rwanda-backed M23 militia’s advance into Goma on 27 January, relative calm returned to the city on 29 January. Hundreds have been killed and over 400,000 displaced in North Kivu since the beginning of 2025, according to the United Nations (UN). The UN has evacuated its non-essential and civilian staff from Goma to Kampala, Uganda. M23 militants began advancing from the town of Minova, captured on 21 January, towards South Kivu on 29 January. On 30 January, violent clashes occurred in Kalangala in South Kivu.

On 28 and 29 January, violent protests broke out in Kinshasa. Protesters engaged in looting and targeted several embassies including those belonging to the United States, France, Belgium, Rwanda, Kenya, and Japan. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters, and unconfirmed reports indicate that live ammunition was used. In response to violent protests breaking out in Kinshasa, the Congolese government has banned protests from 29 January. The US Department of State has updated their Travel Advisory Level from three to four, issuing a “do not travel” warning. Similarly, Belgium’s government has advised its citizens against travelling to the DRC.

While the border with Rwanda is officially open, unannounced border closures are likely. The Australian government has warned citizens of possible cross-border fire and advised against travel to the Rubavu district of Rwanda close to the border. Rwanda has claimed that at least nine citizens were killed in the cross-border fire.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that M23 are attempting to push on to Kavumu, where Bukavu’s airport is located, in the coming days. More broadly, they are almost certainly aiming to capture Bukavu itself, South Kivu’s provincial capital. The quick advance is almost certainly aiming to take advantage of the current weakness of Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), who have so far failed to prevent M23 advances in previous months.

On 30 January, M23 rebel leaders livestreamed a press statement stating that the group plans to remain in Goma and expand its offensive. South Kivu’s governor, Jean-Jacques Purusi Sadiki, has banned all forms of navigation on Lake Kivu on 29 January. This is almost certainly an attempt to protect Bukavu’s northeastern flank from an amphibious M23 approach.

The M23’s capture of Goma and further expansion threatens major regional escalation. Burundian forces have reportedly been sent to South Kivu to help the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) defend Bukavu. Burundi and Rwanda generally have hostile relations, with each government accusing each other of supporting their respective opponents. There is a high risk of Rwanda-backed M23 clashing with Burundian troops, which would almost certainly increase tensions and raise the risk of regional conflict.

Rwanda’s foreign minister has stated that the country backs a possible ceasefire agreement between M23 and the DRC government, while reaffirming that Rwandan forces were not directly involved in the capture of Goma. UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix has asserted that there is “no question” of Rwandan troops assisting M23 in Goma. President Paul Kagame has denied allegations of supporting the Tutsi-led M23 but has consistently accused the DRC of collaborating with Hutu rebels, which he views as a threat to Rwanda.

Although Rwanda denies direct involvement, it is widely believed to provide military support to the group in an attempt to create a buffer zone and extract precious minerals from the DRC. The M23 militia’s continued territorial expansion, therefore, raises significant concerns over the escalation of tensions into a regional conflict, whereby the DRC perceives Rwanda as an aggressor violating its territorial integrity.

French government again at risk of collapse

The government of François Bayrou was appointed in December 2024 after the previous Prime Minister Michel Barnier was ousted following attempts to pass a controversial budget. While Barnier tried to obtain the support of France’s right, Bayrou has courted the Socialist Party (PS). To do so, Bayrou has stated that he is open to renegotiating some particularly inflammatory parts of the budget, such as President Macron’s unpopular pension reform.

On 28 January, PS threatened to withdraw support from Bayrou and possibly support a no-confidence motion following some comments by the PM against migration. While the PS’ threats almost certainly reflect a reaction to the possible political impact of Bayrou’s comments, socialist leaders are also likely seeking to intensify pressure on the government in order to obtain more concessions. The PS’ political strategy highly likely aims to solidly establish the party as a force against Macron’s “austerity” policies, while simultaneously preventing a further haemorrhage of votes towards the more radical and populist La France Insoumise (LFI).

US billionaire Elon Musk speaks at Alternative for Germany (AfD) event

Musk has repeatedly endorsed the AfD, which is on track to obtain its best-ever electoral result at the 23 February elections according to current polls. Connecting remotely to the event hosted in Halle on 25 January, Musk further endorsed the party’s platform and claimed that it is “the best hope” for the country. In response, mass counterprotests were organised in Berlin and Cologne, with 100,000 and 20,000 attending respectively. Musk’s direct engagement in European politics in support of far-right parties may increase risks for US businesses and assets, including diplomatic missions, in Europe. Musk’s Tesla “Megafactory” near Berlin has notably been repeatedly targeted by activists, with a case of sabotage in March 2024 resulting in at least EUR 1 billion in damages.

More than 100,000 protests Prime Minister Robert Fico in Slovakia

At least 60,000 people gathered in Bratislava on 24 January to protest against the Prime Minister’s perceived friendliness to Moscow. Last week, Fico had stated that the planned protests were part of an attempt by foreign forces and domestic fifth columns to stage a coup. In December, the Prime Minister travelled to Moscow to meet Putin, and more recently members of his party advanced the idea of leaving the EU. It is highly likely that the opposition will again attempt to push forward a no-confidence vote, as the pressure from civil society on the government continues to increase.

Lukashenko claims victory in Belarus elections

The authoritarian leader of the East European country claimed to have won a decisive victory, with more than 80 per cent of the vote, granting him a seventh term in office and prolonging his three decades of rule. The election result was not unexpected as Lukashenko’s regime has imprisoned or forced into exile virtually all opposition leaders. A notable development followed the elections as the Hungarian government blocked an EU joint statement condemning the vote as not “free and fair”. The symbolic move was almost certainly linked to the government of Hungary’s broader campaign to change the EU’s foreign policy towards Ukraine, or at least to obstruct support for Ukraine.

Italy arrests, then releases, Libyan police head under arrest warrant by the Hague

Osama Elmasry Njeem, the head of the Libyan judicial police who is accused by the International Criminal Court of multiple crimes including war crimes and crimes against humanity, was arrested earlier in January in Turin. On 21 January, Njeem was freed and repatriated on an Italian government plane. Italian authorities claimed that Njeem had been released due to a “procedural” error.

The episode was widely condemned by the opposition and civil society actors, who have accused Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni of securing Njeem’s release and repatriation in order to maintain good relations with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), a key player in Meloni’s plans to control migrant flows in the Mediterranean.

On 28 January, Italian prosecutors stated they are investigating Meloni, alongside two government ministers, over the episode. There is a realistic possibility of protests in Rome, Turin, and possibly Milan and Bologna, during the weekend.

Protests at key oil ports in Libya

Protesters occupied the ports of Es Sider and Ras Lanuf, which represent key hubs for the export of oil from the Oil Crescent region of the country. The protesters demanded the relocation of oil companies’ headquarters to the area, citing the lack of economic development in the oil-producing region. The protests are relevant as they occur at a time when Libya’s National Oil Corporation is seeking to increase its output in line with other OPEC members.  

Sahel juntas formally leave ECOWAS

The government of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali announced their formal exit from the regional bloc on 29 January. The announcement comes after a year of ECOWAS’ attempts to convince the three states to remain within the bloc.

The three junta states will now highly likely seek to pursue further integration within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), the alternative bloc they have formed in opposition to ECOWAS. The development is likely to accelerate the disintegration of ties between the landlocked junta states and the coastal members of ECOWAS. It may further worsen regional instability, as the three juntas, despite Russian help, remain unable to contain growing Islamist insurgencies in their territories.

Sporadic protests in Mozambique but widespread unrest diminishes

Sporadic protests have broken out along the N4 Maputo-South Africa motorway following Trans-Africa Concession’s (TRAC) attempt to resume toll collection. The most recent blockade by protesters occurred on 29 January, whereby protesters blocked the road shortly after 07:00 local time (05:00 UTC) and continued until approximately 17:30 local time (15:30 UTC), when protesters voluntarily demobilised.

President Daniel swore in a new General Commander of the Mozambican Police (PRM), Joaquim Sive on 27 January. The appointment comes after Chapo dismissed Bernadino Rafael on 23 January. Chapo announced that Sive’s task is to “regain the people’s trust in the police”. Following likely top-down orders to refrain from the use of force, there is a realistic possibility that security forces will attempt to refrain from using tear gas and live ammunition in further cases of unrest.

Activist facing trial for Quran burning in Sweden killed

Salwan Momika had become a popular figure on social media as one of the most prominent faces of the 2023 Swedish Quran burning. He was scheduled to be sentenced alongside another man on 30 January for inciting violence. Momika was reportedly shot and killed on the night of 29 January in the town of Sodertalje, near Stockholm, while he was streaming on TikTok. Five people were arrested in connection with the shooting.

The global high visibility of the victim (Momika had more than 200,000 followers on X.com and videos featuring him have millions of views), plus the highly likely religious motive for the shooting, make the possibility of copycat violence highly likely. For the same reason, there is also a threat of “retaliatory” actions against Muslim communities in Sweden and other Western states.

Turkish forces arrest 100 in anti-Islamic State (IS) raid

The arrests, which occurred last week, were announced by Turkish officials on 29 January. More than 24 provinces were targeted in the operation, including Ankara and Istanbul. Overall, more than 900 suspected IS supporters were arrested in 2024.

Turkey remains a hotspot for IS recruitment and activity, due to its close proximity to the main areas of operations of IS in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its closeness to Europe and Russia, two key targets for IS operations. Turkey is moreover a high-value target due to its counterterrorism efforts in the region. There is a realistic possibility of IS reprisal attacks in response to the raids.

Syrian government intercepts arms shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah

On 25 January, Syrian border forces intercepted a shipment of arms intended for Hezbollah in Serghaya, Rif Dimashq. The interception followed the previous interdiction of a shipment of drones to Hezbollah which was stopped at the port of Tartus. It is highly likely that the shipments had been organised by Iranian-backed elements as part of Tehran’s efforts to rearm Hezbollah following the latest conflict with Israel. The new Syrian government has significantly boosted its diplomatic engagements with international partners and is likely interested in removing Western and Israeli concerns about Hezbollah’s efforts to replenish its arsenals.

The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) launches offensive against Boko Haram in Nigeria

On 27 January, pro-IS channels reported that ISWAP had attacked Boko Haram (JAS) fighters near the small village of Kachalla Kelluri, situated in Borno state at the border with Niger. IS sources claimed that at least 50 Boko Haram fighters were killed in the offensive.

In 2021, ISWAP forces killed Boko Haram leader Abubakar Sheaku in an offensive in Sambisa Forest, Borno State. Since then, the group has made considerable inroads in taking over territory previously occupied by Boko Haram, especially in the Lake Chad basin. Since 2023, Boko Haram has managed to recover some of its losses and has engaged in clashes with ISWAP. In April 2024, more than 100 dead were reported following clashes in the so-called “Tumbums” islands of Lake Chad.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) intensify attack on al-Fashir, Sudan

At least 70 people were killed after RSF forces attacked the last functioning hospital in al-Fashir. The city is the last stronghold of the government in Darfur and has been under an RSF siege since May 2024. With the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continuing to make considerable gains in the country’s east following the beginning of their offensive in Khartoum, it is highly likely that RSF officials are aiming to clear al-Fashir and redirect forces towards the capital. Taking al-Fashir would also represent a significant political victory that is highly likely considered valuable by the RSF after the recent setbacks near Khartoum.

INTERPOL and AFRIPOL arrest 37 in anti-Islamist operation in East Africa

On 27 January, it was reported that coordinated November-December counter-terrorism operations across Africa led to the apprehension of 37 suspected terrorists and the seizure of illicit material, including both small and heavy arms. Arrests were made in eight countries, including Somalia, the DRC, Tanzania, and Kenya- where 17 individuals were detained.

The detentions include suspected Islamic State (IS) and al-Shabaab members, as well as other local terrorist groups such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The operations likely allude to greater international cooperation in Africa and the increased use of modern surveillance, particularly at ports of entry. However, the wave of arrests likely indicates the growing significance of Africa for transregional violent extremist organisations (VEOs) such as the Islamic State. IS has developed a network of affiliates across Africa, overseen by its General Directorate of Provinces, which is seeking to exploit porous borders, and overstretched governments to increase its influence.

Storm Eowyn damages energy infrastructure, causes prolonged outages in UK

At least 3,000 properties continued to suffer outages days after the storm made landfall, and more than 45,000 people were affected by outages in Northern Ireland throughout the period between 24 and 28 January. In total, power outages caused by the storm are estimated to have affected more than one million people. At least two deaths have been recorded, and more than five people were injured. The Met Office described the weather event as the “strongest storm in ten years”. Forecasts indicate that, despite Storm Eowyn’s dissipation on 27 January, strong winds are likely to continue throughout the 31 January – 2 February weekend.

UNRWA ban comes into effect in Israel and the West Bank

The Israeli government had passed a law banning the activities of the United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency (UNRWA), but the legislation only came into effect on 30 January, after a legal challenge to pause it was struck down by Israel’s Supreme Court. The Israeli government has accused UNRWA operators of collaborating with Hamas. UNRWA plays a fundamental role in the West Bank and Gaza, where it operates dozens of clinics. As of the time of writing, the United Nations has said that UNRWA clinics remain operational.

On 29 January, President Asif Ali Zadari gave his assent to a controversial amendment to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), a day after the amendment’s passage in the Senate. The bill had earlier been passed by the National Assembly on 23 January, causing condemnation from international human rights organisations and the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ).

The new legislation criminalises ‘fake news’, expands regulatory control over content and expands the powers of the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority through the establishment of a new Social Media Regulation and Protection Authority. According to the law, spreading “false and fake information” will now be punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The new laws are highly likely intended to be used by authorities to suppress dissent and target opposition supporters who use social media platforms to criticise the government. PECA was initially passed in 2016, and initial fears from activists and human rights organisations that the bill would be used to quash dissent have materialised in recent years during periods of unrest.

The major opposition party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) have led a large-scale anti-government protest movement since the 2022 ousting of the Imran Khan government, which dramatically escalated in 2023 following Khan’s arrest and subsequent imprisonment.

The PFUJ, Pakistan’s largest trade union for journalists, has announced plans for nationwide protests set to culminate in a ‘grand sit in’ in front of Parliament House in Islamabad on 14 February. Parliament House’s location in Islamabad’s ‘Red Zone’, gives authorities extensive powers to prohibit protests and public gatherings in the area – it is highly likely that any significant protests will be met by violent crowd dispersal methods from security forces and result in violent clashes.

An investigation has been launched by authorities following the 19 January discovery of a “caravan” containing enough explosive material to create a bomb with a blast radius of more than 40 metres, in the Sydney suburb of Dural. Alongside the explosives, police found a list of targets linked with the local Jewish community. Two people have been detained in connection with the discovery. One of them had reportedly already been charged for other antisemitic attacks. More than 100 counter-terrorism police have been assigned to the investigation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The discovery follows a significant increase in antisemitic and Islamophobic attacks in Australia. In December, an arson attack occurred at the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne, causing extensive damage and injuring one worshipper. It is almost certain that the rise in sectarian violence targeting Jews and Muslims has been driven by the conflict in Gaza and matches similar trends identified in other Western countries.

Australian authorities have described the latest incident as an “escalation” of the terrorism threat in the country, as it is the first time that large quantities of explosives are found alongside attack plans. The explosive retrieved by authorities reportedly consists of a compound that is commonly used for mining. Access to it requires a licence and proper security clearance, indicating that the perpetrators either acquired it “legally” through their work or stole it from a facility related to the mining sector.

Stampede at Hindu festival in Uttar Pradesh, India, kills more than 30

The Maha Kumbh (“Festival of the Sacred Pitcher) is a Hindu pilgrimage whose location and date are decided via astronomical calculations and represents the largest single religious gathering in the world. In 2025, approximately 100 million people were expected to visit the festival location in Prayagraj over the course of 45 days starting on 13 January. A stampede on 29 January was reported after pilgrims tried to take a holy bath in the Triveni Sangam River, resulting in at least 30 deaths and more than 200 injuries. The massive influx of pilgrims to areas that have insufficient infrastructure poses a severe risk of similar events. There is a realistic possibility that protests will follow the recent incident.

Bangladesh’s Awami League calls for mass protests against Yunus governmen

The party of ousted long-time Bangladeshi ruler Sheikh Hasina called for mass demonstrations to take place between 1 and 18 February against the interim government of Muhammad Yunus. The protests will include a day-long Hartal (general strike) on 18 February. The protests are the most ambitious anti-government effort by the Awami League (AL) since Hasina was forced to flee the country following large-scale demonstrations in August 2024. Since the change in government, there have been multiple cases of political violence targeting AL members and sympathisers. These attacks have been mostly led by extra-parliamentary groups, and the Yunus government has de fact distanced itself from them. There is a realistic possibility of a sharp increase in sectarian political violence during the scheduled protest period.

Myanmar National Unity Government (NUG) leader claim 2025 is “tipping point” in the war

The NUG oversees the anti-junta People’s Defence Force (PDF) coalition. Acting President Duwa Lashi La claimed, in an interview with Al Jazeera, that anti-junta forces are looking to achieve a “Syria-like” resolution to the conflict in 2025. The president also called for international involvement in the conflict and for the cutting of financial lines to the junta. The NUG is likely seeking to maintain a balanced position with regional powers, including Beijing, the junta’s key backer. With junta forces continuing to lose ground and facing significant defections, the NUG’s moderate public diplomacy approach will almost certainly continue in order to push regional powers to increasingly consider a post-junta Myanmar to be aligned with their key interests.

Philippines suspends survey in South China Sea following tensions with China

On 25 January, a scientific survey was suspended after perceived harassment from vessels belonging to China’s Coast Guard and Navy. As two Philippine fisheries vessels approached Sandy Cay to collect sand samples, Chinese vessels reportedly conducted “aggressive manoeuvres” in their vicinity.  In response to accusations by the Philippine Coast Guard, Beijing has claimed that Philippine vessels attempted to illegally land on the Tiexian Reef to collect sand samples. The cancellation comes after numerous instances of brinkmanship in the past weeks over contested waters in the South China Sea. Amid escalating tensions, Manila and Beijing met on 16 January and reportedly agreed to cooperate and resolve the territorial dispute.

Deadly floods and landslides in Malaysian Borneo.

At least five people have been killed and almost 8,000 evacuated from the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo as a result of heavy rainfall and flooding that has occurred since 28 January. The Malaysian Meteorological Department has issued a danger-level continuous rain warning for Sarawak and Sabah, effective until at least 31 January due to continued heavy rainfall. Major roads have been blocked due to floods and landslides, with further damage to infrastructure anticipated due to saturated ground. The rural interior regions of Sabah have been greatly affected, with the remoteness of these areas restricting access to resources, healthcare and other services.

Tropical Low 13U off the coast of Queensland, Australia.

Tropical Low 13U is currently impacting the northern coast of Queensland, Australia. The system has brought torrential rains, leading to widespread flooding in Townsville. Local media reports indicate that the heavy rainfall has caused substantial disruptions in the area. Disaster authorities have issued warnings for the region, predicting up to 19 inches of rain between Cairns and Townsville over the weekend. Residents are advised to stay informed and take necessary precautions as the situation develops.

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At approximately 02:45 local time on 27 January, media spokespersons for the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group announced via a press release that their forces had successfully seized Goma, the capital of North Kivu Province in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Hours earlier, local media reported gunfire in the city’s outskirts, as M23 forces clashed with the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) following their capture of the nearby town of Sake.

Unconfirmed sources indicate that Rwandan forces crossed the border to assist the rebels in seizing Goma. Rwandan and Congolese forces have also reportedly fired at each other across the shared border.

Rwandan soldiers claim that 26 Congolese soldiers and one police officer crossed into Rwanda and surrendered. While the DRC-Rwanda border is reportedly officially still open, border clashes almost certainly prevent any movement.

On 25 January, the DRC severed diplomatic relations with Rwanda, long accused of supporting the M23 movement, and recalled its embassy staff from the country. The following day, on 26 January, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held an emergency session as the rebels advanced toward Goma. During the session, Congolese Foreign Minister Thérèse Wagner accused Rwanda of actions amounting to a “declaration of war“.

The extent of casualties and damage from the M23 offensive remains unclear. In the week preceding the Goma offensive, both M23 and Rwanda faced international condemnation after rebel forces killed 13 United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. M23-affiliated media later released footage showing FARDC soldiers tasked with defending Goma being disarmed and detained under UN peacekeepers’ supervision.

On 26 January, local media reported that hundreds of residents began fleeing Goma after news of M23’s capture of Sake. In recent weeks, M23 has seized key strategic towns, including Katale, Masisi, and Minova, in their advance toward Goma. On 27 January, a mass jailbreak reportedly occurred in Goma, hours after M23 entered the city. The prison held approximately 3,000 inmates and was set on fire during the prisoners’ escape. Deaths were reported, but no official figures have been released.

Goma international airport has been evacuated and has temporarily grounded flights due to the ongoing clashes.

Amid escalating tensions, Kenyan President William Ruto announced on the social media platform X that the East African Community (EAC) will convene an extraordinary summit within 48 hours. DRC president Felix Tshisekedi and Rwandan president Paul Kagame are both set to attend the summit. Ruto stated that the summit will aim to negotiate a ceasefire between M23 and the Congolese government while addressing long-standing tensions between the DRC and Rwanda.

Almost immediately after his inauguration on 20 January, President Donald Trump signed an executive order which designated drug cartels FTOs. After months of rhetoric aimed primarily at Mexican cartels, the executive order targeted multiple cartels throughout the Western Hemisphere, such as the Venezuelan-based Tren de Aragua and the primarily El Salvadorean based Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).

The order declared these organisations a threat to American safety, national security, and the stability of the Western Hemisphere. The order will also tasked Cabinet secretaries with recommending additional criminal organisations for FTO designation within the next 14 days. The order could permit the seizure of cartel assets, sanctions against US citizens dealing with these groups, and the denial of entry to the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Many critics have questioned the efficacy of the executive order, suggesting that it will have few practical effects. Many of the tools and procedures granted under anti-terrorism laws are already in effect as part of broader counter-narcotics operations. Moreover, designating cartels as terrorist organisations does not provide legal authority for large-scale US military intervention in Mexico, something Trump has proposed on multiple occasions. This would require the approval from Congress and would violate Mexican sovereignty, unless the Mexican government consented to the deployment of US troops on its territory.

However, Trump has threatened to deploy US special forces to Mexico in raids against the cartels. This strategy would be possible under the president’s executive powers and would not require congressional approval.

However, the unilateral deployment of US special forces without Mexico’s consent would violate international norms, jeopardise diplomatic relations with Mexico and other Latin American nations, and would undermine trade with Mexico, the US’ largest trading partner. Furthermore, military operations against the well-armed and heavily funded cartels would be high-risk and likely lead to retaliatory attacks on US civilians, personnel and interests in both Mexico and the US. This is a scenario the incoming administration would likely seek to avoid.

The designation of cartels and organised crime groups as FTOs is more likely posturing from the new administration. This tactic is likely aimed at exerting maximum pressure on the Mexican government to do more to curb the power of the cartels and reduce the flow of narcotics into the US. The move will almost certainly appeal to domestic political audiences, given its prioritising of national security and border control, but is likely more significant in its symbolism rather than its practicality.

On 21 January, shortly before 08:00 local time, three vehicles were fired upon by armed gang members near Toussaint Louverture International Airport (PAP) in Port-au-Prince. Two of the vehicles were armoured and fitted with diplomatic plates; one was not armoured.

The vehicles were reportedly transporting India’s consul and staff as they were travelling to their offices in Sarthe. Five people were injured in total, with a sixth person killed. The two drivers and Jenny Handal Bitar, the daughter of the consul, were reportedly among those injured. This event comes the day after a US embassy van was fired upon.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Given a similar incident has occurred twice in one week, gangs were almost certainly deliberately targeting foreign vehicles and diplomatic missions. Some reports indicate that this was likely a retaliatory action in response to recent police and Multinational Security Support (MSS) operations. The attack came one day before Colombian President Gustavo Petro was scheduled to visit; the first time any Colombian president has visited Haiti in over 20 years. By attacking foreign entities, Haitian gangs are likely aiming to send a message of deterrence against foreign involvement in the country.

The ongoing Kenya-led MSS operations, greenlit in October 2023 by the UN Security Council, have faced significant limitations in the form of a lack of funding, equipment, and personnel; it contains a force of just 800, 1,700 short of the intended target of 2,500. António Guterres, the Secretary General of the UN, has warned that if further money, equipment, and personnel are not provided, Haiti’s security institutions could collapse, and gangs could ‘overrun the entire metropolitan area’.

The struggle to control the gangs in Haiti will highly likely be exacerbated by President Trump’s decision to suspend foreign assistance programs for 90 days. Haiti is incredibly reliant on US aid for financial support for its police force as well as humanitarian and health programs. With the US constituting Haiti’s biggest donor, a cut in funding could reduce police capacity even further. Gangs will highly likely take advantage of this and capitalise on the 90-day review period.

The Colombian government of President Gustavo Petro has vowed to wage war against leftwing guerillas in response to a surge in violence that has killed over 100 people and displaced nearly 40,000. The government has also declared a “state of internal emergency” and a “state of economic emergency”, which will grant the executive branch of government to pass certain legislation without congressional approval for up to three months.

The increase in violence has largely been attributed to the National Liberation Army (ELN), which has launched an offensive against rival groups, including Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, to establish control over strategic territories and drug trafficking routes. Fighting has been reported in at least three Colombian departments, with the majority of the fighting occurring in the northeastern Catatumbo region close to the Venezuelan border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As part of the emergency measures enacted by the government,thousands of troops will be deployed to the affected regions. This strategy marks a major shift in the Petro administration’s approach, which has been prioritising dialogue and ceasefire negotiations in its pursuit of “total peace”.

However, it is highly likely that many of the armed factions within Colombia have simply exploited this approach to regroup and rearm, fearing that peace would ultimately threaten their profits from the ultra-lucrative cocaine trade. The government, which has already suspended peace talks with the ELN, will likely prioritise the targeting of the leftist group.

However, the ELN is highly active across multiple regions of Colombia, including the northeast, southwest, midwest, and central areas. There is a realistic possibility that the government’s military intervention could trigger a wave of reprisal attacks across these regions, potentially exacerbating Colombia’s security environment.

These reprisals could include targeted attacks on military units and installations, government facilities, and infrastructure, such as oil pipelines and transport networks. This would further destabilise rural and urban areas, which is likely to result in more civilian casualties and higher rates of displacement.

US President immigration policy plans highly likely to drive civil unrest in urban centres

Donald Trump’s electoral campaign was characterised by promises of strict immigration reforms and an aggressive policy of mass-deportation. On day one of his presidency, Trump signed a series of executive orders that curtailed previous legal routes to enter the US for undocumented migrants at the southern border, declared a border emergency, and expanded federal authorities’ powers to enact deportations.

For example, as per the new executive decisions, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) units will be granted the ability to carry out enforcement actions at schools and churches, after the end of two directives limiting their powers of arrest in “sensitive” locations.

While no large-scale actions have been carried out as of the time of writing, protests have been planned and carried out in largely Democrat-leaning centres like Chicago, Boston, and Los Angeles since inauguration day. While these protests have so far been limited in scale, it is highly likely that immigration-related political developments will drive larger crowds in the coming weeks.

Kenya deploys more police officers to Haiti

Kenya has deployed an additional 217 police officers to Haiti to arrest the spread of gang violence and help stabilise the country. This takes the total number of Kenyan police officers in Haiti to over 600, with plans to increase the number to 1,000, under a UN-backed mission. However, the effectiveness of the international force remains unproven, with gangs still in control of the vast majority of the capital and large swathes of the country. It is now assessed that over 700,000 have been displaced and an estimated 5,600 people were killed in the Caribbean nation in 2024 alone.

Nicaragua launches volunteer police force

More than 4000 officers have been inducted since the group was formed in accordance with changes to Nicaragua’s constitution. A “Volunteer Police” had already existed in 2018, when it was widely deployed by the government to crush domestic opposition with near impunity. It is highly likely that the reinforced organisation, now more clearly institutionalised, will act as a de facto paramilitary supporting the regime of Daniel Ortega.

US withdraws from World Health Organisation (WHO), Paris Climate Agreement

Both decisions had been widely expected to occur on day one of the second Trump administration. The WHO withdrawal is likely to significantly affect the organisation’s operations, as the US provides approximately 18 per cent of its overall funding. In particular, US contributions have been key to the WHO’s programmes to combat HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, as well as tuberculosis.

It is highly likely that the EU and China will take measures to bolster their position within health- and environment-related international agreements and organisations. While the US withdrawal from the WHO is likely to not fundamentally challenge the overarching support the organisation’s mission has abroad, there is a realistic possibility that the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will bolster the political traction of international opponents of the framework, possibly leading to policy developments abroad.

Wildfires continue across Southern California in the US

Southern California continues to grapple with the effects of Santa Ana winds, which have triggered a series of wildfires and power outages across the region. The Hughes Fire is currently burning approximately 72 kilometres north of Los Angeles and has grown to over 10,000 acres, causing tens of thousands to evacuate; the fire has been 14 per cent contained.

The Laguna Fire near Camarillo has been brought under control, with firefighters reporting 70 per cent containment and no structural damage. Evacuation orders around the Cal State Channel Islands campus have been downgraded to warnings as the fire’s forward progress has been halted.

Meanwhile, the Gibbel Fire south of Hemet has also seen its forward progress stopped, with crews remaining on site to ensure the area is fully secured. In San Diego County, the Gilman Fire in La Jolla has been contained, allowing for the lifting of all evacuation orders, though road closures persist.

The Border Fire, now renamed Border 2 Fire, has expanded to 228 acres with no containment reported yet, as it burns in the Otay Wilderness Area near the Mexico border.

On 20 January, the Russian Project 22010 oceanographic research ship “YANTAR” (IMO: 7524419) entered the English Channel and was observed operating in UK waters. This marks the second time in months that the YANTAR has been observed in UK waters.

In November 2024, the vessel was suspected of loitering over undersea critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the Irish Sea. The Royal Navy was tasked with tracking and monitoring the YANTAR on both occasions. In November, an Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) was authorised to surface near the YANTAR as a deterrent, signalling that the vessel was under covert surveillance by the UK.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Officially, the YANTAR is a Russian oceanographic research vessel that is primarily used for deep-sea research and underwater rescue missions. However, the vessel is operated by the highly secretive Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), a branch of the Russian Ministry of Defence tasked with underwater warfare and intelligence gathering.

The YANTAR is one of the most capable vessels within GUGI, equipped with advanced sonar systems and capable of deploying a range of underwater assets, including remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and deep-submergence vehicles (DSVs) that can interrogate depths up to 6,000m. This allows Russia to map some of the deepest undersea critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the oceans, the sabotage of which would be immensely challenging and time-consuming to repair.

However, considering the YANTAR’s strategic importance and the extent to which it is monitored by NATO intelligence assets, it is unlikely that the vessel was conducting nefarious activity. With the Trump administration anticipated to curtail aid to Ukraine, it is likely that European nations will be required to take on a greater responsibility.

The Kremlin, which is already suspected of conducting a reckless sabotage campaign across Europe which has included the severing of undersea cables, is likely sending a strategic message to Ukraine’s European allies. By deploying such assets in proximity to undersea CNI, Russia is communicating that it has both the capability and intent to escalate its sabotage campaign, with undersea sabotage providing a low-cost and highly deniable means of exerting pressure on Ukraine’s allies.

Furthermore, the extent of civilian vessels answering to Russian intelligence makes it almost impossible to accurately monitor Russian activity in the maritime domain and the heavy monitoring of vessels like the YANTAR likely provides opportunities for other vessels to exploit.

Following his inauguration on 20 January, US President Donald Trump made statements and issued executive orders that gave the first indications of how the new Trump administration will handle the war in Ukraine.

Firstly, Trump made statements via social media that Putin is to blame for continuing the war, that Zelenskyy had told Trump “he wants to make a deal” and that Putin is “destroying Russia” by not ending the war. Trump threatened that unless Russia stopped the “ridiculous war”, the US would impose “high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions”.

Secondly, Trump issued an executive order titled “Reevaluating And Realigning United States Foreign Aid” that suspends all US foreign aid for 90 days, which caused concern regarding how US assistance to Ukraine would be impacted.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The executive order is unlikely to significantly impact Ukraine’s war effort. The Biden administration made concerted efforts to “Trump-proof” Ukraine aid, due to Trump’s previous threats to end assistance to Ukraine, with pledged future commitments that cannot be easily suspended with presidential executive authority and NATO taking over the US in coordinating military aid to Ukraine.

The G7-led Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans initiative, the EU’s Ukraine Facility financial assistance program,  the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative  (USAI) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs are all entirely unaffected by the executive order. However, there will nonetheless be a limited impact on Ukraine with foreign development initiatives regarding the restoration of destroyed critical national infrastructure (CNI) and demining being suspended.

It is highly likely that the main intended purpose of the executive order suspending USAID assistance programs relates to the Trump movement’s sociopolitical outlook – the stated “purpose” in the text of the executive order criticises how the “foreign aid industry and bureaucracy” has in many cases been “antithetical to American values” and has promoted ideas “that are directly inverse to harmonious and stable relations”. This is almost certainly in reference to USAID programs that have promoted LGBTQ+ issues, which have received significant criticism from Trump supporters.

What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which Trump will leverage his executive authority to impede the delivery of military assistance to Ukraine. Trump’s statements on social media likely indicate a focus on further economic sanctions as measures to coerce the Kremlin to engage in peace negotiations, as opposed to boosting military aid.

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have intensified attacks on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) around the Tishreen Dam area, a strategic location along the Euphrates River. Attacks have included the use of heavy artillery and rocket strikes; Turkish conventional forces have also conducted drone and airstrikes targeting SDF positions in areas such as Tal Tamr, Hasakah, and Kobani. The SNA has concentrated forces along critical lines of control, including at Ain Issa, Tal Tamr, and Kobani.

The SDF is also contending with attacks by Arab tribal forces in the Deir ez-Zur, which has forced the SDF to deploy reinforcements from the al-Hasakah area to Deir ez-Zur.

Prior to speaking at Davos, Syria’s new Foreign Minister, Assad al-Shaibani, highlighted the potential benefits of a “special relationship” with Turkey. Al-Shaibani suggested that such a relationship would provide the new Syrian government with access to Turkish technology, regional influence, and European relations. Al-Shaibani also stated that there is no longer any justification for the existence of the SDF, with talks to absorb the SDF into government forces ongoing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes are likely shaping activity designed to degrade the SDF and disrupt its supply lines in preparation for a major offensive against SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. The concentration of SNA forces on three axes likely indicates a multi-pronged offensive against the SDF. Such an offensive combined with attacks by Arab tribal forces in Deir ez-Zur will almost certainly overstretch SDF forces, leaving them vulnerable across multiple fronts and likely unable to maintain control over the key territories they hold.

The pro-Turkey comments made by Syria’s foreign minister are likely strategically aimed at pressuring the SDF into aligning with the Syrian government and renouncing further claims for autonomy. In particular, al-Shaibani remarks that the SDF no longer has any justification for its existence underscores the new government’s view that the SDF is an illegitimate force since the collapse of the Assad regime and territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Without external assistance, the SDF is now likely left with two options: be absorbed into the new government’s forces or face military defeat at the hands of Turkey, the SNA, and Arab tribal militias.

However, in the event of a protracted conflict involving the SDF or if the SDF is forced into submission, there is a realistic possibility that this could embolden ISIS, other extremist groups, or former regime loyalists to exploit the resulting instability and potential security vacuums.

On 22 January, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units launched a large-scale operation, named “Iron Wall”, in Jenin. The operation is the first major military development following the signing of the ceasefire in Gaza, and the beginning of the second Trump administration in the US. Donald Trump, on day one of his presidency, removed sanctions on settler groups in the West Bank via executive order. On 19 January, settler groups attacked Palestinian residents in the villages of Jinasfut and Funduq, east of Qalqilya. Coinciding with the new IDF operations in Jenin, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other militant groups announced the creation of a “joint operations room” to coordinate activities in the West Bank.

In Gaza, the ceasefire deal approved on 17 January is so far holding, with the first hostage exchanges having been successfully carried out. Reports indicate that Hamas units are overseeing the return of displaced Palestinians to the north of the Gaza Strip.

In Israel, political pressure on the Netanyahu administration increased. On 21 January, the IDF’s Chief of Staff and the head of Southern Command resigned over the failures to prevent the 7 October 2023 attack. Opposition parties, led by Yair Lapid, likewise called on Netanyahu to resign. The leaders of the far-right parties within the government coalition, Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, continued to call for resuming hostilities following the completion of the first stage of the ceasefire.

Solace Global Assessment: 

With the situation in Gaza having been at least temporarily cooled by the ceasefire, both Tel Aviv and the Palestinian militias are highly likely looking at the West Bank as an increasingly important area of operations.

For Hamas, which retains the strategic goal of expanding its political clout in the West Bank, the setbacks suffered by Iran in the region, the recent Palestinian Authority (PA) raid in Jenin, and the seeming willingness of the new US administration to allow Israeli forces and settlers a greater scope of operations in the area represent growing vulnerabilities. Efforts to coordinate more thoroughly with PIJ and other armed groups are therefore likely reflective of Hamas’ attempts to bolster its short-term resilience while allowing for more effective operations in contested areas like Tulkarm or Jenin.

For the IDF, the 42 days afforded by the ceasefire likely represent an opportunity to further weaken Hamas and PIJ in key West Bank strongholds, while simultaneously allowing the PA to “fill the political gap” left by their retreat.

In Gaza, Hamas will likely use the ceasefire to accelerate attacks on rival militias and local clans that threaten its authority in the area. Reports indicate that Hamas fighters have conducted raids against criminal gangs that were attempting to secure humanitarian aid, hence portraying themselves as a force for stability. Hamas will likewise almost certainly continue recruitment efforts to replenish its manpower.

The flow of internally displaced Palestinian civilians from the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone will also offer an opportunity to re-infiltrate the north of the Gaza Strip. Despite these opportunities, the loss of much of its pre-war infrastructure – including tunnels and arsenals – will hinder Hamas’ rearmament efforts. With Israeli troops still in control of the Philadelphi Corridor, the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt that served as a transit point for smuggled weapons, this is unlikely to change in the short term.

The volatility of Israel’s political situation makes it difficult to assess to what extent Ben-Gvir and Smotrich’s calls to resume the conflict after the first phase of the ceasefire are likely to be observed. If it were to resume hostilities, the Netanyahu government would almost certainly face redoubled international and domestic pressures.

There is also a likelihood that, in such a scenario, Tel Aviv would run into Washington’s opposition. Trump is likely to continue his first term’s foreign policy of improving relations with Gulf states, which however has as a premise the limitation of possible points of contention with key powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Therefore, the White House is likely to continue efforts to stabilise the situation in Gaza and to avoid the restart of a conflict that has minimal potential to advance American strategic interests in the Middle East.

On 19 January, the Houthi-linked Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) released a statement that the Houthis will cease attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, except for “vessels wholly owned by Israeli individuals or entities and/or sailing under the Israeli flag.”  This followed the commencement of the ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas.

The statement promised that following the “full implementation of all phases of the [ceasefire] agreement”, the last remaining “sanctions” against Israeli vessels would be lifted. The statement also stipulated, however, that attacks against vessels affiliated with the US and the UK would recommence “in the event of any aggression” from “the aggressor state(s)”.

Additionally, on 22 January, the Houthis released the crew members of the MV GALAXY LEADER (IMO: 9237307), with the vessel’s hijacking in November 2023 having marked the start of the Houthi anti-commercial shipping campaign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Starting in November 2023, the Houthis attacked over 134 vessels in 12 months with uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), and ballistic and cruise missiles.

With 12 per cent of all global shipping previously having passed through the Bab al-Mandeb, a critical chokepoint for maritime trade routes between Europe and Asia, the Houthi campaign against merchant vessels had a global impact. The Red Sea trade corridor saw a 60 per cent decrease in use, due to the increase in insurance premiums and the danger posed to sailors.

The alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope involves markedly increased transit times and fuel costs, leading to container freight rates increasing by as much as 284 per cent.

The extent to which Houthi activity will genuinely alter following the Gaza Ceasefire will likely become clear in the next few weeks, although it is notable that the Houthis have not launched a successful attack against a vessel since November 2024. It is likely that the efforts of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a US-led naval coalition aimed at intercepting Houthi threats and Operation Poseidon Archer, a US-UK joint mission to strike Houthi capabilities within Yemen, have both helped to degrade Houthi strike capabilities. There is a realistic possibility that recent Houthi statements have been made to obfuscate their current limitations and critical shortages in weaponry.

On 18 January, ballot papers from the October elections were incinerated on the outskirts of Maputo. The administrative court rejected the civil society appeal to stop the process.

On 20 January, the swearing-in ceremony for members of provincial assemblies and governors took place and was attended by opposition parties.

On 23 January, protests broke out along the Maputo-South Africa motorway after Trans-Africa Concession (TRAC) attempted to resume toll collection. Protesters smashed through the gates and refused to pay, threatening to set the toll gate alight. Security forces intervened to remove heavy vehicles blocking access and used live ammunition to quell unrest.

According to local NGOs, approximately 314 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The toll gate rioting comes in response to TRAC attempting to reinstate tolls after approximately two months of not collecting them. Mondlane declared that tolls should no longer be paid in December, something he reiterated on 17 January.

The fact that opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane’s demands still resonate with Mozambique’s population despite Frelimo’s perceived victory suggests that he continues to hold sway over the public. However, despite clashes occurring between protesters and security forces, protests have largely decreased since Chapo’s inauguration, indicating that they may continue to diminish in both scale and frequency.

Furthermore, the opposition parties’ attendance at the swearing-in ceremonies indicates that they are ready to move on from protesting the election results; something that may be reflective of the broader population.

Mondlane has announced that he is not interested in joining the new government, though is ready to help find solutions. He has emphasised that he has no problem cooperating with the government if they respond to the questions he considers ‘essential for the people’. He has called for a new round of relatively small-scale protests every Friday at 13:00 local time during the first 100 days of Chapo’s presidency to pressure the government into acquiescing to his demands.

While Mondlane has outlined that he would consider the next steps if the government does not respond to his demands, there is a realistic possibility that demonstrations’ momentum will be relatively diminished in three months. Furthermore, the time enables the government time to present itself as a change from the previous administration, something that Chapo was keen to emphasise in his inauguration speech.

UK government launches probe on Southport stabbings

The government of Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that a public inquiry will be carried out on the July attack, which killed three children and wounded ten others. On 20 January, the perpetrator of the attacks pleaded guilty to the murders, as well as additional attempted murder charges and charges related to the possession of an al-Qaeda training manual.

The attack’s aftermath resulted in severe protests and episodes of targeted sectarian violence, also fuelled by misinformation spread by online-based domestic and foreign far-right channels, in multiple cities across the United Kingdom. There is a realistic possibility of further civil unrest as the inquiry progresses.

Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico survives no-confidence motion

The vote was raised by opposition parties who accused Prime Minister Robert Fico of shifting Slovakia towards Moscow’s orbit, and of threatening to take the country out of the EU and NATO. The vote, which would have likely failed as Fico holds a parliamentary majority, did not take place as the opposition MPs walked out.

On 20 January, Fico met with Erdogan in Ankara, where the two leaders advanced the idea of redirecting Russian gas supplies to Slovakia via the TurkStream pipeline, a move that considerably worried Brussels. Demonstrations are scheduled to take place in Bratislava on 24 January, and the government stated that it would take precautionary measures over “intelligence” over an alleged plan to carry out a coup against Fico.

Spanish football fans attacked by rival fans in Rome, Italy

Approximately 70 Real Sociedad were attacked by opposing Lazio fans in central Rome on 22 January, the day before a scheduled Europa League match. At least nine Spanish fans were injured with reports indicating that at least two were stabbed and “seriously” wounded.

Football-related violence is a common occurrence in Italy. Teams like Lazio are often supported by organised “ultras” (hooligan) groups that often have ties to far right and neofascist political groups or even organised crime. OSINT analysis highlighted how the attack was highly likely carried out because of political reasons, with pro-Lazio channels describing Real Sociedad fans as “leftists”. 

Three bombings in one night in Sweden

At least two people were injured by a blast in Stockholm on the night of 17-18 January. Explosions are mostly used by organised criminal groups in Sweden and, while often targeting other groups or conducted for intimidatory purposes, often result in bystanders being injured.

Local media reports that 25 bombings occurred in December 2024, and 11 in the first half of January 2025. A growing organised crime presence in Sweden is likely to result in further attacks, especially in the peripheries of large cities. Moreover, as highlighted by counterterrorism researchers with regards to cases in France, there is a growing overlap between criminal gangs and extremist groups, with the latter seeking to obtain access to the former’s arsenals of weapons and improvised explosives.

Knife attack in Aschaffenburg, Germany kills two

Two people, including a two-year-old child, were killed in a stabbing attack in a park Aschaffenburg, Bavaria. According to local media, a man, later identified as an Afghan national who was slated for deportation, attacked a group of children from a daycare centre who were visiting the park.

Germany’s main opposition leader and likely next Chancellor, Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democrats (CDU), has called for a radical shift in Germany’s migration policy ahead of the February general election and criticised the current government for its handling of immigration and deportation processes. Political tensions are expected to intensify as the general election approaches, with migration almost certainly to be a central and controversial issue in campaign discussions.

Two Iranian supreme court justices killed in Tehran

The justices, who had occupied influential positions in Iran’s judiciary since the revolution and had reportedly adjudicated cases involving anti-regime protesters, were killed by a gunman who managed to enter the court on 18 January. A third judge and a bodyguard were also injured in the attack. The shooting follows numerous assassinations of prominent Iranian or allied figures on Iranian soil over the past year. There is a realistic possibility that the regime will use the killings as a pretext for retaliatory violence against regime opponents.

Lebanese military to receive US, EU aid to enforce ceasefire

Washington announced that it would provide USD 117 million, while Brussels pledged USD 62 million to bolster both the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF). The resources will be used to aid the Lebanese military efforts to enforce the demilitarised zone south of the Litani river that was established by the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. More broadly, with Hezbollah at a historical low point in terms of capability, reinforcing the Lebanese military is highly likely seen by both the US and EU as a way to put significant pressure on the Shia militia.

Mali-based Africa Corps receive armoured vehicles from Moscow

On 17 January, reports from Mali identified a large number of Russian armoured vehicles, including tanks and armoured personnel carriers, being delivered to the local paramilitary forces under the control of the Russian Military of Defence. The delivery, which was initially incorrectly claimed by the Malian junta to be for its forces, is significant for multiple reasons.

First, it underscores Russia’s growing commitment to bolster its presence in Africa after its strategic defeat in Syria. Second, it likely further demonstrates how Moscow considers Bamako to be its key partner in the Sahel, and likely the most stable junta in the region. Finally, the shipment of heavy equipment to the Africa Corps demonstrates Moscow’s continued commitment to shifting its model for its footprint in the Sahel away from the more independent Wagner Group towards the “aligned” Africa Corps.  

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continue making progress in Khartoum

The renewed offensive in the capital, where progress had stalled after initial SAF gains in late 2024, comes after the armed forces took control of the strategic town of Wad Madani to the south of the capital and cleared some operationally valuable towns to the capital’s north. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have reportedly been withdrawing units and equipment east of the Nile, likely to set up better defensive positions. The SAF’s primary objective is likely breaking the RSF’s siege of the Signal Corps base, located in the cities southwest. 

Nigerian army kills dozens of Islamist fighters in Borno state

At least 76 fighters from Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) were killed, and a further 72 arrested, in recent operations by Nigerian forces in the northeastern Borno state. The military’s operations are almost certainly retaliatory following an uptick in Islamist groups’ activity in early 2025. On 13 January, ISWAP militants reportedly killed at least 40 farmers in Dumba. Days prior, a failed ambush on a military patrol resulted in 34 Islamists and six soldiers being killed.

Military deployed to northeast DRC to combat Islamic State-aligned group

Troops belonging to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been deployed to the northeast of the country following an attack on the village of Makoko on 15 January. The attack was conducted by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist group aligned with the Islamic State. The initial death toll has been revised to 30 and several volunteers were attacked in the area when attempting to retrieve bodies. ADF attacks in both the DRC and neighbouring Uganda markedly increased in recent years, likely taking advantage of the government’s prioritisation of the southeast, where the rebel M23 group is leading an offensive and has successfully seized major towns and key terrain.

M23 Movement seizes town on main supply route to Goma in DRC’s North Kivu region

On 21 January, Rwanda-backed M23 rebels seized the town of Minova in North Kivu, a key supply hub for the provincial capital Goma. According to local media, clashes occurred on 22 January in Bugulube across Lake Kivu and on 23 January around Sake. The fighting reportedly triggered an exodus of civilians from Nzulo, less than 16 kilometres from Goma.

This comes amidst steady territorial gains from the rebel group after fighting accelerated in October 2024. Recent gains over the past two weeks have reportedly led to over 178,000 displacements, according to the UN. M23 rebels will likely attempt to capitalise on their recent territorial gains and attempt to retake North Kivu’s provincial capital Goma. There is a realistic possibility that further government losses will ignite civil unrest in the capital Kinshasa, which are often anti-Western in their sentiment and violently suppressed by the police.

Fire at a ski resort in Turkey kills at least 78

On 21 January, a fire broke out at approximately 03:30 local time in the restaurant of the Grand Kartal Hotel in Kartalkaya in the Koroglu mountains in northwest Turkey. The high death toll is partially due to the inadequate fire safety measures at the hotel, despite the hotel’s popularity. While some survivors reportedly did not hear an alarm, the hotel’s fire extinguishing systems have been labelled as inadequate.

While the Turkish Culture and Tourism Minister Mehmet Nuri Ersoy stated that the hotel had a fire competence certificate, local mayor Tanju Ozcan stated that the fire department had not issued a positive report since 2007. Police have detained eleven people including the hotel owner as part of an investigation into the fire. Given the high death toll and perceived incompetence of the fire department, who were reportedly responsible for issuing the fire competence certificate, unrest targeting a tightening of legislation and safety standards at such resorts is likely.

Marburg outbreak confirmed in northwest Tanzania

Despite initial attempts to deny the suspected outbreak of the Marburg virus in the northwest Kagera Region, the Tanzanian government confirmed the outbreak on 20 January. The outbreak was confirmed after identifying at least one case in the 25 suspected cases.

The Marburg virus, a highly infectious and often fatal disease, is similar to Ebola and is transmitted to humans from fruit bats and monkeys; it has a very high fatality rate if not treated. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) is deploying a multidisciplinary team and committing USD 2 million to support Tanzania in containing the Marburg virus outbreak, focusing on surveillance, diagnostics, case management, and community engagement.

On 18 January, Myanmar’s junta government and the ethnically Chinese Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) signed a China-brokered ceasefire which came into immediate effect. The ceasefire came after months of pressure from Beijing, and was finally agreed in the seventh round of peace talks in Kunming, China. The MNDAA have reportedly agreed to pull its forces out of several key positions including Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State which was captured in August 2024. The ceasefire terms dictate that full withdrawal must be completed by June.

However, the group has reportedly maintained many of its gains since the offensive beginning October 2023, also known as Operation 1027. Fighting has resumed elsewhere; on 20 January, Myanmar’s military junta bombed the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)-controlled Nawnghkio town in Shan state and carried out two bombing runs in the People’s Defense Forces-controlled Khampat Town in Tamu Township, Sagaing Region on 21 January.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The MNDAA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA), which consists of two other groups, the TNLA and the Arakan Army (AA). The Alliance has been engaged in an ongoing offensive against the military junta since October 2023. During the offensive, the groups captured a significant amount of territory consisting of several towns and border crossings with China in Shan State.

So far, there are no indications that the other two members of the TBA are party to the ceasefire. After securing the ceasefire between the MNDAA and the military junta, Beijing will likely turn its attention to the other two members. The TNLA indicated in November that they are ready to engage in peace talks and the AA followed suit in December, providing a potential pathway for another China-mediated ceasefire.

While the ceasefire presents an opportunity for both sides to de-escalate tensions and engage in further peace talks, its staying power remains to be seen. A China-brokered January 2024 ceasefire between the military junta and the TBA lasted approximately five months, breaking down in June amid continued air and artillery strikes on insurgent-controlled areas and mutual mistrust. Furthermore, while the other two members of the alliance have indicated a willingness to talk, they are not yet party to a ceasefire agreement.

As part of its strategy to pressure the MNDAA into a ceasefire, Beijing closed China’s borders with northern Shan State in June 2024, cutting supplies to citizens residing in MNDAA-controlled territory. In the aftermath of the ceasefire, The Chin Shwe Haw border crossing between China and northern Shan State has been opened, allowing a resumption of trade. This is crucial for China’s economic interests, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Sino-Myanmar pipelines. A reduction in tensions in Myanmar is also key to securing the China-Myanmar border and safeguard regional security since instability in border regions could trigger influxes of refugees.

Thailand legalises same-sex marriage

Thailand has become the first country in Southeast Asia and the third in Asia (following Taiwan and Nepal) to legalise same-sex marriage. The new law grants equal legal rights to same-sex couples, including financial, medical, and adoption rights, and will likely contribute to a cultural shift in Thailand which could reverberate in other parts of Southeast Asia. However, opinion polls indicate that public support was overwhelmingly in favour of the new legislation, parts of Thailand remain deeply conservative and a backlash from more traditional segments of society is possible.

Impeached South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol facing insurrection charges

President Yoon, who was impeached following his attempt to declare martial law, is currently facing charges of insurrection and abuse of power. His impeachment hearing at the Constitutional Court in Seoul has seen significant police presence and sparked protests from both supporters and opponents. He has defended his actions again, stating his declaration of martial law was meant to inform the public of the dangers of an opposition-controlled National Assembly.

Police have also sought arrest warrants for two officials from the presidential security service accused of obstructing investigations related to Yoon’s arrest. The situation has been marked by unrest, with multiple arrests made during protests in support of Yoon. The former president has been detained and moved to solitary confinement. His impeachment hearing continues to draw large crowds and requires substantial police deployment to maintain order. Further unrest is likely as the legal process unfolds.

Chinese national killed in northeastern Afghanistan

The targeted attack occurred on the night of 21-22 January in the Takhar province, near the border with Tajikistan. A Chinese national and a Taliban official were killed in the attack, which also wounded other Chinese and Afghan nationals. The attack was claimed by a group called the National Mobilisation Front (NMF), as well as by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The NMF is an anti-Taliban, anti-ISKP group, which claims to be mostly formed of pre-Taliban Afghan military members.

The NMF justified the attack by stating that the target was a Chinese envoy working with the Taliban intelligence department. While attacks on Chinese nationals have grown in neighbouring Pakistan, they are rare in Afghanistan. The simultaneous claim of the attack by two groups that are ideologically and militarily opposed to each other underscores the high value of Chinese assets and citizens as targets for multiple militant forces. It is likely that attacks on Chinese targets have a strong symbolic value compounded by high visibility for these groups, which thus use them for propaganda and recruitment purposes.

Pakistani intelligence chief visits Bangladesh to improve intelligence sharing

For the first time in decades, the head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has visited Bangladesh, where he was received by Lieutenant General Muhammad Faizur Rahman of the Bangladesh Army. The visit is partially aimed at establishing an intelligence-sharing network between the two countries but has raised concerns due to Rahman’s suspected ties to Islamists and Pakistan.

There are fears that this renewed engagement could lead to subversive activities targeting India, especially through cross-border operations with India suspecting that ISI has long worked with extremist groups that maintain a presence in both India and Bangladesh. The visit follows a series of interactions between Bangladesh and Pakistan, suggesting a thaw in their previously hostile relationship.

Quad member states meet to discuss future policies for Indo-Pacific

On 21 January, the Quad member states of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan convened in Washington to focus on major security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. Salient talking points were the strengthening of free trade and a shared commitment to upholding democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

The was the first Quad meeting since the return of President Trump and occurred only a day after Trump’s inauguration, likely indicating a renewed focus on strengthening the alliance and prioritising regional security concerns, particularly in response to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and its unilateral actions in support of its extensive territorial claims.

Childcare centre targeted in anti-Semitic attack in Sydney, Australia

On 21 January, a childcare centre in Sydney was set on fire in what authorities are deeming the latest incident in a growing trend of anti-Semitic attacks in Australia. The centre, which is located adjacent to a Jewish school and synagogue in the east of the city, was also sprayed with anti-Semitic graffiti. Australia has witnessed a major spike in both anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, with at least six reported incidents in Sydney over the past two months.

Landslide kills at least 19 in Indonesia

The landslide occurred on 21 January in the city of Pekalongan in Central Java following heavy rains that started on the day prior. The rainy season in Java runs from November to March and often triggers flooding on the island. Hilly areas such as those affected by the recent landslides are at a higher risk of flash floods and landslides, and the lack of flood-resistant infrastructure can often complicate search and rescue efforts, as well as making floods’ impact worse.

Further rain is expected in the coming days which could exacerbate flooding and trigger further landslides. Several people still remain missing and casualty figures may rise in the coming days.

Taiwanese undersea cables cut

Two undersea cables connecting Taiwan and the Matsu Islands were reported to have been completely severed on 22 January. Taiwanese authorities claimed that the damage was due to environmental factors and degradation, and that no “suspicious vessels” were reported to have transited near the cable.

Repairs are expected to be completed by late February and a backup system, which uses asynchronous satellites, was activated meaning that the recent damages will highly likely not result in significant disruptions. The incident, which is the fourth cable disruption reported in 2025, is still likely to worry Pacific powers, as it cannot be separated from the growing trend of deliberate, state-sponsored sabotage of undersea infrastructure.

Magnitude 6.4 earthquake in central Taiwan

On 20 January, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake struck Chiayi County in central Taiwan. The earthquake caused significant damage and disruptions and resulted in at least 26 injuries, with the majority occurring in Tainan, and others reported in Yunlin and Chiayi.

The earthquake also led to widespread power outages, with up to 7,000 customers affected in Kaohsiung and 12,000 households in Tainan’s Baihe District experiencing temporary power loss. Structural damage was observed in various areas, including the collapse of multiple residential buildings in Tainan’s Nanxi District, where several people were initially trapped. Approximately 30 households in Tainan’s Yujing District were evacuated due to damage in a multi-story residential building.

Taiwanese authorities have warned of potential aftershocks, with magnitudes possibly reaching 5.0 near the earthquake’s epicentre.

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On 10 January, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was sworn in for his third term despite widespread allegations of electoral fraud during the presidential election. Few international leaders attended the inauguration and only two Latin American leaders were present, President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and President Miguel Díaz-Canel of Cuba, both of whom share Maduro’s far-left authoritarian stance.

Protests occurred in the run-up and during the inauguration but did not reach the levels witnessed during the presidential election. The US, UK and the EU imposed new sanctions on the Maduro regime following the inauguration, with US sanctions including an increased reward for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to USD 25 million from USD 15 million.

Maduro denounced sanctions as an “economic war” on Venezuela and threatened to seize Puerto Rico from the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Maduro’s third term will likely be marked by continued and widespread repression of the opposition, with the regime overly dependent on the military and police to ensure its survival. The scale of protests during the inauguration was likely limited by the arrest of key opposition leaders, a tactic that will almost certainly continue as Maduro consolidates power and curbs the influence of the opposition, civil society groups, journalists and any other critic of the regime.

The low international turnout and the imposition of new sanctions reflect the broader international condemnation of Maduro’s presidency and its lack of legitimacy. These trends will likely push Caracas further towards the orbit of states hostile to the West, including Russia, China and Iran despite BRICS recent rejection of Venezuela- a move caused by Brazil’s veto.

Maduro’s threat towards Puerto Rico is almost certainly sabre-rattling designed to rally his base, with Venezuela lacking the military strength to mount any viable challenge to the US. However, now that Maduro has begun his third term, there is a realistic possibility of increased hostilities with Guyana, with Venezuela claiming the oil-rich Essequibo region. As Maduro consolidates his grip on power, he may seek to intensify these tensions to distract from domestic issues and rally nationalist support.

Supporters of former Bolivian President Evo Morales marched on Bolivia’s administrative capital, La Paz on 13 January. Protestors have clashed with police on multiple occasions and have tried to gain entry to government buildings, including the vice-presidency building. The police have deployed crowd dispersal methods in response, including the use of tear gas.

The protests, predominantly led by Bolivia’s Indigenous community, are partly a reaction to the reissuance of an arrest warrant for Morales in December for charges of statutory rape. However, they are also fuelled by economic hardship and a belief that President Arce is using legal charges against Morales to diminish his influence ahead of the August 2025 presidential election.

Solace Global Assessment: 

With inflation reaching ten per cent, major fuel shortages, critical shortages in imported goods and a lack of foreign reserves, Bolivia is potentially heading for a major economic crisis that will likely sustain unrest until the 2025 presidential election and potentially beyond.

However, the protests, particularly those led by Bolivia’s Indigenous community, have likely exacerbated the country’s economic challenges. Roadblocks, which have become a common tactic in these demonstrations, have significantly disrupted the flow of goods and services, particularly along major supply routes where they have often been erected. The roadblocks are assessed to have cost the economy in excess of USD 2 billion and have exacerbated inflation and fuel supply issues.

The prolonged targeting of Morales combined with the police’s forceful response to indigenous protests, is likely to lead to an increased mobilisation of the indigenous community and heightened tensions, with previous examples suggesting that such tactics only fuel more unrest.

With mounting economic pressures, continued unrest and heightened tensions, Bolivia is likely to enter into a cycle of political instability, further deepening the economic crisis and likely shaping the conditions for a volatile and often violent run-up to the 2025 presidential election.

US to remove Cuba from “state sponsors of terrorism” risk and ease sanctions

The announcement is likely to be one of the last major foreign policy moves made by the Biden administration and follows the precedent set by the Obama White House. Donald Trump reversed President Obama’s move towards the end of his first term, and it is likely that the same will happen once the transition is completed. It is therefore unlikely that this development will be anything more than a symbolic gesture before the return of the Trump administration, with the incoming president likely to sustain his tough stance on the Caribbean nation.

US presidential inauguration to occur on 20 January

President-elect Donald Trump is set to be inaugurated on 20 January for his second term in office, an event that will likely bring severe traffic disruption to central Washington D.C. and a massive security deployment of around 25,000 military and law enforcement personnel.

The highly visible nature of the ceremony makes it an attractive potential target for violent extremists, including domestic and foreign actors. While FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that no specific or credible threats have been identified, this does not rule out the possibility of an attack. Self-radicalised lone actors pose the greatest threat, particularly given the relative ease of obtaining firearms in the US compared to other Western nations. Security agencies have also warned of potential disruptions from anticipated protests,

Over one million now displaced within Haiti

The United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) has stated that over one million people, more than half of whom are children, have now been displaced within Haiti due to escalating gang violence. This figure is three times that of December 2023 and is largely in part to the gangs’ near-total control of Port-au-Prince and other highly populated areas.

The agency warned that shelters are overcrowded, and access to basic necessities such as food and water remains critically limited. Deportations from neighbouring countries, mainly the Dominican Republic, have exacerbated the humanitarian strain, which aid agencies are struggling to deal with.

The IOM has called for urgent aid and long-term solutions; however, with the gangs consolidating power in the capital and disrupting air travel from the island nation, major improvements are unlikely without a major international intervention.

Flooding crisis in eastern Brazil

Since 12 January, the flooding crisis in eastern Brazil has worsened due to ongoing heavy rains, with at least 26 deaths and 3,270 displaced in Minas Gerais as of 16 January. Sixty-three municipalities are under a state of emergency, and emergency responders are overwhelmed by calls in Divinopolis.

Other affected states include Bahia, Pernambuco, and Sergipe, with specific warnings for Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. Authorities have issued warnings for continued heavy rains, which will highly likely lead to more severe flooding and a high threat of major landslides.

Overnight on 13-14 January, Ukraine conducted a large-scale series of long-range strikes against multiple targets on multiple axes between 200-1,000km into Russia. The attack reportedly used six UK-provided Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and US-provided ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), in addition to at least 146 one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs, or attack drones).

The targets included an oil refinery and oil storage facility, glide bomb and cruise missile warehouses, chemical plants, a thermal power plant and military-industrial facilities. These targets were struck in the oblasts of Bryansk, Saratov, Tula, as well as in the Republic of Tatarstan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the largest such attack by Ukraine against Russia in the war thus far, the strikes were primarily conducted against strategic, rather than tactical, targets. Strategic long-range strikes seek to degrade a state’s ability to wage war by destroying the basis of that state’s military capability.

The attack, therefore, likely indicates to the incoming Trump administration and other key Western allies that Ukraine is capable of continuing the fight against Russia for some time yet. There is a realistic possibility that while Ukraine only has a limited number of Western-provided advanced missile systems, Ukraine has built up a substantial stockpile of domestically produced OWA-UAVs that it can use to conduct further periodic large-scale strategic attacks into Russia.

The attack emulated the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of large-scale Russian long-range attacks, by layering large quantities of cheap OWA-UAVS that can overwhelm air defences with advanced missile systems. With the advent of the OWA-UAV, this is highly likely a new universally applicable tactic of warfighting to penetrate advanced modern air defence, which will almost certainly be replicated by other state militaries as well as capable non-state actors (such as the Houthis in Yemen).

Russia is highly likely to retaliate. The November 2024 decision by the Biden administration to allow the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow against targets in internationally recognised Russian territory led to large-scale Russian retaliation strikes. The retaliation strikes included the use of the new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

There is a realistic possibility that in addition to the regular large-scale attacks against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure (CNI), such as a 14-15 January series of strikes, Russia will launch a notably significant wave of attacks against Ukrainian urban centres. These attacks could include the use of Oreshnik (largely due to its symbolic value) and the indiscriminate targeting of civilian targets.

On 11 January, intelligence officials of Syria’s new government announced they thwarted a plan by the Islamic State (IS) to bomb a Shiite shrine in the Damascus suburb of Sayyida Zeinab.

On 14 January, local channels reported the arrest of the Egyptian citizen Ahmad al-Mansur, who had reportedly sought to start an Islamist movement, named the “January 25 Revolutionaries”, to launch an insurrection against Egyptian leader al-Sisi.

On 15 January, other reports indicated that HTS forces had killed Bassem Hussam al-Din, the commander of a Latakia-based militia that had threatened the transition government weeks ago and had reportedly kidnapped multiple security forces members.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The new Syrian administration is likely focusing significant efforts on domestic security and counterterrorism as it seeks to bolster its domestic and international credibility as a long-term administrator for the country. At home, the administration is balancing multiple possible vectors of instability. The various anti-Assad rebel groups and splinter units that have remained armed after the regime’s fall may increasingly become attractive springboards for foreign-backed efforts to destabilise Syria, or may develop into radical formations.

Abroad, the new Syrian administration has taken considerable steps to reassure regional powers, as well as the West, of its viability as a diplomatic partner. The immediate decapitation of the January 25 movement can likely be interpreted in this light. Additionally, Syria’s forces counterterrorism operation against IS is a political victory for the new government, which has pledged to protect religious and ethnic minorities in the country. 

During this reporting period, representatives of Hamas and the Israeli government negotiating in Doha reportedly reached a “breakthrough”, making the approval of a ceasefire in Gaza imminent. By 16 January, reports indicated that the two sides agreed on a three-phase ceasefire framework.

During the first phase, which is to last 42 days, hostilities will end, and Israeli troops will withdraw to the border, retaining control over the Philadelphi corridor at the Gaza-Egypt border. Surviving Israeli hostages as well as the remains of those who died in captivity would then be exchanged for Palestinian prisoners (with a 30:1 or 50:1 ratio, the latter for women and underage hostages). Gradual hostage exchanges would then continue, while humanitarian aid to Gaza would be considerably boosted.

In phase two, also 42 days-long, Israeli forces will completely withdraw from Gaza. Phase three will mostly focus on reconstruction efforts.

On 16 January, the final approval to the agreement was reportedly delayed by internal disagreements within the Israeli government. Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich’s party “Religious Zionism” threatened to pull support from Netanyahu’s government if the deal were to be approved. Similarly, hard-right Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir also threatened to quit.

A meeting to finalise the ceasefire’s approval was delayed and is scheduled to be held on 17 January.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ceasefire achieves some but not all of the Netanyahu government’s stated war goals. It achieves the liberation of the remaining hostages and secures, at least for a period, Israeli control over the vital Egypt-Gaza border. However, the ceasefire does not include the disbandment of Hamas. While Hamas’ has been significantly weakened and depleted by the war and is unlikely to be able to fully replenish its strength during the ceasefire, it has survived the conflict. Hamas will almost certainly use the ceasefire to reinfiltrate parts of Gaza, especially in the north, and to carry out operations against other Palestinian militias operating in Gaza, which have threatened its authority.

In the short term, the ceasefire is almost certain to boost the delivery of much-needed aid to Gaza. This is likely to be compounded by renewed humanitarian efforts by EU and Gulf states. After phase one, there is a realistic possibility of the ceasefire breaking down, especially if the hard-right parties that support the Netanyahu government retain their maximalist positions. The first foreign policy actions of the Trump administration, set to begin on 20 January, are likely to be crucial for the viability of the ceasefire.

In Israel, the ceasefire will highly likely threaten the stability of the Netanyahu administration. The hard-right and pro-war activists are likely to see the ceasefire as “betraying” the goal of destroying Hamas in Gaza. Conversely, anti-war activists, generally on the left, will accuse the Netanyahu government of arbitrarily prolonging the war. Anti-government sentiment from both the left and hard right will likely result in large-scale demonstrations in Israeli urban centres.

If sustained, the ceasefire is likely to have an impact at the international level. A prolonged truce followed by reconstruction will likely lead to a reduction in pro-Palestine protests, although this will likely increase should either party renege. However, the threat posed by radicalisation after the war almost certainly will remain extant, with a high chance of lone-actor attacks in the West regardless of the ceasefire’s success.

After starting as a tropical depression in the Indian Ocean, the storm Dikeledi intensified into a tropical cyclone with maximum windspeeds of 169km/h. On 11 January, Cyclone Dikeledi made landfall in northern Madagascar, causing widespread flooding, landslides and heavy rainfall, resulting in at least three deaths.

After making landfall, Dikeledi weakened into a tropical storm and tracked west in the Mozambique Channel south of Mayotte and Comoros. In Mayotte, at least 14,500 people sought refuge in emergency shelters and heavy rainfall caused flooding and landslides.

The storm then again intensified into a cyclone and briefly made landfall in Mozambique east of Nampula on 13 January, before tracking south. In Nampula, authorities report at least five deaths, over 5,000 houses destroyed, and 35,000 people affected.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The most severe storm of the current South West Indian Ocean cyclone season so far, Cyclone Chido, devastated the French overseas department of Mayotte in December 2024. Mayotte was far less impacted by Dikeledi, although the ongoing recovery efforts from Chido have highly likely been impeded.

This current cyclone season is forecast to run from November 2024 to April 2025 (excluding Mauritius and the Seychelles, which is forecast to end in May 2025). The island nations and overseas territories in the South West Indian Ocean are highly vulnerable to the impact of cyclones.

In the event of a severe natural disaster, evacuation options for business travellers and employees in the region would be limited to difficult and costly maritime options in the event of critical airport closures.

On 15 January, Frelimo candidate Daniel Chapo was inaugurated as President of Mozambique. In his inauguration speech, Chapo announced several measures, promising to slim down government, reduce the number of ministries, and scrap the central-level State Secretariats. He stated that he would redirect the money to education, health, agriculture, water, roads, and energy.

As the third day of the announced three days of strikes, protests occurred across several cities in Mozambique including Maputo and Nampula. Demonstrations occurred directly outside the inauguration ceremony. Security forces responded with live ammunition and tear gas, killing at least eight people. Footage was shared on social media of security forces hitting an unarmed woman.  According to local NGOs, approximately 303 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began.

On 17 January, Frelimo is set to destroy all ballot papers from the October 9 general election. The destruction is set to take place publicly at the District and City Elections Commissions ‘before representatives of candidates, political parties, coalitions of political parties, groups of proposing voters, observers, journalists, and voters in general’, according to the National Elections Commission (CNE). On 8 January, the Public Integrity Center (CIP) reportedly filed an appeal with the Administrative Court to halt the destruction of the ballots.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that Chapo is attempting to present himself as a reformer to portray a distinction between his ministry and the previous government. Now Frelimo have successfully inaugurated their candidate, they will likely attempt to appease protesters with reforms. While the destruction of the ballot papers will likely be incendiary in the immediate term, with protesters likely attempting to storm the District and City Elections Commissions, it may inject a sense of defeatism into opposition forces since they will no longer able to concretely prove that the election was fraudulent.

Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane has declared that he is the legitimate head of state and will announce a program for the ‘first 100 days of his term in office’ on 17 January at 15:00 local time (13:00 UTC). Given he does not have access to state resources, these measures will likely be highly symbolic. He has previously stated that Mozambique requires a new flag; this will likely feature on the agenda. Mondlane has also indicated an end to the protests over the coming months as he implements his shadow government. While the details are yet to be released, this is highly likely to take the momentum out of the demonstrations, which have relied on Mondlane’s organisation since the election.

There is a realistic possibility that Chapo’s inauguration marks a turning point for unrest in Mozambique. The inauguration period has now ended, and Frelimo will almost certainly aim to portray Chapo as a fresh leader with ambitions to better the population, as reflected in Chapo’s inauguration speech. Furthermore, international pressure will likely decrease as other countries set out to strengthen relations with Mozambique’s new government.

Whether demonstrations continue to escalate is almost certainly dependent on Mondlane’s announcement on 17 January. While security forces attempting to arrest Mondlane would also almost certainly incentivise demonstrations, the government has, so far, refrained from taking such measures. It is likely they will continue to refrain from inflaming demonstrations. Without a clear route to power, the widespread perception that Frelimo have “won”, and exhaustion from the economic disruption from the unrest, there is a realistic possibility that demonstrations will gradually diminish over the coming months.

German far-right congress blocked by 10,000 protesters

The demonstrators blocked the entrance to the planned event, in the east German town of Riesa, Saxony, which had been organised by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. Germany is holding general elections on 23 February, and the AfD is polling at 21 per cent, which would be the party’s best-ever result in national elections. Party leader Alice Weidel was nominated as the AfD’s official candidate for the chancellorship despite the disruptions. Further protests against the far-right are almost certain in the run-up to the elections, with previous demonstrations attracting hundreds of thousands of participants.

Davos summit likely to drive civil unrest in Western urban centres

The World Economic Forum (WEF) will host its annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, between 20 and 24 January. The Davos summit is a preferred target for environmentalists, anti-capitalist left-wing groups, and other organisations, and is likely to attract protests. Civil unrest is highly likely to occur in Davos itself, causing some disruptions. Other protests are likely to occur in large Western urban centres, like London, Paris, or Brussels. There is a particularly high likelihood of small-scale symbolic actions by anti-WEF groups, including actions meant to disrupt public transport in target cities.

Thousands demonstrate in Belgrade

On 12 January, 20,000 people gathered in a student-led anti-government protest outside the Constitutional Court of Serbia in Belgrade to commemorate victims of the railway station roof collapse in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024 which left 15 dead. The roof collapse has been blamed on sloppy reconstruction work due to corruption; the Novi Sad railway station building was renovated in a deal with Chinese state companies.

A separate protest also occurred in Nis. Protesters demanded that those responsible be brought to justice. The unrest follows a series of protests which occurred in November and December 2024. The demonstrations reflect a broader frustration with perceived failings of the government. President Aleksandar Vucic is increasingly perceived as shifting towards autocratic rule by curbing democratic freedoms and infringing on civil rights. Further unrest in Serbia is highly likely.

Former Georgian prime minister hospitalised after beating by unidentified individuals

Anti-government protests have continued in Georgia, with levels of political violence escalating. Alongside the deployment of draconian riot police tactics against protesters, the role of pro-government plainclothes provocateurs continues to increase. Called “Titushky” by opposition supporters, a Ukrainian name which derives from the pro-Russian “thugs” who frequently attacked pro-European Ukrainians during the Euromaidan movement, they have highly likely been used to suppress the pro-European movement in Georgia with violence.

On 15 January, footage surfaced showing unidentified men attacking participants of a strike that had gathered in central Tbilisi. On 14 January, Giorgi Gakharia, a former prime minister of Georgia between 2019-2021 who now leads the For Georgia opposition party, was hospitalised after being severely beaten in the lobby of the Sheraton hotel in Batumi. The attack, highly likely conducted by “Titushky”, is likely indicative of an increasingly violent crackdown on the Georgian opposition.

Nawaf Salam is the new Lebanese Prime Minister

Nawaf Salam is the head of the International Court of Justice and was widely supported by Christian, Druze, and Sunni members of parliament, while the Shiite representatives, Hezbollah and its ally the Amal Movement, failed to field a candidate. The appointment of Salam is a political setback for Hezbollah and may underscore a greater boldness by its Lebanese opponents to confront its position as an informal “second military” in Lebanon.

Last week, President Joseph Aoun vowed to ensure that only the state retains control of all arms in the country, a statement that was obviously directed at Hezbollah. While no concrete measures are in place to disarm Hezbollah, such a plan is almost certainly too ambitious to be implemented by the Lebanese government.

More realistically, Salam could work to reduce Hezbollah’s influence in the judiciary and legislature while directing “kinetic” efforts to ensure the continuation of the ceasefire agreement with Israel south of the Litani river, a move that may also send positive signals to Lebanon’s southern neighbour and its allies in Washington.

Mali forces seize gold stocks at Canadian mining company site

The government of Mali began enforcing a provisional order to seize gold at the Loulo-Gounkoto site operated by the Canadian Barrick Gold mining company. The move follows Mali blocking gold shipments by the company, and detaining company employees. It almost certainly continues to highlight the worsening security and viability of Western private actors in the Sahel. There is a realistic possibility that similar developments will follow in Burkina Faso, Niger, and potentially Chad.

NATO to increase force posture in Baltic Sea after multiple cables cut

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has initiated operation “Baltic Sentry” in response to a rise in suspected incidents of underwater sabotage that have primarily targeted undersea internet cables. The operation will include the deployment of frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and autonomous vehicles, including uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).

The operation will almost certainly involve an increase in surveillance on suspected Russian “shadow fleet” vessels, civilian flagged vessels that are alleged to work at the behest of Russian intelligence. However, with Russia’s shadow fleet estimated to contain hundreds of vessels, the NATO task group will likely struggle to actively monitor and deter Russia vessels capable of engaging in Russia’s maritime grey zone strategy.

Anarchist activist firebombs Italian army barracks

On the night of 13 January, a barracks operated by the Carabinieri (Italy’s gendarmerie) in Borgo San Lorenzo, near Florence, was attacked with Molotov cocktails, causing some damage but no injuries. An individual, reportedly an Anarchist activist, was arrested in connection to the incident. There is a realistic possibility that the firebombing was linked to ongoing anti-police protests in central and northern Italy, which have been sparked by the killing of a 19-year-old during a police chase.

Armenia to join global coalition against the Islamic State (IS)

Armenian and American officials announced the beginning of closer defence cooperation between Armenia and the United States, including the former joining the global coalition against IS. Politically, the announcement follows previous Armenian efforts to pivot towards the West following the significant deterioration of its relations with Moscow, following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The announcement almost certainly highlights a growing US interest in the Caucasus, where IS presence is growing through the increased recruitment of Islamic State-Caucasus Province (IS-CP) . In late 2024, an IS-CP cell was discovered in north Azerbaijan and IS-CP has recently claimed attacks in Dagestan, Russia.

Spanish tourist reportedly kidnapped in southern Algeria

Uncorroborated reports indicate that on 15 January a female Spanish tourist was kidnapped from near the southern Algeria town of Tamanrasset, approximately 300km away from the borders with Mali and Niger. The woman was then taken across the border to Mali, where much of the northern region remains largely lawless.

Reports suggest that the woman was captured by militants belonging to the Islamic State Sahel Province, an affiliate of the Islamic State that has grown substantially because of the destabilisation of the Sahel. The kidnappers will now likely attempt to secure a ransom from the Spanish government to fund future operations.

Russia and Iran scheduled to sign 20-year strategic pact

On 17 January, the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin are scheduled to meet in Moscow and sign strategic partnership deal that will govern relations between Russia and Iran for the next 20 years. The deal is claimed to include the further expansion of bilateral ties in trade, investment, transportation, and humanitarian sectors, as well as a deepening of cooperation in defence and security.

Russo-Iranian cooperation is already significant, with Iran supplying Russia with large quantities of Shahed series one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs), attack drones that Russia uses to conduct almost daily attacks against Ukraine. In 2024, the Kremlin made a similar strategic partnership with Pyongyang, leading to the deployment of over 10,000 North Korean troops which are currently engaged in high-intensity combat operations against Ukraine in the Kursk salient. It is unlikely, however, that Iran will send troops.

The agreement is an immediate challenge for the shortly forthcoming Trump administration, with Trump having previously adopted a distinctly hawkish foreign policy posture towards Iran. The agreement likely indicates that Moscow is unwilling to distance itself from Tehran and risk losing critical attack drone supplies in an effort to appease Trump.

Niger and China sign pipeline security memorandum

On 14 January, the Chinese pipeline operator WAPCO signed a framework covering security at its Niger-based operations. The development not only highlights China’s growing economic and strategic footprint in the Sahel, partially accelerated by the West’s retrenchment but also likely Beijing’s growing worries about Islamist groups targeting its assets and citizens in at-risk countries. Attacks on Chinese economic interests have been pervasive in Pakistan, and there is a high likelihood that as China’s footprint grows, African Islamist groups, particularly those affiliated with transregional groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, will increasingly target Chinese interest in the region.

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) make progress in Gezira state, take Wad Madani

SAF units reportedly pushed out Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the city in Gezira state. Wad Madani is a key logistical hub on the Blue Nile, which controls supply routes to Khartoum, located just to its north, and to eastern regions of the country. The offensive is likely to be important for future SAF efforts to secure control of Gezeira state. There is a realistic possibility that the capture of Wad Madani will strengthen the Sudanese government’s position in Khartoum, where SAF advances have recently resumed.

Icelandic authorities increase aviation alert level in response to seismic activity

On 14 January, the Icelandic Meteorological Office elevated the aviation alert level from green to yellow as a precaution. The decision was taken after 130 earthquakes were detected beneath Iceland’s Bardarbunga volcano, provoking concerns over an eruption. The earthquakes included a magnitude 5.1 tremor and 17 others registering above magnitude 3, likely indicating magma accumulation beneath the volcano. The volcano is one of six volcanic systems located under Europe’s biggest glacier Vatnajokull, and in the event of a subglacial eruption, there is a substantial risk of an ash eruption and subglacial flooding

Marburg outbreak suspected in northwest Tanzania

An outbreak of Marburg Virus Disease (MVD), a severe haemorrhagic fever with no known treatment or vaccine, is suspected in Tanzania’s Kagera region, near the borders with Rwanda and Burundi. Nine suspected cases have been reported, including eight deaths, resulting in a case-fatality ratio of 89 per cent. Healthcare workers are among the affected.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has raised concerns about the potential for further spread, particularly given Kagera’s position as a transit hub with frequent cross-border movement. A recent MVD outbreak in Rwanda, which affected 66 people and caused 15 deaths, was declared over in December 2024. In response, rapid response teams have been deployed, a mobile laboratory and treatment centres have been established, and ongoing laboratory tests and contact tracing are underway.

On 15 January, authorities detained Yoon after he failed to comply with multiple summonses from police and investigators. Yoon stated that he would cooperate with investigators but criticised his arrest as illegal. Investigators have 48 hours to question him at the corruption agency’s headquarters in Gwacheon before applying for a detention warrant that could extend his detainment for up to 20 days. On 17 January, South Korea’s anti-corruption agency stated that it would seek to extend Yoon’s detention. Yoon’s defence team is seeking a review of his arrest warrant, and his impeachment trial is set to continue.

The arrest followed a standoff at the presidential residence in Seoul, where authorities faced resistance from Yoon’s supporters and the acting chief of presidential security, who was subsequently detained for obstruction. Approximately 3,000 police officers were deployed to arrest Yoon.  A similar incident occurred on 3 January, whereby authorities were prevented from arresting Yoon after being blocked for approximately six hours. The situation remains fluid, with Yoon’s legal team negotiating for his voluntary appearance before investigators.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Yoon is the first sitting president of South Korea to be arrested. He reportedly faced hours of questioning after his arrest but has not yet been charged. If found guilty of insurrection, Yoon faces the prospect of a heavy fine or life imprisonment. The crime also technically carries the death sentence, but this outcome is highly unlikely due to a long-standing moratorium on executions.

Yoon’s arrest constitutes an important step in restoring normality in South Korean politics. Since Yoon’s declaration of martial law on 3 December, uncertainty has persisted after Yoon refused to step down despite efforts by opposition forces to impeach him, which eventually succeeded on 14 December. The longer Yoon resisted arrest, the greater the chances of further unrest and clashes between his supporters and anti-Yoon movements and government forces. Furthermore, the authorities’ failure to arrest Yoon constituted a source of embarrassment for South Korea’s security forces. If Yoon successfully evaded arrest, it may embolden politicians to curb democratic institutions to retain power.

On 13 January, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated near Muang Pattani police station in Thailand’s southern province of Pattani, injuring nine paramilitary rangers and one Malaysian tourist. The bomb was attached to a motorcycle, which was left by a suspect who fled on foot. Police cordoned off the area and jammed mobile phone signals, fearing that suspected insurgents might have planted a second bomb to ambush officers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This attack adds to a growing series of militant assaults in southern Thailand, a region long plagued by insurgent activity, largely attributed to separatist Islamist groups such as the  Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the New Pattani Revolutionary Front (BPP). Although the latest attack did not result in fatalities, it marks yet another example of the increased use of IEDs by separatist groups in the region.

These attacks have largely escaped international attention, partly due to the lack of high-profile casualties and the Thai authorities’ efforts to downplay the violence to protect the tourism industry and foreign investment. However, the increase in attacks may indicate a resurgence of the insurgency, with peace talks failing to make meaningful progress.

On 16 January, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra visited the three southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, despite the threat of militancy. Her visit was likely a bid to reassure the public and demonstrate the government’s commitment to the restive south, as well as to reassure Chinese visitors, millions of whom visit Thailand during the Chinese Lunar year which begins on 29 January.

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan sentenced to 14 years in prison

The sentence is linked to a corruption case. Khan was accused of exchanging government land for favours by a major real estate developer. Khan, who has been in prison since August 2023, is the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and remains hugely popular in the country and among the Pakistani diaspora community. PTI activists and other supporters have staged sporadic large-scale protests since Khan was imprisoned.

In November 2024, protests led to multiple cities in Pakistan being paralysed, six deaths, and over 1,000 arrests. There is a high likelihood that this development will lead to further protests. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility of civil unrest in cities with a large Pakistani community, including London and other UK urban centres.

Pakistani army expands operations against Baloch militants

At least 27 militants, most belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), have been killed by Pakistani army operations in the restless Balochistan province. Army operations targeted several militant hideouts, as well as weapons and ammunition depots, resulting in the capturing of lethal material. The raids were initiated after a series of BLA and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) which killed multiple government troops.

However, both militant groups have responded with IED attacks on government forces. This is likely to demonstrate strength and to exploit the current overstretching of the Pakistani military which is also contending with a border conflict with the Afghan Taliban, an increase in attacks attributed to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and a wave of sectarian violence in the west of the country.

Beijing deploys its largest coastguard vessel in the Philippines’ waters

On 14 January, Beijing deployed a 164.89-metre-long coastguard vessel 5901 (IMO: 9756028) nicknamed “The Monster” approximately 77 nautical miles off the coast of Philippines’ Zambales province. Manila criticised the act as intended to ‘intimidate fishermen’ and reflective of Beijing’s ‘increasing aggression’. In response to the vessel’s presence, the Philippine Coastguard deployed two of its largest vessels and demanded the withdrawal of the vessel from its exclusive maritime economic zone (EEZ).

On 17 January, the Philippine navy conducted drills near the contested Scarborough shoal in the South China Sea, an act almost certainly conducted in response to perceived Chinese aggression. This incident constitutes the latest spat amid frequent brinkmanship between Philippine and Chinese maritime forces around the contested waters.

Magnitude 6.9 earthquake off Miyazaki, Japan

On 13 January, a magnitude 6.9 earthquake struck off the coast of Miyazaki Prefecture in Japan, prompting a tsunami advisory for coastal areas in Miyazaki and Kochi prefectures. The Japanese meteorological agency reported multiple aftershocks with magnitudes between 3 and 4.1. Following the earthquake, evacuation orders were issued for the coastal areas of Takanabe and Kadogawa. A 10-centimetre wave was observed at Cape Muroto and Tosashimizu, while tide gauges reported a 20-centimetre sea level rise at Miyazaki and Aburatsu ports.

The tsunami advisories and warnings were later lifted, with no reports of significant damage. In the aftermath, local authorities reported minor disruptions, including water outages in the Ikime area of Miyazaki due to apparent pipe damage. At least one person sustained minor injuries in Oita Prefecture. Authorities have called for people to remain alert for further strong tremors in the week following the earthquake.

Eruption of Mount Ibu in Indonesia

On 16 January, Mount Ibu in Indonesia’s North Maluku region erupted Authorities have initiated evacuations for approximately 3,000 residents living in the vicinity of the volcano. As of the latest reports, 182 individuals have taken refuge in evacuation centres. The Indonesian disaster agency has issued a warning to the public to refrain from engaging in activities within a three-mile radius of the volcano’s active crater. Emergency responders have been deployed to manage the situation, following the elevation of the alert status to its highest level. The eruption has prompted swift action to ensure the safety of the local population, which numbers around 13,000 people.

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On 6 January, Justin Trudeau, who has served as Canada’s prime minister since 2015, announced that he would step down as the leader of his party, with the leadership election scheduled for 9 March.

Federal elections are scheduled to be held in Canada by 20 October 2025. The main opposition party is the Conservative Party, which currently polls between 20 and 24 points ahead of the Liberal Party. Furthermore, recent polls indicate that the Liberals risk falling behind the New Democrats, Canada’s third-largest party.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

Trudeau’s resignation follows significant internal pressures within the Liberal Party, as well as considerable domestic and international political setbacks. Trudeau’s political situation had likely become close to unrecoverable following the resignation of long-term ally and Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland in December, who openly accused Trudeau of failing to do enough to meet the challenge posed by US President-elect Donald Trump’s call to impose heavy tariffs on Canadian goods. Freeland’s resignation mobilised large parts of the Liberal Party to increase their calls for the prime minister to step down.

However, even prior to December, Trudeau’s position had gradually deteriorated following repeated setbacks at home and abroad. Canada’s severe cost of living crisis, marked by significant housing shortages, has particularly affected some of the Liberals’ key constituencies.

Domestic protests, such as the COVID-19 and trucker’s protests, a stagnant economy characterised by rising inflation, and growing concerns with immigration also influenced by developments in Europe and south of the border, have all likely contributed to damage Trudeau’s popularity.

On the international stage, the Canadian government has been heavily criticised by pro-Palestine groups, it has engaged in an ongoing diplomatic crisis with India over the alleged targeted assassination of a Sikh independence activist on Canadian soil and has clashed with the incoming US administration.

While a new candidate may boost the Liberal Party’s chances at the elections, it remains highly likely that the Conservatives will win decisively. The first weeks and months of the Trump administration are likely to be particularly crucial. If the promised tariffs are implemented, these are likely to have extremely negative effects for the new Canadian administration. In fact, there is a realistic possibility that Washington will leverage the Liberals’ extremely precarious political position to extract concessions in the areas of security, foreign policy, and trade.

As of 10 January, fast-moving wildfires are currently ongoing in California. At least five separate blazes are currently ongoing around the Pacific Palisades (Palisades Fire), Pasadena (Eaton Fire), Sylmar (Hurst Fire), Acton (Lidia Fire), and Hollywood Hills (Sunset Fire) neighbourhoods of Los Angeles.

The Palisades Fire has burned through over 20,000 acres, causing significant damage, including the destruction of beachfront homes in Malibu; it is approximately six per cent contained. The Eaton Fire has spread to nearly 14,000 acres and is zero per cent contained. The Kenneth Fire has impacted approximately 960 acres and is 35 per cent contained. The Hurst Fire has grown to 800 acres and is 37 per cent contained. The Lidia Fire has grown to approximately 400 acres but is 75 per cent contained.

Mandatory evacuation orders have been issued for nearly 180,000 people in Southern California. Ten deaths have been reported so far. Over 1,400 firefighting personnel have been deployed to combat the blazes and Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency.

Major roads including Sunset Boulevard and part of the Pacific Coast Highway became gridlocked as residents fled the wildfires. Highway lanes near Topanga Canyon Boulevard closed due to the wildfire’s fast expansion. Drivers abandoned their cars on Sunset Boulevard, forcing The Los Angeles Fire Department to deploy bulldozers to Sunset Boulevard to allow fire crews to pass abandoned vehicles.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The fires began on 7 January after a bush fire was caught by a windstorm, spreading the fire into surrounding areas. California is currently affected by the northeasterly Santa Ana winds of approximately 100 km/h, which are caused by high pressure over the Great Basin. These winds have fuelled many of California’s worst wildfires in the past, including the 2018 Woolsey fire, which killed three people.

Peak wildfire season in California typically occurs between July and October each year. Although wildfires are unusual in January, high winds have combined with particularly dry conditions in California to contribute to fertile conditions for the wildfire to spread. Rains of over 0.25 centimetres have not been experienced in Southern California since May 2024. The Santa Ana winds have exacerbated the dry conditions by reducing the humidity levels.

Fire hydrants have reportedly run out of water in the Palisades area. While water tanks are currently being used to supply water to fire fighters, this severely limits the extent to which the fire department can tackle the ongoing wildfires. The reason for the water shortage is currently unknown, but water shortages at fire hydrants may occur because of power outages, high demand during large fires, broken water mains, or drought conditions. Given the recent dry weather, the issues are likely influenced by low water supplies in Southern California.

In the aftermath of the wildfires, residents who have had their property destroyed are likely to ask questions regarding the lack of water in the fire hydrants. Much of California’s water infrastructure was built in the 1960s and 1970s, lacking advanced modern technology and prone to leaks and inefficiency. Furthermore, Los Angeles mayor Karen Bass cut the fire department’s budget in 2024 by approximately USD 17 million. Given California has one of the highest water needs in the US, the federal and state authorities are likely to come under increasing pressure to modernise California’s water infrastructure in the months following the wildfire and increase fire department spending.

Ahead of President Nicolas Maduro’s inauguration for a third six-year term on 10 January, the Venezuelan opposition has warned of a surge in arrests of activists and opposition figures.

Prominent arrests have included press freedom advocate, Carlos Correa, opposition politician Enrique Marquez and briefly, the leader of the opposition, María Corina Machado.

The arrests coincide with planned protests against Maduro’s inauguration, with opposition groups continuing to dispute the results of July’s presidential election, which they allege was marred by fraud and voting irregularities. Several foreign nationals have also been detained on suspicion of conspiracy or sabotage.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

The increase in arrests is likely strategic messaging by the Maduro administration aimed at limiting the extent of planned protests during his inauguration. The strategy, whilst limited to only a handful of prominent individuals, has likely been designed to limit the abilities of key individuals to mobilise protests across Venezuela, as well as rally international support. The detention of foreign nationals is a common occurrence in Venezuela and is often done to portray the idea that the opposition is corrupt and influenced by enemies of the state. Moreover, foreign nationals with current or past associations with foreign governments or militaries are most at risk of being detained, regardless of their true motivations.

Despite the arrests, major disruptive protests in multiple Venezuelan towns and cities during the inauguration are highly likely and will almost certainly be violently suppressed by the government. There is also a realistic possibility of targeted attacks on the inauguration. In 2018, two uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) detonated explosives in Caracas near where Maduro was addressing the Bolivarian National Guard. While some have dismissed this as a false flag attack aimed to bolster support for the regime, the high-profile nature of the inauguration and proliferation of UAV technology likely increase the credibility of such a threat.

Greenland PM pushes for independence as Trump row resumes

The Prime Minister of the Danish autonomous territory, Mute Egede, called for an acceleration of the process to secure independence from the Danish crown. Greenlandic independence is contemplated under the self-rule law of 2009, which posits that it would need to be approved via a referendum. While Egede is part of a well-established independentist movement, the recent comments were almost certainly prompted by US President-elect Donald Trump’s call for the US to buy the strategically important territory from Denmark. In addition to massive reserves of natural resources, Greenland is positioned to strategically control the Arctic, an area where both the US and Russia are increasingly looking to strengthen their positions.

Trinidad and Tobago prime minister to resign before end of term

Prime Minister Keith Rowley announced his plans not to seek re-election and to vacate his post before the end of his term in August 2025. The announcement comes at a time when Trinidad and Tobago struggles with increasing rates of gun violence, which have prompted the government to issue a state of emergency. The ruling People’s National Movement (PNM) will now have to nominate a replacement for Rowley, who will be then appointed by the President.   

Venezuela and Paraguay sever diplomatic ties

On 6 January, Venezuela and Paraguay severed diplomatic ties after Paraguayan President Santiago Pena expressed support for Venezuela’s opposition. Pena spoke with opposition leaders and backed Edmundo Gonzalez, who is in exile and whom the opposition claims won the 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections, after an election marred by accusations of fraud.

Artificial intelligence reportedly used in Las Vegas Cybertruck attack

On 31 December, US Army solider Matthew Livelsberger detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) inside of a Tesla Cybertruck outside of the Trump International Hotel in Las Vegas. Authorities have confirmed that Livelsberger had used the AI chatbot ChatGPT to plan the attack, which would mark the first known use of the platform in support of the development of an IED. The incident has triggered concerns over how easily available AI can be exploited for nefarious means and will likely contribute to demands for stricter regulations on AI platforms.

Central American police arrive in Haiti to reinforce United Nations mission

The first group of a planned 150 military police officers, mostly from Guatemala and El Salvador, arrived in the country to bolster the UN mission, which has so far been led by their Kenyan counterparts.

UN operations in Haiti have so far been relatively unsuccessful at deterring and containing the gangs that control much of the country. The gangs have implemented a terror-reliant strategy, characterised by attacks on hospitals, airports, civil society groups and NGOs, aimed at preventing other actors from establishing control in parts of Haiti, and at maintaining the local civilian population reliant on criminal networks.

It is highly likely that the new deployments will result in a harsh reaction by local gangs, who may accelerate attacks on transport hubs in Port-au-Prince, or carry out killings among the local civilians.

With no involvement by major international players like the US or France, it is unlikely that small countries’ deployment of police forces will manage to stabilise the situation in Haiti in the short term.

Polar vortex in the US and Canada

A polar vortex continues to bring severe winter weather to the US and Canada, prompting widespread disruptions. Georgia’s Governor Brian Kemp has declared a State of Emergency ahead of a winter storm expected on 10 January.

Tennessee’s National Weather Service issued a winter storm warning for Middle Tennessee, forecasting major travel disruptions. In Virginia, Henrico and east Goochland counties remain under a boil water advisory due to storm damage at a Richmond water treatment plant.

Schools in North Texas, including districts like Denton, Dallas, and Fort Worth, have closed for 9 and 10 January. The polar vortex has already triggered a state of local disaster declaration in Saline County, Kansas, after record-breaking snowfall. Power outages have affected thousands in Kentucky, southwestern Indiana, and southeastern Illinois, with restoration ongoing. In Richmond, water production has resumed, though the boil water advisory continues.

Extreme heat and wildfire threat across Chile

Chile’s National System for Disaster Prevention and Response (SENAPRED) has issued multiple yellow alerts across the country warning of intense heat. Yellow alerts have been issued for the Valparaiso, Bio Bio, Maule and metropolitan region which includes the capital, Santiago. Temperatures are set to approach 40 degrees Celsius in several places and are likely to cause or exacerbate many of the wildfires Chile is currently struggling to contain.  

On 6 January, Herbert Kickl, the FPÖ leader, was tasked by President Van der Bellen with forming a new government, after Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) leader and Chancellor Karl Nehammer failed to do so.

FPÖ won the most votes, 28.8 per cent, at Austria’s parliamentary election in September, while the OVP finished second with 21 per cent.

ÖVP’s efforts to form a coalition with the Social Democrats and the liberal Neos failed over disagreements on key policy issues, leading Nehammer to hand in his resignation as chancellor (Nehammer will be replaced on 10 January by Alexander Schallenberg, who will rule until a new government is appointed).

Solace Global Assessment: 

As every other Austrian party has refused to form a coalition with FPÖ, the party’s only option is to make a deal with the ÖVP. The FPÖ has already been in multiple governing coalitions with ÖVP, always as a junior partner (2000-2005, 2017-2019). This time, the party will almost certainly demand the chancellorship, as well as other key government roles. FPÖ currently bargains from a position of strength, as a decision to walk away from the talks would highly likely trigger new elections, where the party would almost certainly improve on its previous vote tally (currently, polls project FPÖ would win 36 per cent of the vote, with ÖVP falling to 21 per cent).

A government led by Kickl, were it to follow FPÖ’s stated policy proposals, would almost certainly drive an increase in civil unrest in Austria.

Some of FPÖ’s pledges are extremely controversial, such as the restriction of welfare benefits to citizens alone, the banning of “political Islam”, and “remigration” – the return of citizens of non-European ethnic backgrounds to the countries their families originate from.

In addition to almost certainly clashing with multiple European institutions and treaties, these proposals are likely to provoke a reaction from multiple civil society actors both on the left and the centre and may likewise drive an increase in political violence. Moreover, FPÖ’s anti-Islam policies are likely to be leveraged by extremist actors to drive recruitment in Austria, increasing the risk of radicalisation and terrorism.

On 5 January, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) launched a limited mechanised offensive against Russian positions in the Kursk salient. AFU forces advanced northeast of Sudzha into Berdin and Novosotnitskii. Initially, the Ukrainian General Staff described the operation as a “new offensive”, however, the Telegram statement was later edited to remove this. Russian forces, meanwhile, reportedly attacked the villages of Malaya Loknya, Sverdlikovo, and Leonidovo from the Kursk salient’s western flank.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The surprise August 2024 Ukrainian offensive into Kursk Oblast rapidly captured ground and temporarily shifted the ‘narrative’ of the conflict. By successfully capturing ground in internationally recognised Russian territory, Kyiv was highly likely hoping to divert considerable Russian forces from offensives in Donetsk and to provide a ‘win’ in the face of increasing Russian momentum in the war. The Kursk offensive, however, was contained without a strategically decisive diversion of forces (the deployment of North Korean personnel to the Oblast is almost certainly part of this effort) and Russia has been gradually but slowly pushing back Ukrainian forces in the north and west of the Kursk salient over the last few months.

It is likely that the current limited offensive operation by the AFU in the east-northeast of the salient has been calculated to exploit potential weaknesses in Russia’s defensive position – Russian forces have focused offensive efforts in the north and west. A breakthrough in the vicinity of Berdin could threaten the outmanoeuvring of Russian forces positioned in the salient’s north, although the diversion of Ukrainian forces from defensive efforts elsewhere in the Kursk salient is risky and has likely factored into the past week’s attempted Russian advances. In addition to the potential tactical advantage, there is a realistic possibility that the limited Ukrainian counteroffensive could have been a probing operation to test the strength of Russian defences in support of a more significant future counteroffensive – Kyiv likely seeks to have a ‘win’ before Trump is inaugurated on 20 January and any territorial gains could put it in a stronger position during anticipated peace negotiations.

Any notable Ukrainian advances would highly likely be met by retaliation by the Kremlin, as part of Russia’s strategy of deterrence. The most likely retaliation would involve significant (larger than in general) long-range strikes using missiles and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) against Ukraine’s major urban centres, possibly using the new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The use of the Oreshnik with a non-nuclear conventional warhead has likely enabled Putin to reduce nuclear brinkmanship, by providing a means of escalatory retaliation without having to resort to a tactical nuclear strike.

On 9 January, the Benin army suffered heavy losses after one of its most well-defended positions was attacked in the north of the country. Beninese troops had been stationed in the area to prevent cross-border attacks from neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, where there are ongoing Islamist insurgencies. The military did not disclose a casualty count; however, the main opposition party has suggested around 30 soldiers were killed in the attack.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack marks one of the worst losses for the Benin Armed Forces since the escalation of the Islamist insurgencies in the Sahel.

No group has currently claimed responsibility for the attack; however, it is highly likely that it was conducted by the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). JNIM, which has initiated an insurgency in neighbouring northern Togo, is likely attempting to achieve several objectives in Benin and the wider West African region.

JNIM’s strategy likely involves establishing a buffer zone by destabilising the areas of countries adjacent to its key area of operations in Burkina Faso and Niger. Such a buffer zone would provide JNIM greater freedom of movement and fix regional militaries within the coastal nations, limiting their ability and will to deploy resources to the Sahel.

A destabilised northern Benin would also provide JNIM with greater opportunities to increase both its revenue and recruitment, with major attacks demonstrating its growing capabilities.

Should JNIM succeed in recruiting disenfranchised Muslims from Benin, this will provide the extremist group with expanded local knowledge and capabilities but would also free up Sahelian fighters to focus on operations within the Sahel itself.

Moreover, with the sustained trend of Western forces being expelled from the region, extremist groups like JNIM will find it easier to expand their operations unless countries like Benin agree to the hosting of Western forces on their soil.

In the long term, if JNIM successfully destabilises the north and establishes a presence there, it could expand its operations further south, ultimately threatening coastal capitals like Porto-Novo and Lomé- coveted targets due to their strategic location and symbolic value.

On 9 January, Chadian authorities claim that 24 individuals armed with knives and machetes attempted to storm the presidential palace with President Mahamat Deby Itno inside. According to authorities, some vehicles appeared to break down at the entrance of the palace before the assailants walked out and stabbed the four entrance guards, killing one. Guards reportedly shot at the assailants, killing 18 and arresting six, repelling the attack.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The apparent attack comes shortly after Chad held elections, with results planned to be released on 15 January. There is significant speculation regarding whether the incident was conducted by Boko Haram, a rival military faction, another armed insurgent group, staged by the government, or the result of confusion with an armed group of civilians. Given the reliance on knives and machetes and relative disorganisation, the attack is unlikely to constitute a coup attempt by a rival military faction.

While Boko Haram typically uses firearms and explosives, there is a realistic possibility that the assailants were associated with the terrorist group, who may have been taking advantage of the withdrawal of French forces in December 2024.

Alternatively, a government-staged coup attempt would likely provide the government with a pretext to bolster security ahead of expected protests. However, authorities appear to be playing down the significance of the attack, implying they were akin to drunken “Pieds Nickeles”. This could indicate an attempt to minimise the threat of armed groups and project stability ahead of the expected election victory. Alternatively, there is a realistic possibility that security forces mistakenly perceived a group of workers as a threat and shot them before they could attack the presidential palace.

According to local NGOs, approximately 289 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began. The most recent “TurboV8” phase resulted in the highest death toll of any phase so far and was set to be followed by the “ponta de lança” (spearhead) phase. However, this stage was subsequently postponed due to fears of opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane’s assassination. Supporters threatened to block all roads if Mondlane did not appear live on Facebook,, which he did on 6 January.

After announcing his return to the capital Maputo, Mondlane arrived in Mozambique on 9 January ahead of the 15 January inauguration of President-elect Daniel Chapo. Mondlane asked his supporters to “welcome” him at Maputo International Airport (MPM) at 08:05 local time. After greeting Mondlane, a procession of people accompanied Mondlane’s car from the airport to the centre of Maputo. Mondlane then spoke at the Mercado Estrela at approximately 10:00 local time, whereby he reaffirmed his claims of an election victory. Security forces subsequently used live ammunition and tear gas in central Maputo to disperse crowds gathered in support of Mondlane, reportedly charging at the crowd and triggering a stampede.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Despite speculation over whether authorities would attempt to arrest Mondlane upon arrival, Mozambique’s Supreme Court has announced that no arrest warrant has currently been issued. However, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has reportedly opened proceedings against Mondlane as the architect of the unrest. If the government targets Mondlane via arrest or assassination, significant unrest will almost certainly take place. In the long term, however, the loss of Mondlane’s leadership may enable the government to suppress demonstrations through curfews and mass arrests, with protests likely to diminish in the absence of his ability to mobilise the opposition.

On 6 January, Frelimo announced the next key dates in the electoral process. In addition to the inauguration of the parliament and president on 13 and 15 January, the date for the destruction of the 9 October election materials was announced as the 22 January. If the government is still in power on 22 January, demonstrations will almost certainly occur on this date as it will likely be perceived as the final step in the government’s consolidation of power following the election. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will target Frelimo offices, particularly in Maputo, in order to prevent the potential destruction of evidence of alleged electoral fraud.

Mondlane continues to state that he will take office on 15 January and that he will announce further details of the new phase of unrest titled “ponta de lança” (spearhead). Significant demonstrations are almost certain in the lead up to the inauguration. There is a realistic possibility that Frelimo will use Mondlane’s presence in country and attempt to inaugurate himself as president as proof of an ongoing coup. If this happens, the government will likely accelerate efforts to crack down on demonstrations and delegitimise Mondlane, who will pose a significant threat to the government’s legitimacy given he appears to have the backing of the majority of the population.

Romania sets date for presidential election repeat

The new vote will take place in two rounds on 4 and 18 May. The previous elections were annulled by the judiciary after the first round on 24 November 2024 as Calin Georgescu, a virtually unknown independent candidate who largely campaigned on social media espousing anti-establishment, anti-NATO and anti-EU positions, won the most votes. The Constitutional Court’s decision was explained as a reaction to allegedly widespread Russian meddling in the campaign, although no claims of direct interference in the voting process were reported.

Georgescu’s bid for the presidency has been boosted by the first vote’s annulment, and he remains the favourite to win in May. However, there is a realistic possibility that Georgescu will not be allowed to run, as the Constitutional Court may declare him ineligible over funding irregularities during the first campaign. If this were to happen, there would be a high likelihood of severe civil unrest in Romania, with other anti-establishment candidates and parties likely to throw their political weight behind Georgescu.

Georgian protests continue as non-recognition bill set to be proposed by US Congress

Anti-government protests continue in Georgia, notably on Orthodox Christmas Eve (7 January) when thousands set off from churches and converged at the church opposite the parliament building. A bill is set to be introduced to the US Congress that will prohibit recognition of the Georgian Dream government. The bill is quoted as making specific reference to Bidzina Ivanishvili, the oligarch and founder of Georgian Dream who was sanctioned by the US in December 2024.

Salome Zourabichvili, a figurehead for the pro-Europe opposition who was ousted as president in a contested December indirect election, continues to claim to be the legitimate president of Georgia. On 9 January, Zourabichvili told journalists that she will travel to the US to attend Donald Trump’s 20 January presidential inauguration, after being invited by a US Congress member.

There are numerous US politicians sympathetic to the pro-Europe Georgian opposition movement – it is likely that significant international pressure from the US would embolden the protest movement, but also further isolate the Georgian Dream government which could accelerate its alignment with Moscow.

Lebanon’s parliament elects new president after two-year vacancy

Following two rounds of voting held in Lebanon’s parliament on 9 January, the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Joseph Aoun, was elected as the fourteenth President of the Lebanese Republic.

The presidency must be occupied by a Maronite Christian, according to Lebanon’s constitution.  As Lebanon is a parliamentary republic, the presidency is a predominantly ceremonial role, though can still wield considerable discretionary reserve powers. The presidency has been vacant since 2022 due to political divisions, with Lebanon’s political system struggling since the end of the previous president’s, Michel Aoun (not related), term. Lebanon has struggled with the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut port explosion, chronic economic crisis and Israel’s military operations against Lebanese Hezbollah.

Joseph Aoun’s election will likely bolster Lebanon’s political stability. With approval from the US, Aoun’s election is likely indicative of the declining influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon after being severely degraded by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). As per the terms of the ceasefire agreement, the IDF’s 60-day withdrawal period from Lebanon expires on 26 January – with this deadline looming, fears regarding the state of the ceasefire, if the IDF continues to occupy areas of southern Lebanon, have likely pressured Lebanese lawmakers to elect Aoun who will continue to have a key role in maintaining the ceasefire.

Attempted attack on Belgian prime minister

On 6 January, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo was targeted in a knife attack outside his home, though the perpetrator was arrested. Little is currently known about the assailant; however, the incident likely reflects a broader rise in violent attacks on political leaders. Uncorroborated reports indicate that the alleged attacker had attempted a similar attack on the US Embassy in Brussels in April.

Greek Anarchists plan “International Week of Action”

The organisation Revolutionary Struggle (RS) has announced a week of political action (between 10 and 16 January) in support of two of its members currently imprisoned in Chalcis. RS has claimed responsibility for carrying out bombings at multiple Greek ministry buildings, the Athens Stock Exchange, the Bank of Greece, the US Embassy in Athens, and IMF offices. There is a high likelihood that Anarchists will carry out attacks in the coming days, likely targeting buildings. There is a realistic possibility that other European Anarchist groups associated with RS, especially in Italy, Spain, and Germany, will carry out actions during the “week of action”.

Attack on Israeli vehicles near al-Funduq, West Bank, kills three and injures eight

The shooting was reportedly carried out by at least three individuals, who targeted civilian vehicles transiting on Route 55. While no claims of responsibility have been made for the attack, it was praised by other Palestinian militias. Israeli sources claimed that the attackers have been nevertheless identified as residents of Jenin. The attack will likely prompt an escalation in Israeli raids in the area, with additional incidents in the West Bank likely leading to increased clashes between Israeli settler communities and Palestinians.

Mali forces capture Islamic State leader

The armed forces of Mali announced the capture of Mahamad Ould Erkehile, alias Abou Hach, who is one of the key leaders of the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP), formerly Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS). The operation leading to Abou Hach’s capture was carried out in the Amasrakad area of the Gao region.

There is a high likelihood that ISSP operatives will carry out retaliatory attacks against Malian security forces and civilians. Since the death of its leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi in 2021, ISSP has sought to restructure its presence in areas of operations, gradually and partly shifting towards a strategy aimed at establishing a structured governance of local populations. This has however made its leaders more visible, allowing junta forces and their allies to carry out more successful decapitation strikes.

Ivory Coast to cut military ties with France

President Alassane Ouattara has announced that French troops are expected to leave the country in January. This makes the country the sixth to have cut military ties with Paris in Africa. The setback in the Ivory Coast follows Senegal’s and Chad’s recent ousting of French forces, and the previous fallout of relations between Paris and the Sahelian juntas.

France will likely have to turn to other regional powers to maintain a presence in the region. The reduction of France’s footprint elsewhere in West Africa and the Sahel has largely coincided with the growth of Russian operations in the region.

However, with Russia’s overextension having been demonstrated in Syria, and also through Wagner and Africa Corps forces’ failures in the Sahel, it is highly likely that the retrenchment of Western forces will leave a security vacuum that could be exploited by regional Islamist groups, who maintain a strategic aim to expand their presence towards the African coast.

M23 Movement captures strategic town in North Kivu

On 5 January, the M23 Movement captured the mineral-rich town of Masisi, the capital of the Masisi territory, 80 kilometres from North Kivu’s provincial capital Goma. Masisi is strategically important due to its richness in agriculture, livestock, and minerals as well as its access to Goma, a long-term target for M23.

Some conflicting reports indicate that the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) alongside its allies, the Wazalendo, a group of irregular forces allied with the military, may have regained control of Masisi. The mixed reporting indicates that the territory is likely contested, with the FARDC launching offensives to recapture the town.

The M23 rebels have recently made significant gains in North Kivu, seizing control of Katale near Masisi. Fighting in other areas of Masisi territory, including Sake and Ngungu also occurred over the past week, reportedly causing approximately 100,000 people to be displaced.

Storm Floriane causes disruptions in France and Sweden

Storm Floriane caused significant disruptions across Europe, starting in France on 6 January with orange weather alerts being issued due to strong winds. The worst-hit regions in northern France, such as Charleville-Mézières, Châlons-en-Champagne, and Bar-le-Duc, experienced gusts between 80 and 110 km/h. Rail travel was particularly affected due to cancellations, delays, and speed restrictions.

The winter storm then moved across the North Sea into Sweden, bringing violent wind speeds and heavy snowfall, leading to extensive travel disruptions. The Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute issued 28 weather warnings. Train routes were closed due to fallen trees and debris, and public transport services were delayed or cancelled.

Storm Dikeledi, tracking towards northern Madagascar, forecast to become tropical cyclone

Forming on 7 January in the southern Indian Ocean, the low-pressure storm system Dikeledi is tracking westwards towards northern Madagascar. The storm is forecast to strengthen into a tropical cyclone with potential maximum windspeeds of 179 km/h and is expected to make landfall in northern Madagascar between 11-12 January. The Madagascan regions most likely to be impacted are Diana, Sava and Ambatosoa.

In addition to Madagascar, Mozambique and Malawi could also be impacted, with meteorological authorities from both countries issuing statements urging their populations to monitor for potential weather warnings. Depending on the direction the storm system takes, the French overseas island of Mayotte could also be impacted.

Mayotte was recently devastated by Cyclone Chido in December 2024, it is likely that heavy rainfall from Dikeledi could further hamper ongoing recovery efforts.

At 09:05 local time (01:05 UTC) on 7 January, a powerful magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck Tingri County in southern Tibet. The epicentre was located approximately 80 kilometres north of Mount Everest at a depth of ten kilometres. The main tremor was followed by aftershocks of above 5.0 magnitude. The earthquake has caused widespread damage across Tingri County, including the city of Shigatse. Tremors were also felt in neighbouring countries, including Nepal and northern India, although no significant damage has so far been reported in these locations.

Initial reports confirm at least 126 fatalities, with more than 1,000 buildings damaged or destroyed. While the mountainous Tingri County is scarcely populated, approximately 7,000 people live within 20 kilometres of the epicentre. The city of Shigatse, the second largest in Tibet, has around 800,000 residents. Local sources reported that the earthquake has disrupted local power and water supplies, and damage to local roadways has also been recorded. In January, the area has daily minimum temperatures of below -15 degrees Celsius, and daily average temperatures of -7.5 degrees Celsius.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The earthquake is one of the deadliest China has experienced in recent years. On 23 January 2024, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Xinjiang, China. The death count was significantly lower, however, with only three deaths. In 2008, a large earthquake in Sichuan province killed nearly 70,000 people. Southwestern regions of China are frequently affected by earthquakes. This is largely due to the region lying at the convergence zone of the Indian Plate and Eurasian Plate, which periodically releases tectonic stress as earthquakes. Furthermore, the region has numerous active fault systems including the Longmenshan Fault Zone, which triggered the 2008 earthquake, and the Xianshuihe Fault Zone.

The Lhasa block, also known as the Lhasa terrane, is a significant geological region in southern Tibet, situated between the Bangong-Nujiang suture zone to the north and the Indus–Yarlung Zangbo suture zone to the south. This positioning generates north-south compression, resulting in crustal shortening and uplift, as well as west-east stress, which drives lateral crustal movements. These geological processes play a crucial role in the formation of the Himalayas and significantly impact regional fault systems and seismic activity. Several aftershocks were felt in Tibet and Nepal; further aftershocks are highly likely in the coming days.

The government’s response to the earthquake is likely to be viewed through the lens of historical Tibetan grievances. Given the mountainous topography of the region and potential aftershocks, relief efforts will likely be hampered, potentially opening the government up for criticism regarding its effectiveness at governing in the region. In the aftermath of the earthquake, there is a realistic possibility that those sympathetic to Tibetan independence will scrutinise the government response and call for self-determination.

Taiwanese authorities are investigating a Chinese-linked ship which they suspect of deliberately dragging its anchor over an undersea fibre optic cable which connects Taiwan to the US. The Cameroon-registered and Tanzania-flagged vessel Shunxing 39 (IMO: 8358427) was briefly detained by Taiwan’s coastguard on 3 January but was subsequently released. Chunghwa Telecom of Taiwan stated that services across the island were largely unaffected and that it had promptly redirected data through alternative cables.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Unconfirmed reports indicate that this may be the 21^st Chinese attempt to sever Taiwan’s undersea internet infrastructure. As an island nation, with approximately only a dozen undersea internet cables landing on its shores, Taiwan is highly vulnerable to undersea sabotage. Despite attempts to accelerate its development of satellite-based backup systems to ensure connectivity during crises, this technology is in its infancy and cannot provide adequate redundancy. China likely calculates that the severing of multiple cables simultaneously would help to isolate Taiwan and hugely damage its economy. It is highly likely that if this is observed, it would be indicative of shaping activity for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

Like Russia, China commands a huge fleet of civilian-flagged vessels which answer directly to the state. Beijing has almost certainly observed Russia’s increased use of civilian vessels to conduct low-cost, hard-to-prove, and deniable acts of undersea sabotage and will likely continue to incorporate this into its own “grey zone” strategy. While China’s primary target for undersea sabotage is Taiwan, there is a realistic possibility that these incidents will migrate to other regions, particularly those heavily dependent on critical undersea infrastructure. This could include areas in the South China Sea, in the waters around South Korea and Japan, and further afield as China continues to expand its maritime presence.

Second arrest warrant issued for President Yoon Suk Yeol

A fresh arrest warrant has been issued for President Yoon after police failed to execute the first one, which ended 6 January. Investigators were prevented from entering the presidential palace, blocked by supporters and security. The chief prosecutor, Oh Dong Woon, has declared that he will “prepare thoroughly” for the second attempt to arrest Yoon, implying that it may be the final opportunity to arrest him. Yoon will almost certainly use his security and supporters again to prevent investigators from executing the warrant. On 9 January, Yoon declared that he would accept the decision of the Constitutional Court if it decides to back the impeachment case. This is almost certainly with the aim of moving on from the incident and dissuading prosecutors from conducting further attempts to arrest him.

Indonesia to joins BRICS

Jakarta’s bid to join the group was approved in 2023. Indonesia’s accession to BRICS almost certainly represents a major development in the country’s traditionally “non-aligned” foreign policy stance However, it is unclear to what extent it will trigger significant regional security developments. Indonesia, like fellow BRICS member India, maintains warm ties to the West, and is concerned about China’s footprint in the region. There is a realistic possibility that Indonesia’s foreign policy will continue to maintain elements of non-alignment while using BRICS to improve Jakarta’s range of foreign policy options.

Eight police officers and driver killed in Maoist attack in Chhattisgarh, India

On 6 January, a bomb blast killed at least eight police officers and a driver. The bomb was reportedly planted by Maoist Naxalite group in the latest of a series of attacks targeting security forces. The Naxalite movement began in 1967 in West Bengal and gained traction in Chhattisgarh in the late 1980s. The government has responded by deploying paramilitary forces and local police to combat the Naxalite group. While the intensity of the insurgency has seen a decline in recent years, it is an ongoing challenge for the government, with sporadic attacks occurring in central India.

Bomb blast injures three police officers in southern Thailand

An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in front of a school in Sai Buri on 3 January. The device was reportedly placed near a “stop” sign the police left near the school while they were off duty. It is highly likely that the perpetrators of the blast were local separatist insurgents. A low-intensity civil conflict has been ongoing for more than 50 years in southern Thailand, including the Patani region where Sai Buri is located, driven by groups like the Patani United Liberation Organisation, which aim at separating the majority-Malay Muslim south from the rest of the country. Local media posited that the blast may have been planned to coincide with the 20^th anniversary of a raid on a military camp in the Cho Airong district of Narathiwat, which represented a significant escalation in the civil conflict.

Former Cambodian politician assassinated in Bangkok

On 7 January, Lim Kimya, a 74-year-old former Cambodian opposition lawmaker and dual Cambodian-French citizen, was fatally shot in Bangkok’s Old Quarter shortly after arriving from Cambodia. Thai authorities have issued an arrest warrant for a 41-year-old motorcycle taxi driver suspected of the murder. The suspect is believed to be a Thai national and has acted as a hitman. Lim Kimya was associated with the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), an opposition group dissolved ahead of the 2018 election amid controversial treason charges. Human Rights Watch has called for a thorough investigation, noting the harassment of former CNRP members by the Cambodian government. Despite denying any involvement, there are major suspicions that this was an assassination sponsored by the Cambodian government which could trigger a diplomatic spat between the two Southeast Asian countries.

Increase in hMPV cases in China

China is dealing with a rise in human metapneumovirus (hMPV) cases, particularly in the north of the country, as well as other seasonal respiratory illnesses like influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). However, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) confirm that these levels remain within the expected seasonal range, and there is no indication of a pandemic-like threat. China’s healthcare system is operating within capacity, with hospital utilisation lower than the previous year, and no emergency response has been initiated. Symptoms are typically mild, resembling the common cold or flu, with severe cases being rare and mostly affecting vulnerable populations.

Fire at market in Zhangjiakou, Hebei province, China kills at least eight

At approximately 08:40 local time on 4 January, a fire broke out at the Liguang vegetable market, a busy market in Zhangjiakou, killing eight and wounding 15. The blaze took approximately two hours to extinguish. Relaxed building codes in China increase the likelihood of fires. Furthermore, traditional markets in China are typically tightly packed, exacerbating the risk to shoppers by making it difficult to escape potential fires.

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