Information correct as of 1200 BST 2nd of October 2024

Nations worldwide are activating contingency plans for evacuating their citizens, with key efforts focused on securing safe transport routes out of Lebanon. Western governments including the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, United States, and Portugal, are urging their citizens to leave the country immediately, and preparations are underway for evacuations by sea and air.

Western government actions taken to date:

With a highly dynamic and evolving security landscape, businesses operating in the region are likely to be considering the evacuation of their employees and/or securing their assets. Beirut’s airport remains operational, but safe travel options may become limited due to the rapidly changing situation on the ground.

Our comprehensive journey management and secure transportation services provide immediate solutions for companies with operations or personnel in high-risk areas like Lebanon.

Second presidential debate, Trump sentencing delayed, and 6 January 2025 security plans.

Former President Donald Trump and current Vice President Kamala Harris participated in their long-awaited presidential debate on 10 September. The debate was the first between the two candidates, but the second in this electoral season, as current President Joe Biden dropped out of the electoral race following a widely criticised performance in his own debate with Trump in June.

Days prior, Judge Juan Merchan, who presided over the hush money trial of the former president in Manhattan, delayed the sentencing to 26 November, to be after the presidential election. In May, Trump was convicted of 34 felony counts of falsifying business records. The maximum sentence that Trump could receive is two years in prison, though such a sentence is unlikely. On 5 September, Trump also pleaded not guilty to federal charges over alleged attempts to interfere with the 2020 election, in a separate case.

Solace Global Assessment: The postponement of Trump’s sentencing is likely to reduce the risk of civil unrest and violence prior to and immediately after the election. However, there is still a realistic possibility of unrest occurring during the remainder of the electoral season. During the debate, the former president repeated claims that the 2020 election results were fraudulent. Trump’s 2024 running mate, J.D. Vance, also separately echoed these views and criticised the results’ certification process for the 2020 election. Moreover, local media have highlighted a growing number of local officials that have either hinted at, or outright threatened, not to certify the 2024 election results if they perceive that they are affected by “irregularities”. Recent notable cases include new Georgia State Election Board rules that instruct county boards to conduct “reasonable inquiries” before certifying the election results, and a lawsuit in Michigan against a county board member who stated that he would refuse to certify the 2024 electoral results if the election were to be “stolen”.

The likelihood of another incident like the 6 January Capitol attack occurring has been significantly reduced by planned security measures and is therefore highly unlikely. On 11 September, the Department of Homeland Security declared the 2025 results’ certification date a “National Special Security Event”, meaning that considerable security – including federal, state, and local assets – will be deployed to secure the Capitol and other key areas in Washington D.C. Nevertheless, a realistic possibility remains of civil unrest at a local level, especially in states where officials have raised doubts about their willingness to certify the election results.

Judicial reform bill approved by Senate after protesters storm the Senate chamber.

The controversial judicial reform bill was approved by the Mexican Senate in the early hours of 11 September, after protesters had stormed the Senate chamber on 10 September. The judicial reform bill proposes that approximately 7,000 state and federal judges, including the Supreme Court, will be replaced by popular elections that will take place in 2025 and 2027. The bill additionally reduces experience and age requirements for multiple judicial roles. Protesters against the bill broke through the door of the Senate chamber using pipes and chains, with security forces deploying tear gas and fire extinguishers. As a result of the incursion, the Senate took a temporary recess, before reconvening and approving the bill.

Solace Global Assessment: The storming of the Mexican Senate by protesters almost certainly marks a further escalation in the anti-judicial reform unrest that has intensified in the last few weeks. Unions representing many of Mexico’s 55,000 judicial workers started an indefinite nationwide strike on 19 August, and on 3 September were joined by the Supreme Court justices.

Protests were initially notably peaceful, until a demonstration by striking judiciary workers blocked access to the Congress building on 3 September before the Chamber of Deputies approved the bill. The drivers of unrest, therefore, have been the Congress votes in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. With the bill now approved by both houses of Congress, all that remains now is for the bill to be ratified by the state legislatures, which will highly likely occur.

President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum will be sworn in on 1 October, and it is highly likely that judicial reform will be the biggest issue she will face at the start of her administration. On the one hand, there is a realistic possibility that unrest will decrease as the opportunities to stop the bill have been almost exhausted. On the other hand, however, it is more likely that unrest will take a more disruptive and violent character. The bill has spooked investors, with concerns that it may undermine the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade pact, and has been met with international condemnation, notably drawing criticism from the US ambassador.

The Peso has weakened by 17% since the landslide victory for the Morena party in the 2 June elections, and a former central bank official has stated that a recession next year is likely.

Venezuelan opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez lands in Madrid.

Gonzalez, who is the most prominent opposition figure in the country alongside Maria Corina Machado, went into hiding following the 28 July election, staying at various diplomatic offices and residences in Caracas. From Madrid, Gonzalez will highly likely use the freedom to speak publicly to gather international support against Maduro. However, it is also highly likely that the Maduro regime will use Gonzalez’s escape as a pretext for increasing accusations of foreign interference and “treason” by opposition forces. This, in turn, may grant the government greater legitimacy to suppress remaining civil society groups and non-aligned figures.

Venezuelan authorities revoke Brazil’s custody of Argentina’s diplomatic offices.

The decision was justified with the accusation that Brazilian officials were using Argentine offices to stage acts of terrorism. The decision will likely result in retaliatory moves in Brazil, and will likely further isolate the Venezuelan government by weakening Brazil’s mediating role. Members of the opposition are currently sheltering in the Argentine ambassador’s residence in Caracas, and the decision by Venezuelan authorities has a remote possibility to be a prelude to a more forceful violation of diplomatic rights in Venezuela.

USA “Terrorgram” leaders charged with allegedly inspiring terrorism.

The transnational collective’s name refers to the social network Telegram. It espoused white supremacist ideology and praised past far-right lone wolf terrorists as “Saints”, in efforts to motivate further attacks. American authorities accuse the two informal “leaders” of the collective of inciting at least three specific terror attacks – an anti-LGBTQ shooting in Slovakia, which killed two, a planned attack in New Jersey, and the recent stabbing outside a Mosque in Turkey. If convicted, the two face up to 220 years in prison.

The development is likely important and may become a key legal precedent in the prosecution of stochastic terrorists. The term “stochastic” identifies a “probabilistic” type of terrorism, where radical messages and calls to violence are indiscriminately spread within a target community (usually online) with the expectation that one or more members will act upon them. Stochastic terrorists are difficult to prosecute as they are not often involved in the planning and organisation of attacks, and maintain some plausible deniability regarding their involvement. There is a remote chance of violent retaliatory actions by Terrorgram supporters in the US.

Canadian counterterrorism arrests Pakistani citizen over 7 October terror plot.

The man was arrested on 7 September over an alleged plan to attack the Jewish community of New York City on the anniversary of the Hamas attack in southern Israel. The individual was almost certainly a self-radicalised lone wolf but nevertheless planned to carry out the attack in the name of IS. 7 October, as well as the 11 October Yom Kippur holiday, are likely to be at a particularly high risk from extremist action targeting both Jewish and Muslim places of worship in Western countries.

El Salvador police chief dead in helicopter crash.

Since 2019, Mauricio Arriaza Chicas was a central figure in implementing the crackdowns on local gangs spearheaded by President Bukele, which led to up to 80,000 arrests and a drastic reduction in murder rates. Chicas was travelling with Manuel Coto, a former credit union head, who was accused of money laundering and was being transported back to El Salvador. Bukele expressed suspicions about the incident’s cause.

South California wildfires destroy homes and cause mass evacuations.

At least three major wildfires erupted in southern California on 8 September. The fires have been especially difficult to contain, highly likely exacerbated by protracted hot and dry conditions in the region, and have expanded particularly quickly due to strong winds. As of 12 September, the fires have destroyed at least 100,000 acres of land, injured 13, and destroyed approximately 40 homes.

All three fires pose a direct threat to the greater Los Angeles urban area, and reports of Californian state firefighting resources being overstretched likely indicate that efforts to contain the blazes will continue throughout the weekend.

Hurricane Francine makes landfall in Louisiana, USA.

Making landfall as a category 2 hurricane, Francine hit southern Louisiana on late 11 September. The storm had maximum record windspeeds of 157 km/h, but quickly weakened into a tropical storm post-landfall. The New Orleans area experienced heavy rainfall, and flash flood emergency warnings were published by authorities. There have been no reported deaths or injuries as of the time of writing, and the storm was downgraded into a tropical depression on 12 September over Mississippi.

Tropical Storm Illeana forms south of Baja California Sur, Mexico

On 12 September, Tropical Storm Illeana formed in the North Pacific, roughly 400 kilometres south of the tip of Baja California Sur, Mexico. Initial forecasts anticipate the storm will bring heavy rainfall, strong winds, and storm surges to the peninsula, as well as to the states of Michoacán, Colima, and Jalisco over the weekend. There is a realistic possibility of localised travel disruptions and damage to physical properties in affected coastal areas.

Bolivia declares a state of emergency due to wildfires.

Over the past three months, wildfires have destroyed an estimated ten million acres of land, especially in the states of Beni and Santa Cruz. The Bolivian government announced that it will seek international support to combat the fires, which have additionally caused disruptions in La Paz and other urban centres.

On 11 September, IDF officials stated that Israeli forces have degraded Hamas forces in Gaza to such a great extent that Hamas is no longer able to operate as an organised military force. However, they also claimed that the complete destruction of Hamas may take approximately another year. The report seems to be based on a captured letter written by Khan Yunis Brigade leader Salameh prior to his killing in July, where the Hamas official claims to only retain a fifth of his personnel, ten per cent of his rocket arsenal, and less than half of his stocks of anti-tank and small calibre munitions.

On the same day, two Israeli strikes on a school building in Nuseirat killed at least 18 people, including six workers of the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency UNRWA. The organisation stated that the strikes resulted in its highest death toll in a single incident throughout the war. The al-Jaouni school had been targeted by Israeli strikes four other times since October 2023.

Solace Global Assessment: The IDF’s assessments of Hamas’ continuing degradation as a viable combat force are likely accurate. The Palestinian militant group has been likely cut off from its main sources of smuggled resources and weapons, Egypt, via the protracted Israeli occupation of the Philadelphi Corridor, and the destruction of much of the tunnels in the area. Satellite imagery from late August showed that Israeli forces had begun paving a road extending six kilometres inland along the corridor, likely an important signal of Tel Aviv’s intention to retain a presence at the Egypt-Gaza border. Hamas, moreover, has likely lost much of its most experienced personnel and morale is highly likely poor.

Nevertheless, Hamas likely retains some capacity to operate small units from densely populated areas previously cleared by Israeli forces, in efforts to inflict protracted attrition on IDF units. Hamas also likely maintains some political leverage via the dozens of hostages still under its control. The new “guidelines” for the treatment of captives issued by the group, which state that its fighters will kill Israeli hostages if IDF troops approach their location, are highly likely aimed at deterring raids by Israeli forces.

Additionally, these measures likely reflect decreasing confidence amongst the Hamas leadership in the organisation’s capability to keep the hostages.

The killing of six UNRWA workers highlights the continuing severe threat to non-combatants in Gaza posed by IDF aerial strikes. Moreover, the strike likely indicates the continued erosion of deconfliction processes in Gaza – whereby humanitarian organisations share their locations, operations and movements with militaries and armed groups.

The administrations of the US and Iraq reached a preliminary deal which would result in the full withdrawal of US and coalition forces from Iraq by the end of 2026. Partial withdrawal will begin in 2025. The deal follows six months of negotiations, and now requires the final approval from Washington and Baghdad. The deal was reached amid increased attacks by Iran-backed, Iraq-based forces on US bases in the country, which this year have killed three US troops and injured dozens more.

Solace Global Assessment: The deal will likely directly benefit Iran and allow Tehran’s proxy forces greater freedom in carrying out operations in Iraq. In return, it may result in a growing volume of Israeli strikes in the country, as Tel Aviv will likely increasingly bear the brunt of containing Iran’s proxy operations.

However, IS still carried out up to 200 attacks in the two countries in the first half of 2024, and likely retains considerable operational capacity. Despite a post-2019 tendency to under-report attacks and territorial control, IS core likely remains the political centre of the global terrorist network. A resurgent IS core may benefit from a decreased Western presence in the area, as well as the growing assets and expertise of other branches, like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), in Afghanistan, and the Islamic State Greater Sahara Province (ISGSP) and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), in the Sahel.

Local media reported on 11 September that six humanitarian workers of the NGO ALIMA were kidnapped by an unspecified armed group in the sub-prefecture of Liwa. At least one of the six was shot dead, while three escaped. The remaining two humanitarian workers are unaccounted for as of the time of writing.

Solace Global Assessment: Incidents affecting aid workers in Chad are less common that in other neighbouring Sahel states. According to the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD), there has been one case of kidnapping of aid workers in the country in 2024, with one victim. The kidnapping occurred in Dona Manga, in the country’s south.

The latest case, instead, occurred in the Lake Chad basin area and was therefore likely carried out by one of the Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs) operating in the area. These include Boko Haram and their rivals the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The kidnapping of aid workers in the area is mostly conducted for ransom, as both local and foreign nationals working for NGOs are perceived as being far wealthier than the general populace.

Due to a lack of state resources to combat local militant groups, targeting NGO workers can be a relatively low-risk effort, especially in regions affected by a security vacuum such as Lake Chad. In general, the risks faced by NGO workers in the Sahel have increased in recent years, while not reaching the severity of the Sudan area. This is likely due to the worsening domestic stability of local authorities, and the growing strength and scope of terrorist groups operating in the region.

Barnier promises new French government “by the end of next week”.

The centre-right politician and newly appointed prime minister is considered by Macron – and, according to some polls, by a slim majority of the French electorate – to be able to compromise with the main parliamentary forces to end the months-long political crisis that followed the European elections.

However, it is unlikely that Barnier’s picks will be able to satisfy the two radical forces in parliament, the far-right National Rally (RN) and the populist, left-wing France Unbowed (LFI). The latter, alongside much of the rest of the New Popular Front (NFP) coalition, has already vowed to support a no confidence vote against the new government.

This means that Barnier will likely be forced to make some important concessions to RN. However, here, RN’s commitment to oppose fiscal reform may prove impossible to accept, as the Barnier-appointed government will only have weeks before the 1 October draft budget deadline. If the Barnier government fails to survive, it is almost certain that the NFP and RN will renew calls for new elections, and there is a likewise high likelihood of severe civil unrest.

Germany begins temporary border controls.

The measure, which is initially scheduled to be in place for six months, follows the terror attack by a radicalised Islamist in Munich, who targeted the Israeli consulate on the anniversary of the 1972 Olympics massacre. It is also likely an attempt by the government coalition to toughen counterterrorism measures after two state-level positive results by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). In late September, state elections will be held in Brandenburg, and the high likelihood of another AfD positive result threatens the stability of the current government.

Abdelmadjid Tebboune predictably re-elected president of Algeria.

Tebboune reportedly won 94 per cent of the vote, after campaigning with the support of the military and the National Liberation Front (NFL). Turnout was low, at a reported 23 per cent, and opposition figures boycotted the election citing the likelihood of fraud. In an unusual move, Tebboune challenged the election results, and particularly the reported turnout rate. There is a realistic possibility of civil unrest following the elections, although this is unlikely to reach the same severity of the 2019 protests.

President Faye dissolves Senegal’s parliament in preparation for upcoming snap-elections

Faye assumed office in April 2024, the first opposition politician to win an election in Senegal’s post-independence history. The decision to hold legislative elections three years earlier than expected is largely attributed to the parliament’s opposition to President Faye’s proposed reforms. The current majority in Senegal’s National Assembly belongs to the United in Hope coalition, founded by former President Macky Sall.

Sall’s controversial presidency saw widespread and often violent protests, particularly by Senegal’s youth, who are largely represented by Faye’s PASTEF party. With the elections approaching, there is a realistic possibility that the tensions witnessed during Sall’s tenure could resurface, potentially instigating renewed civil unrest.

Danish gang-member arrested after antisemitic group attack.

The individual, alongside other accomplices, allegedly carried out an arson attack against a Jewish individual’s residence. The 21-year-old is allegedly a member of a group with links to the street gang Loyal to Familia (LTF), a group based in the Nørrebro district of Copenhagen. In recent years, LTF is one of the main gangs that have tried to expand into Sweden, where there is a greater network of organised crime groups. The case is notable as there is a realistic possibility that it highlights the overlap between organised crime and extremist activity in Denmark, a trend that was already observed in other European cities like Marseille.

Chechen couple sentenced to prison for Antwerp, Belgium, terror plot .

According to authorities, the two had made concrete plans to attack the Jewish quarter as well as an LGBTQ bar. The couple had reportedly self-radicalised, but also contacted Islamic State (IS) members on Telegram and received instructions and guidance on how to carry out the attack. The case likely highlights the considerable overlaps and complex relationship between patterns of self-radicalisation and vertical organisation. Belgium is a desirable target for Islamists as the seat of key EU institutions, and has previously acted as a base for terrorist cells planning attacks in neighbouring countries, especially France.

Russia claims involvement of Finland and Sweden in drone attacks in Murmansk

Ukraine has conducted drone attacks in the Murmansk region since 11 September. According to Russian sources, three Ukrainian drones were shot down on 11 September, with a further two shot down on the following day.

Russian military-affiliated sources have stated that no Ukrainian drones have successfully hit targets in the Murmansk region. Notably, a source linked to the Federal Security (FSB) claimed that the drone attack on 11 September originated from Finland. Furthermore, a prominent Russian military blogger, “Kotenok”, has hinted at a possible Sweden’s involvement in Thursday’s attack due to a Swedish surveillance plane flying near the Murmansk border.

However, no official Russian source has not echoed this latter claim. There is a remote possibility that these accusations could lead to further tension in the region, and greater Russian aggressive moves at its northwestern borders.

Israeli forces strike Masyaf, Syria.

On 9 September, Israeli forces launched a missile strike in the vicinity of Masyaf, targeting facilities reportedly being used by Iranian and Iran-affiliated groups. According to NGO sources, the strike killed at least 25 people, including a number of civilians. There is a realistic possibility of retaliatory strikes on Israeli cities by local Iranian proxy groups or by other members of the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance”.

Terror attack at Allenby Bridge, Jordan-Israel border.

On 8 September, an individual opened fire on Israeli workers at the border crossing with Jordan, killing three. The bridge, also known as King Hussein Bridge, is the only active Israel-Jordan border crossing, and is therefore almost certainly a high-value target for extremist action. The attack was carried out with a pistol and was unsophisticated, which suggests that the attacker was likely not affiliated with any specific terrorist group. Iran and its proxies have increasingly sought to smuggle weapons to organised groups inside Jordan, and the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict has favoured anti-government sentiment inside the kingdom. Similar incidents, which force a security response, likely put a high level of political pressure on authorities’ efforts to retain some stability and popular support.

Dozens of “armed bandits” kidnap travellers in Zamfara, Nigeria.

The kidnapping of an as of the time of writing still unspecified number of travellers occurred on 12 September, just hours after the expiration of a deadline for payment requested by a local bandit leader, known as Bello Turji, and the deployment of increased military assets to the area. The region of Zamfara is extremely underdeveloped, and authorities exercise only partial control over it. It is highly likely that the kidnapping case, is linked to the high level of organised militia activity in the area, and there is a likelihood that it relates to the recent extortion attempt.

Anti-air travel and miscellaneous groups plan “International Day for the Ban on Night Flights”

Dozens of activist groups, almost entirely based in Western Europe, have released a joint statement protesting night flights and calling for a day of sensibilisation on 13 September. While no planned protests were identified, there is a realistic possibility that activists, especially in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands (where the movement is most present) will seek to stage disruptions and protests at or near international airports. These, in turn, may affect travel and business.

Nigeria dam collapse provokes severe floods, displaces thousands

Heavy rains in Borno State, northeast Nigeria, caused the Maiduguri dam to overflow and collapse on 10-11 September. The resulting flooding has affected, according to authorities, up to one million people, with at least 30 reported fatalities at the time of writing. Nigeria’s northeast suffers from poor infrastructure and a lack of authority presence, meaning that rescue efforts are often delayed or impossible.

Moreover, the security situation in Borno is further worsened by the active Boko Haram insurgency. The severity of the floods is likely to result in a sharp number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria’s northeast, and will almost certainly further stretch already insufficient government response assets.

Repeated extreme weather events moreover have a direct negative impact on food security, with young people and at-risk demographics particularly affected, and directly contribute to increases in violent crime. Boko Haram, as well as other violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and bandit groups, have taken advantage of disasters to carry out recruitment efforts among the displaced or dispossessed.

Dengue fever epidemic declared in Central African Republic (CAR).

The CAR’s Minister of Health, Pierre Somsé has declared an epidemic after 13 cases of Dengue fever was declared by the national epidemiological surveillance system in the cities of Bangui and Bimbo. Dengue fever, also known as “tropical flu”, is an infectious, mosquito-borne disease caused by a virus of the same name.

The incident rate of dengue fever in the CAR has significantly increased and is now classified as a ‘re-emerging’ disease. The development reflects the wider trend in rising dengue infections across Africa, with over 270,000 cases and 753 deaths reported across 18 African Union (AU) Member States between 2019 and June 2024.

Ganesh Pandal riots show looming threat of sectarian violence.

On 8 September, a number of individuals reportedly pelted a pandal (a temporary structure erected to celebrate a Hindu god) with stones in Surat, Gujarat. The episode resulted in a riot, and in at least 30 arrests. In the days following the incident, authorities began demolishing irregular settlements in the area, in a move that observers identified as retaliatory targeting of the local Muslim community (although authorities claimed that the demolitions were planned weeks in advance).

Solace Global Assessment: The case almost certainly represents the latest escalation in sectarian, religion-based conflict in India, and there is a realistic possibility that it will lead to an increase in violence in the state.

There is a significant threat of sectarian mob violence in India, with recent cases particularly involving the Hindu and Muslim communities. Local and national officials of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have repeatedly encouraged mob violence – including “bulldozer justice” – against Muslim minorities, and studies have found a correlation between BJP state rule and sectarian anti-Muslim violence.

The BJP is the ruling party in Gujarat, and officials and sympathisers have likely deliberately increased sectarian tensions. During the electoral campaign for the 2024 elections, Gujarat BJP officials accused opponents of unfairly “giving quotas” as “other backward classes” (OBC, a designation that entails some access to reserved government jobs and higher education posts) to Muslims. In March, Muslim students carrying out Ramadan prayers at the University of Gujarat were reportedly attacked by a “Hindu mob”. In September, BJP members were accused of arbitrarily enlisting local secondary school students as party members.

Alongside internal development, sectarian violence in India has also likely been influenced by social media-based disinformation, with radical groups using international developments as instruments to stoke domestic violence. For instance, the recent cases of anti-Hindu violence in Bangladesh following the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, have been reposted and likely inflated by Hindu nationalist influencers and pages in India. OSINT analysis shows that the recent Gujarat case has also been broadcast online as a case of concerted anti-Hindu violence, and there is a realistic possibility that increased attention will result in further calls for retaliatory violence.

Typhoon Yagi kills almost 200 people in northern Vietnam.

Typhoon Yagi made landfall in northern Vietnam on 7 September as a Very Strong Typhoon with windspeeds of 149km/h. 199 people have so far been killed, with over 800 injuries and 128 people still missing. The death toll will almost certainly rise. The deaths were primarily caused by flash floods and landslides in the northwestern Lao Cai province, which borders China. One hamlet in Lao Cai, Lang Nu, was entirely swept away by a flash flood, leading to at least 42 deaths and 52 missing. On 9 September, the Phong Chau bridge in Phu Tho province collapsed. Flood waters from the Red River led to Hanoi neighbourhoods on its banks being flooded, with thousands being evacuated. Power and drinking water has been cut since 11 September. 

Solace Global Assessment: Yagi is the strongest typhoon in Asia this year, having earlier made landfall in Hainan, China on 6 September as a Super Typhoon. In Hainan, four people were killed and 95 injured, with an estimated USD 9.26 billion in total damages. While Yagi considerably reduced in strength before hitting northern Vietnam, the impact has been far greater. This is almost certainly due to the increased vulnerability of Vietnam, which results from architectural practices, resiliency and preparedness measures, and state capacity. Even weakened, Yagi was the strongest typhoon to hit Vietnam in three decades. The flooding in Hanoi is likely the worst in two decades, with warehouses and export-oriented hubs in the east of Hanoi closing. While Sapa, a popular tourist destination for trekking, is located in the worst affected province, Lao Cai, the area is a particularly impoverished part of Vietnam. This highly likely further increased the population’s storm vulnerability. The Australian Foreign Ministry has announced the provision of USD 2 million in humanitarian relief funding, and rescue operations are ongoing.

Kyrgyzstan removes Taliban from list of banned organisations.

The move follows a similar recent one by Kazakhstan. The Kyrgyz government likely has a security interest in normalising relations with the Taliban, as it likely assesses the survival of the current Kabul regime to have a positive effect on regional stability. Moreover Bishkek, like nearby Dushanbe, is almost certainly worried about the possibility of a power vacuum in Afghanistan resulting in a growing Islamist activity in the region.

While primarily active in Afghanistan, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has increased recruitment and fundraising activities beyond the country’s borders. Normalisation with neighbouring central Asian states will also likely be a prelude to similar developments in the Taliban’s relations with Russia and other key regional powers.

Anti-war demonstration in Melbourne, Australia, ends in dozens of arrests and injuries.

Approximately 3,000 protesters clashed with police while attempting to disrupt an expo for weapons manufacturers. Protesters reportedly threw Molotov cocktails and acid bottles at police, which responded with tear gas and stun grenades. At least 39 arrests were made on the day, and more than 100 people were injured.

Due to the violence and increased media exposure of the protest, there is a realistic possibility that it will lead to further cases of civil unrest in the city. Events such as the arms expo in Melbourne constitute high-desirability targets for protesters due to their extremely high visibility.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attacks Shiites on pilgrimage in Afghanistan.

On the morning of 13 September, reports and footage emerged of an ISKP ambush on unarmed Afghan Hazara Shia pilgrims at the border between the provinces of Daikundi and Ghor. Reports indicate that the pilgrims were returning from Karbala, a key location in Shia history. The deliberate attack on pilgrims is likely meant to continue undermining Taliban claims that ISKP has been neutralised, and that Kabul retains full authority over the country. Moreover, although unconfirmed, reports indicate that, in the Ghor province, local Taliban offices have been comprehensively infiltrated by ISKP, with Taliban resources being redirected to train and equip Islamic State fighters.

Over 50 killed after Myanmar’s military bombs Arakan Army prisoner of war camp

On 8 September, Myanmar’s military bombed a prison camp in Maungdaw, killing at least 50 according to yet unverified reports released by the rebel Arakan Army (AA), which operates in Rakhine State. The AA claimed that junta have increased the volume of their bombing campaigns. Pro-junta forces likely see bombing rebel-held areas – including civilian targets – as a way to erode civilian confidence in rebel forces, and to disrupt local logistics.

With the junta continuing to lose territory to the better-motivated and increasingly larger rebel forces, there is a realistic likelihood of further increases in bombing campaigns.

North Korean state media disclose image of uranium-enrichment facility

The image marks the first public disclosure of a uranium-enrichment site since photos of the Yongbyon nuclear complex were released in 2010. North Korean authorities almost certainly saw releasing the image as a way to deter South Korea, the US, and their allies. However, the image may also assist Seoul and Washington in refining estimates of North Korea’s current nuclear capabilities, following satellite images in recent years that indicate significant expansions at the Yongbyon complex.

Tropical Storm Bebinca moving towards China in Philippine Sea.

Bebinca is currently a Severe Tropical Storm, with windspeeds of 110 km/h. The storm is forecast to strengthen into a Typhoon, or even a Very Strong Typhoon, before making landfall in densely populated eastern China on 15-16 September. Within the cone of uncertainty, which is the predicted possible paths the storm could take, are the Chinese areas of southern Jiangsu Province, Shanghai and Zheijiang Province (with the cities of Ningbo, Hangzhou, Taizhou and Wenzhou all liable to be potentially affected).

The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) predict that the storm could have a high humanitarian impact, which is based on the forecast maximum sustained wind speeds, exposed population and vulnerability.

Bebinca will likely enter the Philippine area of responsibility on 14 September and is expected to bring sporadic heavy rainfall or thunderstorms to Manila and other areas of Luzon.

On 15-16 September, the storm is predicted to go past or through the Japanese islands of Amami and Okinawa, with authorities warning of possible landslides and flooding. The area of China that will likely be most impacted is highly developed, with extensive state capacity as well as rigorous storm preparedness and resiliency measures. Nonetheless, Bebinca will likely cause widespread disruptions and impact.

Two hundred evacuated due to volcanic threat in the Philippines

Kanlaon Volcano is located in the centre of the Negros Island. Authorities issued alerts for the area in June, after initial seismic activity. On 11 September, further activity, including sulphur dioxide emissions and more than 300 minor volcanic quakes, prompted authorities to issue an evacuation order for nearby villages due to the risk of a serious eruption.

Volcanic activity could interfere with travel and economic activity elsewhere on the island. In June, flights to Bacolod-Silay International Airports were briefly interrupted due to the volcano’s activity.

Haiti expands state of emergency to cover entire country.

On 5 September, the Haitian government announced that it was expanding the current state of emergency to cover the entire country. Haiti’s Ouest department, home to the capital Port-au-Prince, was placed under a state of emergency on March 3 under former Prime Minister Ariel Henry due to escalating violence and mass prison escapes.

The emergency was extended to other areas, including Artibonite, Centre, and Nippes, which have also experienced severe violence. The announcement also follows widespread protests after the suspension of services at Haiti’s largest hydroelectric dam which has left huge swathes of the country without power.

Solace Global Assessment: Haiti’s expansion of the state of emergency has likely been timed to coincide with the arrival of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Blinken is set to conduct a diplomatic visit to Haiti on 5-6 September where he will meet with Prime Minister Garry Conille to discuss Haiti’s democratic transition. Conille has only been in power for three months and despite the recent deployment of a UN-backed Kenyan security mission, authorities have failed to make much progress in combating the criminal gangs that now control an estimated 80 per cent of the country.

The expansion of the state of emergency is likely aimed at attracting more foreign aid and assistance, with the US currently being the largest contributor. The Kenyan force, which was deployed in June, only consists of 400 police officers, and their effectiveness has been curtailed by salary payment issues. Moreover, the domestic security services are almost certainly underfunded, and overstretched and have been limited to only a few minor operations, with the gangs often outnumbering and outgunning the police.

Conille’s strategy is likely intended to convince Blinken to both increase US contributions but also to secure additional support from the international community. However, foreign assistance will likely be partially dependent on steps towards democratic transition, a process that currently appears unachievable with the gangs exerting so much influence across the country.

Judicial reform bill passed by lower house, despite escalating unrest.

On 3 September, protests led by striking judiciary workers took place outside the Mexican Supreme Court and Congress against the controversial judicial reform bill. The demonstrations blocked access to the Congress building, leading to lawmakers instead gathering in a gymnasium to start the voting proceedings. The Supreme Court additionally released a statement on 3 September that they would be joining the strike, following an 8-3 vote. Despite the protests, the bill was passed on 4 September by the lower house and will now go to the Senate.

Solace Global Assessment: The bill’s most controversial measures involve the direct election of approximately 7,000 judges, magistrates and Supreme Court justices, along with the removal and lowering of several requirements. Critics warn that the bill will politicise the judiciary, lessen the strength of checks and balances against the ruling Morena party, and enable organised crime to exert greater influence over the Mexican judicial system.

The Morena party is only one seat short of the required supermajority in the Senate, and it is highly likely that the bill will pass. President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum’s swearing-in ceremony will take place on 1 October, and she has indicated that the reform package will be one of the first priorities for her administration.

The indefinite nationwide strike by judiciary workers began on 19 August, and demonstrations have taken place in several cities across Mexico. The decision by the Supreme Court to join the strike is highly likely to lend further legitimacy to the protests, which are unlikely to subside in the coming weeks.

While the unrest has been generally peaceful thus far, the blocking of roads and access to Mexico’s congress is an escalation in the tactics employed by the demonstrators, likely indicative of increasing desperation to stop the bill. It is likely that as the legislation further progresses towards being signed into law, unrest will intensify.

Trucker protests paralyse Colombia’s transport network.

Widespread trucker protests have erupted across Colombia following the government’s decision to increase diesel prices. On 31 August, the government raised the price of diesel by 1,904 Colombian pesos or 45 US cents per gallon. In protest, truckers have cut off many of Colombia’s largest cities by staging roadblocks on the nation’s major highways. On 4 September, Colombia’s ombudsman stated that there were at least 127 demonstrations being held across 13 regions, with 42 of them consisting of total road blockades.

Solace Global Assessment: The almost 21 per cent increase in diesel prices by the government has been claimed as fair and justified on the grounds that the country has long subsidised prices. Prices have been held for four years at just over 9,000 pesos but the government has stated that this was fiscally unsustainable and was costing it over one trillion pesos a month.

However, truckers have argued that the immediate and high price increase is set to push their businesses to bankruptcy. Truckers have also likely been frustrated by the removal of subsidies as it has coincided with a huge increase in government spending elsewhere by Colombia’s leftist President Gustavo Petro.

Trucker protests have led to major supply chain issues, reducing the amount of food arriving at wholesale markets. If sustained, the trucker protests are likely to result in price increases and could spark unrest within major cities like Bogota, Medellin and Cali. Colombia’s largest state-owned oil and gas company, Ecopetrol, has also warned that the protests will affect the production of hydrocarbons and fuel supplies across the country.

This trend has been exacerbated by a spate of attacks on Colombia’s pipeline infrastructure in areas held by the National Liberation Army or ELN, following the end of a fragile ceasefire agreement.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to resume on US campuses.

Classes in multiple US colleges that were the epicentres of pro-Palestine protests, including Columbia University, began during this reporting period. It is highly likely that pro-Palestine groups will resume protests from the 6-8 September weekend, and that these will include attempts to start campus “encampments” and, more likely, disrupt local roadways and public transport.

First US presidential debate scheduled for 10 September.

Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump are set to participate in their first debate at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia on 10 September. Given the recent assassination attempt on Donald Trump and the degree of political division in the US, the debates will almost certainly involve heightened security measures and will likely attract large demonstrations in support of a range of issues, most likely the conflict in the Middle East.

Venezuela issues arrest warrant for opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez.

Gonzalez and co-leader of the opposition Maria Corina Machado are currently believed to be in hiding in Venezuela, while other prominent opposition members have either escaped or sought refuge in diplomatic offices in the country. The arrest order is almost certainly meant to reinforce the government’s legitimacy, and may be a prelude to more violent suppression of remaining opposition groups and individuals associated with Gonzalez. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that authorities are aiming to provoke the expatriation of Gonzalez and Machado, likely aiming to link their positions with foreign adversaries of the Maduro regime, while also reducing their ability to coordinate domestic protests at a later date.

US sailor detained by Venezuelan authorities.

According to Pentagon officials, a US Navy sailor was detained in Caracas on 30 August and is currently being held by the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). The detained US service member was reportedly not on approved leave or official travel, and his purpose in-country is currently unknown. On 2 September, the US Justice Department seized a plane belonging to Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, which will likely impede the sailor’s release. It is a realistic possibility that the detention is a result of Venezuelan hostage diplomacy. It is additionally, however, a realistic possibility that the detention relates to concerns from Venezuelan authorities regarding subversive anti-regime actions from US nationals, heightened since the failed 2020 coup plot Operation Gideon that was led by an ex-US service member.

Loggers killed by indigenous group in Peruvian Amazon.

On September 3, two loggers were killed and two others are missing after a clash with the Mashco Piro, an isolated indigenous community in Peru’s Amazon. The conflict occurred in the Madre de Dios region where loggers have been clearing a trail. Confrontations between loggers and indigenous tribes are like to increase as the logging, both legal and illegal, of the Amazon increases. The Peruvian government is investigating the incident, under pressure from local rights groups who claim that the government is failing to recognise indigenous territory.

Continued row between Brazilian judiciary and Elon Musk.

The judiciary of Brazil ordered the owner of X.com, Elon Musk, to uphold the country’s ban on the social network, which followed the platform’s refusal to comply with court orders regarding the removal of profiles spreading disinformation. Musk initially refused to comply with the latest order and has increasingly accused the Brazilian government of ideologically motivated censorship. Musk’s involvement in Brazilian politics has been praised by supporters of former President Bolsonaro, who have called for protests against the Supreme Court on 7 September.

Haiti’s main hydro-electric plant ceases to operate.

On 3 September, Haiti’s state-owned power company, Electricité d’Haiti (EDH), reported that output from the Peligre hydroelectric plant had ceased due to protests over power distribution, with protestors demanding that energy be redistributed beyond the capital, Port-au-Prince. The plant, which provides most of Haiti’s hydroelectric power, has been offline since 2 September, worsened by damage to two transformers and disrupted access due to gang control. Only 49 per cent of Haitians reportedly now have grid access, with the energy blackout likely to further exacerbate many of the country’s current issues, including crime, displacement and the humanitarian situation.

August worst month in two decades for Brazilian wildfires.

Satellite-derived data from Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (Inpe) has indicated that August was the worst month for wildfires in the country since 2010. The 38,266 fire hotspots identified in the Amazon in August were nearly twice the amount observed in the previous month. Warmer temperatures and drier vegetation have provided conditions conducive to the spread of wildfires, many of which are started deliberately to clear land for cattle pastures. Multiple investigations are currently underway looking into possible criminal involvement in the starting of wildfires. Furthermore, deforestation has decreased the rainforest’s long-term ability to maintain moisture, suggesting that future wildfires will increase in scale and frequency.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) wins first state parliamentary election in Thuringia.

In addition to winning 32.8 per cent of the votes cast in the central German state, the party also received the second most votes in Saxony, 31 per cent. The results represent the first time that a far-right party has won an election in Germany since the Second World War.

Solace Global Assessment: The AfD is unlikely to enter the state’s government, as the remaining parties are likely to adopt a strategy of alliances similar to that used by their French counterparts to prevent Le Pen’s National Rally from obtaining power. Still, the result is notable as it is the first time that the AfD has won a state election and is likely to have a significant impact on German politics.

Compared to other European far-right parties – for instance, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy or Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, which have moderated some of their positions in order to court moderate right votes – the AfD’s continued rise has not coincided with a notable change in its proposed policies. In Thuringia itself, the party is led by Björn Höcke, who was found guilty by German courts for using Nazi rhetoric twice. It is likely that the AfD’s victory will prompt civil unrest in Thuringia, Saxony, and in large urban centres in Germany.

There is a realistic possibility that increasing popular support for the AfD will be seized by far-right and identitarian groups to carry out demonstrations and symbolic disruptive action. Finally, the positive performance (15.8 per cent of the vote in Thuringia and 11.8 per cent in Saxony) of the new Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance party (BSW) is also notable. BSW was founded in January 2024 after breaking away from The Left party, and it represents a left-wing populist, socially conservative and nationalist formation that rejects Berlin’s support for Ukraine and the environmentalist policies of the rest of the left.

On 22 September, elections are scheduled for Brandenburg. Polls predict an AfD win (with more than 24 per cent of the vote) and show a realistic chance for BSW to come third or fourth. Another AfD victory, and continued BSW growth, are likely to seriously damage the current governing coalition’s perceived legitimacy. They may, furthermore, create questions about the viability of the SPD-CDU coalition.

Finally, it is important to note that there has been a rise in lone-wolf Islamist attacks in Germany, and media associated with groups like the Islamic State (IS) have called for further attacks following the Mannheim stabbing in late May. It is possible that the AfD victory, even if not directly resulting in the passing of new policies in the short term, will drive a rise in extremist activity in Germany.

Largest West Bank operation of the war ends, Hamas shares new hostage policy.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) declared, on 6 September, that their almost two-weeks-long raids in Jenin, Tulkarem and Tubas have ended. The large-scale operation, which has resulted in at least 33 deaths and 140 injuries, including the head of Hamas in Jenin, was described by Israeli authorities as a response to a growing number of attacks on Israeli settlers and citizens in the West Bank and Israeli territory. In Gaza, Hamas announced a new policy of killing Israeli captives if IDF forces approach areas where they are being held, following the recovery of six hostages’ bodies who had reportedly been shot by their guards, The policy reportedly dates back to June. The reports on the deaths of the six hostages prompted further protests in Israel calling for the Netanyahu administration to reach a ceasefire deal. Protests in Israel were particularly severe in Tel Aviv, with at least 550,000 demonstrators gathering in the city.

Solace Global Assessment: The question of the control over the Philadelphi corridor likely remains the main obstacle in the way of a ceasefire deal. On 4 September, Israeli officials stated that IDF positions at the border with Egypt would be assessed at the war’s end. For Tel Aviv, maintaining control of the Philadelphi corridor is crucial to depriving Hamas of lethal aid and degrading its capabilities. Hamas leaders are likewise highly likely aware of the general degradation of their fighting strength, and of the skills of the fighters that they are able to recruit from the Palestinian population – whose survivability rate has decreased in recent months.

The new hostage policy – which was notably only announced months after its first apparent implementation, likely reflects Hamas’ growing concern over its ability to hold and transfer hostages whilst under pressure from IDF operations. The tactic may also be indicative of a new strategy aimed at undermining Israeli resolve and applying pressure on the Netanyahu administration.

The executions will almost certainly fuel further unrest in Israel and could put pressure on Tel Aviv to accept ceasefire demands that are more favourable to Hamas. However, the often indiscriminate nature of the Israeli campaign to date would suggest that it is unlikely to cause a major shift in Netanyahu’s demands. Moreover, the hostages are Hamas’ main source of leverage. Executing them en masse would diminish this leverage and reaffirm Netanyahu’s stance that Hamas needs to be completely destroyed as a military and political force.

Rival Libyan legislatures jointly agree to appoint new central bank governor.

On 3 September, Libya’s two rival legislative bodies jointly signed a statement agreeing to appoint a central bank governor within 30 days. Previously, on 18 August, long-term governor Sadiq al-Kabir was unilaterally dismissed by the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), which increased tensions In Libya. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) is responsible for holding Libya’s oil revenues, with Libya’s oil reserves being the largest in Africa. The crisis at the CBL has had a wide-ranging impact on Libya’s economy, hampering the payment of state salaries and ordinary transactions.

Assessment: The agreement is likely to reduce tensions in Libya, which have in recent weeks been at their highest since the 2020 ceasefire between the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA, now the GNU) and the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA).

The LNA has been highly likely instrumentalising the flow of oil, causing shutdowns and reduced operations at several oil fields including Libya’s largest, the Shahara oil field. Mass LNA troop mobilisations in the west and southwest of the country, particularly in the vicinity of the strategically significant Ghadames Airport, have caused great concern that Libya is on the verge of renewed civil war.

While the agreement to resolve the crisis at the CBL will likely lessen tensions in the short term, and will likely alleviate the threat of economic crisis, it still remains a realistic possibility that renewed conflict could break out in Libya between the rival governments.

Over 100 killed in Islamist attack in northeast Nigeria.

On 1 September, approximately 150 armed militants suspected of belonging to the Islamist group Boko Haram conducted an attack on the village of Mafa, Yobe State in northeast Nigeria. The militants arrived on motorcycles armed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades and then began to indiscriminately attack locals and set fire to multiple homes and businesses. Original estimates put the death toll at just under 40; however, most revisions have now placed the death toll at over 100.

Solace Global Assessment: The attack took place in northeast Nigeria, where an Islamist insurgency primarily led by Boko Haram has lasted for 15 years and has taken the lives of approximately 40,000 people. It is almost certain that Boko Haram operates within this area with a high degree of freedom and is likely exploiting the increased destabilisation of the wider Sahel region to conduct increased cross-border operations. This attack closely resembles the recent Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) attack in Burkina Faso which killed as many as 500 people. Boko Haram has traditionally employed a range of tactics, including suicide bombings, mass kidnappings and raids or armed assaults.

However, there is a realistic possibility that the success of JNIM’s attack, the overstretching of Nigerian security services and the growing strength of Boko Haram have inspired it to transition towards more hit-and-run raids using motorcycles. These attacks enable Boko Haram to attack isolated villages and then swiftly withdraw before the military can be deployed to the area.

Additionally, by targeting small villages, Boko Haram may force military commanders to spread their resources thinly, making it challenging to allocate sufficient support to defend future potential targets. Of note, unconfirmed reports indicate that militants left the area and rigged the roads leading to it with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), highly likely in an effort to delay the arrival of the armed forces. The scale and sophistication of the attack likely indicate a growth in Boko Haram’s organisational and logistical capacity, which have likely been facilitated by the group’s alliances with regional bandits and ability to exploit safe havens in border areas.

These attacks are likely to continue and will undermine the government’s authority and its ability to provide security, a development that is likely to lead to civil unrest against the government in Nigeria’s north- a trend that has been witnessed throughout the region.

Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier appointed new French Prime Minister.

Barnier is a representative of the Gaullist right adjacent to the Republicans (LR). His appointment ends a two-month-long period of uncertainty that followed the National Assembly elections. The move is likely to be followed by concessions to the right, particularly Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), which will be crucial to surviving a no-confidence vote. Barnier’s appointment is almost certainly going to be received extremely negatively by the left-wing coalition, the New Popular Front (NFP), which had suggested Lucie Castets as a potential prime minister. The NFP was seemingly moving towards collapse due to tensions between its two main members, the Socialists (PS) and the populist France Unbowed (LFI). However, with Macron turning to the right rather than the PS, the left is likely to call for large-scale anti-Macron demonstrations in the coming weeks. As numerous far-left groups threatened violent action if LFI was kept from governing, there is a high likelihood of sabotage.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to increase in intensity in Western Europe.

It is likely that pro-Palestine protests will increase in intensity in September in European countries that have had major protest movements, especially in large urban centres. This is due to multiple factors: the beginning of the academic year, the overlap with multiple Palestine-related anniversaries (i.e. Black September, Oslo Accords), and the approaching one-year anniversary of the 7 October attack.

Volkswagen (VW) cost-cutting plans are likely to provoke civil unrest in Germany.

Senior representatives of the automotive industry giant, which employs about half of its 600,000 workers in Germany, have announced that they are considering cutting production in Germany to relocate plants to other more competitive markets, where labour costs are lower. The announcement is likely to translate into concrete policies, as VW has recently had a decline in profits and competitiveness, especially in the growing electric vehicle market. There is a high likelihood that further pressures will result in labour union reactions, including strikes and protests, in areas that host VW plants.

Major transport strikes organised across Italy.

A series of public transport and air travel strikes have been organised across Italy and are set to begin on 7 September. Strikes over worker conditions for ground operations workers, air traffic controllers and baggage handlers are set to cause major disruptions at Rome’s Fiumicino and Olbia, Milan Malpensa, Florence Amerigo Vespucci and Pisa Galileo Galilei airports. A nationwide rail strike organised for 9 September will be closely followed by a nationwide public transport workers’ walkout will almost certainly cause major disruption on Italy’s train, bus, tram and underground services.

Kosovo closes institutions that serve Serb minority.

On 31 August, Kosovar authorities closed five institutions in the north that served the ethnic Serb minority, a move that escalated tensions with Serbia. Kosovo’s local administration minister, Elbert Krasniqi, stated that these institutions violated Kosovo’s constitution and laws. US officials expressed worries that the move could destabilise the region, a concern that has likely been amplified by Russia’s recent attempts to sow division in the area, including treating Bosnia’s breakaway Republika Srpska as a recognised state. The head of Mitrovica Citizens’ Association, a Kosovar Serb group, has announced the blockade of all administrative border crossings with Serbia in North Kosovo in response to Kosovo’s actions.

Two US marines attacked by mob in Turkey.

Ten individuals were arrested for attacking two US marines in the centre of Izmir. The perpetrators were reportedly part of a nationalist and left-Kemalist (the ideology based on the ideas of Turkish 20^th century leader Ataturk) group known as the Youth Union of Turkey. The arrests have been challenged by the group, and there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory protests by the Youth Union in Izmir and other cities where it has a strong presence, including Istanbul. The actions may also lead to similar attacks on US personnel within Turkey.

Algerian President Tebboune likely to win re-election on 7 September.

The vote, which has been protested by the opposition for being rescheduled to September rather than the customary date in December, is likely to be affected by low voter turnout and government interference. Tebboune’s highly likely re-election could result in protests in Algiers and other cities, albeit these are unlikely to reach the severity of the 2019 protests.

Senegal likely to look to the West for counterterrorism operations.

The newly elected government of Senegal, which has espoused an overall anti-West rhetoric and has previously made diplomatic gestures in favour of the neighbouring Sahel junta states, asked for more international cooperation to tackle local jihadist groups during a visit by Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez. It is highly likely that the move is a response to the failure of the junta states’ counterterrorism operations, which are becoming increasingly reliant on Russian help which has yet to curtail the rate of extremist attacks. The Islamist groups operating in the Sahel likely aim to reach the comparatively richer coastal West African states, as part of growing ambitions to develop territorial entities.

Islamist lone wolf attack in Munich.

The attack occurred on 5 September, near the Israeli consulate and a Holocaust Museum. The attacker almost certainly carried out the attack to coincide with the 52^nd anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, where members of the Palestinian organisation Black September took hostages and killed 11 Israeli athletes. The Munich attacker was killed by police, and no other casualties were recorded. The attack is notable due to the use of a long-barrel rifle by the perpetrator as, in Europe, most lone-wolf attacks involve bladed weapons. According to police reports, the attacker was a self-radicalised 18-year-old supporter of the Islamic State (IS). In 2023, he had reportedly already been investigated by authorities for terrorism-related offences. The attack continues the trend of notably young lone wolves, likely underscoring the growing effect of online self-radicalisation.

Houthis reportedly attack two oil tankers in the Red Sea, including Saudi flagged vessel.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that the Houthis struck the Panama flagged MV BLUE LAGOON I and the Saudi flagged MV AMJAD on 2 September with two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and one one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV). Neither vessel was seriously damaged. The Houthis and Saudi Arabia, after being engaged in a seven-year conflict between 2015-2022, are participating in ongoing peace negotiations and have generally abided by a cessation of fighting since 2022. Both vessels were sailing in close proximity to each other, and it is likely that the Houthis accidentally struck the MV AMJAD. The AMJAD’s owner, Saudi shipping firm Bahri, “unequivocally affirm[ed] that AMJAD was not targeted”, and the Houthis omitted any mention of the AMJAD in their claim of responsibility. This highly likely indicates that both parties are keen to avoid jeopardising peace negotiations.

Prison break in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) results in more than 100 deaths.

The escape started after a riot broke out in the Makala prison of Kinshasa. Authorities responded violently and the resulting clashes killed at least 129 and injured 59. DRC prisons are highly overcrowded, and the government has recently sought to release some inmates convicted of low-level offences to alleviate the pressure. There is a realistic possibility that the combination of overcrowding and insufficient police resources will provoke further riots and prison break attempts.

Uganda opposition leader Bobi Wine shot by police.

Bobi Wine was initially elected as an independent but joined the opposition National Unity Platform party prior to the 2021 presidential election. In early 2024, he announced that he would again run in 2026, challenging Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda since 1986. The autocratic government of Uganda is characterised by a strong symbiotic relationship between government, the judiciary, and security forces, and there is a high likelihood that the shooting was a deliberate attempt on the opposition leader’s life. Due to Bobi Wine’s domestic and international popularity, it is likely that the case will spark significant unrest.

At least one tourist dead following flash floods in Mallorca, Spain.

The individual died while hiking in the area of the Torrent de Pareis, in the Tramuntana mountain range. Approximately ten other people were also trapped by the floods before being rescued. On 2-3 September, extreme weather, with severe showers and localised flash flooding, affected various coastal areas throughout the Mediterranean, including parts of Greece, central Italy and eastern Spain.

Protest bill approved ahead of planned demonstration by main opposition party.

On 5 September, the Pakistani Senate passed the ‘Peaceful Assembly and Public Order Bill 2024’ law. Pending further approval, the law is set to be implemented before a planned major 8 September demonstration by the main opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in support of the jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan. The proposed legislation will empower Islamabad officials to ban assemblies in designated areas, with participants in unauthorised protests liable to receive prison sentences of up to three years.

Solace Global Assessment: In 2023, large-scale civil unrest frequently occurred in Pakistan after attempts to arrest Khan. Initially, the protests were managed by police with riot control measures such as tear gas and water cannons. Later demonstrations led to military deployment and internet shutdowns. Critics view the bill as a government tactic to suppress opposition and the bill’s passage is likely to heighten tensions.

The 8 September demonstration had already been rescheduled from 22 August following the withdrawal of permission by officials, and it is likely that authorities will attempt to suppress the upcoming rally. It is highly likely that violent clashes will occur in Islamabad during the protest. The bill reflects the government’s unstable position following contentious elections in February 2024 and will likely exacerbate levels of violence in future protests that are not granted official permission.

Garment workers protest for higher pay in industrial areas.

Protests by garment factory workers in early September, mainly in key industrial areas such as Gazipur and Narayanganj, resulted in the closure of 130 garment factories. Their demands include higher wages, maternity leave and other concessions. The protesters vandalised factories and vehicles, as well as blocked roads, which resulted in the deployment of military and police forces. Although some workers continued to work throughout the protests, factories were forced to close in order to protect their employees from the violence. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) stated that unspecified “outsiders” were responsible for the violence. The protests initially focused on the demands of garment workers, but then reportedly escalated when outsiders joined the demonstrations, gathering outside factories demanding jobs and pressuring workers to join the protests. In response to the protests, the government has increased security in industrial areas, which allowed the factories to reopen on 5 September.

Solace Global Assessment: These protests are the first significant labour action in Bangladesh’s garment sector since the new interim government took office in August. Although there is increased security in the areas where protests took place, tensions are still likely to persist because a negotiated settlement between the garment workers and BGMEA has not yet been reached. The BGMEA has suggested that the unrest may be linked to the current political instability of Bangladesh, with tensions remaining high since the resignation of the prime minister on 9 August following weeks of deadly protests. Although an interim government has been established to restore law and order, it is likely that groups may be exploiting this to gain access and control of the garment market. On top of this, the ongoing mass floods across Bangladesh have meant factories have had to grapple with production stoppages. The political instability and financial strain the BGMEA are facing mean it is unlikely that the BGMEA will meet the demands of the protests, which would highly likely generate further unrest.In October and November 2023, garment workers’ strikes led to violent clashes with police, with at least three deaths and factories being set alight. There is a realistic possibility that equivalent levels of violence could occur again as a result of the ongoing industrial disputes.

Super Typhoon strength storm Yagi makes landfall in Hainan.

Tropical Cyclone Yagi made landfall in Hainan, China, on 6 September. The storm made landfall at Super Typhoon strength, equivalent to a category 5 hurricane, with maximum windspeeds recorded of 241km/h. Yagi had earlier impacted the northern Philippines on 3-4 September as Severe Tropical Storm Enteng, killing 16 people. Luzon was the most impacted. Yagi then moved past Hong Kong and Macau, causing disruptions.

The Chinese Central Meteorological Agency has issued a red typhoon warning for Hainan and Guangdong, the highest warning possible. Over 400,000 people were evacuated on the southern Chinese coastline.

Solace Global Assessment: Yagi is the second-strongest Tropical Cyclone to occur anywhere in the world in 2024. It is the largest storm to hit Hainan since 2014 when Typhoon Rammasun killed at least 88 people and caused over USD 6.25 billion in damages. Hainan is a tropical holiday destination, referred to as “China’s Hawaii”. In anticipation of the Super Typhoon, Hainan was brought to a standstill, with businesses, schools and transport being halted. While the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area was spared notably severe impact, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai bridge and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange were closed.

The impact in Hainan, where Yagi has made landfall as a Super Typhoon, is highly likely to be worse. Meteorologists have warned that the scale of damage in Hainan could be “catastrophic”. The rigorous preparedness measures by Chinese authorities will, however, significantly aid in mitigating the worst possible outcomes.

Yagi is forecast to weaken from a Super Typhoon to a Very Strong Typhoon once it moves past Hainan, before weakening further to Typhoon strength just before making landfall in northern Vietnam. Four airports have already been closed in northern Vietnam, including Hanoi’s Noi Bai International Airport. Despite Yagi’s greatly increased strength over southern China, it is a realistic possibility that Yagi will cause more fatalities in Vietnam due to Vietnam’s higher level of vulnerability.

Putin visits Mongolia despite ICC arrest warrant.

The state visit likely represents an effort by Putin to highlight that, despite its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia is not internationally isolated. The visit is also likely to reflect ongoing Russian efforts to begin transitioning from its reliance on Europe as the main market for its fossil fuels. Russia and Mongolia have continued talks regarding the construction of a pipeline connecting the two countries.

Pope Francis tours Southeast Asia.

Pope Francis has arrived in Indonesia as part of his 12-day tour of Southeast Asia where he will visit Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Indonesia. In Jakarta, the Pope and Grand Imam Nasaruddin Umar of Istiqlal Mosque pledged to combat religious violence and environmental degradation, highlighting interfaith unity through a symbolic event at the mosque.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) carries out suicide bombing in Kabul.

ISKP had previously carried out a suicide bombing in Kandahar, one of the Taliban’s main strongholds. Its attack outside a Kabul government office, which killed at least six, is likely meant to further demonstrate the group’s ability to strike the Taliban’s administrative centres. Taliban authorities have continuously minimised the threat posed by ISKP, which nevertheless continues to be the Islamic State’s most active and likely most capable “province”.

South China Sea confrontations continue at Sabina Shoal.

Manila and Beijing accused each other of deliberately ramming each other’s vessels in an incident on 31 August at the disputed Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. Aggressive confrontations between Chinese and Filipino vessels have occurred multiple times in recent months at the Second Thomas Shoal, and a deal was reached in late July that was hoped to de-escalate the situation. However, the new incident at the Sabina Shoal, in addition to a reported vessel collision there on 19 August, highly likely indicates that tensions remain high in the South China Sea with a new flashpoint for confrontations at the Sabina Shoal.

Monsoon rains cause deadly flooding in southern India.

Higher than average monsoon rains resulted in the deaths at least 33 people in southern India between 1 and 3 September. Significant flooding occurred as a result of the annual monsoon season since June. Forecasts indicate that the heavy rainfall will continue into late September. While the monsoon season is an annually recurring issue, this year’s monsoon will ultimately highly likely cause a greater level of impact than in previous years, exacerbated by La Nina weather conditions that will likely develop in September. Officials from the India Meteorological Department (IMD) indicate that the withdrawal of the monsoon season will likely be delayed as a result of developing La Nina weather conditions.

Military doctors deployed in South Korean hospitals due to ongoing strikes.

The measure was announced by the health ministry on 2 September to try to alleviate shortages in medical staff. Thousands of junior doctors have been conducting strikes since February 2024, in protest of government plans to drastically increase annual medical school admission caps. While authorities dispute claims by the national association of medical school professions that the medical system is on the verge of collapse, the deployment of military doctors is likely indicative of serious concerns that the staff shortage has drastically impacted the provision of healthcare.

Congressional commission approves controversial judicial reform bill.

On 26 August, a commission in the lower house of Mexico’s Congress approved a judicial reform package, enabling a final debate to take place in the newly-elected Congress next month. The ruling Morena party, who won a landslide victory in June, will hold a two-thirds supermajority in the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies and are only one seat short in the Senate.

The most controversial measure in the judicial reform bill involves a plan to have approximately 7,000 judges, magistrates and Supreme Court justices elected by popular vote. Additionally, the bill scraps a 35-year age limit, lowers experience requirements, and reduces the size of the Supreme Court. The overhaul of the judiciary is planned to be enacted in stages, with staggered judicial elections taking place in 2025 and 2027.

In reaction, both the US and Canadian embassies expressed serious concerns, which led to Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) announcing a pause in relations with these embassies on 27 August. Unions that represent many of the 55,000 judicial workers in Mexico previously launched an indefinite nationwide strike on 19 August, later joined by Mexico’s association of federal judges and magistrates, in protest against the potential reform package.

Solace Global Assessment: 

AMLO, the popular outgoing president who has enjoyed high approval ratings and will be replaced by his successor Claudia Sheinbaum in October, frequently clashed with the courts during his presidential term. The Supreme Court in particular, impeded the implementation of several of AMLO’s initiatives. In response, AMLO has frequently described the Mexican judiciary as corrupt. Proponents of the judicial reform bill argue that it will address endemic corruption in the judiciary. It is highly likely, however, that the bill will further empower the ruling Moreno party. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) held uninterrupted power for 71 years until 2000, effectively making Mexico a single-party state during this period. While constitutional reform has addressed some of these historic issues in Mexico’s democracy, critics of the judicial reform argue that its passage will give the Moreno party too much power without adequate checks and balances.

While purportedly intended to tackle corruption, the bill’s passage would likely enable organised crime to exploit judicial elections for their own ends. During Mexico’s elections, the cartels regularly assassinate candidates and engage in voter suppression. If judges are directly elected, it is highly likely that cartels will attempt to subvert the democratic process, undermining the strength of the judiciary in tackling organised crime. The strikes against the bill have temporarily weakened Mexico’s fragile justice system, and it is likely that the strikes will continue and potentially escalate if the bill passes through both houses.

Large wildfires continue in Brazil, authorities suspect criminal cause.

Record-breaking wildfires are ongoing across the Amazon, Cerrado savannah, Pantanal wetland and the state of Sao Paulo in Brazil. So far, two people have died as a result of the fires, in Urupes. 48 cities declared a red alert due to poor air quality. The smog has impacted cities such as Brazil’s capital, Brasilia, as well as Sao Paulo, Manaus, Porto Velho, Rio Branco and Sao Jose do Rio Preto. In Sao Paulo state, a crisis cabinet was set up to tackle the fires, and the Brazilian environment minister declared that Brazil is “at war” with the fires on 25 August.the paragraph.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Authorities suspect that organised crime gangs are largely responsible for the fires. While a federal prosecutor has stated that there is so far no conclusive evidence that the arson has been coordinated, there are several indications that criminal gangs are likely involved.

Firstly, of the 3,500 fire alerts in southeastern Sao Paulo state, over half were raised on the same day, 23 August. The State Agriculture Secretary later told media that the starting of fires in different locations at the same time indicates coordination and criminal intent. Secondly, according to Brazilian President Lula da Silva, no fires caused by lightning strikes were detected by Brazil’s national fire monitoring centre. Thirdly, Brazilian police have arrested four people linked to the fires, with two men caught on security cameras setting fires.

Some of the suspects have reportedly told police that the fires were set in retaliation against crimefighting efforts. It is likely that the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) gang, one of Brazil’s largest and most powerful organised criminal groups, are connected to the fires. Authorities have recently engaged in a campaign to tackle the PCC’s illicit adulterated fuels trade, which is the most likely trigger for retaliation by the PCC. In 2006, the PCC unleashed a wave of violence across Sao Paulo state which killed over 150 people.

While human involvement in Brazilian wildfires is not uncommon, mainly due to illegal deforestation and agricultural practices, the potential weaponisation of wildfires by criminal gangs is a concerning new development. With a relatively low number of resources, manpower and technical skill, the setting of wildfires can have a significant, highly visible and widespread impact that overstretches resources and capabilities.

The effects of the current fires are being felt in several major Brazilian cities, which are covered in smog. It is likely that if the fires are indeed the result of coordinated organised criminal actions, gangs will continue to deploy the tactic in future when the need for retaliation arises. There is a realistic possibility that gangs elsewhere in Latin America may be inspired by the weaponisation of wildfires and deploy the tactic themselves.

Honduras to end extradition treaty with the US.

On 28 August, Honduras announced that it would terminate its century-old extradition treaty with the US following US concerns over a meeting between Honduran and Venezuelan defence officials about drug trafficking. President Xiomara Castro condemned what she saw as US interference in Honduran politics. The treaty had facilitated the extradition of prominent figures, including former President Juan Orlando Hernandez, convicted in the US on drug charges. The treaty’s termination likely signals Honduras’ alignment with Venezuela and a deterioration in US-Honduran relations which could harm US efforts to combat drugs trafficking.

Protests and government crackdown continue in Venezuela.

Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado called for peaceful protests and international pressure to oust Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, on 27 August. This follows a 22 August decision by the Supreme Court of Venezuela, which is made up of Maduro loyalists, to certify the contested 28 July election result. The election result was highly likely rigged by the regime, with several indications that the opposition won a landslide victory. The regime has since launched a crackdown, and on 27 August, leading opposition figure and lawyer Perkins Rocha was allegedly “kidnapped” by security forces.  An opposition demonstration occurred in Caracas on 28 August, attended by Machado, which was smaller than prior protests. There had been a relative lull in unrest in the past fortnight, highly likely due to the impact of government suppression in arresting protest leaders and the threat of reprisals. While Machado’s call for a revival of anti-government protests is likely to temporarily increase unrest in Venezuela in the short term, it is likely that the extent of the regime’s crackdown will severely curtail the opposition’s organisational capability.

Haitian military starts recruitment drive to combat gang violence.

The Haitian government has launched a huge recruitment drive for its military in a bid to combat escalating gang violence, with gangs controlling 80 per cent of the country. Thousands of Haitian youth are seizing the opportunity, likely as it is one of the few sustainable sources of revenue in a country plagued by poverty and unemployment. However, after being disbanded in 1995 and only reinstated in 2017, it is likely that the military is ill-equipped to deal with the well-armed and organised gangs. Haitian forces have also initiated a joint operation with the recently deployed Kenyan police to oust gangs from one of Port-au-Prince’s most dangerous neighbourhoods. However, the Kenyan police have not yet been paid by the UN, which, if this continues, could impact the effectiveness of the intervention force.

US warns of increased violence in Culiacan, Sinaloa.

The US Embassy in Mexico issued a security alert on 29 August warning of violence and security concerns in Culiacan, Sinaloa province. The alert has warned of the potential for violence across the state but has not provided further details. The alert has likely been published in response to the recent arrest of the Sinaloa Cartel’s leader, “El Mayo” and the son of El Chapo Guzman which has created a power vacuum in Mexico’s most powerful organised crime group.

Central Bolivia struggles to contain wildfires.

The central Bolivian department of Santa Cruz is grappling with a severe environmental crisis, as over 27 wildfires rage, mainly in the Chiquitania region. These fires, exacerbated by extreme drought and strong winds, have devastated 26 of the department’s 56 municipalities and burned nearly 2 million hectares, surpassing the damage caused by the 2019 fires. The situation is particularly dire in municipalities such as San Ignacio de Velasco, San Matías, Santa Ana, and Concepción, where conditions remain favourable for further fire spread. Moreover, Bolivia lacks the personnel and resources to effectively curtail the spread of the fires and will likely be forced to ask for international aid. Fires have significantly worsened air quality, severely affecting vulnerable populations like children, the elderly, and those with respiratory conditions.

Brazilian state of Rondônia declares state of emergency.

The Brazilian state of Rondônia has declared a state of emergency for 180 days valid from 26 August due to the impact of forest fires. The number of fires has doubled compared to August 2023, with nearly 6000 so far in 2024. The fires have hugely disrupted agriculture, river navigation and the local economy. The state is also suffering from water shortages due to a prolonged drought, which is forecasted to last for the next 90 days. The major city of Porto-Velho has not recorded significant rainfall for three months. Water levels on the Madeira River, which runs through the states of Rondônia and Amazonas, have reached their lowest level since 1964 and will likely disproportionately affect riverine communities.

Widespread power outages reported across Venezuela.

Power outages were reported in at least 17 Venezuelan regions, including the capital Caracas on 30 August. The outages are similar to the ones in 2019 which began just before the presidential election and lasted for several months afterwards. The 2019 outages resulted in at least 43 deaths after disrupting the country’s healthcare facilities, transport, industry, and water services. President Maduro blamed both the 2019 and current outages on “sabotage”; however, the likelihood is that Venezuela has suffered a huge reduction in technical expertise following a brain drain of skilled workers.

Macron rules out appointment of prime minister from New Popular Front.

On 26 August, the office of French President Emmanuel Macron stated that following consultations, Macron has ruled out the appointment of a prime minister from the left-wing coalition New Popular Front (NFP).

The June and July snap legislative elections resulted in a hung parliament, with the NFP, Macron’s centrist Ensemble party, and the far-right National Rally (RN) parties winning most of the available seats. Of these, the NFP won the most seats. The RN stated earlier on 26 August that the party would block any prime ministerial appointment coming from the NFP. In reaction, the NFP has announced a refusal to engage in any new consultations unless they are to discuss the nomination of their candidate, Lucie Castets, as prime minister. 

Solace Global Assessment: The NFP is an electoral alliance between the far-left France Unbowed (LFI), the Socialists, the Greens and the Communists. Of these, Mélenchon’s LFI has the most seats. While Castets, is affiliated with the centre-left Socialist Party, it is likely that her confirmation that she would appoint LFI ministers led Macron to conclude that her appointment would be politically unworkable. This is due to the threat of no-confidence motions against a government with LFI ministers. In recent political history, since the establishment of the French Fifth Republic’s strong presidential system in 1958, coalition negotiations have not been a common feature of the French political process. The current stalemate is unlikely to be resolved with a stable, lasting solution. The NFP and NR are likely to both seek to exploit the political chaos to oust Macron, whose presidential term is set to end in 2027, via a call for an early presidential election, should the stalemate not be resolved. The LFI has called for large demonstrations on 7 September, a day before the end of the Paris Paralympic Games, and the Communists have called for a “big popular mobilisation” in the coming days. It is highly likely that civil unrest will increase in France, after a lull during the Olympic Games. Due to the high-security measures that will be enforced during the Paralympic Games in Paris, it is likely that demonstrations will be met with a vigorous police response, which would in turn likely lead to violent clashes.

Al-Qaeda-linked militants killed hundreds on road to capital.

On 24 August, the Burkinabe town of Barsalogho was targeted in a major militant attack. Current estimates assess that as many as 200-500 people were killed in the attack and hundreds injured, most of whom were reportedly civilians. The attack has been claimed by the al-Qaeda-linked Jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The military government was reportedly aware of an impending attack and ordered troops, Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) and civilians to hastily erect defences. JNIM ambushed the defenders in the open, firing indiscriminately on those within the defensive area until reinforcements of Burkinabe troops and the VDP managed to repel the attack.

Solace Global Assessment: The Barsalogho attack marks the worst terrorist attack in Burkina Faso’s history and clearly demonstrates how much the security situation has deteriorated since the expulsion of Western forces. Moreover, with the junta government’s expulsion of Western forces in neighbouring Niger and Mali, violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have been presented with favourable conditions to achieve their objectives. JNIM in particular have exploited the regional destabilisation to expand their operations across the Sahel. Whilst VEOs like JNIM do not typically govern territory in the same manner as a state, it is now assessed that JNIM controls approximately 40 per cent of Burkina Faso as well as huge parts of Mali and Niger.

The attack has almost certainly increased pressure on the junta government and forms part of JNIM’s strategy to target isolated government-held towns to undermine the junta’s authority. Barsalogho is strategically important because the next town is Kaya, located in north-central Burkina Faso, which hosts the last major government military base before reaching the capital, Ouagadougou.

JNIM is likely to continue to employ such brutal tactics to further undermine the regime and also to force civilians to flee as it advances towards Ouagadougou. The current Islamist insurgency, which involves multiple VEOs, has led to multiple coup attempts. This is likely to result in the junta prioritising regime security over counter-insurgency efforts, leading to greater instability and more attacks.

After the expulsion of Western forces, the junta has relied on external support from Mali under the recently formed Alliance of Sahel States and to a lesser extent Russian mercenaries. With Mali facing a similar situation, it is not in a position to send serious reinforcements without jeopardising its security. Russian forces are currently conducting more offensive operations in Mali with limited success. The junta may look to the Kremlin for additional support, although with the war in Ukraine, Russian forces are likely overstretched. If Burkina Faso fails to secure significant external support, it will likely set the conditions for VEOs to expand their operations into the northern parts of coastal West African states like Benin, Ghana and Togo.

Strike set for UK’s busiest airport.

On 31 August, more than 600 Border Force passport control workers at London Heathrow, the UK’s busiest airport, will go on strike for four days. This will then be followed by nearly three weeks of work-to-rule action where workers will do no more work than what is contractually obliged. The strike will almost certainly lead to significant disruption and could have knock-on effects for other UK-based airports.

State elections in Germany’s Thuringia and Saxony.

On 1 September, state elections will be held in Thuringia and Saxony. Recent polls indicate that the German far-right party, Alternative for Germany (AfD) is leading the race and has likely capitalised on the recent attack in Solingen. However, they are unlikely to win a majority, and the remaining parties will be highly reticent to form a coalition with the AfD. Another party polling well is Sahra Wagenknecht’s new Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) party, a left-wing nationalist, populist and Eurosceptic party. If both parties perform well, the remaining parties will face a challenging decision on coalition partners, as both parties advocate for agendas that significantly diverge from those of the central government.

Azerbaijan to hold parliamentary elections.

On 1 September, Azeris will go to the polls in parliamentary elections after President Ilham Aliyev dissolved parliament in June. Over fears of electoral fraud, nearly 300 election monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will observe the polls, an organisation that recently criticised the 2024 presidential election for its lack of transparency and choice. Aliyev’s New Azerbaijan party will almost certainly win the election and may increase its current majority.

CENTCOM kills al-Qaeda affiliate leader in Syria.

On 23 August, forces from the US Central Command (CENTCOM) killed the Hurras al-Din senior leader Abu-’Abd al-Rahman al-Makki in a targeted kinetic strike in Syria. Al-Makki was a Shura Council member of the al-Qaeda affiliate responsible for conducting terrorist operations in Syria. The killing could temporarily disrupt Hurras al-Din’s operations but may also inspire reprisal attacks on US forces in the region.

Israeli forces conduct largest operation in West Bank in months.

On 27 August, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) began an extensive military operation in the West Bank, launching raids in Nablus, Qabatiya, Silat al Khartia, al Fara refugee camp, Jenin refugee camp, and Nour al Shams refugee camp.

The operation has involved hundreds of personnel accompanied by drones, making the operation the largest in the West Bank for months. On 29 August, Israeli forces killed five alleged Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants, reportedly in a home next to a mosque in Tulkarm near the Nour al Shams refugee camp.

According to the IDF, one of those killed was Mohammed Jaber, known as Abu Shujaa, a commander of the local PIJ branch. Abu Shujaa is suspected to have been involved in several terror attacks, namely the June murder of an Israeli citizen in the city of Qalqilya, West Bank. Local media reports that at least 17 people have been killed in this week’s West Bank operation thus far.

The IDF has generally refrained from regularly conducting such large-scale operations in the West Bank, and the United Nations (UN) has issued a statement urging Israel to cease the operation. It is likely that such targeted operations in the West Bank will continue, due to its use as a base of operations for terrorist attacks against Israel. While the Fatah-controlled Palestinian National Authority (PA) in the West Bank are highly unlikely to react to the operation with any military response, it is likely that the relatively substantial IDF presence in the West Bank will generate civil unrest.

Egypt delivers arms to Somalia.

Egypt has delivered military aid to Somalia for the first time in over four decades in a move that will almost certainly escalate relations with Ethiopia. The move follows a recent security pact between Egypt and Somalia, partially motivated by Ethiopia’s deal with Somaliland, which seeks independence from Somalia. Egypt has also offered to send troops to Somalia for a new peacekeeping mission, raising the risk of a proxy conflict between the two nations that have been at odds for years over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

AU and UN planning new Somali peacekeeping mission.

The African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) are planning a new AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia, set to replace the current mission which ends in late 2024. The AU endorsed this successor mission in June 2024, developed a strategic plan in August, and submitted it to the UN Security Council for approval.

This new mission, named the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), will maintain a similar force size to its predecessor, ATMIS, with around 11,911 personnel. AUSSOM will focus on ongoing peace-building efforts, such as providing security and countering al-Shabaab, while international partners and the Somali Federal Government (SFG) will handle state-building tasks. If the peacekeeping mission does not materialise, al-Shabaab and other militant groups will almost certainly be in an advantageous position to increase their attacks, expand their influence and undermine the SFG.

Torrential rain leads to major landslide near Naples, Italy.

A catastrophic landslide caused by torrential rain has killed at least two people near the town of San Felice a Cancello, located approximately 30 kilometres (19 miles) northeast of Naples, Italy. The area that collapsed had already been severely weakened by a wildfire that destroyed much of the vegetation. Southern Italy has been facing extreme temperatures and heavy rainfall, creating conditions ripe for flash floods, landslides, and other environmental disasters, which have been further worsened by deforestation.

World Food Program to launch investigation in Sudan.

The UN’s World Food Program (WFP) has launched an investigation into senior officials in Sudan for alleged fraud and for obfuscating the Sudanese army’s role in obstructing aid deliveries. Other allegations include mismanagement, misleading donors, and the disappearance of resources. Sudan is now facing its worst humanitarian crisis in decades as a result of the civil war. 80 per cent of health facilities are out of service, millions have been displaced and around 20 million are faced with food insecurity.

Dozens killed by bursting dam in eastern Sudan.

At least 30 people have been killed and hundreds missing in eastern Sudan after a dam burst which flooded at least 20 villages. Surging waters caused by torrential rain overwhelmed the Arbaat Dam on 25 August, just 40km north of Port Sudan, the country’s current de facto capital and home to the central government alongside international diplomats, aid agencies and thousands of displaced people. The dam was the main source of water for Port Sudan, which is also home to Sudan’s largest port and working airport, where most international aid is received. Flooding caused by the collapsed dam will almost certainly hinder humanitarian efforts which have already been greatly impeded by the civil war.

Houthis to allow assistance to damaged oil tanker in the Red Sea.

The Houthis have reportedly agreed to tugboats and rescue vessels accessing the stricken oil tanker SOUNION (IMO: 9312145) in the Red Sea. The Houthis are responsible for immobilising and damaging the Greek-flagged vessel during an attack on 21 August, and the tanker has since been abandoned. On 29 August, the Houthi media published footage showing Houthi militants boarding the abandoned vessel and detonating explosives on deck. Carrying 150,000 tonnes of crude oil, there are serious concerns that unless controlled, the leaking of oil could lead to a “potential environmental catastrophe”.

A major spill from the vessel could potentially be one of the largest vessel oil spills in history. The Pentagon has stated that the vessel appears to be leaking oil, however, Aspides, the EU mission in the Red Sea, has since stated that the area around the SOUNION is free of oil. If an oil spill occurred, Houthi Yemen would highly likely be impacted considering its dependence on fishing, which has highly likely motivated the Houthi decision to allow assistance to the vessel.

BLA conduct series of attacks under “Operation Herof”.

On 25 August, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched “Operation Herof” in the Balochistan region. The operation began with a complex attack that used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) at Bela Camp to gain access to the Pakistani military facility. This was followed by BLA squads entering the compound and killing 24 Pakistani soldiers with small arms fire. BLA militants then conducted a series of attacks across the region targeting Pakistan’s security services, and critical national infrastructure (CNI) including railways, and the seizure of major highways. The BLA’s Commander-in-Chief, Bashir Zeib Baloch, stated that the declared intent of the operation was to force the Pakistani government into ceasing its operations in Balochistan. The operation included at least 800 BLA militants, took place in 12 cities across nine districts, and according to the BLA, resulted in the deaths of over 100 Pakistani troops. The BLA established roadblocks and checked the identities of people on highways, shooting 23 identified as non-local migrant workers from the Punjab region.

Solace Global Assessment: The attacks began on the 18^th anniversary of the death of a Baloch nationalist leader, likely suggesting that the BLA are continuing a trend of conducting attacks on important Baloch dates. The series of BLA attacks was likely organised to demonstrate the group’s growing capabilities and ability to launch multiple coordinated complex attacks. The successful partial seizure of a Pakistani military camp and control of highways are further evidence of the BLA’s capabilities and will likely jeopardise Pakistan’s attempts to incorporate the region into China’s Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI). The targeting of essential elements of the BRI, such as roads and railways, was likely designed to deter foreign investment and to send a strategic message that the BLA will not allow the exploitation of local resources. The purported mass execution of Punjab labourers was also likely aimed at achieving these objectives. The central government is increasingly having to turn to labour imported from other parts of Pakistan due to Baloch resistance. High-profile BLA attacks on non-Baloch labour are highly likely to increase to deter future migration into the region. The overall success of the BLA attacks and its ability to provide real-time information about the attacks combined with sophisticated propaganda videos are likely to drive BLA recruitment and funding, further contributing to its operational capabilities.

Pro-democracy journalists charged with sedition.

On 29 August, two editors who led a pro-democracy newspaper, Stand News, were tried by a Hong Kong court and found guilty of sedition. Chung Pui-kuen and Patrick Lam, could now face up to two years in prison. The case marks the first ruling against journalists in Hong Kong since the territory’s handover from the UK to China in 1997. The ruling has been condemned by rights groups as a nefarious campaign against the freedom of the press.

Solace Global Assessment: The case forms part of a wider campaign in Hong Kong aimed at suppressing dissent, and freedom of speech and will likely serve as a precedent for future rulings as Beijing consolidates its control over the territory. Beijing’s ability to stifle the opposition in Hong Kong has been greatly augmented since the introduction of the controversial National Security Law (NSL), which has been in effect since 2020. The NSL was introduced under the justification of combating secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion of foreign forces, although Beijing’s interpretation of these acts likely differs vastly from many in Hong Kong. Whilst the NSL has been greatly successful at curbing dissent, the Stand News editors were actually charged under a colonial-era sedition law. Beijing’s tactic was likely an attempt to deflect from the NSL by adhering to existing legal frameworks but with the same outcome. The case and the wider effort to suppress dissent are unlikely to provoke civil unrest after the crackdown following the 2019-20 protests. However, it will likely damage Hong Kong’s reputation and contribute to deterring foreign investment in one of the world’s major business hubs.

Typhoon Shanshan makes landfall in Kyushu.

The strongest typhoon in the 2024 Pacific typhoon season thus far, Shanshan had maximum windspeeds of 213 km/h and average windspeeds of 157 km/h just before landfall. The typhoon made landfall on the southwestern Japanese island of Kyushu on 28 August. Over 5.2 million people were given evacuation orders.

At least four deaths and 45 injuries have been reported thus far, with three of the deaths being attributed to landslides. Kagoshima and Miyazaki Prefecture were the most severely impacted areas, with damaged residences, overturned cars, flooding, and landslides. Over 250,000 people were left without power, primarily in Kagoshima Prefecture.

Several major international companies suspended operations at their facilities in the area. No impact was reported at Sendai Nuclear Power Plant. In Oita Prefecture, level 5 emergency warnings, which indicate threat to life, were issued for the cities of Yufu and Usa, after the Miyakawa River burst its banks and possible flooding from the Yakkan River.

Solace Global Assessment: Authorities have described Shanshan as one of the strongest storms to ever hit Kyushu. After moving through Kyushu, Shanshan weakened into a tropical storm and is currently moving through Shikoku island. While the storm caused mass disruptions, the level of humanitarian impact has been low relative to the storm’s strength. This is due to Japan’s low vulnerability to tropical cyclones, as the country has comprehensive preparedness and resiliency measures.

The mass evacuation orders issued by authorities almost certainly significantly reduced the death toll.  The storm is forecast to further weaken into a tropical depression and continue moving eastwards over the weekend. While substantially weakened, authorities are concerned that the warm and moist air around the storm that caused heavy rainfall far from the main body in Kyushu will continue to cause adverse weather over the coming days.

On 30 August, tens of thousands were asked to evacuate Tokyo due to landslide warnings, with three Tokyo rivers, the Meguro, Nogawa and Sengawa being issued level 4 warnings. It is highly likely that torrential rain will continue across large areas of Japan over the weekend, disrupting travel and causing factory and office closures.

Myanmar junta commits to 2025 elections.

Myanmar’s military junta has promised to hold a general election in late 2025 but with voting to be staggered due to security concerns. However, junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has made the same promise since 2021 when the military ousted Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party remains disbanded. The announcement has been largely dismissed by the opposition who likely assess that it will be mired in fraud and only used as a mechanism to legitimise military rule. The junta is also likely using the promise of elections to deter the ethnic rebel forces that continue to seize territory from the military.

BJP strike paralyses transport in India’s West Bengal.

On 28 August in West Bengal, thousands of protesters, mainly Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) workers, blocked trains, halted buses, and forced shops to close in response to the brutal rape and murder of a trainee doctor. The BJP called for a 12-hour state-wide protest strike, following clashes with police who used tear gas and water cannons to disperse a recent march. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP party is in opposition in the state and may seek to conduct further protests to undermine the All-India Trinamool Congress coalition which leads the eastern state.

Thailand’s Pheu Thai to exclude military-backed party from coalition.

Thailand’s Pheu Thai Party will exclude the Palang Pracharat Party from its coalition in forming the next government after Palang Pracharat leader Prawit Wongsuwon’s absence from a key parliamentary vote. Despite this, Pheu Thai is confident of securing a strong coalition with over 300 seats. This decision underscores ongoing tensions with military-backed factions, reflecting deeper political rifts and potentially impacting the stability of the new government as Pheu Thai aims to consolidate power and distance itself from military influences.

Multiple attacks through Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

Throughout the reporting period, there have been multiple attacks and counter-terrorism operations throughout multiple districts in the Indian-administered union territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The territory is set to hold its first elections in over a decade starting in mid-September. Militant attacks are likely to increase in the run-up to the elections, with violent extremists’ intent on influencing the elections.

PLA to conduct military exercises on China-Myanmar border.

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has initiated joint air-ground patrols along the border with Myanmar after property in China was damaged by cross-border artillery fire. On 27-29 August elements from the Southern Theater of the PLA conducted live-fire exercises, likely aimed at sending a message to rebel ethnic forces. China is likely becoming increasingly concerned over an overspill of the conflict and the war has decreased cross-border trade. Beijing’s ultimate objective is likely to pressure the warring sides into peace talks, a development that will likely increase its influence in the country.

Cholera warning across Nepal.

The Ministry of Health and Population in Nepal has advised all residents to boil water or purify it before use after identifying 22 cholera cases in the past two weeks. The real number is almost certainly higher as most of the country is not under active surveillance for the disease. The ministry has also warned of increased transmission rates as the dry season approaches due to the increased mixing of waster with decreasing water sources.

Mass flooding in Bangladesh causes devastation.

Heavy rainfall resulting from annual monsoon conditions has caused significant floods, with Noakhali, Cumilla, Laxipur, Feni, Chattogram and Moulvibazar being most impacted. Over 5.7 million people have been affected, with around 500,000 displaced. So far, at least 20 people have died. It is highly likely that the death toll will continue to rise, with rescue and relief operations are ongoing. Water from upstream rivers in India has worsened the floods, with Indian authorities releasing water from dams. Because of this, it is likely that anti-Indian sentiment will increase in Bangladesh, which could result in further attacks on Hindus.

So far, approximately 200 of the 1,000 police officers promised by Kenya to restore order in Haiti have arrived in the country. The force is part of a 2,500-strong UN-backed intervention mission, which is expected to be deployed in the coming months.

Gangs, which currently control much of Haiti and approximately 80 per cent of the capital Port-au-Prince, are assessed as numbering about 12,000 members in total. Following the deployment of the first Kenyan police, gangs reportedly intensified attacks on local police and government institutions. On 2 July, gang members reportedly attacked a police station in Port-au-Prince, killing more than 20 police officers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The gangs, who recently released statements calling Haitians to oppose the “imperialistic” UN intervention, almost certainly do not have any plan to transition the country out of its ongoing state of chaos. Rather, gangs almost certainly highly benefit from the breakdown of government, as it allows them to more freely operate within the country, and to benefit from international smuggling routes, including the influx of illegal firearms from the southeastern US.

Reports indicate that the “Viv Ansamn” coalition of gangs is currently the most influential in Haiti’s capital. However, there is a high likelihood that the network of gangs and criminal groups in Haiti remains highly disorganised and prone to infighting. Gangs are also highly armed due to the high presence of smuggled arms, and currently likely outgun the depleted Haitian police. Gangs will likely seek to undermine Kenyan efforts to secure control of residential areas by attacking the local population. While there is a realistic possibility of gangs opting for occasional “frontal attacks” against the UN-backed forces, the path of low-intensity operations to discourage civil society from collaborating with the police mission is more likely.

The 2024 Atlantic hurricane season’s first hurricane entered the Caribbean Sea on 30 June, peaking at category five with maximum windspeeds of 269 kilometres per hour and causing at least ten deaths. Multiple countries were impacted, including Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG), Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, Jamaica, the Cayman Islands and Venezuela. Hurricane Beryl has now weakened to category two and is currently making landfall in Mexico on the Yucatan Peninsula, prompting multiple alerts for tourist hotspots including Cancún and Tulum.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Many Caribbean island nations are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes due to fragile architecture, poor infrastructure and limited state capacity, and approximately 2.8 million people were in the impact zone.

Beryl has already caused widespread property damage and flooding. SVG was especially affected, with widespread destruction reported on the southern Union Island and Canouan. Grenada also suffered a notably significant impact, and in Jamaica, roofs were ripped off and the airports were closed. While at least ten deaths have so far been reported, it is almost certain the death toll will increase as emergency responders access the affected areas. While Beryl has weakened to category two, the hurricane’s imminent landfall in Mexico through the Yucatan Peninsula still poses a high risk, prompting tourists to rush to Cancún International Airport despite mass flight cancellations. Beryl is the earliest category five hurricane of an Atlantic hurricane season on record, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has previously predicted that the 2024 season is highly likely to be particularly severe, due to extremely high sea temperatures, La Niña conditions in the Pacific, reduced wind shear and low Atlantic trade winds.

There is widespread consensus amongst climatologists that climate change is a major contributing factor to increasingly intense hurricane seasons, due to higher sea temperatures conditioning stronger hurricanes. The prime minister of SVG condemned Western Europe and the US for failing to tackle climate change and raised concerns about accessing aid. The 2024 hurricane season is highly likely to pose continued major challenges in Caribbean nations, exacerbated by their increased vulnerability.

Due to disruptions to law enforcement, the impact of property destruction and pre-existing problems with poverty, hurricanes can significantly increase crime rates in their immediate aftermath – it is likely, therefore, that the threat posed by crime will increase as a result of the hurricane in the impacted countries.

On 1 July, the Cuban government announced new drastic economic measures to combat the country’s high fiscal deficit and inflation. Previous attempts by Havana to pass services, welfare and subsidy cuts, especially targeting fuel, resulted in unusually vocal protests. Likely for this reason, the new measures instead focus on fighting tax evasion, reforming state-run businesses, and favouring foreign exchange. Still, the prospect of renewed civil unrest following further government measures remains a realistic possibility.

Panama’s new President Jose Raul Mulino was sworn in on 1 July. Mulino ran on an anti-immigration platform, primarily directed at addressing the increasing migrant flows through the dangerous Darien Gap, where gangs and human traffickers operate. The president’s oath was followed almost immediately by the signature of a memorandum of understanding with Washington, focused on the Darien Gap issue. As part of the memorandum, the US will foot the bill for the repatriation of migrants from Panama to southern countries. There is a possibility that the prospect of economic returns will increasingly drive the securitisation of the border area, which may negatively affect not only the migrants themselves but also humanitarian organisations active in southern Panama.

The Venezuelan presidential campaign began on 4 July, with President Maduro aiming to retain power despite low approval ratings. Nationwide protests and highly charged political rallies are highly likely until the campaign period concludes on 25 July, with significant gatherings in Caracas and other major cities.

On 5 July, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro was formally accused of embezzlement for allegedly misappropriating luxury gifts that he received from Saudi Arabian officials while he was head of state. This represents the second time Bolsonaro has been formally accused of a crime, the first dating back to March 2024 and being related to allegations of faked Covid records. There is a high likelihood that, if the accusation progresses and reaches the courts, it will drive civil unrest, with a realistic possibility of violence.

On 1 July, a man opened fire and wounded seven of his neighbours in Crete, Nebraska. The man, who killed himself following the shooting, allegedly was a “recluse” and may have carried out the attack because of extremist ideology, as the seven victims are all Guatemalan migrants. If so, the attack represents a case of lone-actor terrorism and may have been motivated by recent media discourses on migration into the US, a topic that is particularly central to the presidential election season which may inspire similar attacks.

Colombia’s national government and the Second Marquetalia (FARC-SM), a faction of dissidents within the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), announced a unilateral ceasefire agreement on 29 June. In 2016, a peace deal was signed between FARC and Bogota,  which although largely successful, led to the creation of several splinter groups such as FARC-SM who continued engaging in armed insurgency. FARC-SM reportedly has approximately 1000 members, and their commitments to release captives and de-escalate conflict will like reduce the threat of armed conflict. However, the Colombian government has yet to formally agree to a cessation of hostilities, with a meeting promised no later than July 20 to present a formal agreement that will then need to be implemented by Presidential Decree. Additionally, it is likely that small numbers of FARC-SM fighters will form splinter groups or join other dissident groups to continue fighting.

On 4 July, Ecuador’s police freed more than 40 hostages being held by the Los Lobos gang, active in the southern Azuay province. Gangs in Ecuador are highly armed and can often match the firepower of security forces. The recent operation likely testifies to the high level of internal organisation of the gangs, allowing them to simultaneously hold dozens of hostages, a prospect that will challenge President Noboa’s attempts to pursue the same path as President Bukele in El Salvador.

A rapidly growing wildfire in north California has prompted the evacuation of at least 25,000 people in the vicinity of Sacramento. The region is particularly at risk from severe wildfires and, in July, the threat is exacerbated by hot and dry temperatures. Most wildfires are started by humans, and there is a high likelihood that the 4 July weekend will drive an increase in fires across the US, also due to the widespread use of fireworks in celebrations.

On 3 July in Colorado, a fourth case of bird flu resulting from the current outbreak amongst dairy cows was announced. The other cases were previously reported in Michigan and Texas. All the cases have involved dairy farm workers, who are susceptible due to their consistent close contact with infected cows. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has stated that there is currently only a low risk to the general public.

Authorities in Boyacá, Colombia have declared a state-wide health emergency over a dengue outbreak with over 1,000 cases recorded since the start of the year. Whilst dengue fever is a year-round nationwide threat in Colombia, projections for 2024 suggest that transmission rates have increased despite the release of genetically modified mosquitoes to curb the prevalence of the disease.

During the last reporting period, Israeli and Hamas officials made progress regarding a long-discussed ceasefire plan for Gaza. On 4 July, Tel Aviv announced that it would send a delegation to Doha to negotiate with the Hamas leadership in Qatar. Despite moves towards a ceasefire, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) have ordered a further series of evacuation zones in Khan Yunis, north of Rafah, in preparation for new ground operations. In the West Bank, the Israeli government approved three settlements, Givat Hanan, Machane Gadi, and Kedem Arava, and the construction of new homes, which a local NGO assessed as the largest land annexation of the kind “in 30 years”.

The announcement came amidst further reported attacks on West Bank Palestinians by Israeli settlers. On 3 July, the IDF carried out a successful decapitation strike that killed Muhammad Nimah Nasser, a senior official of the Iranian proxy group. In response, Hezbollah fired up to 200 rockets and 20 drones into northern Israel in one of its largest relatiations to date which caused minor damage and wildfires near the border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The progress recorded by Israeli authorities likely reflects a greater willingness on behalf of Hamas to negotiate the terms of the disengagement of IDF troops from areas of Gaza during the early stages of the hostage exchange process. Hamas and Israeli disagreements are likely focused on the question of the Philadelphi Corridor, the border between Gaza and Egypt from which Hamas has access to a vital supply of material and weapons.

There is a realistic possibility that Tel Aviv will agree to some limited withdrawal from the border while retaining the ability to monitor border crossings. IDF forces have likely made significant progress in dismantling the network of tunnels used by Hamas operatives under the Philadelphi Corridor, and Israeli officials may assess that Hamas will remain incapable of building or repairing its underground infrastructure, thus being forced to rely on weaponry smuggled through the crossings themselves.

The evacuation orders for Khan Yunis almost certainly continue to highlight Hamas’s capacity to reinfiltrate areas previously cleared by the IDF. There is also a realistic possibility that much of the Hamas leadership left in Gaza will be in Khan Yunis or its proximity, having moved to the area during the IDF’s Rafah offensive. Finally, it is important to note in the context of negotiations that there may be a difference of opinions between the Hamas leadership in Qatar and that in Gaza. Moreover, the low profile that the Gaza leadership necessarily needs to take due to ongoing IDF operations will highly likely have isolated some Hamas units (or what is left of them) from the central command, possibly driving them to operate independently. Consequently, even if a ceasefire agreement is achieved, independent Hamas fighters or other Palestinian militias may continue to attack IDF forces, possibly hindering the hostage exchanges.

The developments in the West Bank also may reverberate in Gaza. Recent reports of settler violence being enabled or tacitly supported by IDF troops in the area may further spur Palestinian dissatisfaction with the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA continues to verge on collapse due to long-standing economic issues and a lack of perceived legitimacy. The acceleration of the settlement-building process may further embolden anti-PA factions, especially ones affiliated with Hamas.

The Hamas Doha leadership likely sees an increase in power in the West Bank as a desirable strategic development and may seek – possibly through covert Iranian support – to accelerate instability there. At the Israel-Lebanon border, the wave of Hezbollah strikes almost certainly reflects the group’s desire not to lose face following a further successful Israeli decapitation strike but is still likely under the threshold of provoking all-out war. Israel’s ability to effectively detect and eliminate senior Hezbollah leaders is expected to severely impair the group’s operational capabilities and may ultimately provoke war. This development is likely a major concern for Tehran, as it seeks to avoid full-scale conflict with Israel to safeguard Hezbollah’s substantial rocket and drone arsenal, which serves as a crucial regional deterrent and tool for power projection for Iran.

Uncorroborated reports citing an unnamed US intelligence official indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has asked Saudi Arabia’s permission to arm Yemen’s Houthi Movement with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The discussions reportedly took place after Putin’s December visit to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Russia maintains an open dialogue with the Houthi Movement and has strong relations with its primary backer, Iran. Moscow has also previously struck a deal with the Houthis to guarantee that Russian ships can safely transit the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden without being targeted by the group and abstained from voting in a UN Security Council resolution which condemned the militant group’s attacks on merchant shipping.

Furthermore, the Kremlin has set a precedent of arming anti-Western groups, with two major examples being the arming of Libyan rebels with advanced weaponry via the Wagner Group and accusations of arming the Taliban to fight coalition forces. Whilst Russia is in critical need of various types of weaponry for its war in Ukraine, it could easily divest itself of much of its ASCM capabilities as the Ukrainian Navy has no ships and is almost solely reliant on asymmetric capabilities such as uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).

Russia is also becoming heavily dependent on Iranian military aid and Tehran may leverage this to convince Moscow to help supply its Axis of Resistance against Israel- especially if a new front is opened against Hezbollah. Such a conflict may also bring Russia more into the fold if Washington directly supports Israel.

However, Russia is also courting rich Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE in its attempts to challenge US influence in the Middle East. Several Arab nations have previously been at war with the Shia Houthi Movement. They will likely protest this development, with unverified reports suggesting Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has already intervened. Should Russia pursue this course of action, it will likely involve the transfer of legacy weaponry such as the P-800 ONIKS (NATO: SS-N-26) or ASCM. However, these systems are still supersonic (Mach 2.5), have a range of 300km and have relatively advanced features such as electronic countermeasures and active radar homing. The cruise missile’s low trajectory makes them hard to detect and would provide air defence less time to react, increasing the threat to international shipping, especially at a time when the Houthis are also improving their USV capabilities.

For the Kremlin, the Houthis’ use of these systems could overstretch and potentially undermine coalition navies, divert resources from Ukraine and serve as payback to the West for supplying Kyiv. It would also impose a higher financial burden on the West, as Russian systems are invariably cheaper than the advanced air defences used by the West to intercept them.

Reports released during the reporting period indicate that the leader of the Islamic State’s Somalia Province (ISSP), known primarily as Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi or Abdulqadir Mumin has been identified as the overall leader or Caliph of the Islamic State (IS). Mumin is a Somali-born British citizen, who escaped to Somalia and declared allegiance to then-Caliph al-Baghdadi in 2015. The information, which is as of yet unconfirmed, was released on a channel of IS defectors. The ruling fifth Caliph of IS was reported by Turkish forces to have been killed in Syria in 2023, while US forces targeted Mumin in May 2024. However, this new information states that al-Qurashi is still alive and operating out of the Somalian breakaway region of Puntland.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the Somalia Province is much smaller compared to many of IS’ other provinces like Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) or Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), it has played a major role in the financial facilitation of IS operations. The al-Karrar office, in Puntland, which is almost certainly run by Mumin himself, was reportedly able to channel donations from South Africa and other Subsaharan states towards the provinces in the broader Middle East as early as 2020.

With decapitation strikes and territorial losses decreasing IS’ operational capabilities in the Levant in the late 2010s and early 2020s, funds from Subsaharan Africa likely played an important part in boosting ISSP’s importance within the broader IS network. The al-Karrar office has played a major role in the transfer of funds from Yemen to Afghanistan, enabling the most active branch, ISKP. ISSP has also likely been able to grow in significance with regional counterterrorism operations concentrating on its local rival, the al-Qaeda-aligned al-Shabaab.

There is also a growing concern that a stronger ISSP is forcing al-Shabaab to develop ties with the Houthis, with recent intelligence indicating the transfer of arms from Yemen to Somalia. While little information on Mumin exists, he is known as having played a fundamental role in radicalisation networks and networks seeking to entice foreigners, especially Britons, to travel to IS units in the Middle East. Given his European connections, Mumin’s appointment may also inspire IS to recalibrate its operations more towards European targets.

Russia is likely to be nominated as a prime target as its Africa Corps expands its counterterrorism operations in Africa, especially if Mumin holds considerable influence over ISKP which recently took credit for a major terror attack in Moscow. However, the credibility of Mumin’s appointment has yet to be assessed and this could be disinformation designed to deflect from the true Caliph, given the success rates against former IS leaders. All of IS’ former leaders have been Arab as well as the majority of its Delegated Committee. Many members will likely protest Mumin’s leadership which would represent a major political change, which may also account for Mumin’s nom de guerre, which includes the patronyms al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, claiming direct links to the Prophet Muhammed.

Four almost simultaneous suicide bombings were conducted in the Nigerian town of Borno state on 29 June. Government officials on 2 July released a statement indicating that the death toll had reached 32, with dozens more requiring hospitalisation. A wedding and a funeral were two of the locations targeted by the suicide bombers. All of the attacks included female suicide bombers, and the attack that targeted the wedding venue purportedly involved a suicide bomber carrying a baby on her back.

Solace Global Assessment: 

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack but the jihadist group Boko Haram is known to operate in the area around Gwoza, a town they once declared the heart of their self-proclaimed caliphate. Furthermore, the use of female suicide bombers to attack mass gatherings is an established tactic of Boko Haram and one championed by their former leader Abubakar Shekau.

This tactic has been a source of friction between Boko Haram and its regional counterpart, the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) which has denounced this methodology. In addition, research conducted by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point indicated that Boko Haram has used females in at least 244 of its 434 suicide bombings between 2014-17. Boko Haram have likely employed this tactic to arouse less suspicion, avoid security searches, encourage more thorough searching of females (which in turn generates outrage), and because of the psychological impact it produces, especially when the bombers are accompanied by children. Furthermore, the group has been involved in multiple mass kidnappings of young females whom they have likely been able to indoctrinate in captivity to conduct suicide attacks.

Boko Haram was ousted from Gwoza in 2015 by a joint Nigerian and Chadian military offensive and has since been largely confined to attacks in rural areas. The organised and coordinated nature of the attacks may indicate a resurgence in the group’s capabilities. Junta governments have expelled Western military forces from countries where Boko Haram has historically operated, such as Niger and Mali and Nigeria’s domestic security is likely being overstretched by a host of issues ranging from kidnap gangs in the northwest to a revival of the Biafra movement in the southeast. These trends are potentially shaping the conditions which a resurgent Boko Haram could exploit to increase the frequency and scale of their attacks.

The UK parliamentary elections were convincingly won by the centre-left Labour Party, led by Keir Starmer. The election results are unlikely to drive large-scale civil unrest in the United Kingdom, although there is a realistic possibility that left-wing minority groups, including environmentalist and pro-Palestine activists, will take advantage of the transition of power to stage symbolic demonstrations, possibly leading to minor and localised disruptions.

The first round of the French National Assembly elections was won by Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), which finished ahead of a populist left-wing coalition and President Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble Party (EN). The results’ announcement drove almost immediate mass protests across France’s main urban centres, with reported cases of clashes between protesters and police. The centre and left candidates have agreed on an ad hoc cordon sanitaire strategy, meant to prevent RN candidates from being elected at the second round runoff vote.

So far, more than 200 third-place candidates from Ensemble and the left-wing coalition have withdrawn their candidacies to try centralising the anti-RN vote. The strategy has been effective before, most importantly twice barring Le Pen from winning the presidency, and there is a high likelihood that it will result in the RN not reaching its stated goal of an absolute parliamentary majority. Still, the positive results of the right are highly likely to continue driving civil unrest and possible political violence, likely posing a security threat during the Olympic Games, now only weeks away.

In the Netherlands, a new right-wing coalition government was installed after months of negotiations that followed the November 2023 general election. The government includes the far-right populist Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, the conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the Christian-democratic New Social Contract (NSC), and the Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB), a populist, big tent group representing farmers’ interests. The government, which has a populist right-wing orientation, is led by independent bureaucrat Dick Schoof.

The ministry split, with BBB obtaining the agriculture and housing ministries, and the PVV securing control over immigration, foreign aid, security and justice. This almost certainly demonstrates that while unlikely to pass any major economic reform (the VVD remains solidly at the helm of economic and fiscal institutions), the new government will seek to pass wide-ranging social and travel reforms, which will likely have an important impact on Brussels. In reaction, protests took place at Huis ten Bosch Palace, The Hague on July 2, though these had low attendance, with further unrest likely in the coming weeks.

Turkish authorities have arrested almost 500 people in connection to anti-Syrian riots that resulted in multiple violent confrontations with the security services. The riots were ignited in response to accusations that a Syrian refugee had assaulted a Turkish child in the city of Kayseri in Central Anatolia. Riots and protests have spread to multiple Turkish cities including Ankara, Konya and Istanbul. The riots have instigated issues outside of Turkey’s border, with reports of deadly clashes between Turkish forces and protestors in northwest Syria and Syrian refugees were reportedly attacked by ethnic Turks on the streets of Berlin.

At least three people were killed in election protests after President Ghazouani was re-elected in Mauritania. The authorities used heavy-handed tactics, internet suspensions and mass detentions to suppress dissent in the town of Kaédi, an opposition stronghold near the Senegal border. The protests were motivated by accusations of electoral fraud, a factor that will likely concern the African Union with President Ghazouani currently holding the chairmanship of the regional bloc.

Turkey has initiated mediation talks between Somalia and Ethiopia regarding a port deal Ethiopia signed with the breakaway region of Somaliland earlier this year. The negotiations aim to repair diplomatic ties strained when Ethiopia agreed to lease 20 km of coastline from Somaliland in exchange for recognition of its independence, with Ankara likely attempting to increase its influence in Somalia where it has built schools, hospitals and other infrastructure and established a military base. The Horn of Africa has become increasingly important for Turkey because of its geographical position, maritime access, mineral wealth and potential for development. Because of this, Ankara has likely calculated that a war between Somalia and Ethiopia would be hugely deleterious to its objectives.

Thousands of Kenyans have continued to protest against the Ruto administration despite the overhauling of the controversial tax bill. Looting and violent clashes between protestors and the authorities have occurred in Nairobi, Mombassa and several smaller towns and cities across the country, leading to over 40 deaths and hundreds of arrests. Protestors are demanding the resignation of President Ruto and will likely sustain unrest until he either steps down or makes major concessions.

On 1 July, South Africa announced its new cabinet government, led by a coalition of parties involving the African National Congress (ANC) and Democratic Alliance (DA). The coalition government is unprecedented and follows ANC’s failure to win a majority of seats at the latest parliamentary election. The new right-liberal government is likely to reassure foreign investors in South Africa. However, the inclusion of DA, perceived by many as a quintessentially “white” party, will likely result in cases of civil unrest and possible inter-ethnic strife in the coming months. A significant driver of unrest is the government’s probable rejection of calls for sweeping land reform and expropriation, which are strongly favoured by the political left, including the Economic Freedom Fighters (EEF) which has historically been accused of inciting violence against white farmers.

Several US bases throughout Europe have been placed on high alert, or Force Protection Condition “Charlie”, in response to undisclosed intelligence relating to a planned terrorist attack, according to officials from the US European Command (EUCOM). The security shift likely indicates EUCOM has received information of an active and credible threat as it has not raised its alert level to Charlie for over a decade. The change coincides with high-profile events and dates such as the Euros in Germany, the Paris Olympics and the 4 July celebrations which will be celebrated by  US service personnel throughout the continent. Terrorist actors may exploit these events and dates for publicity and may take advantage of a current overstretching of domestic security services.

On 1 July, the Financial Times released an interview with a senior UK Ministry of Defence official, Rob Johnson. Johnson assessed that the UK’s armed forces are currently unprepared for a “conflict of any scale”, citing large issues with weapons and ammunition procurement, as well as recruitment. The article, which was almost certainly aimed at reintroducing the issue of the armed forces in the political debate days before the elections, follows months of warnings about the state of the British military.

On 29 June, a security guard outside the Israeli embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, was shot with a crossbow. The guard, who survived, managed to kill the attacker, who early investigations allege was a radicalised Islamist extremist who had pledged allegiance to Islamic State. The attack is almost certainly a case of lone-actor terrorism linked with the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. While most lone-actor attacks do not follow specific events, this case may have been partly influenced by the Israeli ambassador’s statement, in April 2024, that Tel Aviv would not categorise the 1995 Srebrenica massacre as a genocide.

On 2 July, Kazakh government critic Aidos Sadykov died in Ukraine, only days after being shot by unidentified gunmen. There is a high likelihood that Sadykov’s killing was orchestrated by Kazakh intelligence, highlighting how the ongoing war in Ukraine may have created a more permissive environment with reduced security for third-party operations in the region.

On 5 July, the Turkish Interior Minister announced the detention of 45 suspects across 16 provinces linked to the Islamic State during BOZDOĞAN-48 counterterrorism operations. The operations also led to the seizure of large amounts of foreign currency, Turkish Lira and digital material. Turkish counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State frequently trigger reprisal attacks, with the group primarily targeting the security forces, places of worship and symbols of Western decadence.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has indicated that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad may be invited for an official visit, when speaking to journalists at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Kazakhstan on 5 July. While Ankara historically supported some rebel groups fighting against Assad in the Syrian Civil War,  tensions between Turkey and Syria have eased in recent years. Erdogan likely is seeking to promote better relations with Assad to assist their current primary strategic objective in Syria, which is defeating the Kurdish separatist groups that have a foothold in northern Syria as well as neighbouring Iraq.

A jihadist attack on 3 July in central Mali near the town of Bandiagara killed over 20 civilians, likely suggesting that extremist groups are continuing to exploit a weak government and the retrograde of Western forces from the region. In addition, around 60 bodies have been discovered near Abeibara, in the Kidal region of northeast Mali close to the Algerian border. The victims, many of whom were found in mass graves, were largely civilians and are thought to have been killed in late June. It is suspected that the killings were conducted by Malian troops in cohort with the Russian “Africa Corps”, its rebranded Wagner Group. The incident may point to an increased trend of brutal tactics used to counter extremist groups, with the intimidation of civilians suspected of harbouring or assisting extremist groups being used to reduce militant groups’ freedom of movement and to disrupt their support networks.

The Tutsi-led and reportedly Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group has captured two more strategic towns in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s North Kivu province, causing mass displacement and placing further pressure on the humanitarian situation. In addition, two employees of the UK-based NGO Tearfund were killed on 1 July after their convoy was attacked by gunmen likely belonging to the M23 group whilst operating in the North Kivu province. M23 has conducted mass executions and human rights abuses in the past and by targeting international aid workers the group may be attempting to decrease foreign access and oversight of their operations.

In a separate incident in the DRC, six Chinese nationals and at least two Congolese soldiers were killed on 4 July by suspected militants from the Development of the Congo (CODECO) militia group. The attack occurred at a mining site near Abombi, Djugu Territory, Ituri Province in the northeast of the country.

The largely ethnic Lendu CODECO group is notorious for its brutal tactics and has its roots in disputes over land and resources. The group has likely targeted Chinese nationals as it perceives China and the DRC government are exploiting resources that belong to the Lendu people, with its long-term strategy aimed at deterring international investment.

The Iranian presidential election runoff takes place on 5 July. The two remaining candidates to succeed President Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash in mid-May, are Saeed Jalili and Massoud Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian, who represents the reformist front, obtained the most overall votes during the first round of the elections. However, Jalili is likely to win, as he was implicitly endorsed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and as the reformist candidate is likely to be particularly damaged by the low voter turnout. The first round of the elections only had a 40 per cent turnout, the lowest in Iran’s post-1979 history and likely a demonstration of widespread dissatisfaction with the oppressive Shia regime.

Almost unprecedented temperatures of above 35 degrees Celsius were recorded in Moscow during the reporting period, caused by a severe heatwave that is affecting much of European Russia. There is a realistic possibility that the high temperatures will result in the outbreak of further wildfires. Due to Russia’s extensive forest cover and particularly carbon-rich soils, wildfires risk having an especially negative impact far beyond Russia’s borders, possibly accelerating the release of large volumes of CO2 into the atmosphere.

At least seven people have been killed and several remain missing after severe flooding caused by torrential rain that began on 30 June hit parts of southern Switzerland, southern France, and northern Italy. Further rain is forecasted in much of the region, increasing the risk of landslides, flash floods and falling trees which have already caused widespread transport disruption.

On 5 July, the Etna and Stromboli volcanoes, in Sicily, erupted, releasing large quantities of ash and leading to temporary closures of the airport in Catania. Italy has a large number of active volcanoes and eruptions are common, however, they do not always result in transport disruptions. The recent eruptions are unlikely to directly threaten the inhabited areas of Sicily, although there is a realistic possibility of further volcanic activity.

At least 1,000 acres of forest have been burned by ongoing wildfires on the Greek island of Zante. The fires are especially focused on the island’s mountainous areas and have not threatened residential areas as of the time of writing. Fires and extreme heat have been reported in other parts of the country, with hotels being evacuated in Kos and Chios, as well as fires developing on the outskirts of Athens. July is the hottest month of the year in Greece, and the summer of 2023 had extremely severe wildfires that were exacerbated by especially high temperatures. The current weather forecasts make a repeat of last year’s crisis a realistic possibility, with temperatures commonly exceeding 35 degrees Celsius.

In Hathras, Uttar Pradesh state, at least 120 people died following a crowd crush that took place at a religious event hosted by a “godman”, known as Bhole Baba. According to early reports, about 250,000 people gathered at an event hosted at a venue that could accommodate less than 80,000. The stampede reportedly was caused by the attendees’ attempts at collecting soil on which the godman and his entourage had treaded upon exiting the venue. Notably, at least 110 of the casualties were women

Solace Global Assessment: 

Godmen and other gurus are not a new phenomenon in India or the broader Indian subcontinent. Popular gurus play an important role in local and national politics. Candidates from religiously-affiliated parties, such as the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have formally or informally endorsed local preachers, likely in efforts to bolster appeal with local communities.

Observers have remarked that the popularity of religious personalities likely has economic, class- and caste-based implications, with many faithful often coming from disadvantaged groups. In many cases, the attendees at these events hope to gain material riches from touching or interacting with the godmen. However, this creates risks to attendees. Improvised, ad hoc religious events are often held in areas and venues with insufficient capacity or few safety features and are likely to attract more attendees through social media. Stampedes are common as the attendees try to approach the godmen, with little regard for others in the crowd.

Travellers who are not familiar with these events may be tempted to approach large impromptu gatherings. However, the risk of becoming involved in a stampede is high. Albeit much less impactful and influential, it is important to note that charismatic preachers are not solely popular in Hindu contexts. Pakistani Muslim communities also have a history of preachers drawing a considerable number of followers by espousing various religious messages. A contemporary example is a preacher and blogger known as “Muhammad Qasim” who, in addition to sharing visions of God and Prophet Mohammed, blends apocalyptic and millenarist messaging with endorsements of former Prime Minister Imran Khan which has enabled him to draw large crowds.

On 30 June, 16 senior leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) released a video statement from Bogor, Indonesia, announcing that the transnational jihadist militant network based in Southeast Asia would be dissolved. The statement also declared commitment to the Republic of Indonesia and the changing of teachings in JI-run schools to orthodox Islam.

Solace Global Assessment: 

JI is a major terrorist group in Southeast Asia with established links to al-Qaeda, that is known to operate in Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Philippines, Singapore, Brunei and southern Thailand. In 2021, Indonesian security forces estimated that JI had approximately 6000 active members in Indonesia alone.

The group are most infamous for having conducted the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed over 200 people, mostly foreign tourists. However, this attack was reportedly carried out without the support of JI’s leadership. The group are also suspected to have conducted several other notable attacks targeting foreign nationals between 2002-2005. While historically significant and still a prominent force, the group has had a gradually declining influence in Southeast Asia.

The announcement is likely driven by a combination of factors. Firstly, JI runs many religious schools, a key asset, and aims to shield them from government suppression. Secondly, JI’s leadership may be seeking political legitimacy by aligning with the Indonesian Republic, akin to the Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy in the Middle East and North Africa. Thirdly, Indonesian counterterrorism efforts, led by Detachment 88, have successfully foiled plots, arrested senior members, implemented deradicalisation programs, and engaged with JI-aligned intellectuals, putting significant pressure on JI’s leadership.

The decision is highly likely to have implications in both Indonesia and wider Southeast Asia, where the group has also historically operated. In the short term, the announcement will likely enable greater success for JI-affiliated schools and it is a realistic possibility that the leaders will, to varying degrees, enter public life. While the leaders who made the statement are assessed to have considerable credibility within the organisation, active splinter groups are highly likely to emerge.

These splinter groups may seek to publicly assert themselves and gain legitimacy amongst jihadists by conducting terrorist attacks. They may have a much greater disposition towards terrorism, supported by the 2002 Bali bombings being conducted by more extreme JI members without the approval of senior leadership. Dissidents may also seek closer relations and affiliation with more extreme jihadist groups, namely the Islamic State (IS) who already have an established presence in Indonesia through affiliate groups such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD). Considering the historical modus operandi of JI terror attacks, as well as the prevalence of Westerners in heavily touristed areas of Indonesia, high-value targets for terror attacks will likely include major tourist resorts, premium hotels and buildings associated with Western governments such as embassies and consulates.

Residents of Karachi staged protests on 1 July over prolonged load-shedding-driven losses of power in the city’s old town. Pakistan suffers from obsolescent and poorly maintained infrastructure, and the high temperatures currently being recorded in the country have exacerbated difficulties in delivering consistent power to densely populated communities. More than 1,000 deaths were reported in Karachi over the past week due to heatstroke, and recent reports signal that most took place in areas where load-shedding was underway, possibly due to the disruption to domestic and public air conditioning, and delays in the reporting and managing of health emergencies.

In Astana, Kazakhstan on 04 July, during the final day of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, Russian and Chinese presidents, Vladamir Putin and Xi Jinping called for the establishment of a new Eurasian security club. This reflects the increasingly close ties and strategic visions of Moscow and Beijing, who both desire a multipolar world order to counter perceived US and NATO hegemony. The proposal remains in its early stages, and although it is unlikely to be implemented imminently, the deal could result in substantial shifts in the geopolitical landscape. Moscow and Beijing are also likely seeking to expand their power in their respective Eurasian spheres of influence; the newly proposed security pact could be a vehicle to enable these goals. However, given Russia’s and China’s historic rivalries and areas of future competition, an alliance that emulates the same levels of inter-operability as NATO is highly unlikely.

Ten Cambodian environmentalist activists were jailed for “plotting” against the government and for “insulting the king”, and sentenced to up to eight years in prison. The activists had previously reported on the mismanagement of the country’s natural resources by leaders, including the monarchy. The case is highly likely similar to others that occurred in Thailand, where lese majeste laws are often used as a pretext to silence opposition voices from outside of the political establishment.

Over 800,000 people have signed an online petition calling for the impeachment of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol. The number of people attempting to sign the petition was so great that significant issues with accessing the National Assembly’s website arose. The president is deeply unpopular, and the petition’s extensive engagement is reflective of this widespread dissatisfaction. While civil unrest in South Korea is generally peaceful, it is highly likely that protests against the president will continue, in tandem with the ongoing doctors’ strike which has caused disruptions to medical treatment since February 2024.

Despite often tense relations, the Pakistani and US infantry have begun a two-week joint anti-terror exercise at the National Counter-Terrorism Centre in Pabbi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The exercise aims to share counter-terrorism experiences, refine drill procedures, and enhance marksmanship skills during urban warfare and is likely being conducted to help Pakistan counter the rise of ISKP in western Pakistan.

Also in Pakistan, Baluch leaders associated with the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) have accused China of being politically responsible for the ongoing Azm-e-Istehkam counterterrorism operations, targeting BLA and Pakistani Taliban (TTP) militants. The BLA has sought to target Chinese interests, nationals, and physical assets in Pakistan, likely with the strategic aim of undermining Islamabad and discouraging foreign investment. Perceptions of growing Chinese influence on Pakistani authorities’ security policy may become a driver of further attacks, and will likely result in China becoming a more frequent target for extremist propaganda in the region.

A senior Australian diplomat has indicated that adding partners to the AUKUS defence pact would be “complicated”, a development that will almost certainly be welcomed by China. The 2021 agreement was established to counterbalance China’s power and maritime capability. The collective security arrangement involves Australia’s acquisition of sensitive nuclear-submarine technology and it is unlikely that Washington will sanction the further circulation of these capabilities.

On 2 July, police in Sydney Australia arrested a 14-year-old boy after a stabbing at the University of Sydney, which resulted in a lockdown of the university’s buildings. To boy’s ideology or motivation has yet to be determined, however, New South Wales police have expressed concerns over increased rates of young people being radicalised online. The incident also follows the recent stabbing of a bishop in Sydney by a teenage assailant and a mass stabbing attack at a Bondi area shopping mall.

On 1 July, Indian authorities announced that the New Delhi domestic flights airport terminal is scheduled to remain closed for a “few weeks”, after a portion of the terminal roof collapsed on 29 June, killing one and destroying numerous vehicles. The collapse followed heavy rains and resulted in limited closures of the Indira Gandhi International Airport. The accident is likely to result in localised travel disruptions and may have a limited adverse political impact on the ruling Modi government.

Thousands of people have been trapped in their homes in Kachin and Sagaing provinces in northern Myanmar after major flooding caused by several rivers overflowing, with further rain forecasted. Rescue and humanitarian efforts will almost certainly be stretched by the ongoing civil war, with the central government highly unlikely to provide any support in rebel-held areas.

The Japan Meteorological Agency has issued an alert for heat-related illnesses as a heatwave is set to affect much of eastern and western Japan, with dozens of people already hospitalised. The agency has warned that temperatures may hit a record 39.3 degrees Celcius in Shizuoka City, with temperatures in Tokyo already exceeding 35 degrees Celcius. The extreme heat is forecasted to last until mid-July.

On 5 July, a tornado in Dongming County, Shandong Province in northeast China has resulted in at least one death, dozens of injuries and extensive property damage. Tornadoes are rare in this area but may become more frequent due to the altering of atmospheric conditions caused by climate change. Moreover, buildings are likely to be unprepared for tornadoes and there is a lack of shelters, factors that will increase pressure on the authorities.

On 7 October, Hamas launched a series of incursions into Israel. The incursions followed a series of sustained rocket attacks from within Gaza commencing about 06:30hrs (local). The rockets hit several cities, including Tel Aviv, Rehovot, Gedera, and Ashkelon. The rocket attacks were followed by what appears to be, a series of coordinated ground, sea and air attacks by an unverified number of militants who crossed the border into southern Israel and commenced attacking towns and settlements.

The escalation between Israel and Hamas, comes after months of violent clashes in Gaza and the West Bank, which has seen hundreds of Palestinian protesters injured. In a statement on 7 October, Hamas leader, Mohammed Deif stated “We have already warned the enemy before. The occupation committed hundreds of massacres against civilians. Hundreds of martyrs and wounded died this year due to the crimes of the occupation.”

In what would appear to be a rare, yet major intelligence failure, Israel appears to have been caught completely unaware of the attack. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, addressed the Israeli people, stating, that the nation had been subjected to a “murderous attack” and that he had ordered the mobilisation of reserves. He went on to say “We are in a war and we will win it”.

In a further development, reports of Israeli positions coming under fire from Lebanon have resulted in retaliation from the IDF.

The initial Hamas attack saw an unprecedented use of coordinated forces utilising missile salvos, seaborne, light vessel insertion, motorcycle and vehicle insertion and airborne insertion by paragliders. Some 20 towns were targeted and it is reported that Hamas militants went door to door targeting Israeli families. More than 300 Israelis were killed and at least 1800 wounded with reports that as many as 200 civilians were also taken hostage, and moved into Gaza to be used as “human shields”. This is a strategic move to try and protect the Gaza Strip from wide spread and large scale Israeli air strikes.

As anticipated, the Israeli response has been swift and vigorous with Israeli Defence Force (IDF) fighter aircraft’s and helicopters undertaking numerous targeted bombing sorties. IDF spokespersons have warned residents in Gaza to seek shelter away from areas that are being targeted by IDF aircrafts. IDF ground forces appear to be mobilising and will, almost certainly, enter Gaza in the coming hours. News footage appears to show columns of Israeli heavy armour moving towards Gaza.

Furthermore, Hezbollah, based in Lebanon have seized the opportunity to launch an attack of their own. They have carried out a shooting at the border and have also claimed to have launched artillery and guided missiles at Israel following IDF air strikes in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah have stated these were done as Hezbollah leadership congratulated Hamas on their successes on 7 October. The IDF responded by firing artillery fire at the Lebanese border and have announced that they will operate in all regions to defend the Israeli citizens.

Hamas’s attack was coordinated at a time when Israel is vulnerable. As well as Israeli forces being engaged in regular clashes with Palestinian militants across various parts of the West Bank, the attack also came at a time of unpopular political upheaval in Israel. There have been weekly anti-government demonstrations in Tel Aviv practically throughout the entirety of 2023 calling for the both Prime Minister Netanyahu’s resignation and a cancellation of the judicial reforms. This political volatility has led many IDF reservists, to refuse to undertake their military obligations.

Such a coordinated and well-planned attack will have taken Hamas months to prepare for, and it is a major intelligence failure, that Israel did not pick up on any signs that Hamas was preparing for something. The announcement from Hamas that Iran helped support them in this attack is not at all surprising. The timing of the attack is significant, not only has it occurred at around the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, in which Israel also suffered a surprise attack from Egypt and Syria, but it also comes at a profoundly delicate moment in regional politics. This is as, if comments are to be believed, the US backing Israeli and Saudia Arabia, are moving towards normalising ties. This attack and the likely Israeli response, however, will almost certainly further complicate this process, and it is likely the attack was designed to highlight that a normalisation of ties with Israel, without negotiation of a settlement for Palestinians, would not improve Israeli or regional security.

Israel’s failure to see this attack coming will likely prompt an aggressive response from them. Already air strikes in the Gaza Strip have killed at least 234 Palestinians. It is highly likely that the IDF will enter the Gaza Strip, as they seek to not only rescue Israeli citizens but retaliate against Hamas. The vows from the Israeli government to exact a “mighty vengeance” and to “turn them [Hamas] to rubble“ only further increases the likelihood of a full-scale ground invasion of Gaza

Meanwhile, the activity from Hezbollah indicates that the events of yesterday are realistically likely to see Lebanon brought into the conflict making it a broader, wider regional conflict. It is highly possible that Hamas-aligned groups in the West Bank become involved, which would effectively mean that Israel has to fight on a possible three fronts. Israel’s response will not only be shaped by the fact it is reacting to a major intelligence failure, but also by the fact that the current Israeli government is the most right-wing nationalist in its history. As such, there have already been calls to reoccupy and destroy the Gaza Strip. Ultimately, however, for many Israelis, the most damaging element of this attack is that it will have deflated the idea in their minds that due to the billions spent on border security, they were safe and secure.

Whether you are considering an evacuation or seeking to continue operations while ensuring the safety of your team, we are here to assist.

For those seeking a secure exit from Israel, Solace Global offers comprehensive journey management services:

In the early hours of 30 August, the Gabonese Election Centre (CGE) announced that President Ali Bongo had won a third term in office, having received 64.27 percent vote share in Saturday’s general election. However, just after 05:00 local time, a group of senior officers from the Gabonese military announced on television channel, Gabon 24, that they had seized power with the full support of the Gabonese security and defence forces.​

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Introducing themselves as members of The Committee of Transition and the Restoration of Institutions, the officials stated that the election results were cancelled, all borders were closed until further notice and state institutions – the government, the senate, the national assembly, the constitutional court and the election body – were dissolved. ​

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Following the announcement, domestic and regional sources reported gunfire could be heard in the capital Libreville. However, as the day progressed, the streets appeared calm, and crowds of  citizens peacefully took to the streets. Videos circulating on social media showed multiple instances of people celebrating and cheering, often in close proximity to the country’s armed forces. So far, there has been no signs of widespread protest or alarm. Several hours after the officers’ announcement, internet access also appeared to be restored for the first time since Saturday’s vote. ​

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The Gabonese government has yet to make an official statement, with President Bongo reportedly under house arrest, surrounded by his family and doctors.​

Ahead of the coup, there was significant concern over potential unrest following Saturday’s presidential, parliamentary and legislative elections that the opposition alleged were plagued by fraud. Questions over the election’s transparency were re-enforced by the lack of international observers, the suspension of foreign media broadcasts, the decision to cut internet service, and the imposing of a nationwide curfew.​

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President Ali Bongo and his father, Omar Bongo, have ruled Gabon since 1967, but frustrations with the political dynasty had been growing for several years ahead of Saturday’s election. The Central African nation is a major oil producer, so much so that it is a member of OPEC, as well as being a major exporter of uranium and magnesium. Indeed, the country is home to over one-quarter of the world’s proven magnesium reserves. However, Bongo has done little to channel its oil and other wealth towards the population of some 2.3 million people, a third of whom live in poverty. ​

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This is also not the first attempt in recent history to overthrow Bongo as in January 2019 he and the Gabonese government were able to foil an attempted military coup after soldiers briefly seized the state radio station and broadcasted a message saying Bongo, who had suffered a stroke months earlier, was no longer fit for office.

The strength of Gabon’s extractive-based economy means that it is Africa’s third most wealthy country by GDP per capita. However, with large swathes of the country still living in poverty, it is highly likely that the state has failed to transfer much of this wealth to ordinary citizens. It is likely that economic disparities have been one of the major triggers for the coup. This is likely supported by the lack of public resistance and the fact that celebrations have been seen on the streets of Libreville and other major population centres across the country.​

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Furthermore, the coup has yet to be characterised by anti-French rhetoric in a similar vein to the recent West and Central African coups in countries like Niger and Mali. However, the coup is almost certainly another problem for Paris in Africa, with multiple French companies operating in the country. Unlike the other coups in Africa, it is doubtful that the Gabonese coup leaders will seek Russian support in favour of maintaining Western relations. Gabon has traditionally had weak ties with Russia and unlike much of Africa, has not been threatened with major insurgencies and security issues. Moreover, Gabon was one of the countries in Africa that voted against Russia at the United Nations in the 2022 resolution on Ukraine.​

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Economically, the coup is almost certainly going to lead to price volatility in global oil and magnesium markets. Gabon has strong economic links with both France, and increasingly with China, and it is a major exporter of commodities to these nations. Reports indicate that some foreign companies like the French mining company, Eramet, have already suspended operations in Gabon in response to the coup. It is therefore highly likely that both France and China will be looking for the political situation to be resolved quickly, and there is a realistic possibility of diplomatic involvement from both Paris and Beijing. ​

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In the immediate future, it is unlikely that any major protests or armed clashes will break out as the Gabonese security forces are seemingly onside, and most indications suggest the public is too. The turning on of the internet was likely a move to win over the public as well as signal a different approach to governance than the Bongo regime. However, this also presents an increased potential for demonstrations and protests, both in favour and against the coup, to occur as information is spread on social media. There is a realistic possibility of sustained demonstrations which will likely lead to disruption in major population hubs. Borders will likely remain closed for upcoming days, but if scenes remain calm, borders are likely to reopen quicker than seen in Niger and Mali.

On the morning of 26 July, multiple domestic and regional sources reported that a potential coup was underway in Niamey, Niger. Early indications suggested that the Presidential Guard had blocked the entrance to the Presidential Palace, and detained President Mohamed Bazoum. Concurrently, government ministries next to the palace were blockaded, with those inside, including the Minister of the Interior, detained.

By early afternoon, the Niger Armed Forces (FAN) and National Guard had both deployed in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace. The FAN and the Presidential office both released statements asserting that the ongoing coup attempt was being driven by “anti-republican” elements and gave the Presidential Guard an “ultimatum” to stand down and release President Bazoum, or face being attacked. Unverified social media reports have subsequently described armoured FAN columns entering Niamey. Further unverified reports later emerged of roadblocks appearing across the city.

The conditions in Niamey remained calm initially, however, as the situation developed businesses were reputedly told to close and residents were ordered to stay at home. Operations at Diori Hamani International Airport currently remain unaffected, with flight tracking data showing that both inbound and outbound flights were operating as normal.

Since 2020, several coups have taken place across the Sahel region, most notably in neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso. The key driver for instability has been the inability of central governments to guarantee internal security from a myriad of insurgencies and terrorist actors. Niger has been increasingly afflicted by the instability affecting the wider region. In the southeast, Niger is battling incursions from Boko Haram and in the west of the country, the government is attempting to contain threats from Islamic State’s Sahel Province.
Due to the external and internal threats posed by these actors, Niger has become a major operating base for Western nations in the region. Indeed, both France and the USA utilise the country as a base for operations in the wider Sahel.
This relationship has grown in significance for Western governments as relations with other states in the region, such as Mali and Burkina Faso, have broken down in the wake of their own respective coups, leading to the expulsion of French forces.

Further strengthening this relationship is the fact that Niger’s President was democratically elected in 2021 and is one of the region’s few remaining democratically elected heads of state. However, in February 2023 protests erupted in the capital, Niamey, with demonstrators expressing their dissatisfaction with a sustained French military presence in the country, with many believing that the foreign presence was either ineffective or had exacerbated security concerns.

At the time of writing, there has been no official statement from Presidential Guard. However, given the recent regional trends, it is highly likely that this attempted coup has transpired due to concerns regarding the deteriorating security of Niger.

This is further evidenced by the fact that the Presidential Guard has also apprehended the Minister of the Interior, who is the person ultimately responsible for policing and internal security in Niger. The recent uptick in attacks near the borders with Burkina Faso and Mali likely provided the catalyst for the current situation.

As the situation develops, it is almost certain that key transport routes and critical locations across Niamey will be seized by rival forces. This will include Niamey’s key river crossings, which connect the main part of the city on the eastern bank of the Niger River to its western parts, the international airport, and state TV and radio offices. At the time of writing, it is believed that President Mohamed Bazoum remains in detention.

The success of the ongoing attempted coup remains to be seen. Initial signs suggest that the FAN and National Guard have remained loyal to President Bazoum and are willing to fight. If this remains the case, it is unlikely that the coup succeeds due to the disparity in military firepower between the two sides. This result would ultimately see the Presidential Guard purged.

However, should the coup succeed, civil unrest, both in favour and against, will highly likely occur. A transitional military council will likely take over the government and immediately revise the stationing of foreign militaries in Niger. The removal of the last remaining Western forces in the region will likely create a security vacuum, that will almost certainly benefit the insurgencies and terrorist groups in Niger and the wider region.

The vulnerability has been exploited by the threat group APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, Sofacy, and STRONTIUM since April 2022.

It was initially reported to Microsoft by the Ukrainian CERT. According to Microsoft, “a Russia-based threat actor” exploited the vulnerability in targeted attacks against several European organizations in government, transportation, energy, and military sectors.

Currently 15 organisations are believed to have been targeted or breached using CVE-2023-23397.

Solace Cyber Head of Incident Response believes with high certainty that this particular vulnerability will be used by other threat actors – equating to a vast quantity of attacks in the coming days to weeks.

As of 16/03/2023 proof of concept code has been developed by security researchers and it is likely to be used in subsequent attacks by other threat actors.

The attack involves the attacker sending an Outlook note or task to the victim, triggering the notification sound file mechanism, which sends an NTLM negotiation request to the attacker-controlled SMB share. The threat actors accomplish this using extended MAPI properties that contain UNC paths. The vulnerability can be exploited with a simple, specially crafted email, even if the victim doesn’t open the item.

However, it’s worth noting that this vulnerability cannot be exploited with Outlook for iOS, Mac, or Outlook for Android. Nevertheless, it affects all Windows versions of Outlook that are currently supported.  

Note: Those at a higher risk include remote workers due to home firewalls that do not block SMB traffic.

This can be done by emailing all end users to advise a manual update of Microsoft Office (click-to-run) or updating via alternative methods. If you require assistance with auto-patching solace cyber can assist.

Preferably this is run in audit mode only so that forensic data can be reviewed. If the script produces results it is recommended that you review the UNC paths in the outlook items to ensure no exploitation has occurred. 

At around 06:45 local time on 11 January 2023, several people were injured after a lone individual attacked commuters at the Gare du Nord train station in Paris, France. Those present during the incident suggested that the attacker was targeting passengers indiscriminately.

Police officers responding to the incident reportedly fired several shots at the attacker, who was arrested at the scene and remains in a critical condition. Unverified reports suggest that the attacker was first interdicted by an off-duty police officer, although this has not been officially confirmed.

The French Interior Minister Gérald Moussa Darmanin has confirmed that six people have been injured in the attack, including one police officer. A security cordon remains in place around the station, with emergency services still on site.

Police and security officials have not commented on a suspected motive for the attack, and a criminal investigation has been launched.

In the immediate aftermath of the incident, rail network TER Hauts-de-France noted that rail traffic had been disrupted both to and from Paris Nord, with some services still delayed. Limited disruption has been reported for the local road network.

Although officials have not commented on the exact motive for the attack, the methodology (bladed weapon) and targeting preferences (busy transport hub during morning commute) indicate that this incident is highly likely to be terror-related.

There have been a considerable number of high-profile terror incidents in France in recent years, with most attacks in the 21st century conducted either by violent Islamist extremists, or by individuals with extreme right-wing or racist ideologies.

The apparently indiscriminate nature of this attack likely suggests that this incident was an act of Islamist terror, since racially- motivated attacks are highly targeted.

The attack at the Gare du Nord comes less than three weeks (23 December) after a racially-motivated shooting attack killed three at a Kurdish cultural centre and nearby café on the Rue d’Enghien, in the 10th arrondissement, less than 2km from the Gare du Nord station. That incident prompted extensive unrest amongst the local Kurdish population and was condemned by the Kurdish Democratic Council of France (CDK-F).

Previous Islamist terror attacks in France have been motivated by perceived or genuine attacks against ethnic minority, immigrant or Islamic communities.