Gangs are almost certainly continuing their efforts to surround the capital of Haiti by intensifying operations to its north and south. Kenyan and Haitian forces will highly likely fail to contain the spread of violence.

Russian hybrid attacks in Europe will likely intensify as a result of US disengagement, resulting in increased acts of sabotage and cyberattacks against companies and infrastructure supporting Ukraine.

The largest attack on Kyiv, Ukraine, in 2025 is almost certainly reflective of the Kremlin’s continued priority of using military force to fulfil its objectives, and reflects the particular threat posed by ballistic missiles.

Burkina Faso’s junta’s claim of a foiled coup attempt likely reflects the continuously deteriorating security environment outside the capital and likely increases the threat of arbitrary detention to foreign nationals.

JNIM attacks in northern Benin are almost certainly indicative of the extremist group’s intent to expand outside of the Sahel and establish safe havens in neighbouring countries.

There is a realistic possibility that the growing political crisis in Zimbabwe will trigger widespread civil unrest or a coup attempt.

A terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir is unlikely to trigger war between India and Pakistan despite a major diplomatic fallout, but is likely to lead to sustained border skirmishes, protests and sectarian violence.

On 23 April, the University Hospital of Mirebalais declared that it would cease operations following weeks of gang attacks in the area. Hospital administrators and doctors have stated they will seek to move the patients to other regional facilities at a lower risk of gang attacks. Two days prior, on 21 April, Washington announced that it would designate Viv Ansanm, the largest Haitian gang coalition which now occupies large portions of both Mirebalais and the capital, Port-au-Prince, as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO). During the last reporting period, particularly heavy clashes were recorded in the Kenscoff area in the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, where at least three Haitian soldiers were killed in an ambush by gangs on 20 April.

Solace Global Assessment: 

On 21 April, Maria Isabel Salvador, the UN’s special representative to Haiti, stated that, without further support, the UN’s presence in the country may become “unsustainable”. As demonstrated by the gangs’ growing advances on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, the Kenya-led police contingent continues to struggle to provide a sufficient security response to the crisis. Also on 21 April, the Kenyan ambassador to the UN stated that approximately 260 police officers who are scheduled to be deployed to Haiti remain “on standby” due to the lack of equipment and logistical support. The gangs’ operations in Mirebalais likely continue to demonstrate their commitment to a strategy aimed at destroying all civil institutions to force the civilian population to be dependent on them. In addition to shutting down the local hospital and setting fire to the (now empty) police station, gangs have reportedly also targeted independent radio stations.

The gangs’ offensive on Kenscoff is likely dictated by a similar logic to the previous attack on Mirebalais. Kenscoff is located on the Kenscoff-Marigot road, which, although in a state of disrepair, offers an alternative route south of Port-au-Prince, avoiding the gang-controlled National Route 2. Moreover, Kenscoff overlooks the commune of Pétion-Ville, where numerous government offices, banks, and embassies are located. The fall of Kenscoff would therefore likely cut off humanitarian aid routes connecting Port-au-Prince to southern Haiti, further destabilising the government’s position.

“National Day of Action” planned for 1 May in US

A collective of US-based civil society groups has called for non-violent protests to occur on 1 May, in opposition to the current administration. Protests are scheduled to occur in all 50 states, with some related events also occurring in Canada. Due to the high visibility of the events and likely high volume of attendees, there is a realistic possibility of violence breaking out during the protests. There is a remote chance of clashes involving counterprotesters. Finally, there is a realistic possibility of the protests driving localised acts of vandalism against assets owned by or associated with private companies perceived to be supportive of the Trump administration.

The US Education Department to begin collection on defaulted student loans

Approximately 5.3 million borrowers are currently assessed to be in default on their federal student loans. The announcement marks the end of a period of leniency supported by the previous administration. On 5 May, the department is expected to begin involuntary collection via the offset program of the Treasury Department, allowing it to withhold tax refunds, federal salaries, or other government payments, and to garnish wages from borrowers. The measure will likely contribute to driving civil unrest, including both large-scale protests and small-scale direct action.

Guatemalan indigenous leader arrested

On 23 April, Guatemalan authorities arrested Luis Pacheco on charges of terrorism and illicit association. Pacheco is one of the country’s most politically important indigenous leaders. In 2023, he led a network of 48 indigenous communities in staging nationwide blockades of the country’s highway network, in opposition to the then-administration’s questioning of the 2023 electoral results. President Bernardo Arevalo, who appointed Pacheco to a post at the sustainable development ministry upon taking power, has opposed the arrest. It is highly likely that the arrest will drive limited civil unrest in Guatemala, possibly impacting road traffic in the country.

Mass evictions in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, resulted in clashes

More than 500 police officers reportedly participated in operations to evict residents of the Santa Lucia area of the department on 21 April. The operation was reportedly aimed at removing makeshift residential buildings in the area, which were allegedly built illegally on privately owned land. Residents protested the decision, claiming that the decision had not been adequately communicated or debated by the authorities. The protests resulted in limited clashes with police forces, who deployed tear gas and carried out multiple arrests.  

Mexican cartels stage multi-state road blockades

Starting on 23 April, road blockades were recorded on multiple highways in the Mexican states of Jalisco, Michoacán, and Guanajuato, with dozens of vehicles set on fire to block the roadways. The blockades started the day following clashes between security forces and alleged narcotraffickers in the Apatzingán mountains, in Michoacán. These, in turn, were likely provoked by the arrest of a local drug trafficking leader. The road blockades have highly likely been organised by the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), which is the main criminal group in the area, and are likely meant as a show of force. During the Easter celebrations, CJNG members reportedly staged multiple “narco-parades” through town centres in Michoacán, likely a show of force to the local and national governments at a time when both the US and Mexican governments are exerting pressure on the cartels.

Guerilla attack forces shut down of Colombian oil pipeline

On 17 April, the Bicentenario crude oil pipeline in Colombia was forced to shut down following an explosion that the state oil company, Ecopetrol, attributed to a guerrilla attack. Initial reports have indicated that the attack was conducted by the National Liberation Army (ELN), which is currently fighting government forces in multiple parts of Colombia. The pipeline was attacked in the Fortul municipality, in the department of Arauca, a rural area with limited government presence and a known stronghold for the ELN. There is a realistic possibility that the attack may mark a shift in ELN tactics, involving the deliberate targeting of critical national infrastructure (CNI), which the Colombian government heavily relies on, with the ELN having employed this tactic during previous hostilities.

Mapuche leader arrested in Chile

On 24 April, the Chilean Investigative Police (PDI) arrested Federico Astete Catrileo, identified as the leader of the radical Mapuche organisation, Resistencia Mapuche Lafkenche (RML), in the town of Pocuno, Arauco Province. The RML are a militant group made of the indigenous Mapuche that primarily operates in the Araucania and Bio Bio regions of Chile. The group has been implicated in numerous attacks against industries perceived to be exploiting Mapuche lands. Attacks have included acts of arson and sabotage against critical infrastructure and the key industries such as forestry and mining, as well as the deliberate starting of wildfires. The RML has also been involved in armed confrontations with law enforcement, ultimately leading to their designation as a terrorist organisation by the Chilean Congress. Given the RML’s history of retaliatory violence following arrests of its members, there is a realistic possibility that the arrest of their leader will result in reprisal attacks in Chile, most likely targeting the aforementioned industries.  

Colombia, facing rising yellow fever cases, declares a national emergency

Authorities announced the measure during the last reporting period. The nationwide emergency follows a reported 74 cases with at least 34 deaths since the start of the outbreak last year. Authorities have stated that the most affected area is Tolima, located in west-central Colombia, which accounts for approximately a quarter of the cases. Yellow fever, which is highly preventable through vaccination, has estimated death rates of between 40 and 50 per cent. While the Colombian government has pledged approximately USD 140 million to respond to the emergency, rural areas are highly likely to remain at a particularly high risk of the disease.

On 22 April, the Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) warned that Russia is increasing its hybrid attacks against the Netherlands and its European allies, including cyberattacks and acts of sabotage.

In its annual report for 2024, the MIVD disclosed that a Russian cyberattack had targeted a Dutch public service, an attempted act of cyber sabotage aimed at gaining control of a system. Although the attack was ultimately thwarted, it marked the first such attack on a public body in the country.

The agency also reported that Russia has attempted to probe critical infrastructure, assessing that this was likely preparation for further sabotage. Broader concerns were raised about Russia’s mapping of infrastructure in the North Sea, potentially to target internet cables, water supplies and energy infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines as well as offshore wind farms.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Throughout the war in Ukraine, Russia has conducted a campaign of hybrid warfare across Europe that has included cyber-attacks, acts of sabotage and even threats of assassination against individuals supporting Ukraine. With the US potentially disengaging from Ukraine entirely and suspending the delivery of further lethal aid, Russia will likely expand its hybrid campaign across Europe as European nations attempt to compensate for the resulting gap in capability and support.

Reports indicate that Russia has effectively established a “gig economy” as part of its hybrid warfare campaign in Europe. This involves the provision of financial incentives through secure online payments or the use of cryptocurrency to disaffected individuals and marginalised groups that are willing to conduct acts of sabotage or cyber-attacks in support of Russia’s efforts to destabilise and deter the West.

This has primarily involved acts of arson, physical tampering and cyberattacks against industries in support of Ukraine, such as defence companies and components of Ukraine’s wider logistics network, including attacks on transport infrastructure. This shift in strategy has enabled Russia to quickly identify, recruit and control agents from within Russia while still maintaining a high level of plausible deniability.

Western intelligence and law enforcement are likely unable to monitor or police the scale of this activity. As the war continues and divisions in Europe increase, Russia will likely continue to increase recruitment and escalate its hybrid attacks to exploit these growing vulnerabilities and to deter further European support for Ukraine and increase division within Europe.

Targets of Russia’s expanded hybrid attacks will likely include European defence companies, suppliers of non-lethal aid to Ukraine, warehouses storing military equipment or other forms of aid, and key transport infrastructure such as railway infrastructure and even air travel, all of which have been previously targeted in attacks attributed to the Kremlin.

Overnight on 23-24 April, the deadliest long-range strikes against Kyiv since 8 July 2024 occurred, killing at least 12 and wounding 80. According to the Ukrainian air force, the attack involved 11 ballistic missiles, 55 cruise missiles, four glide bombs and 145 uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The Ukrainian air force claims that both F-16 and Mirage multirole fighter aircraft were used in the air defence effort. The Svyatoshynskyi District in the west of Kyiv was the worst hit, with a ballistic missile identified by Ukrainian forces as a North Korean-made KN-23 directly striking a residential building. Fires were reported in multiple other districts of Kyiv, including Holosiivskyi, Solomyanskyi, and the central Shevchenkivskyi district, with most of these almost certainly resulting from debris from successful interception.

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky curtailed a visit to South Africa as a result of the attack, and the US President Donald Trump stated that he was ‘not happy’ and that Russian President Vladimir Putin should ‘STOP!’. The Trump administration has threatened to pull out of the bilateral negotiations if progress is not soon made.

In the first indication of potential concessions to the Kremlin’s previously stated maximalist war goals, sources briefed the Financial Times that Putin is willing to settle on the current frontlines of the conflict.

Zelensky stated that Ukraine will not legally recognise the occupation of Crimea, leading to staunch criticism from Trump, and the Mayor of Kyiv, Vitali Klitschko, suggested that Ukraine may have to give up territory for peace.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The major attack on Kyiv is almost certainly reflective of the continued priority of the Kremlin to use military force to gain leverage to achieve its objectives. With the vaguely defined and enforced moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure having expired on either 16 or 23 April, there have so far been no indications of an extension.

It is highly likely that Moscow is heavily incentivised to deplete Kyiv’s stockpile of Patriot interceptor missiles, with previous shortages due to delays in US Congress approval in late 2023 to early 2024 resulting in a significant increase in the efficacy of Russian long-range strikes. The Patriot air defence system is Ukraine’s most reliable method of intercepting ballistic missiles, which pose the greatest rates of penetration against Ukrainian air defence, with most of the casualties from the 23-24 April Kyiv attack resulting from a ballistic missile.

While Ukraine’s current stockpiles are likely not currently critically low due to the efforts by the previous Biden administration prior to Trump’s inauguration, the Trump administration is far less likely to agree to further replenishment. Ukraine’s European partners, however, are attempting to find methods of indirectly replenishing Ukraine’s stockpiles by purchasing interceptors or even systems from the US.

Whilst the threat of Russian long-range strikes to Kyiv has been lower than in most other major urban centres due to the considerable concentration of air defence assets, renewed interceptor shortages would highly likely significantly increase the risks in Kyiv.

It is highly likely that Moscow has thus far engaged in the US bilateral talks and limited ceasefire proposals primarily to gain concessions to further their continued pursuit of objectives on the battlefield. The briefing of potential acceptance of a deal on current frontlines, as opposed to previously stated demands of full annexation of Crimea, Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk and Luhansk (including all currently unoccupied areas of these administrative divisions), is likely intended to condition the US to apply further pressure on Zelensky to make concessions, which has already materialised to some extent with Trump’s social media posts.

The comments from Klitschko are notable in that they additionally represent an internal division of messaging in Ukraine, which is highly likely also an objective of the Kremlin. As supported by comments from Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on 23 April, even if Russia agrees to a truce on current frontlines without the fulfilment of the objectives to demilitarise Ukraine and replace Kyiv’s government with a puppet government, Russia would restart the war if the ‘legitimacy’ of Zelensky is questioned by the ‘people’.

Kyiv, therefore, is almost certainly highly reluctant to make concessions for a truce if adequate security guarantees against Russian re-invasion are not in place.

On 21 April, Burkina Faso’s junta government claimed it had foiled a ‘major plot’ emanating from Abidjan. According to the Burkinabe Ministry of Security, communications between a Burkinabe military officer and “terrorist leaders” were intercepted, revealing a plan to “sow total chaos, and place the country under the supervision of an international organisation”. The plan was alleged to ultimately culminate in an assault on the presidency by soldiers on 16 April. Security forces reportedly arrested a dozen military personnel (including two officers) following the plot’s discovery.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Since the successful 2022 coup led by Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, the junta has claimed to have thwarted multiple attempts to “destabilise” the government, with the accusations typically involving Abidjan as a source for the plots. The last alleged “destabilisation” plot to be foiled was in November 2024. While the Traoré regime is almost certainly heavily incentivised to generate an atmosphere of paranoia, particularly involving accusations against a foreign power, there have likely been genuine plans of varying degrees of sophistication that have intended to oust Traoré.

Jihadist insurgent groups in Burkina Faso, particularly the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), are currently estimated to control between 40 to 60 per cent of the country. Widely considered the most fragile of the Sahel junta states, the Ouagadougou-based junta is highly likely to be gradually losing the war against JNIM, despite its claims to the contrary. In 2024, Burkina Faso was ranked by the Global Terrorism Index as the country most affected by terrorism for the second year in a row.

Due to continuously deteriorating security outside of Ouagadougou, where the junta has likely overconcentrated forces due to a prioritisation of regime survival, there is a realistic possibility of multiple currents within the Burkinabe military that wish to depose the junta in another coup d’etat. Despite the extensive operational freedom JNIM exercises across the country, the situation in Ouagadougou remains stable, with no major attacks having been conducted in the city in the last few years.

Should a coup attempt be actioned, however, the security situation could rapidly deteriorate in the city. Additionally, the junta continues to heavily repress civil society. While the crackdown following the latest alleged coup plot has reportedly been limited to a few military personnel, it is likely that the posture of security forces in Ouagadougou is heightened, posing increased threats of arbitrary detention to foreign nationals.

On 17 April, the al-Qaeda affiliated transregional violent extremist organisation (VEO), Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), conducted twin attacks on army bases in northern Benin in the Kandi province, approximately 500 km (300 miles) from the capital Cotonou. JNIM claims that it killed 70 Beninese soldiers in the attacks, which would mark the most successful attack in Benin since JNIM’s formation in 2017. Official statements from the Benin Armed Forces (BAF) acknowledged the attacks, initially providing a death toll of only eight, however, this was later revised to 54 and marks the highest death toll since JNIM attacks started in the north of the country.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attacks in northern Benin by JNIM likely illustrate the group’s intent to expand its operational footprint into countries bordering the Sahelian states of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso and into coastal West Africa. The objectives of this broader JNIM strategy are likely manifold.

By increasing instability in the regions that border the Sahel, the group is likely attempting to establish safe havens in these areas and increase recruitment from the local and often disenfranchised Muslim communities. In this context, Benin likely initially published a much lower death toll to limit the effectiveness of JNIM’s propaganda and recruitment messaging.

The establishment of safe havens in the north of Benin and the north of Togo would help shield the group from the junta forces of Burkina Faso and Niger, and also help the group consolidate control of its supply chains.

In the long term, this may also help the group shift operations further towards the coast, placing it in a better position to conduct high-profile mass casualty attacks, such as the 2016 Grand-Bassam beach resort attack in Côte d’Ivoire, which was linked to JNIM.

The destabilisation of areas that border the Sahel also presents JNIM and other violent extremist organisations (VEOs) with the opportunity to limit external intervention in the Sahel. If JNIM can sustain its attacks in Benin, Togo and other neighbouring countries like Côte d’Ivoire, it could force regional nations and groups like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to divert resources internally and away from the Sahel, which is JNIM’s primary area of operations.

If attacks continue at such a scale, there is a realistic possibility that Benin will impose a state of emergency in the north in a move that mirrors the strategy already set by Togo.

On 21 April, Blessed Geza, who was recently expelled from the ruling ZANU-PF party, called for an indefinite nationwide shutdown on 22 April to pressure President Emmerson Mnangagwa into resigning. According to Geza’s statement, the shutdown would constitute a final push to end a ‘corrupt’ and ‘incapacitated’ regime.

Geza has also claimed to be working with elements of the security establishment, including the armed forces, in his attempt to remove Mnangagwa from power. This was implicitly denied by the armed forces, who denounced individuals misusing military uniforms.

The calls for a nationwide shutdown largely failed, with most people going about their daily routines. Security forces were on high alert, with increased security presence in urban centres. On 22 April, an apparent cabinet memorandum outlining constitutional amendments which would allow Mnangagwa to remain in office until 2031 was leaked. The document has been dismissed as ‘fabricated’ by Ziyambi Ziyambi, Zimbabwe’s Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs minister.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Zimbabwe is undergoing significant economic problems characterised by volatile inflation, unsustainable debt, energy shortages, a collapsing currency, and unpredictable regulation. These have been exacerbated by governance failures and corruption, with Mnangagwa consolidating political power. The current tensions come amid proposals by ZANU-PF members to delay the 2028 elections to 2031, which would exceed the two five-year term presidential limit.

Following Mnangagwa’s rise to power in a 2017 coup, he reportedly pledged to hand over leadership to Vice President Constantino Chiwenga after completing his term. This agreement now appears at risk if elections are postponed, prompting Geza to urge Mnangagwa to uphold his promise and step down so Chiwenga can take his place. In recent weeks, Mnangagwa has reportedly come under significant pressure from ZANU-PF loyalists to oust Chiwenga, threatening a political crisis.

So far, despite public discontent over the economy and Mnangagwa’s political manoeuvring, demonstrations have failed to gain traction. A previous call by Geza for protests on 31 March was largely ignored by the population. This is highly likely due to fears that the country may descend into civil war, as well as fears of repression by security forces. Before the 31 March demonstrations, Mnangagwa emphasised that security forces would respond with force, and there is a historical precedent of intense repression by ZANU-PF, which killed approximately 20,000 civilians in demonstrations in the 1980s.

While the population remains tentative, there is a realistic possibility that continued economic difficulties combined with perceived authoritarian moves by Mnangagwa, such as the dismissal of Chiwenga, will contribute to a growing public anger and pressure to resign, which could result in large-scale demonstrations across the country. Alternatively, the growing political divisions could result in a coup attempt, with Mnangagwa having recently replaced army chief General Anlem Sanyatwe with loyalist Emmanuel Matatu, triggering anonymous military factions to issue coup threats in February.

International Workers Day almost certain to coincide with large-scale protests

Civil unrest is likely to occur across all large European urban centres. Violent clashes are likely to occur in cities that have a history of escalating tensions during the day, including Paris and other French cities, Istanbul, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Berlin. There is a high likelihood of traffic disruptions in local city centres during the day. As in 2024, it is highly likely that concurrent pro-Palestine protests will be held on 1 May. 

Anti-government, far-right protests planned across Germany on 26 April

The group Together for Germany (GfD) has announced that it will stage demonstrations in 16 federal states on 26 April. The group opposes the current government’s policy of support to Ukraine and particularly the possibility of its supplying of Taurus missiles to Kyiv. Moreover, GfD calls for “comprehensive border controls” and safeguarding freedom of expression.

While the group’s website states that the organisers are “working to exclude extreme movements” from participating in the demonstrations, past GfD demonstrations, including one in late March in Dresden, attracted multiple far-right and identitarian groups. The 26 April protests are likely to be the largest organised by the group so far.

It is almost certain that they will attract counterprotesters and that they will result in significant police deployments at the protest locations. There is a realistic possibility of violence erupting between the protesters and counterprotesters or the police.

Pope Francis dies aged 88

The Pontiff died on 21 April in Rome, just weeks after being hospitalised for double pneumonia. The College of Cardinals is now set to hold a conclave – the papal election – beginning around 5-10 May. The conclave, which happens during the Jubilee – the Catholic holy year that attracts millions of pilgrims to Rome – is likely to impact the risks faced by travellers to Italy and the Vatican.

First, the influx of pilgrims to Rome is almost certain to increase in the short term, possibly resulting in traffic and service disruptions in the Italian capital. Second, the Pope’s death is a high-visibility event and may drive unrest or direct action by groups seeking to mainstream their political or religious positions. Finally, the visibility of the event may result in an increased threat of terrorism, particularly that linked with religious extremism.

Protests continue in Slovakia over controversial NGO law

On 24 April, protests occurred in Bratislava and several other Slovakian cities over the government’s passing of a law which mandates that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) disclose their funding sources. The legislation has been widely criticised as a “Russian law” due to its perceived targeting of NGOs receiving foreign funding, like Russia’s “foreign agents” bill. The law has ignited multiple previous rounds of protests across Slovakia, with critics arguing that it infringes on privacy and freedom of expression and is in violation of EU regulations. President Peter Pellegrini could veto the law before 2 May. However, his decision could be overridden by a majority in parliament. A refusal to veto the legislation or its ultimate passing will likely result in widespread protests across Slovakia.  

Moldova to hold elections in September

The country’s parliament voted to hold the contest on 28 September. The elections are highly likely to be extremely competitive and will likely shape the future of Moldova’s relations with the EU. Moldova is currently ruled by the pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), whose leader, Maia Sandu, became the country’s president in 2024 in an election that was perceived as a referendum between Brussels and Moscow. Sandu has sought to combat the pro-Russian regionalist elements in Transnistria, which is a hub for Moscow-backed hybrid warfare, and Gagauzia. The elections are likely to drive civil unrest and possibly political violence. Unrest is particularly likely in the Gagauzia and Transnistria. Moreover, the elections will almost certainly be shaped by the developments in Ukraine.

Bulgarian government survives no-confidence vote

On 17 April, the centre-right Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party survived its second no-confidence motion in two weeks. The motion put forward by the Morality, Unity, Honour (Mech) party and two other nationalist parties, Vazrazhdane and Velichie, was defeated 130-72.

The pro-Western opposition party PP-DB refused to back the motion due to not wanting to destabilise the government before the upcoming European Commission report on Bulgaria’s proposed entry into the Eurozone. The motions were put forward after the opposition accused the government of failing to fight against widespread corruption.

Corruption levels in Bulgaria are high, with accusations of underhanded public procurement procedures, rampant lobbying, and vote buying. Until 2023, when Hungary took first place, Bulgaria consistently ranked as the most corrupt country in the European Union, according to the Corruption Perception Index. Given the failure of the first two motions, another imminent no-confidence motion is unlikely.

Tunisian opposition leaders receive harsh prison sentences

A Tunisian court handed down terms of up to 66 years in prison to a group of 40 figures of the opposition, ending a mass trial that started in March. Among those charged, there are several politicians, journalists, and private sector figures. Around 20 of the defendants have escaped the country since being charged.

The development is almost certainly a further escalation in Tunisian President Kais Saied’s efforts to silence civil society and opposition voices, and to centralise power. Saied, who was elected in 2019, has gradually demolished Tunisia’s opposition, particularly following a “self-coup” in 2021.

Internationally, Saied has pursued close relations with the European Union, and particularly southern states like Italy, which see Tunisia as fundamental to stopping migrant flows in the Mediterranean. In doing so, Saied has likely significantly weakened the EU powers’ appetite to question the country’s authoritarian backsliding.

Jordan outlaws Muslim Brotherhood

Coinciding with the decision, Jordanian police seized the offices and assets used by the Islamist group in the country. The development follows the arrest of 16 Muslim Brotherhood members over alleged participation in a foiled coup plot. The Muslim Brotherhood is Jordan’s main political opposition force and can count on a transnational support network. Consequently, the ban has a realistic possibility of triggering civil unrest and political violence targeting government and police officials.

The government of Jordan has played a balancing act, seeking to retain positive relations with the West and Israel, while simultaneously appeasing a strongly pro-Palestinian civil society. The recent ban is likely to damage this policy, as it is a major shift in the country’s domestic political structure, and could realistically destabilise the Jordanian government.

In particular, if unrest or violence follows the ban, the government is likely to respond by cracking down on dissent. However, such a move could offer an opportunity for anti-government forces and their international supporters, like Iran, to intensify anti-government action, thus driving overall instability.

ECOWAS to withdraw key institutions from Sahelian states

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has initiated the process of relocating key institutions out of the breakaway Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which includes Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, following their formal withdrawal from the regional bloc earlier in 2025. The move will almost certainly lead to the further isolation of the junta governments and is likely to lead to greater economic instability in the Sahelian states. These developments will likely continue to foster an environment conducive to the proliferation of extremism within the Sahel, which in the long term is likely to increase the risk of violence spreading to neighbouring nations, such as Togo, Benin and other West African states.

Multiple airport workers’ unions in Nigeria begin indefinite nationwide strike

On 23 April, Nigeria Meteorology Agency (NiMet) workers began an indefinite nationwide strike over poor working conditions, low salaries, and inadequate welfare packages compared to other government agencies. The suspension of meteorological services has resulted in other unions suspending operations, including the Union of Air Transport Employees and the Association of Nigerian Aviation Professions, due to the heightened risk associated with operating without meteorological services. The strikes will almost certainly disrupt flights over the coming days, and potentially weeks, unless a settlement is reached.

Ex-DRC President Joseph Kabila’s party suspended

On 19 April, the DRC’s government announced that Joseph Kabila’s People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), is suspended and that the other leaders’ assets would be seized in connection with acts constituting high treason, with the government accusing Kabila of supporting AFC/M23 rebels amid their ongoing offensive in the eastern DRC.

While Kabila has not yet responded, Ferdinand Kambere, secretary of Kabila’s party, called the suspension a flagrant violation of the constitution. Kabila’s spokesperson, Barbara Nzimbi, announced that she would address the nation in the coming days or hours.

The decision comes after Kabila announced his return to the country after a self-imposed exile in South Africa following significant unrest that forced him to step down in 2019. While his current whereabouts are unconfirmed, he is rumoured to be in the AFC/M23-controlled Goma. There is a realistic possibility that his return to the country will trigger civil unrest in the capital, Kinshasa.

Ugandan security forces use tear gas and live ammunition against protests at Kyambogo University

On 21 April, students protested against a UGX 50,000 (GBP 10) surcharge for late tuition registration implemented by the university administration, as well as the disallowing of students who have not paid at least 70 per cent of their tuition to sit end-of-semester examinations. Security forces fired tear gas and live ammunition into the air to disperse the protesters (which triggered a stampede), and arrested the guild president, Benjamin Akiso, alongside 10 other students. The university responded by citing existing policies.

Public universities in Uganda have faced underfunding in recent years, relying on non-tax revenue, including tuition, to cover operating costs. Other public universities, including Makerere University in Kampala, have raised tuition fees, raising the possibility of more widespread student protests amid likely frustration, which could result in clashes with security forces.

Attacks on prison apparatus continue in France

Alleged members of the Defence of the Rights of French Prisoners (DDPF) group, which in the last weeks staged attacks across multiple detention facilities, carried out a firebombing at the house of a prison officer in Lyon. Moreover, the group published online “bounties” for information on the residences of prison officers.

The recent attacks are almost certainly meant as a response to the government, which has pledged to crack down on the group. While DDPF’s name is likely meant to give the group’s actions a sense of political legitimacy, the group is likely operating with the backing or direct guidance of organised criminal groups. Further attacks, especially following a government crackdown, remain likely. As French criminal gangs are extremely well-armed, future attacks are likely to pose a significant threat to bystanders.

Turkey detains 525 in biggest-ever anti-drugs bust

The raids targeted Ankara only, following a large-scale Europe-wide operation which was led by Europol and arrested around 230 suspects in the Netherlands, Turkey, Spain, Germany, and Belgium. The operation is notable as it targeted individuals at multiple levels of drug-trafficking organisations, including street sellers. Consequently, it is likely meant to cripple drug revenues and logistics in the short term, and there is a realistic possibility that further arrests will be carried out in the short term.

Turkey has emerged as a key drug trafficking hub since 2022-2023, particularly for cocaine and methamphetamine. This has been driven by multiple factors, including the increase in smuggling routes from Russia following the beginning of the war in Ukraine, and the Dutch authorities’ crackdown on smuggling at the port of Rotterdam.

Salafi extremists capitalise on Syrian regime transition, target pro-Assad elements

Syrian sources reported the increase in extrajudicial killings of individuals perceived as being associated with the ousted Assad regime by a group known as Saraya Ansar al Sunnah. The group appears to share an ideology similar to that of the Islamic State (IS) and has pledged to attack the “apostates” who fought IS. This includes not only elements of the pro-Assad forces, but also religious minority communities like Syrian Druzes and Alawites. Notably, the group rejects the interim government as a “nationalist” entity but has refrained from attacking government forces. Consequently, its targeted efforts are likely meant to stoke tensions between Damascus and the communities newly under its control, possibly driving them to arm themselves and increase the overall insecurity in Syria.

Al-Shabaab fight government forces over strategic base as Turkey enhances force posture in Somalia

Militants from the extremist group, al-Shabaab, are fighting Somali government forces over control of the Wargaadhi base in the Middle Shabelle region. Capturing the base would enable al-Shabaab to sever the main supply route between Mogadishu and the Galmudug State, a key area of influence for the al-Qaeda aligned group, and also place it in an improved position to threaten the capital. Somali forces are reportedly struggling to reinforce the base, with most avenues of approach traversing through al-Shabaab-held territory. On 21 April, Turkey deployed an extra 400 troops to the TURKSOM base in Mogadishu, bringing its total contingent of troops in Somalia to approximately 2,500. The deployment is almost certainly linked to Turkey’s recent securing of oil and gas contracts in Somalia and is likely to be followed by further deployments and military assistance to Somalia in response to al-Shabaab’s offensive.

RSF continue attacks on El Fasher and displacement camps in western Sudan

The Rapid Support Forces have continued to indiscriminately shell El Fasher in North Darfur and neighbouring displacement camps, resulting in dozens of casualties. El Fasher is the last remaining stronghold of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the Darfur region and is estimated to house more than one million people. The city is home to tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs), following attacks on displacement camps and rural areas in the region. Attacks have involved the deliberate shelling of residential areas and open markets, likely in a move to likely in a move to depopulate the city and deny humanitarian access and external oversight of their actions. Sustained attacks are almost certain to continue with the RSF siege aimed at dislocating the city and the SAF from resupply or mutual support. 

Kinshasa and AFC/M23 agree to pause fighting in Eastern DRC

On 24 April, the DRC government and Congo River Alliance (AFC), of which M23 is a principal member, announced they would work towards a truce to end the ongoing fighting in Kivu after further Qatar-mediated talks. The statement declared that “both parties reaffirm their commitment to an immediate cessation of hostilities”, seemingly agreeing to a pause in fighting as they work towards a peace deal.

While this marks a significant development in the conflict, at least six ceasefires have been agreed between Kinshasa and M23 since 2021, each one collapsing due to perceived violations. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the agreement constitutes a definitive ceasefire agreement.

Despite the apparent truce agreement, there were reports of clashes between AFC/M23 and the pro-FARDC Wazalendo in a village south of Bukavu on 24 April. Clashes also occurred in Uvira between the FARDC and Wazalendo after the FARDC attempted to dislodge some fighters from strategic positions close to the town.

This reflects both the fragility of ceasefire deals in the DRC as well as the lack of control the FARDC has over the Wazalendo fighters, which could jeopardise agreements made between the government and AFC/M23.

Severe flooding in northern Italy

The northwest region of Piedmont, where Turin is located, had severe flooding following multiple days of heavy rain. According to Italian authorities, the extreme weather event, with 500 mm of rain recorded in 72 hours in some areas near the Alps, is the most severe to strike the region in 30 years. Usually, floods in Piedmont occur during the September-November period, meaning that the recent event is somewhat unusual. Floods in central and northern Italian regions like Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, and Veneto have, in recent years, become more frequent and destructive. Limited traffic and service disruptions are likely to continue, particularly in rural areas in the region’s north, following the floods.

Earthquake strikes close to Istanbul, Turkey in Sea of Amara

On 23 April, a 6.2 magnitude earthquake occurred in the Sea of Amara, with the epicentre approximately only 40km southwest of Istanbul. The earthquake resulted in damage to almost 400 buildings, and almost 400 people were injured, primarily from people attempting to evacuate. At least 180 aftershocks were recorded, including several over magnitude 4. The earthquake’s epicentre was situated along the North Anatolian Fault, a region of significant seismic activity. Experts have long warned that Istanbul is overdue for a major earthquake, potentially exceeding magnitude 7, and recent estimates have indicated that the city is underprepared for a major earthquake, with over 1.5 million buildings in Istanbul at risk of severe structural damage.

Cholera outbreak in Lakes State, South Sudan

The local ministry of health has stated that three counties in Lake State are currently affected by the outbreak, which has killed at least 27 people. South Sudan recently launched a vaccination campaign, reaching approximately 300,000 people in the state. Nevertheless, multiple factors are likely to contribute to spreading cholera. These include the ongoing internal instability plaguing the country; the remoteness of some local communities, which are difficult to reach due to poor infrastructure, and the beginning of the rainy season, which usually lasts from April to November and facilitates the spread of water-borne diseases.

On 22 April, militants opened fire on a popular tourist site in Jammu and Kashmir, killing 26 people and injuring 17, with 25 of the fatalities being Indian nationals. The incident took place in Baisaran Valley, a well-known tourist destination in the Himalayan region often referred to as a mini-Switzerland due to its unspoilt natural scenery. The authorities reported that about 1,000 people were in the area at the time, which has an influx of tourists during the spring season.

The attack has been claimed on social media by the militant group Kashmir Resistance or The Resistance Front (TRF), with the group espousing its hostility to “outsiders” in the region, however, some sources have questioned the authenticity of the post. Following the attack, Indian tourists are urgently attempting to leave Kashmir, with airlines arranging additional flights to meet the demand.

According to Indian sources, the TRF is an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and India has previously accused Pakistan of supporting militant activity in the disputed region.  On 24 April, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh vowed to deliver a “very loud response” to those behind the attack and promised to retaliate against those sitting behind the scenes, without explicitly referring to Islamabad.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi cut short his diplomatic visit to Saudi Arabia to return to India after the attack and also swore to bring justice for those behind the attack. Following the attack, India has closed the border with Pakistan, suspended a water-sharing treaty, downgraded diplomatic ties and has instructed Pakistani nationals in India to leave within 48 hours.

Pakistan has responded by suspending all visas issued to Indian nationals under an exemption scheme, reducing the number of Indian diplomats in Islamabad, asking all Indian military advisers in Pakistan to leave the country, closing its airspace to all Indian airlines and suspending all trade with India. Islamabad also declared that any attempt to stop or divert water will be considered an “act of war”. There have also been reports of skirmishes involving small arms fire along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack was almost certainly designed to deter further Indian and primarily Hindu tourism from the disputed region. The Modi administration has implemented several initiatives to bolster tourism in Jammu and Kashmir following the controversial removal of the region’s special autonomous status in 2019, resulting in huge increases in tourists.

The revocation of the special autonomous status has also allowed the Indian government to implement new domicile laws, which significantly broaden eligibility for residency and land ownership in Jammu and Kashmir, leading to the settlement of non-local populations, particularly Hindus from other parts of India.

The combined effect of these trends has hugely increased tensions and resulted in growing perceptions among local communities of a deliberate effort to alter the region’s demographic and cultural identity, effectively amounting to a process of ‘Hindufication’ championed by the Modi administration. This has resulted in higher levels of militancy and has been heavily condemned by Pakistan, which continues to claim Jammu and Kashmir as its territory.

India has long accused Pakistan of supporting militancy in Jammu and Kashmir, primarily through established groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), which have been associated with numerous attacks on Indian security services, civilians and infrastructure.

The emergence of groups like KRF, which claim to be an entirely local force with no overt ties to Pakistan, could provide Islamabad with greater plausible deniability. This has likely complicated India’s ability to establish direct evidence of Pakistani involvement, although Indian security assessments suggest that the KRF is effectively a rebranded version of LeT and therefore maintains operational ties to Islamabad.

Moreover, Indian reports are claiming that at least three of the assailants were natives of Pakistan and were members of LeT. This claim has almost certainly accounted for the diplomatic fallout.

This was the worst terrorist attack targeting civilians on Indian territory since the 2008 Mumbai attack, with the publicity and success of the attack having the potential to inspire other attacks in both Jammu and Kashmir, and potentially other parts of India. India is almost certain to respond to the attack with a significant escalation in internal security measures and increased operations across Jammu and Kashmir.

This is likely to include a rise in arrests, with 1,500 already recorded, focused security raids, the expansion of checkpoints, heightened surveillance, intensified patrols, restrictions on movement and public gatherings, and the temporary suspension of communications.

Despite the major diplomatic fallout, extreme rhetoric espoused from both sides, and reports of border skirmishes, the risk of an all-out war or major escalation remains low, given that both India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed states with an established history of managing crises below the threshold of a full-scale conflict. However, there is a realistic possibility that sustained exchanges of fire along the Line of Control as of 25 April could provoke a miscalculation and eventual escalation in hostilities.

Outside of Jammu and Kashmir, a well-publicised attack on Indian tourists has the potential to instigate sectarian tensions and violent protests across India. The attack follows recent and controversial changes to the Waqf system, which governs Islamic religious endowments. These changes have sparked widespread protests within India’s Muslim community, with many viewing it as a move by the Modi administration to diminish religious and cultural autonomy, which has increased sectarian tensions.

In Pakistan, protests have erupted over India’s threats, especially regarding the threat to suspend the delivery of water to Pakistan, which is being characterised as “water terrorism”. If India decides to limit the flow of water to Pakistan from the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers, Pakistan’s water security will almost certainly be severely affected. Such a move would threaten Pakistan’s access to drinking water, its ability to generate energy and its agriculture, with approximately 80 per cent of its crops irrigated by the three western rivers.

However, India is highly unlikely to immediately alter the flow of water, partially due to legal restraints under the treaty, which prohibit the unilateral suspension, but primarily due to technical constraints, with changes to water distribution demanding substantial infrastructural developments.

Russia removes Afghan Taliban from list of banned terrorist groups

The Taliban had been on the list for two decades, and Moscow’s shift is likely to open the way for a normalisation of relations between Russia and Afghanistan. Moscow almost certainly considers establishing positive relations with the Taliban as a vital interest in both economic and security terms.

First, despite being extremely underdeveloped, Afghanistan is a crucial node in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly as part of the Wakhan Corridor, which bypasses maritime routes controlled by India. Moreover, the country has vast mineral resources, including vast lithium deposits, valued at up to USD 3 trillion.

In security terms, Moscow almost certainly sees Afghanistan’s stability as key to combating the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which was responsible for the 2024 Crocus Hall attack near Moscow, and continues to seek to expand to both the central Asian states and Russian territory.

Protesters destroy fast food restaurants in Pakistan

During the last reporting period, at least 20 American-owned fast food restaurants were vandalised by attendees of pro-Palestine protests. At least one employee was shot and killed during an attack in Sheikhupura, near Lahore. American-owned businesses, including fast food chains, have been accused of supporting the Israeli war efforts in Gaza and have been targeted in multiple countries where large-scale pro-Palestine protests have been held. It is almost certain that the restart of hostilities in Gaza in late March has significantly increased the threat to Western, and particularly American, personnel and property.

Myanmar’s military junta extends ceasefire to support earthquake relief

The ceasefire, which ended on 22 April, has been extended until 30 April to support humanitarian efforts in the wake of the 7.7 magnitude earthquake which struck northwest of Mandalay on 28 March. The decision comes following the head of the junta, Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Bangkok to meet with regional leaders, who reportedly attempted to persuade him to extend the ceasefire.

Likely, the decision was also influenced by the fact that the earthquake damaged many Tatmadaw-held areas of Mandalay, making them vulnerable to an offensive by insurgent groups in the Mandalay region. Despite the ceasefire agreement, the junta has been accused of numerous violations, most recently conducting airstrikes on Singu Township of Mandalay on 21 April, as well as blocking humanitarian aid to rebel-held areas. Further ceasefire violations will likely occur, despite the decision to extend the agreement.

At least 253 people killed during Songkran celebrations in Thailand in 2025

Songkran celebrations marking the Thai New Year are known locally as the “seven dangerous days”, occurring from 11 to 17 April. According to Thailand’s Road Safety Operation Centre, a total of 253 people were killed and 1,495 injured in road traffic accidents (RTAs) during celebrations this year. Bangkok recorded the most fatalities with 19 deaths, and Phatthalung had the highest number of accidents and injuries. Only six provinces reported zero RTA deaths.

Motorcycles accounted for 84.11 per cent of RTAs, the high rate of which is largely attributed to driving under the influence, speeding, crossing lanes, and inadequate safety wear during a period of elevated traffic levels. Overall, the number of accidents significantly decreased from the same period in 2024, which recorded 480 RTA fatalities.

The decrease is highly likely due to the impact of the 28 March Myanmar earthquake, which also affected Bangkok, causing many tourists to reconsider travel to Thailand.

New Zealand healthcare workers plan strike on 1 May

On 24 April, the members of the Association of Salaried Medical Specialists (ASMS), a union of health sector workers, voted in favour of holding the first general strike since the union was established in 1989. At least 5,500 senior doctors are expected to strike nationwide, with the action motivated by pay disputes. ASMS has demanded a 12 per cent pay rise for hospital specialists, and has cited the government’s approval of only below-inflation wage increases since 2020.

In addition, union officials have accused the government of systemically underfunding and understaffing the healthcare sector, with some hospitals facing precarious operating conditions. The strike is likely to be the highest-profile labour action by healthcare workers in years. On 1 May, there is a high likelihood of limited availability of non-emergency health services at public hospitals across New Zealand.

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