The introduction of a state of emergency in Peru is unlikely to curtail the influence of transnational organised crime groups operating in the country.

Protests are likely in Brazil as the Supreme Court considers charges against former president Jair Bolsonaro. Protests will likely escalate if the indictment phase decides to proceed with the case.

The Kremlin will almost certainly manipulate the limited ceasefire proposal in Ukraine to pressure concessions, and long-range strikes against medical facilities and transport infrastructure will likely increase.

The largest-ever protest in Serbia is almost certainly reflective of widespread public disillusionment with government corruption and will likely continue until a change of government.

There is a realistic possibility that demonstrations provoked by a nightclub fire in North Macedonia will evolve into a wider protest movement against government corruption and a lack of accountability.

The arrest of leading Turkish political opposition figure Imamoglu is almost certain to drive large-scale unrest in Istanbul and other cities. Police will highly likely respond violently, with travellers also at risk of arrest.

The Israeli airstrikes on Gaza have almost certainly ended the ceasefire. The strikes will highly likely be followed by a major ground offensive. Civil unrest in Israel and abroad will almost certainly increase.

The Yemen-based Houthi movement will likely resume attacks against commercial shipping and highly likely continue attacks against US naval vessels and Israeli territory.

There is a realistic possibility that student-led demonstrations over controversial reforms in Indonesia that favour the military could evolve into a wider and potentially violent protest movement.

On 17 March, the Peruvian government declared a state of emergency to combat a recent crime wave, that will cover the capital Lima and the neighbouring province of Callao. The state of emergency was imposed after musician Paul Flores was killed on 16 March after unknown assailants ambushed his band’s tour bus, resulting in nationwide outrage.

The emergency measures will last for 30 days and were announced by President Dina Boluarte who also called for the reintroduction of the death penalty, with Peru currently only sanctioning the death penalty for cases of treason. Under the terms of the state of emergency, the authorities will be granted the right to deploy Peru’s Armed Forces to support the National Police and will have the power to detain people with few limitations, search homes without warrants and deny the freedom of assembly.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The killing of Flores was likely the immediate trigger for the state of emergency but not the underlying justification. There has been a significant increase in killings in Peru, particularly in Lima, many of which have been linked to extortion rackets. This has involved multiple shooting attacks and the use of explosives targeting businesses that refuse to pay extortion demands.

These attacks frequently target establishments with high civilian footfall, such as bus operators and restaurants, as well as offices and private businesses in public areas. As a result, there has been a substantial rise in civilian casualties, further fuelling public anxiety and pressure on the government to take action. Recent police reporting indicates that there were at least 459 killings from 1 January to 16 March and almost 2000 individual cases of extortion in January alone.

Declaring states of emergency has become a routine strategy for the Peruvian government in response to surges in criminal activity or civil unrest. However, previous deployments of the military and the use of expanded powers have only resulted in temporary relief and failed to dismantle organised crime networks or prove to be an effective long-term deterrence.

The rise in crime has been attributed to multiple factors, many of which are unlikely to improve in the near future.  Economic issues, political instability, corruption and weak law enforcement have all been significant contributors to the deteriorating security situation. However, the primary driver has likely been the growing influence of transnational organised crime groups, which view Peru as a crucial hub for their operations.

If crime rates continue to rise at a similar rate, there is a realistic possibility that the Peruvian government will be forced into implementing severe security measures,  similar to those seen in El Salvador and Ecuador. This could involve mass arrests, prolonged military deployments, and the suspension of civil liberties in an attempt to quash the influence of organised crime groups.

On 25 March, the Brazilian Supreme Court will convene to consider charges against former President Jair Bolsonaro for his role in attempting a coup after the 2022 election.  Bolsonaro, who lost to Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, refused to accept the result and left the country before Lula’s inauguration in January 2023. This led to Bolsonaro supporters storming government buildings in an attempted coup. Additional investigations claim to have uncovered plots that indicate Bolsonaro was attempting to assassinate opposition figures and if found guilty, he could face up to 40 years in prison.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Despite the proceedings and allegations, Bolsonaro remains incredibly popular within Brazil. As recently as 16 March, thousands of Bolsonaro supports gathered on Rio de Janeiro’s Copacabana Beach to show support for him and to demand a pardon for supporters of the former president, who were accused of ransacking government buildings days after the inauguration of da Silva.

If the trial goes ahead, thousands of Bolsonaro supporters will likely protest in the vicinity of the courthouse in Brasilia and other protests will likely be organised outside major government buildings in other Brazilian cities. Protests will likely escalate if the indictment phase decides to proceed with the charges. If the case moves ahead to a full trial, it may last months or even years.

A full trial is likely to further polarise Brazilian society and deepen divisions between Bolsonaro supporters and the incumbent government, likely leading to episodic and often violent unrest ahead of the 2026 presidential election. In the long term, if Bolsonaro is convicted, widespread demonstrations across Brazil are likely to take place.

Violent protests in Dominica over series of controversial reforms

On 19 March, protests in Dominica escalated into violence as police clashed with demonstrators opposing three electoral reform bills, the Electoral Commission Bill 2024, the House of Assembly Elections Bill 2024, and the Registration of Electors Bill 2024. Clashes took place when protestors attempted to bypass barriers near Parliament in the capital Roseau, which led to the police firing tear gas and rubber bullets at the protestors. Further protests are likely as the opposition, which has condemned the electoral reform bills, continues to encourage demonstrations.

Nationwide protests in Guatemala over mandatory car insurance law

Nationwide protests erupted on 17 March in Guatemala after the Central American country decided to introduce a new law mandating compulsory car insurance. Protestors blocked several major roads throughout the country and clashed with the police, leading to the deployment of riot police and the use of tear gas.

Protests ended on 19 March, after a decree from President Bernado Arévalo repealed the mandate. However, the government has stated that road traffic accidents are the main cause of death in the country and that things “must change”, potentially signalling the introduction of alternative measures to reduce deaths; however, future attempts to introduce similar legislation are likely to provoke further resistance that may evolve into major demonstrations.

US expels South African ambassador

Ebrahim Rasool was declared persona non grata and has been ordered to leave the country by 21 March. The announcement was posted by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on social media on 14 March, where he accused Rasool of being a “race-baiting politician”.

The development follows an executive order by the White House in early February, which froze assistance funding to South Africa. The current US administration has accused the South African government of discriminating against the country’s white minority.

There is a realistic possibility that the announcement will result in protests and other unrest, including possible vandalism of US-linked assets, in South Africa. Likewise, the US has a large South African diaspora of around 140,000, particularly concentrated in California and Florida, which could drive protests if relations between the two countries continue to worsen.

Canada to boost military presence in the Arctic

Prime Minister Mark Carney has announced plans to strengthen Canada’s military presence in the Arctic, committing CAD 420 million to expand training and deployment for year-round operations. Canada will also partner with Australia to build an early-warning radar system at a cost of CAD 6 billion. The decision likely follows increased geopolitical interest in the Arctic, with China and Russia increasing activity in the region and US President Trump criticising Canada’s defence spending and signalling his interest in acquiring Greenland. However, the investment is unlikely to enable Canada to effectively monitor the vast region. Most importantly, the radar system will be deployed under the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and will improve the US’ early warning of potential airborne threats, a move that has likely been engineered to appease the Trump administration.

MS-13 leader arrested in Mexico and extradited to US

On 17 March, Mexican authorities arrested Francisco Javier Román-Bardales near Veracruz, an alleged Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang leader and one of the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted Fugitives. Bardales was then extradited to the US, where he faces charges related to violent crime, drug distribution and extortion in the Eastern District of New York. The arrest and extradition follow the designation of MS-13 as a foreign terrorist organisation (FTO) by the Trump administration and is likely further proof of the Mexican government responding to the threat of US tariffs by intensifying its operations against organised crime. However, MS-13 has evolved to become a highly decentralised transnational organised crime group, and the arrest is unlikely to disrupt the gang’s operations.

Four Doctors Without Borders vehicles came under fire in Haiti

On 15 March, four Doctors Without Borders vehicles came under fire as they attempted to evacuate staff from the Turgeau Emergency Center in Port-au-Prince. The incident resulted in some minor injuries but no deaths. The incident reportedly occurred despite prior coordination with the authorities. As a result of the incident, the aid group has suspended operations at the hospital for the second time in four months. Gangs control approximately 85 per cent of Port-au-Prince and will highly likely continue to conduct attacks against aid workers, particularly those affiliated with international NGOs, and security forces as they attempt to consolidate and expand their control and dissuade foreign intervention.

Protracted power outages affect millions in Cuba

The outages, which began on 14 March affected the entire island for more than 36 hours, with power only gradually returning to Havana and the east on 16 March. The blackout was the fourth in six months and was reportedly caused by a substation failure. It not only affected electricity but also phone lines and water services. Cuba is undergoing a severe economic crisis, worsened by the US blockade and the protracted effect of the COVID-19 pandemic, which significantly damaged its tourism economy. Power outages, as well as austerity measures implemented by the government, have been drivers of protests in recent months. While demonstrations are rare in Cuba, further large-scale outages are likely to increase resentment towards the government and may increase the long-term risk of civil unrest.

Plane crash off Roatan in Honduras’ Bay Islands

On 18 March, a Lanhsa Airlines plane crashed into the sea off Roatán in Honduras’ Bay Islands, killing 12 people, including the musician Aurelio Martínez Suazo. Five survivors have been reported, and one person remains missing. The incident was caused by the plane skidding off the runway at Juan Manuel Gálvez International Airport (RTB). While rescue efforts are ongoing, adverse weather conditions have complicated search and rescue efforts. An investigation into the crash has been launched by authorities.

On 15 March, an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 protesters gathered in the Serbian capital of Belgrade. The protests marked the largest gathering in the nation’s history and the climax of anti-corruption protests that began in November 2024, after 15 people were killed in Novi Sad after the collapse of a railway station roof.

On 19 March, Serbia’s parliament formally accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Milos Vucevic, triggering a 30-day deadline for the formation of a new government or the calling of a snap election. Vucevic, a major ally of President Aleksandar Vučić and head of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), resigned on 28 January but had delayed his resignation until the formal parliamentary acceptance.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The political situation has become increasingly volatile and polarised, adding extreme pressure on President Vučić to resign. Vučić is likely hoping that the formal resignation of Prime Minister Vucevic will help quell the protests. However, during the recent protests, there was potential video evidence of a “sonic cannon” being used to disperse protestors, rumours that the government enlisted the help of football hooligans in counter-protests and a purported government supporter drove a vehicle into the protestors. These developments not only underline how dangerous the protests are becoming but have almost certainly inflamed tensions and increased mistrust in the government.

The continuation of the protests and their intensification makes it increasingly likely that the only measure that will quell the unrest is the resignation of President Vučić, who has governed Serbia for 14 years and has been widely implicated in both corruption and mismanagement. However, it is unlikely that Vučić will step down soon, especially as the SNS still command a lot of support in Serbia.

Alternatively, Vučić will likely exploit the formal resignation of Vucevic to delay the political crisis further by attempting to form a new government. Additionally, by promising snap elections as early as June, Vučić is likely aiming to buy time and maintain his grip on power, all while avoiding immediate concessions to the growing public unrest.

This strategy is likely to prolong the current cycle of protests in Serbia, with major protests likely being organised in response to any political development that favours Vučić or the SNS. If elections fail to materialise in June, or if they go ahead and the SNS maintains power, it is likely that widespread and potentially violent unrest will erupt throughout Serbia.

On 16 March, at least 59 people aged between 14 and 24 were killed in the North Macedonian city of Kočani after a fire started at a local nightclub. According to the country’s interior minister, the cause of the fire was pyrotechnics. The majority of those killed died as a result of a stampede caused by people trying to exit the club.

Initial investigations suggest that the club was operating without a licence, had only two fire extinguishers, no fire alarm or sprinkler system, was over capacity and had only one effective exit as the back door was locked during the event.

The authorities have now closed multiple nightclubs and entertainment venues after inspections identified many operating without licences and in violation of numerous safety regulations. 15 individuals have also been detained for questioning on suspicion of bribery and corruption.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Protests and vigils have already taken place in response to the nightclub fire, which is being described as the worst fire in North Macedonian history. Initially, these protests have been led by students, with minor clashes between demonstrators and the police observed in Kočani, whereas mainly peaceful vigils have been held in the capital, Skopje.

The government has likely initiated investigations and made arrests in an attempt to control the situation, and has declared a seven-day mourning period. However, as investigations continue to expose safety violations across the country, many likely linked to bribery or corruption, it is likely that these protests will escalate.

The initial student-led protests could evolve into a wider movement, similar to the anti-corruption demonstrations seen in neighbouring Serbia, where public frustration at government malpractice and corruption has led to mass protests. Once the mourning period concludes, public anger over both the fire and the broader systemic issues will likely fuel larger-scale protests, which may result in widespread disruption and violent interactions with the police.

On 18 March, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke via a telephone call for over two hours, during which Trump attempted to persuade Putin of a full and immediate 30-day ceasefire in the Ukraine war. This was rejected by Putin, who reportedly set a list of preconditions for the US proposal, primarily the cessation of US military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine.

Trump subsequently proposed a limited 30-day ceasefire on all “energy and infrastructure”, which Putin agreed to. On 19 March, Trump spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Kyiv agreed to a limited ceasefire applying to all energy, infrastructure and civilian targets.

The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) claims that following the Trump-Putin call, they executed an order to halt long-range strikes against Ukrainian “energy infrastructure facilities” and intercepted their airborne one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs), which has been disputed by Zelensky. In contrast, the Russian MoD claims that Ukrainian OWA-UAVs hit an oil transshipment facility in Krasnodar Krai and Ukraine is therefore violating the limited ceasefire.

Waves of Russian long-range strikes against civilian targets continued, including strikes against railway infrastructure in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Ukrainian long-range strikes also continued, including a successful OWA-UAV swarm attack against the Engels-2 strategic bomber airbase in Saratov Oblast, Russia. Early on 21 March, the Sudzha gas pumping station in Kursk Oblast was attacked. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed Russian forces shelled the energy infrastructure facility themselves, while the Russian military claimed that Ukraine was responsible and had therefore violated the limited ceasefire.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The days following the agreed limited 30-day ceasefire have been marked by confusion, contradictory statements and several accusations of violations. This is highly likely intended by Moscow, who are highly likely deploying reflexive control to exploit the ceasefire proposal, manipulate the narrative and gain concessions to further its goals without making any concessions of their own. By demanding preconditions, Putin has de facto rejected the Trump proposal for a full and immediate ceasefire that can act as a precursor to peace negotiations. It is almost certain that the Kremlin will attempt to manipulate as far as possible a narrative of the limited ceasefire to influence the Trump administration into renewing the cessation of US military aid and intelligence sharing.

The Trump administration is likely incentivised to end attacks on critical national infrastructure (CNI) in both Ukraine and Russia, with global oil prices already having slightly decreased following the limited 30-day ceasefire announcement. Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy facilities have intensified in the past months, likely intended to both demonstrate strength to the Trump administration and capability to continue engaging Russia in a longer-term war with operations against strategic targets.

Although Russian forces have considerably more vast long-range strike capabilities than Ukrainian forces, Kyiv has leveraged its rapidly developing domestic advanced drone manufacturing capabilities to asymmetrically compete in the aerial domain.  The Kremlin does therefore likely have a notable incentive for a ceasefire against CNI strikes. However, Moscow is also almost certainly incentivised to continue the depletion of Ukrainian interceptor munition stockpiles and will highly likely continue layered large-scale long-range strikes against urban centres in Ukraine. A reduction in Russian attacks targeting energy infrastructure will likely result in an increase in the targeting of other high-value targets (HVTs), including medical facilities, transportation infrastructure and potentially indiscriminate attacks on major towns and cities.

On the morning of 19 March, the Mayor of Istanbul and head of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), Ekrem Imamoglu, was arrested on suspicion of being the head of a “criminal organisation” as well as aiding the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The day before, the University of Istanbul had annulled Imamoglu’s degree, citing irregularities with his transfer from another university during his studies.

Authorities also reported that “100” other suspects had been arrested alongside Imamoglu, including prominent journalists. In addition to restrictions on protests in Istanbul, confirmed reports indicate the imposition of widespread internet restrictions, limiting access to platforms including X, YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok. Significant protests have been recorded following the arrest in Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara, as well as other urban centres. Authorities have responded violently, with multiple arrests carried out by the police. At least 37 individuals were arrested for their posts on social media by 20 March. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

Imamoglu’s arrest is almost certainly politically motivated. First, the timing of the arrest is notable. CHP was scheduled to hold its candidate selection process on 23 March, and Imamoglu was largely expected to emerge as the party’s official candidate at the event before being stripped of his university degree (as only graduates can become president in Turkey) and arrested.

Second, the rapid and coordinated approach by Turkey’s police and by pro-Erdogan political figures highly likely illustrates how the government had carried out prior assessments of the arrest’s impact. The almost immediate identification and arrest of 37 individuals for social media posts almost certainly demonstrates this high level of preparation.

Third, the profile of those arrested, which not only included Imamoglu and his associates but also prominent journalists and online personalities, likely indicates an aim to cripple the opposition beyond the CHP leadership.

It is likely that Ankara’s decision to arrest Imamoglu reflects an improving outlook for President Erdogan. The removal of Assad in Syria has been an important victory for Turkey and made Ankara the key link in communications between the new regime in Damascus and Brussels. Moreover, the recent PKK calls for a ceasefire have diminished, at least for the moment, the political threat from the Kurdish militants.

The arrests will likely be followed by political moves to secure Erdogan’s next term. While Erdogan technically cannot run for president again, his allies have long aimed to pass a constitutional amendment to change this or have raised the possibility of calling early elections to bypass the term limit. There is a realistic possibility that the arrests are meant to proactively damage the opposition, making it unable to mount a coherent challenge to these further reform proposals once they are more clearly formulated.

It is highly likely that protests will continue and intensify on 21-23 March. Police are likely to respond extremely harshly, focusing on protest hotspots like Istanbul University and Taksim Square. There is a realistic possibility of short-term internet limitations in the coming weeks. Turkish police have at times also targeted foreigners, and there is a realistic possibility of a greater threat of arrest and violence to travellers. Finally, if the disorders persist there is a realistic possibility that transnational terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) will seek to capitalise on them by staging attacks. In this sense, it is notable that IS carried out a series of deadly attacks in Turkey in 2017, just months after the July 2016 failed coup.

On 18 March, the ceasefire between Israel and the various Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip collapsed, after Tel Aviv launched a wave of surprise airstrikes.The strikes killed more than 400 people, with Hamas-linked channels stating that most of the victims were civilians. Further airstrikes have continued on 19, 20 and 21 March, and have killed an additional 100 people, making the latest wave of strikes the deadliest since late 2023.

The strikes killed Mahmoud Abu Watfa, the head of Hamas’ interior ministry. Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) units have also begun ground operations in Gaza, seeking to expand the Netzarim corridor in the centre of the Gaza Strip. The IDF’s 252^nd Division has advanced down from Gaza’s northern border towards Beit Lahiya.

Israeli officials have issued evacuation orders for Gaza’s border areas, and have declared the Salah al-Din road, the main roadway connecting south and central Gaza, closed. Hamas reportedly fired at least three rockets into Israel, but these were either intercepted or landed in empty areas near the Gazan border. Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz has called on Hamas to release all the remaining hostages, threatening to annex parts of the Gaza Strip in case of non-compliance.

The strikes in Gaza coincided with important political developments in Israel. On 19 March, Itamar Ben Gvir, the head of the far-right Otzma Yehudit party, returned to his cabinet position. On 20 March, the Israeli Knesset passed the first budget framework vote. Moreover, the Knesset also voted in favour of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s call to remove Ronen Bar, the head of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), from his post. Protests were recorded in West Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and other Israeli urban centres.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The latest Israeli strikes have almost certainly ended the ceasefire process. The stated Israeli goal for resuming the war is that the killing of senior Hamas figures will force the group to release the remaining hostages, and possibly dissolve as a political and military entity. It is however more likely that it reflects both the Netanyahu administration’s need to appease the hawkish figures in its coalition to survive the budget vote and remove the head of ISA, who is an important political opponent and is in charge of investigating some of Netanyahu’s closest aides for alleged national security breaches.

It is highly likely that the strikes will be followed by a ground operation targeting Gaza’s urban centres. Current advances suggest that Israeli forces will focus on the area north of the Netzarim corridor, at least in the short term. Hamas and other groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have almost certainly capitalised on the ceasefire to replenish some of their ranks and re-infiltrate previously cleared areas.

However, with the flow of weapons from Egypt largely interrupted by the Israeli presence in the Philadelphi Corridor, it is unlikely that these groups have been able to significantly replenish their stocks of rockets or missiles. The firing of only three rockets in response to the Israeli strikes likely reflects these limitations.

IDF advances in Gaza, airstrikes, and engagements with Palestinian militias are almost certain to result in a significant short-term degradation of Gaza’s already severe humanitarian situation.

The restart of the war is almost certain to result in civil unrest and political violence abroad. In Israel, there is a high likelihood of protests in the 21-23 March period and beyond. Moreover, both organised and lone-wolf terror attacks are likely to continue, especially in Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. Protests are also almost certain to occur in large European and North American cities. Likewise, there is a realistic possibility that the renewed hostilities will drive lone-wolf attacks in the West, particularly around the major Christian and Jewish holidays in April.

Over several consecutive days starting 15 March, United States Central Command (US CENTCOM) forces conducted long-range strikes against targets across Houthi-controlled Yemen. Strikes targeted Houthi assets in the cities of Sanaa and Sa’dah, and in the provinces of al-Bayda, Hajjah and Dhamar. Targets have included radar systems, air defence systems, uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) launch sites, and command and control (C2) centres assessed to be housing senior Houthi leadership.

Washington claims that multiple Houthi “leaders” were killed, and funerals were held for 16 Houthi officers including a colonel, two majors and two captains. The Houthi-controlled Health Ministry stated that at least 53 people were killed and 98 wounded in the strikes so far.

In response, the Houthis conducted layered attacks against the USS HARRY S. TRUMAN carrier strike group (CSG) over five consecutive days, using anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and one-way attack UAVs (OWA-UAVs).

Following last week’s ultimatum issued by the Houthis that strikes against Israel and Israeli-linked commercial vessels would resume if the flow of aid did not resume in Gaza, the ceasefire has de facto collapsed with the renewal of significant Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations.

The Houthis subsequently launched claimed “Palestine 2” hypersonic ballistic missiles against Israel on 18 and 20 March, targeting Nevatim air base in southern Israel and Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Internation Airport (TLV) respectively. Both missile attacks were reportedly intercepted outside Israeli airspace with the Arrow missile defence system.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is likely that as the Trump administration escalates a military campaign against the Houthi movement and the IDF resumes large-scale operations in Gaza, the Houthis will resume attacks against commercial shipping transiting the Red Sea and highly likely continue attacks against US naval vessels and Israeli territory.

The 19 January 2025 Gaza ceasefire led to Houthis announcing a halt in the campaign against all but Israeli-flagged vessels and vessels wholly owned by Israeli individuals or entities. However, the Houthis had not conducted an attack against commercial shipping since 19 December 2024, likely conditioned by the degradation of Houthi launch capabilities by US-led coalition efforts and the depletion of Houthi weapon stockpiles. 

The Houthis have likely used the months since to replenish stockpiles and construct new launch sites. Advanced Houthi weapon systems are almost certainly heavily reliant on Iranian supply, although it is likely that systems such as uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), whether they be improvised skiff designs or the purpose-built Toofan-series, are domestically assembled in workshops using Iranian-derived components. It is likely that Tehran has devoted considerable resources to resupplying the Houthis, who have gained even greater strategic importance for Iran following the severe degradation of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria.

Tehran, however, almost certainly exercises far less control and influence over the Houthis than it does other Iranian-backed proxy forces such as the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMFs) or Lebanese Hezbollah. Iranian officials have reportedly attempted to pressure the Houthis to reduce tensions with the US and Israel, with Houthi leadership rejecting these requests.

US President Donald Trump has threatened Iran with “dire” consequences if Houthi attacks continue. It is highly likely that the Iranian regime is in its most vulnerable geostrategic position in decades, and Tehran is highly likely inclined to avoid escalation.

However, the Houthis likely rely on the domestic support afforded by external conflict despite their failures to provide effective governance, with large-scale demonstrations against the US and Israel in support of the Houthis occurring in both Sanaa and Sa’dah this past week.

Pro-Palestine protests are highly likely to occur across Europe following latest Israeli strikes

Pro-Palestine protests are likely to be organised in major European cities like Paris, London, Amsterdam, Berlin, and Barcelona on the weekend of 21-23 March, following smaller gatherings throughout the week. The unrest would follow the 17-18 strikes on the Gaza Strip by Israeli forces, which have been the deadliest in more than a year and have collapsed the ceasefire (see main piece in EMEA section), as well as broader developments such as the arrest of a US-based pro-Palestine activist. These protests could become violent with little warning, and result in localised travel and services disruptions.

Protests triggered after Hungary bans pride parade

The Hungarian parliament has fast-tracked legislation that has led to the ban on the annual Pride parade, a move that has triggered protests in central Budapest and resulted in the ignition of smoke bombs within the parliament building. The law was proposed by Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party on 17 March and signed into effect by the Hungarian president on 19 March, under the justification that the annual parade violates the country’s strict child protection laws. The new law will allow authorities to use facial recognition technology to identify and fine participants. However, it is likely that thousands will still attempt to hold a parade on 28 June, to mark the 30^th anniversary of the Budapest Pride March, which will likely provoke a violent crackdown from the authorities.  

Greek government workers set to strike on 21 March

Union workers in Greece have called for a 24-hour strike to commence on 21 March to demand improved working conditions and long-term contracts for employees for those working in social services. The rally will take place in central Athens outside of government buildings and is likely to result in transport disruptions. Police presence is expected to be high after recent protests on the two-year anniversary of the Tempi train crash that provoked multiple violent interactions with the police, leading to multiple arrests and injuries.  

Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas leave Francophonie (OIF)

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger officials announced the decision on 18 March. The OIF is a cultural and political organisation that promotes the French language and includes numerous French colonies. OIF had suspended the three juntas following their coups. The move is almost certainly a further political signal of the decoupling of the AES members from the West.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to withdraw from Ottawa Convention.

The three Baltic nations and Poland have announced their intent to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention, an international treaty that bans anti-personnel mines, citing security concerns over a resurgent Russian military threat. The decision is likely to be emulated by other nations, such as Finland, and is also likely a precursor for a broader shift in regional defence policies that will result in the acquisition of new defence capabilities. The decision follows Poland’s recent statement that it will build a half-million-man army and is looking at staging US nuclear weapons within its borders to serve as a deterrent to Moscow.

Clashes in Syria at Lebanon border and in Kurdish-controlled northeast

Armed clashes erupted at the Lebanon-Syria border on 16 March following accusations by the Syrian interim government that Hezbollah had kidnapped and killed three Syrian soldiers on Lebanese soil. Syrian forces shelled Lebanese border territory, reportedly killing seven Lebanese civilians and injuring 57 others, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployed to counter the threat.

A ceasefire agreement was reached on 18 March between Beirut and Damascus, with stipulations to enhance coordination and cooperation. Due to Hezbollah’s support for the overthrown Assad regime, it is highly likely that tensions will remain high at the border, with the Beqaa Valley being a Hezbollah stronghold.

Clashes also continued in northeast Syria, controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), between the SDF and Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The SDF allege that Turkish-led forces committed a massacre in the village of Barkh Botan overnight on 16 March, and carried out a series of retaliatory strikes.

Burkina Faso forces accused of massacre of ethnic minority groups

On 14 March, Human Rights Watch reported on a massacre of dozens of people, mostly women and children, in the western town of Solenzo, which occurred on 10-11 March. According to the humanitarian group, the victims of the massacre were Fulani/Peul people, who are often blamed as supporters of Islamist groups like the Islamic State (IS) or Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM). Government officials called the report “disinformation” and stated they had engaged fighters, although footage from the town may disproves this.

On 18 March, Burkinabe opposition channels reported that a member of an anti-government civil society group who had reported on the massacres was “kidnapped” in Saaba, near Ouagadogou. Burkinabe forces are almost certainly unable to deal with the growing Islamist insurgency, and their attacks on Fulani communities likely represent retaliatory violence on groups that Ouagadogou considers to be vital to IS and JNIM’s bases. It is highly likely that these attacks play in the hands of the two groups.

JNIM does not exploit ethnic divisions in the Sahel, and they are almost certain to capitalise on government brutality to increase their recruitment and propaganda operations. JNIM, for instance, pledged to send “humanitarian aid” to the survivors of the massacre in Solenzo, and swore to carry out revenge attacks on the government.

State of emergency declared in Nigeria’s Rivers State

On 18 March, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu declared a state of emergency in Rivers State, suspending the governor, deputy, and lawmakers, citing their failure to curb recent pipeline vandalism by militants. The move allows the federal government to assume direct control of the state government, with a retired vice admiral appointed as caretaker for an initial six-month period.

Pipelines and other infrastructure are often targeted by militants in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, disrupting both the production and shipment of oil, Nigeria’s most important export. While the state of emergency may enable the federal government to stabilise the region and curb attacks, there is a realistic possibility that the move will be interpreted as a federal overreach, which would likely deepen tensions and potentially provoke civil unrest.

Sudanese government forces recapture presidential palace

On 21 March, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) announced that they recaptured the presidential palace in Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This will almost certainly be perceived as a major symbolic victory in the battle for the capital and central Sudan.

There have been mass reports of the RSF indiscriminately killing civilians in Khartoum, a trend that is likely to continue as the paramilitary forces conduct a fighting withdrawal from the capital, targeting anyone it deems to be in support of the SAF. Moreover, the RSF still maintains control over most of the Darfur region and the gradual loss of the capital may provoke more war crimes targeting government supporters and ethnic groups in the region in retaliatory attacks.

Al-Shabab target presidential convoy in Somali capital

On 18 March, a roadside improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated near Somalia’s presidential palace in an attack targeting President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy. The president was unharmed, and the attack was quickly claimed by the al-Qeada-aligned Islamist group, al-Shabab. The attack occurred just after the president’s convoy left the palace en route to the airport, ahead of his planned visit to Middle Shabelle to oversee military operations against the group.

On 19 March, al-Shabab militants fired mortars into the Halane compound near Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu, one of the most heavily secured zones in Somalia that houses the United Nations, African Union officials, and multiple foreign embassies. The twin attacks clearly demonstrate al-Shabab’s ability to conduct attacks in the most secure parts of the country and have likely been ordered in response to government attempts to launch an offensive against the group in other parts of the country.

M23 rebels capture major town in eastern DRC and reject ceasefire talks

On 20 March, the M23 rebel group announced that they had captured the strategic town of Walikale in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which lies on both the N3 and R29 main supply routes, as well as the Lowa River. M23 have rejected government calls for a ceasefire and have reiterated their motivations to march towards the capital Kinshasha. The fall of Walikale now puts the rebels within 400km of Kisangani, the DRC’s fourth largest city and major port and the farthest navigable point upstream of the capital Kinshasa on the River Congo. Its fall may have also dislocated government forces from major supply routes and restricted their ability to mutually reinforce other units, a development that is likely to place increased pressure on Kinshasa to push for ceasefire talks.

Fire at electrical substation shuts down UK’s and Europe’s busiest airport

On 21 March, Heathrow Airport was closed due to a massive fire at a nearby electrical substation, causing a significant power outage and disrupting flight schedules globally. The fire, which also destroyed the backup power system, led to flight diversions, cancellations, and widespread chaos, with over 120 flights rerouted to other airports. As a result, at least 1,300 flights were affected, and thousands of passengers were stranded or redirected, impacting global flight networks. Assessments indicate that the airport will remain closed until midnight, and experts warn of continued disruptions and significant delays as airlines scramble to reconfigure schedules.

Severe floods in Tuscany cause EUR 100 million in damages

Flooding was reported in multiple towns in the central Italian region starting on 14 March, following heavy rains which, in some towns, exceeded a volume of more than 250mm in 72 hours. Florence, Pisa, Prato, and Livorno have been affected by the floods, and severe travel disruptions were recorded in the region between 14 and 17 March.

Parts of the region that were flooded had been also severely affected by the 2023 floods. The neighbouring Emilia Romagna region, which had three severe floods in the last two years, was less affected. Central-west Italy, from northern Lazio to the Po Valley, has a high risk of flooding. This is likely in part due to changing weather patterns, which can, as in the case of past floods in Emilia Romagna, “trap” weather systems under the Alps, resulting in long periods of heavy rain.

5.5 magnitude earthquake strikes Ethiopia close to capital

A moderately strong earthquake registering 5.5 magnitude on the Richter scale struck Ethiopia on 16 March, with the epicentre less than 200km from Addis Ababa, in the Afar region. Minor tremors were felt in the capital and in several other towns.

The quake is part of the ongoing seismo-volcanic crisis that is affecting the Dofen volcano region since December 2024, which have resulted in thousands of evacuations.  Concerns have been raised over the structural integrity of the Kesem Dam, which is only designed to withstand earthquakes up to 5.6 on the Richter scale.

Experts have warned that the ongoing series of quakes could result in a structural failure, resulting in catastrophic flooding that is likely to affect hundreds of thousands of people. Alerts have also been issued warning of aftershocks, that may occur weeks after the initial quake and are sometimes equal or larger in magnitude.

Large acid spill from Chinese-operated mine “kills” Zambian river

During this reporting period, local Zambian and international sources published reports on a large spill of acid waste into the Kafue River, which occurred in February. The spill reportedly started after a dam, which contained massive quantities of acid waste originating from a copper mine in Kitwe, in the country’s north, broke. Signs of contamination were recorded up to 100 kilometres downstream from the leak.

Zambia’s economy has historically been heavily reliant on copper exports from its northern Copper Belt, and, in recent years, China has increasingly played a vital role in controlling national extraction operations, including the Sino-Metals Leach Zambia mine, where the leak started.

The Kafue runs through Zambia, and around 60 per cent of the country’s population lives on or near its banks. The river also supplies drinking water to around 5 million people, water for irrigation and industry, and is a key source of food.

On 20 March, the Indonesian parliament ratified changes to its military law that will allocate more civilian posts within the government for military officers. The proposed changes would expand the number of government agencies where military officers can serve from 10 to 16, including the Supreme Court, the national disaster agency, and the Attorney General’s Office. The changes have been condemned by many activists and civil society groups within Indonesia, citing fears that the world’s third largest democracy is slowly returning to its “New Order” era under President Suharto, which was effectively a military dictatorship characterised by human rights abuses, repression and the mass killing of government opponents.

The legislative changes have provoked student-led protests outside of the Indonesian parliament. The government has defended the changes, stating that geopolitical and technological changes have warranted the amendments.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The changes have almost certainly provoked fears that incumbent President Prabowo Subianto, an ex-special forces general and former Suharto son-in-law, is attempting to reform the Indonesian government in favour of the military and to consolidate his power. The revisions will also enable the military to assume posts within the government without first retiring or resigning from the military. This will likely ensure that the armed forces maintain direct influence over civilian governance, increase its role in policy making and weaken Indonesia’s democratic institutions. Many will also likely see this as the nascent steps towards an authoritarian role under Subianto, especially given his past military ties and connections to Suharto, who is widely considered a dictator.

Attempts to reverse a constitutional court ruling in August 2024 resulted in tens of thousands of protestors amassing in Jakarta and proposed economic reforms in February 2025 triggered student-led protests across the archipelagic nation, including in Jakarta, Medan, Makassar and Yogyakarta. These protests are likely indicative of a broader disillusionment with the Subianto administration, whose militarisation of government and authoritarian-style reforms are increasingly viewed as a threat to democratic freedoms.

The student-led protests that have emerged in response to the current amendments are likely reflective of growing discontent with the Subianto administration and there is a realistic possibility that as the protests gain traction, they will attract a wider segment of society, including labour unions, civil society groups, political activists, etc. and could spread to other parts of the country. If major protests are organised, there is a high likelihood of violent clashes, with the potential deployment of riot police, mass arrests, and the use of tear gas to disperse crowds. These measures could further escalate tensions, leading to widespread disruption and potentially more intense confrontations between demonstrators and security forces.

Second hearing to start against impeached South Korean president

On March 24, the second hearing in the criminal case against impeached South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol will take place over his short-lived martial law declaration. Yoon, the first sitting president to be indicted for criminal charges, faces allegations of insurrection, a charge for which a president has no immunity. The case has divided South Korea, resulting in multiple protests both in support and against Yoon, with major developments in the case likely to spark further demonstrations. The police are expected to deploy 14,000 riot police officers and anti-drone equipment and will lock down the areas near the Constitutional Court during the hearing.

Baloch separatists continue to target Pakistani government forces

On 16 March the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched a suicide attack in Noshki, Balochistan, targeting a Pakistani Army convoy. A vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) destroyed a military bus, followed by a coordinated assault by the BLA’s Fateh Squad, resulting in claims that 90 Pakistani soldiers were killed according to the BLA, while the government reported a lower death toll of five.

The attack likely marks a shift in the BLA’s tactics, combining suicide bombings with direct engagement, and is another example of the BLA moving away from sporadic violence to well-coordinated military engagements, often targeting government forces when in transit. This latest attack follows the hijacking of the Jaffar Express, further showcasing the BLA’s growing operational sophistication and orchestration of attacks likely designed to increase publicity and bolster recruitment.

Communal clashes in Nagpur, India

On 17 March, communal tensions escalated into violent protests in the Mahal area of Nagpur city with demonstrators setting vehicles alight and throwing stones. The events escalated when two Hindu groups, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal, burned an effigy of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, a devout Muslim accused of razing Hindu temples, calling for his tomb to be removed. Rumours that a copy of the Quran had been desecrated sparked approximately 250 Muslims to start a counter-demonstration which spiralled into clashes. At least 50 people were detained, 33 police officers were injured, and 32 vehicles set on fire.

In response to the communal violence, authorities imposed a curfew in parts of Maharashtra. Tensions have been high in recent weeks due to the release of the Bollywood film “Chhaava”, which depicts the life of the Maratha ruler Chhatrapati Sambhaji Maharaj, who resisted Aurangzeb but was captured, tortured, and executed. The depiction of Aurangzeb as a tyrant has reinforced an anti-Muslim narrative among the Hindu community. Further clashes are likely.

Severe rainfall leads to mass evacuations and disruptions in southern Malaysia

Heavy rainfall across the Malay Peninsula has caused widespread flooding, particularly in Johor State, where approximately 15,000 people have been evacuated and relocated to temporary shelters. Major disruption has occurred, with key roads submerged in areas such as Tebrau, Pandan, Larkin, and Skudai. The disruption has resulted in major congestion at the Woodlands and Tuas checkpoints between Malaysia and Singapore, forcing the Singaporean authorities to issue an alert suggesting to avoid all non-essential cross-border travel.

The floods have forced the closure of schools and businesses, and dangerously high river levels have been reported. Forecasted continued heavy rainfall over the next 72 hours will likely result in further flooding, evacuations, landslides, and major transport disruptions. Less severe flooding has also been reported in the Malaysian provinces of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo.

Bushfire warnings following extreme heat in Australia’s east coast

New South Wales locations, including Sydney, recorded temperatures of above 39 degrees Celsius starting on 15 March. Similarly high temperatures were also recorded in Victoria state, where at least one house was destroyed by a bushfire near Melbourne. In addition to the extremely high temperatures, low levels of humidity and windy conditions are likely to create a protracted threat of wildfires in the short term. These conditions are notable in March, which is in Australia’s autumn and past the hottest season of December-February. On average, cities like Sydney have maximum daily temperatures between 23 and 27 degrees.

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