The arrest of a Green Card holder for his partaking in pro-Palestine protests is highly likely to drive demonstrations at US universities.

The ELN’s threat of “total war” is almost certainly a further indication of a deteriorating security environment in Colombia and could suggest that violence will migrate to other parts of the country.

There is a realistic possibility that President Noboa’s “strategic alliance” with a US private military company will escalate violence in Ecuador, which has become the homicide capital of Latin America.

Russia will likely attempt to leverage the US ceasefire proposal with Ukraine to gain concessions, while the Kursk salient is highly likely to be imminently lost by Ukrainian forces.

The rejection of Calin Georgescu’s candidacy for the Romanian presidential elections is almost certainly going to cause unrest in the country. Moscow is likely to intensify hybrid operations in Romania to exploit the crisis.

Sectarian violence in Syria likely represents a critical failure in the HTS-led transitional government’s ability to control its allied militias and armed forces and will likely be exploited by both Israel and Iran.

There is a realistic possibility of a return to civil war in South Sudan, with tensions likely at their highest since the 2018 peace agreement. Renewed conflict would highly likely involve fighting in Juba.

There is a realistic possibility that the recent hostilities in the Tigray region of Ethiopia will result in greatly increased tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, threatening the start of an interstate conflict.

The BLA’s high-profile hijacking of a train in Pakistan carrying government troops has almost certainly undermined the central government and will likely force it to increase operations in Balochistan.

Twin Ramadan attacks in Thailand’s Deep South are likely to force the government into reassessing its strategy and result in increased counter-insurgency measures that may escalate tensions.

One of the key figures in Columbia University’s post-October 7 pro-Palestine protests was arrested on 9 February by US immigration agents, who said they were acting on State Department orders reflecting a presidential executive order against anti-Semitism.

Mahmoud Khalil is a permanent US resident, a Green Card holder, and does not face any criminal charges. Federal authorities are seeking to deport Khalil, who is currently held at a detention facility in Louisiana. A federal judge temporarily blocked the deportation proceedings on 10 February.

On 13 February, a progressive Jewish group staffed a peaceful sit-in at Trump Tower in Manhattan against the deportation proceedings. Police reported around 100 arrests following the demonstration.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The case is extremely high-profile and high-visibility due to the major protests in the United States and the central role Columbia has played in them.

Moreover, the political relevance of the case is increased by how unusual it is, as Green Card holders are seldom deported in the absence of a criminal charge and instead on the basis of a foreign policy provision – with the State Department stating that the deportation order is based on a “reasonable ground to believe that [Khalil’s] presence or activities in the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States”.

It is highly likely that the case will be a major driver of protests in the short term, particularly in cities that have large university campuses and that have had pro-Palestine demonstrations.

The final decision on the case is likely to be extremely consequential, as it may either halt or, conversely, accelerate the Trump administration’s stated efforts to target high-profile figures of the pro-Palestine protest movement.

Senior leaders within the leftist guerilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), have warned that Colombia is heading towards “total war”, claiming that President Petro’s “total peace” plan has exacerbated conflict and have vowed to resist the government’s counteroffensive. ELN comments follow the government’s deployment of 10,000 troops to the Catatumbo border region and a recent statement made by Colombia’s newly appointed Defence Minister, who has vowed to reclaim territory lost to rebel groups.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Colombia is currently experiencing its worst levels of violence since the 2016 ceasefire agreement and eventual disbandment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However, rival groups like the ELN have filled the power vacuum left by FARC, especially in rural and border areas, and have secured profitable drug trafficking routes. The ELN’s sustained resistance to the peace process and recent offensives have resulted in tens of thousands being displaced, almost 100 civilian deaths, the imposition of armed strikes and a deterioration in the humanitarian situation in rural and border areas.

Government attempts to dislodge the ELN from rural areas are likely to face multiple setbacks. The ELN remains heavily entrenched, controls strategic and hard-to-access rural areas, is afforded support from the local community, is well-funded, well-armed and purportedly supported to some degree by Venezuela.

Moreover, the ELN has a considerable presence throughout much of Colombia and can conduct its concept of “total war” on multiple fronts. Should the ELN suffer setbacks in the northeast, there is a high likelihood that it will escalate attacks on the government, police, military and even the civilian population across Colombia as part of its doctrine of “total war”.

The group is known for its expertise in asymmetric warfare, often using bombings, ambushes, hit-and-run tactics and increasingly, drones to target security forces, government installations and infrastructure. These attacks can often result in high levels of collateral damage, and the ELN has demonstrated its ability to strike high-value targets in Bogota and other major cities.

Kidnapping for ransom is another key tactic of the ELN, and there is a realistic possibility that the deployment of this tactic will increase in order to help the guerilla group sustain its operations against the government.   

Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa has announced that his administration is seeking to establish a strategic alliance with Erik Prince, the founder of the controversial US private military company (PMC) Blackwater, which now goes by the name Constellis.

The specifics of the alliance have yet to be disclosed; however, it is widely believed that its aim will be to combat organised crime, which has led to Ecuador becoming one of the most dangerous countries in Latin America.

Noboa has also stated that Ecuador will soon receive international assistance in the form of “special forces abroad.” However, he has not clarified where they will come from or under what legal framework they will operate. The move to enlist security assistance from abroad has been condemned by some within Ecuador’s security apparatus.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Enlisting the help of a foreign PMC, especially one implicated in human rights abuses, is likely to provoke both public and political backlash, with many interpreting it as an erosion of Ecuadorian sovereignty and a move that could undermine the authority of Ecuador’s military and law enforcement.

However, President Noboa likely feels that the decision to turn to PMCs is one of his few remaining options. Noboa has introduced multiple draconian measures to counter organised crime, emulating many of the policies of President Bukele in El Salvador. This has involved the imposition of strict curfews and states of emergency, increasing military deployments, expanding the powers of the armed forces, increasing surveillance and raiding prisons to dismantle the leadership of organised crime groups.

However, Noboa has failed to achieve the same levels of success as witnessed in El Salvador. Ecuador now has the highest homicide rate in Latin America, assessed at 38.8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

Noboa has likely underestimated the strength of the gangs and cartels that operate within Ecuador, which has become a “superhighway” for Peruvian and Colombian cocaine. The strategic significance of Ecuador has resulted in foreign organised crime groups arming and financing local gangs, which are often better equipped and more heavily armed than the country’s security forces.

The extent of foreign PMCs’ involvement has not been disclosed and may range from non-combat operations, such as training, to direct action. However, there is a high likelihood that the involvement of foreign PMCs will escalate violence, which has been observed before in countries like Iraq, Nigeria and Mozambique.

Criminal groups may respond with more violence to what they perceive to be foreign intervention, escalating attacks on the security forces, the government and even the civilian population. Furthermore, PMCs’ aggressive and often unregulated tactics are likely to provoke retaliatory violence from Ecuador’s criminal organisations.    

Canada’s new PM almost certain to prioritise trade war with Washington

Mark Carney is to take office as the next prime minister of Canada on 14 March. Carney won his bid to succeed Justin Trudeau, who resigned due to record-low polling numbers, at the Liberal Party’s primaries that ended on 9 March. Carney has stated that his first priority will be to “win” the trade war with the United States. Despite the Liberal Party falling behind the opposition Conservative Party in recent polls and its heading to anticipated elections from a position of weakness, Carney enters office with significant bipartisan consensus to address Washington’s economic threats. It is thus highly unlikely that the inauguration will result in notable civil unrest.

Opposition wins elections in Greenland

The centre-right Democratic Party won around 30 per cent of the vote and will now almost certainly lead coalition talks. The elections had been called by the previous government, led by the Inuit Ataqatigiit party, as a reaction to Washington’s interest in gaining sovereignty over the territory, which is part of Denmark but retains considerable independence. Most parties in the Greenlandic parliament, including the Democratic Party and the Naleraq party, which won the second most votes, are pro-independence (and against US annexation) but disagree on the timeline and mode for achieving it. The Democratic Party is in favour of a more moderate and long-term process, focusing on carrying out domestic reforms first.  

Teslas vandalised as US House Republicans call for investigation

On 12 March, US representatives signed a letter calling for authorities to investigate vandalism on Tesla cars as “domestic terrorism” incidents. In the past weeks, there have been dozens of reported firebombings and other cases of damage against the US carmaker’s dealerships as well as private vehicles.

It is almost certain that the cases reflect opposition to Elon Musk, the owner of Tesla, who has so far played an important role in the Trump administration’s government restructuring efforts and has supported various far-right parties throughout Europe. The attacks are highly likely difficult to stop due to how dispersed the targets are, and the deployment of government forces to protect key targets, such as Tesla offices or dealerships, may be counterproductive by increasing the company’s visibility.

Tesla assets – including the “gigafactory” near Berlin, Germany – have also been targeted for vandalism in Europe in the past, and it is highly likely that the cases in the US will drive copycat actions on the other side of the Atlantic.

Protests erupt in Argentine capital over government austerity measures

On 12 March, police clashed with protestors outside of the Argentine Congress in Buenos Aires after demonstrations were held in response to new austerity measures introduced by the government of President Javier Milei. The police deployed water cannons, tear gas and batons to disperse protesters and made over 100 arrests. The protests were caused by reforms that the opposition claimed are unfairly targeting pensioners, and were attended by a large cross-section of society, including football fans who put historic rivalries aside to participate. Further protests are likely, with retirees currently protesting every week against cuts to their pensions.

Islamic State (IS) lone wolf arrested in Sao Paolo, Brazil

Brazilian special counterterrorism forces arrested a man in Sao Paolo on 12 March. The individual was found to have “firearms, ammunition, fragmentation grenades, explosive material, gas masks, knives and crossbows” as well as IS propaganda and was subdued by police after attacking them with a knife. Images from the suspect’s house, as well as reports of the content of a “diary” in his possession, also show elements that may be linked to far-right ideology and other miscellaneous extremist positions. The case highly likely demonstrates the growing threat of self-radicalisation in Latin America and possibly further shows how lone wolves often combine different ideologies to justify their violent attacks.

Flash flooding warning issued for Puerto Rico

On 14 March, a flash flooding warning was issued for Bayamón and Toa Baja in Puerto Rico, due to heavy rainfall, which could affect over 200,000 residents. The National Weather Service (NWS) reported 3 to 6 inches of rain, with an additional 2 inches possible, causing life-threatening flash flooding. Residents have been urged to avoid low-flying areas due to the risk of life-threatening flash flooding. Flooded roads and potential landslides are likely to lead to significant transport disruptions.

Flooding in Argentina kills at least 16

The city of Bahia Blanca and the nearby town of Cerri were hit by severe floods on 7 March following protracted rainfall, with 400mm of rain recorded in eight hours. The floods resulted in severe disruptions throughout the area, with almost 100 people declared missing in addition to the 16 fatalities. The flooding has resulted in significant anti-government sentiment, as reports indicated that the Argentine National Emergency Directorate, the body which is responsible for providing disaster relief, was shut down three days before the severe weather event. Local authorities have stated that Bahia Blanca “needs to be rebuilt” and that the storm caused severe infrastructural damage.

Following the cessation of US military aid and intelligence sharing to Ukraine, Russian forces launched a series of long-range aerial strikes against critical Ukrainian national infrastructure (CNI) and major population centres.

On 11 March, just hours before a key meeting between the US and Ukraine in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian forces launched their largest-ever drone attack against targets in Russia. According to the Russian Defence Ministry, 343 one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) were intercepted across Russia, including 91 over the Moscow region. At least three people were killed due to debris caused by interceptions, and all four of Moscow’s airports were temporarily shut down.

At the Jeddah meeting, the US delegation, led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and national security advisor Mike Waltz, spoke for over five hours with the Ukrainian delegation led by President Volodymyr Zelensky’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak. A US proposal for an immediate 30-day ceasefire with Russia was accepted by Ukraine, and the US agreed to lift the suspension of intelligence sharing and military aid.

On 13 March, in a joint conference with the President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, Russian President Vladimir Putin questioned the ceasefire proposal and indicated that it would only be acceptable if a series of conditions were met, de facto rejecting the proposal. One of the key questions Putin raised was the status of the Kursk salient, with Ukrainian forces having been forced out of most of the salient by Russian counteroffensives in recent weeks.

On 13 March, the Russian Defence Ministry announced that Sudzha, the last remaining major settlement held by Ukrainian forces in Kursk, had been successfully retaken by Russian forces.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As a centre of gravity (COG) for Ukrainian military efforts, the cessation of US military aid and intelligence sharing likely posed an existential threat to Ukraine’s position in the conflict. The most immediate impact from the loss of critical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities was likely in the Kursk salient. The Trump administration was highly likely able to compel Kyiv to accept a proposal for an immediate 30-day ceasefire by leveraging the military value of its military aid and intelligence sharing. With Kyiv now compliant, it is highly likely that the resumption of US support is intended to apply renewed pressure on the Kremlin to now agree to a ceasefire agreement that likely favours Washington.

It is highly unlikely, however, that Moscow will agree to a ceasefire while counteroffensive operations are ongoing in Kursk. The Kursk offensive was almost certainly intended by Kyiv to provide a bargaining chip in future peace negotiations. However, Russian forces have seized the initiative on this axis and have almost certainly benefitted from the suspension of US intelligence, which has denied Ukraine early warning of Russian movements and reduced its ability to target Russian high-value targets. The Kursk salient is now highly likely to be lost imminently by Ukrainian forces, as failing to withdraw would risk the encirclement of critical troops and resources.

It is likely that the Kremlin will attempt to leverage the ceasefire proposal to gain concessions by deploying reflexive control (the use of deception and other techniques to alter an opponent’s behaviour so they voluntarily behave in a desired way). Having likely successfully presented itself as desiring serious peace talks to the Trump administration, Moscow will now likely attempt to extract concessions as conditions for a hypothetical ceasefire, concessions which will enable greater success on the battlefield to achieve its war goals and may delay the war until concessions that favour Russia are proposed.

Calin Georgescu, the populist anti-NATO and anti-EU outsider who surprisingly won the, later annulled, first round of the Romanian presidential elections in December 2024, was barred from running at the re-do vote in May. The decision, which was issued by the Central Election Bureau on 10 March, resulted in protests and clashes in Bucharest on 10 and 11 March. The court’s decision was criticised by both Washington and Moscow and has driven an increase in calls for political violence. Prior to being barred from running, Georgescu was polling at around 40 per cent and was the clear favourite for May’s vote. This is not the first time a candidate has been barred from running in the election: in October 2024, Diana Sosoaca, leader of the SOS Romania party, had her candidacy rejected over “incompatibility” with Romania’s constitutional values.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that protests will continue in the short term, and is likewise highly likely that tensions will increase as the vote approaches. If elections were to be held today, Georgescu would likely win. Since the first vote’s annulment and his later arrest, he has become a unifying figure for Romania’s populist and anti-establishment forces, such as the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). AUR’s leader George Simion had previously refrained from running for president so as not to interfere with Georgescu’s bid but has changed his stance after Georgescu’s disqualification.

In addition to protests, there is a realistic possibility of intensified hybrid operations being carried out in Romania by Moscow to politically destabilise the country at a key moment. Russia has increasingly adopted a sabotage and espionage “gig economy”, relying on citizens of target countries to carry out low-sophistication operations. It is highly likely that Russian intelligence will seek to take advantage of a growing number of Romanians who are disappointed with their political institutions following the recent developments. The recent arrest of six individuals who had reportedly previously travelled to Moscow and were planning to carry out destabilisation operations in Romania likely demonstrates Russia’s proactive approach to capitalise on the crisis.

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), over 1,300 civilians were killed by security forces supporting the Syrian transitional government between 6 and 12 March, with particularly severe massacres occurring in the Latakia and Tartus governorates. Most of the civilians were Alawite, with former President Bashar al-Assad being a member of the minority group. The violence was reportedly perpetrated by forces linked to Syria’s new government, including the official Syrian Ministry of Defence and General Security Service members, allied Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) militias, and other armed individuals described by witnesses as including “foreigners” of Turkmen and Chechen origin. Syria’s interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has denied government responsibility for the killings and has vowed to hold the perpetrators accountable.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is almost certain that these massacres represent a significant escalation in sectarian violence that will undermine Syria’s already fragile post-Assad transition. The systematic targeting of Alawites almost certainly indicates retribution killings. The violence likely represents a critical failure in the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led transitional government’s ability to maintain command and control over its allied militias and security forces.

The massacres will highly likely accelerate a nascent insurgency against the HTS-controlled interim government and will likely be exploited by both Israel and Iran to pursue their objectives in Syria. Moreover, successful attacks by the resistance will likely result in more retaliatory attacks on the Alawite community. An appeal by Alawite leaders was read on Israeli TV on 10 March, which called for intervention by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). As Israel has likely exploited the status of Syria’s Druze minority in southern Syria to justify its Syrian incursion, the treatment of Syria’s Alawite minority will likely be exploited to further its aims. Moreover, Tehran is highly likely to support efforts by Assad-regime remnants to launch an insurgency, with the loss of Syria being a critical blow to its influence across the Middle East and its ability to sustain its primary proxy force, Hezbollah. The confluence of internal sectarian tensions and foreign interests highly likely presents a significant challenge to stability and peace in the new post-Assad Syria.

On 8 March, the US Department of State ordered the departure of non-emergency US government employees from South Sudan. The order comes within the context of heavy fighting in Nasir, Upper Nile State, between the national army and White Army militias, and the arrests of several key military and political figures allied with former Vice President Riek Machar.

A day prior, on 7 March, a United Nations (UN) helicopter rescue mission in Nasir was attacked, resulting in the deaths of General Majur Dak, a UN crewmember, and approximately 27 troops.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) warned on 12 March that the escalation in South Sudan is pushing the country dangerously close to renewed civil war. The 2013-2018 civil war fought between President Salva Kiir’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Machar’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) resulted in the deaths of almost 400,000 people and displaced four million.

Uganda’s Chief of the Defence Forces, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, announced that Ugandan special forces had been deployed to South Sudan’s capital Juba to “secure it” on 11 March, although their presence is unconfirmed and has been denied by South Sudan’s government.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The South Sudanese civil war was largely fought along ethno-sectarian lines, with members of the Dinka ethnic group from Northern Bahr al-Ghazal state generally aligned with Kiir and the Nuer ethnic group from the Greater Upper Nile region generally aligned with Machar. Due to the prevalence of oil fields, fighting was particularly concentrated in the Upper Nile states.

Almost certainly exacerbated by ethnic sectarianism, the conflict was characterised by the frequent targeting of civilians, mass sexual violence, looting and the destruction of property. The White Armies are formed from Nuer communities and fought alongside SLPM-IO during the civil war.

However, the SPLM-IO leadership highly likely does not exercise full command and control over these militias, and there is a realistic possibility that the recent increase in White Army attacks has occurred without direction from Machar and his allies.

The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed in 2018 between Kiir and Machaar promised to bring an end to the civil war, but tensions and levels of violence have remained relatively high since. Several stipulations from the peace agreement have yet to be implemented, including an election (with elections currently postponed until 2026), a new constitution, and the integration and reunification of armed groups into a singular national military.

Tensions are likely the most severe since 2018, and there is a realistic possibility that a full-scale civil war could once again break out. A return to full-scale civil war would likely see gun battles erupt in the capital, Juba.

Kampala is almost certainly heavily incentivised to protect its interests in South Sudan, having invested heavily in infrastructure projects and being a major trading partner. However, there is a realistic possibility that Kainerugaba’s announcement made on X of troop deployment is false.

Kainerugaba, who is the son of President Yoweri Museveni and widely considered the heir-apparent, is a prolific user of X and has on numerous occasions posted controversial and bizarre statements. It is likely, however, that even if false, the announcement has further increased tensions with calls being made by opposition groups for the “immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops”.

On 11 March, factions of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) carried out multiple attacks on units of the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) and seized towns in the Tigray region and key offices in the Tigray capital of Mekelle. The TIA is the government that emerged from the 2022 Pretoria Peace Treaty and is backed by Ethiopia. While part of the TPLF has recognised its legitimacy, factions within the paramilitary group have accused it of acting as a proxy of Ethiopia.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea fought against TPLF during the 2020-2022 civil war. However, since the 2022 treaty, relations between the two neighbouring states have become increasingly unstable. Last year, Eritrea signed a security deal with Somalia and Egypt, which was likely a response to Ethiopia’s stated interest in gaining a direct access seaport and reducing its reliance on the Port of Djibouti.

In late February, reports emerged that Eritrea had started mobilising its forces in response to the increasing tensions. Ethiopia has accused Asmara of undermining the peace and destabilising Tigray and has, according to Tigray channels, sent troops to its northern border. There is a realistic possibility of the tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia resulting in a conflict between the two states, with each nation state supporting rival Tigray factions.

Despite being the much smaller and militarily weaker nation of the two, Eritrea has previously been successful at sustaining long-term military operations against Ethiopia. This has largely been achieved by external support and the adoption of guerilla tactics. However, weaknesses within the Ethiopian state have played to Eritrea’s advantage.

Should a renewed conflict erupt, there is a realistic possibility that other separatist forces in Ethiopia will seek to exploit the situation by conducting their own operations against state forces, which may become increasingly overstretched.

However, a renewed conflict Ethiopia and Eritrea is not in the interest of external powers due to the potential for regional instability, humanitarian crises, and the disruption of vital trade routes in the Horn of Africa. External actors, including the UN, African Union and the European Union, will likely champion diplomatic efforts to prevent a return to conflict and on 14 March, 24 embassies based in Addis Ababa issued a joint statement urging for the protection of the Pretoria Agreement.

Protests continue in Greece over controversial fatal train crash

Protests continued in several Greek cities on the weekend of 7-9 March to mark the anniversary of the 2023 Tempi train crash. Violent clashes erupted, and Molotov cocktails were thrown in both Athens and Thessaloniki, resulting in the police using tear gas and making multiple arrests. There is a realistic possibility that further protests will be organised on the weekend of 14-16 March as a result of ongoing investigations and the police’s response to the protests.

Serbian anti-corruption protests target state media

Anti-corruption protests have continued throughout Serbia, with recent demonstrations aimed at state-run media institutions. On 10 March, protesters blocked entrances to the headquarters of Serbia’s state-owned broadcaster RTS in Belgrade, vowing to stay for 22 hours. On 11 March, a protest was organised outside the RTS buildings in both Belgrade and Novi Sad, as well as outside the N1 television channel office in Belgrade.

The protests likely reflect a deep dissatisfaction with the way state-run media organisations have been reporting the anti-corruption protests, the lack of independent journalism and the lack of freedom of the press in Serbia. However, the demonstrations likely do not reflect a major change in strategy of the wider protest movement, which has been blocking major transport networks across the country and organising huge protests in the country’s major cities.

A major protest has been organised in Belgrade on 15 March, which may attract protestors as early as 14 March. These protests may spread to other parts of the country and are likely to involve violent confrontations with the security forces.  

Syrian Kurds strike deal with Damascus

The Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control much of the country’s northeast and are backed by the US, agreed on a deal to join Syria’s new government institutions on 10 March.

The deal is almost certainly a major breakthrough which will shape the political future of post-Assad Syria, and it is likely to decrease the risk of a conflict between the SDF and Damascus. The deal entails the integration of SDF institutions within the Syrian state and grants the Kurdish community comprehensive minority rights, a long-standing political demand that had been denied under Assad. The deal was almost certainly backed by the US, which is trying to reduce its footprint in Syria.

It also highly likely complicates Turkey’s position. Ankara classifies the SDF as a terrorist organisation and backs the Syrian National Army (SNA) operations against SDF-controlled areas. Turkey, whose government has recently made overtures to its domestic Kurdish community, may find tolerating the deal beneficial.

Although, with increased sectarian violence and the threat of a nascent insurgency launched by Assad-remnants which would likely be backed by Iran, there is a realistic possibility that the deal will collapse in the face of a return to civil war.

Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) supporters arrested in Spain

On 10 March, a coordinated operation between Spanish and Italian police that lasted for three years led to the arrest of 11 alleged TLP supporters in Barcelona. According to authorities, the group was engaged in the spread of information and propaganda encouraging violence in Europe.

TLP, which remains extremely popular in Pakistan, has called for violence against European politicians perceived as attacking the Islamic faith. Among other actions, TLP leaders called for violence in the Netherlands following the 2018 publication of caricatures of the Islamic Prophet Mohammed, and praised the murder of French school teacher Samuel Paty in 2020 over (false) accusations of blasphemy.

The case highlights ongoing TLP efforts to increase support in Europe, including in countries with smaller Pakistani diasporas like Spain and Italy.

Armenia and Azerbaijan agree to peace treaty 

On 13 March, negotiations concluded between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with both sides agreeing on key terms for a draft peace treaty deal. This follows almost four decades of territorial disputes between the two nations that have been marred in conflict since the fall of the Soviet Union.

The most significant conflict occurred in 2020 when Azerbaijan reclaimed large parts of the Armenian-dominated Nagorno-Karabakh region. Azerbaijan seized the territory in September 2023, leading to the exodus of over 100,000 Armenians from the region.

The peace treaty could bring lasting peace in the South Caucasus; however, the timeline is uncertain as amendments are expected to Armenia’s constitution from Azerbaijan, which would require a referendum. Azerbaijan demands that Armenia eliminate any territorial claims over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is highly likely to cause discontent and resistance in Armenia.  

Hezbollah leader warns of continued resistance if Israel refuses to withdraw from Lebanon

Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Naim Qassem has warned Israel that if it continues its occupation of southern Lebanon, it will be confronted by Hezbollah as well as the Lebanese people and the Lebanese Army, accusing Israeli forces of over one thousand violations of the ceasefire.

Qassem also warned that despite suffering several setbacks during its previous confrontations with Israel, such as the loss of two leaders, Hezbollah remains vast, capable and has addressed previous security vulnerabilities.

Regarding domestic politics, Qassem reaffirmed Hezbollah’s commitment to state-building and participation within the electoral process, a move that is likely aimed at reducing pressure from the central government whilst it struggles to regroup after losing critical ground lines of communication through Syria.

Clashes as Malian migrants attack Mauritanian border police station

The violence erupted on 8 March near the Gogi crossing in Hodh al Gharbi province. According to local media, the migrants were scheduled to be deported from Mauritania after entering the country illegally, almost certainly en route to Europe. After arriving at the border post, the migrants refused to cross it and clashed with police, prompting the intervention of the Mauritanian gendarmerie. In the past week, Mauritania has carried out a wave of arrests and deportations. The government of Mauritania is seeking to build stronger economic ties with the EU, and the recent raids are likely an attempt to send a signal to Brussels.

Al-Shabab lay siege to Somali hotel

On 11 March, militants belonging to al-Shabab stormed the Qahira Hotel in the city of Beledweyne in central Somalia, approximately 335km (208 miles) north of Mogadishu. The militants detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) and then entered the hotel with small arms. The attack is thought to have killed 15 people, including six militants, after Somali security forces ended the siege. The attack was likely a strategic message sent to the central government as it reportedly took place while politicians, security officials, and traditional elders were gathered to discuss strategies for an upcoming offensive against the group in central Somalia.

Islamic State plan to strengthen affiliates in DRC and Mozambique

Uncorroborated reports from within the Islamic State indicate that the terrorist organisation is planning on deploying senior leaders to one of its lesser-known affiliates, Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCA), which primarily operates in the DRC and Mozambique. This likely reflects an attempt to exploit the current instability of both countries, porous borders, lack of governance and the intent to establish a largely peripheral affiliate into a more capable operational force, potentially with the ability to conduct external attacks into some of the regions more stable countries.

South Africa discloses information on dismantled criminal group and extremist cell

South African authorities have revealed details about a series of arrests that occurred in July 2024. Five individuals were arrested by South African authorities, three of whom are accused of having ties to an extremist group, likely the Islamic State (IS). According to prosecutors, the five were linked to at least two separate cases of kidnapping of businessmen for ransom.

During the operation, a 72-year-old captive was freed. Moreover, authorities claim that the cell was linked to kidnapping cases dating as far back as 2020. The case, while not recent, is extremely notable as South Africa, despite not having had a history of IS attacks, is a key source of funds that the group uses to finance its activities elsewhere in Africa. The inquiry into the kidnapping cell could shine further light on the interplay between South African organised crime and transnational extremism.

Storm Jana causes disruptions in southern Spain and Portugal

The weather system hit southern Iberia and the Balearic Islands between 6 and 12 March. The storm caused significant flooding, with cities like Granada, Malaga and Seville being particularly affected. Local media indicates that at least five flights were diverted from landing at Malaga airport due to the strong winds, which reached speeds of up to 90 kph. In the Balearics, the severe rain caused by the storm resulted in localised flooding and travel disruptions.

First case of cholera confirmed in Namibia after decade-long absence

Namibia has confirmed its first case of cholera in ten years, according to the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC). The case has raised concerns, prompting health officials to strengthen their response efforts. The outbreak is believed to be linked to a cholera epidemic in neighbouring Angola, which has killed 237 people since January. The Africa CDC has sent 2,000 oral cholera vaccines to Angola to protect healthcare workers, though far more resources are likely needed to contain the outbreak.

On 11 March, militants belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) derailed the Jaffar Express train in the Bolan district while it was travelling from Quetta in Balochistan Province to Peshwar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. BLA militants bombed the tracks, then fired upon the train and then stormed the carriages. The train was carrying approximately 450 passengers, including at least 100 off-duty security personnel travelling home on leave.  Militants took control of the train and held hundreds of passengers hostage. The BLA threatened to kill them unless their demands for the release of imprisoned BLA members were met.

Pakistani security forces conducted a rescue operation that lasted approximately 27 hours and resulted in the deaths of all 33 insurgents. Unconfirmed reports from the Pakistani military indicate that the assailants killed 21 hostages, but no hostages died because of the rescue operation.  However, BLA statements contradict official reports, suggesting that more than 100 people were killed, including dozens of Pakistani soldiers, during the rescue operation and multiple hostages were taken into the neighbouring mountains in small groups. Pakistani authorities have accused the Taliban in Afghanistan of facilitating the attackers, a claim that Taliban officials have denied.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The scale, sophistication and target of the attack suggest that this was a well-planned operation and may indicate that the BLA has infiltrated Pakistan’s security apparatus, allowing them to obtain intelligence on the movements of Pakistani security personnel.

Targeting transport infrastructure has become an established tactic, technique and procedure of the BLA, with this attack following multiple attacks on ports, roads and the rail network.  The BLA advocates for Baloch independence and opposes what it sees as the exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources. Therefore, attacks on transport infrastructure have become highly symbolic, as they represent the mass movement of people and goods from Balochistan to other parts of Pakistan and are likely aimed at deterring foreign, particularly Chinese, investment.

Consequently, BLA attacks on transport infrastructure and foreigners in the region will almost certainly continue, despite the risk of economic losses for the Baloch community. These attacks are likely to occur in hard-to-access areas with limited mobile and internet signals, which will hinder timely communication and coordination, resulting in increased response times for security services, helping to maximise the success of attacks.

This attack likely marks a major escalation. The operation has gained worldwide publicity and will almost certainly serve as a major embarrassment, undermining Pakistan’s claims of its ability to guarantee security. If the BLA has successfully managed to keep some security personnel hostage, it will likely leverage this for further concessions.

Furthermore, the BLA reportedly filmed the attack and released it for propaganda, a move that will likely help it achieve greater publicity and buttress recruitment. In response to the attack, Pakistan will likely be forced to intensify its counterterrorism operations in Balochistan, including increased military deployments, intelligence gathering and increased security measures on transport infrastructure.

However, the Pakistani military is facing significant strain as it grapples with sectarian violence, militancy in multiple regions, and ongoing border clashes with the Taliban, creating an opportunity that the BLA is likely to exploit in the near term. Moreover, the strategic aim of the BLA may be to force Pakistan into increasing its operations against it. This would likely provide the militant group with more opportunities to conduct similar attacks and to undermine the central government’s legitimacy, expose weaknesses in security forces and disrupt local economic activity, all of which will enable it to increase propaganda, recruitment and funding.

On 8 March, twin attacks targeted the Thai security services in the Sungai Kolok district on the Malaysian border in the Narathiwat province and the Sai Buri district in the Pattani province, in Thailand’s restless Deep South region. In Sungai Kolok, masked assailants dismounted from a pick-up truck, fired small arms and threw incendiary devices at on-duty security volunteers. The attackers also detonated explosives hidden inside a car and a motorcycle, which were parked outside the district office compound. The attack killed at least two security personnel and injured several more. In Sai Buri, a bomb was detonated outside a local government site, killing three officials.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Thailand’s Deep South has struggled with a low-intensity conflict since 2004. Attacks from Islamist groups like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional are common during Ramadan and typically target local government and security forces. Many of the defence volunteers are Muslims from the local community, and the attack was likely coordinated to target personnel while they were breaking their fast. However, the attack was unusually early in the Ramadan period, with attacks traditionally increasing during the last ten days of the Holy Month. This may indicate that militants have adapted their tactics to exploit decreased security measures during the start of the period or may indicate that this year’s Ramadan will involve a higher rate of attacks than what is usually observed.

The deadly twin attacks follow a series of largely non-fatal attacks in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkhla. These attacks are often underreported by the Thai government, which fails to reflect the deteriorating security environment in the Deep South. The current Thai administration, led by Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, has made achieving peace in the Deep South a top priority, which was also championed by her father and former prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. It is likely that militant groups in the Deep South are attempting to undermine this process and will continue to conduct attacks in the Deep South. The attacks have already resulted in prominent Thai politicians calling for a reassessment of peace negotiations and allegations that those involved do not represent the militant groups.

In response to the attacks, the Thai Interior Minister has ordered increased security in the Deep South, with further security meetings planned. This will likely involve increased military and police deployments, increased raids and arrests, increased security at government locations, increased vehicle inspections, tighter border security and potentially the imposition of curfews. Malaysia has also increased its border security and has warned its citizens not to travel to southern Thailand, with fears that the attack may have been a cross-border attack conducted by Malaysia-based militants. However, increased counter-insurgency operations are likely to exacerbate tensions and may result in an increase in militant attacks. Furthermore, militant groups have previously conducted high-profile attacks in other parts of Thailand. If the Thai government intensifies its operations in the Deep South, there is a realistic possibility of reprisal attacks migrating to other parts of Thailand, including major tourist resorts.

Large Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) protest broken up by Bangladeshi police

Around 4,000 supporters of the Islamist movement, which is currently banned in Bangladesh, gathered in Dhaka to call for the country to become a caliphate. The police intervened after supporters reportedly attempted to break through the police barricade. Videos show the deployment of tear gas by police forces, and at least 39 people were arrested. The rally is likely an important show of force by HT. The group was banned under the government of long-serving Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who was ousted in August 2024. It is highly likely that banned groups like HT are seeking to increase pressure on the interim government as a means to re-enter mainstream politics and advance their, in this case, politico-religious message.

Former president arrested in the Philippines

Former Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte was arrested at Manila Airport on 11 March in response to the International Criminal Court (ICC) issuing a warrant for his arrest relating to Duterte’s war on drugs. The former president was then forced onto a plane heading to the ICC court at the Hague. Duterte faces charges for “the crime against humanity of murder” after his presidency oversaw the killing of thousands of people associated with the narcotics trade. Many of these killings are believed to have been extra-judicial and lacked due process. However, Duterte largely won his presidency on the promise of combating the drug trade and still commands a lot of support in the Philippines. Supporters have protested outside the locations where Duterte has been held, and there is a realistic possibility that major developments in his trial will trigger major unrest in the Philippines.

Pakistan sets 31 March deadline for illegal foreigners to leave the country

The announcement, issued on 7 March by the Ministry of the Interior, is almost certainly aimed at Afghans and singles out holders of an Afghan citizen card. Currently, UN estimates put the number of Afghans residing in Pakistan at above two million. Since Pakistan started its deportation drive in 2023, up to 800,000 have returned to the neighbouring country. There is a high likelihood that the ultimatum will drive civil unrest in Pakistan and may cause sectarian strife. Islamabad has increasingly blamed Afghan residents for threats to its security. Although this is mostly inaccurate, there is a significant likelihood that groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which primarily operates in Afghanistan and has a lot of influence in Pakistan, may target the diaspora for radicalisation and recruitment. These efforts could be further facilitated by the Pakistani government’s increased focus on repatriation and deportation measures.

Myanmar junta looks to Russia for military cooperation

Myanmar’s junta government has reportedly turned to Moscow for military cooperation, a development that has likely materialised due to General Min Aung Hlaing’s recent round of high-level talks with President Putin at the Kremlin. The junta is hoping to obtain high-tech drones from Russia as well as access to Russian satellite-derived imagery intelligence (IMINT).  Improved access to these technologies will almost certainly improve the junta’s surveillance, intelligence gathering and targeting of rebel forces and could help shift the balance in the current civil war.

Healthcare access affected by nationwide physician shortage in South Korea

The US Embassy in South Korea has issued an alert relating to reduced access to healthcare across the country. The alert indicates that the embassy has received reporting suggesting that there have been complications involving access to emergency care, with major hospitals prioritising care based on the severity of injury or illness, resulting in delays to care or even denials in less urgent cases. The shortages have impacted private healthcare facilities less. The shortages in physicians are almost certainly linked to the ongoing doctors’ strike in South Korea, which has led to thousands of doctors going on strike to protest government plans to increase medical school admissions, arguing it will lower the quality of healthcare and strain resources.

Cyclone Alfred causes traffic and power disruptions in east Australia

More than 200,000 homes were reported to be without power on 10 March, most of them in the Gold Coast area of Queensland and New South Wales, due to the cyclone. Cyclone Alfred formed at sea northeast of Queensland on 23 February and first made landfall over Bribie Island on 8 March, dissipating the following day. The significant interval between the cyclone’s formation and its landfall has almost certainly allowed Australian authorities to take proactive measures to minimise its impact. Nevertheless, at least one death was caused by the cyclone in Dorrigo, New South Wales, and dozens of people were injured. At least four people are considered missing as of the time of writing.

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