Mexico’s unprecedented extradition of cartel members to the US is almost certainly anattempt to appease the Trump administration and will likely involve an increase in counter-cartel operations.

Nicaragua’s withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council is almost certainly indicative of a broader effort to limit foreign oversight of human rights abuses and government repression.

Russia will almost certainly exploit the US decision to suspend military aid and intelligence sharing with Ukraine by increasing the scale and frequency of its long-range attacks.

Significant armed clashes in Syria are likely indicative of a nascent insurgency, which would highly likely receive support from Iran.

The US government has almost certainly rejected the Arab League’s Gaza plan. Washington’s pressure on Hamas, as well as the ongoing blockade in Gaza, are likely to destabilise the ceasefire.

Terror attack highly likely in Mogadishu amid an ongoing al-Shabaab offensive in Somalia.

Ghanaian MPs’ resubmission of a controversial anti-LGBT bill is likely to be passed by parliament and will likely result in increased violence and repression of the LGBT community.

Reprisal attacks by ISKP highly likely in Pakistan after regional commander arrested in joint US–Pakistan operation.

An investment deal between the US and Taiwan’s TSMC is highly likely indicative of a strategic priority for the Trump administration to mitigate against the potential impact of Taiwan’s invasion.

In an unprecedented move, Mexico City has authorised the extradition of 29 high-ranking cartel members to the US, many of whom are alleged to have committed serious crimes, including murder. The most high-profile extradition was that of Rafael Caro Quintero, or the “Narco of Narcos”, who allegedly ordered the kidnap, torture and killing of DEA special agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena in the 1980s which placed him on the FBI’s most wanted list until his capture in 2022. If convicted, many of those extradited could face the death penalty, according to the US Department of Justice. The extraction follows the designation of several Mexican drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) by US President Donald Trump in January.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Mexico’s compliance with US demands was almost certainly a reaction to the threat of economically devastating tariffs imposed by the Trump administration. However, Trump imposed tariffs on Mexico on 4 March and declared a “war” on Mexican cartels the same day. These moves likely indicate that Trump’s war against the cartels has only just begun, and his administration will leverage tariffs to exert pressure on Mexico City to sustain its commitment to counter-cartel operations.

In a recent visit to the southern border, US Vice President JD Vance dismissed the idea of the US military “invading” Mexico. However, US strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) airborne assets, such as the RC-135 “Rivet Joint”, have continued to fly missions close to the Mexican border. This likely suggests that the US military has intensified its surveillance of the cartels. The US may also be sharing some of this intelligence with Mexico to support Mexican counter-cartel operations, which could explain a series of recent high-profile arrests of major cartels designated as FTOs.

Reporting indicates that the cartels, especially the notorious Sinaloa cartel, have been significantly impacted by the recent government crackdowns, which have involved arrests, drug seizures and raids on fentanyl labs. This has forced the Sinaloa cartel to scale back fentanyl production and move labs to other parts of Mexico. Anecdotal reporting from cartel members indicates that they have linked this to increased US operations, especially drone surveillance. Cartels are beginning to invest in drone-detection technology and have expressed that they genuinely feared arrest or death for the first time in years.

However, cartel members have also suggested that they are unlikely to cease operations and will not go down without a fight, especially when confronted with the prospect of extradition and the death penalty. Sustained pressure from both the US and Mexican governments is likely to result in a shift in cartel operations.  Cartels are likely to employ more violence to deter the Mexican government, and increased arrests could result in the splintering of cartels, posing the risk of greater competition and more violence.  If the cartels start to view US involvement as an existential threat, there is a realistic possibility that cartels might deliberately target US citizens and interests. This could include attacks on American businesses, kidnappings of US citizens, or attempts to increase narcotics shipments to the US.

Nicaragua has announced that it will withdraw from the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) following a UN report which urged the international community to address human rights abuses committed by the government of President Daniel Ortega. The UN report alleged that the Ortega regime had engaged in a systematic crackdown on human rights, democratic norms and had increased its repression of religious groups.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Nicaragua’s withdrawal from the UNHRC was quickly followed by an announcement that it will also quit the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). These withdrawals likely indicate a broader trend of Nicaragua attempting to reduce foreign oversight of its abuses, which have been preceded by several major reforms that have enabled Ortega and his family to consolidate power in the country. These have included changes to the constitution that have expanded presidential powers, allowing him to exert more control over the judicial and the legislative branches of government, more control over the police and military, and more state control over the media.  

These moves indicate that Ortega is further isolating Nicaragua from international scrutiny and consolidating his grip on power. This will almost certainly result in increased oppression of NGOs, civil society groups, independent media, the Catholic Church and other organisations critical of the regime.

In August 2024, Ortega banned approximately 1,500 NGOs in Nicaragua that were deemed to be hostile towards the government, which included the Nicaraguan Red Cross and several charities associated with the Catholic Church. Future repressive measures will likely involve arbitrary detentions, expulsions and the use of state-sponsored physical and psychological violence, including threats, beatings, solitary confinement and even extrajudicial killings.

This repression and reduction in foreign assistance will almost certainly lead to a deterioration of humanitarian conditions and likely increase migration flows out of Nicaragua.

US tariffs on Canada and Mexico go live, then get postpone

Tariffs of 25 per cent on goods entering the US from Mexico and Canada took effect on 4 March, only to then get rolled back on 6 March, following direct calls between Trump and the leaders of Mexico and Canada.

In addition to driving significant market fluctuations, the moves are likely to have a political impact on the two US neighbours. In Canada, Trump’s adversarial stance has “resurrected” the ruling Liberal Party’s 2025 electoral bid, with the centre-left party gaining 10 points in the polls in little more than a month and planning to elect a new party leader on 9 March.

In Mexico, Washington’s crackdown on migration at the southern border has been a driver of unrest. Further unrest in large Canadian and Mexican cities in response to future US trade policy shifts remains a realistic possibility.  

Police clash with protestors in Argentine capital over pension reforms

On 6 March, protestors clashed with the police in Buenos Aires after attempting to march around the Argentine Congress to demand higher pensions and a reversal of medication cuts. The protests were organised in response to austerity measures introduced by President Javier Milei, who has overseen sweeping reforms aimed at reducing public expenditure, debt and inflation.

However, reports from February suggest that Milei’s reforms have drastically cut Argentina’s inflation, reducing it to a five-year low, likely indicating that further controversial reforms and cuts are on the horizon.

Major protests are likely to be organised on 8 March to coincide with International Women’s Day. The “Ni Una Menos” (“Not One [Woman] Less”) movement typically organises protests in the capital and other cities to protest issues like femicide, gender-based violence and women’s rights. The protests are likely to attract more protestors than usual due to Milei’s views on topics like abortion and in response to some of his reforms which have negatively affected childcare subsidies, women’s labour rights and the dismantling of organisations within government such as the Ministry of Women, Genders, and Diversity.

Haitian police increasingly using drones to fight gangs

During this reporting period, Haitian police forces in Port-au-Prince have carried out multiple successful strikes on gang members using first-person-view (FPV) drones. On 4 March, a police FPV drone reportedly injured the leader of the 5 Segonn Gang, “Izo”, during a Carnival celebration. The use of drones is likely to allow Haitian police, and possibly the international police forces supporting them, to carry out more effective decapitation strikes on high-ranking gang members, particularly in areas where the large presence of gang members makes ground operations risky. However, as previous cases illustrate, there is a realistic possibility that such strikes will result in retaliatory actions by gangs, including the indiscriminate targeting of the civilian population.

Guyana accuses Venezuela of entering oil block in Guyanese waters

On 1 March, Guyanese President Mohamed Irfaan Ali accused a Venezuelan coast guard patrol of entering Guyanese waters. The vessel allegedly approached an offshore oil facility in an oil block operated by Exxon Mobil and sent out a message claiming the Guyanese output vessel was in “disputed international waters”. In response to the incident, Ali summoned the Venezuelan ambassador and instructed Guyana’s embassy in Caracas to file a formal protest with the government. He also deployed air assets and the country’s coastguard to ward off the threat. This constitutes the latest incident in a diplomatic spat whereby Venezuela claims the Essequibo region, which comprises approximately two-thirds of Guyana. Further tensions are highly likely amid ongoing brinkmanship by Venezuela.

Windstorm-fuelled wildfires in south and central Texas

Windstorm-fuelled wildfires have broken out in south and central Texas. The latest reports indicate that the Twin Oryx Fire in La Salle County is 60 per cent contained, covering approximately 900 acres. The Onion Creek Fire in west Buda is 80 per cent contained at about 190 acres, with a containment line established. Additionally, the Duke Fire in Bexar County has been fully contained across 244 acres. The Welder Complex Fire in Sinton is at 75 per cent containment and spans an estimated 785 acres. Evacuation orders in Sinton have been lifted after the wildfire destroyed at least 20 homes. A red flag warning has been issued for critical fire weather conditions across parts of Texas and neighbouring states.

Widespread power outages across Honduras

Honduras experienced widespread power outages impacting multiple regions and major cities, including Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, on 1 March. The outages were initially reported without a known cause. The Honduran energy minister ruled out a failure at the El Cajon hydroelectric dam; it was later confirmed that the outages resulted from a ‘temporary and atypical failure in the interconnection between Honduras and Nicaragua.’ The outages also affected regional energy lines connected to neighbouring countries, but no widespread outages were reported outside of Honduras. All power was restored later on 1 March.

On 4 March, US President Trump suspended all military aid to Ukraine with the reported aim of pressuring Ukrainian President Zelensky into agreeing to a ceasefire agreement with Russia. The suspension reportedly includes any further drawdown from the most recent USD 3.85 billion of military aid approved by Congress under former President Biden and a halt in deliveries already approved by Biden, inclusive of aid currently in transit or pre-staged in Poland. The decision to suspend military aid was followed by a ban on US intelligence sharing with Ukraine, which extended to US-derived intelligence being shared via third parties like the United Kingdom.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Trump administration’s decision to suspend both military aid and intelligence sharing is almost certainly a mechanism to exert pressure on Zelensky to agree to ceasefire terms that would significantly benefit the US, especially regarding favourable terms for US access to Ukrainian mineral resources. Should Zelensky acquiesce to Trump’s demands, there is a realistic possibility that the US will reverse these decisions in order to apply renewed pressure on Russia to agree to terms that align with US strategic interests.   

The suspension of military aid and intelligence sharing will almost certainly result in an increase in Russian long-range missile and UAV strikes on Ukrainian population centres, critical national infrastructure and high-value targets in rear areas. Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian aerial threats, particularly ballistic missiles, relies heavily on US aid and intelligence.

The US-derived Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) system is Ukraine’s most capable air defence system and Kyiv’s European allies are unable to support Ukraine with a comparable system that can provide as effective an air defence umbrella. Russia will almost certainly exploit current developments to deplete Ukraine’s Patriot missile stocks by increasing its layered, near-simultaneous long-range aerial attacks on multiple axes.

A critical shortage in Patriot interceptors will almost certainly make Ukraine more vulnerable to long-range Russian attacks, severely degrade its ability to intercept Russian ballistic missiles, and enable Russian air with more freedom of movement. Kyiv will likely be forced to prioritise its remaining air defence resources to defend major cities like Kyiv, leaving smaller cities, rear areas and frontline positions more vulnerable to Russian attack.

The suspension in intelligence sharing will further expose Ukraine to Russian aerial attacks. The US provides Ukraine with satellite reconnaissance, radar tracking, and signals intelligence (SIGINT) to detect missile launches and drone movements. This allows Ukraine to issue air raid alerts, prepare air defence and increase its ability to intercept incoming threats.

A loss of this vital intelligence will degrade Ukraine’s situational awareness, reduce reaction time, overwhelm air defence and likely force Ukraine to adopt a more reactive rather than proactive air defence strategy. Ukraine will also likely be forced to rely more on its own air defence radars to compensate for the loss of early warning.

These radar systems are high-value targets (HVTs) for Russia. If forced to radiate for extended periods, Ukrainian radars will be more detectable to Russian SIGINT and thus easier to target, jam, deceive or map out, further degrading Ukraine’s aerial defences.

Ukraine’s frontlines are unlikely to be immediately affected by the suspension of military aid. 90 per cent of US-derived weapons and munitions are already in-country, and Ukraine has increased the domestic production of UAVs, which it is using extensively for frontline operations.

Assessments in late February indicated that Ukraine could maintain its current operational tempo until approximately mid-2025 (around June), provided that the US continues delivering the aid previously agreed upon under the Biden administration’s planned schedule. However, if the suspensions on military aid and intelligence are sustained, Ukraine’s ability to defend its frontlines and the effectiveness of its counteroffensives will almost certainly be severely degraded.

Ukraine is still heavily dependent on US-derived long-range systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the Army Tactical Missile System) (ATACMS) to target Russian dynamic HVTs in rear areas. Whilst Ukraine still has access to these systems, it lacks the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to effectively find, fix and finish Russian HVTs in the deep battlespace.

Without this targeting capability, Ukraine’s ability to strike Russian logistic nodes, command and control centres (C2), force concentrations, ammunition depots and other HVTs will be severely degraded, further allowing Russia to seize the initiative on the ground.

At least 70 people were killed during a series of armed clashes between security forces and Assad-loyalists between 4 and 6 March, including at least 13 Syrian security officers. The fighting was most intense in the northwestern coastal governorates of Latakia and Tartus, and in the Daraa Governorate in southwestern Syria. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that clashes took place in Homs and Aleppo.

These mark the deadliest attacks against the security forces of Syria’s new Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led interim government since the December 2024 overthrow of the Assad regime. The clashes followed operations targeting Assad-regime remnants, with armed groups in many cases ambushing security forces.

Anti-government protests took place in the port cities of Latakia and Tartus, with authorities imposing curfews which are ongoing as of 7 March. Moreover, supporters of the HTS-led government participated in demonstrations in numerous cities, including Damascus, Manbij and Idlib.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In addition to the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), a nexus of sectarian militias and decentralised armed groups supported the Assad regime. Following the HTS-led lightning advance that toppled the regime, the SAA collapsed with many personnel and senior officers going into hiding or fleeing into neighbouring Iraq. HTS has highly likely taken a “carrot and stick” approach, by offering clemency for lower-level officers and soldiers if they hand in their weapons to the state, while simultaneously conducting combing operations to root out armed remnants and higher-level officers that are implicated in war crimes. It is highly likely that many units have simply gone underground and integrated into local militia groups.

It is likely that the clashes are indicative of a nascent insurgency by these groups, which would highly likely receive support from Iran. The loss of Syria has been a critical strategic defeat for Tehran. In the past week, an official declaration was made for the creation of a new group named the “Islamic Resistance Front in Syria”, which is highly likely an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked project. It is likely that Iranian support for regime remnants groups and insurgent activity will operate primarily out of Iraq, which can be used as a staging post for the infiltration of Shia militia fighters and the smuggling of arms. It is likely that clashes will continue to occur in response to combing operations, particularly in the Alawite stronghold governorates of Latakia and Tartus.

The 4 March Arab League summit in Cairo produced a new, three-stage plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. The plan envisions a three-year reconstruction period, and the creation of a Palestinian Authority (PA)-backed “technocratic government” supported by an Egypt- and Jordan-trained police force. The Gaza Strip is currently undergoing a week-long aid blockade, which has resulted in worsening conditions for the civilian population and growing fears of collapse in the ceasefire.

The US has so far ignored the Arab League plan and remains committed to the controversial “Riviera” plan, which envisions the displacement of Gaza’s population. Washington has, for the first time since 1997, established direct communication channels with Hamas and increased pressure on the group, pledging to collapse the ceasefire if all remaining Israeli hostages are not released. At the same time, US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff has renewed calls on Israel to respect the ceasefire at least until his visit to the region.

Israel Defence Forces (IDF) operations in the West Bank, which started on 21 January, have continued. More than 50 Palestinians have been killed during the ongoing operations. IDF units are continuing to demolish homes in the Nur Shams refugee camp and to carry out raids in Tulkarm, Tubas, and Jenin. Israeli settler groups have attacked Palestinian villagers in the Masafer Yatta area.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Arab League peace plan likely contains important concessions to Tel Aviv and Washington. It effectively sidelines Hamas by vesting authority in PA technocrats and possibly establishes a deterrence in the form of a local police force trained by Egypt and Jordan. At the same time, however, the plan clashes with US calls to displace, likely permanently, Gaza’s civilian population, which is almost certainly unacceptable to Cairo and Amman, as well as other Arab states. The US’s approach towards Hamas likely combines inducements and, more importantly, threats.

While the direct channel of communication offers Hamas a way to negotiate a deal bypassing Israel, the renewed threats of collapsing the ceasefire are almost certainly deepening the group’s worries about its future after losing its main source of political leverage on Tel Aviv, the hostages. The impasse is likely to further destabilise the ceasefire, particularly if Hamas leaders in Gaza feel that their negotiating position is unrecoverable.

In the West Bank, the continuation of Israeli operations likely reflects Israeli assessments of Washington’s support. The Trump administration removed sanctions on Israeli settler groups and has made important overtures to the Israeli far-right. Most notably, on 6 March, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, leader of the ultra-nationalist Religious Zionism party, met with his American counterpart in Washington. This represents a notable shift from the Biden administration, which had refrained from inviting Smotrich for bilateral talks. Further Israeli operations and settler violence are highly likely to further damage the already precarious position of the PA in the West Bank.

A group of ten Ghanian members of parliament have resubmitted a controversial bill that, if signed into law, will impose strict restrictions on LGBT rights and the LGBT community. The bill will impose a three-year jail term for individuals who identify as LGBT and five to ten years for promoters or advocates of LGBT rights. The bill passed a parliamentary vote in 2024 but was not signed into law by former President Nana Akufo-Addo, who cited legal challenges, and was then dropped following the dissolution of parliament in 2024 ahead of the general election.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The initial legal challenges against the bill have been dismissed by the Supreme Court of Ghana, clearing the way for the bill’s resubmission and likely approval. The majority of Ghanaian political parties, including the National Democratic Congress (NDC), which controls parliament and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which constitutes the largest opposition party, have expressed support for the bill, suggesting that it is highly likely to pass. If passed, the bill is likely to be part of a wider and more sustained attempt to suppress LGBT rights which has attracted widespread support in Ghana. Moreover, politicians in Ghana have expressed that they no longer need to fear economic sanctions in response to the bill, likely assessing that the current geopolitical climate favours conservatism and that Western nations are likely reticent to jeopardise relations with Ghana over a domestic issue.

The bill is likely to legitimise anti-LGBT views in Ghana and result in a significant rise in violence against  LGBT individuals, particularly outside of Accra. This was observed in 2022 when the bill was originally drafted. This involved higher rates of physical attacks, arrests, police extortion and incidents of “corrective rape”. By criminalising advocacy for LGBT rights, the bill will almost certainly result in the closure of support centres and other resources for the LGBT community. While the majority of these attacks will likely target local nationals, there is a high likelihood that foreign workers or travellers in Ghana may also become targets, particularly if suspected of promoting LGBT rights within the country.

On 2 March, the Somali National Army, alongside international partners, killed at least 40 al-Shabaab members in the Biya Cadde region of Hirshabelle State. The successful operation comes amid strategic gains by al-Shabaab, who launched an offensive on the Middle Shabelle and Hiraan regions on 20 February, recently encircling Jowhar, a town 91 kilometres north of Mogadishu and the capital of Hirshabelle State. On 4 March, Somali forces clashed with al-Shabaab in Middle Shabeele, repelling an attack in the Boos-Hareeri area of the Aadan-Yabaal district, which the Somali government has held for several years. Aerial strikes, highly likely conducted by the US, reportedly targeted al-Shabaab forces in Al-Kowthar, a town in Middle Shabelle that was seized by al-Shabaab militants last week. Ceelbaraf, an important transportation hub in the region, fell to al-Shabaab militants, despite being targeted by aerial strikes.

On 4 March, the US embassy in Somalia issued a security alert claiming that it is ‘tracking credible information related to potential imminent attacks against multiple locations in Somalia including Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport.’ The warning stated that attacks may target ‘airports and seaports, checkpoints, government buildings, hotels, restaurants, shopping areas, and other areas where large crowds gather and Westerners frequent, as well as government, military, and Western convoys.’ The intelligence spurred the US embassy to cancel all personnel movements; Turkish Airlines and EgyptAir have suspended all flights to Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The renewed al-Shabaab offensive has killed at least 60 pro-government forces and aims to recapture areas taken from the insurgent group after the Somali government’s counteroffensive from 2022 to 2023. By launching an offensive, al-Shabaab highly likely aims to take advantage of the security gaps in the region caused by inter-clan fighting and Burundi’s lack of participation in the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Despite joint US counterterrorism efforts almost certainly slowing al-Shabaab’s ongoing offensive, al-Shabaab will highly likely continue to make territorial gains.

Since President Donald Trump took office, the US has participated in air strikes against al-Shabaab, the latest supporting Somali forces in their 2 March operation. While the embassy statement did not accuse a specific group, the intelligence was highly likely linked to al-Shabaab, who have conducted several bombings and shootings in Mogadishu in recent years. By targeting Mogadishu, the group likely aims to undermine public confidence in the Somali government and divert resources from counteroffensive capabilities to shoring up security in the capital. Furthermore, the group will likely also particularly target US personnel in an attempt to retaliate against US counterterrorism efforts and raise the profile of the attacks. While al-Shabaab are the most likely culprit, there is a realistic possibility that the intelligence was linked to Islamic State Somalia (ISS), who are currently being pushed back by Puntland forces and US air strikes.

Germany’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats (SPD) to start coalition talks

The return to a “Grand Coalition” between the two main centre-right and centre-left parties was made almost certain by the failure of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) to enter parliament.

The talks will highly likely result in a workable coalition, especially as, on 5 March, the two parties overcame a significant disagreement over reforming the “debt brake”. While the decision to create a EUR 500 billion infrastructure fund and to overhaul borrowing limits was hailed by the CDU/CSU as a necessary decision due to Washington’s shift in Ukraine, it likely represents an SPD victory.

As the opposition (comprised of the far-right and far-left) will only acquire its “blocking” privileges following the creation of a new government, the next SPD-CDU/CSU moves are highly likely forced: the two parties will begin talks on 7-9 March, submit the debt brake proposal for a vote early next week, and announce the coalition following that. There is a realistic possibility that the manoeuvre will drive a response from the left, including protests in Berlin and other major cities.

General strike planned for 7-8 March in Italy

Several public and private sector labour unions have announced strike action to coincide with International Women’s Day. Striking workers include railway and airport personnel. The strikes are almost certain to result in severe traffic disruptions throughout Italy starting on the evening of 7 March. On 8 March, authorities agreed with airport workers on two periods of activity, where flights will go ahead, between 07:00 and 10:00 and between 18:00 and 21:00 local time.

Flares and tear gas released in Serbian parliament

On 4 March, opposition coalition lawmakers, led by the Serbian Progressive party (SNS), discharged flares and tear gas on the first day of parliament. Three lawmakers were injured, with one experiencing a stroke and in critical condition. The incident occurred during a vote on a bill to increase university funding and was in support of the student-led anti-corruption protests, which have been ongoing since November 2024 after the Novi Sad railway station roof collapsed, resulting in 15 fatalities. This highly publicised incident will highly likely have an invigorating effect on the protests, which constitute a significant threat to President Aleksandar Vucic’s power.

Greek government faces no-confidence vote over fatal train crash

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ government is facing a no-confidence vote over the 2023 railway disaster that killed 57 people, with opposition parties accusing the government of shielding officials from accountability. Major nationwide protests erupted on 28 February to mark the second anniversary of the train crash. However, protests have continued in major Greek cities, including in Athens and Thessaloniki, resulting in clashes with the police and the use of tear gas and other crowd dispersal methods. Failure of the government to take action is likely to sustain protests, which may intensify on the weekend.

Tunisian opposition members tried on terrorism charges

On 4 March, a mass trial of around 40 members of the Tunisian opposition, including lawyers, journalists, and politicians, began in Tunis. Many of the defendants have charges such as “belonging to a terrorist group” or “plotting against state security”. Human rights and civil society groups have claimed that the trial is politically motivated and aims at silencing opposition voices. The trial almost certainly represents part of President Kais Saied’s broader efforts to sideline and silence opposition and civil society voices. There is a realistic possibility that the trial will drive protests in Tunis, and other urban centres.

Refugee clashes with Kenyan police amid food ration protests

On 4 March, clashes broke out between refugees and security forces in Kenya’s Kakuma refugee camp following the imposition of food and water rationing, which left many struggling to obtain essential resources. Four people were injured after security forces used live ammunition to disperse protesters. The camp is one of the largest in the world and houses approximately 200,000 refugees from various countries, including South Sudan, Ethiopia, Burundi, and the DRC. The rationing was imposed amid shortages triggered by USAID cuts, which have reportedly contributed to rising insecurity in the camp. Further unrest at refugee camps is likely amid further humanitarian aid shortages. There is a realistic possibility that it will contribute to anti-US sentiment in towns and cities close to the refugee camps.

At least 16 protesters injured during march in Maputo, Mozambique

On 5 March, security forces shot and injured at least 16 protesters during a march in Mozambique’s capital, Maputo. Opposition figure Venâncio Mondlane was leading the demonstrations, which took place hours before the controversially elected President Daniel Chapo signed a political agreement with opposition parties which would end the post-election protests. Mondlane’s current whereabouts is reportedly unknown.

Despite the winding down of the unrest that has so far led to at least 353 deaths since October and Mondlane’s agreement to engage in opposition via political means, the continued demonstrations reflect the continued frustration with the government. Security forces’ use of live ammunition has typically triggered unrest to spiral into clashes and the well-publicised incident will likely trigger further anti-government demonstrations. Given Mondlane’s involvement in this protest, there is a realistic possibility that supporters will view this as an attempt to assassinate Mondlane, also spurring further unrest.

Car-ramming attack in Mannheim, Germany, kills two, wounds dozens

On 2 March, a car-ramming attack occurred in the southwestern German city during a Carnival parade. The perpetrator of the attack was a 40-year-old German citizen who has previously been fined for a hate speech offence in 2018. Local authorities have not disclosed a possible motive for the attack as of the time of writing.

The attack follows multiple similar car-ramming attacks that have occurred in Germany over the past few months. These have been inspired by different ideologies, from Islamist extremism (as in the case of the February attack in Munich) to far right and anti-Islam ideology (as in the attack at the Magdeburg Christmas market).

Moreover, OSINT shows a rise in extremist calls for attacks on German Carnival events in the days prior to the recent attack, including from Islamic State-linked media. There is a realistic possibility that, even if not ideologically aligned, the Mannheim attacker was influenced or inspired by notable past car-ramming attacks.

Cyberattack at Poland’s Space Agency (POLSA)

On 2 March, unauthorised access to POLSA’s IT infrastructure was detected by Polish cybersecurity, who secured the affected systems. While the perpetrators have not yet been identified, there is a realistic possibility that foreign political actors perpetrated the attack. Poland’s digital minister, Krzysztof Gawkowski claimed in January that Poland is the most frequently targeted country for cyberattacks in the European Union, having doubled since 2023, with Russia allegedly perpetrating most attacks. POLSA was highly likely targeted due to space agencies’ collaboration with military and intelligence agencies; sensitive security data was likely targeted. Further attacks on Polish cyber infrastructure are highly likely in the coming months.

Russian security kills Islamic State militants near Moscow and in Dagestan.

The Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on 3 March the killing of a Russian national who had allegedly been planning attacks on the metro service in the Russian capital, as well as on Jewish places of worship. The man had allegedly been planning to travel to Afghanistan for training. This, alongside the pro-Islamic State (IS) propaganda and the IS flag found at his apartment, make it highly likely that the man was planning his attack on behalf of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

On 5 March, Russian security forces also killed four alleged ISKP militants in Dagestan. According to state reports, the four were planning to conduct a bombing attack on a regional interior ministry branch. The two cases continue to highlight ISKP’s efforts to expand its attacks to Russia and replicate its 2024 Crocus Hall attack.

ISKP sees Russia as a desirable target as it likely assesses that its security services are overstretched due to the war in Ukraine. Moreover, ISKP continues to successfully radicalise Russian citizens from the Caucasus region, as well as citizens of central Asian states who can enter Russia with relative ease as migrant workers.

Turkish forces continue to target Kurdish militants despite disarmament calls

Turkey’s Defence Ministry has stated that it has killed almost 30 Kurdish militants in Iraq and Syria in the week following calls to disarm by Abdullah Ocalan, a key leader within the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Turkey considers the Syrian Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG/J) and the Iraqi Peshmerga as extensions of the PKK and has warned that military operations will continue if disarmament efforts fail to progress. However, the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which includes the YPG, has distanced itself from the PKK and Ocalan’s call, indicating that Turkish offensive operations in Syria are likely to continue regardless of developments on the domestic front.

One killed after stabbing attack in Haifa, Israel

The attack occurred on 3 March at a bus and train station. In addition to one death, the attack resulted in at least four injuries. The perpetrator was reportedly an Israeli citizen of Druze Arab origin, who recently entered Israel from Germany. The motive of the attack was not officially disclosed by authorities, but it is highly likely that it was linked to Israeli operations in Gaza, the West Bank, and Syria. Low-sophistication, “lone-wolf” attacks continue to pose a significant security threat in Israel. As other recent cases have highlighted, perpetrators frequently target high-traffic locations, including transport hubs.

Jordanian border forces clash with smugglers

On 6 March, Jordanian border forces clashed with smugglers attempting to cross into the kingdom from Syria, resulting in the deaths of four smugglers. The smugglers were attempting to exploit poor weather conditions to enter Jordan illegally, and large quantities of weapons and narcotics were seized. The incident follows recent meetings between the King of Jordan and Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who have agreed to bolster border defences to combat arms and narcotics trafficking. Syria has been a key producer of captagon, while Jordan serves as a transit route for narcotics destined for the Gulf and beyond. Efforts to combat smuggling are likely aimed at preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State, which has historically profited from the trade.

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) ends blockade of Lere, Mali

On 3 March, the al-Qaeda-affiliated JNIM ended the blockade of Lere. The blockade lasted approximately three months and disrupted supply routes and movement in Timbuktu. Lere is a significant crossroad town in the region and serves as a market as well as a base for humanitarian groups operating in the region. Residents faced significant resource scarcities and those travelling from Timbuktu were forced to take a detour via Douentza and Mopti.

Despite the lifting of the blockade, residual effects are highly likely in the coming months as seasonal economies including agriculture can be negatively affected by blockades, impoverishing families for years. Siege tactics have increasingly been deployed by insurgent groups in Mali to disrupt local economies and restrict access to humanitarian organisations. Furthermore, blockades aim to force local militias to disarm and undermine local governance to create a security vacuum, which armed groups aim to fill.

Opposition party figures arrested in South Sudan after being accused of allying with militia

On 4 March, Petroleum Minister Pout Kang Chol, General Gabriel Duop Lam, and several other Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO) members allied with First Vice President Riek Machar were arrested in their homes. Military personnel were also deployed around Macher’s residence.

An SPLM-IO spokesperson has labelled the act a “grave violation” of the fragile 2018 peace agreement that ended the civil war by establishing a power-sharing arrangement between rival factions. The arrests follow significant fighting in Nasir between national forces and the White Army militia, who are mostly made up of the Nuer ethnic group in common with Machar.

Information Minister Michael Makuei, in justification for the arrests, accused Machar loyalists of collaborating with the White Army to attack Nasir on 4 March. This incident marks a significant escalation in internal tensions and increases the likelihood of a renewed civil war.

Puntland forces continue to make gains against the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS)

The armed forces of the breakaway territory of Somalia continued their offensive in the Cal Miskaad mountain range. Puntland forces took the stronghold of Dhasan and completed the “second phase” of “Operation Hilaac”, as the offensive has been named. The high presence of foreign nationals, especially from the Arab Peninsula, among ISS forces continues to be noted by advancing Puntland forces.

The offensive, which has been ongoing for weeks, has likely significantly damaged ISS’s capabilities in the area, and there are reports that ISS forces have split in three groups, retreating towards the mountainous Karinka Qandala area, Tog Miraale and Tog Curaar respectively. US and UAE airstrikes have almost certainly played a fundamental role in the successes of the operation so far.

The airstrikes are likely to help prevent ISS units from reforming in more remote areas where the ground-based Puntland units are likely to find considerable logistical and operational difficulties. ISS controls the al-Karrar office, one of IS’s nine regional offices and increasingly a key hub for the financing of IS affiliates in Africa and Afghanistan.

Isolated Depression at High Levels (DANA) causes heavy rain and flooding in eastern Spain

Eastern Spain continues to grapple with severe weather conditions as a DANA, a high-altitude isolated depression, persists, bringing heavy rain and flooding to several regions. The lowest level emergency alert has been issued for residents living along the Hozgarganta River in Andalusia due to anticipated heavy rainfall.

Additionally, Madrid is under a yellow alert for heavy rain expected between 18:00 and 21:00 local time. The Canary Islands have reported around 20 vehicles affected by floods, while flight operations at Gran Canaria Airport have resumed normality after being disrupted by floodwaters.

An orange alert remains active for heavy rain in Valencia, Castellón, and Almería, with yellow warnings for areas including Albacete and Navarre. The Spanish authorities have also initiated a “pre-emergency phase” of the flood plan in Andalusia. Flooding has already impacted infrastructure, with at least 11 roads affected in Castellón and Valencia, and the road between Alcalà de Xivert and Coves de Vinromà entirely cut off.

Flooding in greater Johannesburg, South Africa

Flooding in greater Johannesburg on 5 March has caused significant disruptions. A bridge on Platina Street in the Jukskei Park area of Randburg has suffered considerable damage due to the overnight flooding. The local utility company has reported power outages in the Hurst Hill neighbourhood and indicated that restoration efforts are hampered by the ongoing weather conditions. Emergency services have shared videos of roads inundated by floodwaters in the Newlands area, advising motorists to exercise caution. The Klein Jukskei River has overflowed, leading to at least one vehicle becoming stranded. The flooding has predominantly affected the Randburg area, with several low-lying roads being impacted and reports of structural damage in residential neighbourhoods.

On 2 March, the Mohammad Sharifullah, or “Jafar”, a regional ISKP commander, was charged by the US with “providing and conspiring to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization resulting in death.” The charge comes after Pakistani security forces captured Sharifullah along the Pakistan-Afghan border region in late February before transferring him to the FBI for extradition. US President Donald Trump thanked the Pakistani government for their cooperation, stating, “I want to thank, especially, the government of Pakistan for helping arrest this monster.”

According to an interview with the FBI on the same day he was charged, Sharifullah admitted to helping plan the August 2021 bombing in Afghanistan, also known as the Abbey Gate attack, which killed 170 Afghans and 13 US troops. Sharifullah reportedly scouted a route to the airport for the attacker and checked for law enforcement and security checkpoints, giving the all clear to the attacker. Sharifullah also admitted to conducting surveillance to prepare the suicide bomber behind the 20 June 2016 attack on the Canadian embassy in Kabul as well as sharing instructions on how to use weaponry to the 22 March 2024 Crocus City Hall attackers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

If Sharifullah is convicted, he faces a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. The arrest is hailed as a major victory against ISKP, Sharifullah being ‘the top terrorist responsible for that atrocity’ (referencing the Abbey Gate attack), according to Trump. US officials have announced that Sharifullah was one of two members involved in the planning of the bombing. Sharifullah’s arrest marks a symbolic victory for the Trump administration, who likely wants to portray his counterterrorism operations as a continuation of the hardline approach that led to the territorial defeat of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019.

The arrest and extradition of Sharifullah are likely indicative of renewed cooperation between the US and Pakistan over counterterrorism. In response to Trump’s comments regarding the government of Pakistan, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif emphasised that ‘we will continue to partner closely with the United States in securing regional peace and stability’. This is highly likely because of pressure from the US to increase counterterrorism operations and will likely trigger ISKP reprisal attacks in Pakistan.

The operation follows a period of limited bilateral cooperation since 2021, stemming from US concerns over Pakistan’s alleged support for the Afghan Taliban, which Pakistan denies. The Pakistani government’s cooperative role in the operation, which involved the CIA and FBI, was almost certainly a signal to the Trump administration, indicating that Islamabad wants to strengthen counterterrorism relations. If bilateral cooperation increases significantly, this will almost certainly bolster Pakistani security forces’ counterterrorism capabilities and assist in their counterinsurgency operations in the restive Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa regions.

On 3 March, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) announced a deal with US President Donald Trump to invest an additional USD 100 billion into the US, with plans to build five additional chip fabrication plants. The TSMC chief executive CC Wei stated that the deal will mean that TSMC will produce the most advanced chips on US soil. A Taiwanese government spokesperson, however, promised that Taipei will ensure that the most advanced manufacturing processes will be kept in Taiwan.

On 4 March, the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defence reported that 19 sorties of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft, five People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels and three “official ships” were detected operating around Taiwan. 11 of the 19 PLA sorties are claimed to have crossed the median line, entering Taiwan’s southwestern Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Solace Global Assessment: 

TSMC produces approximately 90 per cent of the world’s most advanced semiconductor chips, which are critical for technologies such as smartphones and artificial intelligence (AI). A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would highly likely cause a global economic crisis, with some estimates predicting a loss of approximately ten per cent of global GDP, significantly worse than the 2008 global financial crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. With major US companies such as Apple and Nvidia so critically dependent on TSMC semiconductor manufacturing, in addition to advanced military technology, it is highly likely a strategic priority for the Trump administration to increase chip fabrication on US soil to mitigate against the impact of Taiwan’s potential invasion or blockade.

For Taiwan, the monopoly on advanced semiconductor manufacturing is almost certainly a key strategic deterrence against a Chinese invasion, with the US being economically motivated to contribute to Taiwanese deterrence with security guarantees. This highly likely explains Taipei’s desire to restrict the production of the most advanced chips in US facilities. The Trump administration, however, has likely compelled TSMC’s compliance with the threat of tariffs, with Trump stating that the deal will mean that TSMC will be excluded from industry-wide 25 per cent tariffs.

The regularity of PLA exercises around Taiwan is increasing. In February, 480 PLA aircraft and 223 PLAN vessels were detected around Taiwan, a 40 per cent increase from January. The exercises are also becoming increasingly complex, with warnings from senior Indo-Pacific US military commanders that PLA activity now often resembles rehearsals for an invasion involving multi-domain operations. In addition to the training benefits for the Chinese military, the exercises are highly likely intended to make it more difficult to discern between drills and a genuine invasion of Taiwan, complicating response. There is also a realistic possibility that the recent increase in exercises is due to a desire in Beijing to test Donald Trump’s willingness to defend Taiwan, with the US’s reliability as a military ally likely brought into question by Trump’s more isolationist foreign policy posture.  

Crime soars in Bangladesh due to widespread insecurity

Several reports have indicated that crime rates in Bangladesh have noticeably increased in late 2024 and early 2025, with the country recording the highest number of robberies in six years in January 2025. Moreover, there are increasing reports of police corruption, as well as security forces’ growing inability to deal with both petty and violent criminality. These trends have likely been partly worsened by the administrative and political instability that followed Sheikh Hasina’s ousting in August 2024. While nominally independent, the Bangladeshi police, alongside other state institutions, had been previously controlled by Hasina’s Awami League (AL), and the parties that support the post-Hasina government are currently seeking to purge it of pro-AL elements. This, in turn, has likely weakened the police and has opened more space for institutional corruption.  

15 injured in accidental bombing by South Korean air force jets

On 6 March, eight bombs were dropped by two jets on the civilian district of Pocheon, South Korea, injuring 15 and damaging several houses and a church. The bombs were mistakenly dropped during military exercises near the demilitarised zone along the border with North Korea. The accident reportedly occurred because the pilot entered the incorrect coordinates. Further live-fire exercises have been suspended until a review of the incident has taken place. Residents in the area have protested the exercises for years; demonstrations will likely take place as a result of this incident.

President Putin hosts Myanmar junta leader at the Kremlin

On 4 March, Putin held talks with General Min Aung Hliang, the head of Myanmar’s junta government, to discuss increased cooperation amid sanctions and isolation from the West. Russia remains a major supporter of Myanmar and one of the country’s primary arms suppliers. Russian-made fighter jets and other weapon systems have been used extensively by the junta in attacks on rebel forces and the civilian population across Myanmar. While many of the topics discussed centred on economic cooperation, it is likely that military and security collaboration were also key areas of discussion. Russia is expected to continue supplying Myanmar with advanced weaponry, including aircraft, air defence systems, and other military technology in exchange for a strategic foothold in Southeast Asia and improved access to the Indian Ocean, especially if it senses that an end to the Ukraine war is drawing closer. Russian military aid to the junta will likely prolong the current civil war and result in higher rates of civilian casualties.

Severe weather causes avalanche in northern India

On 28 February, an avalanche hit the town of Badrinath in India’s Uttarakhand state. Rescue operations concluded on 2 March with the recovery of the last missing person from the avalanche site. The final death toll stands at eight, while 46 individuals have survived the incident. The avalanche initially left several people trapped, prompting a large-scale search and rescue effort. In addition to the avalanche, severe weather conditions, including heavy snow and rain, have caused further disruptions in the region, such as landslides blocking highways and flash flooding damaging homes and infrastructure in Himachal Pradesh.

On the east coast of China, unusual weather conditions cause snowfall and heat waves

During the 1-3 March period, severe blizzards and snowfall were recorded in the province of Shandong, south of Beijing. The severe weather caused widespread travel and business disruptions, including office and school closures and multiple red alerts. At the same time, the area of Shanghai reported record heat for this time of the year, with temperatures of up to 28.5 degrees Celsius. Last year was reported as being the hottest on record in China.

Flooding in Indonesia’s Western Java Island

Recent severe weather in Indonesia has triggered flooding in West Java. Flooding has been widespread across western Java, with significant impacts reported in East Jakarta, Tangerang, and Depok City, where evacuations were underway. On 3 March, two bridges collapsed in Cisarua due to rising river levels, though no injuries were reported.

The flooding has also affected Baureno in Bojonegoro Regency, preventing residents from leaving their homes. On 4 March, flash floods in Cisarua, Bogor, resulted in one fatality and affected over 300 people. On 7 March, a landslide in Sukabumi City killed at least one person, with seven others missing.

Flooding in Simpenan, Sukabumi Regency, led to one death and injured seven others, with around 200 people displaced in shelters. Severe flooding in Bekasi submerged areas with waters reaching up to nearly 10 feet, prompting evacuations. Further flooding and disruptions are highly likely.

Cyclone Alfred approaching landfall on Australia’s east coast

Cyclone Alfred is set to make landfall on Australia’s east coast on 8 March at approximately 00:00 UTC with sustained wind speeds of approximately 80 km/h. The cyclone caused significant disruptions and damage across parts of Australia, particularly in New South Wales and Queensland. More than 38,000 homes and businesses in New South Wales and 56,000 customers in southeast Queensland are without power due to the cyclone’s impact. Emergency crews are working to restore power where it is safe.

Residents in areas such as Moreton Island, Redland City, and the Gold Coast have been advised to take shelter due to heavy rain and winds. Evacuations have been ordered in several locations, including Kings Point Park in Macksville and Belongil Beach, due to flooding concerns. One person is reported missing after being swept into floodwaters near Megan, Australia.

Supermarkets and distribution centres in Queensland are gradually closing as the cyclone approaches Brisbane. Additionally, public transport from Noosa to the New South Wales border will be closed.

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