Further unrest is likely in Panama after major union clashes with security forces in Panama City over a government bill.

Chilean authorities indicate that some of the current wildfires were likely intentionally ignited. A trend of wildfires being weaponised for political or criminal goals will likely grow across South America in 2025.

A car-ramming attack in Munich, has almost certainly increased fears of political violence and terrorism ahead of the German election, with anti-migration rhetoric high and the far-right polling strongly.

Trump’s push for immediate peace talks between Russia and Ukraine will likely be exploited by the Kremlin to divide Ukraine’s allies. It is unlikely that an imposed peace on Kyiv could deter future Russian aggression.

Israeli and Hamas officials have likely agreed on a path for future hostage releases, but tensions in Gaza remain high. US President Trump’s “Gaza plan” comments are likely to further destabilise the already precarious truce.

The suspension of NGO operations in the Sahel are highly likely part of a wider attempt to curtail foreign oversight and will almost certainly exacerbate an already dire humanitarian situation.

SAF advances in Khartoum will likely set the conditions for offensives in western Sudan. However, further advances will highly likely result in high civilian casualties and compound the humanitarian crisis.

The offensive by Puntland forces in the Cal Miskaad mountain range, if successful, is highly likely to be a major blow to the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). The intensity of the clashes will likely intensify in the short term.

The ISKP bombing at a bank in Kunduz, northern Afghanistan, highly likely demonstrates the group’s ability to strike at will on Afghan territory and likely underscores growing security issues at the Afghan-Tajik border.

On 12 February, protests broke out among members of the Single National Union of Construction and Similar Workers (SUNTRACS) in Panama City. The demonstrations began as the National Assembly deliberated Law 163 which would reform the Social Security Fund (CSS), raising the retirement age and reducing pension amounts.

The protests also served to honour the memory of Al Iromi Smith Renteria, who was killed by the police on 12 February 2008, denounce Donald Trump’s statements regarding the Panama Canal, and protest the pro-US attitude of President Jose Raul Mulino’s government.

Protests escalated into clashes with Crowd Control units after they attempted to reopen the roads. The protesters threw projectiles at officers, injuring 16. Security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters and arrested at least 480 demonstrators, injuring at least 100.

Closures occurred across Panama City, including on Balboa Avenue, Via Tocumen, Howard, Via Espana, Transistmica, Ricado J. Alfaro, Centenario, Cincuentenario, and Brisas del Golf.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the wake of the protests, President Mulino declared that the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic will audit SUNTRACS’s funds from different government entities.

Mulino called for a stop to collaboration with SUNTRACS, calling it a ‘terrorist union organisation.’ He also claimed that the government would ‘not allow pseudo-union anarchy in this country.’ Reforming the CSS has constituted a long-term ambition for Mulino to ensure its financial sustainability and he will likely not back down in the face of union unrest.

SUNTRACS is one of the largest trade unions in Panama, with approximately 40,000 members. The union is known for its militant class war unionism and leads Coordinadora de Unidad Sindical (CONUSI), the most radical major union federation in the country.

The union has coordinated several major protests in recent years, including a general strike in March 2024. Recently, SUNTRACS protested against the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s arrival in Panama in the wake of President Trump’s comments regarding the Panama Canal.

Other organisations including Coordinadora de Unidad Sindical (CONUSI) and the National Front for the Defense of Economic and Social Rights (FRENADESO) have denounced the government reforms.

SUNTRACs have demanded the release of the detained workers, claiming that ‘we will defend our comrades to the last consequences.’ Given SUNTRACS’s militancy, recent history of significant unrest, and likely unfulfilled demands, further demonstrations and clashes with security forces are likely.

On 8 February, the President of Chile Gabriel Boric declared a state of emergency in the regions of Ñuble and Maule and imposed a 22:00-06:00 curfew in 12 communes of Araucanía due to the threat of wildfires. Large-scale efforts to combat the wildfires are ongoing, with 22 wildfires still active and 55 under control. Wildfires have impacted several regions, including Araucanía, O’Higgins, Bio Bio, Ñuble, and Maule. The fires have led to at least one death (in Maule), three injuries, and 28 destroyed homes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In February 2024, Chile’s wildfire season caused widespread devastation with an estimated 137 deaths, 1,100 injuries, 14,000 destroyed structures, and USD 4.39 billion in damages. The 2024-2025 Chilean wildfire season has not been nearly as severe due to comprehensive efforts made by authorities to control the fires. Authorities have suggested that a large part of the fires affecting La Araucanía are intentional, with President Boric stating they have well-founded reasons to believe so, with 14 people already arrested. The intentional starting of fires could be related to territorial grievances within indigenous Mapuche areas.

Intentionally ignited fires, exacerbated by dry conditions and high temperatures, is highly likely an increasing threat across South America. Widespread fires which caused large-scale destruction and disruption in Brazil in 2024 were, in many cases, highly likely intentionally started by criminal networks to clear land for illegal logging and agricultural purposes. In some instances, particularly Brazilian wildfires were suspected to have been intentionally started in defiance of local government crackdowns. This weaponisation of large-scale fires for political and criminal purposes is a trend that is likely to grow in 2025. 

Nicaragua continues to crack down on Catholics

On 9 February, the Nicaraguan foreign ministry released comments describing the Vatican as “depraved” and “paedophilic”, following a televised interview with Bishop Rolando Alvez, currently living in exile after being imprisoned for more than a year.

The regime of Daniel Ortega has targeted Catholic priests with arrests and deportations in the country since the local church supported large-scale student protests in 2018. Other Christian groups, including Evangelicals, have also been persecuted. The comments will likely be followed by further measures targeting local Catholic churches and communities.

The Vatican likely has few avenues to respond to the Nicaraguan regime’s policies and to incite change. Pressuring Washington to act may be one. However, while US Foreign Secretary Marco Rubio has recently criticised Nicaragua as an “enemy of humanity” alongside Venezuela and Cuba and has also threatened to block its participation in the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, Washington’s concern is mostly directed at the issue of migration.

Moreover, relations between the Trump administration and the Vatican are cold, after Pope Francis criticised Trump’s deportation plan and Washington appointed Brian Burch, an outspoken critic of Francis and Catholic charities aiding Latin American migrants, as its ambassador to the Holy See.

Ecuador presidential election heads to runoff

Ecuador held the first round of its presidential elections on 9 February, with incumbent President Daniel Noboa seeking re-election. However, the election resulted in a near tie with neither candidate securing an outright majority.

A second run will take place on 13 February, with Noboa hoping that his adoption of militarised security policies will help him secure the presidency. During the first round, Noboa ordered an increased security presence at all Ecuadorian ports of entry and temporarily closed the country’s land borders to prevent attempts to destabilise the election from armed groups.

There is a realistic possibility that similar measures will be introduced in the second round.

Stabbing at anti-Trump protest in Los Angeles leaves one wounded

A mass brawl reportedly broke out at a rally to protest President Trump’s mass deportation plan in downtown Los Angeles. The protest, on 7 February, followed six consecutive days of unrest.

According to witnesses, the attacker was not part of the demonstration but was instead “yelling incendiary things” at the protesters. Law enforcement has not yet confirmed the motive behind the attack, but given the political nature of the protest and the assailant’s reported behaviour, there is a realistic possibility that the stabbing was politically motivated.

Further attacks at similar rallies remain possible as tensions over the deportation plan continue to rise.

Colombian Defence Minister resigns in response to escalating violence

Colombia’s Defence Minister, Iván Velásquez, has resigned amid escalating violence, marking another high-profile departure from President Gustavo Petro’s cabinet as his government struggles to contain the spread of guerilla and narco-related violence.

Community leaders in the eastern Catatumbo region, where the National Liberation Army (ELN) first initiated its offensive, have been murdered and over 50,000 remain displaced.

Fighting has recently intensified in the western region of Chocó, where the ELN and Clan del Golfo are fighting over drug routes on the Pacific Coast and into Panama. The expansion of fighting is likely to continue and will likely overstretch the underfunded Colombian military which has suffered major budget cuts under the Petro administration, resulting in the grounding of critical aerial platforms like helicopter gunships, which have been vital in combating armed groups in the harsh terrain of the Colombian jungle.

Winter storms hit US Midwest, Great Lakes, Northeast and southeast Canada

Large parts of the US and Canada have been hit by a series of disruptive winter storms that have led to the issuing of winter weather alerts and hazardous conditions.

Winter Storm Harlow first brought significant ice accumulation to parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania, causing downed trees and power lines. Harlow was followed by Winter Storm Iliana, which is currently bringing snowfall to the Great Lakes, the Northeast and parts of Canada, with hail affecting the Appalachians.

The heaviest recorded snowfall was 28 cm (11 inches) in Lowden, Iowa, while parts of Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa have seen 8-15 cm (3-6 inches). Milwaukee has recorded over 18 cm (7 inches). Southern Ontario and Quebec are also experiencing snowfall and icy conditions.

Winter Storm Jett will follow Iliana, bringing more snow to the Plains, Midwest, Northeast, and Canada, as well as heavy rain and potentially severe thunderstorms in the South. Multiple winter weather alerts have been issued warning of hazardous travel conditions.

Magnitude 7.6 earthquake in the Caribbean Sea briefly triggers tsunami warnings

On 8 February, the most powerful earthquake recorded globally since 2023 occurred approximately 202 kilometres southwest of the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean Sea, with a magnitude of 7.6 at a depth of 10km.

The earthquake briefly triggered numerous tsunami alerts or advisories for the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Honduras, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands, all of which were later rescinded. Despite the earthquake’s magnitude, the impact was ultimately minimal with little to no tsunami threat and only light shaking felt in the Cayman Islands.

Regional experts warn that the threat of a significant tsunami impacting the Cayman Islands is low but not zero. In some highly unlikely but possible modelled scenarios, it is deemed possible that Grand Cayman could suffer a tsunami wave impact up to approximately three metres following a high-magnitude earthquake emanating from nearby fault lines. While not comparable to the 30-metre tsunami that devastated parts of Japan in 2011, such a tsunami could still cause significant damage due to Grand Cayman’s low elevation.

Most of the Cayman Islands’ risk modelling and earthquake impact forecasting is funded by USAID. While modelling work in the Cayman Islands continues as of the time of writing, it is likely that the Trump administration’s efforts to defund USAID and make substantial cuts to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), if successful, will have a considerable impact on not only the efforts of earthquake modelling in the Cayman Islands but worldwide.

On 13 February 2025, a car ramming incident in Munich, Germany left at least 28 people injured, including children. The suspect, a 24-year-old Afghan asylum seeker, drove a white Mini Cooper into a crowd of demonstrators near the city’s central railway station during a trade union protest. German counter-terrorism police have assumed responsibility for the investigation and the authorities suspect the incident was a targeted attack. The suspect was apprehended at the scene, with police firing a shot at the vehicle during the arrest. The investigation into the motives is ongoing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There are indications of an extremist connection with some sources suggesting that the suspect posted jihadist material on social media before the attack. The attack also occurred ahead of the  Munich security conference, hours before the US vice president and the Ukrainian president were set to arrive in the city, which has likely raised the profile of the attack. The suspect had his asylum application rejected, but his deportation was suspended, which was likely a significant factor contributing to radicalisation and a motivation for the attack.

The attack has almost certainly contributed to heightened fears of political violence and terrorism in Germany, with the federal elections approaching on 23 February. Tensions over immigration and asylum policies are high, with many Germans fearing the growth of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. This has recently intensified after the centre-right Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) collaboration with the AfD.

On 31 January CDU leader, Friedrich Merz, sought support from the AfD to pass a bill known as the Influx Limitation Act, aimed at tightening asylum rules in Germany by implementing such measures as permanent border controls and turning back asylum seekers. This has been perceived as a breach of the “firewall” or “cordon sanitaire” strategy aimed at alienating the far-right, with widespread fears such a shift in strategy has legitimised the far-right.

This has sparked major protests across Germany with over 160,000 people demonstrating in Berlin on 2 February and more than 200,000 in Munich on 8 February. However, the growing popularity of the far-right has forced mainstream parties to promise to introduce stricter immigration and asylum policies, with increased deportations often being promised.

As the election approaches, the risk of political violence and terrorism will likely increase across Germany. Anti-far-right protests, counter-protests from far-right groups, and clashes with police are likely to continue, mirroring the violent confrontations seen during previous election cycles. The threat of terrorism, both far-right and extremist Islamist in nature, is likely to increase anti-migrant sentiment, calls for deportations and cancelled asylum statuses, with the Munich attack almost certainly exacerbating pre-existing tensions which will invariably be exploited by the far-right.

On 12 February, US President Donald Trump announced that talks to end the war in Ukraine would begin “immediately”, after a “lengthy” phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The announcement followed US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth telling European allies at a defence summit in Brussels that a return to Ukraine’s pre-2014 borders was “unrealistic” and ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine.

Beijing has also reportedly proposed to hold a summit between Putin and Trump to end the war in Ukraine. Trump has stated that he expects to meet Putin in Saudi Arabia, although no date has yet been set.

European leaders and NATO officials have so far reacted with concern, broadly commenting that Europe must be a full participant in any talks, rejecting an imposed peace on Ukraine, and stressing that any peace agreement must be long-lasting with provisions to ensure that the conflict could not easily recommence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Moscow’s strategic objectives in Ukraine are the ceding of Ukrainian territory (including the Donbas, Crimea and the land bridge which connects Crimea to mainland Russia) and permanent Ukrainian neutrality. At the start of the full-scale 2022 invasion, Russian war goals highly likely also included even more maximalist demands including the “denazification” (likely meaning the overthrow of the Kyiv government and the imposition of a rump puppet state in the east) and demilitarisation of Ukraine.

Kyiv’s strategic objectives include the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from all internationally recognised Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, as well as NATO membership or equivalent security guarantees to deter further Russian aggression.

The Trump administration’s objectives, while less clear, highly likely involve the ending of the Ukraine war as soon as possible (even with significant Ukrainian concessions and only weak security guarantees that are likely inadequate to deter further Russian aggression), the cessation or a significant reduction of US-expenditure on Ukraine, and access to USD 500 billion worth of Ukraine’s rare earth mineral deposits. The latter desire is almost certainly reflective of Trump’s broader agenda of transactional diplomacy.

While Trump stated that Ukraine has “essentially agreed” to hand over the mineral rights, Zelensky has reportedly not yet signed an agreement presented by the US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in Kyiv on 12 February.

It is likely that the Kremlin will actively seek to portray Russia as pursuing peace, while simultaneously escalating military operations in Ukraine to press for its more maximalist demands. Peace talks could serve as a strategic tool for Moscow to sow further division within Ukraine and amongst Ukraine’s allies to reduce military aid to Kyiv.

Nonetheless, with US military aid being a fundamental centre of gravity for Ukraine’s defensive efforts, Trump could force Kyiv to accept terms far short of its strategic objectives. The ceding of the territory south of the Dnipro River between the Donbas and Crimea, in addition to only limited security guarantees, would likely be the most difficult potential peace treaty conditions for Kyiv to accept.

With only limited security guarantees, there would be a substantial threat of Russia recommencing the war to achieve the Kremlin’s even more maximalist objectives after consolidating its position and reconstituting its forces.

Fears regarding the stability of the ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas have increased following delays in the planned release of Israeli hostages by the Palestinian militants. Israeli officials threatened the restart of hostilities on 10 February, and again on 14 February, putting in place a deadline for the release of further hostages by 15 February. The Hamas delegation in Cairo has stated its willingness to abide by the deadline and has scheduled three hostages to be released on 15 Saturday, but tensions in the Gaza Strip remain high, with occasional Israeli airstrikes reported.

On 12 February, at least one person was killed in an airstrike in Rafah that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated was targeting a weapons-smuggling effort. Hamas had justified the postponement of hostage release due to claimed Israeli violations of the ceasefire.

In Washington, US President Donald Trump has repeatedly reiterated his plan for the Gaza Strip, centred on the resettlements of residents to Jordan and Egypt and a US-led effort to rebuild and “control” the area. The White House’s plan has been widely rejected by regional and global powers. Jordanian King Abdullah rebuked the plan during a summit with Trump in Washington on 11 February, while Egypt’s President al-Sisi postponed a planned visit to the US in protest.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recent developments likely pose a considerable threat to the viability of the ceasefire. Hamas is highly likely currently facing a dilemma: its leaders likely consider it realistic that Israel will resume hostilities if they relinquish their main source of leverage, the remaining hostages. If they choose to do so, however, they likely assess that Israel is highly likely to use it as a casus belli (cause for war) to again intervene in Gaza.

In this situation, Hamas must almost certainly rely on credible guarantors of the pact to deter further Israeli intervention. Washington is the only power that can achieve this. However, Trump’s recent comments have almost certainly reduced its reliability for this role and therefore make it likelier that Hamas will choose to renege on the agreement.

In addition to threatening the stability of Gaza, recent developments have also threatened the stability of Jordan and Egypt themselves. While ostensibly allied to Washington, both Amman and Cairo have largely pro-Palestinian populations that oppose any plans for the resettlement of Palestinians. Both states are moreover targets for destabilisation operations by regional competitors and transnational extremist groups.

In the (so far, unlikely) case that Trump’s plan was to be implemented, Egypt would find itself bordering a US-controlled territory. This would almost certainly result in a significant increase in anti-US sentiment and likely boost Islamist factions and groups in Egypt. In the Sinai Peninsula, there is a realistic possibility that greater US involvement in neighbouring Gaza would embolden groups like the local branch of the Islamic State (IS-Sinai) to resume their low-intensity insurgency, which al-Sisi declared had ended in 2023.

On 9 February, the junta government in Niger announced the closure of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s operations in the country. The junta has justified the action in response to reports that the ICRC was allegedly not adhering to regulations stipulated by the government. The move follows statements made by the Nigerien authorities in November, which expressed concerns about the European Union’s unilateral distribution of humanitarian aid to NGOs, which included the ICRC. According to the junta, the distribution of aid was ‘in disregard of the principles of transparency and good collaboration.’

On 10 February, Burkina Faso’s junta followed suit, imposing a blanket ban on all NGO activity operating without government permission. The directive follows concerns over security risks regarding unregulated NGO activity.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The decision to ban the Red Cross in Niger and NGOs in Burkina Faso comes at a time when the countries are struggling with dire humanitarian situations caused by conflict with jihadist and separatist groups, as well as increasing international isolation. In Niger, the ICRC has provided medical care, food and other forms of support for decades and is assessed to have directly supported almost 150,000 people between January to June 2024.

In Burkina Faso, NGOs have also played a significant role in addressing humanitarian issues. The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) helped over 130,000 individuals in 2023 with education, food security, shelter, protection, and water programs; Caritas Burkina Faso assisted 1.5 million individuals in 2018 with agriculture, emergency assistance, microfinance, food security, and access to social services programs.

These decisions to cease ICRC and NGO operations are likely a move to curb foreign influence and independent voices in both countries. The move comes amid reports that NGOs have been utilised by France to exert influence in the Sahel region. While this is disputed, the perceived historic involvement of Western countries in the Sahel makes it likely to be believed and may increase anti-Western sentiment in the region.

The move is almost certainly part of a wider trend, with the Sahel junta governments limiting the influence of foreign mining companies, militaries, and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This trend has likely grown for several reasons. The juntas likely perceive the operations of foreign organisations, as contributing to the legitimacy of criticisms from hostile groups, including violent extremist organisations (VEOs) and rival factions. More importantly, foreign entities provide oversight of government actions, often documenting and reporting on human rights violations, mismanagement, and the impact of conflict on civilians.

By expelling these groups, the juntas likely hope to diminish external scrutiny of their actions and incompetence. However, the expulsion of NGOs will almost certainly exacerbate humanitarian crises, increase internal scrutiny, and ultimately play into the hands of the VEOs. Extremist groups are likely to exploit the worsening conditions to expand their influence, recruit disaffected individuals, and position themselves as alternative providers of aid and security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) has achieved rapid advances in the capital Khartoum, capturing key strongholds previously held by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The SAF is reportedly on the verge of controlling all of northern Khartoum, however, the RSF still maintains control of vital ground such as the Soba Bridge on the River Nile.

The UAE, an alleged backer of the RSF, has called for a Ramadan ceasefire to be observed from 28 February to 30 March. However, Sudan’s Sovereign Council President has rejected talks with the RSF unless they lay down their arms, while army officials have dismissed ceasefire proposals unless the RSF retreats. Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, aligned with the SAF, has proposed a roadmap to end the civil war, including the formation of a civilian-led government and free elections. The proposal has been submitted to the African Union (AU), the United Nations, and the Arab League for support.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The recapturing of Khartoum would serve as a major military and political victory for the SAF. However, the SAF’s advance has been enabled by a heavy use of airstrikes and artillery resulting in high rates of collateral damage. With the SAF advancing, the RSF are likely to withdraw from the east bank of the River Nile and consolidate their forces in the west of the city, with the UAE proposal for a ceasefire providing more time to regroup.

The RSF’s regrouping coupled with their control of vital ground will likely slow the rate of the SAF’s advance and lead to higher rates of civilian casualties and displacement, with the SAF likely to conserve manpower through leveraging long-range fires.

Advances in Khartoum suggest that the SAF has seized the initiative which has likely been enabled by Russian support. On 13 February, Sudan and Russia finalised a long-standing agreement for a Russian naval base at Port Sudan. The base is almost certainly a strategic priority for Russia. Access to Port Sudan will enable Moscow to facilitate operations in Africa and achieve a permanent naval presence on the Red Sea, a critical sea line of communication with two strategic choke points that could be blocked in a time of war.

The capture of Khartoum and increased Russian support will almost certainly set the conditions for an SAF offensive aimed at defeating the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. During such an offensive, the RSF is likely to commit to a fighting withdrawal. This will likely involve indiscriminate attacks on civilians, especially as the SAF has ruled out negotiations, a precedent already set by the RSF.

SAF reprisal attacks on the civilian population are also likely. Reports indicate that activists, human rights defenders, and humanitarian workers are being accused of collaborating with the RSF. Lists have reportedly been circulated, identifying politicians, activists, medical professionals, public prosecutors, and members of protest groups as “partners of the RSF.”

The current civil war in Sudan has created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with over 30 million people in need of aid. The establishment of a government in the capital would likely be beneficial for facilitating humanitarian aid into Sudan and its distribution across the country. However, future SAF offensives in western Sudan are likely to exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the short term by disrupting the delivery of aid, damaging vital infrastructure and increasing displacement.

Furthermore, the Trump administration’s 90-day freeze on foreign aid, which may be extended, has already severely impacted Sudan’s humanitarian efforts, leading to the Closure of 742 community kitchens serving over 816,000 people, with USAID providing 75 per cent of the funding. Civilian-led Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), which operate on a volunteer basis, have had to halt operations, leaving millions without access to essential food and medical supplies.

Large-scale clashes which resulted in approximately 100 deaths were recorded on 11 February as Puntland forces advanced deeper into the Cal Miskaad mountain range, where ISS’s main strongholds are located. ISS forces reportedly attacked Puntland forces’ positions using at least 15 person-borne IEDs (PBIEDs) and one vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) on 11 February alone. At least 30 suicide bombings have been reported since the beginning of 2025.

The UAE and US have offered limited support to Puntland units, conducting airstrikes around Dhasaq on 10 February. Puntland sources continue to note the large presence of foreign fighters in ISS units, especially among the perpetrators of suicide bombings. Accounts of ISS’s total manpower vary considerably, from minimum estimates of 400 to maximums of over 1,000 fighters.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The intensification of ISS’s suicide bombings makes the latest campaign reminiscent of larger-scale battles in Mosul and Marawi. In both cases, Islamic State (IS) forces opted to resort to more PBIEDs and VBIEDs to defend vital areas. The recent trends in Cal Miskaad likely reflect the mountain range’s importance for ISS. The large presence of foreigners among ISS units almost certainly showcases the Somali branch’s adoption of tactics used by larger IS branches as well as its close ties to the “core” of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The recent advances by Puntland forces have been successful, with considerable casualties recorded on ISS’s side. Nevertheless, the attrition faced by the attacking force is likely to increase in the short term as Puntland forces continue to advance towards more fortified positions. There is a realistic possibility of a stalemate, with ISS retaining some control in the area and looking for opportunities to reform.

If ISS were to lose Cal Miskaad, the group would highly likely suffer a significant setback, which may have impacts on IS’s global network of branches. ISS, while smaller than other “provinces”, is a key hub for IS’ international flows of funds and fighters, particularly in Africa and the Arab Peninsula.

Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) walks away from coalition talks, deepening crisis

The FPÖ, led by Herbert Kickl, was tasked with forming a government after the centre-right People’s Party (ÖVP) failed to do so. Both major right-wing parties, therefore, have now been unsuccessful in their attempts to form a workable coalition.

President Alexander Van der Bellen now has the option of either calling for new elections or tasking the ÖVP with trying to form a government with the left. In both scenarios, the FPÖ is likely to benefit. Since the 2024 general election, where it finished first with 29 per cent of the votes, the FPÖ has increased its polling to around 35 per cent, meaning that another vote would likely see it increase its numbers in parliament.

On the other hand, the ÖVP has lost considerable public support and is now polling behind the Social Democrats (SPÖ), so, even if it were to form a cordon sanitaire with the left to keep the Freedom Party out of government, it would do so from an extremely weak position and would be exposed to FPÖ’s attacks.

Romania’s president resigns due to significant pressure from opposition

Klaus Iohannis announced his resignation on 11 February amid an impending parliamentary impeachment vote. Senate President Ilie Bolojan has replaced Iohannis and will act as the interim head of state.

Romania is currently undergoing a period of extreme political uncertainty after the second round of the presidential elections in December 2024 was cancelled by the constitutional court over alleged Russian involvement. The first round had unexpectedly been won by Calin Georgescu, a pro-Russia, anti-EU outsider with little political experience.

The unprecedented decision has almost certainly boosted Romania’s anti-establishment parties, particularly the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), which threw its weight behind Georgescu prior to the vote, and SOS Romania, whose leader Diana Sosoaca was barred from running at the elections.

AUR and other populist formations are highly likely to continue pushing for early presidential elections, possibly sooner than the government’s proposed dates in May.

First major blackout in Nigeria in 2025

On 12 February, Nigeria suffered its first major power outage of 2025, after recording 12 consecutive grid collapses in 2024. The Ikeja Electricity Distribution Company reported that the system outage affected all its customers, especially in Lagos, Abuja and Osun due to a line tripping on this axis, which disrupted many businesses and essential services.

The government has implemented several measures to improve the grid, including the privatisation of the power sector and increasing investment in infrastructure. However, inadequate maintenance, corruption, antiquated infrastructure, vandalism and extremist attacks on the grid have hampered major improvements.

Nigerians have expressed their discontent on social media, with historic blackouts fuelling civil unrest and resulting in higher rates of crimes, especially in urban areas when blackouts disrupt lighting and security systems.

Russia claims Ukraine is preparing for false flag attack against vessel in the Baltic Sea

Russia has claimed that Ukraine, with Western support, is preparing a provocation in the Baltic Sea by using Russian-made sea mines to destroy a foreign vessel. The aim, according to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), is to blame Moscow for the explosion, creating a pretext for NATO to intervene and potentially block Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea, which would almost certainly heighten tensions.

This accusation likely serves several strategic purposes.- to sow distrust between NATO and Ukraine, to justify Russia’s own military actions in the Baltic, and to frame Ukraine as an unpredictable actor willing to escalate the conflict. Russia is also likely seeking to undermine peace efforts by portraying Ukraine’s leadership as desperate and willing to provoke further violence rather than seek a resolution.

Russia thwarts Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) attack in Pskov

On 13 February, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) stated its agents had discovered and neutralised an ISKP cell planning a large-scale attack on the local train station. Pskov is a medium-sized city located near the Russian border with Estonia and far from ISKP’s Caucasus recruitment hotspots like Dagestan or Chechnya.

The discovery of an ISKP cell in Pskov is likely reflective of the group’s increasing focus on Russia as a desirable target. ISKP leaders almost certainly assess that the war in Ukraine has made Russia vulnerable to attack. Further ISKP operations in Russia remain highly likely and these will likely include both lone-wolf attacks, but also group-level, more sophisticated actions.

Stabbing in Dublin, Ireland, injures three

Multiple stabbing attacks occurred at several locations in north Dublin on 8 February. Authorities arrested one man, a Brazilian citizen, for allegedly carrying out the attack. As of the time of writing, no motive for the attack has been revealed. Due to the suspect’s migrant background, there is a realistic possibility that retaliatory violence and protests will occur in the short term in Dublin and other Irish cities. Mass riots have occurred in the capital following similar incidents involving migrants, or Irish citizens descended from migrants, most notably in November 2023 following a stabbing incident.

Grenade attack in Grenoble, France, injures 12

The incident occurred on the evening of 12 February at a bar near the Olympic Village quarter. Authorities have excluded a terrorism-related motive for the attack and have instead tentatively linked it to a “settling of scores”. Grenoble is near Marseilles, close to the Italian border, and is a hub for organised crime linked to drug trafficking, especially cocaine, in France. Violence associated with drug trafficking has increased significantly since the summer of 2024, following police operations and inter-group fighting that have created opportunities for violent competition between local groups.

Fitness influencer arrested in Spain for spreading Islamic State (IS) propaganda

The individual reportedly used his social media presence to spread IS content, often mixed with otherwise harmless workout and fitness material, to more than 100,000 followers across different social media platforms. The case likely illustrates a trend already seen in other cases of radicalisation and extremism of extremists’ efforts to “hijack” online communities and to weaponise them as tools to encourage violence and terrorist activity.

Major anti-Mafia operation in Palermo, Sicily

Italian authorities arrested 183 people during a large-scale raid on 10-11 February, which reportedly involved over 1,200 Carabinieri (Italy’s gendarmerie). Most of the arrested are accused of collaborating with Cosa Nostra, the Italian mafia in Sicily.

According to Italian media, the raid led to the discovery of Cosa Nostra operatives’ use of increasingly sophisticated logistics and communications, including encrypted messaging channels and sophisticated equipment. Those arrested include both older leaders and a large number of younger members of local mafia groups, almost certainly showcasing how organised crime in Sicily continues to recruit from younger and more disadvantaged demographics.

Compared to other “mafias” in Italy, such as the Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta and the Campania-based Camorra, Cosa Nostra has been on the back foot for years due to multiple large-scale anti-crime operations and has shifted to “less visible” sectors like online gambling. The latest raid is likely to further weaken the organisation.

Small Yemeni-flagged fishing boats seized off the coast of Eyl, Somalia

On 9 February, a suspected pirate attack occurred against a Yemeni-flagged dhow off the coast of Eyl in northern Puntland. While the incident is still under investigation, a separate report indicates that suspects may have hijacked three small boats.

Hijacking small boats including skiffs and dhows is a tactic utilised by well-armed pirate groups to travel deeper into the Indian Ocean and target larger vessels. Most piracy in Somalia stems from Puntland, where economic opportunities are scarce, and Somali security forces are combatting the Islamic State and Al-Shabaab.

The large-scale clashes between Puntland forces and ISS in recent weeks have highly likely provided a vacuum for armed piracy groups to resume operations. The increase in counter-insurgency operations will highly likely enable local fishermen to carry out further attacks and hijackings on vessels.

Ebola cases continue to rise in Uganda

As of 14 February, the number of confirmed Ebola cases has risen to nine, with one confirmed death, since Uganda declared an outbreak of the disease in late January. Seven cases are being treated in Kampala and one in Mbale.

265 people who have been identified as having contact with the confirmed cases have been quarantined. Given that Ebola symptoms can take up to 21 days to appear, more confirmed cases will likely be announced in the coming weeks.

This latest outbreak is driven by the Sudan strain of Ebola, which has no approved vaccine. While there are currently approximately 2,400 vaccines in Uganda, they are for the Zaire strain behind outbreaks in the DRC. Furthermore, communication deficiencies from authorities and resistance from businesses have made tackling the outbreak more challenging.

On 11 February, an ISKP militant detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) in front of a bank in Kunduz, where a large crowd of civilians and the Taliban were gathered waiting for their salary distribution. The blast killed the attacker, with reports varying on the number of other fatalities, ranging from five to over 25. In March 2024, ISKP carried out a suicide bombing with the same methodology in Kandahar.

On 12 February, reports emerged that ISKP attempted another suicide bombing, this time in Kabul, but that the attack was thwarted by local security.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is the second notable ISKP operation in the north of Afghanistan in recent weeks, the other being the (disputed) assassination of a Chinese citizen in Takhar, a region that borders Kunduz Province to the east. ISKP’s primary area of operations has traditionally been within Kabul and the eastern provinces like Kunar and Nangarhar. The attack therefore highly likely demonstrates ISKP’s improving reach, and how the group increasingly sees the north as a key area where to expand its presence.

Tajikistan, while not having had any recent large-scale terror attacks, has a growing domestic extremism problem. Factors including a lagging economy, combined with an extremely authoritarian government that has sought to neutralise and control religious institutions, have almost certainly created an environment that is extremely receptive to pro-IS radical propaganda. The border area with Tajikistan, which is poorly policed, remains a key entry point for foreign fighters seeking to join ISKP in Afghanistan.

With the Taliban preoccupied with cross-border tensions, as well as domestic rebel groups, ISKP is likely exploiting a weaker Taliban in peripheral regions.

In political terms, the choice of target likely also matters. ISKP propaganda accuses the Taliban government of being propped up by Western funds, which makes banks symbols of both Taliban rule and Western intervention.

The attack in Kabul is likely to undermine the Taliban’s ongoing assertion that they have defeated ISKP. There is a realistic possibility of further ISKP operations in the north in the medium term. More broadly, ISKP is highly likely to continue taking advantage of an overstretched Taliban, carrying out opportunistic attacks on civilians and Taliban forces to undermine Kabul’s tenuous hold on power.

UN suggests former Bangladeshi government complicit in crimes against humanity

A report by UN human rights investigators has accused the former Awami League government under ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of being complicit in crimes against humanity. The report indicates that the government’s brutal response to the student-led protests in 2024, which killed an assessed 1400 people, involved “an official policy to attack and violently repress anti-government protesters”.

The report also suggests that senior members of the government, including Hasina, were aware of and involved in serious offences. The report is likely to validate many of the narratives pushed by opposition groups, who have long accused the former government of authoritarianism, repression, and human rights abuses.

There is a realistic possibility that this will result in unrest and political violence targeting Awami League supporters, government-affiliated institutions, and religious minorities such as Hindus, who have historically been associated with the party.

South Korean president to face insurrection charges

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol will face his first preliminary hearing on 20 February on insurrection charges, while impeachment proceedings against him continue. His impeachment followed a failed attempt to declare martial law in December 2024, with the legislature removing him for constitutional violations. In January, he was arrested on separate criminal charges of insurrection.

The Constitutional Court is overseeing the impeachment process, while the Seoul Central District Court is handling the criminal trial. Impeachment proceedings are progressing rapidly, with some legal experts anticipating a verdict by mid-March.

However, Yoon’s legal team may seek to pause the impeachment by invoking a constitutional act due to the parallel criminal trial. The trial against Yoon will likely provoke several protests, with thousands of demonstrators continuing to rally across South Korea, both in support of and against the president.

First US Navy ship transits Taiwan Strait under Trump administration

On 10 February, the USS Ralph Johnson, a guided-missile destroyer, and the USNS Bowditch, a survey ship, conducted a north-to-south transit through the Taiwan Strait. The transit marks the first US Navy passing of the Taiwan Strait since President Trump assumed office in January and likely served as a strategic message to Beijing, stressing the US’ right to exercise the freedom of navigation and its sustained support for Taipei.

China’s Eastern Theatre Command stated that it had monitored the passage and criticised the US action for sending “the wrong signals” and increasing “security risks in the region.

Almost 200 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) detected in western India

As of 12 February, at least 197 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) have been detected in the Indian state of Maharashtra, with the outbreak concentrated within the Pune region. The death toll is currently assessed at eight, with the first death in Mumbai recorded on 12 February.

GBS is a rare neurological disorder which affects the nervous system, leading to muscle weakness, numbness, and, in severe cases, paralysis. The disease can affect all people but typically follows a viral or bacterial infection. The death rate is generally low (3-7 per cent), however, in severe cases, complications such as respiratory failure, infections, or blood clots can be fatal. Authorities in the region have advised the public to drink boiled water and avoid the consumption of stale or undercooked food.

Island-wide power outage in Sri Lanka

On 9 February 2025, Sri Lanka experienced a nationwide power outage after a monkey came into contact with power lines at a substation in Panadura. The blackout caused widespread disruptions, including railway gate and warning system malfunctions, and the government issued an advisory urging water conservation.

Power was restored to most of the country within hours, however, the authorities had to introduce load-shedding on 10 and 11 February. However, the incident has almost certainly triggered major concerns over the vulnerability of Sri Lanka’s power grid to external disruptions and highlights a major lack of investment in the nation’s infrastructure.

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