Almost immediately after his inauguration on 20 January, President Donald Trump signed an executive order which designated drug cartels FTOs. After months of rhetoric aimed primarily at Mexican cartels, the executive order targeted multiple cartels throughout the Western Hemisphere, such as the Venezuelan-based Tren de Aragua and the primarily El Salvadorean based Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13).

The order declared these organisations a threat to American safety, national security, and the stability of the Western Hemisphere. The order will also tasked Cabinet secretaries with recommending additional criminal organisations for FTO designation within the next 14 days. The order could permit the seizure of cartel assets, sanctions against US citizens dealing with these groups, and the denial of entry to the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Many critics have questioned the efficacy of the executive order, suggesting that it will have few practical effects. Many of the tools and procedures granted under anti-terrorism laws are already in effect as part of broader counter-narcotics operations. Moreover, designating cartels as terrorist organisations does not provide legal authority for large-scale US military intervention in Mexico, something Trump has proposed on multiple occasions. This would require the approval from Congress and would violate Mexican sovereignty, unless the Mexican government consented to the deployment of US troops on its territory.

However, Trump has threatened to deploy US special forces to Mexico in raids against the cartels. This strategy would be possible under the president’s executive powers and would not require congressional approval.

However, the unilateral deployment of US special forces without Mexico’s consent would violate international norms, jeopardise diplomatic relations with Mexico and other Latin American nations, and would undermine trade with Mexico, the US’ largest trading partner. Furthermore, military operations against the well-armed and heavily funded cartels would be high-risk and likely lead to retaliatory attacks on US civilians, personnel and interests in both Mexico and the US. This is a scenario the incoming administration would likely seek to avoid.

The designation of cartels and organised crime groups as FTOs is more likely posturing from the new administration. This tactic is likely aimed at exerting maximum pressure on the Mexican government to do more to curb the power of the cartels and reduce the flow of narcotics into the US. The move will almost certainly appeal to domestic political audiences, given its prioritising of national security and border control, but is likely more significant in its symbolism rather than its practicality.

On 21 January, shortly before 08:00 local time, three vehicles were fired upon by armed gang members near Toussaint Louverture International Airport (PAP) in Port-au-Prince. Two of the vehicles were armoured and fitted with diplomatic plates; one was not armoured.

The vehicles were reportedly transporting India’s consul and staff as they were travelling to their offices in Sarthe. Five people were injured in total, with a sixth person killed. The two drivers and Jenny Handal Bitar, the daughter of the consul, were reportedly among those injured. This event comes the day after a US embassy van was fired upon.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Given a similar incident has occurred twice in one week, gangs were almost certainly deliberately targeting foreign vehicles and diplomatic missions. Some reports indicate that this was likely a retaliatory action in response to recent police and Multinational Security Support (MSS) operations. The attack came one day before Colombian President Gustavo Petro was scheduled to visit; the first time any Colombian president has visited Haiti in over 20 years. By attacking foreign entities, Haitian gangs are likely aiming to send a message of deterrence against foreign involvement in the country.

The ongoing Kenya-led MSS operations, greenlit in October 2023 by the UN Security Council, have faced significant limitations in the form of a lack of funding, equipment, and personnel; it contains a force of just 800, 1,700 short of the intended target of 2,500. António Guterres, the Secretary General of the UN, has warned that if further money, equipment, and personnel are not provided, Haiti’s security institutions could collapse, and gangs could ‘overrun the entire metropolitan area’.

The struggle to control the gangs in Haiti will highly likely be exacerbated by President Trump’s decision to suspend foreign assistance programs for 90 days. Haiti is incredibly reliant on US aid for financial support for its police force as well as humanitarian and health programs. With the US constituting Haiti’s biggest donor, a cut in funding could reduce police capacity even further. Gangs will highly likely take advantage of this and capitalise on the 90-day review period.

The Colombian government of President Gustavo Petro has vowed to wage war against leftwing guerillas in response to a surge in violence that has killed over 100 people and displaced nearly 40,000. The government has also declared a “state of internal emergency” and a “state of economic emergency”, which will grant the executive branch of government to pass certain legislation without congressional approval for up to three months.

The increase in violence has largely been attributed to the National Liberation Army (ELN), which has launched an offensive against rival groups, including Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, to establish control over strategic territories and drug trafficking routes. Fighting has been reported in at least three Colombian departments, with the majority of the fighting occurring in the northeastern Catatumbo region close to the Venezuelan border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As part of the emergency measures enacted by the government,thousands of troops will be deployed to the affected regions. This strategy marks a major shift in the Petro administration’s approach, which has been prioritising dialogue and ceasefire negotiations in its pursuit of “total peace”.

However, it is highly likely that many of the armed factions within Colombia have simply exploited this approach to regroup and rearm, fearing that peace would ultimately threaten their profits from the ultra-lucrative cocaine trade. The government, which has already suspended peace talks with the ELN, will likely prioritise the targeting of the leftist group.

However, the ELN is highly active across multiple regions of Colombia, including the northeast, southwest, midwest, and central areas. There is a realistic possibility that the government’s military intervention could trigger a wave of reprisal attacks across these regions, potentially exacerbating Colombia’s security environment.

These reprisals could include targeted attacks on military units and installations, government facilities, and infrastructure, such as oil pipelines and transport networks. This would further destabilise rural and urban areas, which is likely to result in more civilian casualties and higher rates of displacement.

US President immigration policy plans highly likely to drive civil unrest in urban centres

Donald Trump’s electoral campaign was characterised by promises of strict immigration reforms and an aggressive policy of mass-deportation. On day one of his presidency, Trump signed a series of executive orders that curtailed previous legal routes to enter the US for undocumented migrants at the southern border, declared a border emergency, and expanded federal authorities’ powers to enact deportations.

For example, as per the new executive decisions, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) units will be granted the ability to carry out enforcement actions at schools and churches, after the end of two directives limiting their powers of arrest in “sensitive” locations.

While no large-scale actions have been carried out as of the time of writing, protests have been planned and carried out in largely Democrat-leaning centres like Chicago, Boston, and Los Angeles since inauguration day. While these protests have so far been limited in scale, it is highly likely that immigration-related political developments will drive larger crowds in the coming weeks.

Kenya deploys more police officers to Haiti

Kenya has deployed an additional 217 police officers to Haiti to arrest the spread of gang violence and help stabilise the country. This takes the total number of Kenyan police officers in Haiti to over 600, with plans to increase the number to 1,000, under a UN-backed mission. However, the effectiveness of the international force remains unproven, with gangs still in control of the vast majority of the capital and large swathes of the country. It is now assessed that over 700,000 have been displaced and an estimated 5,600 people were killed in the Caribbean nation in 2024 alone.

Nicaragua launches volunteer police force

More than 4000 officers have been inducted since the group was formed in accordance with changes to Nicaragua’s constitution. A “Volunteer Police” had already existed in 2018, when it was widely deployed by the government to crush domestic opposition with near impunity. It is highly likely that the reinforced organisation, now more clearly institutionalised, will act as a de facto paramilitary supporting the regime of Daniel Ortega.

US withdraws from World Health Organisation (WHO), Paris Climate Agreement

Both decisions had been widely expected to occur on day one of the second Trump administration. The WHO withdrawal is likely to significantly affect the organisation’s operations, as the US provides approximately 18 per cent of its overall funding. In particular, US contributions have been key to the WHO’s programmes to combat HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, as well as tuberculosis.

It is highly likely that the EU and China will take measures to bolster their position within health- and environment-related international agreements and organisations. While the US withdrawal from the WHO is likely to not fundamentally challenge the overarching support the organisation’s mission has abroad, there is a realistic possibility that the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement will bolster the political traction of international opponents of the framework, possibly leading to policy developments abroad.

Wildfires continue across Southern California in the US

Southern California continues to grapple with the effects of Santa Ana winds, which have triggered a series of wildfires and power outages across the region. The Hughes Fire is currently burning approximately 72 kilometres north of Los Angeles and has grown to over 10,000 acres, causing tens of thousands to evacuate; the fire has been 14 per cent contained.

The Laguna Fire near Camarillo has been brought under control, with firefighters reporting 70 per cent containment and no structural damage. Evacuation orders around the Cal State Channel Islands campus have been downgraded to warnings as the fire’s forward progress has been halted.

Meanwhile, the Gibbel Fire south of Hemet has also seen its forward progress stopped, with crews remaining on site to ensure the area is fully secured. In San Diego County, the Gilman Fire in La Jolla has been contained, allowing for the lifting of all evacuation orders, though road closures persist.

The Border Fire, now renamed Border 2 Fire, has expanded to 228 acres with no containment reported yet, as it burns in the Otay Wilderness Area near the Mexico border.

On 20 January, the Russian Project 22010 oceanographic research ship “YANTAR” (IMO: 7524419) entered the English Channel and was observed operating in UK waters. This marks the second time in months that the YANTAR has been observed in UK waters.

In November 2024, the vessel was suspected of loitering over undersea critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the Irish Sea. The Royal Navy was tasked with tracking and monitoring the YANTAR on both occasions. In November, an Astute-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) was authorised to surface near the YANTAR as a deterrent, signalling that the vessel was under covert surveillance by the UK.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Officially, the YANTAR is a Russian oceanographic research vessel that is primarily used for deep-sea research and underwater rescue missions. However, the vessel is operated by the highly secretive Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), a branch of the Russian Ministry of Defence tasked with underwater warfare and intelligence gathering.

The YANTAR is one of the most capable vessels within GUGI, equipped with advanced sonar systems and capable of deploying a range of underwater assets, including remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), and deep-submergence vehicles (DSVs) that can interrogate depths up to 6,000m. This allows Russia to map some of the deepest undersea critical national infrastructure (CNI) in the oceans, the sabotage of which would be immensely challenging and time-consuming to repair.

However, considering the YANTAR’s strategic importance and the extent to which it is monitored by NATO intelligence assets, it is unlikely that the vessel was conducting nefarious activity. With the Trump administration anticipated to curtail aid to Ukraine, it is likely that European nations will be required to take on a greater responsibility.

The Kremlin, which is already suspected of conducting a reckless sabotage campaign across Europe which has included the severing of undersea cables, is likely sending a strategic message to Ukraine’s European allies. By deploying such assets in proximity to undersea CNI, Russia is communicating that it has both the capability and intent to escalate its sabotage campaign, with undersea sabotage providing a low-cost and highly deniable means of exerting pressure on Ukraine’s allies.

Furthermore, the extent of civilian vessels answering to Russian intelligence makes it almost impossible to accurately monitor Russian activity in the maritime domain and the heavy monitoring of vessels like the YANTAR likely provides opportunities for other vessels to exploit.

Following his inauguration on 20 January, US President Donald Trump made statements and issued executive orders that gave the first indications of how the new Trump administration will handle the war in Ukraine.

Firstly, Trump made statements via social media that Putin is to blame for continuing the war, that Zelenskyy had told Trump “he wants to make a deal” and that Putin is “destroying Russia” by not ending the war. Trump threatened that unless Russia stopped the “ridiculous war”, the US would impose “high levels of Taxes, Tariffs, and Sanctions”.

Secondly, Trump issued an executive order titled “Reevaluating And Realigning United States Foreign Aid” that suspends all US foreign aid for 90 days, which caused concern regarding how US assistance to Ukraine would be impacted.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The executive order is unlikely to significantly impact Ukraine’s war effort. The Biden administration made concerted efforts to “Trump-proof” Ukraine aid, due to Trump’s previous threats to end assistance to Ukraine, with pledged future commitments that cannot be easily suspended with presidential executive authority and NATO taking over the US in coordinating military aid to Ukraine.

The G7-led Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) loans initiative, the EU’s Ukraine Facility financial assistance program,  the Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA), the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative  (USAI) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs are all entirely unaffected by the executive order. However, there will nonetheless be a limited impact on Ukraine with foreign development initiatives regarding the restoration of destroyed critical national infrastructure (CNI) and demining being suspended.

It is highly likely that the main intended purpose of the executive order suspending USAID assistance programs relates to the Trump movement’s sociopolitical outlook – the stated “purpose” in the text of the executive order criticises how the “foreign aid industry and bureaucracy” has in many cases been “antithetical to American values” and has promoted ideas “that are directly inverse to harmonious and stable relations”. This is almost certainly in reference to USAID programs that have promoted LGBTQ+ issues, which have received significant criticism from Trump supporters.

What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to which Trump will leverage his executive authority to impede the delivery of military assistance to Ukraine. Trump’s statements on social media likely indicate a focus on further economic sanctions as measures to coerce the Kremlin to engage in peace negotiations, as opposed to boosting military aid.

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have intensified attacks on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) around the Tishreen Dam area, a strategic location along the Euphrates River. Attacks have included the use of heavy artillery and rocket strikes; Turkish conventional forces have also conducted drone and airstrikes targeting SDF positions in areas such as Tal Tamr, Hasakah, and Kobani. The SNA has concentrated forces along critical lines of control, including at Ain Issa, Tal Tamr, and Kobani.

The SDF is also contending with attacks by Arab tribal forces in the Deir ez-Zur, which has forced the SDF to deploy reinforcements from the al-Hasakah area to Deir ez-Zur.

Prior to speaking at Davos, Syria’s new Foreign Minister, Assad al-Shaibani, highlighted the potential benefits of a “special relationship” with Turkey. Al-Shaibani suggested that such a relationship would provide the new Syrian government with access to Turkish technology, regional influence, and European relations. Al-Shaibani also stated that there is no longer any justification for the existence of the SDF, with talks to absorb the SDF into government forces ongoing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Turkish artillery, air, and drone strikes are likely shaping activity designed to degrade the SDF and disrupt its supply lines in preparation for a major offensive against SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. The concentration of SNA forces on three axes likely indicates a multi-pronged offensive against the SDF. Such an offensive combined with attacks by Arab tribal forces in Deir ez-Zur will almost certainly overstretch SDF forces, leaving them vulnerable across multiple fronts and likely unable to maintain control over the key territories they hold.

The pro-Turkey comments made by Syria’s foreign minister are likely strategically aimed at pressuring the SDF into aligning with the Syrian government and renouncing further claims for autonomy. In particular, al-Shaibani remarks that the SDF no longer has any justification for its existence underscores the new government’s view that the SDF is an illegitimate force since the collapse of the Assad regime and territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Without external assistance, the SDF is now likely left with two options: be absorbed into the new government’s forces or face military defeat at the hands of Turkey, the SNA, and Arab tribal militias.

However, in the event of a protracted conflict involving the SDF or if the SDF is forced into submission, there is a realistic possibility that this could embolden ISIS, other extremist groups, or former regime loyalists to exploit the resulting instability and potential security vacuums.

On 22 January, Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units launched a large-scale operation, named “Iron Wall”, in Jenin. The operation is the first major military development following the signing of the ceasefire in Gaza, and the beginning of the second Trump administration in the US. Donald Trump, on day one of his presidency, removed sanctions on settler groups in the West Bank via executive order. On 19 January, settler groups attacked Palestinian residents in the villages of Jinasfut and Funduq, east of Qalqilya. Coinciding with the new IDF operations in Jenin, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other militant groups announced the creation of a “joint operations room” to coordinate activities in the West Bank.

In Gaza, the ceasefire deal approved on 17 January is so far holding, with the first hostage exchanges having been successfully carried out. Reports indicate that Hamas units are overseeing the return of displaced Palestinians to the north of the Gaza Strip.

In Israel, political pressure on the Netanyahu administration increased. On 21 January, the IDF’s Chief of Staff and the head of Southern Command resigned over the failures to prevent the 7 October 2023 attack. Opposition parties, led by Yair Lapid, likewise called on Netanyahu to resign. The leaders of the far-right parties within the government coalition, Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, continued to call for resuming hostilities following the completion of the first stage of the ceasefire.

Solace Global Assessment: 

With the situation in Gaza having been at least temporarily cooled by the ceasefire, both Tel Aviv and the Palestinian militias are highly likely looking at the West Bank as an increasingly important area of operations.

For Hamas, which retains the strategic goal of expanding its political clout in the West Bank, the setbacks suffered by Iran in the region, the recent Palestinian Authority (PA) raid in Jenin, and the seeming willingness of the new US administration to allow Israeli forces and settlers a greater scope of operations in the area represent growing vulnerabilities. Efforts to coordinate more thoroughly with PIJ and other armed groups are therefore likely reflective of Hamas’ attempts to bolster its short-term resilience while allowing for more effective operations in contested areas like Tulkarm or Jenin.

For the IDF, the 42 days afforded by the ceasefire likely represent an opportunity to further weaken Hamas and PIJ in key West Bank strongholds, while simultaneously allowing the PA to “fill the political gap” left by their retreat.

In Gaza, Hamas will likely use the ceasefire to accelerate attacks on rival militias and local clans that threaten its authority in the area. Reports indicate that Hamas fighters have conducted raids against criminal gangs that were attempting to secure humanitarian aid, hence portraying themselves as a force for stability. Hamas will likewise almost certainly continue recruitment efforts to replenish its manpower.

The flow of internally displaced Palestinian civilians from the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone will also offer an opportunity to re-infiltrate the north of the Gaza Strip. Despite these opportunities, the loss of much of its pre-war infrastructure – including tunnels and arsenals – will hinder Hamas’ rearmament efforts. With Israeli troops still in control of the Philadelphi Corridor, the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt that served as a transit point for smuggled weapons, this is unlikely to change in the short term.

The volatility of Israel’s political situation makes it difficult to assess to what extent Ben-Gvir and Smotrich’s calls to resume the conflict after the first phase of the ceasefire are likely to be observed. If it were to resume hostilities, the Netanyahu government would almost certainly face redoubled international and domestic pressures.

There is also a likelihood that, in such a scenario, Tel Aviv would run into Washington’s opposition. Trump is likely to continue his first term’s foreign policy of improving relations with Gulf states, which however has as a premise the limitation of possible points of contention with key powers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Therefore, the White House is likely to continue efforts to stabilise the situation in Gaza and to avoid the restart of a conflict that has minimal potential to advance American strategic interests in the Middle East.

On 19 January, the Houthi-linked Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) released a statement that the Houthis will cease attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea, Bab-el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, except for “vessels wholly owned by Israeli individuals or entities and/or sailing under the Israeli flag.”  This followed the commencement of the ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas.

The statement promised that following the “full implementation of all phases of the [ceasefire] agreement”, the last remaining “sanctions” against Israeli vessels would be lifted. The statement also stipulated, however, that attacks against vessels affiliated with the US and the UK would recommence “in the event of any aggression” from “the aggressor state(s)”.

Additionally, on 22 January, the Houthis released the crew members of the MV GALAXY LEADER (IMO: 9237307), with the vessel’s hijacking in November 2023 having marked the start of the Houthi anti-commercial shipping campaign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Starting in November 2023, the Houthis attacked over 134 vessels in 12 months with uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), and ballistic and cruise missiles.

With 12 per cent of all global shipping previously having passed through the Bab al-Mandeb, a critical chokepoint for maritime trade routes between Europe and Asia, the Houthi campaign against merchant vessels had a global impact. The Red Sea trade corridor saw a 60 per cent decrease in use, due to the increase in insurance premiums and the danger posed to sailors.

The alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope involves markedly increased transit times and fuel costs, leading to container freight rates increasing by as much as 284 per cent.

The extent to which Houthi activity will genuinely alter following the Gaza Ceasefire will likely become clear in the next few weeks, although it is notable that the Houthis have not launched a successful attack against a vessel since November 2024. It is likely that the efforts of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a US-led naval coalition aimed at intercepting Houthi threats and Operation Poseidon Archer, a US-UK joint mission to strike Houthi capabilities within Yemen, have both helped to degrade Houthi strike capabilities. There is a realistic possibility that recent Houthi statements have been made to obfuscate their current limitations and critical shortages in weaponry.

On 18 January, ballot papers from the October elections were incinerated on the outskirts of Maputo. The administrative court rejected the civil society appeal to stop the process.

On 20 January, the swearing-in ceremony for members of provincial assemblies and governors took place and was attended by opposition parties.

On 23 January, protests broke out along the Maputo-South Africa motorway after Trans-Africa Concession (TRAC) attempted to resume toll collection. Protesters smashed through the gates and refused to pay, threatening to set the toll gate alight. Security forces intervened to remove heavy vehicles blocking access and used live ammunition to quell unrest.

According to local NGOs, approximately 314 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The toll gate rioting comes in response to TRAC attempting to reinstate tolls after approximately two months of not collecting them. Mondlane declared that tolls should no longer be paid in December, something he reiterated on 17 January.

The fact that opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane’s demands still resonate with Mozambique’s population despite Frelimo’s perceived victory suggests that he continues to hold sway over the public. However, despite clashes occurring between protesters and security forces, protests have largely decreased since Chapo’s inauguration, indicating that they may continue to diminish in both scale and frequency.

Furthermore, the opposition parties’ attendance at the swearing-in ceremonies indicates that they are ready to move on from protesting the election results; something that may be reflective of the broader population.

Mondlane has announced that he is not interested in joining the new government, though is ready to help find solutions. He has emphasised that he has no problem cooperating with the government if they respond to the questions he considers ‘essential for the people’. He has called for a new round of relatively small-scale protests every Friday at 13:00 local time during the first 100 days of Chapo’s presidency to pressure the government into acquiescing to his demands.

While Mondlane has outlined that he would consider the next steps if the government does not respond to his demands, there is a realistic possibility that demonstrations’ momentum will be relatively diminished in three months. Furthermore, the time enables the government time to present itself as a change from the previous administration, something that Chapo was keen to emphasise in his inauguration speech.

UK government launches probe on Southport stabbings

The government of Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that a public inquiry will be carried out on the July attack, which killed three children and wounded ten others. On 20 January, the perpetrator of the attacks pleaded guilty to the murders, as well as additional attempted murder charges and charges related to the possession of an al-Qaeda training manual.

The attack’s aftermath resulted in severe protests and episodes of targeted sectarian violence, also fuelled by misinformation spread by online-based domestic and foreign far-right channels, in multiple cities across the United Kingdom. There is a realistic possibility of further civil unrest as the inquiry progresses.

Slovakia’s Prime Minister Fico survives no-confidence motion

The vote was raised by opposition parties who accused Prime Minister Robert Fico of shifting Slovakia towards Moscow’s orbit, and of threatening to take the country out of the EU and NATO. The vote, which would have likely failed as Fico holds a parliamentary majority, did not take place as the opposition MPs walked out.

On 20 January, Fico met with Erdogan in Ankara, where the two leaders advanced the idea of redirecting Russian gas supplies to Slovakia via the TurkStream pipeline, a move that considerably worried Brussels. Demonstrations are scheduled to take place in Bratislava on 24 January, and the government stated that it would take precautionary measures over “intelligence” over an alleged plan to carry out a coup against Fico.

Spanish football fans attacked by rival fans in Rome, Italy

Approximately 70 Real Sociedad were attacked by opposing Lazio fans in central Rome on 22 January, the day before a scheduled Europa League match. At least nine Spanish fans were injured with reports indicating that at least two were stabbed and “seriously” wounded.

Football-related violence is a common occurrence in Italy. Teams like Lazio are often supported by organised “ultras” (hooligan) groups that often have ties to far right and neofascist political groups or even organised crime. OSINT analysis highlighted how the attack was highly likely carried out because of political reasons, with pro-Lazio channels describing Real Sociedad fans as “leftists”. 

Three bombings in one night in Sweden

At least two people were injured by a blast in Stockholm on the night of 17-18 January. Explosions are mostly used by organised criminal groups in Sweden and, while often targeting other groups or conducted for intimidatory purposes, often result in bystanders being injured.

Local media reports that 25 bombings occurred in December 2024, and 11 in the first half of January 2025. A growing organised crime presence in Sweden is likely to result in further attacks, especially in the peripheries of large cities. Moreover, as highlighted by counterterrorism researchers with regards to cases in France, there is a growing overlap between criminal gangs and extremist groups, with the latter seeking to obtain access to the former’s arsenals of weapons and improvised explosives.

Knife attack in Aschaffenburg, Germany kills two

Two people, including a two-year-old child, were killed in a stabbing attack in a park Aschaffenburg, Bavaria. According to local media, a man, later identified as an Afghan national who was slated for deportation, attacked a group of children from a daycare centre who were visiting the park.

Germany’s main opposition leader and likely next Chancellor, Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democrats (CDU), has called for a radical shift in Germany’s migration policy ahead of the February general election and criticised the current government for its handling of immigration and deportation processes. Political tensions are expected to intensify as the general election approaches, with migration almost certainly to be a central and controversial issue in campaign discussions.

Two Iranian supreme court justices killed in Tehran

The justices, who had occupied influential positions in Iran’s judiciary since the revolution and had reportedly adjudicated cases involving anti-regime protesters, were killed by a gunman who managed to enter the court on 18 January. A third judge and a bodyguard were also injured in the attack. The shooting follows numerous assassinations of prominent Iranian or allied figures on Iranian soil over the past year. There is a realistic possibility that the regime will use the killings as a pretext for retaliatory violence against regime opponents.

Lebanese military to receive US, EU aid to enforce ceasefire

Washington announced that it would provide USD 117 million, while Brussels pledged USD 62 million to bolster both the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF). The resources will be used to aid the Lebanese military efforts to enforce the demilitarised zone south of the Litani river that was established by the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. More broadly, with Hezbollah at a historical low point in terms of capability, reinforcing the Lebanese military is highly likely seen by both the US and EU as a way to put significant pressure on the Shia militia.

Mali-based Africa Corps receive armoured vehicles from Moscow

On 17 January, reports from Mali identified a large number of Russian armoured vehicles, including tanks and armoured personnel carriers, being delivered to the local paramilitary forces under the control of the Russian Military of Defence. The delivery, which was initially incorrectly claimed by the Malian junta to be for its forces, is significant for multiple reasons.

First, it underscores Russia’s growing commitment to bolster its presence in Africa after its strategic defeat in Syria. Second, it likely further demonstrates how Moscow considers Bamako to be its key partner in the Sahel, and likely the most stable junta in the region. Finally, the shipment of heavy equipment to the Africa Corps demonstrates Moscow’s continued commitment to shifting its model for its footprint in the Sahel away from the more independent Wagner Group towards the “aligned” Africa Corps.  

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continue making progress in Khartoum

The renewed offensive in the capital, where progress had stalled after initial SAF gains in late 2024, comes after the armed forces took control of the strategic town of Wad Madani to the south of the capital and cleared some operationally valuable towns to the capital’s north. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have reportedly been withdrawing units and equipment east of the Nile, likely to set up better defensive positions. The SAF’s primary objective is likely breaking the RSF’s siege of the Signal Corps base, located in the cities southwest. 

Nigerian army kills dozens of Islamist fighters in Borno state

At least 76 fighters from Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) were killed, and a further 72 arrested, in recent operations by Nigerian forces in the northeastern Borno state. The military’s operations are almost certainly retaliatory following an uptick in Islamist groups’ activity in early 2025. On 13 January, ISWAP militants reportedly killed at least 40 farmers in Dumba. Days prior, a failed ambush on a military patrol resulted in 34 Islamists and six soldiers being killed.

Military deployed to northeast DRC to combat Islamic State-aligned group

Troops belonging to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been deployed to the northeast of the country following an attack on the village of Makoko on 15 January. The attack was conducted by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist group aligned with the Islamic State. The initial death toll has been revised to 30 and several volunteers were attacked in the area when attempting to retrieve bodies. ADF attacks in both the DRC and neighbouring Uganda markedly increased in recent years, likely taking advantage of the government’s prioritisation of the southeast, where the rebel M23 group is leading an offensive and has successfully seized major towns and key terrain.

M23 Movement seizes town on main supply route to Goma in DRC’s North Kivu region

On 21 January, Rwanda-backed M23 rebels seized the town of Minova in North Kivu, a key supply hub for the provincial capital Goma. According to local media, clashes occurred on 22 January in Bugulube across Lake Kivu and on 23 January around Sake. The fighting reportedly triggered an exodus of civilians from Nzulo, less than 16 kilometres from Goma.

This comes amidst steady territorial gains from the rebel group after fighting accelerated in October 2024. Recent gains over the past two weeks have reportedly led to over 178,000 displacements, according to the UN. M23 rebels will likely attempt to capitalise on their recent territorial gains and attempt to retake North Kivu’s provincial capital Goma. There is a realistic possibility that further government losses will ignite civil unrest in the capital Kinshasa, which are often anti-Western in their sentiment and violently suppressed by the police.

Fire at a ski resort in Turkey kills at least 78

On 21 January, a fire broke out at approximately 03:30 local time in the restaurant of the Grand Kartal Hotel in Kartalkaya in the Koroglu mountains in northwest Turkey. The high death toll is partially due to the inadequate fire safety measures at the hotel, despite the hotel’s popularity. While some survivors reportedly did not hear an alarm, the hotel’s fire extinguishing systems have been labelled as inadequate.

While the Turkish Culture and Tourism Minister Mehmet Nuri Ersoy stated that the hotel had a fire competence certificate, local mayor Tanju Ozcan stated that the fire department had not issued a positive report since 2007. Police have detained eleven people including the hotel owner as part of an investigation into the fire. Given the high death toll and perceived incompetence of the fire department, who were reportedly responsible for issuing the fire competence certificate, unrest targeting a tightening of legislation and safety standards at such resorts is likely.

Marburg outbreak confirmed in northwest Tanzania

Despite initial attempts to deny the suspected outbreak of the Marburg virus in the northwest Kagera Region, the Tanzanian government confirmed the outbreak on 20 January. The outbreak was confirmed after identifying at least one case in the 25 suspected cases.

The Marburg virus, a highly infectious and often fatal disease, is similar to Ebola and is transmitted to humans from fruit bats and monkeys; it has a very high fatality rate if not treated. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) is deploying a multidisciplinary team and committing USD 2 million to support Tanzania in containing the Marburg virus outbreak, focusing on surveillance, diagnostics, case management, and community engagement.

On 18 January, Myanmar’s junta government and the ethnically Chinese Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) signed a China-brokered ceasefire which came into immediate effect. The ceasefire came after months of pressure from Beijing, and was finally agreed in the seventh round of peace talks in Kunming, China. The MNDAA have reportedly agreed to pull its forces out of several key positions including Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State which was captured in August 2024. The ceasefire terms dictate that full withdrawal must be completed by June.

However, the group has reportedly maintained many of its gains since the offensive beginning October 2023, also known as Operation 1027. Fighting has resumed elsewhere; on 20 January, Myanmar’s military junta bombed the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)-controlled Nawnghkio town in Shan state and carried out two bombing runs in the People’s Defense Forces-controlled Khampat Town in Tamu Township, Sagaing Region on 21 January.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The MNDAA is a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA), which consists of two other groups, the TNLA and the Arakan Army (AA). The Alliance has been engaged in an ongoing offensive against the military junta since October 2023. During the offensive, the groups captured a significant amount of territory consisting of several towns and border crossings with China in Shan State.

So far, there are no indications that the other two members of the TBA are party to the ceasefire. After securing the ceasefire between the MNDAA and the military junta, Beijing will likely turn its attention to the other two members. The TNLA indicated in November that they are ready to engage in peace talks and the AA followed suit in December, providing a potential pathway for another China-mediated ceasefire.

While the ceasefire presents an opportunity for both sides to de-escalate tensions and engage in further peace talks, its staying power remains to be seen. A China-brokered January 2024 ceasefire between the military junta and the TBA lasted approximately five months, breaking down in June amid continued air and artillery strikes on insurgent-controlled areas and mutual mistrust. Furthermore, while the other two members of the alliance have indicated a willingness to talk, they are not yet party to a ceasefire agreement.

As part of its strategy to pressure the MNDAA into a ceasefire, Beijing closed China’s borders with northern Shan State in June 2024, cutting supplies to citizens residing in MNDAA-controlled territory. In the aftermath of the ceasefire, The Chin Shwe Haw border crossing between China and northern Shan State has been opened, allowing a resumption of trade. This is crucial for China’s economic interests, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the Sino-Myanmar pipelines. A reduction in tensions in Myanmar is also key to securing the China-Myanmar border and safeguard regional security since instability in border regions could trigger influxes of refugees.

Thailand legalises same-sex marriage

Thailand has become the first country in Southeast Asia and the third in Asia (following Taiwan and Nepal) to legalise same-sex marriage. The new law grants equal legal rights to same-sex couples, including financial, medical, and adoption rights, and will likely contribute to a cultural shift in Thailand which could reverberate in other parts of Southeast Asia. However, opinion polls indicate that public support was overwhelmingly in favour of the new legislation, parts of Thailand remain deeply conservative and a backlash from more traditional segments of society is possible.

Impeached South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol facing insurrection charges

President Yoon, who was impeached following his attempt to declare martial law, is currently facing charges of insurrection and abuse of power. His impeachment hearing at the Constitutional Court in Seoul has seen significant police presence and sparked protests from both supporters and opponents. He has defended his actions again, stating his declaration of martial law was meant to inform the public of the dangers of an opposition-controlled National Assembly.

Police have also sought arrest warrants for two officials from the presidential security service accused of obstructing investigations related to Yoon’s arrest. The situation has been marked by unrest, with multiple arrests made during protests in support of Yoon. The former president has been detained and moved to solitary confinement. His impeachment hearing continues to draw large crowds and requires substantial police deployment to maintain order. Further unrest is likely as the legal process unfolds.

Chinese national killed in northeastern Afghanistan

The targeted attack occurred on the night of 21-22 January in the Takhar province, near the border with Tajikistan. A Chinese national and a Taliban official were killed in the attack, which also wounded other Chinese and Afghan nationals. The attack was claimed by a group called the National Mobilisation Front (NMF), as well as by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The NMF is an anti-Taliban, anti-ISKP group, which claims to be mostly formed of pre-Taliban Afghan military members.

The NMF justified the attack by stating that the target was a Chinese envoy working with the Taliban intelligence department. While attacks on Chinese nationals have grown in neighbouring Pakistan, they are rare in Afghanistan. The simultaneous claim of the attack by two groups that are ideologically and militarily opposed to each other underscores the high value of Chinese assets and citizens as targets for multiple militant forces. It is likely that attacks on Chinese targets have a strong symbolic value compounded by high visibility for these groups, which thus use them for propaganda and recruitment purposes.

Pakistani intelligence chief visits Bangladesh to improve intelligence sharing

For the first time in decades, the head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has visited Bangladesh, where he was received by Lieutenant General Muhammad Faizur Rahman of the Bangladesh Army. The visit is partially aimed at establishing an intelligence-sharing network between the two countries but has raised concerns due to Rahman’s suspected ties to Islamists and Pakistan.

There are fears that this renewed engagement could lead to subversive activities targeting India, especially through cross-border operations with India suspecting that ISI has long worked with extremist groups that maintain a presence in both India and Bangladesh. The visit follows a series of interactions between Bangladesh and Pakistan, suggesting a thaw in their previously hostile relationship.

Quad member states meet to discuss future policies for Indo-Pacific

On 21 January, the Quad member states of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan convened in Washington to focus on major security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. Salient talking points were the strengthening of free trade and a shared commitment to upholding democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

The was the first Quad meeting since the return of President Trump and occurred only a day after Trump’s inauguration, likely indicating a renewed focus on strengthening the alliance and prioritising regional security concerns, particularly in response to China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific and its unilateral actions in support of its extensive territorial claims.

Childcare centre targeted in anti-Semitic attack in Sydney, Australia

On 21 January, a childcare centre in Sydney was set on fire in what authorities are deeming the latest incident in a growing trend of anti-Semitic attacks in Australia. The centre, which is located adjacent to a Jewish school and synagogue in the east of the city, was also sprayed with anti-Semitic graffiti. Australia has witnessed a major spike in both anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attacks since the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, with at least six reported incidents in Sydney over the past two months.

Landslide kills at least 19 in Indonesia

The landslide occurred on 21 January in the city of Pekalongan in Central Java following heavy rains that started on the day prior. The rainy season in Java runs from November to March and often triggers flooding on the island. Hilly areas such as those affected by the recent landslides are at a higher risk of flash floods and landslides, and the lack of flood-resistant infrastructure can often complicate search and rescue efforts, as well as making floods’ impact worse.

Further rain is expected in the coming days which could exacerbate flooding and trigger further landslides. Several people still remain missing and casualty figures may rise in the coming days.

Taiwanese undersea cables cut

Two undersea cables connecting Taiwan and the Matsu Islands were reported to have been completely severed on 22 January. Taiwanese authorities claimed that the damage was due to environmental factors and degradation, and that no “suspicious vessels” were reported to have transited near the cable.

Repairs are expected to be completed by late February and a backup system, which uses asynchronous satellites, was activated meaning that the recent damages will highly likely not result in significant disruptions. The incident, which is the fourth cable disruption reported in 2025, is still likely to worry Pacific powers, as it cannot be separated from the growing trend of deliberate, state-sponsored sabotage of undersea infrastructure.

Magnitude 6.4 earthquake in central Taiwan

On 20 January, a magnitude 6.4 earthquake struck Chiayi County in central Taiwan. The earthquake caused significant damage and disruptions and resulted in at least 26 injuries, with the majority occurring in Tainan, and others reported in Yunlin and Chiayi.

The earthquake also led to widespread power outages, with up to 7,000 customers affected in Kaohsiung and 12,000 households in Tainan’s Baihe District experiencing temporary power loss. Structural damage was observed in various areas, including the collapse of multiple residential buildings in Tainan’s Nanxi District, where several people were initially trapped. Approximately 30 households in Tainan’s Yujing District were evacuated due to damage in a multi-story residential building.

Taiwanese authorities have warned of potential aftershocks, with magnitudes possibly reaching 5.0 near the earthquake’s epicentre.

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