On 6 January, Justin Trudeau, who has served as Canada’s prime minister since 2015, announced that he would step down as the leader of his party, with the leadership election scheduled for 9 March.

Federal elections are scheduled to be held in Canada by 20 October 2025. The main opposition party is the Conservative Party, which currently polls between 20 and 24 points ahead of the Liberal Party. Furthermore, recent polls indicate that the Liberals risk falling behind the New Democrats, Canada’s third-largest party.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

Trudeau’s resignation follows significant internal pressures within the Liberal Party, as well as considerable domestic and international political setbacks. Trudeau’s political situation had likely become close to unrecoverable following the resignation of long-term ally and Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland in December, who openly accused Trudeau of failing to do enough to meet the challenge posed by US President-elect Donald Trump’s call to impose heavy tariffs on Canadian goods. Freeland’s resignation mobilised large parts of the Liberal Party to increase their calls for the prime minister to step down.

However, even prior to December, Trudeau’s position had gradually deteriorated following repeated setbacks at home and abroad. Canada’s severe cost of living crisis, marked by significant housing shortages, has particularly affected some of the Liberals’ key constituencies.

Domestic protests, such as the COVID-19 and trucker’s protests, a stagnant economy characterised by rising inflation, and growing concerns with immigration also influenced by developments in Europe and south of the border, have all likely contributed to damage Trudeau’s popularity.

On the international stage, the Canadian government has been heavily criticised by pro-Palestine groups, it has engaged in an ongoing diplomatic crisis with India over the alleged targeted assassination of a Sikh independence activist on Canadian soil and has clashed with the incoming US administration.

While a new candidate may boost the Liberal Party’s chances at the elections, it remains highly likely that the Conservatives will win decisively. The first weeks and months of the Trump administration are likely to be particularly crucial. If the promised tariffs are implemented, these are likely to have extremely negative effects for the new Canadian administration. In fact, there is a realistic possibility that Washington will leverage the Liberals’ extremely precarious political position to extract concessions in the areas of security, foreign policy, and trade.

As of 10 January, fast-moving wildfires are currently ongoing in California. At least five separate blazes are currently ongoing around the Pacific Palisades (Palisades Fire), Pasadena (Eaton Fire), Sylmar (Hurst Fire), Acton (Lidia Fire), and Hollywood Hills (Sunset Fire) neighbourhoods of Los Angeles.

The Palisades Fire has burned through over 20,000 acres, causing significant damage, including the destruction of beachfront homes in Malibu; it is approximately six per cent contained. The Eaton Fire has spread to nearly 14,000 acres and is zero per cent contained. The Kenneth Fire has impacted approximately 960 acres and is 35 per cent contained. The Hurst Fire has grown to 800 acres and is 37 per cent contained. The Lidia Fire has grown to approximately 400 acres but is 75 per cent contained.

Mandatory evacuation orders have been issued for nearly 180,000 people in Southern California. Ten deaths have been reported so far. Over 1,400 firefighting personnel have been deployed to combat the blazes and Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency.

Major roads including Sunset Boulevard and part of the Pacific Coast Highway became gridlocked as residents fled the wildfires. Highway lanes near Topanga Canyon Boulevard closed due to the wildfire’s fast expansion. Drivers abandoned their cars on Sunset Boulevard, forcing The Los Angeles Fire Department to deploy bulldozers to Sunset Boulevard to allow fire crews to pass abandoned vehicles.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The fires began on 7 January after a bush fire was caught by a windstorm, spreading the fire into surrounding areas. California is currently affected by the northeasterly Santa Ana winds of approximately 100 km/h, which are caused by high pressure over the Great Basin. These winds have fuelled many of California’s worst wildfires in the past, including the 2018 Woolsey fire, which killed three people.

Peak wildfire season in California typically occurs between July and October each year. Although wildfires are unusual in January, high winds have combined with particularly dry conditions in California to contribute to fertile conditions for the wildfire to spread. Rains of over 0.25 centimetres have not been experienced in Southern California since May 2024. The Santa Ana winds have exacerbated the dry conditions by reducing the humidity levels.

Fire hydrants have reportedly run out of water in the Palisades area. While water tanks are currently being used to supply water to fire fighters, this severely limits the extent to which the fire department can tackle the ongoing wildfires. The reason for the water shortage is currently unknown, but water shortages at fire hydrants may occur because of power outages, high demand during large fires, broken water mains, or drought conditions. Given the recent dry weather, the issues are likely influenced by low water supplies in Southern California.

In the aftermath of the wildfires, residents who have had their property destroyed are likely to ask questions regarding the lack of water in the fire hydrants. Much of California’s water infrastructure was built in the 1960s and 1970s, lacking advanced modern technology and prone to leaks and inefficiency. Furthermore, Los Angeles mayor Karen Bass cut the fire department’s budget in 2024 by approximately USD 17 million. Given California has one of the highest water needs in the US, the federal and state authorities are likely to come under increasing pressure to modernise California’s water infrastructure in the months following the wildfire and increase fire department spending.

Ahead of President Nicolas Maduro’s inauguration for a third six-year term on 10 January, the Venezuelan opposition has warned of a surge in arrests of activists and opposition figures.

Prominent arrests have included press freedom advocate, Carlos Correa, opposition politician Enrique Marquez and briefly, the leader of the opposition, María Corina Machado.

The arrests coincide with planned protests against Maduro’s inauguration, with opposition groups continuing to dispute the results of July’s presidential election, which they allege was marred by fraud and voting irregularities. Several foreign nationals have also been detained on suspicion of conspiracy or sabotage.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

The increase in arrests is likely strategic messaging by the Maduro administration aimed at limiting the extent of planned protests during his inauguration. The strategy, whilst limited to only a handful of prominent individuals, has likely been designed to limit the abilities of key individuals to mobilise protests across Venezuela, as well as rally international support. The detention of foreign nationals is a common occurrence in Venezuela and is often done to portray the idea that the opposition is corrupt and influenced by enemies of the state. Moreover, foreign nationals with current or past associations with foreign governments or militaries are most at risk of being detained, regardless of their true motivations.

Despite the arrests, major disruptive protests in multiple Venezuelan towns and cities during the inauguration are highly likely and will almost certainly be violently suppressed by the government. There is also a realistic possibility of targeted attacks on the inauguration. In 2018, two uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) detonated explosives in Caracas near where Maduro was addressing the Bolivarian National Guard. While some have dismissed this as a false flag attack aimed to bolster support for the regime, the high-profile nature of the inauguration and proliferation of UAV technology likely increase the credibility of such a threat.

Greenland PM pushes for independence as Trump row resumes

The Prime Minister of the Danish autonomous territory, Mute Egede, called for an acceleration of the process to secure independence from the Danish crown. Greenlandic independence is contemplated under the self-rule law of 2009, which posits that it would need to be approved via a referendum. While Egede is part of a well-established independentist movement, the recent comments were almost certainly prompted by US President-elect Donald Trump’s call for the US to buy the strategically important territory from Denmark. In addition to massive reserves of natural resources, Greenland is positioned to strategically control the Arctic, an area where both the US and Russia are increasingly looking to strengthen their positions.

Trinidad and Tobago prime minister to resign before end of term

Prime Minister Keith Rowley announced his plans not to seek re-election and to vacate his post before the end of his term in August 2025. The announcement comes at a time when Trinidad and Tobago struggles with increasing rates of gun violence, which have prompted the government to issue a state of emergency. The ruling People’s National Movement (PNM) will now have to nominate a replacement for Rowley, who will be then appointed by the President.   

Venezuela and Paraguay sever diplomatic ties

On 6 January, Venezuela and Paraguay severed diplomatic ties after Paraguayan President Santiago Pena expressed support for Venezuela’s opposition. Pena spoke with opposition leaders and backed Edmundo Gonzalez, who is in exile and whom the opposition claims won the 2024 Venezuelan presidential elections, after an election marred by accusations of fraud.

Artificial intelligence reportedly used in Las Vegas Cybertruck attack

On 31 December, US Army solider Matthew Livelsberger detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) inside of a Tesla Cybertruck outside of the Trump International Hotel in Las Vegas. Authorities have confirmed that Livelsberger had used the AI chatbot ChatGPT to plan the attack, which would mark the first known use of the platform in support of the development of an IED. The incident has triggered concerns over how easily available AI can be exploited for nefarious means and will likely contribute to demands for stricter regulations on AI platforms.

Central American police arrive in Haiti to reinforce United Nations mission

The first group of a planned 150 military police officers, mostly from Guatemala and El Salvador, arrived in the country to bolster the UN mission, which has so far been led by their Kenyan counterparts.

UN operations in Haiti have so far been relatively unsuccessful at deterring and containing the gangs that control much of the country. The gangs have implemented a terror-reliant strategy, characterised by attacks on hospitals, airports, civil society groups and NGOs, aimed at preventing other actors from establishing control in parts of Haiti, and at maintaining the local civilian population reliant on criminal networks.

It is highly likely that the new deployments will result in a harsh reaction by local gangs, who may accelerate attacks on transport hubs in Port-au-Prince, or carry out killings among the local civilians.

With no involvement by major international players like the US or France, it is unlikely that small countries’ deployment of police forces will manage to stabilise the situation in Haiti in the short term.

Polar vortex in the US and Canada

A polar vortex continues to bring severe winter weather to the US and Canada, prompting widespread disruptions. Georgia’s Governor Brian Kemp has declared a State of Emergency ahead of a winter storm expected on 10 January.

Tennessee’s National Weather Service issued a winter storm warning for Middle Tennessee, forecasting major travel disruptions. In Virginia, Henrico and east Goochland counties remain under a boil water advisory due to storm damage at a Richmond water treatment plant.

Schools in North Texas, including districts like Denton, Dallas, and Fort Worth, have closed for 9 and 10 January. The polar vortex has already triggered a state of local disaster declaration in Saline County, Kansas, after record-breaking snowfall. Power outages have affected thousands in Kentucky, southwestern Indiana, and southeastern Illinois, with restoration ongoing. In Richmond, water production has resumed, though the boil water advisory continues.

Extreme heat and wildfire threat across Chile

Chile’s National System for Disaster Prevention and Response (SENAPRED) has issued multiple yellow alerts across the country warning of intense heat. Yellow alerts have been issued for the Valparaiso, Bio Bio, Maule and metropolitan region which includes the capital, Santiago. Temperatures are set to approach 40 degrees Celsius in several places and are likely to cause or exacerbate many of the wildfires Chile is currently struggling to contain.  

On 6 January, Herbert Kickl, the FPÖ leader, was tasked by President Van der Bellen with forming a new government, after Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) leader and Chancellor Karl Nehammer failed to do so.

FPÖ won the most votes, 28.8 per cent, at Austria’s parliamentary election in September, while the OVP finished second with 21 per cent.

ÖVP’s efforts to form a coalition with the Social Democrats and the liberal Neos failed over disagreements on key policy issues, leading Nehammer to hand in his resignation as chancellor (Nehammer will be replaced on 10 January by Alexander Schallenberg, who will rule until a new government is appointed).

Solace Global Assessment: 

As every other Austrian party has refused to form a coalition with FPÖ, the party’s only option is to make a deal with the ÖVP. The FPÖ has already been in multiple governing coalitions with ÖVP, always as a junior partner (2000-2005, 2017-2019). This time, the party will almost certainly demand the chancellorship, as well as other key government roles. FPÖ currently bargains from a position of strength, as a decision to walk away from the talks would highly likely trigger new elections, where the party would almost certainly improve on its previous vote tally (currently, polls project FPÖ would win 36 per cent of the vote, with ÖVP falling to 21 per cent).

A government led by Kickl, were it to follow FPÖ’s stated policy proposals, would almost certainly drive an increase in civil unrest in Austria.

Some of FPÖ’s pledges are extremely controversial, such as the restriction of welfare benefits to citizens alone, the banning of “political Islam”, and “remigration” – the return of citizens of non-European ethnic backgrounds to the countries their families originate from.

In addition to almost certainly clashing with multiple European institutions and treaties, these proposals are likely to provoke a reaction from multiple civil society actors both on the left and the centre and may likewise drive an increase in political violence. Moreover, FPÖ’s anti-Islam policies are likely to be leveraged by extremist actors to drive recruitment in Austria, increasing the risk of radicalisation and terrorism.

On 5 January, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) launched a limited mechanised offensive against Russian positions in the Kursk salient. AFU forces advanced northeast of Sudzha into Berdin and Novosotnitskii. Initially, the Ukrainian General Staff described the operation as a “new offensive”, however, the Telegram statement was later edited to remove this. Russian forces, meanwhile, reportedly attacked the villages of Malaya Loknya, Sverdlikovo, and Leonidovo from the Kursk salient’s western flank.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The surprise August 2024 Ukrainian offensive into Kursk Oblast rapidly captured ground and temporarily shifted the ‘narrative’ of the conflict. By successfully capturing ground in internationally recognised Russian territory, Kyiv was highly likely hoping to divert considerable Russian forces from offensives in Donetsk and to provide a ‘win’ in the face of increasing Russian momentum in the war. The Kursk offensive, however, was contained without a strategically decisive diversion of forces (the deployment of North Korean personnel to the Oblast is almost certainly part of this effort) and Russia has been gradually but slowly pushing back Ukrainian forces in the north and west of the Kursk salient over the last few months.

It is likely that the current limited offensive operation by the AFU in the east-northeast of the salient has been calculated to exploit potential weaknesses in Russia’s defensive position – Russian forces have focused offensive efforts in the north and west. A breakthrough in the vicinity of Berdin could threaten the outmanoeuvring of Russian forces positioned in the salient’s north, although the diversion of Ukrainian forces from defensive efforts elsewhere in the Kursk salient is risky and has likely factored into the past week’s attempted Russian advances. In addition to the potential tactical advantage, there is a realistic possibility that the limited Ukrainian counteroffensive could have been a probing operation to test the strength of Russian defences in support of a more significant future counteroffensive – Kyiv likely seeks to have a ‘win’ before Trump is inaugurated on 20 January and any territorial gains could put it in a stronger position during anticipated peace negotiations.

Any notable Ukrainian advances would highly likely be met by retaliation by the Kremlin, as part of Russia’s strategy of deterrence. The most likely retaliation would involve significant (larger than in general) long-range strikes using missiles and one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) against Ukraine’s major urban centres, possibly using the new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The use of the Oreshnik with a non-nuclear conventional warhead has likely enabled Putin to reduce nuclear brinkmanship, by providing a means of escalatory retaliation without having to resort to a tactical nuclear strike.

On 9 January, the Benin army suffered heavy losses after one of its most well-defended positions was attacked in the north of the country. Beninese troops had been stationed in the area to prevent cross-border attacks from neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, where there are ongoing Islamist insurgencies. The military did not disclose a casualty count; however, the main opposition party has suggested around 30 soldiers were killed in the attack.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack marks one of the worst losses for the Benin Armed Forces since the escalation of the Islamist insurgencies in the Sahel.

No group has currently claimed responsibility for the attack; however, it is highly likely that it was conducted by the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). JNIM, which has initiated an insurgency in neighbouring northern Togo, is likely attempting to achieve several objectives in Benin and the wider West African region.

JNIM’s strategy likely involves establishing a buffer zone by destabilising the areas of countries adjacent to its key area of operations in Burkina Faso and Niger. Such a buffer zone would provide JNIM greater freedom of movement and fix regional militaries within the coastal nations, limiting their ability and will to deploy resources to the Sahel.

A destabilised northern Benin would also provide JNIM with greater opportunities to increase both its revenue and recruitment, with major attacks demonstrating its growing capabilities.

Should JNIM succeed in recruiting disenfranchised Muslims from Benin, this will provide the extremist group with expanded local knowledge and capabilities but would also free up Sahelian fighters to focus on operations within the Sahel itself.

Moreover, with the sustained trend of Western forces being expelled from the region, extremist groups like JNIM will find it easier to expand their operations unless countries like Benin agree to the hosting of Western forces on their soil.

In the long term, if JNIM successfully destabilises the north and establishes a presence there, it could expand its operations further south, ultimately threatening coastal capitals like Porto-Novo and Lomé- coveted targets due to their strategic location and symbolic value.

On 9 January, Chadian authorities claim that 24 individuals armed with knives and machetes attempted to storm the presidential palace with President Mahamat Deby Itno inside. According to authorities, some vehicles appeared to break down at the entrance of the palace before the assailants walked out and stabbed the four entrance guards, killing one. Guards reportedly shot at the assailants, killing 18 and arresting six, repelling the attack.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The apparent attack comes shortly after Chad held elections, with results planned to be released on 15 January. There is significant speculation regarding whether the incident was conducted by Boko Haram, a rival military faction, another armed insurgent group, staged by the government, or the result of confusion with an armed group of civilians. Given the reliance on knives and machetes and relative disorganisation, the attack is unlikely to constitute a coup attempt by a rival military faction.

While Boko Haram typically uses firearms and explosives, there is a realistic possibility that the assailants were associated with the terrorist group, who may have been taking advantage of the withdrawal of French forces in December 2024.

Alternatively, a government-staged coup attempt would likely provide the government with a pretext to bolster security ahead of expected protests. However, authorities appear to be playing down the significance of the attack, implying they were akin to drunken “Pieds Nickeles”. This could indicate an attempt to minimise the threat of armed groups and project stability ahead of the expected election victory. Alternatively, there is a realistic possibility that security forces mistakenly perceived a group of workers as a threat and shot them before they could attack the presidential palace.

According to local NGOs, approximately 289 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began. The most recent “TurboV8” phase resulted in the highest death toll of any phase so far and was set to be followed by the “ponta de lança” (spearhead) phase. However, this stage was subsequently postponed due to fears of opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane’s assassination. Supporters threatened to block all roads if Mondlane did not appear live on Facebook,, which he did on 6 January.

After announcing his return to the capital Maputo, Mondlane arrived in Mozambique on 9 January ahead of the 15 January inauguration of President-elect Daniel Chapo. Mondlane asked his supporters to “welcome” him at Maputo International Airport (MPM) at 08:05 local time. After greeting Mondlane, a procession of people accompanied Mondlane’s car from the airport to the centre of Maputo. Mondlane then spoke at the Mercado Estrela at approximately 10:00 local time, whereby he reaffirmed his claims of an election victory. Security forces subsequently used live ammunition and tear gas in central Maputo to disperse crowds gathered in support of Mondlane, reportedly charging at the crowd and triggering a stampede.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Despite speculation over whether authorities would attempt to arrest Mondlane upon arrival, Mozambique’s Supreme Court has announced that no arrest warrant has currently been issued. However, the Public Prosecutor’s Office has reportedly opened proceedings against Mondlane as the architect of the unrest. If the government targets Mondlane via arrest or assassination, significant unrest will almost certainly take place. In the long term, however, the loss of Mondlane’s leadership may enable the government to suppress demonstrations through curfews and mass arrests, with protests likely to diminish in the absence of his ability to mobilise the opposition.

On 6 January, Frelimo announced the next key dates in the electoral process. In addition to the inauguration of the parliament and president on 13 and 15 January, the date for the destruction of the 9 October election materials was announced as the 22 January. If the government is still in power on 22 January, demonstrations will almost certainly occur on this date as it will likely be perceived as the final step in the government’s consolidation of power following the election. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will target Frelimo offices, particularly in Maputo, in order to prevent the potential destruction of evidence of alleged electoral fraud.

Mondlane continues to state that he will take office on 15 January and that he will announce further details of the new phase of unrest titled “ponta de lança” (spearhead). Significant demonstrations are almost certain in the lead up to the inauguration. There is a realistic possibility that Frelimo will use Mondlane’s presence in country and attempt to inaugurate himself as president as proof of an ongoing coup. If this happens, the government will likely accelerate efforts to crack down on demonstrations and delegitimise Mondlane, who will pose a significant threat to the government’s legitimacy given he appears to have the backing of the majority of the population.

Romania sets date for presidential election repeat

The new vote will take place in two rounds on 4 and 18 May. The previous elections were annulled by the judiciary after the first round on 24 November 2024 as Calin Georgescu, a virtually unknown independent candidate who largely campaigned on social media espousing anti-establishment, anti-NATO and anti-EU positions, won the most votes. The Constitutional Court’s decision was explained as a reaction to allegedly widespread Russian meddling in the campaign, although no claims of direct interference in the voting process were reported.

Georgescu’s bid for the presidency has been boosted by the first vote’s annulment, and he remains the favourite to win in May. However, there is a realistic possibility that Georgescu will not be allowed to run, as the Constitutional Court may declare him ineligible over funding irregularities during the first campaign. If this were to happen, there would be a high likelihood of severe civil unrest in Romania, with other anti-establishment candidates and parties likely to throw their political weight behind Georgescu.

Georgian protests continue as non-recognition bill set to be proposed by US Congress

Anti-government protests continue in Georgia, notably on Orthodox Christmas Eve (7 January) when thousands set off from churches and converged at the church opposite the parliament building. A bill is set to be introduced to the US Congress that will prohibit recognition of the Georgian Dream government. The bill is quoted as making specific reference to Bidzina Ivanishvili, the oligarch and founder of Georgian Dream who was sanctioned by the US in December 2024.

Salome Zourabichvili, a figurehead for the pro-Europe opposition who was ousted as president in a contested December indirect election, continues to claim to be the legitimate president of Georgia. On 9 January, Zourabichvili told journalists that she will travel to the US to attend Donald Trump’s 20 January presidential inauguration, after being invited by a US Congress member.

There are numerous US politicians sympathetic to the pro-Europe Georgian opposition movement – it is likely that significant international pressure from the US would embolden the protest movement, but also further isolate the Georgian Dream government which could accelerate its alignment with Moscow.

Lebanon’s parliament elects new president after two-year vacancy

Following two rounds of voting held in Lebanon’s parliament on 9 January, the commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, Joseph Aoun, was elected as the fourteenth President of the Lebanese Republic.

The presidency must be occupied by a Maronite Christian, according to Lebanon’s constitution.  As Lebanon is a parliamentary republic, the presidency is a predominantly ceremonial role, though can still wield considerable discretionary reserve powers. The presidency has been vacant since 2022 due to political divisions, with Lebanon’s political system struggling since the end of the previous president’s, Michel Aoun (not related), term. Lebanon has struggled with the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut port explosion, chronic economic crisis and Israel’s military operations against Lebanese Hezbollah.

Joseph Aoun’s election will likely bolster Lebanon’s political stability. With approval from the US, Aoun’s election is likely indicative of the declining influence of Hezbollah in Lebanon after being severely degraded by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). As per the terms of the ceasefire agreement, the IDF’s 60-day withdrawal period from Lebanon expires on 26 January – with this deadline looming, fears regarding the state of the ceasefire, if the IDF continues to occupy areas of southern Lebanon, have likely pressured Lebanese lawmakers to elect Aoun who will continue to have a key role in maintaining the ceasefire.

Attempted attack on Belgian prime minister

On 6 January, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo was targeted in a knife attack outside his home, though the perpetrator was arrested. Little is currently known about the assailant; however, the incident likely reflects a broader rise in violent attacks on political leaders. Uncorroborated reports indicate that the alleged attacker had attempted a similar attack on the US Embassy in Brussels in April.

Greek Anarchists plan “International Week of Action”

The organisation Revolutionary Struggle (RS) has announced a week of political action (between 10 and 16 January) in support of two of its members currently imprisoned in Chalcis. RS has claimed responsibility for carrying out bombings at multiple Greek ministry buildings, the Athens Stock Exchange, the Bank of Greece, the US Embassy in Athens, and IMF offices. There is a high likelihood that Anarchists will carry out attacks in the coming days, likely targeting buildings. There is a realistic possibility that other European Anarchist groups associated with RS, especially in Italy, Spain, and Germany, will carry out actions during the “week of action”.

Attack on Israeli vehicles near al-Funduq, West Bank, kills three and injures eight

The shooting was reportedly carried out by at least three individuals, who targeted civilian vehicles transiting on Route 55. While no claims of responsibility have been made for the attack, it was praised by other Palestinian militias. Israeli sources claimed that the attackers have been nevertheless identified as residents of Jenin. The attack will likely prompt an escalation in Israeli raids in the area, with additional incidents in the West Bank likely leading to increased clashes between Israeli settler communities and Palestinians.

Mali forces capture Islamic State leader

The armed forces of Mali announced the capture of Mahamad Ould Erkehile, alias Abou Hach, who is one of the key leaders of the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP), formerly Islamic State Greater Sahara (ISGS). The operation leading to Abou Hach’s capture was carried out in the Amasrakad area of the Gao region.

There is a high likelihood that ISSP operatives will carry out retaliatory attacks against Malian security forces and civilians. Since the death of its leader Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi in 2021, ISSP has sought to restructure its presence in areas of operations, gradually and partly shifting towards a strategy aimed at establishing a structured governance of local populations. This has however made its leaders more visible, allowing junta forces and their allies to carry out more successful decapitation strikes.

Ivory Coast to cut military ties with France

President Alassane Ouattara has announced that French troops are expected to leave the country in January. This makes the country the sixth to have cut military ties with Paris in Africa. The setback in the Ivory Coast follows Senegal’s and Chad’s recent ousting of French forces, and the previous fallout of relations between Paris and the Sahelian juntas.

France will likely have to turn to other regional powers to maintain a presence in the region. The reduction of France’s footprint elsewhere in West Africa and the Sahel has largely coincided with the growth of Russian operations in the region.

However, with Russia’s overextension having been demonstrated in Syria, and also through Wagner and Africa Corps forces’ failures in the Sahel, it is highly likely that the retrenchment of Western forces will leave a security vacuum that could be exploited by regional Islamist groups, who maintain a strategic aim to expand their presence towards the African coast.

M23 Movement captures strategic town in North Kivu

On 5 January, the M23 Movement captured the mineral-rich town of Masisi, the capital of the Masisi territory, 80 kilometres from North Kivu’s provincial capital Goma. Masisi is strategically important due to its richness in agriculture, livestock, and minerals as well as its access to Goma, a long-term target for M23.

Some conflicting reports indicate that the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) alongside its allies, the Wazalendo, a group of irregular forces allied with the military, may have regained control of Masisi. The mixed reporting indicates that the territory is likely contested, with the FARDC launching offensives to recapture the town.

The M23 rebels have recently made significant gains in North Kivu, seizing control of Katale near Masisi. Fighting in other areas of Masisi territory, including Sake and Ngungu also occurred over the past week, reportedly causing approximately 100,000 people to be displaced.

Storm Floriane causes disruptions in France and Sweden

Storm Floriane caused significant disruptions across Europe, starting in France on 6 January with orange weather alerts being issued due to strong winds. The worst-hit regions in northern France, such as Charleville-Mézières, Châlons-en-Champagne, and Bar-le-Duc, experienced gusts between 80 and 110 km/h. Rail travel was particularly affected due to cancellations, delays, and speed restrictions.

The winter storm then moved across the North Sea into Sweden, bringing violent wind speeds and heavy snowfall, leading to extensive travel disruptions. The Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute issued 28 weather warnings. Train routes were closed due to fallen trees and debris, and public transport services were delayed or cancelled.

Storm Dikeledi, tracking towards northern Madagascar, forecast to become tropical cyclone

Forming on 7 January in the southern Indian Ocean, the low-pressure storm system Dikeledi is tracking westwards towards northern Madagascar. The storm is forecast to strengthen into a tropical cyclone with potential maximum windspeeds of 179 km/h and is expected to make landfall in northern Madagascar between 11-12 January. The Madagascan regions most likely to be impacted are Diana, Sava and Ambatosoa.

In addition to Madagascar, Mozambique and Malawi could also be impacted, with meteorological authorities from both countries issuing statements urging their populations to monitor for potential weather warnings. Depending on the direction the storm system takes, the French overseas island of Mayotte could also be impacted.

Mayotte was recently devastated by Cyclone Chido in December 2024, it is likely that heavy rainfall from Dikeledi could further hamper ongoing recovery efforts.

At 09:05 local time (01:05 UTC) on 7 January, a powerful magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck Tingri County in southern Tibet. The epicentre was located approximately 80 kilometres north of Mount Everest at a depth of ten kilometres. The main tremor was followed by aftershocks of above 5.0 magnitude. The earthquake has caused widespread damage across Tingri County, including the city of Shigatse. Tremors were also felt in neighbouring countries, including Nepal and northern India, although no significant damage has so far been reported in these locations.

Initial reports confirm at least 126 fatalities, with more than 1,000 buildings damaged or destroyed. While the mountainous Tingri County is scarcely populated, approximately 7,000 people live within 20 kilometres of the epicentre. The city of Shigatse, the second largest in Tibet, has around 800,000 residents. Local sources reported that the earthquake has disrupted local power and water supplies, and damage to local roadways has also been recorded. In January, the area has daily minimum temperatures of below -15 degrees Celsius, and daily average temperatures of -7.5 degrees Celsius.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The earthquake is one of the deadliest China has experienced in recent years. On 23 January 2024, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Xinjiang, China. The death count was significantly lower, however, with only three deaths. In 2008, a large earthquake in Sichuan province killed nearly 70,000 people. Southwestern regions of China are frequently affected by earthquakes. This is largely due to the region lying at the convergence zone of the Indian Plate and Eurasian Plate, which periodically releases tectonic stress as earthquakes. Furthermore, the region has numerous active fault systems including the Longmenshan Fault Zone, which triggered the 2008 earthquake, and the Xianshuihe Fault Zone.

The Lhasa block, also known as the Lhasa terrane, is a significant geological region in southern Tibet, situated between the Bangong-Nujiang suture zone to the north and the Indus–Yarlung Zangbo suture zone to the south. This positioning generates north-south compression, resulting in crustal shortening and uplift, as well as west-east stress, which drives lateral crustal movements. These geological processes play a crucial role in the formation of the Himalayas and significantly impact regional fault systems and seismic activity. Several aftershocks were felt in Tibet and Nepal; further aftershocks are highly likely in the coming days.

The government’s response to the earthquake is likely to be viewed through the lens of historical Tibetan grievances. Given the mountainous topography of the region and potential aftershocks, relief efforts will likely be hampered, potentially opening the government up for criticism regarding its effectiveness at governing in the region. In the aftermath of the earthquake, there is a realistic possibility that those sympathetic to Tibetan independence will scrutinise the government response and call for self-determination.

Taiwanese authorities are investigating a Chinese-linked ship which they suspect of deliberately dragging its anchor over an undersea fibre optic cable which connects Taiwan to the US. The Cameroon-registered and Tanzania-flagged vessel Shunxing 39 (IMO: 8358427) was briefly detained by Taiwan’s coastguard on 3 January but was subsequently released. Chunghwa Telecom of Taiwan stated that services across the island were largely unaffected and that it had promptly redirected data through alternative cables.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Unconfirmed reports indicate that this may be the 21^st Chinese attempt to sever Taiwan’s undersea internet infrastructure. As an island nation, with approximately only a dozen undersea internet cables landing on its shores, Taiwan is highly vulnerable to undersea sabotage. Despite attempts to accelerate its development of satellite-based backup systems to ensure connectivity during crises, this technology is in its infancy and cannot provide adequate redundancy. China likely calculates that the severing of multiple cables simultaneously would help to isolate Taiwan and hugely damage its economy. It is highly likely that if this is observed, it would be indicative of shaping activity for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.

Like Russia, China commands a huge fleet of civilian-flagged vessels which answer directly to the state. Beijing has almost certainly observed Russia’s increased use of civilian vessels to conduct low-cost, hard-to-prove, and deniable acts of undersea sabotage and will likely continue to incorporate this into its own “grey zone” strategy. While China’s primary target for undersea sabotage is Taiwan, there is a realistic possibility that these incidents will migrate to other regions, particularly those heavily dependent on critical undersea infrastructure. This could include areas in the South China Sea, in the waters around South Korea and Japan, and further afield as China continues to expand its maritime presence.

Second arrest warrant issued for President Yoon Suk Yeol

A fresh arrest warrant has been issued for President Yoon after police failed to execute the first one, which ended 6 January. Investigators were prevented from entering the presidential palace, blocked by supporters and security. The chief prosecutor, Oh Dong Woon, has declared that he will “prepare thoroughly” for the second attempt to arrest Yoon, implying that it may be the final opportunity to arrest him. Yoon will almost certainly use his security and supporters again to prevent investigators from executing the warrant. On 9 January, Yoon declared that he would accept the decision of the Constitutional Court if it decides to back the impeachment case. This is almost certainly with the aim of moving on from the incident and dissuading prosecutors from conducting further attempts to arrest him.

Indonesia to joins BRICS

Jakarta’s bid to join the group was approved in 2023. Indonesia’s accession to BRICS almost certainly represents a major development in the country’s traditionally “non-aligned” foreign policy stance However, it is unclear to what extent it will trigger significant regional security developments. Indonesia, like fellow BRICS member India, maintains warm ties to the West, and is concerned about China’s footprint in the region. There is a realistic possibility that Indonesia’s foreign policy will continue to maintain elements of non-alignment while using BRICS to improve Jakarta’s range of foreign policy options.

Eight police officers and driver killed in Maoist attack in Chhattisgarh, India

On 6 January, a bomb blast killed at least eight police officers and a driver. The bomb was reportedly planted by Maoist Naxalite group in the latest of a series of attacks targeting security forces. The Naxalite movement began in 1967 in West Bengal and gained traction in Chhattisgarh in the late 1980s. The government has responded by deploying paramilitary forces and local police to combat the Naxalite group. While the intensity of the insurgency has seen a decline in recent years, it is an ongoing challenge for the government, with sporadic attacks occurring in central India.

Bomb blast injures three police officers in southern Thailand

An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in front of a school in Sai Buri on 3 January. The device was reportedly placed near a “stop” sign the police left near the school while they were off duty. It is highly likely that the perpetrators of the blast were local separatist insurgents. A low-intensity civil conflict has been ongoing for more than 50 years in southern Thailand, including the Patani region where Sai Buri is located, driven by groups like the Patani United Liberation Organisation, which aim at separating the majority-Malay Muslim south from the rest of the country. Local media posited that the blast may have been planned to coincide with the 20^th anniversary of a raid on a military camp in the Cho Airong district of Narathiwat, which represented a significant escalation in the civil conflict.

Former Cambodian politician assassinated in Bangkok

On 7 January, Lim Kimya, a 74-year-old former Cambodian opposition lawmaker and dual Cambodian-French citizen, was fatally shot in Bangkok’s Old Quarter shortly after arriving from Cambodia. Thai authorities have issued an arrest warrant for a 41-year-old motorcycle taxi driver suspected of the murder. The suspect is believed to be a Thai national and has acted as a hitman. Lim Kimya was associated with the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), an opposition group dissolved ahead of the 2018 election amid controversial treason charges. Human Rights Watch has called for a thorough investigation, noting the harassment of former CNRP members by the Cambodian government. Despite denying any involvement, there are major suspicions that this was an assassination sponsored by the Cambodian government which could trigger a diplomatic spat between the two Southeast Asian countries.

Increase in hMPV cases in China

China is dealing with a rise in human metapneumovirus (hMPV) cases, particularly in the north of the country, as well as other seasonal respiratory illnesses like influenza and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV). However, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) confirm that these levels remain within the expected seasonal range, and there is no indication of a pandemic-like threat. China’s healthcare system is operating within capacity, with hospital utilisation lower than the previous year, and no emergency response has been initiated. Symptoms are typically mild, resembling the common cold or flu, with severe cases being rare and mostly affecting vulnerable populations.

Fire at market in Zhangjiakou, Hebei province, China kills at least eight

At approximately 08:40 local time on 4 January, a fire broke out at the Liguang vegetable market, a busy market in Zhangjiakou, killing eight and wounding 15. The blaze took approximately two hours to extinguish. Relaxed building codes in China increase the likelihood of fires. Furthermore, traditional markets in China are typically tightly packed, exacerbating the risk to shoppers by making it difficult to escape potential fires.

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