On 16 December, an arrest warrant was issued for former Bolivia President Evo Morales over allegations that he fathered a child with a fifteen-year-old girl in 2016 when he was in office.

The arrest warrant differs from the previous one issued in September 2024, which was issued for the same reasons but halted after Morales’ lawyers launched a successful appeal. The new warrant has been reissued after Morales defied an order to testify but must still be approved by a judge. Morales has denied any wrongdoing and accused his political opponents of trying to eliminate him from the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for 10 August 2025.

Morales has reportedly taken refuge in the central province of Chapare, where he is afforded considerable political support.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The issuing of the original arrest warrant in September was interpreted as a political manoeuvre executed by President Arce to bar Morales from the 2025 presidential election.

Morales supporters, largely from his Movement for Socialism (MAS) party, organised widespread protests across Bolivia, which included strikes, sit-ins and roadblocks. The demonstrations led to multiple violent clashes with the security services, severely disrupted transportation networks, and public services and cost the Bolivian economy almost USD 2 billion.

The Bolivian government’s increasing use of force to disrupt the protests resulted in an escalation of violence, leading to hundreds of injuries and over 20 fatalities.

Morales’ base will almost certainly become galvanised if a judge signs the arrest warrant, perceiving it once again as a politically motivated attempt to bar Morales. This will likely result in a resumption of major protests and road blockades across Bolivia, causing further major disruptions, shortages, price increases and multiple incidents of violence, which may continue periodically until the August election.   

Severe fuel shortages in Cuba

Cuba is suffering from severe fuel shortages, resulting in the closure of many gas stations and long queues for fuel. The fuel crisis follows a series of major electricity blackouts that caused widespread disruption and led to incidents of civil unrest. The fuel and electricity crises have almost certainly placed huge pressure on the communist-run Cuban government, which is receiving fewer fuel deliveries from its major suppliers, Mexico and Venezuela. Should the crisis continue unresolved, there is a high likelihood of unrest in the Caribbean island nation.

Possible lone wolf terror attack at school in Wisconsin, USA

On 16 December, a 15-year old reportedly carried out a school shooting at a private Christian school in Madison, Wisconsin. Two people were killed, a student and a staff member, and six were injured. The attacker, who was found dead at the scene, reportedly shared a manifesto online. The document, if authentic, makes the shooting more likely to be a case of lone wolf terrorism, as the publishing of self-authored statements is a key part of lone wolves’ actions, especially in Western states. The case almost certainly is a further demonstration of the growing trend of extremely young suspects in similar cases.

Major prison riot with multiple deaths may drive protests in Tabasco state, Mexico

At least seven inmates were killed during a mass riot at a detention centre in Villahermosa, Tabasco, on 19 December. According to local authorities, the riot began after two inmates were scheduled to be transferred to a different facility. Following the riot, relatives of the inmates gathered on the Frontera-Villahermosa highway in protest. There is a high likelihood of increased security in the area. There is a realistic possibility of protestors establishing road blocks in the near future.

Gangs in Haiti hijack boat, kidnap dozens

On 13 December, “armed bandits” were reported to have boarded the vessel Nono, which was carrying 52 passengers and 6 crew, during a crossing between La Gonâve and Arcahaie. The hijackers then took the vessel to Maryani, a stronghold of the Bout Ba gang. The worsening of the economic and political situation in Haiti has almost certainly made it easier for gangs to successfully carry out hijacking operations. In August, gangs briefly captured a cargo ship carrying 60,000 bags of rice and kidnapped the crew off the coast of Port-au-Prince. In the ensuing firefight, at least two police officers were killed.

Government-mandated power cuts in Ecuador

Despite President Noboa’s November declaration that power in Ecuador will be restored in December, the government has introduced mandated power cuts that are expected to last throughout December. The power outages will affect millions of Ecuadoreans and have resulted in at least seven major companies being disconnected from the public grid. The government’s inability to resolve the crisis will likely damage the economy, increase crime rates, jeopardise security systems and could lead to anti-government demonstrations in Ecuador’s major cities.

Wildfire season begins in Araucanía, Chile

On 16 December, Chilean authorities issued a red alert for the town of Lonquimay due to a blaze approaching the urban centre. The latest emergency notice is part of an increase in wildfires since late November, with the area of Carahue also affected. The Chilean wildfire season usually begins in early-to-mid December and can last for three months. Due to the difficult terrain in parts of Chile, controlling wildfires can be extremely difficult, and, especially in rural areas, residents risk becoming trapped by the blazes. There is a high likelihood that the pace and severity of wildfires will increase over the coming weeks, as temperatures in the region reach their yearly average maximums in January.

On 16 December, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the Social Democrats (SPD) party lost a vote of confidence in the Bundestag, which resulted in the dissolution of parliament and the calling of snap federal elections scheduled for 23 February 2025.

Out of the 717 votes cast, 207 supported Scholz, 394 opposed him, and 116 abstained. Until a new government is formed, Scholz will continue in a caretaker capacity.

The vote follows the disbandment of Germany’s ruling “traffic light” coalition of the SPD, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) after the withdrawal of the FDP from the alliance following major disagreements over the country’s fiscal policies.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In early November, Chancellor Scholz dismissed Finance Minister Christian Lindner of the FDP over escalating disputes relating to Germany’s economic policies and how to manage an expected recession. The FDP’s subsequent withdrawal resulted in the coalition government losing its parliamentary majority, triggering a broader political crisis and the scheduling of early federal elections.

Current polls indicate that Germany will drift to the right, with the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leading with almost 32 per cent of the vote. The next highest polling party is the far-right populist party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is achieving almost 20 per cent of the vote share. However, all mainstream parties have refused to enter a coalition with the AfD.

This suggests that the next government will likely be another rainbow or grand coalition, involving both right- and left-leaning parties. With the SPD, the third-highest polling party at only 17 per cent, it is highly likely that at least three parties will need to form a coalition which could take months to achieve and will likely result in a high degree of political instability.

With the rise of the AfD and the increasing popularity of the far-left populist Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW) party, the German electoral campaign will almost certainly be characterised by increased anti-immigration rhetoric and calls to end or limit funding for Ukraine. The threat from the populist parties will also likely force the CDU to drift further right, particularly in regard to immigration.

The combined effect of increased anti-immigration rhetoric, populist rallies, increased deportations and Germany’s recent decision to suspend Syrian asylum applications will likely increase the threat of terrorism and political violence in Germany, potentially leading to incidents similar to the 2024 attacks in Mannheim.

Germany’s political polarisation will also almost certainly lead to large-scale rallies and counter-demonstrations, as witnessed during the 2021 federal elections. In 2021, AfD rallies in the East German cities of Berlin, Dresden and Leipzig often attracted thousands of participants and were met by counter-protests, frequently leading to violent confrontations.

In West Germany, where the AfD has traditionally achieved less support, large-scale and potentially disruptive protests against the AfD are likely to take place in major cities like Munich, Hamburg and Cologne. Such protests are likely to be larger and more energised than before in response to the AfD’s current polling, success in state elections and after a series of scandals and accusations of extremism.

On 14 December, Mikheil Kavalashvili was elected as president in the first Georgian presidential election conducted using an indirect vote system through a 300-member College of Electors that is composed of MPs and local government representatives.

225 electors attended the vote, with 224 voting for Kavalashvili. Kavalashvili is staunchly anti-West and a leader in the People’s Power party, which split from the ruling Georgian Dream party in 2022 but still supports the government.

Concurrently, daily pro-European anti-government protests continued, with tens of thousands still attending demonstrations which are primarily taking place on Rustaveli Avenue in the vicinity of the parliament building in Tbilisi.

European Union (EU) sanctions against Georgian officials proposed by the new High Representative Kaja Kallas were reportedly vetoed by Hungary and Slovakia, although a plan to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian officials holding diplomatic passports advanced, pending a formal proposal by the European Commission.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The election of Kavalashvili constitutionally now entails the replacement of the pro-European incumbent President Salome Zourabichvili, with Zourabichvili’s term expiring on 29 December.

While the role of president in Georgia is largely ceremonial, Zourabichvili has used her position to be a figurehead for the pro-European opposition movement. She has previously vowed to remain in office when her term expires (due to accusations that the Georgian parliament is illegitimate following the allegedly fraudulent October election) and called Kavalashvili’s election “a mockery of democracy”. 

The opposition protest movement has likely gradually lost momentum over the past two weeks, with the scale of demonstrations reducing, although daily protests have continued.

However, the demonstrations have thus far failed to pressure the government to compromise. With the opposition parties lacking any political mechanisms to challenge the government, in addition to the protest movement currently losing the ‘battle on the streets’ with riot police, it is highly unlikely that Georgian Dream will be compelled to make meaningful concessions.

Nonetheless, 29 December will be a key date for potential escalation. If Zourabichvili refuses to step down, as promised, she may be forcibly ousted or even arrested. This would highly likely trigger further unrest.

Alternatively, Zourabichvili may extract negotiated concessions from the government in return for stepping down, though it is likely that any concessions Georgian Dream is willing to make will be merely symbolic.

The leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) Ahmed al-Sharaa (commonly known by his former nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Golani) stated that all rebel factions in Syria will be “disbanded and the fighters trained to join the ranks of the defence ministry”. Furthermore, a senior HTS commander called for a unified Syrian state without federal regions, raising serious questions about the prospects of the Kurdish-occupied territories in northeast Syria.

Clashes have continued between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) with conventional Turkish military support and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). While a US State Department official stated on 17 December that a ceasefire around Manbij had been extended until the end of the week, on 19 December Turkish defence ministry officials stated that no such ceasefire talks have taken place and that Turkish-backed forces will ultimately control the Kurdish areas in northern Syria. In reaction, the SDF vowed to fight Turkey and called on residents in Kobani to take up arms.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the past week following the initially scheduled expiration of the Manbij ceasefire (which was highly likely not comprehensive in effect even when active), clashes with heavy weaponry and artillery barrages have taken place at key strategic locations along the Euphrates River at the Qereqozaqê Bridge and Tishreen dam. It is likely that in the near future, Turkish-backed forces with the support of conventional Turkish artillery and airpower will escalate operations against the SDF. There is additionally a realistic possibility that Turkish ground forces will launch an offensive against Kobani.

Currently, Kurdish forces are being pushed back to the Euphrates River, which likely provides a more advantageous defensive position against further SNA offensives from the west. HTS, which controls the interim government in Damascus, has received significant support from Turkey, although it is almost certainly not a Turkish proxy force in the same manner as the SNA. Nonetheless, HTS proposals that essentially imply that the SDF should disarm pose an existential threat to Kurdish control in northeast Syria.

It is unclear how the forthcoming Trump administration will treat the issue, however, Trump has stated on social media that the US should “not get involved” in Syria. Without substantial US support, it is likely that the SDF will struggle to maintain autonomy in the face of significant Turkish-led offensives. It is highly likely, given the threat, that the SDF will refuse to disarm. It is almost certain that a conventional Turkish military invasion would drastically increase the likelihood of attacks conducted by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey.

On 18 December, the Supreme Court of Ghana rejected two separate legal challenges against the country’s proposed anti-LGBT legislation. The rejection will enable President Nana Akufo-Addo to sign the bill into law, who had delayed signing it in response to the legal challenges. The bill was unanimously approved by Ghana’s parliament in February and has also been widely supported by a coalition of Christian, Muslim and traditional leaders.

Solace Global Assessment: 

With such widespread support it is highly likely that President Akufo-Addo will pass the bill. This is despite international condemnation and warnings as to how the bill might affect Ghana’s economy, with fears it may jeopardise financial assistance from both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The bill has been described as one of the most restrictive anti-LGBT laws in Africa and likely reflects a conservative backlash. Whilst same-sex sexual activity was already punishable by up to three years, the bill will increase the prison sentence to five years and also cover the support and promotion of LGBT activities. This last component is vaguely defined and will likely be exploited to target not only individuals engaging in same-sex relations but also those who advocate for LGBT rights or provide support to LGBT communities.

The broad and ambiguous nature of the law could lead to its use against a wide range of activities, including public demonstrations, media discussions and online speech. The passing of the bill will likely serve to legitimise both anti-LGBT sentiment and violence, which will likely increase in Ghana in the long term, leading to major safety concerns and discrimination for both LGBT local nationals and foreign travellers. Foreign LGBT travellers will likely have to adopt a more cautious approach when visiting Ghana and avoid any activities that could be interpreted as promoting or supporting LGBT rights.   

Protests have been ongoing in Mozambique since the October elections. On 16 December, security forces reportedly shot dead two mourners at the funeral of a popular blogger in Ressano Garcia. The incident occurred after mourners blocked roads with trucks, which security forces responded to using live ammunition.

Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane announced a suspension of protests until the Constitutional Council announces its verdict on electoral results on 23 December. Mondlane has declared the schedule until this date, calling for protesters to undertake four days of mourning from 19-22 December, maintaining normal work activities and refraining from protesting.

On 23 December, Mondlane requested that all activity must stop in Mozambique and that citizens must stay in their homes or in the vicinity of the Constitutional Council to listen to its judgement. According to Mondlane, if the Council, which is currently in the process of validating the election results, declares Frelimo as the legitimate winner, then the “TurboV8” phase of protests will begin. As he stated in his latest announcement, “everything is in the hands of the Constitutional Council”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Protesters have, so far, generally adhered to Mondlane’s schedules. Therefore, country-wide unrest across multiple cities will be unlikely to take place over the 19-23 December period. However, there is a realistic possibility that localised demonstrations will occur in reaction to perceived heavy-handedness by security forces.

It is unclear whether the “TurboV8” phase will begin immediately on 23 December following the Council’s announcement. It is highly likely that Mondlane will use Facebook to livestream the details of the “TurboV8” phase shortly after the announcement if the Council rules in favour of Frelimo. While Mondlane may harness popular outrage to call for protests to begin the same day, there is a realistic possibility that the “TurboV8” phase will begin on 24 December.

The Constitutional Council is generally viewed as an arm of the government and will likely declare the results valid. The Mozambican Bar Association has criticised the Council’s process, declaring it illegal. They claim the only response should be a vote recount or a cancellation of the elections. The Council has instead claimed that its review is limited to verifying the results sheets and polling station minutes, rather than recounting original ballots. This method may expose discrepancies such as mismatches with party-held copies or inconsistent totals but will not be as thorough as a full recount.

The Council of State, which advises the President of Mozambique, has called for reforms to the country’s electoral legislation. Podemos, the opposition party, has called for a vote recount. As a further indication of mounting political pressure on the government, Angola has urged South Africa to find a regional solution to the instability.

Cyclone Chido left a significant impact on the French department of Mayotte and neighbouring regions including Comoros, northern Madagascar, the Cabo Delgardo region of Mozambique, and Malawi. As of December 19, the United Nations reports that at least 31 people have died and around 100,000 individuals have been displaced in Mayotte due to the cyclone.

French President Emmanuel Macron has declared a national mourning day on December 23 to honour the victims. Macron is currently in Mayotte to assess the damage and visit remote areas affected by the storm. The cyclone has caused widespread power and communication outages, leaving approximately 76,000 people without power or internet in the Mecufi District of northern Mozambique. The death toll in Mozambique has risen to 45, with over 174,000 people impacted. In Malawi, the storm has resulted in seven deaths and affected more than 7,700 households.

The situation in Mayotte remains critical, with authorities implementing curfews to maintain order as they continue recovery and relief efforts. The Red Cross has reported losing contact with 200 volunteers due to the outages. The French government and international organizations are actively working to assist and restore services in the affected areas. Mayotte’s only international airport has experienced major damage, making it difficult for authorities to restart operations.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Mayotte, a French overseas department, has experienced significant political tensions driven by illegal migration and economic frustrations. Its high levels of poverty and crime alongside overwhelmed infrastructure from the high numbers of migrants make it France’s poorest department. The French government has recently attempted to revoke birthright citizenship, changing Mayotte’s constitution and conducting mass deportations, a highly controversial move.

The damage from the tropical cyclone is highly likely to exacerbate tensions by further straining Mayotte’s infrastructure, damaging its crops, and pushing more residents below the poverty line. Mayotte’s population may, therefore, direct its anger against the ruling authorities and conduct significant social unrest to express their frustration. Macron’s declaration of a National Day of Mourning is likely indicative of his concern over popular sentiment.

In Comoros, strained resources, deforestation, and coastal erosion have worsened poverty, with 40 per cent of the population living below the poverty line. The recent cyclone has caused significant damage, further disrupting communities and affecting agriculture, which employs over 35 per cent of the population. Parliamentary elections on 12 January 2025 are highly likely to be impacted, with heightened tensions and potential unrest likely escalating in the coming weeks.

In Mozambique, the cyclone has affected the Cabo Delgado region, an area experiencing an ongoing insurgency. Moreover, significant unrest regarding the October election has been ongoing in the region. The government’s ability to commit resources to the areas affected by the cyclone will highly likely be significantly hindered. While the coming days may see reduced unrest as communities seek immediate safety in the aftermath of the cyclone, unrest in Pemba will likely increase in the coming weeks.

Libya’s rival factions resume talks in Morocco

On 18 December, delegations from Libya’s two rival warring factions resumed talks near Rabat, Morocco. The talks were held between the country’s two legislative bodies, the High Council of State based in Tripoli in the west and the House of Representatives based in Benghazi in the east, which emerged after the collapse of the Gadafi regime. However, major disagreements over proposed electoral processes, candidate eligibility, and the legitimacy of the rival governments will likely

impede progress towards a lasting resolution.

These factions remain entrenched in their positions, with the House of Representatives insisting on the legitimacy of its government in the east, while the High Council of State in the west refuses to recognise it.

BBC banned in Niger by junta government

The Nigerien junta has banned the BBC from operating in the country for three months after alleging that the media outlet spread false information. The accusation suggests that the BBC spread false information regarding a jihadist attack that reportedly killed 90 government troops. The junta has argued that the report will undermine troop morale, embolden militants and destabilise the country. However, the BBC is just the latest Western media outlet to be banned in the country and it is likely that the junta is attempting to limit its exposure to international criticism as such reporting is likely to increase internal condemnation of an increasingly fragile government.  

Liberian parliament building torched during protests

On 18 December, the parliament building in Monrovia was set on fire during severe civil unrest. The protests were driven by ongoing debates about the House of Representatives’ push to remove House Speaker Konati Koffa over allegations of corruption. According to local media, “dozens” of protesters were arrested between 17 and 18 December, and police deployed tear gas to control the crowds. There is a realistic possibility of the protests increasing in severity as the political situation develops.  

Beginning of Catholic Jubilee to affect terrorism and sabotage risk in Italy

The year-long event begins on 24 December. It is expected that the event will result in a significant increase in tourist arrivals in Rome and other major Italian cities. The jubilee is likely to result in increased anti-tourism incidents in Rome, Florence, Bologna, Milan, and other cities. Possibly, action will include vandalism of private businesses, hotels, and vehicles, or attacks on transport and energy infrastructures.

There is a realistic possibility of a terror attack due to the high visibility of the event and its Catholic identity. Note that, in September, the US State Department increased Italy’s travel threat level to 2 (“exercised increased caution”) due to the possibility of a terror attack.

Growing Islamic State presence in northeast Azerbaijan

An alleged Islamic State (IS) supporter was shot and killed during a confrontation with police forces in the Qusar district. This is the second reported case of IS activity in Qusar in a few months. In September, multiple Azeri police officers were killed in a clash with militants which was claimed by IS as the first “official” attack in Azerbaijan. The recent killing is likely a further demonstration of the growing IS presence in the Qusar area.

More broadly, IS operations in the Caucasus may benefit from multiple factors: Russia’s growing difficulty in allocating resources to police its at-risk regions, the growing traction of Asia-based IS networks and groups, and the return of Azeri foreign fighters previously active in Syria.

US imposes new sanctions on Yemen’s Houthis after escalation with Israel

The US government has imposed new sanctions on the Houthi Movement, which follows a recent escalation between the Iranian-backed group and Israel. On 19 December, a school in the city of Ramat Gan in the Tel Aviv district was damaged by a partially intercepted ballistic missile launched by the Houthis after a series of other attempted attacks on Israel. Israel retaliated with strikes on Houthi targets, including port and energy infrastructure in both Sana’a and al-Hudaydah.

The Houthis have likely increased their Iranian-sponsored attacks in response to Iran’s strategic loss of influence in the Middle East following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the degradation of Lebanese Hezbollah. There is a high likelihood that new US sanctions, Israeli attacks and recent US Central Command (CENTCOM) strikes on the Houthis will result in an increase in Houthi attacks on merchant shipping near Yemeni waters.  

Peace talks cancelled between DRC and Rwandan governments

DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame were scheduled to meet as part of the Angola-mediated peace talks. However, the Rwandan delegation reportedly declined to participate, citing the condition for dialogue between the DRC and the Rwanda-backed M23 rebels, which the Congolese government had rejected. According to a UN report, 3,000 to 4,000 Rwanda Defence Force troops are fighting alongside the M23 Movement in the North Kivu Region.

While Kigali has been accused of providing material and logistical support to M23, the group is not directly beholden to Kigali. Furthermore, Kigali has frequently denied directly backing the M23 rebels, which has been accused of numerous war crimes including killing civilians. Taking part in peace talks without engaging the group would, therefore, be an admission of direct influence on the group, which Kagame is unlikely to accept.

Intense clashes in the region have occurred this week, with M23 rebels taking control of the Bingi village near Lubero on 18 December amidst an ongoing northern offensive against the DRC military. Thousands of civilians have reportedly fled the Lubero area amidst the M23 advance.

Widespread power outage in Kenya

On 18 December, a six-hour power outage occurred across most of Kenya. The power outage resulted in network connectivity metrics dropping to approximately 50 per cent in Kenya and neighbouring Tanzania. The cause has yet to be officially determined, with Kenya Power stating that investigations are underway. However, the Kenyan Cabinet Secretary of Energy, Opiyo Wandayi, and anonymous Kenya Power sources have suggested that the outage resulted from a fault in Tanzania on the Kenya-Tanzania power corridor. Kenya has struggled with power outages in recent months, with other recent major blackouts also being blamed for regional connections with neighbouring countries.  

Militants in Pakistan’s restive Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province have continued their attacks on polio vaccination teams as the government attempts to complete the last vaccination drive of 2024. Twin attacks on 16 December in the Bannu and Karak district targeted the security forces assigned to protect the vaccination teams. In Karak, gunmen opened fire on a police convoy escorting polio workers, killing one officer and injuring a health worker. In Bannu, a police officer guarding a vaccination team was injured after being shot by an assailment on a motorcycle.

Then on 17 December, three police officers were killed after an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated on the roadside in Dera Ismail Khan district.

Solace Global Assessment: 

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack; however, the most likely group was the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or Pakistani Taliban. The group has long supported conspiracy theories that polio vaccinations are a Western attempt to sterilise Muslim children and has been responsible for a series of historical attacks on health workers and their security escorts.

However, there is also a realistic possibility that Baloch militants such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) could have conducted the attacks as they are in the southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province close to Balochistan. The timing of the attack is unlikely to be coincidental. The attacks were timed to take place on the starting day of the final 2024 vaccination drive and are likely a direct response to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s recent declaration that Pakistan will win the war against polio.

The attacks will likely disrupt the vaccination drive and will likely continue if the drive isn’t suspended. A drive in Balochistan was postponed on 18 December in response to the attacks. Previous attacks, which disproportionately target the security services, have previously resulted in police strikes that have forced suspensions. However, the high-profile nature of the attacks has attracted international attention, with the campaign supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Under international attention and with polio rates continuing to increase, Islamabad is unlikely to call off the vaccination drives. To enable the continuation of vaccination campaigns, the authorities will likely issue Section 144s to limit militants’ opportunity to attack and will have promised to deploy more security resources to areas like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Given the ongoing insurgencies in both provinces and the already overstretched Pakistani forces, these measures could lead to more attacks on security forces. Militant groups will likely target both the vaccination campaigns and government forces elsewhere in a bid to further overstretch the security services and undermine the government’s authority.

On 17 December, a magnitude 7.3 earthquake at a depth of 57.1km occurred 30km west of Vanuatu’s capital, Port-Vila. As a result, Port-Vila experienced severe shaking which caused considerable damage. A tsunami was initially issued, but withdrawn after two hours. Being so close to Vanuatu’s most populous urban area, the powerful earthquake has caused at least 14 deaths, with 200 people being treated for injuries. Telecommunications, electricity and water supply were each significantly impacted. The acting Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Charlot Salwai, declared a state of emergency that is in effect until at least 23 December, with a 18:00-06:00 local time curfew.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Vanuatu is one of the most natural disaster-prone countries in the world, due to the frequency of both earthquakes and tropical cyclones that impact the archipelago. This earthquake, however, is almost certainly one of the worst natural disasters to affect Vanuatu in decades, due to the intensity of the earthquake and its close proximity to the capital. The UN estimates that 116,000 people could be affected and major humanitarian challenges have resulted.

Port-Vila is without water due to reservoirs being destroyed, and there is a near-total internet outage due to a submarine cable being damaged. Due to the nature of these damages, it is unlikely that they can be rapidly fully repaired. Reports indicate that despite the internet outage, Starlink customers have been able to access the internet with Starlink coverage of Vanuatu becoming officially available in October.

Port Vila Bauerfield International Airport (VLI) was closed for 72 hours except for relief flights – despite the scheduled 21 December reopening, it is likely that access to the airport will remain difficult due to blocked roads and bridges.

A snap election had been called for 14 January 2025 following the dissolution of parliament by Salwai, with a constitutional challenge to the dissolution by opposition MPs being dismissed by the Vanuatu Chief Justice merely days before the earthquake. There is a realistic possibility that the election will be postponed, which would likely prolong Vanuatu’s current political crisis.

Protesters block trains in ‘rail roko’ protests in Punjab, India

As part of long-standing farmers protests in the Punjab, protesters on 18 December blocked railway tracks to press their demands. These protests have been labelled the ‘rail roko’ protests, and resulted in disruptions to train services across the state. The farmers have numerous demands, including minimum price controls and pensions. Previously, farmers have used tractor convoys and road blockades.

A key current trigger for civil unrest is the condition of a farmer protest leader, Jagjit Singh Dallewal, who on 19 December entered his 24^th day of a “fast-unto-death” hunger strike. Dallewal’s condition has reportedly turned critical and the Supreme Court has directed the Punjab government to intervene.

If Dallewal either dies of starvation or is force-fed (a dangerous and often violent procedure), it is likely this will further inflame unrest.

Protests erupt in Taiwan over proposed opposition amendments

On 19 December, over 10,000 people gathered near the Legislative Yuan in Taipei to join an organised protest over proposed amendments put forward by Taiwan’s current opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The demonstrations were sparked by proposed amendments to key laws, including the Public Officials Election and Recall Act, the Constitutional Court Procedure Act, and the Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures.

Protestors have stated that the amendments are undemocratic and would curtail judicial independence. If the amendments are approved in the Legislative Yuan on 20 December, they will be sent to the president for signing into law—an outcome that is likely to spark further and potentially more intense unrest.

Indian police arrest Bangladeshi militants plotting terror attack

On 18 December, police in the Indian state of Assam apprehended five members of the Islamist militant group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) which reportedly foiled an impending terror plot. JMB is a proscribed terrorist group whose main objective is to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh to replace its secular democracy.

It is highly likely that the plot was inspired by the wider tensions between India and Bangladesh. Since the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, there have been multiple incidents of sectarian violence in both India and Bangladesh between Hindus and Muslims, a trend that is likely to continue with Hasina seeking shelter in India.

Reports that Myanmar junta coerced NGOs into not reporting food scarcity figures

According to a report released by Reuters, the military government of Myanmar carried out arbitrary detentions and other intimidation actions to discourage food security researchers from reporting on widespread hunger in areas of the country under government control. The report is notable as it highlights growing risks faced by humanitarian workers in Myanmar.

The junta, which continues to lose ground against the many rebel groups it is facing, likely has a strong interest in portraying itself as the only capable administrator for the country. As the junta’s diplomatic and military situation worsens, it is likely that the suppression of NGOs will continue.

Moreover, disruptions of aid operations may have broader spillover effects in the region, for instance by increasing refugee flows to Bangladesh’s Cox Bazaar area, which continues to house hundreds of thousands of people displaced from Myanmar.

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