On 6 and 7 December, at least 184 people, most of whom were elderly, were killed in Cite Soleil with guns, machetes, and knives. The murders were reportedly orchestrated by gang leader Monel Felix, or “Mikanò”, of the Micanor gang who reportedly acted upon the belief that his child’s illness was caused by witchcraft. In response, Haiti’s government has promised to “mobilise all its forces to track down and annihilate” the perpetrators.

Despite the severe violence, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) announced it would resume some operations in Haiti on 11 December, with however a limited scope due to the security situation. On the same day the government announced that Port-au-Prince airport would reopen for civilian flights, after it was forced to shut when multiple planes were hit by gunfire.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The mass-killing occurred in Cite Soleil, which is one of the most impoverished parts of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. The Wharf Jeremie neighbourhood, which includes the eponymous port, in Cite Soleil is the stronghold of the Micanor gang. According to local media, the massacre occurred at a time when gangs are increasing their attacks on poor neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince amidst an overall worsening security situation. Last week, two police officers were killed in the Nazon area during a shootout with members of the gang coalition Viv Ansamn, which controls much of the capital.

As gangs continue to operate with impunity in most of the capital, the international peacekeeping mission led by Kenyan police has likely failed to restore a degree of order. In early December, reports emerged that around 20 officers had resigned from the UN-backed mission due to unpaid wages, which Kenyan officials deny. The likely economic pressures will further add to domestic opponents of the Kenyan government, which have protested the use of government resources abroad as a personal prestige-seeking effort by President William Ruto.

The security situation in Haiti is likely to remain extremely deteriorated. Gangs have adopted a strategy aimed at destroying all alternative administrative authorities in the country, including by targeting missions and NGOs, and at paralysing communications and contacts with the outside world. It is likely that, as flights resume and intensify, gangs will once again begin firing on civilian aircraft, possibly resulting in casualties and prompting further airport closures.

On 9 December, the government of leftist President Gustavo Petro announced that it had conducted its first ever air strikes on the Gulf Clan.

The air strikes targeted the powerful organised crime group in the department of Antioquia in northwest Colombia, a key stronghold of the Gulf Clan, where it oversees extensive operations in drug trafficking, human trafficking, and illegal gold mining and controls an estimated 52 per cent of the municipalities.

The strikes resulted in the deaths of at least four members of the Gulf Clan and were aimed at denying the group the ability to build up its resources in the department of Antioquia where it already poses a credible threat to the government.

Solace Global Assessment: 

For over half a century, successive right-wing governments in Colombia relied on airstrikes to combat cartels and left-wing guerrilla groups, including the Marxist FARC movement, which disarmed following a historic peace agreement in 2016.

This strategy was abandoned by President Petro’s government, which has tried to minimise collateral damage and establish “total peace” in Colombia. However, various armed groups have exploited ceasefire deals to consolidate power and build up their capabilities rather than commit to genuine peace talks.

The head of Colombia’s armed forces recently indicated that this has been the case in what was likely a challenge to the Petro administration. The resumption of air strikes may indicate a shift in strategy by the Colombian armed forces and is likely to threaten the progress of continued ceasefire agreements.

The Gulf Clan is one of the fastest growing criminal organisations in Colombia which was formed from remnants of right-wing paramilitary groups that had been disbanded under the peace process.

The group dominates much of the drug routes in Colombia, has destabilised rural locations, has been implicated in multiple attacks on the government and has established itself in at least 24 of Colombia’s 32 departments.

The government’s use of air strikes likely enables it to disrupt Gulf Clan operations without having to commit to major and often costly ground offensives in rural areas. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that the strikes also serve as strategic messaging to FARC dissidents who have refused to engage in peace talks and are also heavily involved in organised crime.

The extension of air strikes targeting other armed groups cannot be ruled out; however, this shift will likely be a major roadblock towards Petro’s plans of total peace and will likely provoke retaliatory attacks by the armed groups.

Donald Trump vows to end US birthright citizenship, pardon some 6 January rioters

The President-elect likely lacks the ability to carry out the former reform, as it is enshrined in the US Constitution, and attempts to abolish it by executive decree are almost certain to meet significant opposition by the legislative and judiciary branches of government.

Meanwhile, the second pledge falls within the president’s powers and could be carried out on “day one” of the presidency.

Both moves are likely to be extremely politically contentious if implemented or even just attempted, and are likely to result in widespread protests, especially in large urban areas like New York and Washington, as well in areas with a large presence of first-generation US citizens.

Mexican truck drivers block major roads to protest the non-payment of bills

On 10 December, truck drivers staged blockades on two major highways, one near Mexico City and another in the Yucatán Peninsula, to protest unpaid wages from government subcontractors.

The subcontractors claimed they withheld payments because the government had not settled its debts with them after their work on a trainline. The government announced it had begun releasing funds to these companies, which is expected to reduce the likelihood of further protests from truck drivers who worked on this project.

This event reflects a larger problem of delayed government payments, stemming from significant deficits incurred to fund projects initiated under the previous administration. If companies continue to withhold wages from workers due to unpaid government contracts, additional protests are likely.

NGO report reveals human rights abuses in Nicaragua

A report by the Nicaragua Never Again Human Rights Collective released on 8 December has indicated that at least 229 people detained for political reasons in the country over the last seven years have suffered torture and other forms of human rights abuses.

The NGO documented at least 40 different types of torture used by the Ortega regime, which has also recently passed reforms to extend the powers of the police, military and the president to curb internal unrest.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative will now also launch an investigation into Nicaragua’s government for persistent attacks on labour rights, human rights and the rule of law, with much of the abuse aimed at NGOs, civil society organisations, journalists and the Catholic Church.

Mexican congressman killed in Veracruz

On 9 December, Congressman Benito Aguas Atlahua of the Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM), was gunned down in the Mexican state of Veracruz.

The killing is part of a wider trend of political violence across Mexico, which led to over two dozen politicians being killed in the run-up to the 2024 elections. However, those targeted are typically local politicians and the killing of a federal congressman who is also part of the ruling coalition will likely present a major challenge to President Claudia Sheinbaum and has raised questions over her internal security policies.

The high-profile nature of the attack is likely to add extra pressure on the government to curb cartel violence and break from its current strategy of “hugs, not bullets”.

Large wildfires in Malibu, California destroy homes and force evacuations

The “Franklin Fire” ignited on 9 December near Malibu and advanced towards the town, burning, as of 12 December, an area of approximately 4,000 acres.

The fire prompted mass evacuations from the area, with approximately 22,000 people estimated to be affected. This is the latest in a series of severe wildfires that have affected the Los Angeles area of California over the past months and have been exacerbated by dry and warm conditions during the summer.

Extinguishing these wildfires is further complicated by the mountainous geography of southwestern California, which makes accessing the affected areas more difficult. As of the time of writing, the fire is assessed as being 20 per cent contained.

Central and South America experiences record year for dengue fever

Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) has stated that 2024 was a record year for dengue fever across Central and South America, with Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico worst affected.

The increases have largely been driven by a hotter and wetter climate which has been exacerbated by poor waste management, creating stagnant bodies of water which are ideal breeding grounds for dengue carrying mosquitoes.

The report warned that the virus is posing a higher than usual risk to children, with children making up around 70 per cent of dengue related deaths in Guatemala and a significant proportion in other parts of Latin America.

Wildfire season in Chile’s Valparaiso region

Recent fires in Chile’s Valparaiso region have prompted evacuation orders and emergency responses from authorities. On December 7, a red alert was issued in Quillota, where evacuation orders were enforced in the Enrique Arenas area due to a significant blaze. Similarly, a yellow alert was declared in Cartagena.

On 10 December, a large forest fire occurred near Calle Larga, southwest of Los Andes. In Catemu, Valparaíso, a red alert was put into effect as a wildfire consumed over 345 acres, leading to the evacuation of at least 25 people and affecting five homes. These events underscore the ongoing severity of the wildfire season in the region; further wildfires are to be expected. Chile’s wildfire season typically begins in early December and runs for approximately 19 weeks.

Protests against the Georgian Dream government which intensified following an announcement that EU accession talks would be suspended until 2028, have continued and remain marked by violent clashes.

The largest protests have taken place primarily on Rustaveli Avenue in the vicinity of the Georgian parliament building in Tbilisi, although smaller demonstrations have also occurred in the past week outside the Georgian Public Broadcaster’s offices and in Kutaisi.

Security forces continue to deploy tear gas and water cannons against protesters, and protesters in turn are increasingly using fireworks against the riot police. What is almost certainly a government-led crackdown on dissent has continued and expanded, with the police conducting regular raids of protester residences, opposition political party headquarters, as well as civil and journalistic organisations. Additionally, multiple reports indicate that cases of “gangs” of masked individuals violently attacking opposition politicians, activists, and journalists are increasing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the levels of political violence in Georgia are increasing, with pro-government gangs (that are called “titushky” by opposition supporters—the term used for the pro-Russian plain-clothed provocateurs in Ukraine before and during the Euromaidan movement) having escalated a campaign of violence against the opposition.

The increasingly regular use of fireworks by protesters, indicates that protester tactics are developing as they attempt to resist the so far generally successful clearance operations conducted by riot police.

Overall, it is likely that the demonstrations lost momentum over the past week. Multiple factors could be contributing to this, including ‘protest fatigue’ and the impact of the government crackdown. However, the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for 14 December, is likely to trigger renewed unrest, as incumbent pro-opposition President Salome Zourabichvili is expected to be ousted, primarily due to the new presidential electoral system.

On 8 December, Damascus was seized by opposition forces just one week and four days after Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) led a rebel offensive that rapidly overwhelmed the regime’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA).

Syria’s now former dictator, Bashar al-Assad, fled the country and has been granted asylum in Russia. In the aftermath of the decisive rebel victory, HTS installed a transitional government headed by Mohammed al-Bashir, who was previously the prime minister of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in HTS-controlled Idlib.

Concurrently, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) moved forces into Syria north of the Golan Heights (which Israeli officials claim is to establish a “buffer zone”) and conducted nearly 500 aerial strikes against Syrian military assets. These included naval vessels, air defence systems, aircraft, and weapon stockpiles.

The IDF claimed they destroyed 70-80 per cent of the Syrian state’s military capabilities in the operation, called “Operation Bashan Arrow”.

Meanwhile, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched an offensive against Kurdish-led and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlled Manbij. The conventional Turkish military also conducted airstrikes against Kurdish targets in northeast Syria, including an airstrike in Raqqa (the first since 2017).

On 11 December, the Kurdish-led force announced a US-brokered ceasefire in Manbij with the SNA.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Leading HTS figures have attempted to present an image of moderate technocratic pluralism since coming to power. Their leader, Abu Mohammed al-Golani (who now refers to himself by his real name, Ahmad al-Sharaa, rather than his nom de guerre), exemplifies this shift.

Al-Golani had initially been sent to Syria by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (who later became the first caliph of the Islamic State) to establish the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, al-Nusra Front. HTS, however, emerged as an organisation from al-Nusra and other Islamist rebel groups following the breaking of ties with al-Qaeda.

Al-Golani has since attempted to cultivate an image that is much more palatable to Western observers, though HTS is still designated by the US State Department as a foreign terrorist organisation.

Syria’s new leaders presently have four key challenges. Firstly, the conflict between the SNA (with conventional Turkish military support) and the SDF remains unresolved, and there is a realistic possibility that these tensions could result in a second civil war.

Secondly, Israel’s freedom of action to conduct considerable military operations in Syria is a fundamental challenge to Syrian sovereignty. It is notable that when pressed by a journalist for a reaction to the Israeli air strikes, an HTS spokesperson evaded the question and spoke instead of the need for institutions and the provision of services—this is indicative of the likely HTS strategy to presently avoid as far as possible any antagonism with Israel and instead focus on state-building.

Thirdly, the remnants of the regime, backed by Iran and Tehran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’, will likely continue to hold some appeal amongst Syria’s Alawi, Ismaili and Shia minorities (although efforts have been made by HTS representatives to develop ties with these communities). The fall of Assad is a critical defeat for the Iranian grand strategic objective, pioneered by the late Qasem Soleimani, of control of the Shia Crescent through proxies and allies, which created a sphere of influence across the Middle East and a ‘land bridge’ between Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. It is highly unlikely that senior Iranian Quds Force commanders will entirely abandon their objectives in Syria.

Fourthly, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have highly likely attempted to exploit the retreat of the SAA to reestablish a foothold in Syria, which has been met by dozens of airstrikes by US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces. SDF-controlled facilities house over 9,000 ISIS fighters. If the SDF are forced to abandon these prisons due to an escalation in hostilities, the potential escape of these detainees poses a threat not only to Syria, but also to the European countries from which many imprisoned ISIS foreign fighters originate.

On 7 December, Ethiopian forces entered the Somali town of Doolow in the contested administrative Gedo region of the semi-autonomous state of Jubaland. Somali federal forces and residents reportedly blocked further advancements into Buulo Hawo, also in Gedo.

This incursion comes as Mogadishu has accused Addis Ababa of smuggling arms to Jubaland and flying Jubaland’s Deputy President Mahmud Seiyd Aden to Ethiopia, viewing its actions as an attempt to destabilise Somalia and a violation of its territorial integrity. As such, Mogadishu has vowed to defend Somali territory if continued “violations” occur and take measures against those who collaborate with Addis Ababa.

On 11 December, fighting broke out between Mogadishu and Jubaland. Jubaland Derawish forces reportedly captured the strategically important Oodow well, Raaskanbooni’s water source, after federal Government troops allegedly initiated combat. In response, Mogadishu deployed more forces to the city before withdrawing them on 12 December to “prevent further violence”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Recent weeks have seen heightened tensions between Mogadishu and Jubaland. On 25 November, Ahmed Madobe was re-elected for a third term in Jubaland after the state’s constitution was amended to remove presidential term limits. Mogadishu responded by declaring this election illegal since they were held without federal government involvement.

In the aftermath, each region issued arrest warrants for each other’s presidents. Despite Mogadishu withdrawing its forces, tensions between Mogadishu and Jubaland will almost certainly continue as each authority attempts to assert its control over southern Somalia.

Mogadishu has accused Addis Ababa of illicitly supporting Jubaland in a bid to secure Ethiopia’s border. Addis Ababa has significant security concerns over the region, viewing Jubaland as a potential buffer zone against cross-border incursions by extremist groups including al-Shabaab which operate in the area.

The Gedo region is on the Jubaland-Ethiopia border, and is, therefore, strategically important for Addis Ababa to control to prevent incursions. As such, Addis Ababa has armed clan militias and seized key airports in Gedo. Mogadishu and Jubaland are also vying for administrative control of the region, which acts as an important gateway for trade and security. Moreover, Mogadishu views control of Gedo as a means of asserting federal authority over Jubaland, weakening the state’s autonomy. The Marehan clan, prominent within Somalia’s federal government, is also predominant in Gedo, culturally linking Mogadishu to the contested region.

Recent tensions over Gedo contribute to general animosity between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. Addis Ababa made a deal with Somaliland’s government in January 2024, which has leased access to its port in exchange for official recognition. Mogadishu, who considers Somaliland’s government to be secessionist and illegitimate and, therefore, unable to grant access of this kind to Somali territory, considers this deal illicit.

In response, Mogadishu made a deal with Cairo to receive Egyptian weaponry, military training, and Egyptian troop deployments to Somalia. Under Turkey’s mediation, Somalia and Ethiopia reportedly agreed to work together to resolve the Somaliland port dispute on 12 December. However, given Ethiopia’s strategic interests in Somalia to protect its borders, combined with Mogadishu’s inability to rein in the motivations of semi-autonomous states including Somaliland and Jubaland, further tensions between the two governments are almost certain.

Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane initiated a “4×4” phase of protests from 4-11 December. Local NGOs report that approximately 110 people have been killed and over 300 injured since Mozambique’s post-election unrest began. During the 4×4 phase, protests escalated nationwide, with roadblocks in Maputo, vandalised government buildings, police stations attacked, and a tourist complex damaged.

In one instance, a detention centre was targeted by protesters, resulting in 46 inmate escapes. Another event saw protesters target the Ressano Garcia and Gigawatt power stations near the South African border, disrupting electricity generation. Public utility EDM implemented power cuts, resuming operations on 9 December after reaching an agreement with the protesters. On 7 December, Mondlane claimed that a second assassination attempt was conducted against him. This, in turn, intensified demonstrations. He announced plans for a “TurboV8” protest phase if demands remain unmet.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Mondlane’s demands remain unmet and demonstrations show few signs of abating. Protesters have increasingly targeted government facilities after discovering hundreds of voter cards in a Frelimo headquarters in Muecate on 4 December. Recent unrest has also expanded focus to also target national infrastructure such as power stations. This indicates that protesters, guided by Mondlane, are increasingly inclined to pressure the government by shutting down state functions.

While Mondlane has not yet announced what the “TurboV8” phase will involve, it is highly likely to focus on public institutions to scale up the pressure.

Security forces continue to utilise forceful measures including tear gas and live ammunition to disperse protests. This has generally proved unsuccessful; protests have typically spiralled into clashes and the targeting of police institutions once security forces use more forceful measures against protesters. Historically, security forces in Mozambique have utilised forceful measures to quell unrest, including the 2010 Bread Riots, which resulted in 13 deaths. The insurgency in Cabo Delgado region in northern Mozambique has compounded pressure on the government to control the unrest by similarly challenging its ability to govern its territory.

Given the steadily increasing pressure on the government, security forces will almost certainly continue to use repressive measures against demonstrators to prevent unrest spiralling further.

On 6 December, members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) began evacuating Syria as the al-Assad regime neared collapse after days of rebel offensives. By 10 December, all IRGC elements left Syria, alongside an estimated 4,000 Iranian citizens. In the days following the fall of Syria, Tehran reportedly remains in an extremely cautious state, and international media has reported growing infighting at the highest levels of Theran’s military and political establishment, with significant questions being raised about President Pezeshkian and the current leadership of the IRGC.

Particularly severe criticisms are being raised at the leader of the elite Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, accused of responsibility for the rout of the Syrian regime’s army. To prop up the Assad regime during more than a decade of civil war, Iran spent billions of dollars and supplied large quantities of resources, including an estimate of 50-70,000 barrels of crude oil per day, weapons, industrial products, and human resources.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The collapse of the al-Assad regime, the degradation of Hezbollah, and the repeated failures of Iran’s deterrence towards Israel and the West have almost certainly constituted Tehran’s largest geopolitical setback in decades. With the ousting of Assad, Iran has lost a major component of its “Shia Crescent”, which has almost certainly disrupted its main facilitation route to Lebanon. The effect of this will limit Hezbollah’s ability to replenish its arsenal and in the long-term is likely to severely weaken Iran’s primary proxy force and main strategic deterrent against Israel.

Tehran’s failure to support the Assad regime effectively in the face of rebel advances has likely conveyed significant messages to Iran’s regional adversaries regarding the true strength of its military capabilities and willingness to support allies. This failure is likely to undermine Iran’s future efforts in establishing deterrence.

Iran is almost certainly at its weakest position in decades. The regime will almost certainly be forced to significantly alter its foreign policy in light of the new developments in Syria. In the immediate term, the collapse of the Assad regime could result in a reshuffle in the leadership of the IRGC and within the broader government. However, Tehran is likely reticent to introduce overly destabilising changes at such a crucial moment, with the regime looking weak to an internal audience.

In the short term, Iran is likely to avoid further escalation with Israel, instead prioritising internal security and the strengthening of its proxy forces. With the facilitation route through Syria severely disrupted, Iran will likely prioritise its smuggling routes through Jordan into the West Bank, where it has attempted to establish an additional front against Israel.

With Iran’s proxy forces degraded and the Assad regime deposed, Iran’s long-term strategy at re-establishing deterrence against Israel, the West and regional Arab rivals will almost certainly evolve. This will likely involve increased investment in long-range conventional military capabilities such as drones and ballistic missiles, capabilities that can reach Israel and breach it’s air defence when launched in large-scale and layered salvos.

However, to truly achieve deterrence, Tehran likely calculates that its best option is to accelerate its nuclear programme, with voices within Iran starting to challenge Ayatollah Khamenei’s 2003 fatwa against nuclear weapons and demanding that Iran withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Growing support for a potential reversal of Iran’s non-nuclear status is also reflected in the country’s accelerated production of 60 per cent enriched uranium, drawing censure from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These developments are unlikely to lead to an immediate nuclear test, as Iran is focused on renewing negotiations with the West and avoiding a regional backlash. However, Tehran may be using this brinkmanship to apply pressure, particularly on Brussels and Washington.

Farmers’ protest escalates in UK capital

On 11 December, hundreds of tractors arrived in Westminster, London to protest the Labour government’s recent budget and its planned changes to inheritance tax for agricultural businesses. The initial protest was set to be held in Trafalgar Square but was to large, promoting its diversion to Westminster, with protests also being staged on major roads outside of the capital. The protests caused significant disruption and are likely to be held again with the incumbent government refusing to amend its proposed policy changes.

François Bayrou appointed as new French Prime Minister

President Emmanuel Macron named Bayrou to succeed Michel Barnier, who was ousted by a no-confidence vote over the 2025 budget a little more than a week ago. Bayrou is a centrist politician and was a government minister early in Macron’s first term. Bayrou’s appointment is likely to disappoint the left, whose moderate elements had been in discussions with Macron over a possible left-wing appointment to replace Barnier.

Five dead in refinery explosion near Florence, Italy

The explosion, which occurred on 9 December, also injured approximately 26 people. Authorities are yet to establish the cause of the explosion. However, the incident has resulted in strikes by local labour unions, with a general demonstration jointly organised by unions of Tuscany’s main urban areas on 11 December.

Burkina Faso junta shuffles government

Ibrahim Traore, who heads the country’s military government, announced the dismissal of Prime Minister Kyelem da Tambela and his government, and replaced him with Rimtalba Jean Emmanuel Ouedraogo. The reshuffle occurred only days after the allied junta in Mali did the same. However, unlike in Mali’s case, the new prime minister is not a member of the military. Ouedraogo is the country’s former communications’ minister and is therefore already well-connected to the junta. Traore gave no reason for the change in government, but it is likely that it is a reaction to the worsening security and socioeconomic situation in Burkina Faso.

Security forces teargas protesters against gender-based violence in Kenya

On December 10th, security forces made numerous arrests and used teargas to disperse protests against femicide rates in Kenya. The country has seen a significant number of gender-based violence cases, with 97 women reportedly killed since August, mostly by male partners.

These clashes are the latest in a series of cases of unrest in Kenya in 2024. Demonstrations against a government Finance Bill in June spiralled into violent clashes between protesters and security forces. Kenya’s underlying economic issues continue to be present, with demonstrations threatening to escalate multiple times since.

Security forces’ reaction to the protests against gender violence is highly likely an attempt to prevent demonstrations from spiralling again. As such, security forces will likely continue to use forceful measures to quell unrest.

Three students arrested in France for planning attacks on behalf of IS

The suspects are reportedly all under 21 years of age and had managed to prepare improvised explosive devices to allegedly use in attacks in the cities of Nimes and Nantes, targeting French security forces. According to authorities, the suspects stated that they expected that their attacks would trigger a civil war and eventually the establishment of an Islamic state in France. The case is further evidence of increased radicalism amongst the European youth, which may further increase as a result of developments in the Middle East.

Multiple Islamic State (IS) supporters arrested for planning attacks in Germany

On 10 December, German police announced the arrest of three individuals from Hesse and Mannheim on suspicion of planning a terror attack on an unspecified target on behalf of IS. Notably, authorities seized an “assault rifle” from the suspects. Days prior, an Iraqi national was arrested in Bavaria for allegedly planning an attack on a local Christmas market, also in support of IS. The recent cases continue to highlight the high threat posed by lone-wolf terrorism and self-radicalised terrorists in Europe. IS-linked terrorists continue choosing high-visibility targets, such as Christmas markets.

Romanian police arrests armed men en route to Bucharest

The security situation in Romania has worsened since the constitutional court made the unprecedented choice to annul the first round of the presidential elections over concerns of Russian interference in helping anti-NATO candidate Calin Georgescu. The 20 individuals arrested on 8 December, armed with bladed weapons and firearms, allegedly included individuals who had links to the Wagner Group.

Russian security forces detain Islamist terrorists in Dagestan

The arrests took place on 7 December, with Moscow stating that the 12 suspects were planning a “major terrorist attack” at an unspecified location in Russia. Authorities also seized two explosive devices, firearms and ammunition. There is a realistic possibility that the arrests will be followed by further moves to increase state surveillance in regions that Russia deems at risk from terrorist activity, such as Dagestan and Chechnya. Multiple channels close to the Kremlin have noted that the fall of Assad in Syria raises the profile of Russia as a possible target for terrorist actors, who may increase recruitment in Russia or in its peripheral regions such as the Caucasus.

Growing likelihood of escalation between Palestinian Authority (PA) and militants in West Bank

On 8 December, the PA launched a counterterrorism operation in Jenin – notably, the first in years – following a threat by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants that they would attack PA government buildings. The raid resulted in at least three PA security officers being injured, as well as the alleged killing of a 17-year-old Palestinian civilian by PA officers.

This latter incident has provoked an escalation in the tensions between the PA and local Palestinian armed groups, including PIJ and elements of Hamas, with clashes recorded in Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm and Tubas. There is a realistic possibility that the growth of PA operations, as well as the willingness to carry out a counterterrorism operation in Jenin in the first place, is a response to PA officials’ growing interest in exploiting the weakness of local Palestinian militant groups.

At the same time, the PA remains widely disliked in the West Bank and continues to remain on the edge of financial collapse. If tensions escalate, Israeli forces are likely to step in to support the Palestinian Authority, which is viewed by Tel Aviv as a stabilising entity for both the West Bank and a potential post-Hamas Gaza.

Series of terrorist attacks in Niger close to Burkina Faso border

There have been a series of terrorist attacks in western Niger close to the Burkina Faso border targeting both the Nigerien military and civilians. The Niger Army reported that 21 civilians and 43 soldiers were killed in one attack near Tera on 5 December, with additional attacks in the west of the country occurring on both 11 and 12 December.

The government has attributed the attacks to the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP), which has traditionally used the border regions as a hideout.  With the Benin-Niger border intermittently closed due to sanctions and escalating extremism in the region, Niger is increasingly reliant on trade routes through Burkina Faso for essential goods.

Violent extremist organisations (VEOs) like ISSP are likely attempting to disrupt these routes in a bid to undermine and isolate the junta government in Niamey.

French forces begin withdrawing from Chad

French Mirage jets left their base in N’Djamena on 10 December for Nancy, weeks after Chadian authorities annulled their defence cooperation agreement with Paris. French officials have stated that the phases of the withdrawal and their specifics are still being discussed with their Chadian counterparts.

The withdrawal of French troops constitutes a significant setback for France in the Sahel and may result, as highlighted in Niger, in a security vacuum that could be exploited by Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs) or groups looking to oust the junta government.

While Sahel states have looked to Russia for help to replace departing Western forces, Moscow’s setbacks in Syria and its expenditure of resources in Ukraine and elsewhere in the Sahel may reduce its ability to effectively replace Western forces.

Suspected bandits kidnap 50 in northwest Nigeria

The Nigerian army has deployed more resources to the state of Zamfara in northwest Nigeria in response to the abduction of civilians from a village within the Maradun Local Government Area. On 8 December, suspected bandits kidnapped an estimated 50 women and children from the village and have to date refused to accept ransom payments for some of the victims.

The kidnappings are part of a wider trend in northern Nigeria that is being driven by poverty, high rates of unemployment and the proliferation of illegal firearms. Moreover, government forces are overstretched by an Islamist insurgency in the north and separatist movements in the south.

IED attack on Jewish community in Cape Town, South Africa

Early on 6 December, an improvised explosive device (IED) was thrown at a Jewish community centre in Cape Town. The device failed to detonate, and thus the attack resulted in no injuries. Attacks on Jewish community centres and places of worship, as well as private homes, have increased since 7 October 2023 across most countries, with notable cases in France and Australia. However, similar cases have been relatively less frequent in South Africa. The attack is likely to provoke some symbolic protests in Cape Town, although these are unlikely to result in large-scale transport disruptions.

Offices, colleges, and schools to close in Tehran due to air pollution

Over the weekend, elementary schools and kindergartens were closed and football matches were cancelled due to soaring pollution levels. To prevent further pollution, the government-imposed measures such as traffic restrictions including a 48-hour ban on diesel trucks. This did not reduce pollution levels in the immediate term and on 10 December, government offices, schools, and universities will close in Tehran for two days due to pollution.

In January, The Health and Climate Change Department of the Ministry of Health reported that 14 per cent of natural deaths in Iran are associated with air pollution levels. The human cost is reportedly between USD 12 and 20 billion each year. This is largely due to the use of mazut, a form of fuel oil utilised in power plants and industries, which releases high levels of particulate matter.

While authorities have attempted to reduce air pollution by halting the burning of mazut for electricity generation, these measures alone are unlikely to considerably reduce air pollution levels.

Nigeria experiences 11^th nationwide power outage in 2024

On 11 December, Nigeria’s national grid collapsed marking the 11^th time in 2024. The blackout affected much of the country, including Lagos and Abuja, with outages expected to last for several days in parts of Nigeria, with the restoration of power being prioritised in major cities.

The blackout has disrupted telecommunications and traffic systems and will likely jeopardise many security systems. Periodic blackouts have also been one of the main drivers of civil unrest in Nigeria and there is a realistic possibility of demonstrations being held in the upcoming days, especially as the central government has recently established a team to overcome this issue.  

In the morning of 11 December, a suicide bombing attack occurred in central Kabul near the refugees ministry building. The attack killed at least 12 people, among them Khalil Haqqani, a Taliban government minister and one of the key leaders and founders of the Haqqani network, a semi-independent militia in charge of Afghanistan’s domestic security. Haqqani is the highest-profile member of the Taliban killed since the group took power in 2021. Taliban officials have stated that the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was responsible for the attack, and ISKP have also claimed it.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The killing continues to highlight the significant failures of the Taliban to establish a degree of security, even in Kabul, and underscores the regime’s continued difficulties in combating the existential threat of ISKP, alongside pressures from the rebel National Resistance Front (NRF) and neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. For ISKP, the attack likely represents a significant success, as it both demonstrates the Taliban’s overall weakness, and thus advances the goal of destabilising the regime, and reinforces local perceptions of the Islamic State’s capabilities.

In practice, the killing is unlikely to affect the Haqqanis’ strength in the short term or the actual functioning of the Taliban government, as elderly Khalil Haqqani’s post as the head of the refugee ministry was mostly ceremonial despite his large political influence. Nevertheless, the attack is likely a significant strike to the power centres of the Taliban regime and may impact internal power dynamics. In particular, the security failure may exacerbate latent tensions between the Haqqanis and the rest of the Taliban government. Sirajuddin Haqqani, currently the interior minister of Afghanistan and the de facto head of the Haqqani network, has repeatedly been described as a dissenting voice, opposed to the Kandahari Taliban faction led by Afghan supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada.

The Haqqani network will almost certainly respond violently to the attack. This may entail carrying out retaliatory attacks in eastern regions of Afghanistan that have a higher ISKP presence, like Kunar and Nangarhar. Moreover, Taliban officials have repeatedly accused Pakistan of sheltering ISKP members in its territory, and there seems to be a widespread belief among senior Taliban that ISKP actions are at least in part sanctioned by Pakistani intelligence. The recent attack could therefore once again widen fault lines between Islamabad and Kabul, with adverse security impacts in the border regions of the two countries, where the Taliban and ISKP both have a strong presence.

Following President Yoon’s temporary imposition of martial law on 3 December, an impeachment bill filed by the National Assembly failed on 7 December. Yoon’s People Power Party (PPP), at least eight of whom were required to achieve the required two-thirds majority, refused to participate in the proceedings and boycotted the vote.

The president has accused the opposition of obstruction and election fraud, justifying his actions during the martial law period, and has stated he has no intention of resigning early. Opposition parties filed a second impeachment bill against President Yoon on 12 December, with a vote scheduled for 14 December.

Yoon is also under investigation for the crime of insurrection, a crime that carries a potential death sentence. As part of the investigation, police forces have raided his office and other key government buildings, but the Presidential Security Service has blocked investigators from accessing the Presidential Office Building. Yoon has been issued a travel ban while investigations are underway. A court has issued an arrest warrant for former Defence Minister Kim Yong-hyun, accusing him of sedition and abuse of power. While in detention, Kim attempted to take his own life.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Opposition forces have vowed to hold an impeachment vote every Saturday until Yoon is no longer president. Yoon held a speech on 12 December defending his actions as an act of governance, denying claims of insurrection. Given Yoon has remained defiant, he appears unlikely to step down willingly.

While Yoon’s party failed to back the first impeachment bill, Yoon-loyalist Kwon Seong-dong has indicated that he is in favour of impeaching Yoon. Protests have occurred daily in Seoul since Yoon imposed martial law. They are highly likely to continue until he is either impeached or steps down. Demonstrations and growing frustration with Yoon will almost certainly add pressure on the PPP to back impeachment proceedings. If Yoon’s party fails to back the 14 December vote, unrest will likely escalate.

India and Bangladesh hold talks to defuse tensions amidst protests in Dhaka

On 9 December, Indian and Bangladeshi foreign secretaries met in Dhaka to discuss growing tensions after Sheikh Hasina’s deposition. Recent tensions have revolved around accusations by Hindu-majority India that Hindus are being persecuted in Muslim-majority Bangladesh. Hindu rights groups in India and Bangladesh have criticised the interim government of facilitating violence against Hindus, leading to fears that Muslim-Hindu tensions will flare up in reciprocal violence.

In Dhaka, protesters rallied around the Bangladesh diplomatic mission on 10 December in protest of this violence. Hindus have been historically persecuted in Bangladesh. With the removal of Hasina, who kept extremist Islamist sentiments largely in check, these fears have reignited. Given the recent ousting in the country and unstable political situation, potential for violence to flare up is particularly concerning.

Bangladeshi officials have accused India of attempting to undermine the interim government by exaggerating violence against Muslims. The meeting indicates an important step in reducing tensions between the two nations, something that could have a knock-on effect in easing fears of renewed Hindu persecution in Bangladesh.

At least 55 arrested following protests at the presidential palace in the Maldives

The protesters, who are migrant workers from India and Bangladesh, claimed they had not been paid in more than six months. According to local media, the protests have resulted in the opening of an investigation by local authorities.

While protests sometimes occur in the Maldives, these are often met violently by authorities, and also by pro-government supporters. It is unlikely that the recent protests will result in further unrest by local civil society actors. However, as relations between India and the Maldives remain at historic lows, the arrests could result in diplomatic tensions between the two countries.

Pakistani military continues targeted operations amid surge in militant attacks

The Pakistani military has continued its intelligence lead operations in the militant strongholds of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan where it is attempting to kill or capture senior figures within militant groups, particularly in the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA). However, the operations have likely inspired a wave of militant attacks, with the BLA conducting multiple attacks on government forces throughout the reporting period.

An Islamabad-based think tank has reported that there were at least 61 militant attacks in Pakistan across November 2024. This marks a 27 per cent increase in attacks but the attacks resulted in a 69 per cent increase in fatalities. This likely indicates that militant attacks are becoming larger and more deadly- a trend that is likely to increase in response to government operations.

Rebels in Myanmar claim full control of border with Bangladesh

On 10 December, one of the largest ethnic rebel groups in the Myanmar civil war, the Arakan Army, announced that it captured the last junta military outpost in the strategic western town of Maungdaw in Rakhine State. The Arakan Army now claims to have secured full control of Myanmar’s 271-kilometre border with Bangladesh.

The seizure of Maungdaw will likely put the Arakan Army in a more favourable position to secure autonomy from the junta, will likely embolden other rebel forces and will place considerable pressure on an increasingly isolated regime. However, the Arakan Army has been accused of human rights abuses and uncontested control of large parts of Rakhine State could result in greater persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim minority, leading to more inter-ethnic violence and migration flows to neighbouring Bangladesh.

China conducts large-scale military exercise around Taiwan

On 9 December, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) conducted a major military exercise simulating the isolation and invasion of Taiwan. The exercise is one of the largest ones held by China to date, involving an estimated 90 PLAN and CCG vessels, combined with 47 aircraft being detected within Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ).

The exercise was likely a direct response to Taiwan President Lai’s recent diplomatic visits to nations that recognise Taiwan, including the US. China has now staged four large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in just two years, the regularity of which will likely make it increasingly challenging to identify a genuine invasion of Taiwan.

Melbourne synagogue set on fire

The building, located on the outskirts of the Australian city, was burned by two unidentified individuals in the early hours of 6 December. The fire injured one worshipper who was on the premises for morning prayers. Days later, on the night of 10 December, a further series of acts of vandalism, including a car being torched and anti-Israel graffiti were reported in Sydney.

Since 7 October 2023, antisemitic attacks in Australia have grown exponentially. The government has called for the establishment of a task force to combat antisemitism after the synagogue attack. However, attacks on places of worship are difficult to prevent due to the ease of maintaining anonymity for perpetrators and the lack of community and police resources to protect the sites. There is a realistic possibility of further copycat actions against Jewish places of worship in Australia.

Kanlaon Volcano erupts in central Philippines

The Kanlaon volcano in central Philippines erupted on 9 December, prompting significant emergency responses and safety measures. The eruption led to the evacuation of tens of thousands of residents from affected areas, particularly in the Western and Central Visayas regions. The Philippines’ seismological agency has maintained an alert level three and warned of potential rain-induced lahars on the southern slopes of the volcano in Negros Occidental. This alert level indicates increased volcanic unrest, necessitating close monitoring and readiness for possible escalation.

Local authorities have implemented several precautionary measures. The governor of Negros Occidental declared a red alert due to “magmatic unrest,” and forced evacuations were ordered in high-risk areas across five barangays in Canlaon City. Additionally, schools in Isabela, Negros Occidental, were closed and a mandatory masking order along with a 22:00 curfew for minors and businesses was enforced. Cebu Pacific cancelled flights to and from Iloilo, and several police stations in Negros Oriental were placed on heightened alert to monitor ash plumes.

Despite the disruption, regional airports reported no significant operational impacts from the eruption. However, the civil defence office highlighted that at least 54,000 people were affected by the volcanic activity. The situation remains dynamic, with authorities continuing to monitor the volcano closely and prepare for any further developments.

Thousands affected by landslides and flash flooding in Indonesia’s West Java

Landslides and flash floods have severely impacted West Java, Indonesia, particularly affecting the Sukabumi Regency as a result of torrential rains. More than 176 villages have been affected, resulting in at least 10 fatalities. The situation has prompted a large-scale evacuation and major disruption with over 30 bridges and 80 roads damaged. Sustained heavy rain is forecasted for much of the region, with up to three tropical cyclones set to bring adverse weather conditions in the following days.

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