Alix Didier Fils-Aimé was appointed as the country’s new Prime Minister on 10 November by the transitional council, replacing his predecessor Garry Conille after six months of rule. Fils-Aimé is the country’s former Chamber of Commerce president and has pledged to eradicate the gang violence currently plaguing the country.

On the following day, the Port-au-Prince airport was shut down after a Spirit Airlines flight from Florida was hit by gunfire, which injured one.

Coinciding with the removal of Conille, leaders of the Viv Ansanm alliance, likely the most powerful in the country, called for an intensification of the violence. At least two further cases of planes being fired upon occurred following the first incident.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Conille’s dismissal is unlikely to signal a fundamental shift in the council’s approach to the conflict and is almost certainly more a product of infighting within the transitional body than of strategic considerations. Conille, in particular, refused the council’s calls for a cabinet reshuffle and recently sought to sack three council members accused of corruption.

With no real political legitimacy behind the new appointment, there is a high likelihood that the change in administration will result in an increase in the infighting within the already precarious transitional government apparatus.

The Haitian gangs’ seeming attacks on inbound flights may be particularly important to understand the armed group’s objectives and current strategy. The fact that multiple incidents took place makes it highly unlikely that the shootings were independently carried out with no hierarchical direction. It instead appears likelier that they are deliberate efforts by local gangs to stop airport operations in Port-au-Prince.

Of note, attacks on aircraft have come after gangs blocked access to the main port in Port-au-Prince in September, forcing Haiti to rely heavily on air transport for critical humanitarian aid. The attacks are likely  part of the gang’s ongoing strategy to undermine the transitional government and other international efforts. Gangs have previously targeted alternative administrative authorities and welfare providers in the country, including hospitals and Christian missions, to coerce the local population into relying on them for basic necessities.

Interrupting reliable travel to and from Port-au-Prince may likewise serve gang’s economic interest to maintain a monopoly on migration routes, and simultaneously discourage foreign actors and international organisations from operating in Haiti. It is likely that, given the success of the latest action, gangs will continue to carry out attacks on the Port-au-Prince airport and other transport hubs in Haiti.

On 11 November, the French Minister of the Overseas, François-Noël Buffet, arrived in Martinique for a scheduled visit, which lasted until 14 November. The visit by the minister was made in the context of protests linked to the high cost of living which have gripped Martinique since September.

The leader of key protest group the Rally for the Protection of Afro-Caribbean Peoples and Resources (RPPRAC), Rodrigue Petitot (known as “Le R”), entered the prefectural residence on 11 November demanding to meet the visiting minister, before being escorted off the premises by police. Subsequently, on the afternoon of 12 November, in Canal Alaric, Fort-de-France, Petitot was arrested on charges of home invasion and acts of intimidation against people exercising a public function.

After ten days of relative calm in Martinique, the arrest triggered a resurgence in violent unrest in Fort-de-France. Between 100 and 350 demonstrators convened in front of the police station on Boulevard General de Gaulle demanding the release of Petitot. Violent clashes ensued, with security forces deploying tear gas and stun grenades, and some protesters allegedly opening fire with live ammunition in the direction of security forces. Three police officers were treated for minor injuries.

Buffet left Martinique on 14 November. Although the minister did not ultimately meet with RPPRAC during his visit, Buffet told a journalist that a meeting would happen in the future.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The security profile of Martinique had almost certainly drastically improved before the 12-13 November clashes, with a nightly curfew and other administrative police measures being lifted since 5 November. The arrest of the key protest figure Petitot, however, reignited civil unrest and there is a realistic possibility that if renewed civil unrest continues, authorities may be compelled to reimpose a curfew.

Since the 12-13 November clashes, however, there have not been any reports of any notable further incidents. This has highly likely been at least partly conditioned by the release of Petitot from custody on 14 November. Petitot’s lawyers stated that he will be tried on 15 November under the immediate appearance procedure by the Fort-de-France criminal court. The events of the trial will likely be significant in determining the intensity and frequency of any further unrest.

Furthermore, Buffet’s promise to meet RPPRAC leaders may reduce tensions, although this meeting will highly likely need to now take place in Paris.

Trump cabinet picks likely hint at future US foreign policy

US President-elect Donald Trump announced the first picks for the cabinet that will take office in Washington in January 2025. It is a remarkedly “anti-establishment” cabinet so far, for instance including a newly formed position for billionaire and ally Elon Musk, overseeing “government efficiency”.

From a foreign policy perspective, some of Trump’s nominees likely suggest that the new administration will adopt a foreign policy in line with that espoused in the 2017-2021 period. The two top foreign policy positions, Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, are projected to be occupied by Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, respectively. The former rival-turned-ally and the Republican congressman share hawkish views on China, as well as espouse the president view that European NATO allies need to become more independent from a defence perspective. Rubio has also advocated for reaching a quick “conclusion” to the Ukraine war, another promise of the Trump campaign.

For the Middle East, Trump is set to appoint Steven Witkoff as a special envoy to the region, and Mike Huckabee as the new Ambassador to Israel. Both are staunchly pro-Israel, and are likely to continue Trump’s previous efforts to establish closer military and economic ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Future Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, a FOX News host, is an “outsider” and loyalist who is expected to support efforts to challenge the “Pentagon’s establishment”. Likewise, Trump’s pick for the head of the CIA, former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe, is a loyalist who helped efforts to investigate President Biden’s son Hunter and has previously heavily criticised the intelligence agency’s practices.

Cubans protest following blackouts

Multiple arrests were carried out by Cuban authorities in Havana, Ciego de Avila and the province of Mayabeque after unrest broke out following protracted power outages during the weekend. Protracted outages are increasingly common in Cuba, as the government continues to struggle with a stagnating economy, worsened by a mass-exodus of citizens and past damages from extreme weather events.

In particular, the Cuban electric grid was severely affected by the recent hurricanes, particularly Category 3 Hurricane Rafael which hit the western half of the island in early November, and, on 10 November, by a 6.8 magnitude earthquake which caused some damage in east Cuba. It is unlikely that the government has the means to provide emergency relief following the latest extreme weather events.

While last weekend’s protests seem to have been effectively contained as of the time of writing, there is a realistic possibility of more severe unrest breaking out in the short term.

Evo Morales barred from contesting 2025 Bolivian presidential election

The decision by the constitutional court reiterates a 2023 ruling and the pre-existent constitutional two-term limit for the president’s office. The ban comes a month after Morales alleged that he was targeted in as botched state-sponsored assassination attempt, a claim that the ruling government rejects.

It is likely that the ruling will further embolden supporters of the former president to continue civil unrest, with crowds continuing to block roadways and clash with police forces in several parts of the country. According to Reporters without Borders (RSF), protesters have attacked at least 25 journalists at blockade points since the beginning of the latest stage of demonstrations.

Man dies in likely attempt to carry out bomb attack at Brazil supreme court

On the night of 13 November, a man died while an explosive device on his person detonated while he was trying to enter the compound of the Supreme Court in Brasilia. The individual was highly likely aiming to carry out an attack on the building. The incident occurred five days prior to the G20 summit, which Brazil is set to host.

It is highly likely that the incident is a case of lone wolf terrorism, although it is not fully clear what the ideological affiliation of the attacker was there are indications that he has linked to the far-right. The Brazilian Supreme Court has recently been involved in multiple high-profile political controversies.

Dozens killed in Ecuadorian prison riot

On 12 November, a prison riot in Ecuador’s Guayaquil resulted in the deaths of at least 15 inmates and several more injured. The riot may be an indication of the failure of President Noboa’s strategy to conduct mass arrests and incarcerations in a similar manner to El Salvador to curb street violence.

The strength, reach and resilience of Ecuador’s heavily funded and cartel-linked gangs has likely been underestimated, with the gangs controlling their operations from within the prison system. With arrests continuing to mount, overcrowding and poor conditions will likely to lead to further riots, with the potential for prison feuds to be played out on the street.

Tropical Storm Sara heads north and intensifies after causing damage in Honduras

After causing heavy flooding and damage in Honduras, Tropical Storm Sara is intensifying and heading north, likely posing significant threats to Central America, the Gulf of Mexico, and potentially the southeastern United States.

Favourable conditions, such as warm waters and low wind shear, are expected to fuel its development into a robust tropical storm and possibly a hurricane, with alerts currently in place across Honduras, Belize, Nicaragua, and Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula.

State of emergency declared in response to flooding in Colombia

On 12 November, authorities in Colombia declared a nationwide state of emergency in response to major flooding that has affected much of the country and thousands of people. The northwest of the country has been worst affected, particularly the Choco Department; however, rainfall has also led to severe flooding in the capital Bogota.

The extreme weather, worsened by the onset of La Niña, has caused widespread flooding, landslides, significant infrastructure damage and major travel disruptions. Forecasters warn that the severe weather pattern is expected to intensify throughout November.

On 13 November, the newly appointed Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz publicly stated that, while the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had essentially “defeated Hezbollah”, the war in south Lebanon would continue and expand in scope, with IDF forces approaching the second line of towns within Lebanon (approximately 6-7 km deep at some points).

On the following day, reports emerged that US and Israel are in the final stages of agreeing on a draft ceasefire proposal for Lebanon. Hezbollah’s attacks into northern Israel have continued, although significantly declined in volume due to IDF operations in the country. Israeli strikes during this reporting period have been particularly focused on Baalbek and the outskirts of Beirut, with a single strike on 11 November killing at least 23 people.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The acceleration and expansion of IDF operations in the south of Lebanon is consistent with Tel Aviv’s war aim of destroying Hezbollah forces and assets south of the Litani River and creating the conditions for the return of Israeli civilians to previously evacuated areas of north Israel. Tel Aviv almost certainly wants to avoid committing to a protracted deployment of troops in south Lebanon, which is a costly and politically unpopular endeavour.

However, Israel likely wants to retain troops in a position whereby the IDF can strike Hezbollah if it attempts to re-establish positions south of the Litani River, especially prior to a ceasefire agreement. This requirement essentially bypasses the international mandate of UNIFIL and also the domestic security prerogative of the armed forces of Lebanon.

Israeli strikes have likely degraded Hezbollah’s missile arsenal and the expansion of strikes in Baalbek are likely aimed at disrupting the facilitation of lethal aid from Syria.

Hezbollah is likely to reject a ceasefire proposal reflecting the Israeli position. First, this is due to the group still assessing that it can maintain a presence in parts of south Lebanon and that Israel likely lacks the resources, willingness, and diplomatic capital to commit to a long term occupation. Second, Hezbollah’s acceptance of an Israeli-drafted ceasefire plan would constitute a significant political defeat for the group at home and with its core constituencies.

Still, Hezbollah’s officials’ decreasing public mentions of Gaza in connection with the ceasefire negotiations hint at the group’s willingness to “decouple” the conflict in Lebanon from the one in Gaza, and thus from Hamas’ position and survival.

The US election results will also likely play an important role in shaping Tel Aviv’s (and Tehran’s) considerations regarding the possibility of a ceasefire. The Trump administration has nominated pro-Israel figures to occupy key Middle East-oriented roles, a sign that the new administration will likely continue its 2017-2021 foreign policy stance vis-à-vis Israel. However, Trump’s presidential campaign was also successful due to the massive defection of Arab Americans from the Democrat Party, achieved by promoting a foreign policy based on “ending wars”.

Moreover, Trump’s previous Middle East foreign policy was built on improving relations with Saudi Arabia, but this rapprochement has been partly stifled by the war in Gaza, with Saudi Arabia worryingly repeatedly sending positive signals to its traditional rival Iran. Faced with these factors and constraints, the Netanyahu administration will likely take advantage of the US’ transitional period to improve its battlefield position in Lebanon as much as possible.

On 8 November, a new Islamist group operating in the northwest of Nigeria conducted an attack on Mera village in Kebbi State, approximately 50 kilometres from the border with Niger. The group, which has adopted the name Lakurawas, is thought to primarily operate within four local government areas in Sokoto State, namely Binji, Gudu, Tangaza, and Silame, as well as parts of Kebbi State.

The group has reportedly been enforcing strict Islamic law, has been engaged in radical preaching, has imposed mandatory Zakat on the communities where it operates and has coerced parents into marrying off their daughters.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Whilst the Nigerian Defence Headquarters has described the Lakurawa group as a new terrorist organisation, there is evidence to suggest that group has existed for years and has made earlier attempts to establish itself in northwest Nigeria. The group primarily consists of Malians and Nigeriens, who were allegedly first invited to northwest Nigeria in 2017 by local leaders in Sokoto State to protect communities from bandits.

However, the group has increased its ranks, likely exploiting the 2023 coup in Niger, the general destabilisation of the Sahel and the overstretching of Nigerian security services who have struggled to contain a host of domestic security challenges, most notably a resurgent Boko Haram in the northeast. The Malian and Nigerien composition of the group may allude to connections to the al-Qaeda affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an alliance of local jihadist groups that has excelled at exploiting local grievances and weak governance and has managed to ally diverse ethnicities, tribes and other marginalised groups under its core message of the establishment of Sharia Law and rejection of Western influence.

If the Lakurawas group is indeed the latest franchise of JNIM, this will invariably be a major concern to Abuja and is further evidence of the JNIM’s efforts to spread beyond the Sahel.

For JNIM, fostering a new insurgency in northwest Nigeria would present several advantages. Firstly, it could help fix Nigerian forces in Nigeria, decreasing the chances of Abuja launching operations in neighbouring Niger, where JNIM has significant influence. Secondly, destabilised border regions will help facilitate JNIM cross-border operations, enabling it to more easily move people, arms, resources and illicit goods from country to country, likely increasing the group’s funding. Thirdly, it could help expand JNIM’s reach, potentially making it easier to conduct attacks on more high-profile or Western-linked targets in Nigeria, a development that would help boost JNIM’s profile, recruitment and propaganda efforts.

For Nigeria, an increased threat in the northwest may force it to allocate resources here ahead of other areas, like the northeast, potentially providing opportunities to Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

Mozambique is currently experiencing its fourth wave of unrest. On 13 November, protests reportedly occurred in Maputo, Ressano Garcia, Quelimane, Manica, Inhassunge, and Nampula. Police reportedly used live ammunition in Nampula, killing two protesters, and a combination of live ammunition and tear gas in Quelimane. In Inhassunge, protesters are claimed to have torched a police station and police vehicles, and allegedly killed Luís Joaquim Salimo, the local President of the District Elections Commission (CDE).

On 14 November, protests occurred in at least Maputo, Lichinga, and Xai-Xai. Security forces reportedly deployed tear gas and made arrests to disperse demonstrators in Lichinga. In Maputo, police used tear gas against a group of motorcycle taxi service providers, who signalled their protest by honking their horns while driving through the streets. The Lebombo border crossing with South Africa has intermittently closed, causing significant trade disruption. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has scheduled an emergency summit to address the situation between 16 and 20 November.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Since Mozambique’s electoral commission declared that Daniel Chapo of the incumbent FRELIMO party was elected president on 24 October, the country has experienced intense periods of civil unrest, provoked by accusations of electoral fraud. Security forces have deployed teargas and live ammunition to disperse protesters, with at least 30 deaths being recorded since demonstrations began.

Reports indicate that over 150 shops have been vandalised and roughly EUR 354 million lost during the unrest. The government has used internet shutdowns and social media restrictions to prevent the spread of further protests.

The killing of a FREMLIMO member on 13 November indicates efforts by sections of the protest movement to specifically seek out and target pro-FRELIMO officials with violence, which could inadvertently put uninvolved civilians at risk due to potential cases of mistaken identity.

The border disruption has reportedly affected trade, causing food shortages in Mozambique. According to the president of the Confederation of Economic Associations of Mozambique (CTA), roughly EUR 6 million has been lost due to transport disruptions during the unrest.

Blocking the border has been a key protest tactic to pressurise Mozambique’s government, with Mondlane specifically calling for truck drivers to block key roads and border posts. Given that approximately 40 per cent of Mozambique’s imports and 20 per cent of exports pass through South Africa, this is particularly disruptive for the region.

According to The South African Road Freight Association, South Africa’s economy has also been impacted, with the ongoing unrest costing USD 550,000 daily. It is almost certain that further economic disruptions will occur in Mozambique and South Africa if unrest continues, and border crossings are affected.

It is highly likely that protests will continue. Sources indicate that some military personnel sympathise with protesters, with videos of some soldiers signalling their support for Mondlane circulating online. It is likely that a growing dissatisfaction within the military will add pressure to a government already experiencing significant condemnation from international agencies and its population.

Protests likely to occur in western Europe during the weekend for International Students Day

Demonstrations between 15 and 17 November have already been planned in Bologna, Paris, and other European cities. There is a high likelihood that France will be particularly severely affected by protests due to the recent developments in Lebanon and Gaza, as well as the recent unrest in Paris.

Protests in Paris on Nations League match week

Pro-Palestine demonstrations occurred in Paris on 13-14 November 13 and 14. On 13 November, protesters gathered in multiple parts of the capital to protest a planned fundraiser event for the IDF. Clashes between protesters and police were reported in different parts of the city, with the latter deploying tear gas. Moreover, multiple cases of storefronts being vandalised were reported, targeting international chains that are accused of being “Zionist”.

On 14 November, the Stade de France hosted a Nations League match between the French and Israeli team. The match was highly policed, which likely prevented disorders outside the stadium. Nevertheless, clashes between Israeli and French fans inside the stadium were reported.

France’s parliament rejects new budget bill, deepening political crisis

The legislative body rejected an already-amended text of the bill that included proposals by the left-wing opposition, the New Popular Front (NFP), to increase taxes by an estimated EUR 75 billion to avoid the spending cuts favoured by Prime Minister Barnier’s supporters. The NFP proposal, which included some measures also espoused by the far-right National Rally (RN), was described by some lawmakers as likely being largely illegal from a constitutional perspective.

While the parliament’s vote frees Barnier to again attempt to present a more palatable bill, it also further deepens the rift between the three blocks that currently constitute the French parliament, and poses a serious threat of a continuing deadlock. Moreover, continuing political instability is likely to have an impact at the street-level. France, and Paris especially, are currently undergoing severe protests by groups supporting their counterparts in Martinique. These have been attended by NFP politicians.

There is a realistic possibility that the NFP’s parliamentary defeat, if followed with a protracted stall or a rapprochement between Macron’s centre and the right, will result in a increase in civil unrest.

German plans February election as ruling coalition collapses

German leaders have settled on 23 February as the date for a snap general election after collapse of the centre-left coalition headed by Chancellor Olaz Scholz and his Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). The coalition, which primarily collapsed over disagreements as to how to fund Ukraine, has likely provided an opportunity for Germany’s far-right anti-immigration party Alternative for Germany (AfD) to exploit, whose support has recently risen to almost 20 per cent of the polled electorate.

An increasingly polarised campaign season is likely to be marked by increased anti-immigration rhetoric, protests and counter-protests and potentially political violence.

Israeli Knesset passes preliminary approval of new surveillance bill

The legislation increases the scope for the legal use of spyware by law enforcement agencies, allowing its use even without the knowledge of the target device’s owner and on the basis of its possible utility to “prevent” an offence. The bill was advanced by the far-right Otzma Yehudit party of Minister of National Security Ben Gvir. It is highly likely that the bill is a direct political attack on Justice Minister Yariv Levin, who recently authorised a committee to investigate the possible unlawful use of spyware by police. Levin is hugely unpopular with the governing coalition’s right-wing and with the ultra-orthodox community due to the controversy surrounding the draft law reform. If enacted, the bill would pose a significant security risk to travellers to Israel, especially in terms of the protection of sensitive information.

Phone call between Saudi and Iranian leaders before upcoming Arab-Islamic summit

On 10 November, Saudi Arabia’s (KSA’s) Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman received a call from Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian. The leaders reportedly discussed the upcoming 18 November joint Arab-Islamic follow-up summit in Riyadh that will discuss issues relating to Israel’s campaigns in Gaza and Lebanon, with Pezeshkian praising KSA’s initiative to host the summit. High-ranking military figures from Iran and KSA additionally met in Tehran to discuss common interests and possible cooperation.

Before a China-brokered deal in 2023 that improved relations between the two regional powers, a de facto proxy conflict or ‘cold war’ existed between Iran and KSA, an antagonism that had a considerable impact on influencing the entire Middle East and beyond.

During his previous presidency, President-elect Donald Trump’s administration, who in contrast to a trend of ‘America First’ isolationism was distinctly hawkish regarding Iran, highly likely leveraged the Saudi-Iran cold war to further anti-Iranian strategic goals in the region.

With tensions at a generational high between Israel and Iran, Trump’s new administration will highly likely need to wrestle with a significantly different geopolitical landscape in the Middle East that is marked by rapprochement between Iran and the Gulf states.

Senegalese prime minister has called for revenge over campaign violence

Senegal’s Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko has called on supporters of his ruling party, Pastef, to take revenge for alleged violence against them during the campaign for the 17 November parliamentary election. Sonko condemned attacks on his supporters in Dakar and other major cities, urging retaliation through a social media post, stressing a “legitimate right to respond”. Sonko’s call, combined with the recent violence and violence observed in the March presidential elections, could gain traction among much of the country’s youth, leading to potentially violent protests in Senegal.

Guinean opposition demands return to civilian rule

On 12 November, a coalition of opposition groups, civil society organisations, and activists, known as the Forces Vives, called for the establishment of civilian rule by 1 January. The call comes in response to the military government’s promise of a two-year transition to civilian rule but with few indications of progress. Failure to acknowledge this demand and make any steps towards democracy will likely lead to protests, with previous demonstrations against the junta often leading to deadly confrontations.

Mauritius Prime Minister Jugnauth concedes defeat

The ruling coalition was defeated at the latest legislative elections held on 10 November, amidst multiple scandals and poplar opposition to a brief social media ban imposed by the government. The opposition coalition Alliance of Change, led by two-time Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam, obtained 62.6 per cent of the votes and, under the country’s “winner takes all” system, is set to take 60 of the 62 available seats in the National Assembly. The change in power is unlikely to drastically affect Mauritius’ foreign policy, with Ramgoolam historically taking a balanced approach to both China and India.

Belgian police arrests six after online calls for violence against Antwerp Jewish community

According to local media, the group, at least one of which is a minor, called for a “Jew hunt” to take place in the historical Jewish quarter in the Flemish city. It is likely that the calls for violence were meant to capitalise on last week’s violence between Israeli football fans and pro-Palestine protesters in Amsterdam, which attracted international attention. However, available information seems to indicate that no concrete plan for action had been implemented by the suspects. Coinciding with the online calls to violence, anonymous channels shared a video allegedly showing a targeted attack on a Jewish youth in Antwerp.

Turkish teenager arrested for Christmas market attack plan in Germany

The suspect, who allegedly planned to carry out an attack using a truck, similar to the 2016 Berlin Christmas market terror attack, was arrested via a joint US-German effort. According to available sources, he planned to launch an attack in the town of Elmshorn, in Schleswig-Holstein. The plot continues to underscore the growing trend of teenagers becoming self-radicalised and engaging in lone wolf terrorism, which is evident in recent cases of both Islamist and far-right terror.

US CENTCOM strikes Iranian-backed forces in Syria

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted a series of strikes against weapon caches and logistic nodes linked to Iranian-backed proxy forces in Syria. The strikes are almost certainly in response to a 12 November rocket attack on a US base in Hasakah province, believed to have been conducted by Iranian-aligned groups. There is a realistic possibility that tit-for-tat strikes will continue to escalate until the inauguration of Donald Trump, who has hinted at a full US withdrawal from Syria.

Two Saudi military personnel killed in Yemen

The attack occurred on 9 November in a military camp in the city of Seiyun, in the Hadhramout governorate under government control. The person responsible for the attack was reportedly a Yemeni soldier, with no clear motive currently known. The Houthis did not claim responsibility for the attack, but nevertheless praised as a blow to the “invaders”. As a member of the Yemeni armed forces, it is likely that the soldier was Sunni and could have been motivated to attack Saudis for Riyadh’s tepid stance towards Israel or increasingly stronger ties with Iran.

Mali junta arrests Australian mining company executives

Three executives of the Australian gold mining company “Resolute Mining” were arrested on 8 November, under unclear charges. Resolute Mining holds an 80 per cent stake in the Syama gold mine, the remaining stake being held by the government. The arrests follow a similar episode in September, when four employees of a Canadian mining company were also detained for days. Mali’s gold mines have long been a key Russian strategic interest. Whilst Russia has slowly increased its involvement in Mali, the junta has expressed caution regarding Russian involvement, partly due to concerns over the Wagner Group’s activities in critical economic sectors.

Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) and JNIM clash in north Burkina Faso, IS official killed

Groups of fighters from the two jihadist groups reportedly engaged in a firefight in the town of Dori. According to IS channels, at least nine JNIM fighters were killed in the engagement.

While in theory ISSP and JNIM are enemies, both groups have pragmatically engaged in informal non-aggression agreements, which have made engagements like the latest one relatively rare. There is a realistic possibility that the continuing breakdown of government authority in the Sahel, and especially in Burkina Faso and Niger, will result in a growing number of clashes between various insurgent groups seeking to control territory and expand their influence.

Further validating this assessment, on 11 November local sources reported that the leader of a regional ISSP sector in the Tessit region of Burkina Faso was assassinated by militants who defected to JNIM.

Approximately 4,000 illegal miners cut off from supplies by South African government

Illegal mining operations are prevalent in the country’s gold-rich North West province, and is often carried out by transnational armed groups. To deter it, the government has implemented a program known as “Vala Umgodi”, or “close the hole”, as part of which police is used to cut supplies to locations where illegal mining operations are ongoing, in an effort to force the illegal miners to surface.

The approach reduces risks for police officers, who would face environmental hazards, as well as the threat of armed opposition, if attempting to carry out arrests inside the mines. However, faced with imprisonment, miners often choose to remain underground for protracted periods of time.

Approximately 4,000 miners are trapped in one mineshaft in Stilfontein, of which only a few dozen have surfaced so far.

Argentina’s envoy to COP29 recalled from Azerbaijan

President Milei’s decision to recall his team from the summit only a few days after its beginning is a politically important gesture and may be a nod to the future US administration, as Trump previously took the US out of the Paris Climate Agreement over accusations of it being unfair to American businesses.

The COP29 summit has been marred by political failures. During the event, for instance, the EU Parliament voted to amend and significantly “water down” a bill to impose due diligence obligations on traders importing raw materials into Europe, which was strongly supported by Green parties and environmental activists.

On 12 November, the Prime Minister’s Office of Thailand issued an alert relating to a “growing fear of attacks on Israelis and Jews across Thailand,” with Thai police specifically warning of a terror plot to target the 15 November Full Moon party on the tourist island of Koh Phangan. The party island is popular with Israeli tourists who are either banned from entering several countries in the region or have to meet strict conditions to enter.

The Israeli intelligence agency, the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations which is known more commonly as Mossad, has confirmed that it has received concrete intelligence of the plot and has advised Israeli citizens from highlighting their nationality or religion when in Thailand and to avoid large gatherings throughout the country.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The nature of the alert specifically warns about an attack targeting Israelis, however, the indiscriminate nature of many attack methodologies, such as improvised explosive devices, small arms fire and even mass stabbings pose a serious threat to all tourists. Thailand has recently struggled with a resurgence in the south Thai insurgency, which is typically confined to attacks on the army and police in the provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. However, it is likely that militants like Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) have a high degree of movement throughout Thailand and networks established throughout much of the country.

Attacks on tourists are typically rare and would potentially serve to undermine their cause. However, a string of attacks in popular tourist areas like Hua Hin, Surat Thani, Trang and Phuket suspected to have been conducted by Muslim separatists killed four and injured 36 in 2016. A separate attack at a Bangkok Shrine in 2015 killed 20 and was attributed to Pan-Turkic ultra-nationalists, indicating vulnerabilities in Thailand’s security apparatus.

Whilst Thailand’s separatists have traditionally rejected jihadist ideology, rates of radicalisation have likely increased as a result of the war in the Middle East and as a consequence of setbacks in ceasefire talks, increasing the likelihood of separatists conducting a high-profile attack in a tourist location frequented by multiple nationalities.  Alternatively, there is a realistic possibility that the alert is linked to foreign nationals who may have exploited Thailand’s relatively lax visa policies to establish a footprint in the country, with groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda known to have previously used Thailand as a base for logistics, recruitment and fundraising.

Starting 11 November, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) has halted the provision of advanced chips to clients in the People’s Republic of China. These sophisticated chips, seven nanometre or below designs, are often used for artificial intelligence (AI) and graphics processing units (GPUs).

According to unnamed sources, the US Department of Commerce ordered TSMC to do this. Unnamed sources also stated that “any future supplies of such semiconductors by TSMC to Chinese customers would be subject to an approval process likely to involve Washington.”

The Department of Commerce has declined comment, and a TSMC spokesperson simply stated that TSMC are a “law abiding company” and will comply with all “domestic and international regulations”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There is a realistic possibility, particularly with the election of Donald Trump, that such chip shipment bans could in future be expanded to include “central processing units (CPU), autonomous-driving chips” and “smartphone chips”. With China reportedly accounting for “11 per cent of TSMC’s third-quarter revenue”, it is almost certain that chip export bans have been made for geopolitical purposes. The US and China are highly likely in a de facto ‘AI arms race’, with AI promising to have significant commercial and military utility.

The decision to halt shipments of advanced chips to Chinese clients comes just weeks after the US Commerce Department was informed by TSMC that one of their chips had been found in a Chinese multinational technology corporation Huawei produced “AI processor”, in “apparent violation of export controls” due to Huawei’s inclusion on a restricted trade list. Major US chip manufacturers Nvidia and AMD have had restrictions from the Commerce Department on exports of AI-related chips to China since 2022.

The US is almost certainly already far ahead in the AI arms race against China, and this new development will almost certainly further curtail Beijing’s ambitions to catch up with the US in the development of advanced AI, with the Kunlun II processor used in AI chips produced by the Chinese tech company Baidu, for example, being made by TSMC.

President-elect Donald Trump has indicated that he will impose a considerable increase on already high tariffs on Chinese imports, which would likely renew the ‘trade war’ with China that occurred in Trump’s previous presidency. Trump’s prior statements that Taiwan should pay for its own defence, which prompted fears of the unreliability of US security guarantees for Taiwan against a hypothetical Chinese invasion in a new Trump presidency, were likely part of Trump’s foreign policy of ‘transactional diplomacy’, the leveraging of international overreliance on US security guarantees and attempts to gain benefits for the US’ domestic economy.

Trump has long complained about TSMC’s global monopoly on the production of advanced semiconductors, desiring greater manufacturing of such chips in the US. On 7 November, Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs J.W. Kuo reaffirmed that Taiwan’s technology protection rules prohibit TSMC from producing two nanometre chips abroad, likely targeted at concerns that TSMC will be forced by Trump to produce these chips ahead of schedule at fabrication facilities in Arizona.

It is likely that Trump will apply such pressure, and it is likely that the new TSMC advanced chip export ban to China will increase China-Taiwan tensions.

Storm Usagi strengthened to super typhoon status before making landfall near Baggao in Cagayan, the Philippines, with maximum winds reaching 185 km/h on 14 November. This prompted the government to issue a Wind Signal 5 warning for northeast Cagayan, the highest level of alert in the country.

In the aftermath of the storm, significant damage was reported, including the collapse of a bridge in Gonzaga, Cagayan province, the Philippines, highlighting the destructive power of Usagi. The storm caused severe flooding and landslides in Cagayan and Isabela provinces, with warnings issued for similar conditions in six other provinces.

At least one person was reported dead, and two others were missing in Cagayan due to the storm’s impact.

Solace Global Assessment: 

After travelling through the Philippines, Typhoon Usagi has weakened, with current maximum sustained winds of around 100 km/h.  Taiwan’s weather agency issued land warnings for Kaohsiung, Pingtung, and Taitung as the storm approached and it is set to make landfall late 15 November. As the Philippines recovers from Typhoon Usagi, Typhoon Man-yi is set to hit the Luzon region again, due to make landfall in Luzon on 17 November with sustained winds of approximately 225 km/h. The Philippines is almost certain to experience further damage once Typhoon Man-yi makes landfall.

Usagi is the fifth major storm to hit the Philippines within three weeks, during which time at least 160 deaths and nine million displacements have occurred. The United Nations reportedly counts 207,000 houses damaged or destroyed over the past month due to typhoons and has requested USD 32.9 million in aid for the worst affected regions.

Much of the Philippines is low-lying land, which makes it particularly vulnerable to flooding caused by precipitation and storm surges. The repeated flooding of farmland will likely affect replanting efforts and impact the populations’ access to food. Despite being typically exposed to 20 typhoons a year, the country does not have resilient infrastructure; many roads, buildings, and buildings are poorly constructed and maintained, adding to their susceptibility to damage.

While the government has responded by evacuating citizens and providing relief, its capabilities are limited by resource constraints and the typhoons’ frequency. Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has appealed to neighbouring countries to assist with disaster relief efforts.

Climate change has increased the frequency and intensity of typhoons in the Philippines in recent years. Because oceans are warmer, storms can pick up more energy while they track, causing intensified wind speeds. Moreover, the risk of flooding has escalated due to increased precipitation rates driven by a warmer atmosphere. Additionally, storm surges are now reaching further inland due to the rise in ocean levels. As a result, typhoons reportedly form closer to land, intensify quicker, and last longer, increasing their risk to local populations.

Bangladesh opposition takes to the streets to call for new elections

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), an Islamist party which represented one of the key opposition forces to the Hasina regime and now provides vital political support to the interim government of Muhammad Yunus, staged a demonstration in Dhaka calling for new elections and the formation of a political government.

The BNP has likely sought to amplify its political sway in Bangladesh in the last month, also trying to establish its control over the informal systems of administrations and clientelism that were previously governed by the Awami League, Hasina’s Party. Elections are highly likely to benefit BNP beyond the prospect of a more active role in government.

By legitimising the new political status quo, elections would also stop Hasina’s supporters’ efforts to question the validity of the new executive, and allow the former opposition more freedom to challenge the remnants of the Awami League.

The Philippines pass new laws on maritime territory, angering Beijing

The two measures, which were signed into law by President Marcos on 8 November, reaffirm Manila’s claims over areas of the South China Sea that China claims as its own. The approval was met with a formal protest by Beijing. Notably, the laws include a provision that all artificial islands constructed within Filipino territory are Manila’s sovereign territory, and at least one Chinese-built reef base would theoretically fall within this category.

While it is still unclear how Manila will implement the new laws, it is highly likely that they will contribute to heightened tensions with China, and may result in further provocative actions, including clashes between the two country’s coast guards in disputed waters.

Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba re-appointed after disastrous election

The new Japanese parliament, fresh from a watershed election which resulted in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) losing its majority in the lower house of parliament, voted for incumbent Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba to retain his position. Ishiba recently won a highly contested leadership vote in the LDP, and called the elections after his nomination.

After his re-election, Ishiba chose to retain most of his cabinet members, and indicated a willingness to cooperate with opposition forces, especially the moderate Democratic Party for the People.  While the parliament vote is unlikely to resolve the political weakness of the new administration, it will likely allow Ishiba to carry out a series of key diplomatic and domestic tasks in the next few months, including crucial summits with regional partners and a likely meeting with US President-elect Donald Trump.

11 dead in clashes between militants and security forces in Manipur, India

On 11 November, 11 camouflaged Kuki-Zo militants died in a gunfight with security forces in the Jiribam District of Manipur. Militants reportedly fired indiscriminately at a police station and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp, injuring two CRPF members. In response to the violence, the Kuki-Zo Council imposed a curfew from 05:00 to 18:00 local time and prohibited the carrying of anything that could be used as an offensive weapon.

Coming after a brief lull, this marks a fresh escalation in violence in the Manipur region, which has seen over 260 deaths since 7 November 2023, when a Hmar tribal woman was burned alive. The multiple tribal communities, the main three being the Kuki-Zo, Meiteis, and Nagas, have clashed primarily over land rights, representation, and resource allocation since Manipur achieved statehood.

The 11 November attack represents a broader failure of local security forces to bring the conflict under control in a region that is central to India’s Look East policy of strengthening trade and commerce in the region. It is highly likely that this attack will trigger further ethnic violence in Manipur from rival tribal groups, primarily the Meitei, causing further displacement and civilian casualties.

Indian Naga insurgents threaten to restart violence

The latent insurgency, which is composed of a network of ethnic Naga groups seeking to establish an independent state (“Nagalim”) in India’s North-Eastern Region (NER), is the oldest still active in the country, having begun in the mid-1950s. However, a ceasefire has been in place between Delhi and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the main Naga militant group, since 1997, which was renewed in 2015.

On 8 November, NSCN leaders threatened to resume violent action after accusing India of “betraying” the “spirit” of the agreement. If violence were to resume, it is highly likely that the resulting destabilisation will impact nearby provinces, including Arunchal Pradesh. The continued destabilisation of neighbouring Myanmar has likely provided militants with an opportunity to acquire arms, a development that would hinder India’s ability to contain the conflict should it restart.

More than 30 dead after vehicle attack in Zhuhai, China

On the evening of 11 November, a 62-year-old man drove a vehicle into crowds at stadium in Zhuhai, killing 35 and injuring dozens more. The motive for the attack, which was almost certainly deliberately carried out to maximise casualties, is unclear, but Chinese media has indicated that there seems to be no indication that the suspect espoused an extremist ideology. The attack likely is the deadliest “random” attack in China in years, and follows similar cases from earlier this year, including a stabbing and shooting attack in Shandong in February 2024 which killed 21.

Pathogenic avian influenza identified for eighth time this year at Japan poultry farm

The latest case was reported in Asahikawa in the Hokkaido island. The first outbreak of bird flu in Japan this season was recorded in mid-October, also in Hokkaido. The virus usually spreads with migration patterns in the fall. The identified strand of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (HPAIV) is the subtype H5, which is particularly deadly. The H5 strand affects birds and can be transmitted to mammals. In the US, there are recent cases of dairy and poultry workers contracting the virus.