On 13 October, elements of the Colombian army launched an attack on the FARC dissident group Central General Staff (EMC), aimed at retaking El Plateado. At least 17 army personnel were reported to have been injured in the early stages of the operation, with multiple injuries caused by EMC’s use of cheap drones. El Plateado has been under EMC control for approximately five years and is a strategically important hub for drug trafficking in the country’s west.

Last week, the government and the central command of the EMC agreed on a truce in the Cali area for COP16, which Colombia will host between 21 October and 1 November. Earlier in 2024, the Colombian government of Gustavo Petro suspended its ceasefire agreement with elements of the EMC in the areas of Cauca, Nariño and Valle del Cauca.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The offensive into El Plateado is likely meant to exploit fractures within the complex network of EMC-affiliated groups, and to bolster the Petro government’s position before the summit. It nevertheless may result in an overall increase in tensions, possibly affecting Cali.

Moreover, the offensive highlights the Petro government’s continuing ambivalent strategy which combines ad hoc negotiations with limited coercive measures. This approach likely reflects the government’s understanding of its own limitations vis-à-vis the EMC and other regional armed groups, which retain significant assets as well as local support and sources of income.

Entering into ad-hoc ceasefire agreements with parts of the EMC is likely helping the government to divide the rebel group. The EMC, likely due to its rapid growth over the last decade, has evolved into a fractured organisation, made up of four national blocs and dozens of sub-structures, which operate in accordance with their own interests and local considerations while maintaining a degree of hierarchical cohesion.

For instance, in July, the government’s unilateral decision to suspend its ceasefire agreement with the main Cali branch of EMC, while retaining it with the group’s elements in Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Meta and Caqueta, reportedly resulted in significant internal disagreements among EMC’s leadership on the feasibility of continuing talks with the government. However, this strategy is likely to lead to the splintering of groups and may result in increased violence within the areas where they operate.

Following a 10 October announcement by a Bolivian prosecutor that confirmed an arrest warrant had been issued for former Bolivian president Evo Morales, after he did not appear in court on charges of human trafficking and statutory rape, Morales supporters engaged in a wave of unrest.

On 14 October, protesters initially blocked two major roads that connect the department of Cochabamba with the cities of Sucre and Santa Cruz. Following violent clashes with police forces, with the police deploying tear gas, a protest was dispersed in Parotani.

On 17 October, the Bolivian Highway Administration stated that the protesters have increased the number of blockades to 13, with blockades located at: Pongo-Confital, Bombeo-Pongo, Suticollo-Parotani, San Jacinto-Paracti, San Germán-Ichilo Bridge, Rodeo-Cruce Vacas, Obra-Rodeo, Lope Mendoza Bridge-Epizana, Epizana-Tiraque C, Copachuncho Bridge-Pojo, Aiquile Exit-Railroad Crossing, Arce Bridge and Tholapalca.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The unrest has arisen within a context of growing economic insecurity, dissatisfaction with current president Luis Arce, and democratic fragility following the failed June coup attempt. Morales was Bolivia’s president from 2006 to 2019, before resigning after unrest resulting from the contested 2019 election and going into exile.

Evo Morales has since stated his intent to stand again in Bolivia’s August 2025 election, against Arce who is in the same party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). The prospect of Morales standing was almost certainly a key trigger for the general Zúñiga’s failed attempted coup in June.

The unrest also follows violent clashes at protests in El Alto in September when Morales led supporters in a march from Caracolla to La Paz, leading to supporters of the rival MAS factions, the pro-Arce Arcistas and pro-Morales Evistas, clashing with firecrackers, improvised bombs, and stones. The Evistas have stated that the unrest will be indefinite, and it is highly likely that intermittent unrest will continue in Bolivia until at least next year’s election.  If Morales is arrested, as per the issued arrest warrant, it is highly likely that the current unrest will escalate even further.

Canada-India diplomatic row continues as Indian ambassador expelled

Canadian authorities claimed Indian embassy staff had been involved in the June 2023 killing of a Sikh separatist activist in British Columbia. India, in turn, expelled multiple Canadian diplomats. It is highly likely that India has intensified activities to exert influence over large diasporas abroad, including in Canada, the UK, Australia and the US, and has leveraged local communities to carry out intelligence operations. Canada’s tougher stance on India may be followed by the UK and other countries.

US Manhattan stock exchange protests

At least 500 individuals staged a sit-in on 14 October in protest to Washington’s policy of military support for Israel. Local authorities reported that 206 participants were arrested during the protests. The protest almost certainly was a response to the Israeli forces airstrikes in northern Gaza during the weekend, which killed at least 200 Palestinians, as well as the announcement that the US will provide Tel Aviv with a Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system following the Iranian 1 October missile strike. There is a high likelihood of further protests near US financial and political centres in the weeks before the presidential elections.

Another possible assassination attempt on Trump prevented in California, USA

On 12 October, a man was arrested near the location of a campaign rally of former President Donald Trump in Coachella, California. The man was allegedly in possession of an unregistered firearm, and multiple fake documents and had a vehicle with fake licence plates when he was stopped by police approximately 500 metres from the location of the rally after trying to enter with a fake VIP pass.

According to authorities, the suspect likely is a member of a right-wing anti-government group and runs a website where he espouses conspiratorial and anti-establishment narratives. If this assessment is accurate, it highlights how trends of copycat violent actions cannot be restricted to a single ideological profile.

There is a realistic possibility that continued copycat assassination attempts will inspire further lone wolves to target other US politicians.

Venezuela’s regime increasingly using passport restrictions against opposition

The Financial Times reported on 12 October that at least 40 civil society figures, mostly journalists and humanitarian workers, have had their passports annulled since the country’s last election in July. Reportedly, individuals had their passports confiscated by authorities while attempting to board flights from Caracas. It is highly likely that the government will continue to expand passport confiscations, as they offer a much lower political cost and visibility than incarcerations and killings.

Canadian Jewish girls’ school targeted by gunmen

The attack took place on the night 12 October, Yom Kippur, and resulted in no injuries as the institute was closed. The Toronto school had already been targeted similarly in May. The attack was almost certainly an intimidation operation by local radicalised elements. While the dynamic of the attack demonstrates that the perpetrators almost certainly sought to minimise the risk of being caught, there is a realistic possibility of further lone-actor attacks on Jewish individuals and institutions in Canada and the US in line with developments in the Middle East.

Governor of Sinaloa, Mexico announces troop deployments

Officials in Sinaloa, where a deadly gang war between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel continues to intensify, have announced the deployment of 300 extra personnel from the National Guard as well as a special forces company. More than 100 people were killed in Sinaloa between July and September, after the outbreak of violence following the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada in the US. 

Peru has record wildfires in 2024

Data from the Global Wildfire Information System (GWIS) showed that Peru had more than 10,400 wildfires in 2024, which burned 2.5 times the amount of area of the previous most severely affected year, 2020. The most recent wildfires occurred in the country’s north. Climate scientists have argued that both anthropogenic and non-human factors have contributed to the high incidence of wildfires in Peru and neighbouring South American countries. These include low rainfall volumes and higher temperatures caused by El Nino, and by patterns of deforestation and intensive farming which have reduced local ecosystems’ resilience.

Through mid-October, widespread flooding occurred in France as a result of adverse weather, particularly affecting the southern and central regions. On 17 October, weather warnings were issued across affected regions, with the departments of Ardèche, Loire, and Haute-Loire placed on red alert. By the evening, six departments were on red alert, including the cities of Lyon and Cannes, and 33 others were on orange alert. Authorities closed roads and evacuated the most at-risk neighbourhoods.

By 18 October, the red alerts were lifted, but 18 departments remained on orange alert. The flooding caused significant disruption, including 186-mile delays on roads in the Ile-de-France region and public transport disruptions. One person was killed and two others injured in Paris when a tree fell on them during the heavy rains.

Emergency services conducted over 1,000 interventions on 17 October, including 25 flooding rescues. In Lyon, at least 480 evacuations and 520 emergency interventions were carried out.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The adverse rainfall resulted from the remnants of Hurricane Kirk moving across western Europe. The French Ecological Transition Minister described the current floods as “unprecedented”. The French floods follow the September central European floods from Storm Boris, which impacted Austria, Czechia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Moldova, Germany and Hungary, leading to at least 27 deaths and between EUR 2-3 billion in damages.

While France has resilient infrastructure and considerable emergency response capability, the significant disruption caused by the widespread flooding highlights the increasing threat of environmental risks in Europe which will highly likely continue to intensify as a result of climate change.

While emergency services remain active in managing the aftermath of the floods as of 18 October, no red alerts remain in place and the worst of the rainfall is forecast to be over.

Israel Defence Forces (IDF) units have continued to advance across multiple axes on the Israel-Lebanon border, occupying and clearing villages from Hezbollah assets and military infrastructure developed by the group. On 15 October, IDF channels announced that elements of a fifth division – the 210^th Division – has begun operating in Lebanon. Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem described Hezbollah’s war against Israel in existential terms, and seemed to contradict previous hints by other officials that the Lebanon-based group would be willing to agree to a ceasefire deal with Tel Aviv that did not include Gaza.

On 15 October, the Biden administration warned Israel that it has “30 days” to implement measures to guarantee significant improvements to the humanitarian situation in Gaza, at the cost of interrupting military aid transfers. In September, the amount of aid entering Gaza was assessed as being the lowest of any month since the start of the war. In the north of the Gaza Strip, aid provision has been particularly affected by an ongoing IDF offensive in the Jabalia area, where Israeli forces assess Hamas has successfully begun restructuring some units.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israeli ground operations in south Lebanon are almost certainly aimed at creating a scenario in which Hezbollah units are unable to carry out further operations from territory adjacent to the Israeli border. Instead of a protracted deployment, IDF operations are highly likely focusing on destroying civilian and military infrastructure that Hezbollah could leverage following their withdrawal.

So far, combat in south Lebanon has proved costly for the IDF, which has faced stiff Hezbollah resistance without however achieving large-scale engagements that could result in high Hezbollah casualties. Hezbollah, in turn, has almost certainly acquired significant knowledge of Israeli tactics and defence capabilities, allowing the armed group to inflict significant attrition both in south Lebanon and north Israel.

During the last reporting period, a Hezbollah drone strike – which, according to reports, was conducted in a way that “disoriented” Israeli air defences – injured 67 IDF soldiers and killed four in a base near Haifa, the single highest-casualty event suffered by the IDF since 7 October 2023.

On 17 October, IDF channels reported that Yahya Sinwar, military chief of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and de facto head of the group since Ismail Haniyeh’s death, was killed in Rafah. Reports that no hostages were found in the building where Sinwar was killed highly likely indicate that the Hamas chief was killed in a raid by IDF troops, rather than an airstrike.

On 15 October, the Biden administration warned Israel that it has “30 days” to implement measures to guarantee significant improvements to the humanitarian situation in Gaza, at the cost of interrupting military aid transfers. In September, the amount of aid entering Gaza was assessed as being the lowest of any month since the start of the war. In the north of the Gaza Strip, aid provision has been particularly affected by an ongoing IDF offensive in the Jabalia area, where Israeli forces assess Hamas has successfully begun restructuring some units.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Sinwar’s death is almost certainly a politically relevant development. It follows multiple decapitation strikes on Hamas and “Axis of Resistance” members over the past months. Sinwar was the last major figure associated with the 7 October 2023 attack to survive in Gaza. After the death of Haniyeh, his succession as the political leader of Hamas represented a victory for the hardliners of the group against the moderate wing and the leaders outside of Gaza.

While other senior Hamas officials – namely Sinwar’s brother Mohammad – survive in Gaza and maintain some leverage over Israel in the form of the surviving hostages, the almost complete destruction of the group’s leadership is likely to hinder its ability to reform as a viable political force. The killing of Sinwar therefore likely further creates opportunities for Israel to develop an alternative political structure for Gaza which excludes Hamas, a task which can likely only be accomplished by leveraging surviving Gaza clans opposed to Hamas, Fatah, or both.

In the short term, the latest decapitation is unlikely to change the military situation in Gaza, where depleted Hamas units, who almost certainly already act with a high degree of independence from their leadership, will continue “hit-and-run” attacks on IDF forces.

Due to the extremely high visibility of Sinwar, it is likely that the attack will result in an increase in extremist messaging in the short term, and there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory acts of violence targeting Jewish communities in Israel and the West. In particular, Hamas has recently increased the volume of terror attacks in Israeli cities, targeting high-traffic areas such as shopping centres and transportation hubs. There is a high likelihood that Hamas-affiliated channels will seek to inspire lone wolf attacks in Israel. Moreover, as shown in the case of the recent terror attack in Munich, Germany – which coincided with the anniversary of the 1972 Olympics massacre – anniversaries and significant developments in the Israel-Palestine conflict are drivers of extremist action.

Government of Iceland collapses

Icelandic Prime Minister Bjarni Benediktsson called for parliament to be dissolved and for new elections on 30 November, over disagreements within the governing coalition. Benediktsson, the leader of the centre-right Independence Party, is currently allied with the Progressive Party, a centrist group, and the Greens. The government collapse is likely to boost the position of the opposition parties, especially the Social Democrats.

Various Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT)-linked demonstrations in northern Europe

The Dutch chapter of the Salafi group held a demonstration in Amsterdam on 13 October. Additionally, approximately 5,000 supporters of the Salafi group Muslim Interaktiv (MI) staged a march in Hamburg, Germany. MI is largely assessed to be a “rebrand” for HuT, which is banned in Germany, and shares considerable ideological elements with HuT, including calling for the establishment of a “caliphate” as a solution to a vast array of domestic and international issues. HuT, like other Salafi groups, has almost certainly leveraged the Palestinian cause to build international support for its political project. The MI protests in Hamburg will almost certainly be leveraged by the far-right and lead to further polarisation within Germany.

Le Pen trial begins in France

The leader of the far-right National Rally began her testimony in a trial over the alleged embezzlement of European Parliament funds on 14 October. If found guilty, Le Pen and her associates risk a fine of more than EUR 1 million, a prison sentence and crucially, a ban from running for public office, which would erase Le Pen’s ambitions for the 2027 presidential elections. The trial proceedings, which are expected to last until late November, are highly likely to result in increased civil unrest in France.

Left-wing wins Lithuanian elections

The opposition Social Democrats (LSDP) party won the largest share of votes (approximately 19.5 per cent) in the first round of the country’s parliamentary elections on 13 October, matching results predicted by polls. The SD will now almost certainly enter talks with the Farmers and Greens Union and the Democrats “For Lithuania”. The result is unlikely to change Lithuania’s foreign policy or to result in significant civil unrest. The second election round, on 27 October, will however likely be crucial to assess the composition of the new coalition.

Unrest continues in Albania

On October 17, tensions escalated as protesters set a fire outside the City Hall in Tirana during a demonstration against corruption, according to local media reports. The protests, which have been ongoing for several months, have seen increased confrontations between demonstrators and law enforcement. The unrest follows an incident in which Albanian Democratic Party deputy Flamur Noka claimed that a police officer pointed a firearm at him inside the parliament building, after protests last week. Last week’s unrest occurred on 7 October, with clashes between protesters and police near the parliament building resulting in injuries to at least seven protesters and 12 police officers. The police used tear gas to disperse the crowds, leading to multiple injuries among the demonstrators. It is likely that unrest will continue in Tirana, characterised by violent direct action. 

Large protest in Madrid, Spain, over high cost of living

More than 12,000 people marched through central Madrid on 13 October over high costs of living, and notably over the low availability of long-term rental. Protesters have notably sought to bring attention to the expansion of the number of “for-tourism” rental properties and platforms like Airbnb. Spain has had the largest anti-tourism protests in Europe. 

Clashes between protesters and police in Bahrain

On 11 October, Shia protesters clashed with police after Friday prayers outside the Imam Sadiq Mosque in Diraz. According to reports, the clashes occurred after attendees displayed pictures of recently killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Bahrain, like other Gulf States, has sought to prevent pro-Palestine protests and other forms of civil unrest, and authorities often deploy violent crowd control measures, including tear gas, to disperse protests.

FRELIMO wins Mozambique elections with reports of fraud

As expected, the party – which has ruled Mozambique since independence almost 50 years ago – won the majority of the popular vote. On 13 October, independent opposition candidate Venancio Mondlane threatened to call a nationwide strike accusing FRELIMO of doctoring the results. Other opposition figures associated with the Podemos party have stated that FRELIMO leaders doctored the result to grant RENAMO – the other major opposition party – the second-highest vote tally, to establish RENAMO as a controlled opposition. There is a realistic possibility that the various challenges to FRELIMO’s victory will result in civil unrest in Mozambique, with the capital Maputo being particularly at-risk. If protests break out, it is highly likely that the Republican Police (PRM) will respond violently.

Brother of Oklahoma election attack suspect arrested in France

Last week an Afghan national was arrested in the United States for reportedly planning an attack during election day in the name of the Islamic State (IS). French media has reported that the brother of the US suspect was arrested in Toulouse, under highly similar circumstances. According to French authorities, the individual – who was arrested following a joint US-French operation – intended to carry out an attack on a stadium or shopping centre. The case is interesting as it may offer analysts some more insight about patterns of cross-country radicalisation.

Mass-bomb threats to diplomats in Ukraine

On 14 October, more than 60 embassies and diplomatic offices in Ukraine received coordinated bomb threats, almost certainly from the same sources. The threats resulted in multiple offices temporarily suspending services to citizens in Ukraine. In total, more than 2,000 messages were reported as of 16 October. Indications that the messages originated from Russian IP addresses make it likely that they were part of a hybrid operations meant to cause confusion in Kyiv. However, their state provenance remains unclear, and it is possible that pro-Kremlin non-state actors may have been responsible for the operation. Notably, the messages included threats towards Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), which recently conducted an investigation on Russian sabotage operations in Ukraine.

USA Central Command continues to increase strikes in Syria

On 12 October, the US CENTCOM reported having conducted a “series” of airstrikes against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) targets in Syria, including training camps. The attacks follow previous strikes during the past weeks. US forces have increased strikes on ISIS assets, which likely corresponds to the growing level of activity of ISIS. Notably, IS attacks in Syria since August have increasingly targeted security forces.

Italy bans surrogacy

The Italian Senate approved a law to extend a ban on surrogacy to couples that seek arrangements abroad. The bill has been a longstanding project of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and likely appeals to elements of the Catholic electorate in the country, and follows similar calls for a ban raised by the Vatican. The bill’s approval has been criticised by LGBTQ civil society groups in the country. There is a high likelihood of demonstrations being staged in Rome over the next week in protest to the bill. Importantly, the bill’s approval overlaps with the government’s new 2025 budget and is therefore likely to offer some political breathing room at a crucial time.

Moderately strong earthquake in the Eastern Anatolia region of Turkey

A magnitude 5.9 earthquake struck the Kale district of Malatya, Turkey on 16 October. The earthquake resulted in 94 injuries, primarily due to panic, according to the Governor of Malatya. Two buildings sustained heavy damage, and at least four people were rescued from a partially collapsed structure. The Turkish Interior Ministry reported that a total of 187 citizens were affected by the event. Shaking from the earthquake was felt across northern Syria and the Turkish regions of Diyarbakir and Elazig, prompting crews to be dispatched for damage assessment.

Tensions continue to heighten between North Korea and South Korea, following a series of developments – an announced increase in North Korean artillery readiness, the detonation of infrastructure, and an announced change in North Korea’s constitution.

On 13 October, North Korean state media reported that North Korea’s military had ordered its artillery units stationed near the border to “get fully ready to open fire”. This was followed by the detonation of two pairs of roads and railway routes on the edge of the military demarcation line (MDL) in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) by North Korea on 15 October.

On 16 October, the North Korean state newspaper Rodong Sinmun confirmed that a meeting last week to adjust the constitution in North Korea’s legislature, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), resulted in South Korea being declared a “hostile state” in North Korea’s constitution.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The developments follow an increase in tensions between North and South Korea this year, following North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un’s order in January that North Korea will abandon the goal of peaceful unification and designate South Korea as the North’s “invariable principal enemy”. The announced constitutional amendment likely provides constitutional justification for the January order and was used in official announcements this week to validate the destruction of infrastructure in the DMZ.

Tensions have been further increased since May when North Korea started sending balloons into South Korea carrying detritus and faeces, with South Korean activists sending balloons into North Korea carrying US dollars, USB sticks downloaded with K-pop and K-dramas, and leaflets.

The key trigger for this week’s events has been accusations by North Korea that South Korea has used drones to drop propaganda leaflets in Pyongyang three times this month, which has been neither confirmed nor denied by South Korean authorities. There is a realistic possibility that these Pyongyang drone flights were conducted by private individuals in South Korea, due to the ease of access to such drone technology by the public, and the historical record of evangelical Christian groups, defectors and conservatives in South Korea using balloons to send propaganda into North Korea.

While North Korea has been conducting operations in the DMZ for several months, including the erection of anti-tank barriers and the laying of mines, it is unlikely that the destruction of infrastructure was part of general North Korean efforts to fortify the border. Instead, it is likely that the unused roads and rail lines were destroyed for their symbolic value – the infrastructure was primarily constructed with South Korean funds during the period of rapprochement between the two powers that occurred in the late 90s and 2000s.

Despite escalating tensions, it is unlikely that North Korea would launch a major pre-emptive operation against South Korea which would risk full-scale war, without an external extenuating factor such as China invading Taiwan, as a war would pose a significant risk to the survival of the North Korean regime. Instead, it is likely that increasingly bellicose North Korean behaviour is aimed at bolstering internal support and warding off South Korean influence.

There is a realistic possibility that such actions are additionally aimed at providing leverage for hypothetical future nuclear negotiations with the US.

On 14 October, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted a large-scale military exercise named Joint-Sword-2024B in the waters surrounding Taiwan. The exercise was conducted with assets from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and the China Coast Guard (CCG).

In a map issued by the PLA theatre command, two exercises occurred on Taiwan’s east coast, three on the west coast, one to the north and three in the vicinity of Taiwan-controlled islands off the coast of mainland China. Numerous warship surface action groups with air support took part in the war games, with a reported 17 warships (including a Lianoning aircraft carrier task force east of Taiwan) and 125 aircraft taking part, which is the most Chinese aircraft ever detected in a single day by Taiwan. Notably, four formations of CCG vessels entered the restricted waters off Matsu and Dongyin islands.

Joint-Sword-2024B was claimed by PRC military authorities to involve simulated missile launches, the opening up of “air assault corridors”, and long-range bomber missions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is likely that in terms of practicable military training benefit, the exercises were practising an island-wide blockade of Taiwan, the prevention of foreign force troop deployments and aid, and the closure of international shipping lanes. The significant role of CCG vessels in the exercise is a notable development, marking the first incursion by the CCG into the restricted Matsu island waters, which in addition to the continuous CCG’s use in contested waters in the South China Sea against Philippine vessels, almost certainly further indicates the utility of the CCG as a sub-threshold force for Beijing’s objectives.

The main purpose of the exercise was almost certainly as a follow-up to Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te’s National Day speech on 10 October. Lai, who has a reputation as a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan’s independence” and who is considered by Beijing to be a pro-independence “troublemaker”, reiterated in his address Taiwan’s independence from the PRC and that the PRC “has no right to represent Taiwan”. Chinese military officials have stated that the drills were a “stern warning” to Taiwanese separatism. It is highly likely, however, that Joint-Sword-2024B was planned well in advance of the speech and would take place regardless of the content of the speech. Lai’s speech was relatively restrained, involving overtures of collaboration with Beijing on multiple issues including climate change. It is likely that if such major exercises continue to occur regardless of key triggers, they will lose their deterrent factor to coerce compliance and caution in Taiwan’s political leaders and officials.

Joint-Sword-2024B is the second major blockade simulation exercise to take place in 2024, after April’s Joint-Sword-2024A which followed Lai’s inauguration. It is likely that Beijing is seeking to normalise large-scale military exercises around Taiwan as a method of providing cover for any future hypothetical invasion of Taiwan, in a similar manner to how Russia conducted multiple exercises near Ukraine before the 2022 invasion. By making such exercises routine, it would complicate distinguishing exercises from genuine operations that require a kinetic response when observing considerable Chinese deployments.

However, a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan would highly likely have a significant observable military build-up, though likely under the guise of military exercises. This week’s exercise was more limited than April’s – it was only one day as opposed to two, and the PLA-denoted exercise zones were smaller. Additionally, the exercise involved no missile launches (unlike 2022’s exercises), no announcement of live-fire exercises, and no impositions of no-fly zones. A factor in the exercise’s relative limits likely was to avoid making Taiwan a key issue in the ongoing US presidential election campaigns.

Bangladesh government issues Hasina arrest warrant

On 17 October, Bangladeshi authorities issued an arrest warrant for the ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who fled to India in August during nationwide severe protests. The interim government of Bangladesh, headed by Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus continues to have to balance a precarious political situation.

The arrest warrant for Hasina is highly likely meant to appease radical opposition parties which now support the interim government but have ambitions to rule the country. So far, much of the interim government’s authority has been supported by a consensus to root out the remnants of the Awami League, Hasina’s party which had long-controlled most government institutions, and “fill the gaps” left by this process.

Subianto set to become Indonesia’s new president

On 20 October, Prabowo Subianto is set to be inaugurated as Indonesia’s new president. The former special forces commander, who has been linked to former regime abuses, has attempted to soften his image and has promised to unite the Indonesian people. However, given his previous record and controversial comments made regarding democracy, there are major concerns over what a Subianto presidency would look like. Human rights groups and likely many Indonesians fear an authoritarian leadership marked by an increase in the power of the military and less transparency. His forecasted aggressive approach to foreign policy may also jeopardise Indonesia’s traditionally non-aligned international posture.

Reports of mass-killings at Iran-Afghan border

On 17 October, Taliban officials stated that they were investigating reports of a large-scale attack on Afghan migrants by Iranian security forces. The attack allegedly took place on 13 October near the town of Saravan, in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan which is located on migration routes for Afghans trying to reach the countries further west. According to some reports, which are at the time of writing still unsubstantiated, the attack may have killed up to 250 migrants. The case has the potential to intensify tensions between Iran and Afghanistan, possibly leading to a security escalation similar to the one in May of 2023.

Indian states mandate controversial anti-Muslim policies

The Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh have introduced controversial new anti-Muslim laws that are likely to be emulated in other states. The laws require that workers at restaurants will have to publicly display their names. This has been interpreted as a measure designed to discriminate against Muslims by exposing their faith through their names. This will likely lead to the boycott of restaurants with Muslim workers by hardline Hindus and may also result in targeted attacks. The controversial law is also likely to result in the sacking of many Muslim workers, which in turn is likely to increase radicalisation and sectarian divisions.

Ongoing dengue fever season kills two more in Bangladesh.

According to Bangladesh’s Directorate of Health, two more deaths have been recorded within this year’s ongoing dengue fever epidemic season. The total number of dengue fever deaths this year in Bangladesh currently stands at 201. The mosquito-borne disease has been an annual issue in Bangladesh since the first outbreak occurred in 2000. The 2023 outbreak was the deadliest on record, killing approximately 1,705 people.

The 2024 outbreak has so far been far less deadly than in 2023, however, the general annual trend has been towards increasing dengue-related deaths, highly likely due to a confluence of environmental and viral host factors, but likely also due to failures in managing dengue patients by authorities.

Highly active Japanese volcano erupts multiple times.

The active stratovolcano Sakurajima located near the city Kagoshima in southern Kyushu, Japan has been notably active in the past week. On 13 October, an eruption at the volcano caused volcanic ash to spread towards Kagoshima city. On 18 October, a more explosive eruption occurred, sending ash 4,000 metres above Sakurajima’s crater, and triggering ash fall warnings in Kagoshima and Miyazaki. The eruption is the most significant at the volcano since 29 July, although no injuries or damage have been reported.

Sakurajima is the most active volcano in Japan and has near-constantly erupted since 1955. In 1914, a considerable eruption killed dozens. The authorities dedicate substantial resources to monitoring the volcano, due to its proximity to dense population centres, and have issued emergency warnings and evacuations due to the volcano’s activity in recent years.