On the evening of 9 October Hurricane Milton made landfall near Siesta Key on the west coast of Florida. Hurricane Milton was initially a category 5 hurricane with maximum windspeeds of 287 km/h in the Gulf of Mexico, but weakened to a category 3 with maximum windspeeds of 193 km/h before landfall.

At least 16 deaths have so far been attributed to the storm, which is highly likely to rise, with four of the deaths being caused by tornadoes in St. Lucie County. Evacuation orders were issued in the Tampa Bay area, largely due to fears of a 4.5 metre storm surge (the rise in sea level caused by a storm, which can cause considerable flooding).

The hurricane destroyed at least 100 homes and left 3.4 million customers without power.

Solace Global Assessment: 

At its strongest while category 5 in the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Milton was the fifth most intense hurricane ever recorded in the Atlantic. However, the storm weakened considerably before landfall and the predicted storm surge did not occur. Hurricane Milton ended up tracking south of Tampa, effectively sucking water out of Tampa Bay, instead of causing a 4.5 metre storm surge. A 2.4 to 3 metre storm surge was however still recorded in parts of Sarasota county.

It is almost certain that Hurricane Milton will be assessed as having caused fewer deaths than Hurricane Helene in late September, which caused at least 227 deaths, which made it the deadliest hurricane on the US mainland since 2005’s Hurricane Katrina. This is almost certainly due to the reduction in Milton’s reduction in strength before landfall, the lack of predicted storm surge, and the path the hurricane took – cutting straight through Florida from west to east rather than tracking north into other southeastern US states. Many of the deaths caused by Helene were caused in North Carolina, with at least 72 deaths recorded just in Buncombe County where the city of Asheville was devastated.

The cost of damages by Milton, however, may be similar to Helene – Helene is estimated to have caused up to USD 47.5 billion in damages, whereas estimates suggest that Milton could cost insurers USD 30-50 billion. Former President and Presidential candidate Donald Trump criticised the federal government response to the hurricane. Following the devastation caused by 2005’s Hurricane Katrina, George W. Bush’s ratings fell considerably and never fully recovered.

While it is highly unlikely that the federal response to both Helene and Milton will have a similarly significant political impact, disinformation and conspiracy theories regarding government manipulation of weather have been proliferated in response to Hurricane Milton, including by Republican Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, leading to condemnation by at least three other Republican Representatives. It is a realistic possibility that small-scale civil unrest may materialise directly as a result of the hurricane.

As of 11 October, Hurricane Milton has reduced into a Post-Tropical Cyclone and is tracking eastwards in the Atlantic, scheduled to track south of Bermuda on 12 October.

On 3 October, the Haitian gang “Gran Grif” launched an attack in Port-Sonde, in the country’s west. During this reporting period, information emerged reporting that the attack, carried out with firearms and bladed weapons, resulted in at least 70 deaths, as well as the displacement of 6,000 residents. The leader of the Gran Grif group, Luckson Elan, stated that the attack was in response to civilian apathy regarding gang members being killed by the police and a grassroots “vigilante” movement, known as “Bwa Kale”.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is likely notable as the highest-severity violence in Haiti has been mostly concentrated in the capital, Port-au-Prince, where gangs continue to oppose the UN-backed and Kenya-led international police mission. Gangs lack an overarching strategy. However, their actions – including the violent attacks on civil society and institutions like churches and missions – signals a general aim to prevent the Haitian population from accessing other sources of welfare, thus keeping in place a system of coercion and reliance in areas under gang control.

The Haitian vigilante movement developed in April in Port-au-Prince, likely in response to the solidification of part of the gang front, and has carried out targeted attacks on gang members, as well as summary executions of suspected criminals. A report by a local NGO assesses that the vigilantes killed at least 160 suspected gang members in their first month of operations.

The gangs in the Bas-Artibonite region, where Port-Sonde is located, are allied to members of the capital’s powerful G-Pep alliance, which has, according to available information, sought to increase its influence in areas north of the capital where much of Haiti’s agricultural production is concentrated. G-Pep is one of the two main gang networks operating in the country, and was involved in a struggle with the rival G9 group.

In February 2024, G9 and G-Pep leaders announced the formation of Viv Ansanm, a coalition of gangs that has at times espoused “political” aspirations to influence the transitional administration of Haiti. The stability and actual functioning of Viv Ansamn is however unclear, especially outside of Port-au-Prince. In the capital’s informal settlement of Cite Soleil, divisions between the two groups were recorded at least until late July, when G9 and G-Pep agreed on the removal of roadblocks.

The Port-Sonde attack underscores the extremely severe internal security situation in Haiti, and almost certainly demonstrates the insufficiencies of current international efforts meant to restore order to the country. Currently, the almost totality of UN-backed efforts are focused in the capital. This is likely both a reflection of the mission’s overall interest in providing a stable administrative “centre” from which the new interim government can begin in-country operations, and of the significant shortfalls and deficiencies of the UN force’s assets.

The renewal of the police mission by the UN Security Council, on 30 September, is not likely to drastically change the situation in the short term. The UN mission currently operates with 410 personnel and is expected to eventually grow to a total manpower of 2,500.

Cost of living activists clash with police forces in Martinique

On 7 October approximately 50 cost of living activists clashed with police in Lamentin, Martinique, resulting in 11 injuries to police officers. Law enforcement employed necessary measures to disperse the unrest, resulting in five arrests. The unrest is a broader movement against the high cost of living, a continuing theme in the French West Indies, which was initiated in September by the Rally for the Protection of Afro-Caribbean Peoples and Resources (RPPRAC).

RPPRAC calls for food prices in Martinique to be aligned with mainland France, where prices are (according to French media) approximately 40% lower. As well as the cost-of-living protests, Martinique has seen a rise in urban violence, leading to the government imposing curfews in the capital Fort-de-France and the district of Lamentin to maintain public order.

Afghan lone wolf arrested in US over election day attack plans

The suspect was arrested by the FBI in Oklahoma, after leaving an online and financial trail that alerted authorities to his plans for an attack. The suspect, an Afghan national, reportedly planned to acquire semiautomatic weapons and carry out a mass-shooting on behalf of the Islamic State (IS).

The suspect is almost certainly a self-radicalised “lone wolf” and planned to carry out an attack on election day due to the event’. In the United States, the ease of accessing firearms almost certainly makes lone wolf attacks significantly deadlier than those that occur in Europe, which are mostly conducted with bladed weapons or vehicles.

New armed cartel founded in Mexico

The “Tabasco New Generation Cartel” (CTNG) reportedly operates in the municipalities of Jalpa and Macuspana in the Tabasco area. The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), one of the country’s largest, also operates in the area, as does another smaller group known as La Barredora. Alleged CTNG members released videos threatening government forces and other criminal groups in the area, although it is not clear if the group has already carried out any actions, beyond some alleged fires at commercial establishment in the area.

Brazil wins legal contest against Elon Musk’s X

On 8 October, the Brazilian Supreme Court allowed the social network X.com (previously Twitter) to resume service in the country after it agreed to comply with court rulings regarding content moderation that owner Elon Musk had previously rejected, as well as to pay fines. The development is likely a political victory for the administration of Brazilian President Lula. Musk has recently transitioned towards a more politically “visible” role in support of international right-wing politicians, most notably endorsing Donald Trump’s campaign for the US presidency. In April, former President Bolsonaro directly praised Musk for his opposition to the Brazilian Supreme Court’s rulings.  

Ken McCallum, the director general of the UK’s domestic security service MI5, provided an overview of current security risk trends faced by the UK during a rare threat update on 8 October. The speech was the first of its kind since 2022, and broadly covered topics including Iranian, Chinese and Russian espionage and hybrid warfare, as well as more specifically focusing on terrorism.

McCallum argued that, currently, UK intelligence and security services are facing an increased threat from Islamist Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs), and that the Islamic State (IS) is most active among them. McCallum also highlighted how MI5 resources are currently overstretched.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of the speech, two weeks before the UK’s Labour government is set to publish its 2025 budget plan, makes it highly likely that its primary objective is to secure increased funding for MI5. The highlighting of the threat from IS almost certainly reflects not only the return of the Islamist group to active planning of sophisticated terror attacks abroad – as in the case of the March Crocus Hall shooting in Moscow – but also the growing traction that the group’s messaging has in driving cases of self-radicalisation and lone wolf terrorism.

Despite suffering significant setbacks, the Islamic State almost certainly retains a strong online presence, via both “affiliated” and semi-official channels and international networks of supporters that use the group’s easily identifiable symbols and rhetoric (its “branding”). In July, the terrorism research platform GNET released a report highlighting IS’ use of sophisticated techniques to recruit and radicalise target audience members, for instance by seeking to “hijack” Islamic communities online or using “micro-influencers” to spread extremist propaganda and direct sympathisers to private channels – mostly on the Telegram app – where further radicalisation and planning can occur.

Notably, McCallum reported that, in the 2021-2024 period, MI5 analysts observed a threefold growth in the number of individuals under 18 involved in terrorism and extremist activity, meaning that underage individuals currently make up approximately 13 per cent of the total number of people involved in terrorism cases. This almost certainly reflects the growth in online radicalisation – likely favoured by increased isolation and social media usage during and after the COVID19 pandemic – which has benefitted propaganda efforts by VEOs like IS, as well as other Islamist and far-right extremist groups.

The demonstration – which had not been authorised by authorities – took place on 5 October in south-central Rome. The majority of the individuals that were injured were reportedly members of the police, which clashed with demonstrators as some groups tried to break through their lines. According to some attendees, the Italian Interior Ministry, and reporters, the violence was caused by groups of far-left “black bloc” activists.

Over the rest of the reporting period, further protests occurred in various European cities, with some university-based activist groups resuming occupations and other actions on campus. Clashes between university students and police were recorded in Paris, as police intervened to clear a demonstration at Sciences Po.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The high volume of protests is highly likely to continue over the next week, and to particularly increase on 12-13 October, the anniversary of the first entry of Israeli troops into Gaza which began a year-long ground operation. Further developments in Lebanon are highly likely to impact civil unrest in Europe, and particularly countries that have large Lebanese diasporas – firstly France. Moreover, the start of the new academic year in late September, nearly coinciding with the 7 October anniversary, is likely to further drive unrest episodes at European university campuses.

The Rome protests are likely to cause a political reaction from the Italian government, which is currently in the process of approving security legislation that the opposition denounced as “authoritarian” and expands penalties for unauthorised protests and road blockades – likely targeting environmentalist groups and far-left activists. OSINT analysis shows a significant deployment of security forces in key at-risk locations in Italy, including Jewish places of worship, religious schools and government buildings.

The reserve 146^th division of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) joined the 36^th, 91^st, and 98^th divisions in the Israeli ground operations in Lebanon, which are currently concentrating on the eastern part of the Israel-Lebanon border. IDF forces continue to carry out limited raids to destroy Hezbollah facilities near the border without reportedly seeking to retain control of the positions they take.

Fighting in south Lebanon is likely particularly difficult for the IDF due to both the terrain’s features and Hezbollah’s ground fortifications. On 10 October, reports emerged that Israeli troops fired at three UN peacekeepers’ positions, including the main base in Naqoura, injuring two peacekeepers. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has operated in Lebanon’s south for decades and received an enhanced mandate in 2006.

Tel Aviv is also currently considering options for retaliating for Iran’s 1 October strike, which may represent an escalation of the conflict. Likely options include: a strike on Iranian military targets, on oil infrastructure, or on nuclear plants.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Biden administration has likely sought to persuade the Israelis of carrying out a limited strike on Iran’s military infrastructure, as this would almost certainly pose the lowest risk of regional escalation. If Israel, instead, strikes Iran’s oil fields, refineries, or fuel shipping hubs, there is a realistic possibility of Tehran and its Axis of Resistance retaliating by targeting oil facilities in the wider region, and/or blocking the Strait of Hormuz, threatening region-wide economic and possibly military crisis. A strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities – while likely the preferred option of the Israeli government’s most hawkish components – is unlikely to succeed without direct US help, an option that the White House has already rejected. There is a high likelihood that the Israeli retaliatory strike will occur during the weekend.

Israeli operations in Lebanon are likely aimed at destroying Hezbollah structures in the south as part of a prelude to achieving the strategic objective of returning Israeli residents to the north border areas. Hezbollah, whose leadership has been significantly depleted over the past weeks, almost certainly continues to face difficulties at reconstituting a clear political chain of command, although its structure is highly likely flexible enough to not be impacted by Israeli decapitation strikes in terms of its battlefield operations.

Hezbollah, while still deeply influenced by Tehran’s decisions, almost certainly maintains retaining its political authority in Lebanon as a vital objective, and there is a realistic possibility that Israeli operations in Lebanon are partly aimed at eroding Hezbollah’s popularity and support base in order to coerce the Shia group into making significant and strategically valuable concessions.

New French government of Michel Barnier survives no-confidence motion

On 8 October, the French National Assembly failed to pas a motion of no-confidence put forward by the left-wing New Popular Front (NFP) coalition, which would have ousted the new Prime Minister Michel Barnier weeks after his appointment by Macron. Only the NFP supported the motion and, while the centre’s opposition was expected, it was the far-right National Rally’s (RN) abstention that was fundamental to the government’s survival.

The RN, which failed to achieve a major victory at the latest National Assembly elections, likely remains the only kingmaker in the current fragmented French parliament. The RN’s support for Barnier almost certainly remains conditional on the new government’s policy proposals. The tacit agreement between the Macron government and Le Pen’s RN will likely continue to be a driver of protests by the left in France.

Hungarians protest state television

On 5 October, the leading Hungarian opposition party TISZA organised a thousand-strong protest in Budapest, near the offices of the state broadcaster MTVA, over accusations of it functioning as a propaganda organ of Prime Minister Orban’s government. TISZA is a new political formation launched by former Orban ally Peter Magyar. It is a strongly personalistic and populist party and likely constitutes the major current challenge to Orban’s rule.

TISZA’s political strategy is likely aimed at challenging the base of Orban’s support by presenting an alternative – yet still “anti-establishment” – position. Further high-visibility protest actions are likely to take place in Hungary, especially targeting cultural and political institutions perceived as aligned with the Orban government.

Romanian Russophile candidate banned ahead of presidential election

Romania will hold presidential elections in two rounds on 24 November and 8 December. The polls are currently led by Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu and former NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana. On 5 October, the Constitutional Court ruled to remove Diana Sosoaca, leader of far-right, anti-EU and anti-NATO party SOS Romania, from the list of eligible candidates.

The court claimed that Sosoaca’s opinions made her unlikely to respect the presidential mandate to respect the constitution if elected. The ruling is likely to boost Sosoaca’s public image and will draw increased criticism of the country’s judiciary. There is a high likelihood of civil unrest in Bucharest, and especially near governmental buildings.

Saied predictably wins Tunisian elections

The current president secured a reported 91 per cent of the vote, with a low turnout of 29 per cent. Much of the opposition boycotted the vote, after numerous candidates were either imprisoned or prevented from running. The turnout levels, the lowest since 2011, likely highlight a continued voter apathy towards the political system of Tunisia, which has gradually become more authoritarian since Saied took power in 2019. Some civil unrest is likely to take place after the vote, but it is unlikely that it will result in severe disruptions or large-scale violence.

Norway raises terror threat alert level

The increase brings the country’s terror threat level to the second-highest level. Authorities justified the increase as responding to the broader situation in the MENA region. However, it is likely that Norwegian security services are also reacting to tangible threats targeting the Jewish community and Israeli assets and individuals in the country.

Norway has an overall low terror threat. However, an increase in radical activity and recruitment in northern Europe, especially notable since 7 October, has likely translated into a cross-border risk increase. The threat level increase results in police officers now being able to carry firearms nationwide, a precaution that almost certainly significantly increases their ability to respond to terrorist action.

The main terror threat in Norway highly likely remains that from lone wolves, self-radicalised terrorists, especially espousing an extremist Islamist ideology.  

Six wounded in Israel stabbing attack

The attack took place in the Israeli city of Hadera on 9 October. The alleged attacker was killed by responding security forces. It is highly likely that the attack was a lone wolf action, and there is a likelihood that it was a copycat attack inspired by the recent firearm and knife attack in Jaffa.

Wagner’s north Mali expedition ends with no clear outcome

A column of more than 60 Russian and Malian vehicles, directed towards the Tinzaouaten area near the Algerian border, returned to their base in Kidal without a major engagement with the Tuareg and Islamist groups that had inflicted a severe defeat on the group in July. The expedition, which was highly likely aimed to retaliate for the disastrous July ambush, was marked by considerable logistical difficulties, with the column reportedly being forced to abandon part of their equipment en route.

In addition to the considerable material expenses, the failure of the expedition will almost certainly be considered a political victory for the al-Qaeda-affiliated and Tuareg groups in the country’s north. It also highly likely represents an embarrassment for the junta – and Wagner – who promised a decisive military result after months of setbacks.

North Niger rebel group form alliance

The “Coordination of the Free Forces of Niger” was formed by four rebel groups based in the country’s north. The four groups are mostly comprised of Tuaregs, support the pre-junta government, and have carried out targeted operations, including kidnappings and assassinations, against junta officials. The Nigerien groups have also increasingly pursued closer cooperation with their Malian counterparts.

Clashes between army and al-Shabaab in south and central Somalia

At least 59 members of the Islamist group were killed, as well as four soldiers, in two separate operations in the Garilay area of Galgaduud region and in the Hawadlay area of the Middle Shabelle region. The operation is highly likely a success for government forces, whose offensive against al-Shabaab has stalled with the exception of few regions. Progress in Galgaduud follows the liberation of the town of Ali Yabal last week.

Peace talks continue between Armenia and Azerbaijan

In an effort to ease tensions in the South Caucasus region, the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments are actively pursuing a peace deal. This follows a year of tense negotiations that escalated after Azerbaijan militarily occupied the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September 2023, which led to thousands of Armenians fleeing the area.

The peace talks have been challenging, with both sides accusing the other of lacking a genuine commitment to end the decades-long conflict, which began following their respective independence from Russia in the 1990’s. In a significant development earlier this year, Armenia withdrew from several Azerbaijani villages it had controlled since the 1990’s as part of the peace process thus, allowing thousands of Azerbaijanis to return to the areas.

Armenian president Vahagn Khachatryan expressed cautious optimism of the peace deal being reached before the 29^th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29) scheduled from 11-24 November in Baku.

Rwanda begins Marburg vaccinations

The disease, a viral haemorrhagic fever that is similar to Ebola, was first detected in the country in late September. So far, around 50 cases have been reported and 12 casualties – this reflects the high fatality rate of the virus, which can be higher than 80 per cent. It is highly likely that the actual number of cases is higher, especially in rural areas. Uganda also has had outbreaks of the virus in the past, and there is a realistic possibility that the spread of the virus could impact countries neighbouring Rwanda, including Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

On 7 October, a Chinese convoy travelling from the Port Qasim Electric Power Company, a joint China-Pakistan coal-fired power plant project, was attacked by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) near Jinnah International Airport (KHI) in Karachi. The attack was conducted using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), with the Pakistani Bomb Disposal Unit specifying that 80 kilograms of commercial explosives were used, destroying three vehicles and damaging 12. Two Chinese nationals were killed, with at least 10 injuries.

The Chinese embassy strongly condemned the attack and stated that they are working with Pakistani authorities and advised Chinese citizens to avoid travel to the southwest province of Balochistan and the northwest province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Baloch militants also conducted several other attacks during this reporting period, including a 5 October attack that allegedly killed three security personnel in Kalat district (claimed by BLA), an 8 October armed assault on military personnel in Mand Chokap, Kech which the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) claim killed two, an 8 October rocket attack against a military camp in the Tijaban area of Kech claimed by the BLF, and a 9 October attack against on a Sabakzai Dam checkpoint that reportedly killed one and injured 11 others.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack on a Chinese convoy follows multiple BLA attacks covered in the previous Global Intelligence Summary, including an attack against workers at a gas and oil exploration company site in Musakhail. In August there was a distinct spike in Baluch militant activity, with coordinated attacks killing over 70 people. It is highly likely that the intensification of Baluch attacks seen in recent months will continue, likely indicating a coordinated campaign. Balochistan is the poorest province in Pakistan, which is highly disproportionate to its considerable oil and mineral wealth. Since Balochistan’s accession to Pakistan in 1948, there have been multiple secessionist insurgencies. The political marginalisation and cultural suppression of the Baloch people, as well as the increasing economic exploitation in the region, are almost certainly key factors in sustaining Baloch militancy.

On 15-16 October, Pakistan will host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Islamabad, with representatives from Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran attending. In combination with recent violent protests in Islamabad in support of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, it is likely that the declining security situation in Balochistan (as well as in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where numerous Islamist militant groups are active) will raise questions about the security of Pakistan for the summit. It is a realistic possibility that the summit will be a high-value target for attacks and/or disruption by the various groups and movements that challenge Pakistan’s security.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPED) is the flagship project of Beijing’s grand strategic Belt and Road initiative in Pakistan, intending to connect Gwadar Port in Balochistan with the Xinjiang region in China with highways, railways and pipelines. Over USD 62 billion has already been invested in the project. Empowered by local grievances about the project, Baloch militants (primarily from the BLA) have consistently targeted Chinese nationals linked to CPEC projects since 2018. It is likely that increased Chinese involvement in local security will occur, however, it is unlikely that Baloch militancy against Chinese interests will decrease.

Tens of thousands of activists supporting the imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan clashed with security forces on the roads into Islamabad on 4-5 October. Overnight on 4 October, the chief minister of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Ali Amin Gandapur, led thousands of protesters to block the Islamabad-Peshawar highway. Riot police deployed teargas and baton charges against the demonstrators, cutting off mobile internet access and blocking roads into Islamabad. The Interior Ministry has stated that over 550 people were arrested, and over 80 police officers were injured in the clashes.

Imran Khan’s party, Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), has claimed that Gandapur has been abducted and unlawfully detained. Pakistani troops have been deployed in Islamabad-Rawalpindi and are scheduled to remain until 17 October, after the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit which will be held in Islamabad on 15-16 October. In Lahore, security forces also suspended cell phone and internet services, and blocked roads into the city with hundreds of containers, with clashes being reported near Lahore’s High Court on 5 October.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that unrest will continue in Pakistan, with PTI issuing a fresh call for a series of protests. Disruption to the SCO summit will highly likely present a high-value target for opposition forces in Pakistan. Imran Khan has been held in jail since August 2023, with over 100 charges relating to terrorism and corruption. In March 2023, following attempts by security forces to arrest Khan, large scale, widespread and violent unrest was triggered across Pakistan, leading to at least eight deaths.

Highly likely due to the success of government suppression in preventing protesters from entering major urban centres such as Islamabad and Lahore, PTI leadership figures have stated that the party will shift its protest strategy to instead focus on “district-level protests”, rather than solely concentrating on larger cities. Nonetheless, there are indications that the PTI is planning a nationwide call for a demonstration in Islamabad, pending discussion amongst the PTI leadership. There are currently protests scheduled in Multan and Sahiwal on 11 October, Gujranwala and Sargodha on 12 October, Dera Ghazi Khan on 13 October, and Lahore and Faisalabad on 14 October.

Pakistan’s security profile faces considerable challenges from three fronts: civil unrest in support of Imran Khan, an intensification of attacks by militants in Balochistan, and a deterioration of security in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It is highly likely that draconian government suppression over the past week is due to concerns over disruption to the SCO summit, however, it is likely that rather than reducing the threat from these three distinct issues, opposition forces will be driven further to increasingly violent methods.

Pakistan bans prominent Pashtun rights group

The Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) was founded in 2014 and advocates for the rights of Pakistan’s ethnic Pashtuns. Pakistan’s counterinsurgency against the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other militant groups in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has allegedly led to widespread oppression of Pashtuns. This week, following recent mobilisations, the PTM planned a three-day national gathering in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to oppose military abuses against Pashtuns and recent declining security amidst a marked increase in militant attacks in the past few months.

The PTM have been proscribed by Pakistan’s Interior Ministry under the Anti-Terrorism Act, which freezes the organisation’s assets, closes offices, prohibits publishing literature and enables the seizure of published material. PTM’s leader, Manzoor Pashteen, has gone into hiding, and hundreds of PTM members have been arrested. A PTM spokesperson has stated that the group still intends to undertake the three-day national gathering, despite efforts by security forces to violently prevent it.

The PTM likely operated as a political outlet for local Pashtun grievances, and it is likely that the group’s proscription will drive PTM members and supporters into more radical and violent actions.

One hospitalised in India during doctor hunger strike

A junior doctor was hospitalised after carrying out almost a week-long hunger strike in protest over the rape and murder of a trainee medic in a hospital in Kolkata, which resulted in widespread protests in August. The case continues to highlight the significant political impact of the attack, which protesters have argued demonstrated ongoing and widespread gender inequality and oppression in India. The latest hunger strike was motivated by doctors’ perceptions of insufficient government responses to their demands for greater security at hospitals. There is a realistic possibility that the hospitalisation of the junior doctor will spark further localised civil unrest in Kolkata.

Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wins in Haryana

The opposition Congress party’s alliance won the first elections in Jammu and Kashmir in the first vote after the border state was stripped of much of its autonomy. The BJP was projected to lose in Haryana, and the surprising result is likely to provide a significant domestic boost to Modi, after his party’s underwhelming victory at the past general elections. Congress officials challenged the vote results, claiming that the voting process was marked by irregularities. If Congress’ challenge of the results progresses, there is a realistic possibility that it will result in unrest and possible sectarian violence in the state.

China and the Philippines clash over disputed territories in the South China Sea

Tensions between China and the Philippines have sharply escalated over disputed territories in the South China Sea, with reports of six aggressive incidents having occurred in August alone. Five of these incidents took place near Scarborough Shoal and Sabina Shoal, areas within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that China claims as its own. Hostile actions have included intentional boat rammings, uses of water cannons to target vessels, and other forms of physical confrontation.

China has characterised its relationship with the Philippines as being at a critical juncture, urging Manila to reconsider its future actions. This situation poses a potential risk of involving the United States, which maintains a mutual defence treaty with the Philippines and has pledged to support Manila in the event of armed attacks against Filipino forces.

Speaking at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 10 October, the president of the Philippines called for an urgent speed in negotiations to resolve the increasing tensions.

Sri Lanka issues red alert flood warnings to coastal regions in the south and southeast

Red alert flood warnings have been issued for the south and southeastern coastal regions of Sri Lanka. Local media have already reported images of flooding in Walagedara. The areas with the highest warning and risk are the coastal areas extending from Puttalam to Hambantota, via Colombo and Galle.

It is expected that wind speeds will reach 60-70 kph and naval and fishing communities are being advised not to venture out until further notice. Sri Lanka has been in an economic crisis following its meltdown in 2022 and although the new government has shown positive signs of improvement (with The World Bank confirming Sri Lanka is recovering faster than expected) it is heavily reliant on the country maintaining stability.