Heavy fighting between two rival factions of the Sinaloa cartel is ongoing, primarily in Sinaloa’s state capital, Culiacan. Since the fighting initially broke out on 25 July, at least 132 deaths have been attributed to the cartel civil war, 20 of these civilians, and an additional 160 people have been reported missing or kidnapped.

On 29 September, approximately 1,500 residents marched through Culiacan demanding peace, organised by the civic group “Culiacan Valiente,” or Brave Culiacan. On 30 September, it was announced that the approximately 1,000-member local municipal police force had their firearms seized by the military, with soldiers, state police and National Guard taking over patrolling.

The state governor, Ruben Rocha, subsequently announced that local police will not return to duty until they retrieve their weapons.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Sinaloa cartel civil war stems from the July arrest of Sinaloa leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada by US authorities. El Mayo was lured onto a private plane by one of former Sinaloa leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman’s sons, Joaquín Guzmán López, which then landed in El Paso, Texas. The two rival factions are Los Chapitos, those loyal to the El Chapo’s other sons, and La Miyaza/Mayitos, who are loyal to El Mayo.

While Culiacan has historically been the epicentre of multiple outbreaks of cartel violence, such as the 2019 Battle of Culiacan, the current civil war has been notably intense. Firefights have broken out even in Culiacan’s downtown, as well as in upscale neighbourhoods. Cartel members have made barricades of burning buses and trucks to block the highways around Culiacan, which has led to security forces deploying five ‘anti-blockade’ units.

It is highly likely that the seizure of local police firearms has been conducted due to distrust of the local police force, rather than routine inspection of permits and serial numbers.

With the violence having already spilt over to other northern Mexican states, including Sonora, Baja California, Chihuahua, Zacatecas and Durango, there is a realistic possibility that a spillover of violence could manifest in US cities, particularly in California, Texas and Arizona. Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), the now former-President as of 30 September, partly blamed Washington DC for the surge in violence, a claim denied by the US ambassador to Mexico, Ken Salazar. It is likely that this has further increased diplomatic tensions, in addition to the recent spat stemming from comments made by Salazar criticising the planned judicial reform overhaul in Mexico.

The new Mexican president sworn in on 1 October, Claudia Sheinbaum, faces an immediate challenge in tackling the Sinaloa civil war. AMLO pursued a “hugs not bullets” policy towards cartel violence, intended to tackle the issue with job opportunities and training programmes rather than armed force. A record number of homicides were recorded during AMLO’s presidency, however. While Sheinbaum’s tenure as the mayor of Mexico City saw the homicide rate halve, with Sheinbaum implementing expanded surveillance and police monitoring policies, it is highly unlikely that such policies will be replicable nationwide.

While Sheinbaum has appointed former senior police officer Omar Garcia Harfuch as security secretary, which potentially indicates a change in security policy, Sheinbaum has publicly stated that she will continue AMLO’s policy platform.

On 3 October, the President of Ecuador, Daniel Noboa, declared an extension to the current state of emergency which will last a further 60-day period. The extension will cover the same areas as the previous state of emergency which included the provinces of Guayas, home to Guayaquil, the most populated city in Ecuador, along with Los Ríos, El Oro, Manabí, Santa Elena, and Orellana, as well as the canton of Camilo Ponce Enríquez – a mining enclave in Azuay province, where criminal gangs have attempted to seize control of illegal mining operations.

However, the state of emergency will now cover the capital Quito, which has been justified within the presidential decree by “the intensification of hostilities, the commission of crimes and the intensity of the prolonged presence of organised armed groups”. The state of emergency will include a curfew from 10 p.m. to 5 a.m. in areas with high crime rates and will temporarily suspend rights such as the inviolability of homes and freedom of assembly.

Despite this, the Constitutional Court is set to review the decision and has previously annulled similar measures.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Since coming to power in November 2023, President Noboa has sought ways to curb endemic gang violence within Ecuador which has been the main driver behind a fourfold increase in the homicide rate between 2018 and 2022. In 2023, alone there were an estimated 7,500 murders in a country of just 18 million, providing a murder rate of 44.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, behind only Jamaica in the Western Hemisphere.

In El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele has reduced the murder rate to 2.4 in 2023 as part of his “guerra contra las pandillas” or war against the gangs. This has involved multiple states of emergencies, expanded powers, the suspension of constitutional rights and the arrest of over 80,000 suspected gang members. President Noboa has attempted to emulate these tactics in Ecuador. However, early indications are that these policies have not been successful and there has been an increase in crime.

Unlike in El Salvador, Ecuador’s gangs are not unorganised or poorly funded street gangs. Ecuador’s gangs include well-organised, well-armed and heavily financed outfits associated with the Mexican and Colombian cartels, both of which have expanded their power in the country since the demobilisation of the FARC group which used to control much of the cocaine trade. These cartels are unlikely to submit to Noboa’s policies due to the strategic significance of Ecuador, which sits between the major cocaine-producing countries of Peru and Colombia, and its ports have been key exit points for cocaine shipments.

The prison system is another critical point of failure in Noboa’s crackdown. The major cartels control operations and recruit new members within the prison system, enabling them to establish stronger networks, leading to more violence both within and outside of the prison. The militaristic strategy of the Noboa administration may still yield short-term reductions in crime; however, by underestimating the power of the cartels and failing to address some of the other underlying conditions that have driven violence, the security situation in Ecuador is unlikely to significantly improve and will likely remain trapped in a cycle of state of emergencies.

On 3 October, thousands of students marched in multiple Argentine cities including Buenos Aires and Rosario against planned government education budget cuts. The marches unfolded mostly peacefully, although some cases of violence towards counter-protesters were recorded. Hours before the demonstration, President Javier Milei had threatened to veto a law that would guarantee university funding for the academic year.

The protests represent the second instance of large-scale civil unrest driven by student groups within the past six months, following significant demonstrations in late April over budget cuts. The protests occurred only weeks after Milei published the government’s 2025 budget bill, which predicts a continuing surplus and shrinking inflation, as well as the further devaluation of the Argentine Peso.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The socioeconomic situation in Argentina continues to remain extremely precarious and is almost certainly exacerbating political divisions. Despite the Milei government’s success in reducing inflation to its lowest levels in decades, cutting the government’s spending deficit, and beginning to replenish foreign currency reserves, these policies have also led to a sharp rise in poverty and a drop in consumer spending. This has placed severe pressure on key economic sectors, with small- and medium-sized businesses suffering the most.

Milei’s popularity levels have remained consistent for much of the past year, despite experiencing a relative decrease in September. However, despite relatively high popularity rates, Milei’s continuous attacks on the public sector and welfare state have continued to drive large-scale protests, led by the country’s unions, left-wing parties, and student groups. Recent estimates indicate that poverty rates under Milei have soared to over 50 per cent as a result of Milei’s austerity measures.

With poverty rates this high, Milei’s popularity is likely to decrease and larger segments of the population will likely become susceptible to unrest, leading to increased disruption, instability and potentially political violence.

US Supreme Court tackling of sensitive cases likely to drive civil unrest

The conservative-leaning Supreme Court began its new nine-month term on 1 October, as part of which it is scheduled to review a series of cases on highly contentious political issues, including gun control and LGBTQ rights. There is a high likelihood that decisions made by the legislative branch will play a key role in the political system of the US in the coming weeks, especially due to the high likelihood of legal challenges being raised prior to and after the elections.

Claudia Sheinbaum sworn in as Mexico’s first woman President

Sheinbaum takes power while Mexico is struggling with multiple issues. As highlighted in her inauguration speech, the president’s main priority in the immediate term will be to reassure foreign partners and civil society regarding the highly controversial judicial reform bill passed by her predecessor. Moreover, the first test faced by the government will be the budget, which has a deadline of 15 November.

More broadly, Sheinbaum inherits a precarious domestic security situation, marked by increasing violence between the two main cartels present in the country, the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation which have been fighting since the arrest of the former’s senior leadership.

Dominican Republic to deport “10,000” Haitians a week

The Dominican government announced on 2 October that it will start mass deportations of Haitian migrants in the country, citing an exponential growth of migrant numbers, almost certainly due to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in its neighbouring country. In 2023, the Dominican Republic deported more than 170,000 people, almost all Haitians, and expelled at least 65,000 in the first half of 2024. The announcement and implementation of the plan is likely to translate into an increase in civil unrest, as the opposition continues to criticise the government of President Luis Abinader for its harsh treatment of Haitian migrants.

Mexican soldiers fire on migrants near Guatemalan border

On October 1, 2024, Mexican soldiers shot at a truck carrying migrants near Huixtla, Chiapas, resulting in six fatalities. The military claimed the truck was evading personnel and followed by vehicles linked to criminal groups, prompting the soldiers to open fire after hearing gunfire. This incident underscores the ongoing violence and risks faced by migrants in Mexico, exacerbated by increasing enforcement measures likely influenced by US policies. Critics have argued that militarisation in immigration enforcement endangers migrants, making their journey to the US even more dangerous.

At least 200 deaths attributed to Hurricane Helene in US

Hurricane Helene, which had initially made landfall in the Big Bend area of Florida as a category 4 storm on 26 September, caused at least 200 deaths across the Southeast US. Deaths have been reported in the states of Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee and Virginia. North Carolina was particularly affected, with at least 72 deaths reported in Buncombe County alone. Buncombe County’s city of Asheville was devastated by flooding.

By the morning of 30 September, over two million customers remained without power. With the death toll highly likely to continue to rise, Helene is one of the deadliest hurricanes to impact the mainland US in 50 years, and the deadliest since 2005’s Hurricane Katrina.

The demonstrations have been organised by local groups and are meant to commemorate one year since the start of the conflict. Protests have been scheduled to take place in multiple large cities and capitals, including London, Paris, Rome, Warsaw, Madrid, Amsterdam, Athens, Berlin, and Istanbul.

Some of these planned gatherings have not been approved by authorities, including the event scheduled to take place in Rome on 5 October – although organisers have still called for the event to go ahead. In addition to its overlap with 7 October, the scheduled period of protests begins on the day following Rosh Hashanah, and will also end on the eve of Yom Kippur, thus occupying the period between the two holiest days of the Jewish religious calendar.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The choice to hold pro-Palestine protests overlapping with the anniversary of the 7 October Hamas attack in southern Israel will likely be perceived as a provocation and almost certainly result in an increased security risk at the protest locations. There is a high likelihood of pro-Israel counter-protester groups seeking to disrupt the pro-Palestine gatherings. Likewise, there is a high likelihood of clashes breaking out between protesters and police, especially in cities where clashes have previously occurred (such as Paris), and in those where the protests have not been approved.

The scope and high visibility of the demonstrations are also likely to result in an increased threat from lone-wolf terrorism, either targeting the protesters or high-visibility targets in protest locations, including government buildings and places of worship.

The case of Italy is likely to be particularly affected by the latter dynamic. The government’s refusal to grant protesters a permit to demonstrate has been met with severe backlash by the opposition. Moreover, the Italian lower chamber recently passed a new security law, which has been strongly criticised by the opposition for reportedly restricting freedom of protest.

These two developments will likely drive significant civil unrest on 5 October and in the coming weeks in large Italian cities.

On 29 September, Austria held legislative elections to elect the 28^th National Council, the lower house within Austria’s bicameral parliament. The far-right FPÖ party won more than 29 per cent of the vote, almost doubling its vote share from the last elections in 2019. The centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and Green Party both saw an important decline in the number of votes, while the Social Democrats (SPÖ) held their 21 per cent vote share.

The results’ announcement quickly translated into some civil unrest. On 30 September, protests took place near the parliament building in Vienna.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The vote is highly likely a historic result for the Austrian far right, and further emphasises some visible trends from across Europe: a collapse of the Green parties – marked by a shift among young voters towards more established left parties, or the populist right – and a decrease in the traction of establishment centre-right parties. The FPÖ’s success was almost certainly achieved through its ability to tap into a range of concerns shared among large sections of the Austrian electorate. The party’s main source of success has been its ability to leverage concerns over immigration and national identity.

The FPÖ has championed policies and concepts that include the “remigration” of immigrants and the creation of a more homogenous Austria. However, what sets the party apart from some of its European far-right counterparts is its attempts to appeal to Turkish-origin voters, a demographic estimated to be as many as 500,000. This tactic has involved framing Turkish-origin voters as well-integrated compared to migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and other Muslim nations. It is currently unclear as to how successful this tactic has been. However, early indications are that it has proven reasonably successful with the Turkish youth.

Moreover, by appealing to well-integrated Muslims, this tactic helps the FPÖ distance itself from accusations of being racist, nationalist, or exclusively Christian. In the long term, this tactic, which has been disparaged as opportunistic, may be emulated by other members of the European far-right if deemed successful. This form of selective inclusion, whilst also championing policies like remigration and deportations, is likely to stoke divisions within the Muslim diaspora, potentially undermining social cohesion and potentially leading to incidents of unrest or violence that strengthen the FPÖ’s core narratives.|

It is currently unclear as to whether or not the FPÖ will become part of a ruling coalition. To achieve this, the FPÖ will require a coalition partner. The only prospective “kingmaker” is the centre-right ÖVP. However, the ÖVP’s leader and current Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer, has ruled out entering a coalition if the FPÖ leader, Herbert Kickl, insists on becoming Chancellor. A potential outcome would be the mirroring of the 2023 Dutch elections, where a coalition was formed only after far-right leader Geert Wilders agreed not to be prime minister.

An FPÖ-ÖVP coalition with the ÖVP nominating a Chancellor is assessed as the most likely development. Both parties have some ideological overlap over issues like immigration, however, if the FPÖ is forced to give up the Chancellery, it will likely demand support for stronger policies over immigration. There is a realistic possibility that the advancement of immigration policies like stricter border controls and increased deportations, could create an environment where violence is more likely to occur, as well as strain the relationship between migrant communities and the government.

The only real viable alternative to an FPÖ-ÖVP coalition is a coalition between the ÖVP and the centre-left SPÖ. However, this coalition will likely be interpreted as an attempt to establish a firewall around the far-right, similar to the tactics observed in Germany, and has several issues. Firstly, a centre-right-centre-left coalition will likely be ungovernable and both parties will likely risk alienating their base by betraying their respective values. There is a high likelihood that such a coalition will collapse, leading to early elections where the FPÖ could extend its vote share. Secondly, a firewall around the  FPÖ could play into the party’s hands by reinforcing their narrative of being outsiders persecuted by the political establishment, thereby increasing their appeal to voters who feel increasingly disenfranchised by mainstream politics.

On 27 September, a large-scale Israeli strike in southern Beirut killed the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, as well as other high-ranking officials of the Lebanese militant group. Shortly after 23:00 local time on 30 September, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) launched what they described as a “targeted and delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon”, aimed against “terrorist targets and infrastructures of Hezbollah”.

As of the time of writing, available OSINT shows that IDF operations have been limited, with no attempts at penetrating deep into Lebanese territory. Israeli ground operations in Lebanon have so far been mainly carried out in the two directions of Odaisseh and Maround al Ras. On the first day of operations, the IDF reported that 8 soldiers had been killed in combat.

On the afternoon of 1 October, Iran launched a two-wave ballistic missile attack on targets throughout Israel, with reportedly at least 180 missiles being used. Israeli missile defence forces, as well as IAF and allied American and Jordanian air force units, contributed to the interception of the majority of the Iranian projectiles. Nevertheless, this attack was likely more successful at penetrating Israeli defences that the previous large-scale strike in April.

The attacks resulted in only one confirmed casualty, a Palestinian civilian who was killed by debris near Jericho, in the West Bank.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The IDF’s ground offensive has likely been timed to exploit the current lack of command and control (C2) within Hezbollah which has been achieved through a series of decapitation strikes on the group’s senior leadership. In September, the Netanyahu administration added the return of Israeli citizens to settlements near the Israel-Lebanon border to their list of stated war aims.

The significant degradation of Hamas forces in the Gaza Strip following a year of conflict has also almost certainly allowed Tel Aviv to shift its focus to the north. Israeli officials almost certainly assess that a reduced ground force, combined with a constant threat of airstrikes, will be sufficient to prevent Hamas from reforming units capable of significantly threatening IDF forces in Gaza.

IDF operations are highly likely aimed at destroying Hezbollah assets in the south of Lebanon and preventing the group from targeting north Israel. While Hezbollah maintains some long-range weapons systems, much of the group’s arsenal has a maximum range of ~40km. IDF operations will highly likely seek to force Hezbollah to retreat north of the Litani River, as per the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

It is unlikely that the IDF will commit to a long-term occupation of southern Lebanon, which would entail high political and economic costs as well as a high rate of casualties.

The latest attack by Tehran is likely to allow Israeli forces the political justification to increase strikes and ground operations targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as strikes on other regional Axis of Resistance members. Israeli forces may seek to capitalise on the recent decapitation strikes to significantly degrade Hezbollah’s manpower and, especially, weapons stocks as a prelude to a UN-mediated deal on its northern border.

An Israel-Hamas ceasefire deal, remains, as of now, highly unlikely to occur imminently, especially due to the approaching 7 October anniversary, whose political significance makes such a deal unthinkable for the Israeli leadership.

Israeli forces will almost certainly retaliate for Iran’s attack. However, it is likely that retaliatory strikes targeting Iranian assets or territory will be limited to avoid further escalation and meant at re-establishing deterrence. There is a realistic possibility that Israeli forces will opt to strike Iranian officials and assets in Iraq or Syria, including IRGC members.

Moreover, Israeli strikes could also target military targets, including missile launch sites and air defence stations, in Iranian territory, as well as strategic objectives like oil extraction facilities and refineries. Finally, there is a realistic possibility of Israeli strikes targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, which would likely only be symbolic due to the impossibility of causing genuine damage to Iran’s largely underground nuclear facilities with long-range fires and the necessity to conduct such an operation with airframes penetrating deep into Iranian airspace carrying bunker buster bombs.

While such a course of action has been advocated by “hawkish” elements of the Israeli government, as well as some allied political figures, such a move would highly likely be opposed by London, Washington, and Brussels, as it poses an obvious threat to the possible resumption of nuclear negotiations, which Pezeshkian has repeatedly called for in his recent speech at the UN General Assembly.

Growing unrest following general strike call in France

Starting on 1 October, major French unions have called for a general strike, with 180 events taking place across the country. Not all major unions have supported the appeal, with some citing that it is still “premature” due to the Barnier government having only recently been installed. Students have also joined the strikes, with multiple high schools in Paris and other major French urban centres being occupied.

There is a realistic threat of political violence during the strikes. In Lyon, on the night of 30 September, reports indicate that local far-right groups staged impromptu demonstrations and “patrols” in residential areas.

“Ecotage” action targets Flamanville nuclear power plant, France

The plant is the newest to be commissioned in France (in 2007), and, after years of delays and significant cost increases, is set to become operational in the next months. On 30 September, anarchist activists claimed responsibility for targeting an electricity pylon supplying energy to the site.

The action did not result in any notable damage. However, the case continues to highlight the risk that ecotage (sabotage carried out by radical environmentalists, often targeting energy infrastructure or vehicles) poses to high-visibility targets and industries.

Around 3,000 march in Portugal against “uncontrolled immigration”

The demonstrations, which took place in Lisbon on 29 September, were organised by the right-wing populist CHEGA party. In 2024, CHEGA, which was only founded in 2019, won 50 seats, becoming the third-largest political force in the country. The latest protests were notable as participants deliberately marched through areas of Lisbon with large migrant communities. Moreover, reports indicate that members of neo-Nazi and far-right groups, including the Grupo 1143 – a former hooligan club reconstituted into a militant formation – attended the event.

FRELIMO almost certain to win Mozambique elections

General elections are scheduled to take place in Mozambique on 9 October. The vote will serve to appoint the president and 250-member Assembly of the Republic for a five-year term. Mozambique has been governed by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) since independence from Portugal in 1975. FRELIMO has gradually drifted towards authoritarian rule and recent elections have been likely doctored to ensure its victory. FRELIMO will almost certainly win the elections, which will likely be fraught with irregularities.

There is a high likelihood of civil unrest following the vote and a realistic possibility of violence against government officials and police. While all the major RENAMO-originated armed groups have been largely neutralised, some anti-government cells likely remain operational and will seek to stage anti-government action.

Two teenagers arrested over suspected bomb attack at Israeli embassy in Denmark.

The two teenagers, both reportedly Swedish citizens, were arrested on 3 October, the day after two early morning explosions occurred near the embassy compound in Copenhagen. It is highly likely that the attack was a botched attempt at targeting Israeli diplomatic personnel.

It is likely that the case will bring further attention to the crime and extremist action threat in Denmark originating from neighbouring Sweden. The reported use of “hand grenades” during the attack is likely a demonstration of the overlap between radical networks and organised crime groups in northern Europe, with the former increasingly having access to more sophisticated weaponry, including explosive material.

At least 31 wounded in arson, vehicle, and machete attack in Essen, Germany.

An individual, reportedly wearing a keffiyeh and Palestinian flag and identified as a Syrian national, set fire to multiple buildings in Essen, North Rhine Westphalia and then drove a van into local storefronts, before exiting the vehicle and trying to attack bystanders. The motive of the attack is still unclear as of the time of writing, but authorities have claimed that the most likely reason is related to mental health. Still, the attackers’ choice to wear items associated with the Palestinian cause will almost certainly be used by anti-Palestine channels, and will likely increase far-right sentiment within Germany.

US Central Command kills 37 ISIS and Hurras al-Din fighters in Syria.

The two strikes, on 16 and 24 September, are among the largest conducted by US forces in the past year, and were reportedly successful in killing a Hurras al-Din local commander and at least four Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) leaders.

ISIS and other Islamist groups have increased the volume of attacks in Syria and Iraq, especially targeting oil and gas facilities. On 3 October, ISIS channels released information concerning a large-scale attack on Iraqi security forces in Anbar, which reportedly resulted in eight government casualties.

Militant groups are likely exploiting regional tensions, with coalition forces currently concentrating their efforts on Iranian proxy forces such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). This has likely provided Islamist groups more freedom of movement and groups like ISIS have likely been emboldened by the recent announcement that the US will withdraw its forces from Iraq.

Terror attack in Jaffa, Israel kills seven.

On 1 October, two individuals carried out a gun and knife attack in Jaffa, south Tel Aviv, killing seven and wounding at least eleven. The perpetrators were killed by responding security forces. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack, although the credibility of this claim is uncertain. While the dynamic of the attack remains partly unclear, there is a high likelihood that it will result in spontaneous retaliatory violence in the West Bank, perpetrated by both the IDF and Israeli settlers.

Yemen’s Houthis exchange strikes with Israel and attack two vessels in Red Sea.

After Yemen’s Houthi militants launched a ballistic missile towards Israel on 29 September, reportedly targeting Ben Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv and intercepted by Israeli air defence, Israel’s military conducted air strikes on Hodeida and Ral Isa, Yemen.

The Houthis then claimed they launched several one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs) toward Eilat and Tel Aviv, Israel. Their claims that the OWA-UAVs largely bypassed air defence systems, are however likely untrue.

Additionally, the Houthis attacked two vessels in the Red Sea on 1 October, after an almost month-long lull in Houthi anti-merchant shipping attacks. One of the vessels, the Panama-flagged  CORDELIA MOON (IMO: 9297888), was struck by an uncrewed surface vessel (USV), puncturing a ballast tank.

The CORDELIA MOON is reportedly part of Russia’s “dark fleet”, vessels trading under opaque ownership that allow Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, despite an agreement between Russia and the Houthis that exempts Russia-linked vessels from being targeted.

Islamic State Somalia Province (ISSP) reported to have “doubled” in size since 2023.

The group is particularly active in the country’s north. While ISSP is comparatively smaller and less active than other branches of the Islamic State (IS), it benefits from being a hub for the rerouting of funds originating from supporters in Africa, and from its geographical closeness to IS Yemen Province (ISYP).

Reports indicate that the leader of ISSP – Abdulqadir Mumin – is a key figure in the global organisation of IS, and likely acts as the de facto leader of IS’ external operations. Some reports have, moreover, identified Mumin as the current Caliph of IS (the group’s figurehead is currently only known via their nom de guerre). However, this is unlikely as IS has its “heartland” in Iraq and Syria and has heavily emphasised its belief that a “rightful” Caliph should come from Prophet Mohammed’s Quraish tribe – and therefore be ethnically Arab.

ISSP almost certainly remains too small to threaten Mogadishu, other regional powers, or the much larger al-Shabaab. However, ISSP may be following al-Shabaab in exploiting the Somalian state’s current weakness and the rifts between Mogadishu and the breakaway northern region of Puntland, to accelerate recruitment.

Iranian separatist group attacks police forces in Khash.

Militants from the Jish al-Adl group, a Baloch and jihadist separatist militant group which operates in the Iran-Pakistan border area, conducted twin attacks on 1 October in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province. The attacks are estimated to have killed six Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Islamic Republic law enforcement personnel, including a local IRGC commander. Despite Iranian efforts to curtail the activities of militant groups in the Baluch region, groups like Jish al-Adl remain highly operational and are likely capitalising on the continued destabilisation of Afghanistan, where they can easily procure weapons and seek refuge. Moreover, Baluch groups have likely been emboldened by the recent surge of attacks by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) in Pakistan.

Marburg disease potentially identified in Germany.

A platform was cordoned off at Hamburg Central Station on 2 October over concerns that train passengers were infected with the Marburg virus. A medical student and his partner developed flu-like symptoms after returning from Rwanda where there is a current outbreak of the disease. The Marburg virus, which is transmitted through contact with infected bodily fluids, can cause severe illness with symptoms such as fever, headaches, vomiting, and diarrhoea, and has a mortality rate of approximately 50 per cent according to the World Health Organisation (WHO).

Wildfires in Corinthia, Greece kill two people.

In northwestern Corinthia, approximately 35km northeast of Corinth, two people died as a result of a wildfire that began on 29 September. Two firefighters were also injured. An estimated 11,791 hectares of land were in the burned area. The Greek fire service stated that the fire was suspected to have started accidentally by a beekeeper smoking out hives. Due to its climate, Greece annually experiences significant wildfires. However, due to abnormally severe summer heatwaves, drought, and higher-than-average spring temperatures, 2024 has seen a record number of wildfires in Greece. While wildfires typically primarily occur during the summer months, many wildfires, such as this week’s Corinthia fire, took place earlier or later than normal. This is likely due to the impact of climate change, and the trend will likely continue.

UN calls for increased donations for Yemen due to cholera outbreak.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for Yemen has pleaded for more donations for Yemen due to the spread of cholera in the country. The agency assesses that there are over 186,000 suspected cases and there have been almost 700 associated deaths since March 2024. The outbreak has almost certainly been compounded by heavy rains and years of conflict, which together have strained resources, resulted in poor sanitation and provided the conditions conducive to the spread of waterborne diseases. The outbreak, which has been ongoing since 2016, is estimated to have killed almost 4,000 people, with Yemen accounting for 84-93 per cent of all cholera cases in the world.

Pro-Palestinian demonstrations are expected to occur throughout the Asia-Pacific region during October, particularly around the anniversary of the Israel-Hamas conflict on 7 October. Several protests have already been scheduled throughout the region.

In Australia, a pro-Palestine rally will be held on 7 October near Victoria Barracks. In India, left-wing parties have called for nationwide gatherings on 7 October to demand a ceasefire, and in Indonesia, protests have been organised outside the US Embassy. Protests have also been organised on 7 October or on the preceding days in Malaysia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The vast majority of protests throughout the Asia-Pacific region are likely to be relatively small and peaceful, although travel disruption is forecasted in major city centres due to heightened security measures. However, Australian police have attempted to ban protests on 6-7 October due to the higher likelihood of violence.

Australia is an ally of Israel and has a relatively large Jewish population (c. 100,000), who are expected to hold vigils on 7 October, which are likely to be coveted targets for acts of terrorism. There is also the potential for violence between protestors and counter-protestors in Australia and to a lesser extent in New Zealand.

Impromptu or not publicly announced protests are likely to occur outside of the embassies and consulates of countries providing political and material support to Israel, such as the US, UK and France. Protests are also highly likely outside of Israeli embassies within the region and have previously been observed in Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines.

In Pakistan, two of the country’s largest parties, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party have announced joint protests on 7 October that will cross the political divide. Protests are likely to develop outside US diplomatic buildings in Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar. There is a realistic possibility that militants may seek to attack large gatherings to undermine the government in Pakistan.

The attacks took place on 28-29 September, in the Panjgur and Musakhail districts of Balochistan, and were reportedly carried out by multiple, coordinated groups of militants. As part of the operations, militants attacked a gas and oil exploration company site in Musakhail. In late August, another major attack took place in Musakhail, as gunmen killed 23 individuals, mostly workers from Punjab, after pulling them out of their civilian vehicles. The August attack, as well as other recent raids across the province that resulted in a total death toll of more than 50, were claimed by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA).

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the latest attacks were also carried out by BLA militants. The BLA maintains the strategic objective of eliminating what it sees as “foreign interests” from Balochistan, as part of a broader effort to destabilise the central Pakistani government and pave the way for the creation of an alternative local administration.

Attacking workers and targeting isolated plants and other industrial hubs is likely an attractive strategy to BLA militants due to its relatively low risks – with authorities almost certainly unable to effectively prevent raids – and high political and economic impact. Baloch militants have especially sought to target Chinese interests and workers engaged in projects in Pakistan as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative.

During the Summer, Beijing has increased appeals to Islamabad to allow a greater Chinese security involvement in the country to protect its interests and, in late September, a growing number of reports indicated that the two countries are likely close to agreeing to a deal to create joint security companies. Such a deal would, for the first time, allow Chinese forces to operate as security providers in Pakistan.

Notably, available information indicates that the division of responsibilities is being decided in order to minimise Chinese forces’ “visibility”. This is most likely meant to avoid a backlash that would play into the hands of the BLA and other independentist movements, as well as, possibly, Islamist groups.

Typhoon Krathon made landfall over Kaohsiung on 3 October at typhoon strength, with maximum windspeeds of 160 km/h. The typhoon had weakened, previously reaching category 4 super typhoon strength in the Luzon Strait on 30 September with maximum windspeeds of 241 km/h. While tracking north of the Philippine’s northern Luzon island, the typhoon caused at least 2 deaths and displaced thousands in the Philippines.

In Taiwan, the typhoon caused at least two deaths, with several people still missing, and over 120 injuries. The typhoon caused significant torrential rainfall, with landslides being reported even in far north-east Taiwan. Schools, offices and shops were closed, and 170,000 households were initially left without power, reducing to 51,000.

All domestic flights were cancelled, in addition to 242 international flights, and considerable rail disruption occurred, including the north-south high-speed rail line which suspended services between the central and southern regions. Also on 3 October, a hospital fire killed 9 people at Pingtung County Hospital outside Kaohsiung – the fire is suspected to have been started by an electrical fault, not the typhoon, but response efforts were complicated by the typhoon conditions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Krathon, called Typhoon Julian in the Philippines, was unusual in that firstly, the storm moved slowly, hovering off Taiwan’s coast for an unusually long period before making landfall. Secondly, Taiwan’s west coast is typically not directly hit by typhoons. The last significant storm to cause major casualties in Kaohsiung was Typhoon Thelma in 1977, which caused mass devastation and killed 37 people. Fears that a similar level of impact would occur with Typhoon Krathon did not materialise, almost certainly due to Taiwan’s considerably improved storm resilience and preparedness measures.

38,000 troops were placed on standby for disaster response, sandbags and water pumps were widely distributed, and 10,000 people in high-risk areas were evacuated. Disruption was still widespread, however, and Taiwan’s stock exchange shut for two days for the second time this year after July’s Typhoon Gaemi killed 11 people in Taiwan. The storm has quickly weakened into a tropical depression post-landfall, however, adverse rainfall is forecast to highly likely continue over the coming days in eastern and southern Taiwan.

Anti-judicial reform protests organised in Pakistani capital

From 4 October, schools have been closed and roadblocks established in Islamabad in preparation for a major protest led by former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. The PTI are protesting constitutional amendments that they view as attempts to undermine the independence of the judiciary, a claim denied by the incumbent government.

The government is expected to suspend mobile phone services and issue Section 144 orders that restrict public gatherings. Section 144s have already been issued throughout the Punjab province, including in the cities of Bahawalpur, Faisalabad and Mianwali. The protest in Islamabad is anticipated to draw large crowds to the capital, leading to widespread travel disruption. Furthermore, the police have deployed significant resources to the main protest site near D-Chowk, with recent protests often involving clashes between the security services and the protestors.

Bangladesh interim government pursues constitutional reform

The new government, led by Nobel prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, formed a constitutional reform panel, in a move that was justified by the executive as an effort to prevent a return to authoritarian rule. Moreover, initial reports indicate that the government may pursue constitutional reform prior to calling for a new election. Although such a decision is likely intended to bolster the state’s stability before the upcoming vote, implementing a vertical reform could lead to a resurgence of civil unrest, particularly fueled by militant factions within the post-Hasina coalition.

Japan’s incoming Prime Minister calls for elections in October

Shigeru Ishiba, who is set to replace Fumio Kishida as Japan’s prime minister after winning the leadership vote of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), almost certainly called the vote to re-establish the party’s political legitimacy and to accrue political capital. While Japan has free and fair elections, the LDP has ruled Japan almost uninterruptedly since the end of the Second World War, and the party is highly likely to win the vote. It is, likewise, highly likely that Ishiba also called the vote in order to ensure political stability prior to the 5 November US elections.

Mass-stabbing before China National Day highlights a unique security threat

On 30 September, the eve of the national celebration, a man launched a stabbing attack in a shopping centre the Songjiang district of Shanghai, killing three and injuring at least 15. According to initial reports, the man had been involved in a financial dispute, and was not likely driven by a specific ideology.

Seemingly “random” stabbing attacks have increased over the past year in China – some involving the targeting of foreigners. Chinese authorities have likely sought to underplay these events, with little information, beyond descriptions of attackers being affected by “mental health issues”, being briefed to local and international media. There is a realistic possibility that the growing trend of mass stabbing attacks follows a dynamic comparable to that of “Mudjima” (“don’t ask why”) stabbings in South Korea.

Both countries’ cases often occur in highly trafficked areas – including shopping malls and markets – and are seemingly committed by ideologically “unaligned” individuals. Perpetrators, instead, are often reported as dealing with financial issues or declare themselves as feeling “resentful”, and portray their actions as a way to attack society as a whole. These attacks, moreover, are dissimilar from the “lone wolf” attacks that take place in the West, in that they do not focus heavily on obtaining high visibility – instead maximising the number of casualties – and lack many of the distinctive elements of lone wolf terrorism, such as perpetrators sharing “manifestos” or other media to explain and broadcast their actions and beliefs.

Cambodia invites US Navy to use Chinese-made naval base

Cambodia has stated that the US Navy will be allowed to make port calls at the Ream Naval Base in the Gulf of Thailand. The base, which is being constructed with the help of China, has raised concerns over a permanent People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) outpost adjacent to the southern parts of the contested South China Sea. However, Cambodia’s invitation to the US is likely a deflection from the underlying reality that the base is likely to serve as an obfuscated permanent outpost for the PLAN which is reflective of Phnom Penh’s strategic realignment with China.

Flooding continues in northern Thailand

The economic impact of flooding in Thailand this year has been estimated to be as high as USD 1.4 billion USD, 0.27 per cent of Thailand’s GDP. Torrential rainfall, worsened by the tropical cyclones Typhoon Yagi and Tropical Storm Soulik in September, has led to significant flooding and landslides across northern Thailand, with Chiang Rai province being the hardest hit.

Adverse weather conditions continued in the past week, with weather warnings being issued for all provinces in the North, Northeast and Central Plain, including Bangkok. Thailand’s Prime Minister, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, stated that Bangkok will not experience substantial flooding like the city did in 2011, due to major dams still having spare capacity.

Although flooding is common during the annual monsoon season, which runs from July to October, authorities indicate that this year has seen the worst flooding in decades, highly likely conditioned by La Niña conditions in the Pacific Ocean.