Haiti expands state of emergency to cover entire country.

On 5 September, the Haitian government announced that it was expanding the current state of emergency to cover the entire country. Haiti’s Ouest department, home to the capital Port-au-Prince, was placed under a state of emergency on March 3 under former Prime Minister Ariel Henry due to escalating violence and mass prison escapes.

The emergency was extended to other areas, including Artibonite, Centre, and Nippes, which have also experienced severe violence. The announcement also follows widespread protests after the suspension of services at Haiti’s largest hydroelectric dam which has left huge swathes of the country without power.

Solace Global Assessment: Haiti’s expansion of the state of emergency has likely been timed to coincide with the arrival of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Blinken is set to conduct a diplomatic visit to Haiti on 5-6 September where he will meet with Prime Minister Garry Conille to discuss Haiti’s democratic transition. Conille has only been in power for three months and despite the recent deployment of a UN-backed Kenyan security mission, authorities have failed to make much progress in combating the criminal gangs that now control an estimated 80 per cent of the country.

The expansion of the state of emergency is likely aimed at attracting more foreign aid and assistance, with the US currently being the largest contributor. The Kenyan force, which was deployed in June, only consists of 400 police officers, and their effectiveness has been curtailed by salary payment issues. Moreover, the domestic security services are almost certainly underfunded, and overstretched and have been limited to only a few minor operations, with the gangs often outnumbering and outgunning the police.

Conille’s strategy is likely intended to convince Blinken to both increase US contributions but also to secure additional support from the international community. However, foreign assistance will likely be partially dependent on steps towards democratic transition, a process that currently appears unachievable with the gangs exerting so much influence across the country.

Judicial reform bill passed by lower house, despite escalating unrest.

On 3 September, protests led by striking judiciary workers took place outside the Mexican Supreme Court and Congress against the controversial judicial reform bill. The demonstrations blocked access to the Congress building, leading to lawmakers instead gathering in a gymnasium to start the voting proceedings. The Supreme Court additionally released a statement on 3 September that they would be joining the strike, following an 8-3 vote. Despite the protests, the bill was passed on 4 September by the lower house and will now go to the Senate.

Solace Global Assessment: The bill’s most controversial measures involve the direct election of approximately 7,000 judges, magistrates and Supreme Court justices, along with the removal and lowering of several requirements. Critics warn that the bill will politicise the judiciary, lessen the strength of checks and balances against the ruling Morena party, and enable organised crime to exert greater influence over the Mexican judicial system.

The Morena party is only one seat short of the required supermajority in the Senate, and it is highly likely that the bill will pass. President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum’s swearing-in ceremony will take place on 1 October, and she has indicated that the reform package will be one of the first priorities for her administration.

The indefinite nationwide strike by judiciary workers began on 19 August, and demonstrations have taken place in several cities across Mexico. The decision by the Supreme Court to join the strike is highly likely to lend further legitimacy to the protests, which are unlikely to subside in the coming weeks.

While the unrest has been generally peaceful thus far, the blocking of roads and access to Mexico’s congress is an escalation in the tactics employed by the demonstrators, likely indicative of increasing desperation to stop the bill. It is likely that as the legislation further progresses towards being signed into law, unrest will intensify.

Trucker protests paralyse Colombia’s transport network.

Widespread trucker protests have erupted across Colombia following the government’s decision to increase diesel prices. On 31 August, the government raised the price of diesel by 1,904 Colombian pesos or 45 US cents per gallon. In protest, truckers have cut off many of Colombia’s largest cities by staging roadblocks on the nation’s major highways. On 4 September, Colombia’s ombudsman stated that there were at least 127 demonstrations being held across 13 regions, with 42 of them consisting of total road blockades.

Solace Global Assessment: The almost 21 per cent increase in diesel prices by the government has been claimed as fair and justified on the grounds that the country has long subsidised prices. Prices have been held for four years at just over 9,000 pesos but the government has stated that this was fiscally unsustainable and was costing it over one trillion pesos a month.

However, truckers have argued that the immediate and high price increase is set to push their businesses to bankruptcy. Truckers have also likely been frustrated by the removal of subsidies as it has coincided with a huge increase in government spending elsewhere by Colombia’s leftist President Gustavo Petro.

Trucker protests have led to major supply chain issues, reducing the amount of food arriving at wholesale markets. If sustained, the trucker protests are likely to result in price increases and could spark unrest within major cities like Bogota, Medellin and Cali. Colombia’s largest state-owned oil and gas company, Ecopetrol, has also warned that the protests will affect the production of hydrocarbons and fuel supplies across the country.

This trend has been exacerbated by a spate of attacks on Colombia’s pipeline infrastructure in areas held by the National Liberation Army or ELN, following the end of a fragile ceasefire agreement.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to resume on US campuses.

Classes in multiple US colleges that were the epicentres of pro-Palestine protests, including Columbia University, began during this reporting period. It is highly likely that pro-Palestine groups will resume protests from the 6-8 September weekend, and that these will include attempts to start campus “encampments” and, more likely, disrupt local roadways and public transport.

First US presidential debate scheduled for 10 September.

Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump are set to participate in their first debate at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia on 10 September. Given the recent assassination attempt on Donald Trump and the degree of political division in the US, the debates will almost certainly involve heightened security measures and will likely attract large demonstrations in support of a range of issues, most likely the conflict in the Middle East.

Venezuela issues arrest warrant for opposition leader Edmundo Gonzalez.

Gonzalez and co-leader of the opposition Maria Corina Machado are currently believed to be in hiding in Venezuela, while other prominent opposition members have either escaped or sought refuge in diplomatic offices in the country. The arrest order is almost certainly meant to reinforce the government’s legitimacy, and may be a prelude to more violent suppression of remaining opposition groups and individuals associated with Gonzalez. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that authorities are aiming to provoke the expatriation of Gonzalez and Machado, likely aiming to link their positions with foreign adversaries of the Maduro regime, while also reducing their ability to coordinate domestic protests at a later date.

US sailor detained by Venezuelan authorities.

According to Pentagon officials, a US Navy sailor was detained in Caracas on 30 August and is currently being held by the Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). The detained US service member was reportedly not on approved leave or official travel, and his purpose in-country is currently unknown. On 2 September, the US Justice Department seized a plane belonging to Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, which will likely impede the sailor’s release. It is a realistic possibility that the detention is a result of Venezuelan hostage diplomacy. It is additionally, however, a realistic possibility that the detention relates to concerns from Venezuelan authorities regarding subversive anti-regime actions from US nationals, heightened since the failed 2020 coup plot Operation Gideon that was led by an ex-US service member.

Loggers killed by indigenous group in Peruvian Amazon.

On September 3, two loggers were killed and two others are missing after a clash with the Mashco Piro, an isolated indigenous community in Peru’s Amazon. The conflict occurred in the Madre de Dios region where loggers have been clearing a trail. Confrontations between loggers and indigenous tribes are like to increase as the logging, both legal and illegal, of the Amazon increases. The Peruvian government is investigating the incident, under pressure from local rights groups who claim that the government is failing to recognise indigenous territory.

Continued row between Brazilian judiciary and Elon Musk.

The judiciary of Brazil ordered the owner of X.com, Elon Musk, to uphold the country’s ban on the social network, which followed the platform’s refusal to comply with court orders regarding the removal of profiles spreading disinformation. Musk initially refused to comply with the latest order and has increasingly accused the Brazilian government of ideologically motivated censorship. Musk’s involvement in Brazilian politics has been praised by supporters of former President Bolsonaro, who have called for protests against the Supreme Court on 7 September.

Haiti’s main hydro-electric plant ceases to operate.

On 3 September, Haiti’s state-owned power company, Electricité d’Haiti (EDH), reported that output from the Peligre hydroelectric plant had ceased due to protests over power distribution, with protestors demanding that energy be redistributed beyond the capital, Port-au-Prince. The plant, which provides most of Haiti’s hydroelectric power, has been offline since 2 September, worsened by damage to two transformers and disrupted access due to gang control. Only 49 per cent of Haitians reportedly now have grid access, with the energy blackout likely to further exacerbate many of the country’s current issues, including crime, displacement and the humanitarian situation.

August worst month in two decades for Brazilian wildfires.

Satellite-derived data from Brazil’s National Institute for Space Research (Inpe) has indicated that August was the worst month for wildfires in the country since 2010. The 38,266 fire hotspots identified in the Amazon in August were nearly twice the amount observed in the previous month. Warmer temperatures and drier vegetation have provided conditions conducive to the spread of wildfires, many of which are started deliberately to clear land for cattle pastures. Multiple investigations are currently underway looking into possible criminal involvement in the starting of wildfires. Furthermore, deforestation has decreased the rainforest’s long-term ability to maintain moisture, suggesting that future wildfires will increase in scale and frequency.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) wins first state parliamentary election in Thuringia.

In addition to winning 32.8 per cent of the votes cast in the central German state, the party also received the second most votes in Saxony, 31 per cent. The results represent the first time that a far-right party has won an election in Germany since the Second World War.

Solace Global Assessment: The AfD is unlikely to enter the state’s government, as the remaining parties are likely to adopt a strategy of alliances similar to that used by their French counterparts to prevent Le Pen’s National Rally from obtaining power. Still, the result is notable as it is the first time that the AfD has won a state election and is likely to have a significant impact on German politics.

Compared to other European far-right parties – for instance, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy or Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, which have moderated some of their positions in order to court moderate right votes – the AfD’s continued rise has not coincided with a notable change in its proposed policies. In Thuringia itself, the party is led by Björn Höcke, who was found guilty by German courts for using Nazi rhetoric twice. It is likely that the AfD’s victory will prompt civil unrest in Thuringia, Saxony, and in large urban centres in Germany.

There is a realistic possibility that increasing popular support for the AfD will be seized by far-right and identitarian groups to carry out demonstrations and symbolic disruptive action. Finally, the positive performance (15.8 per cent of the vote in Thuringia and 11.8 per cent in Saxony) of the new Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance party (BSW) is also notable. BSW was founded in January 2024 after breaking away from The Left party, and it represents a left-wing populist, socially conservative and nationalist formation that rejects Berlin’s support for Ukraine and the environmentalist policies of the rest of the left.

On 22 September, elections are scheduled for Brandenburg. Polls predict an AfD win (with more than 24 per cent of the vote) and show a realistic chance for BSW to come third or fourth. Another AfD victory, and continued BSW growth, are likely to seriously damage the current governing coalition’s perceived legitimacy. They may, furthermore, create questions about the viability of the SPD-CDU coalition.

Finally, it is important to note that there has been a rise in lone-wolf Islamist attacks in Germany, and media associated with groups like the Islamic State (IS) have called for further attacks following the Mannheim stabbing in late May. It is possible that the AfD victory, even if not directly resulting in the passing of new policies in the short term, will drive a rise in extremist activity in Germany.

Largest West Bank operation of the war ends, Hamas shares new hostage policy.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) declared, on 6 September, that their almost two-weeks-long raids in Jenin, Tulkarem and Tubas have ended. The large-scale operation, which has resulted in at least 33 deaths and 140 injuries, including the head of Hamas in Jenin, was described by Israeli authorities as a response to a growing number of attacks on Israeli settlers and citizens in the West Bank and Israeli territory. In Gaza, Hamas announced a new policy of killing Israeli captives if IDF forces approach areas where they are being held, following the recovery of six hostages’ bodies who had reportedly been shot by their guards, The policy reportedly dates back to June. The reports on the deaths of the six hostages prompted further protests in Israel calling for the Netanyahu administration to reach a ceasefire deal. Protests in Israel were particularly severe in Tel Aviv, with at least 550,000 demonstrators gathering in the city.

Solace Global Assessment: The question of the control over the Philadelphi corridor likely remains the main obstacle in the way of a ceasefire deal. On 4 September, Israeli officials stated that IDF positions at the border with Egypt would be assessed at the war’s end. For Tel Aviv, maintaining control of the Philadelphi corridor is crucial to depriving Hamas of lethal aid and degrading its capabilities. Hamas leaders are likewise highly likely aware of the general degradation of their fighting strength, and of the skills of the fighters that they are able to recruit from the Palestinian population – whose survivability rate has decreased in recent months.

The new hostage policy – which was notably only announced months after its first apparent implementation, likely reflects Hamas’ growing concern over its ability to hold and transfer hostages whilst under pressure from IDF operations. The tactic may also be indicative of a new strategy aimed at undermining Israeli resolve and applying pressure on the Netanyahu administration.

The executions will almost certainly fuel further unrest in Israel and could put pressure on Tel Aviv to accept ceasefire demands that are more favourable to Hamas. However, the often indiscriminate nature of the Israeli campaign to date would suggest that it is unlikely to cause a major shift in Netanyahu’s demands. Moreover, the hostages are Hamas’ main source of leverage. Executing them en masse would diminish this leverage and reaffirm Netanyahu’s stance that Hamas needs to be completely destroyed as a military and political force.

Rival Libyan legislatures jointly agree to appoint new central bank governor.

On 3 September, Libya’s two rival legislative bodies jointly signed a statement agreeing to appoint a central bank governor within 30 days. Previously, on 18 August, long-term governor Sadiq al-Kabir was unilaterally dismissed by the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), which increased tensions In Libya. The Central Bank of Libya (CBL) is responsible for holding Libya’s oil revenues, with Libya’s oil reserves being the largest in Africa. The crisis at the CBL has had a wide-ranging impact on Libya’s economy, hampering the payment of state salaries and ordinary transactions.

Assessment: The agreement is likely to reduce tensions in Libya, which have in recent weeks been at their highest since the 2020 ceasefire between the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA, now the GNU) and the Benghazi-based Libyan National Army (LNA).

The LNA has been highly likely instrumentalising the flow of oil, causing shutdowns and reduced operations at several oil fields including Libya’s largest, the Shahara oil field. Mass LNA troop mobilisations in the west and southwest of the country, particularly in the vicinity of the strategically significant Ghadames Airport, have caused great concern that Libya is on the verge of renewed civil war.

While the agreement to resolve the crisis at the CBL will likely lessen tensions in the short term, and will likely alleviate the threat of economic crisis, it still remains a realistic possibility that renewed conflict could break out in Libya between the rival governments.

Over 100 killed in Islamist attack in northeast Nigeria.

On 1 September, approximately 150 armed militants suspected of belonging to the Islamist group Boko Haram conducted an attack on the village of Mafa, Yobe State in northeast Nigeria. The militants arrived on motorcycles armed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades and then began to indiscriminately attack locals and set fire to multiple homes and businesses. Original estimates put the death toll at just under 40; however, most revisions have now placed the death toll at over 100.

Solace Global Assessment: The attack took place in northeast Nigeria, where an Islamist insurgency primarily led by Boko Haram has lasted for 15 years and has taken the lives of approximately 40,000 people. It is almost certain that Boko Haram operates within this area with a high degree of freedom and is likely exploiting the increased destabilisation of the wider Sahel region to conduct increased cross-border operations. This attack closely resembles the recent Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) attack in Burkina Faso which killed as many as 500 people. Boko Haram has traditionally employed a range of tactics, including suicide bombings, mass kidnappings and raids or armed assaults.

However, there is a realistic possibility that the success of JNIM’s attack, the overstretching of Nigerian security services and the growing strength of Boko Haram have inspired it to transition towards more hit-and-run raids using motorcycles. These attacks enable Boko Haram to attack isolated villages and then swiftly withdraw before the military can be deployed to the area.

Additionally, by targeting small villages, Boko Haram may force military commanders to spread their resources thinly, making it challenging to allocate sufficient support to defend future potential targets. Of note, unconfirmed reports indicate that militants left the area and rigged the roads leading to it with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), highly likely in an effort to delay the arrival of the armed forces. The scale and sophistication of the attack likely indicate a growth in Boko Haram’s organisational and logistical capacity, which have likely been facilitated by the group’s alliances with regional bandits and ability to exploit safe havens in border areas.

These attacks are likely to continue and will undermine the government’s authority and its ability to provide security, a development that is likely to lead to civil unrest against the government in Nigeria’s north- a trend that has been witnessed throughout the region.

Brexit negotiator Michel Barnier appointed new French Prime Minister.

Barnier is a representative of the Gaullist right adjacent to the Republicans (LR). His appointment ends a two-month-long period of uncertainty that followed the National Assembly elections. The move is likely to be followed by concessions to the right, particularly Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN), which will be crucial to surviving a no-confidence vote. Barnier’s appointment is almost certainly going to be received extremely negatively by the left-wing coalition, the New Popular Front (NFP), which had suggested Lucie Castets as a potential prime minister. The NFP was seemingly moving towards collapse due to tensions between its two main members, the Socialists (PS) and the populist France Unbowed (LFI). However, with Macron turning to the right rather than the PS, the left is likely to call for large-scale anti-Macron demonstrations in the coming weeks. As numerous far-left groups threatened violent action if LFI was kept from governing, there is a high likelihood of sabotage.

Pro-Palestine protests likely to increase in intensity in Western Europe.

It is likely that pro-Palestine protests will increase in intensity in September in European countries that have had major protest movements, especially in large urban centres. This is due to multiple factors: the beginning of the academic year, the overlap with multiple Palestine-related anniversaries (i.e. Black September, Oslo Accords), and the approaching one-year anniversary of the 7 October attack.

Volkswagen (VW) cost-cutting plans are likely to provoke civil unrest in Germany.

Senior representatives of the automotive industry giant, which employs about half of its 600,000 workers in Germany, have announced that they are considering cutting production in Germany to relocate plants to other more competitive markets, where labour costs are lower. The announcement is likely to translate into concrete policies, as VW has recently had a decline in profits and competitiveness, especially in the growing electric vehicle market. There is a high likelihood that further pressures will result in labour union reactions, including strikes and protests, in areas that host VW plants.

Major transport strikes organised across Italy.

A series of public transport and air travel strikes have been organised across Italy and are set to begin on 7 September. Strikes over worker conditions for ground operations workers, air traffic controllers and baggage handlers are set to cause major disruptions at Rome’s Fiumicino and Olbia, Milan Malpensa, Florence Amerigo Vespucci and Pisa Galileo Galilei airports. A nationwide rail strike organised for 9 September will be closely followed by a nationwide public transport workers’ walkout will almost certainly cause major disruption on Italy’s train, bus, tram and underground services.

Kosovo closes institutions that serve Serb minority.

On 31 August, Kosovar authorities closed five institutions in the north that served the ethnic Serb minority, a move that escalated tensions with Serbia. Kosovo’s local administration minister, Elbert Krasniqi, stated that these institutions violated Kosovo’s constitution and laws. US officials expressed worries that the move could destabilise the region, a concern that has likely been amplified by Russia’s recent attempts to sow division in the area, including treating Bosnia’s breakaway Republika Srpska as a recognised state. The head of Mitrovica Citizens’ Association, a Kosovar Serb group, has announced the blockade of all administrative border crossings with Serbia in North Kosovo in response to Kosovo’s actions.

Two US marines attacked by mob in Turkey.

Ten individuals were arrested for attacking two US marines in the centre of Izmir. The perpetrators were reportedly part of a nationalist and left-Kemalist (the ideology based on the ideas of Turkish 20^th century leader Ataturk) group known as the Youth Union of Turkey. The arrests have been challenged by the group, and there is a realistic possibility of retaliatory protests by the Youth Union in Izmir and other cities where it has a strong presence, including Istanbul. The actions may also lead to similar attacks on US personnel within Turkey.

Algerian President Tebboune likely to win re-election on 7 September.

The vote, which has been protested by the opposition for being rescheduled to September rather than the customary date in December, is likely to be affected by low voter turnout and government interference. Tebboune’s highly likely re-election could result in protests in Algiers and other cities, albeit these are unlikely to reach the severity of the 2019 protests.

Senegal likely to look to the West for counterterrorism operations.

The newly elected government of Senegal, which has espoused an overall anti-West rhetoric and has previously made diplomatic gestures in favour of the neighbouring Sahel junta states, asked for more international cooperation to tackle local jihadist groups during a visit by Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez. It is highly likely that the move is a response to the failure of the junta states’ counterterrorism operations, which are becoming increasingly reliant on Russian help which has yet to curtail the rate of extremist attacks. The Islamist groups operating in the Sahel likely aim to reach the comparatively richer coastal West African states, as part of growing ambitions to develop territorial entities.

Islamist lone wolf attack in Munich.

The attack occurred on 5 September, near the Israeli consulate and a Holocaust Museum. The attacker almost certainly carried out the attack to coincide with the 52^nd anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, where members of the Palestinian organisation Black September took hostages and killed 11 Israeli athletes. The Munich attacker was killed by police, and no other casualties were recorded. The attack is notable due to the use of a long-barrel rifle by the perpetrator as, in Europe, most lone-wolf attacks involve bladed weapons. According to police reports, the attacker was a self-radicalised 18-year-old supporter of the Islamic State (IS). In 2023, he had reportedly already been investigated by authorities for terrorism-related offences. The attack continues the trend of notably young lone wolves, likely underscoring the growing effect of online self-radicalisation.

Houthis reportedly attack two oil tankers in the Red Sea, including Saudi flagged vessel.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported that the Houthis struck the Panama flagged MV BLUE LAGOON I and the Saudi flagged MV AMJAD on 2 September with two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and one one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicle (OWA-UAV). Neither vessel was seriously damaged. The Houthis and Saudi Arabia, after being engaged in a seven-year conflict between 2015-2022, are participating in ongoing peace negotiations and have generally abided by a cessation of fighting since 2022. Both vessels were sailing in close proximity to each other, and it is likely that the Houthis accidentally struck the MV AMJAD. The AMJAD’s owner, Saudi shipping firm Bahri, “unequivocally affirm[ed] that AMJAD was not targeted”, and the Houthis omitted any mention of the AMJAD in their claim of responsibility. This highly likely indicates that both parties are keen to avoid jeopardising peace negotiations.

Prison break in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) results in more than 100 deaths.

The escape started after a riot broke out in the Makala prison of Kinshasa. Authorities responded violently and the resulting clashes killed at least 129 and injured 59. DRC prisons are highly overcrowded, and the government has recently sought to release some inmates convicted of low-level offences to alleviate the pressure. There is a realistic possibility that the combination of overcrowding and insufficient police resources will provoke further riots and prison break attempts.

Uganda opposition leader Bobi Wine shot by police.

Bobi Wine was initially elected as an independent but joined the opposition National Unity Platform party prior to the 2021 presidential election. In early 2024, he announced that he would again run in 2026, challenging Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda since 1986. The autocratic government of Uganda is characterised by a strong symbiotic relationship between government, the judiciary, and security forces, and there is a high likelihood that the shooting was a deliberate attempt on the opposition leader’s life. Due to Bobi Wine’s domestic and international popularity, it is likely that the case will spark significant unrest.

At least one tourist dead following flash floods in Mallorca, Spain.

The individual died while hiking in the area of the Torrent de Pareis, in the Tramuntana mountain range. Approximately ten other people were also trapped by the floods before being rescued. On 2-3 September, extreme weather, with severe showers and localised flash flooding, affected various coastal areas throughout the Mediterranean, including parts of Greece, central Italy and eastern Spain.

Protest bill approved ahead of planned demonstration by main opposition party.

On 5 September, the Pakistani Senate passed the ‘Peaceful Assembly and Public Order Bill 2024’ law. Pending further approval, the law is set to be implemented before a planned major 8 September demonstration by the main opposition party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in support of the jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan. The proposed legislation will empower Islamabad officials to ban assemblies in designated areas, with participants in unauthorised protests liable to receive prison sentences of up to three years.

Solace Global Assessment: In 2023, large-scale civil unrest frequently occurred in Pakistan after attempts to arrest Khan. Initially, the protests were managed by police with riot control measures such as tear gas and water cannons. Later demonstrations led to military deployment and internet shutdowns. Critics view the bill as a government tactic to suppress opposition and the bill’s passage is likely to heighten tensions.

The 8 September demonstration had already been rescheduled from 22 August following the withdrawal of permission by officials, and it is likely that authorities will attempt to suppress the upcoming rally. It is highly likely that violent clashes will occur in Islamabad during the protest. The bill reflects the government’s unstable position following contentious elections in February 2024 and will likely exacerbate levels of violence in future protests that are not granted official permission.

Garment workers protest for higher pay in industrial areas.

Protests by garment factory workers in early September, mainly in key industrial areas such as Gazipur and Narayanganj, resulted in the closure of 130 garment factories. Their demands include higher wages, maternity leave and other concessions. The protesters vandalised factories and vehicles, as well as blocked roads, which resulted in the deployment of military and police forces. Although some workers continued to work throughout the protests, factories were forced to close in order to protect their employees from the violence. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) stated that unspecified “outsiders” were responsible for the violence. The protests initially focused on the demands of garment workers, but then reportedly escalated when outsiders joined the demonstrations, gathering outside factories demanding jobs and pressuring workers to join the protests. In response to the protests, the government has increased security in industrial areas, which allowed the factories to reopen on 5 September.

Solace Global Assessment: These protests are the first significant labour action in Bangladesh’s garment sector since the new interim government took office in August. Although there is increased security in the areas where protests took place, tensions are still likely to persist because a negotiated settlement between the garment workers and BGMEA has not yet been reached. The BGMEA has suggested that the unrest may be linked to the current political instability of Bangladesh, with tensions remaining high since the resignation of the prime minister on 9 August following weeks of deadly protests. Although an interim government has been established to restore law and order, it is likely that groups may be exploiting this to gain access and control of the garment market. On top of this, the ongoing mass floods across Bangladesh have meant factories have had to grapple with production stoppages. The political instability and financial strain the BGMEA are facing mean it is unlikely that the BGMEA will meet the demands of the protests, which would highly likely generate further unrest.In October and November 2023, garment workers’ strikes led to violent clashes with police, with at least three deaths and factories being set alight. There is a realistic possibility that equivalent levels of violence could occur again as a result of the ongoing industrial disputes.

Super Typhoon strength storm Yagi makes landfall in Hainan.

Tropical Cyclone Yagi made landfall in Hainan, China, on 6 September. The storm made landfall at Super Typhoon strength, equivalent to a category 5 hurricane, with maximum windspeeds recorded of 241km/h. Yagi had earlier impacted the northern Philippines on 3-4 September as Severe Tropical Storm Enteng, killing 16 people. Luzon was the most impacted. Yagi then moved past Hong Kong and Macau, causing disruptions.

The Chinese Central Meteorological Agency has issued a red typhoon warning for Hainan and Guangdong, the highest warning possible. Over 400,000 people were evacuated on the southern Chinese coastline.

Solace Global Assessment: Yagi is the second-strongest Tropical Cyclone to occur anywhere in the world in 2024. It is the largest storm to hit Hainan since 2014 when Typhoon Rammasun killed at least 88 people and caused over USD 6.25 billion in damages. Hainan is a tropical holiday destination, referred to as “China’s Hawaii”. In anticipation of the Super Typhoon, Hainan was brought to a standstill, with businesses, schools and transport being halted. While the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area was spared notably severe impact, the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai bridge and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange were closed.

The impact in Hainan, where Yagi has made landfall as a Super Typhoon, is highly likely to be worse. Meteorologists have warned that the scale of damage in Hainan could be “catastrophic”. The rigorous preparedness measures by Chinese authorities will, however, significantly aid in mitigating the worst possible outcomes.

Yagi is forecast to weaken from a Super Typhoon to a Very Strong Typhoon once it moves past Hainan, before weakening further to Typhoon strength just before making landfall in northern Vietnam. Four airports have already been closed in northern Vietnam, including Hanoi’s Noi Bai International Airport. Despite Yagi’s greatly increased strength over southern China, it is a realistic possibility that Yagi will cause more fatalities in Vietnam due to Vietnam’s higher level of vulnerability.

Putin visits Mongolia despite ICC arrest warrant.

The state visit likely represents an effort by Putin to highlight that, despite its illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia is not internationally isolated. The visit is also likely to reflect ongoing Russian efforts to begin transitioning from its reliance on Europe as the main market for its fossil fuels. Russia and Mongolia have continued talks regarding the construction of a pipeline connecting the two countries.

Pope Francis tours Southeast Asia.

Pope Francis has arrived in Indonesia as part of his 12-day tour of Southeast Asia where he will visit Singapore, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Indonesia. In Jakarta, the Pope and Grand Imam Nasaruddin Umar of Istiqlal Mosque pledged to combat religious violence and environmental degradation, highlighting interfaith unity through a symbolic event at the mosque.

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) carries out suicide bombing in Kabul.

ISKP had previously carried out a suicide bombing in Kandahar, one of the Taliban’s main strongholds. Its attack outside a Kabul government office, which killed at least six, is likely meant to further demonstrate the group’s ability to strike the Taliban’s administrative centres. Taliban authorities have continuously minimised the threat posed by ISKP, which nevertheless continues to be the Islamic State’s most active and likely most capable “province”.

South China Sea confrontations continue at Sabina Shoal.

Manila and Beijing accused each other of deliberately ramming each other’s vessels in an incident on 31 August at the disputed Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. Aggressive confrontations between Chinese and Filipino vessels have occurred multiple times in recent months at the Second Thomas Shoal, and a deal was reached in late July that was hoped to de-escalate the situation. However, the new incident at the Sabina Shoal, in addition to a reported vessel collision there on 19 August, highly likely indicates that tensions remain high in the South China Sea with a new flashpoint for confrontations at the Sabina Shoal.

Monsoon rains cause deadly flooding in southern India.

Higher than average monsoon rains resulted in the deaths at least 33 people in southern India between 1 and 3 September. Significant flooding occurred as a result of the annual monsoon season since June. Forecasts indicate that the heavy rainfall will continue into late September. While the monsoon season is an annually recurring issue, this year’s monsoon will ultimately highly likely cause a greater level of impact than in previous years, exacerbated by La Nina weather conditions that will likely develop in September. Officials from the India Meteorological Department (IMD) indicate that the withdrawal of the monsoon season will likely be delayed as a result of developing La Nina weather conditions.

Military doctors deployed in South Korean hospitals due to ongoing strikes.

The measure was announced by the health ministry on 2 September to try to alleviate shortages in medical staff. Thousands of junior doctors have been conducting strikes since February 2024, in protest of government plans to drastically increase annual medical school admission caps. While authorities dispute claims by the national association of medical school professions that the medical system is on the verge of collapse, the deployment of military doctors is likely indicative of serious concerns that the staff shortage has drastically impacted the provision of healthcare.