The UN-backed peacekeeping mission to Haiti, led by Kenyan police forces, has made some very limited progress in its efforts to take back control of the country from the gangs that continue to fuel ongoing chaos and violence.

In late July, Kenyan forces started shifting from their initial strategy of taking control of key points – including hospitals and police stations – in favour of an area-based approach. While gangs have conducted some frontal assaults on police forces during the initial stages of deployment, especially in Port-au-Prince, they have reportedly increasingly switched to a strategy of hit-and-run attacks on Kenyan officials.

At the same time, gangs continue attacking the few remaining operational welfare providers, with an assault on a Church-run children’s institute – resulting in looting – reported on 7 August. On 2 August, a UN report called for a greater deployment of international forces to Haiti. The report included data signalling that, despite the arrival of foreign troops, crime levels in Haiti remain extremely severe, particularly rates of homicide and sexual violence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that the Kenyan forces have encountered significant limitations in meaningfully securing areas previously under gang control. While some reports of Kenyan forces taking over settlements on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince have emerged, no evidence signals that Kenyan police are carrying out “government-building” operations there, and there is a high likelihood that gangs are able to re-infiltrate areas that the UN mission previously cleared.

Consequently, it is almost certain that the main success of the mission so far has been the re-taking of important logistical and government buildings, ensuring some service provision to residents. Gangs’ capacity to attack police stations and other institutions has likely not been affected by the deployment of Kenyan forces, whose “permanent” presence likely only deters operations in some parts of Port-au-Prince.

While trying to inflict some attrition on the Kenyan forces, gangs’ main efforts are likely still aimed at retaining control of the local population to ensure reliance on their criminal networks. Recent gang efforts (led by a group called “400 Mawozo”) to take control of the Ganthier area, near the border with the Dominican Republic, likely illuminate the gangs’ interest in controlling the flows of refugees towards their neighbours.

Government forces in Venezuela have cracked down on protests with increasing brutality and success. At least 2,200 people have so far been arrested since the vote, and hundreds have been injured, with at least 24 deaths recorded according to human rights groups in the country.

On 8 August, the Maduro regime announced that in-country access to social media platform X would be cut for ten days. Two days prior, the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB), the country’s military, reiterated its “absolute loyalty” to Maduro, rejecting appeals from the opposition leaders to topple the regime.

Government officials have also opened criminal proceedings against opposition leaders including Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzalez, on charges of inciting insurrection.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As covered in last week’s assessment, it is highly unlikely that the military would defect and join anti-regime forces. This is due to the regime’s effective coup-proofing measures, including fostering an environment of uncertainty and insecurity among the highest echelons of the armed forces, pushing for greater oversight of Cuban intelligence, and playing the military against other government militias. It is also due to the opposition’s failures to address the military’s main incentive to back the regime – the direct economic benefits they receive from having a direct stake in oil export operations.

Two weeks after the election, there likely is no realistic path for the opposition to take power. In the short term, it is highly likely that repressive measures will successfully reduce the severity of public demonstrations. This will, in turn, highly likely result in severely increased threats for humanitarian workers and travellers in the country.

Still, it is likely that the regime will need to grant some concessions to reduce the wave of civil unrest that followed the vote. These are almost certainly going to be targeted inducements aimed at satisfying the middle class and bureaucratic intelligentsia. In order to accomplish this, the regime is likely to increasingly look to deepening ties with Russia and China, and to take precautions to reduce the impact of the further wave of sanctions that is highly likely to be imposed by the EU and US on Caracas in the coming weeks.

US Vice President and Democratic candidate Harris picks running mate

Minnesota Governor Tim Walz was not initially considered to be the likeliest candidate for the position. However, Walz was likely selected due to his relative appeal (compared to other potential nominees like Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro) to the left wing of the party, with no notable controversies that could upset progressive voters and a strong record on green issues. Moreover, the Democrat presidential candidate likely sees in Walz a chance to win over some moderate Republican voters disillusioned with Trump.

In Chile, mass blackouts disrupt flights, cause civil unrest

On 6 August, power outages affecting up to 1.2 million people were recorded in Chile, after severe weather damaged energy infrastructure. The blackout resulted in large demonstrations, with protesters clashing with police and blocking roads leading to airports in Pudahuel and Santiago, as well as other urban centres. Large blackouts have become somewhat common in Chile, with one in June affecting 400,000 people, and are often linked to severe weather conditions. Further protests could disrupt travel and business across the country, resulting in larger economic costs.

Multiple clergy members arrested for criticising Nicaraguan regime

The Nicaraguan government has illegally detained at least 13 priests, deacons, and members of religious congregations, the most significant instance of persecution against the  Catholic Church in 2024. Most of these arrests have targeted clergy from the Diocese of Matagalpa, whose Bishop is exiled from the country.

The Catholic Church remains one of the few organisations in Nicaragua that openly criticises the regime of President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo which has expanded its crackdown on civic institutions since 2018 in an attempt to silence the opposition. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that Nicaragua has ordered the expulsion of the Brazilian ambassador, due to the Lula administration’s criticism of the government’s repression of the Catholic Church

Costa Rican authorities crack down on US-bound international human trafficking network

On 6 August, Costa Rican authorities raided 18 sites linked to an international human trafficking network operating between Ecuador and the US. The operations were coordinated with the US and Panama, leading to the arrests of 21 people. Gangs were charging an average of USD 14,000 to illegally smuggle migrants from Ecuador to the US. Most migrants were Ecuadorian but many were also from further afield, including from Africa and Asia.

Costa Rica is now considering a similar deal to the one recently agreed between the US and Panama, whereby Washington will fund the deportation of US-bound migrants from the host country. Organised and violent crime groups in the region are increasingly turning to human trafficking due to the high profit margins, high demand and lower risk of detection and prosecution.

US avocado demand leads to violence and environmental damage in Mexico

Mexican authorities have indicated that as many as 80 per cent of the avocado orchards in the state of Michoacán have been established illegally and their increased cultivation is being driven by US demand. The illegal expansion of avocado orchards and circumvention of Mexico’s environmental regulations are leading to high rates of deforestation, damage to the local ecology, depletion of local water resources and exacerbating drought. High profits have attracted the involvement of the cartels, who have employed violence and intimidation to suppress dissent, displace local communities and extort payments from farmers.

Brazilian farmers attack indigenous activists in Mato Grosso do Sul state, injuring 11

The attack took place on 5 August, as the activists sought to retake land scheduled to be cleared for farming operations. The farmers’ reportedly set fire to tents where some of the activists were staying and fired rubber bullets. Increasing numbers of clashes between farmers and indigenous people have been recorded as pro-farmer lobbies are currently seeking to amend Brazil’s constitutional provisions that grant indigenous groups claims to their ancestral lands.

The UK government, led by newly-elected Prime Minister Keir Starmer, has begun implementing stricter measures, including arrests for incitements to violence online, to curb the sectarian violence that has affected much of northern England, as well as cities in southern England and Northern Ireland, following the stabbing of multiple children at a dance class in Southport, which killed three.

On 9 August, a 28-year-old man was arrested for encouraging rioters to attack a hotel housing asylum seekers in Leeds via social media. At the same time, the government has also put in place measures to expedite the sentencing of rioters. As of 8 August, UK police assessed that more than 480 arrests had been made in connection with the riots, and at least 150 charges had been brought forward, and stated that both numbers are rapidly rising.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the intensity of the protests has decreased during the week, there is a realistic possibility of a further increase during the weekend. The harsher measures put in place by the government are likely to lessen the scale of the unrest, as they place a deterrent on further riots while simultaneously dismantling spaces for online organisation.

While the initial protests that followed the stabbing were community-driven, the increase in tensions has allowed extremists, mostly online-based, to gain a prominent role in fuelling the violence. A possible indication of social media’s prominent role is the notably young age of many of the rioters. According to British police, more than a quarter of people charged so far are under 21 years of age, with some of the individuals arrested as young as 11.

Still, it is unclear to what extent the Starmer government will be able to effectively reduce the impact of online radical discourse. Much of the extremist material currently fuelling the riots is produced outside of the United Kingdom, mostly by users based in continental Europe or the US, and it is unlikely that Westminster will be able to create a legislative framework that is able to deal with these channels without compromising the openness of the British information space in the immediate term. Moreover, the threat posed by social media-based extremist discourse will almost certainly extend well beyond the current crisis, with a high likelihood of commentary regarding the riots continuing to drive radicalisation among UK-based youth. While the deterrents put in place by the government may discourage large gatherings, there is a realistic possibility of a change in the nature and scope of sectarian violence in the medium term, entailing a movement towards targeted, lone-actor violence.

Iran has repeatedly conducted actions and promulgated narratives indicating that it will take this course of action, including the issuing of multiple Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMs) aimed at communicating an aerial attack is imminent. On 7 August, the Iranian armed force-run media outlet Defa Press suggested that Iran should target Israel from multiple directions to disperse Israeli assets, thereby exposing targets.

Iran has also published information relating to what targets it has already decided to strike, although this may be disinformation. The list includes Israeli military bases and government sites like the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, the Israeli Knesset building in Jerusalem, and eight airbases spread across Israel. Iran also named civil infrastructure sites like airports, gas fields, and power plants throughout Israel.

Iran’s most powerful proxy force, Lebanese Hezbollah, has also vowed to retaliate for the assassination of one of its senior commanders, Fuad Shukr. On 7 August, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah, warned that Israel should prepare for any scenario and that Hezbollah is poised to strike Israel either as part of a wider Iranian-sponsored attack or independently of Tehran.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The US, Russia and other external actors are championing diplomatic efforts in order to de-escalate the situation and avert a wider conflict. There is a realistic possibility that Iran seeks a peaceful resolution, with reports indicating that Tehran may relinquish its plans to attack Israel in exchange for a ceasefire in Gaza. However, after the assassination of Haniyeh and the appointment of the more militant Sinwar as Chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau, Iran will likely struggle to persuade Hamas to accept a ceasefire at this time.

Iran’s most likely course of action is to conduct a similar attack to the layered missile, rocket and drone attack in April. However, it is assessed that 99 per cent of the threats heading to Israel were either intercepted by Israeli air defence or US, UK and Jordanian jets. Iranian proxies have probed Israeli air defence for several months to identify weaknesses or gaps in coverage. Furthermore, Iranian media’s repeated discussion of the attack and the release of potential targets spread across Israel has been designed to disperse Israeli air defence. However, the US has increased its force posture in the region and is likely in a better place to intercept threats- a course of action it will almost certainly pursue to manage escalation.

To effectively penetrate Israel’s air defence, Iran may be forced to leverage its proxy forces more to strike Israel. Threats launched from Lebanon, Syria and Iraq will provide less early warning and reaction time for both Israel and collation forces. However, if Iran is too successful it may inadvertently escalate.

Iran’s primary goal is likely to effectively penetrate Israeli air defence with multiple ballistic missiles as these could be nuclear-armed in the future, suggesting that Iran’s main effort is not to kill Israeli citizens, only to demonstrate capability and bolster its deterrence. For this reason, Iran will likely prioritise military sites over population centres.

However, if Hezbollah adopts a divergent path, many of its crude and indiscriminate rocket systems will pose a credible threat to settlements in northern Israel, including population centres as far south as Acre, Haifa and Nazareth. Hezbollah attacks will almost certainly provide the Netanyahu administration the pretext to severely degrade the militant group on Israel’s border. This would almost certainly involve expanded strikes in northern and central Lebanon against high-value targets, but depending on the scale of a Hezbollah attack could trigger a limited ground offensive into southern Lebanon by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).

On 2 August, the al-Qaeda aligned Somalia-based jihadist group, al-Shabaab (AS) conducted a mass casualty complex attack at the popular Lido beach in Mogadishu. The assailants targeted the area late on a Friday when residents of the city typically congregate at seaside restaurants and cafes. A suicide bomber detonated his device, which was then followed by several gunmen opening fire on civilians. It is currently estimated that at least 37 people were killed in the attack and over 200 injured, marking one of the most deadly attacks in Mogadishu in 2024. On 5 August, hundreds of Somali citizens gathered near the attack site to protest AS and to show that they had not succumbed to the group’s attempts to intimidate.

Solace Global Assessment: 

AS, which has now been fighting an insurgency against the Somali government for almost 20 years, has targeted the Lido area multiple times before. The area is an upmarket area of Mogadishu with enhanced security protocols, often frequented by foreigners, international diplomats as well as Somali government and military staff. An AS attack here clearly demonstrates AS’ capability to target any part of the capital and serves to undermine the authority of the central government.

In 2022, a Somali government offensive against AS resulted in the group ceding much territory to government forces backed by international support from the African Union (AU), local clans and drone strikes by the US and Turkey. Initial optimism fuelled by the offensive’s success led Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to announce that AS would be defeated within months or reduced to just a few isolated pockets of influence. However, as an insurgent force, AS does not rely on holding territory and has been able to continue its operations by transitioning to guerrilla tactics and blending into civilian populations.

In recent months, AS has managed to reclaim ground from the government in its traditional strongholds in central and southern Somalia, likely providing it with more freedom of movement and greater capacity to conduct operations. To compound the current situation, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is set to end in late 2024, with responsibility for all security operations set to be transferred to the Somali National Armed Forces. The AU’s drawdown will almost certainly lead to an overstretching of government forces who are also having to contend with other militant groups, Puntland and Somaliland separatist movements and the looming threat of war with Ethiopia.

Moreover, it is unlikely that the government can independently deal with the financial costs or logistical demands to combat AS and has also become over reliant on fragile clan support. A resurgent AS will almost certainly seek to exploit these conditions and exact revenge by reclaiming lost territory and by increasing attacks within Somali government-held territory, with Mogadishu being the most coveted target.

Catalan separatist leader Puigdemont evades capture after appearance in Barcelona.

Former Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont defied his Spanish arrest warrant by returning to Barcelona and appearing at a pro-independence rally on 8 August. The separatist leader addressed thousands of supporters, calling for the revival of the Catalan independence movement. In 2017, large-scale unrest and an independence referendum that was not recognised and deemed illegal by Madrid, led to a significant political crisis in Spain. Puigdemont has been in a self-imposed exile from Spain since 2017, wanted for alleged embezzlement.

It is suspected that Puigdemont evaded capture from authorities with the assistance of a police officer. It is likely that civil unrest will increase in Barcelona from pro-independence protestors, galvanised by Puigdemont’s surprise appearance. It is also likely that anti-independence protests will increase across Spain, especially in Madrid, with criticism of authorities for failing to capture Puigdemont likely to be a major theme.

Turkey bids to join South Africa’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) case against Israel.

The lawsuit accuses Israel of committing the crime of genocide in Gaza. The move follows from previous anti-Israeli gestures and statements by the Turkish government. It is highly unlikely that this development will affect the war in Gaza, and Ankara likely sees it as a way to increase its domestic support.

Provincial governor of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) suspends Chinese mining.

China has important economic interests in the DRC. The northeastern Haut-Uélé province has the Kibali Gold Mine, one of Africa’s largest, and is rich in rare earth materials. DRC authorities claimed that the suspension was caused by non-compliance with standards for the prevention of environmental degradation. However, Chinese mining practices are well-known, and it is more likely that the ban is part of larger re-negotiations of mining terms, with local officials seeking a bigger share of the profits.

Ukraine Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba to visit Malawi, Zambia and Mauritius.

The diplomatic trip follows the collapse of Ukraine’s relations with the Sahel junta states and is almost certainly an attempt to counter Moscow’s growing diplomatic clout in Sub-Saharan Africa. Kuleba’s efforts are highly likely to mostly cover grain exports from Ukraine to Africa – especially Malawi and Zambia, who have growing populations combined with extreme economic deprivation – and will likely not focus on minerals (which remain Russia’s main focus in the continent). Mauritius, the most economically competitive country in Africa, may be of particular interest to Kyiv due to its potential in the context of post-war reconstruction.

Controversial South Africa healthcare reform goes ahead despite opposition.

The legislation overhauls the healthcare system by limiting private provider’s ability to restrict access to care and set their own prices. President Cyril Ramaphosa signed the bill before the May election, highly likely in an unsuccessful attempt to increase electoral support for his African National Congress (ANC) party. The ANC’s main government ally, the pro-market Democratic Alliance (DA) is strongly opposed to the bill. The bill’s rollout could lead to intra-government tensions, possibly having an impact on civil unrest in South Africa.

Three Taylor Swift concerts in Vienna cancelled due to fears of Islamic State (IS) attack.

Authorities arrested two individuals in connection with a possible plot to attack venues hosting the concerts in Vienna. However, the concerts were still cancelled due to fears of additional IS affiliates still undetected. The two suspects are 18 and 19, and pledged allegiance to IS online. This highly likely continues to highlight the global trend of Islamists managing to radicalise younger individuals, using social media as a primary tool.

IS has increased efforts to target Western cities, and this international outlook is line with its growth in the Sahel, Somalia, and Afghanistan. High-visibility events, such as the Olympics or large cultural and sporting events, are likely desirable targets. By seeking to target a Taylor Swift concert, the suspected terrorists were almost certainly aiming to replicate the media effect of the Manchester Arena bombing of 2017.

The arrests were featured heavily in propaganda by the Austrian chapter of the far-right group Generation Identity (GI). GI is likely seeking to expand its political influence after a period of relative decline.

A stabbing in Holon, Israel, kills two and injures two more.

Lone wolf attacks remain a major threat in Israeli urban areas. There is a realistic possibility that the profile of the victims – two senior citizens – will result in retaliatory mob violence, especially against Israel’s Arab population.

Russia cancels Houthi arms supply.

Reports indicate that the Kremlin has cancelled its plans to arm the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. Initial indications suggested Russia was seeking to arm the militant group in response to the Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to attack mainland Russia with US-derived weapons. The delivery would have included capable anti-ship weapon systems such as anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), a development that would increase the Houthis’ ability to conduct attacks in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden.

Pressure from the US and more importantly, Saudi Arabia likely persuaded Russia to abandon these plans, fearing it would lose influence in Arab countries. However, unconfirmed reports indicate that Russian military advisors have visited Yemen, likely to train and advise the Houthis on how to use their existing weapon systems more effectively against international shipping.

UK Foreign Office issues urgent travel alert for Djibouti.

The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) has issued an urgent travel alert for the East African country of Djibouti, warning of the “very likely” threat of terror attacks. The alert warns that transport hubs; hotels, restaurants and bars; shopping areas; religious events; sporting events; and military bases are likely targets, with the US, France, China, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all maintaining a constant military presence in the highly strategically placed country.

Few details are specified in the alert, which is likely predicated on credible but classified intelligence. However, Djibouti’s involvement in counter-al-Shabaab operations under the African Union has likely made it a coveted target for the al-Qaeda-aligned group.

US forces complete withdrawal from Niger.

US forces have completed their withdrawal from Niger after leaving their Air Base 201 in Agadez, northern Niger. 800 service personnel had already withdrawn in early July, with 200 following on 5 August, after the junta demanded US forces leave over a year ago. The base was primarily being used to operate US drones against al-Qaeda and Islamic State-affiliated groups throughout the Sahel region.

The loss of this strike and intelligence capability will almost certainly degrade Nigerien forces’ ability to counter these threats but has opened the door for greater Russian involvement. The US has also cited concerns over Iran wanting to access Niger’s mineral wealth, most notably its vast uranium reserves which Washington believes it is wanting to use in its nuclear programme.

Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) kidnaps two Russians in Niger.

A video was shared by the al-Qaeda affiliated group on 3 August, showing the two who are identified as being employees of a Russian mining company. The case highlights the ongoing security vacuum in Niger, with neither Russia or the military alliance between the three neighbouring juntas likely able to contrast a growing Islamist presence at this time. Extremists will likely continue to target foreign nationals, especially those associated with the mining industry, which is attracting foreign influence to the region.

Torrential rainfall in Yemen results in at least 40 deaths.

Heavy rainfall in Houthi-occupied western Yemen led to at least 40 deaths as a result of flooding.

On 7 August, humanitarian organisations announced that they had begun deliveries of vital aid to affected areas. It is likely that the impact of the floods is worsened firstly by the poor record of basic service delivery by the Houthi administration, and secondly by the challenging threat environment for aid workers. There have been multiple reports of aid workers being abducted by Houthi authorities, due to suspicion of espionage.

While reduced, rainfall is forecast to continue through next week. It is likely that even moderate rainfall will pose challenges, due to the lack of adequate drainage and flood-resistant infrastructure in a region that historically has not had much rainfall.

Zimbabwean government assesses that cholera outbreak has ended.

Zimbabwe originally declared a state of emergency in November last year, after 7,000 suspected cases were reported, and dozens of deaths. The severity of the 18-month-long outbreak was almost certainly worsened by the 2022 shortage in cholera vaccines, which forced the International Coordinating Group (ICG) to temporarily change the vaccine regime from the usual two doses to one. Moreover, as cholera is transmitted via contaminated water or food, countries with less robust water infrastructure are at a much higher risk of outbreaks. The latest estimate of the outbreak’s impact is a total of 34,550 suspected cases (of which 4,200 confirmed), 631 suspected deaths, and 88 confirmed ones.

Amid heavy rainstorms across southern China, flash floods occurred in areas of the Sichuan. The floods affected 265 households and damaged multiple power lines. Eight people were killed and at least 19 are missing. Moreover, north China is suffering from a heat wave, with fears of drought, triggering concerns about farm production. While severe weather has become more common, there have been calls from Chinese policymakers for better disaster prevention in preparation for more severe weather conditions, including both droughts and floods.

Solace Global Assessment: 

China’s flood season lasts predominantly between May and September, peaking from mid-July to mid-August. Over the last two months, multiple severe environmental events have been recorded, with landslides and flooding killing over 150 people. The Chinese government has said that the rainfall and subsequent flooding have led to a doubling of the economic losses caused by natural disasters in July from the previous year, amounting to a total loss of CNY 76.9 billion (USD 10.1 billion) from natural disasters, an estimated 88 per cent of this being due to the heavy rain and floods.

In total, extreme weather events are assessed to have affected around 26 million people across China, with an estimated 1.1 million relocated, 12,000 houses destroyed, and 157,000 damaged, as well as 2.42 million hectares of crop affected in July alone. Severe and protracted damage from extreme weather events may increasingly become a driver of popular dissatisfaction towards local and national governments. Civil unrest has the potential to occur across affected regions in response to perceived government inaction or unpreparedness for the floods.

Other ongoing social issues may also contribute to a general dissatisfaction towards Beijing’s ability to provide welfare. The central government is currently debating plans to raise the retirement age by an average of five years, a decision which has been met with widespread dissatisfaction. Broader political developments could further drive local grievances with the government, adding to pre-existing discontent. Protests erupted in multiple cities at a similar time last year after the government channelled water from swollen rivers to populated areas, to prevent Beijing from flooding. The inhabitants of the area flooded, Zhuozhou in the Hebei Province, protested the measure, and were met with a harsh response from the police. The 2023 episodes may serve to deter protests linked to the current floods. In addition, the Chinese government may have learned from their previous mistakes and has this year allocated flood relief funding for five provinces, which may be able to settle and reassure the public.

On 8 August a 7.1 magnitude earthquake occurred off the coast of Kyushu, Japan. Tsunami warnings were issued and strong shaking was felt in Miyazaki. A small number of residential buildings were damaged, with one collapsing, in areas such as Osaki town in Kagoshima prefecture.  At least 16 people were injured. No major damage or deaths have been reported, and nuclear power plants were unaffected. While the 7.1 earthquake’s impact was relatively minimal, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) issued an advisory warning that the probability of a megaquake occurring in the Nankai Trough is several times higher than usual

Solace Global Assessment: 

The warning indicates an increased likelihood of a megaquake, which typically refers to magnitude 8 and above earthquakes. However, the advisory has almost certainly been issued as a precaution, rather than a definitive prediction. The Nankai Trough, located south of Japan, hosts a significant fault, the Nankai megathrust. Megathrust earthquakes, such as the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, which was magnitude 9.1, pose a significant risk. Worst-case scenario estimates predict that over 200,000 people could be killed as a result of a Nankai Trough megaquake. The most at-risk areas are on Japan’s southern Pacific coast.

In the next 30 years, seismologists estimate that there is a 70 to 80 per cent chance of a Nankai Trough megaquake occurring. Although the JMA are not able to accurately predict exactly when and where the earthquake will occur, they have urged residents on Japan’s Pacific coast to reaffirm their preparedness and take precautions over the next week. Japan has rigorous earthquake preparedness measures. The use of advanced earthquake-resistant technologies, infrastructure resilience, stringent building codes, and thorough disaster response plans all contribute towards making Japan highly resistant to the impact of earthquakes. However, extremely powerful earthquakes such as the 2011 earthquake are still capable of causing widespread damage and large numbers of fatalities.

As a result of the warning, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has cancelled a scheduled 9 August visit to central Asia, which almost certainly indicates a high level of concern. Multiple companies are taking precautionary measures, such as reviewing business continuity plans and conducting drills, and major utility companies are preparing their communication networks and readiness protocols. It is almost certain that the elevated state of earthquake preparedness will continue over the next week.

On 5 August, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Skeikh Hasina fled to India and resigned after weeks of widespread civil unrest, ending 15 years of her rule. Bangladesh’s president dissolved the parliament on 7 August, clearing the way for new elections. Thousands of protesters defied a military curfew, storming her official residence and setting parts of it on fire.

Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus, currently in Paris, has agreed to lead a transitional government. However, Army Chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman has announced that an interim government would be formed, with the military set to govern the country until the next round of elections. The military has stated that it will lift the current curfew, address the injustices of the Hasina administration and restore normalcy.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The resignation of Hasina and the promise of new elections will almost certainly end much of the current unrest. Recent unrest was triggered by a High Court’s decision to reimpose a controversial jobs quota system, and authorities employed high levels of violence to curb civil unrest, leading to the deaths of at least 300 people. The most likely outcome is that a new government is formed in which the military, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the recently banned Islamist party, share posts.

However, while major unrest directed towards the government is likely to significantly decrease, there are early indications that there may be a new wave of civil unrest emerging in Bangladesh. Hasina’s Awami League party championed secularism and Hindus in Bangladesh are largely thought to have voted for the party. Hindus, who make up approximately eight per cent of the population, have frequently been targeted in the past when the Awami League has lost power. Reports on social media suggest that violent mobs have attacked and looted Awami League offices and Hindu properties and temples throughout the country, leading India to evacuate most of its non-essential embassy staff.

The Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist Christian Unity Council, which represents the country’s religious minorities, claims that as many as 300 Hindu homes and 20 temples have been damaged in the attacks. If the attacks continue to escalate, there is a realistic possibility that sectarian violence will spread throughout the region, with Hindu nationalists in India or further afield, targeting the Muslim population in reprisal attacks.

On 7 August, Thailand’s Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the Move Forward Party, (MFP) the party which received the largest amount of votes in the 2023 election but whose leader at the time, Pita Limjaroenrat, was blocked from his attempt to become prime minister. The court also banned the party’s executive committee from participating in Thai politics for ten years. The court’s decision follows a ruling in January which stipulated that MFP’s pledge to reform Thailand’s controversial lèse-majesté laws was unlawful. Pita stated that the movement would continue by establishing a new party with new leadership.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Thailand’s courts have dissolved political parties and banned popular politicians several times in the past in order to prevent reformist movements from challenging the country’s conservative establishment, which has consolidated its power after a military coup in 2014. In 2018, the Future Forward Party (FFP), a progressive party similar to the MFP, was established. The FFP emerged as the third-largest party in the House of Representatives after the 2019 elections. The FFP was subsequently dissolved and its leaders barred from politics in 2020 after accusations of violating election laws, with many believing these charges had been manufactured by the conservatives.

The dissolution of FFP led to widespread protests in Bangkok and several other major cities, largely driven by the Thai youth who accused the government and judiciary of colluding together to suppress political opposition and undermine democracy. The initial protests evolved into a wider pro-democracy movement that attracted tens of thousands of participants to multiple protests. Protestors demanded constitutional reforms, the resignation of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, and a reduction in the monarchy’s power, which persisted into late 2021. Protests were often marked by violent clashes with the police, resulting in at least four deaths, over 150 injuries, hundreds of arrests, the closure of public services, and disruption to transport.

The most likely course of action for MFP and its supporters will be to reconstitute the party under a different name and with new leadership. However, there is a realistic possibility that the MFP’s dissolution will spark protests across the country that could evolve into a wider pro-democracy movement.

Pakistani Islamist party Jamaat-i-Islami announce end of sit-in protest in Rawalpindi.

The Islamist political party Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) announced on 9 August that it is ending its two-week sit-in after negotiating an agreement with the government. The deal includes the establishment of a task force to tackle issues with independent power producers (IPPs), reduce electricity bills, and the lowering of certain taxes. The sit-in involved thousands of participants occupying a road at Liaquat Bagh in Rawalpindi. JI leaders insisted, however, that the sit-in would resume if the government does not fulfil its promises.

Fijian Prime Minister to visit China.

Fiji’s Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka will visit China from August 14 to 21 in a move aimed at strengthening their strategic ties amidst growing geopolitical competition in the Asia-Pacific region. The visit follows Fiji’s decision to maintain a policing cooperation deal with China, which has raised concerns in Australia, highlighting the broader contest for influence between China and the United States in the region.

The visit also coincides with important regional discussions at the Pacific Islands Forum, underlining the broader context of regional security and strategic planning. This visit could potentially elevate Fiji-China relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership, reflecting China’s ongoing efforts to deepen its influence in the Pacific over the US.

Australia raises terror threat level.

The Australian government has raised its terror alert from “possible” to “probable” citing the concerns of security officials regarding a major increase in extremist views online. The probable category is level three out of five and indicates that officials believe that the probability of an attack is over 50 per cent. Sources from the country’s main domestic intelligence agency Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) indicated that extremism has increased across “all ideological spectrums” and that the current Israel-Hamas conflict has been a major driver in the rise of extremism.

Three explosions detonate in Thailand’s Patani province.

On 9 August, three bombs exploded in the vicinity of a police station in Muang Patani, Patani province. The first bomb was detonated near a fishing pier and was followed by two subsequent blasts close to the original explosion. One person was injured and has been taken to hospital. Patani province is one of Thailand’s four primarily Muslim provinces where many people speak Malay as a first language and are seeking separation from Thailand. The group most active in Pattani, is the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), which has led an insurgency for several decades and has carried out multiple attacks throughout Thailand.

Severe floods in Nepal kill more than 160, displace hundreds.

Nepal and its neighbours’ monsoon season occurs between June and August and is marked by torrential rain that can easily damage poorly erected informal settlements. In Nepal, at least 167 people have died, and more than 4,000 households have been displaced. Nepal’s uniquely mountainous topography almost certainly contributes to making search and rescue efforts more difficult, and to leaving affected communities at a higher risk of isolation from authorities.

There is a high chance of La Nina conditions, marked by the cooling of the middle Pacific Ocean’s surface, developing this year by September. La Nina tends to coincide with more severe monsoon seasons which, although boosting agricultural yields, are likely to further exacerbate damage in the Indian subcontinent.

North Korea offered humanitarian aid by Russia.

Severe rainfalls and floods have caused damage and disruptions in North Korea’s northwest, reportedly isolating more than 5,000 residents and damaging up to 4,000 homes. The Russian offer of aid further demonstrates the growing security and diplomatic partnership between the two countries which has largely been characterised by the exchange of military technology.