The deployment of US airborne intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets to Mexico is almost certainly indicative of the Trump administration’s strategic priority to counter the cartels.

The ELN’s imposition of an “armed strike” in Colombia’s Chocó Department will almost certainly disrupt the provision of essential services and increase pressure on the central government.

The upcoming German elections will highly likely result in the Christian Democrats winning the most votes, but will likely be followed by a period of instability due to a fractured parliament.

The beginning of bilateral US-Russia talks that exclude Ukraine, and the public dispute between President Trump and President Zelensky, likely puts the Ukrainian president in a lose-lose situation.

The ceasefire in Lebanon is holding, however, there is a realistic possibility that Israel will challenge the terms of the ceasefire, assessing that other parties are in too weak a position to retaliate.

A suspected failed terror attack in Israel will almost certainly be used to justify expanded IDF operations in the West Bank.

There is a realistic possibility that increased IDF operations in the West Bank are shaping activity for increased settlement, a development that could undermine the ceasefire and fuel unrest.

The detention of two British nationals in Iran under charges of espionage is highly likely an example of hostage diplomacy, reaffirming the threat posed by arbitrary detention in adversarial states.

AFC/M23 rebels are highly likely to continue their advance in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which could trigger further unrest in Kinshasa.

Pakistan’s hosting of its first international cricket tournament since 2009 is almost certainly a coveted target for multiple terrorist groups operating in the country.

In Bangladesh, both the arrests of Awami League supporters and the clashes between student groups are almost certainly driven by ongoing power struggles for political primacy post-Hasina.

There is a realistic possibility that student-led protests in Indonesia could evolve into a wider movement if joined by other sections of society, potentially leading to violent clashes with the police.

Since early February, the US military and intelligence community has significantly increased its surveillance of Mexican cartel activity. This has primarily been achieved by deploying a range of tactical to strategic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) airborne assets to monitor cartel activity.

The US Navy has deployed P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft to identify vessels of interest, monitor surface activity and intercept communications. Assets from the US Coast Guard have supported US Navy missions.

The US Air Force (USAF) has deployed RC135 Rivet Joint, a dedicated signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft capable of intercepting, geolocating, and classifying electronic emissions. The USAF has also deployed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, primarily for wide-area imagery intelligence collection.

Neither the Pentagon nor the White House have confirmed the deployment of RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft. However, US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has stated that 140 military intelligence personnel have been assigned to the border mission. Their role includes full-motion video analysis, counter-network analysis, and Spanish language translation in support of the US Border Patrol Office of Intelligence.

Reports also indicate that US military operations are being supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is reportedly flying unarmed MQ-9 Reaper uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) ISR missions directly over Mexican airspace.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The use of strategic military assets like Rivet Joint against the cartels is an unprecedented shift which has likely been authorised following President Trump’s 20 January executive order to designate several of the cartels as foreign terrorist organisations (FTOs), which came into effect on 19 February.

The designation has likely permitted other forms of more covert intelligence collection, such as directed surveillance, which is hard to identify in the open-source domain. The use of strategic assets combined with the scale and frequency of US ISR missions over Mexico, the US-Mexico border and maritime approaches indicates that this activity is unlikely to be simply strategic messaging towards the cartels.

SIGINT platforms will be able to provide US intelligence with information relating to phone signals, radio transmissions, encrypted devices, satellite signals, radar emissions from vessels, and other electronic communications.

When layered with imagery collection and other forms of intelligence collection, such as human intelligence (HUMINT), this data will allow for a comprehensive understanding of cartel operations. When analysed, US intelligence will likely be able to uncover cartel patterns of life, identify key locations such as fentanyl labs, trace drug trafficking routes, map cartel networks and leadership structures, identify enablers, track financial operations, and gather other critical insights into cartel activity.

How this intelligence will be used remains unknown. The CIA has conducted ISR missions against the cartels in the past, but this has often been done with authorisation from the Mexican authorities. Moreover, it is unlikely that the US will be operating within Mexican airspace without approval from the Mexican government.

Trump has posited the idea of using US special forces to conduct targeted operations against the cartels, a policy that is unlikely to require congressional approval. However, the most likely scenario is that the US is fulfilling a sophisticated intelligence capability that Mexico currently lacks. By delivering surveillance, signals intelligence, and analytical support to Mexican authorities, the US is likely enhancing Mexico’s ability to more effectively target cartels and disrupt their operations as part of a partnered operation.

This has likely placed enormous pressure on Mexico to adapt its strategy towards the cartels or face a reaction from the Trump administration, such as tariffs.

However, such a shift could precipitate a change in the security environment in Mexico which may threaten US interests. The cartels may be forced to alter their tactics, which could involve more sophisticated counter-surveillance measures, more innovative ways to smuggle illicit goods into the US or an escalation in violence.

If the cartels perceive increased US involvement as an existential threat to their operations, they may respond with a range of retaliatory actions to deter further intervention. There is a realistic possibility that this could include increased cartel violence on the border, attacks on Mexican security services and assassinations of high-profile civilian targets such as politicians and journalists.

A more extreme response could involve cartels deliberately targeting US interests in Mexico or beyond. This might include attacks on American businesses, kidnappings of US citizens or deliberate attempts to flood the US with higher volumes of narcotics and potentially more lethal varieties.

On 17 February, members of the National Liberation Army (ELN) declared that a three-day “armed strike” would be enforced in the Chocó Department. The strike began on 18 February at midnight and is set to end on 21 February at midnight.

Under the terms of the strike, no public activities will be allowed to take place, public transportation will cease to operate, no one will be able to travel on public roads, and civilians will be forced to remain indoors for the entire period. The ELN has stated that the strike has been imposed in order to expose collusion between the state, military forces and mercenary groups operating in the region.

This is the ninth armed strike that the ELN have imposed but is considerably larger than the previous strikes.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ELN’s imposition of an armed strike likely serves several purposes. The ability to impose an armed strike largely unchallenged will almost certainly be perceived as a direct challenge to the government, likely weakening public confidence in state security forces.

Public confidence in the government will be further tested if the ELN can expose collusion between the state and other armed groups, such as the Gulf Clan. If the ELN succeeds in these efforts, it will likely increase pressure on the Petro administration to concede to more favourable terms in the ongoing peace negotiations.

If successful, it is highly likely that the ELN will impose similar armed strikes in other parts of Colombia, with the group having a major presence in departments such as Norte de Santander, Arauca, Cauca, and Nariño, where it has long-established control and influence. The armed strikes will likely disrupt the provision of essential services, including food, medicine and health care, especially if they increase in scale and duration. Furthermore, anyone contravening the ELN’s orders is likely to be apprehended or executed, including individuals who are typically afforded protection, such as healthcare professionals and humanitarian workers.

The government claims that the ELN is using the armed strike to limit traffic on the area’s roads and waterways. This strategy will enable the ELN to transit illicit goods such as cocaine and illegally mined materials out of the region, ultimately helping to fund future operations. In response, the Colombian government will likely increase military and police deployments in key areas and along major transport routes in an attempt to restore order, interdict smuggling, and prevent the ELN from expanding its influence. However, given the ELN’s entrenched position in the rural Chocó Department and its preference for asymmetric warfare, it is unlikely that government forces will be successful in dislodging the ELN from its area of operations.

Former Brazilian president charged over coup attempt

Brazilian prosecutors have charged former President Jair Bolsonaro over an alleged coup plot to poison his successor, current President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and to kill a Supreme Court judge. The prosecutor general stated that Bolsonaro and 33 others were complicit in the plot.

Bolsonaro has rejected the accusation, labelling the incumbent government as an authoritarian regime. The former president still commands significant support in Brazil and is attempting to rekindle his political career, despite being banned from holding public office until 2030.

Bolsonaro is unlikely to be arrested before his trial, but his future arrest or any major developments in the case are likely to provoke major unrest, with many of his supporters previously attempting to storm government buildings in the capital, Brasilia, after his defeat in the 2022 presidential election.

Argentine President Javier Milei receives backlash following crypto scandal

On 14 February, Milei posted a link to a website selling the cryptocurrency $Libra, leading to it quickly appreciating in value before suddenly dropping, losing up to USD 4 billion, after early investors sold their coins. The main opposition coalition, led by the Socialist Party, has accused Milei of fraud and has called for the start of impeachment proceedings.

Milei defended his actions stating that he did not advertise the coin, shared it from his personal account, and that investing in crypto is like gambling, so he is not responsible for investors’ losses. Milei’s seeming promotion of the little-known cryptocurrency follows similar actions by other politicians. On the eve of the inauguration, US then-President-elect Donald Trump launched a personal crypto coin and was shortly followed by First Lady Melania Trump.    

Six Guyanese soldiers injured in suspected gang attack across Venezuela’s border

On 18 February, armed men on the Venezuelan side of the Cuyuni River opened fire on soldiers on a resupply mission along the Guyana side, injuring six. While there was an exchange of fire, it is unclear whether any attackers, who were suspected gang members, were hit.

Guyana’s defence force has released a statement claiming that it ‘remains committed to protecting its borders and will take all necessary measures to address any threats to national security’. The incident is expected to raise tensions between the two countries and is the latest in a diplomatic feud over the shared border.

Venezuela has claimed that it has been cheated out of the mineral rich Essequibo region, which makes up two-thirds of Guyana, and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has threatened to forcefully annex the region. Protests are likely in Guyana’s capital Georgetown amid public anger at Venezuela’s actions.

Colonel killed in likely cartel-mandated assassination in Ecuador

Colonel Porfirio Cedeño was shot and killed in the town of Guayaquil. According to local media, “multiple” gunmen ambushed the colonel’s vehicle as he was en route to a military ceremony in Manta. Cedeño was the leader of a special armed forces unit, the Special Operations Group, tasked with carrying out operations against drug traffickers in the country. The shooting, almost certainly mandated by local cartels, is the latest in a series of high-profile assassinations of figures within the Ecuadorean government.

Brazilian forces launch large-scale operation against illegal logging

Brazilian forces seized at least 5,000 truckloads of timber during Operation Maravalha, a series of large-scale raids targeting illegal logging in the states of Para, Amazonas, and Rondonia. In addition to the seizures, authorities closed multiple sawmills.

The Lula government has made some considerable progress in curbing illegal logging in the Amazon rainforest, with levels of illegal deforestation falling since the 2022 elections. Deforestation, including logging and deliberate wildfires, is mostly carried out to turn portions of the rainforest into pastures, making them more profitable.

While the government raid, the largest in five years according to government sources, is a notable win for the Lula government, Brasilia likely continues to face significant difficulties in curbing illegal deforestation, which is both widespread and difficult to monitor.

Dengue cases continue to rise in Brazil

On 19 February, the government of São Paulo declared a state of emergency due to a significant rise in dengue cases, with 124,000 infections and 113 deaths reported since the beginning of the year. While the numbers are lower than last year, the state is nearing the epidemic threshold set by the WHO. Almost one-third of Brazil’s dengue cases have been identified in São Paulo, which has necessitated the allocation of more resources to the area. At least five people have also died in the state of Minas Gerais since the start of 2025, which has also recorded over 13,000 cases. One of the primary drivers of the case increases has been the low uptake in vaccinations, which has prompted the Ministry of Health to expand vaccine eligibility and allow doses close to expiration to be administered to a wider population.

On 23 February, German citizens vote to elect the 630 members of the Bundestag. Currently, the Christian Democratic sister parties CDU/CSU are leading the polls with an estimated 29 per cent of overall public support. The incumbent Social Democrats (SPD) are far behind with 16 per cent support. The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is second in the polls, at around 21 per cent.

The electoral campaign in Germany has been extremely tense and has attracted significant international attention. Most notably, the AfD, which was previously endorsed by presidential advisor and the world’s richest man Elon Musk, also recently received a less vocal endorsement by US Vice President JD Vance, who met AfD leader Alice Weidel in Munich. Large-scale anti-AfD rallies have occurred with some regularity in Berlin as well as other large urban centres.

The campaign has also been characterised by several cases of violence. Multiple terror attacks inspired by Islamist ideology have occurred in Germany in recent months, including in Munich, Solingen, and Mannheim. A further mass casualty attack, a vehicle ramming attack on a Christmas market in Magdeburg, was carried out by a Saudi national who espoused anti-Islam and anti-government extremist beliefs. These attacks have made migration one of the key issues of the campaign.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The elections will highly likely see the Christian Democrats emerge as Germany’s main force in parliament. The AfD will highly likely be the second-largest party in the Bundestag, securing their best-ever result.

However, the leader of the CDU/CSU, Friedrich Merz, is likely to uphold the “firewall” against the AfD, despite having previously sought the far-right party’s support to pass legislation. Instead, the CDU/CSU will likely look to the left for support in forming a government. This would likely take the form of a Merkel-era “Grand Coalition” with the SPD.

This development would almost certainly result in short-term uncertainty and potentially long-term instability, with the coalition likely to have fewer seats than previous Grand Coalitions due to the forecasted success of the AfD.

This scenario, with the AfD more powerful than ever but still exiled from government, would almost certainly aggravate and embolden the far right, which may have material impacts on Germany’s risk environment. A stronger and more visible AfD is almost certainly going to result in more civil unrest. Alternatively, If Merz tries to pass further laws with the AfD’s support, more protests like those recently seen in Berlin and other cities are almost certain to occur. Alongside civil unrest, there is a realistic possibility of increased political violence, including attacks on politicians and activists, as well as acts of vandalism and sabotage.

It is notable that the AfD is now both openly endorsed by elements of the US administration and American-based pro-Trump channels, as well as Russian information operations. These efforts raise a credible risk of sabotage and activist violence against US businesses in Germany, driven by perceptions of US backing for the far-right. Last year’s sabotage of the Tesla “Gigafactory” near Berlin likely represents an early case of US politics driving activist sabotage in Germany, likely serving as inspiration for similar future actions.

On 18 February, the US and Russia engaged in bilateral talks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The US delegation was headed by the Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who was joined by national security advisor Mike Waltz and Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff. The Russian delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, joined by Vladamir Putin’s advisor Yuri Ushakov.

The meeting, mediated by senior Saudi officials including the foreign minister, discussed conditions for a possible Trump-Putin summit and agreed to start negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. The talks notably excluded any Ukrainian representatives. President Zelensky had been scheduled to also visit Saudi Arabia but has postponed the visit to 10 March as Kyiv does not want to give legitimacy to the US-Russia talks.

In response to Kyiv’s concerns about being excluded from the talks, US President Donald Trump told reporters that Ukraine should have never started the war and Zelensky’s popularity ratings are as low as four per cent. Zelensky then publicly stated that Trump is “living in a disinformation space” created by Russia. Trump subsequently posted on social media that Zelensky, a “modestly successful comedian”, is a “Dictator without Elections” and “has done a terrible job”. 

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the initial bilateral US-Russia talks, briefings to the press from both Russian and American delegation members give some early indications of possible core principles and red lines for peace negotiations. Waltz specified that a peace deal would require a permanent end to the war, security guarantees for Ukraine, and will have to include talks on territory. The latter condition almost certainly refers to the ceding of Ukrainian territory to Russia, namely Crimea, the Donbas and highly likely the occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts. This would be an immediately offered concession to Ukraine’s stated strategic objectives of full Russian withdrawal from internationally recognised Ukrainian territory.

Lavrov, on the other hand, stated that any deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine, “even under other flags”, would be unacceptable. This condition was almost certainly set in the context of proposals for NATO-member peacekeeping forces that could serve as a security guarantee for Ukraine, with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer stating that he is “ready and willing” to deploy British troops as peacekeepers, with French President Macron making similar pledges in the past.

It is highly likely that peace negotiations, with the aforementioned core principles, already have built-in issues. While the US delegation expresses a desire for security guarantees sufficient to make peace permanent, the Kremlin has so far not expressed any indications of possible concessions that could enable this.

One possible scenario that Moscow would be more amenable to may be the deployment of forces from a non-NATO member such as China, although it is unlikely this would provide a sufficient guarantee against future Russian re-invasion.

Fundamentally, while Ukraine (and European partners) have been excluded from these talks thus far, Kyiv would need to accept any proposals for them to be effective. If determined, however, there is a realistic possibility that the Trump administration could force Kyiv to accept an imposed peace due to a threat of total defeat without any US support.

Zelensky is likely in a lose-lose situation, with any statements against Trump leading to a severe backlash, but silence enabling the imposition of an unfavourable peace.

The ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, reached in November 2024, has largely held despite notable challenges and incidents. On 18 February, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) units withdrew from positions along the southern border, with Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) units moving in to replace them. However, IDF troops remained stationed on five strategic hills, where they have established observation posts.

On 19 February, an Israeli drone strike in the town of Aita al-Shaab resulted in one fatality, marking the first casualty since the IDF’s withdrawal. Both the UN and the Lebanese government have condemned the continued IDF presence at these locations as a violation of the ceasefire terms. However, Tel Aviv maintains that the deployments are temporarily necessary to ensure border security.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The continuation of the ceasefire agreement, despite Lebanon’s protests and Israeli strikes, is largely due to the positions of the three main parties involved: Israel, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese government.

Israel is likely pursuing two main objectives. Firstly, Israel is attempting to facilitate the return of 60,000 residents to northern Israel, the failure to do so has placed significant pressure on Tel Aviv. Secondly, Israel almost certainly wants to maintain a ground presence in Lebanon to monitor Hezbollah in case it attempts to reestablish a military presence south of the Litani River.

The threat of a sustained and likely destabilising IDF presence in Lebanon is also likely placing pressure on Beirut to adopt a more proactive role in containing the militant group.

Hezbollah, severely degraded after IDF operations and the loss of its Syrian supply lines likely has little choice but to accept Israel’s presence or risk a collapse of the ceasefire and renewed IDF operations. The Lebanese government has demonstrated an increased willingness to contain Hezbollah. However, with political and economic challenges, and a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) ill-equipped to directly challenge Hezbollah, the central government will likely have to accept the IDF’s continued presence within its borders.

Given Israel’s position of strength and the relative weakness of other parties involved, it is likely that it will continue to challenge the terms and push the boundaries of the ceasefire agreement. Israel will likely calculate that it can continue to strike at targets of opportunity within southern Lebanon, assessing that any major retaliation is unlikely.

On the night of 20 February, three bombs detonated on empty buses on the wider Tel Aviv bus network. Two explosions occurred in Bat Yam, a city south of Tel Aviv, while a third was reported in the nearby town of Holon. At least one additional explosive device was discovered on another bus in Holon. No injuries were sustained during the blasts.

Israeli police have stated that the bombs were detonated with a timer and were non-standard explosives. The police also commented that the bombs looked similar to those engineered in the West Bank. Israel’s Shin Bet internal security agency stated that it was taking over the investigation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing and placement of the explosive devices strongly suggest that they were intended to detonate during rush hour traffic, likely aiming to cause mass casualties. Furthermore, bus bombings have been a recurrent tactic used by Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups during past hostilities.

A group on Telegram, claiming to be a branch of the Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, based in the northern West Bank city of Tulkarem stated “We will never forget to avenge our martyrs as long as the occupation remains on our land.” This could suggest that the failed attack was Hamas’ revenge for Israeli operations in Palestine or potentially indicative of an internal split within Hamas, both of which are likely to undermine ceasefire negotiations.

However, the failure of three separate explosive devices to detonate at the correct time, coupled with the fact one device reportedly carried a message declaring “Revenge from Tulkarm”, is likely to generate suspicion and fuel speculation that the attack was a false flag operation. Many will likely believe that Israel engineered the incident to undermine ceasefire negotiations and justify continued Israeli military operations in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Regardless of the attack’s origins, when combined with Hamas’ recent public display of deceased Israeli children, it will almost certainly be used as justification for expanded Israeli operations in the West Bank and will likely be widely supported. Early indications suggest that Israel’s Defence Minister has already instructed the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to intensify operations in the West Bank, especially in the Tulkarem refugee camp.

This escalation is likely to jeopardise ceasefire efforts and provoke further retaliatory attacks from the West Bank into Israel, increasing the risk of a broader cycle of violence. If sustained, there is a realistic possibility that it will draw Iran further into the conflict, with senior figures within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) recently renewing threats towards Israel.

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) has increased the tempo of its operations in the West Bank, conducting multiple raids as part of its operation “Iron Wall” which started on 21 January. Raids intended to target militants and dismantle “terrorist infrastructure” have taken place in major Palestinian refugee camps, including in Jenin, Nur Shams, and Nablus and have also been conducted in smaller settlements near Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem. Some raids were reportedly conducted by Israeli settlers supported by the IDF.

The Palestinian Authority’s (PA’s) Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Information Nabil Abu Rudeineh denounced the international community for remaining silent about Israel’s plans for “racist annexation and territorial expansion,” and called on the US to intervene to stop Israeli aggression, warning that failure to do so would only embolden Israel and lead to an uncontrollable escalation in violence.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Israel has likely been emboldened by the initial steps of the new Trump administration. Trump has sanctioned the International Criminal Court for its issuing of an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu; proposed the US control and redevelopment of Gaza; increased military support for Israel; and has threatened to unleash “hell” unless Hamas releases the remaining hostages. Israel is likely exploiting a more favourable White House and the current Gaza ceasefire to expand operations in the West Bank. Tel Aviv will also almost certainly exploit the recent failed terror attack and Hamas’ treatment of deceased Israeli hostages as a pretext for increased operations in the West Bank.

The primary objective of Operation Iron Wall is to dismantle militant networks that are likely receiving increasing support from Iran, which is attempting to establish another front against Israel, an objective that has almost certainly been prioritised since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. However, there is a realistic possibility that the increase in operations and consequent displacement of Palestinians, especially in areas near East Jerusalem, are shaping activity for an expansion of Israeli settlements. The previous Trump administration shifted US policy towards Israeli settlements, no longer viewing them as inconsistent with international law, a policy that is likely to provide Israel with diplomatic cover for continued expansion. For example, on 17 February, Israel issued a tender for the construction of nearly 1,000 additional settler homes in the Efrat settlement near Jerusalem.

The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank is likely to jeopardise ceasefire agreements, undermine hostage exchanges and increase both radicalism and militancy throughout Palestine. Militant groups like Hamas are likely to exploit settlement growth as a justification to abandon talks with Israel, making negotiations and any long-term solution much harder to achieve. Increased settlement is also likely to severely undermine the PA’s credibility. The PA is already struggling with declining legitimacy and a weakened security apparatus, which it has often used to suppress Palestinian militancy, developments that will ultimately play into the hands of the militant groups. Despite a lull in fighting in Gaza, intensified Israeli operations and settlement expansion in the West Bank will likely fuel anti-Israeli sentiment and global protests. Perceived US backing for Israel is also likely to drive anti-US protests, especially in the Middle East, potentially increasing security risks for American citizens and interests abroad.

On 18 February, two detained British nationals were charged with espionage by Iranian authorities. According to a judiciary spokesman, the couple had “entered Iran under the guise of tourists” and “collected information in several provinces of the country”. The British couple, Mr and Mrs Foreman, were on a worldwide motorbike trip.

The couple intended to stay in Iran for five days, having crossed into Iran from Armenia on 30 December, having earlier admitted that they were ignoring warnings from the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) not to travel to Iran. In January, the couple were arrested in the city of Kerman. The FCDO has stated that they are providing consular assistance to the couple and are in contact with Iranian authorities.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The case is highly likely an example of ‘hostage diplomacy’, the practice of a state using arbitrary detention for geopolitical purposes and to gain transactional rewards. In recent years, numerous British nationals have been arrested in Iran. In a high-profile example, the British-Iranian dual national Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe was arrested in 2016 by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at Imam Khomeini International Airport (IKA) in Tehran after visiting Iran on holiday. Zaghari-Ratcliffe was detained for six years, only being released once the British government agreed to settle an outstanding GBP 400 million debt that dated back to the 1970s.

Due to the likely increasing phenomenon of hostage diplomacy, there is almost certainly a severe risk of arbitrary detention posed to nationals travelling to countries hostile to the West, such as Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Russia. On 7 February, a US citizen was detained in Russia due to allegedly possessing cannabis-infused marmalade. With the talks being conducted between Russian and US officials in Saudi Arabia regarding Ukraine, the Russian government released the US citizen in what has been perceived as a gesture of goodwill. Such events are indicative of how travellers can be subjected to detention in adversarial states, with their continued imprisonment or release being then subject to globally significant geopolitical developments.

On 14 February, AFC/M23 entered the outskirts of Bukavu after capturing the airport in Kavumu, the second major airport to fall to the AFC/M23. On 16 February, AFC/M23 took full control of the provincial capital. Following minimal resistance in Bukavu, AFC/M23 continued south along the N2 Highway, capturing Kamanyola on 18 February. In North Kivu, AFC/M23 militants reportedly captured the city of Kitsumbiro on 20 February, approximately 27 kilometres from the centre of the Lubero region. Having attempted to push along the N2 Highway to Lubero but facing resistance, the group strategically diverted East to Kipese on 20 February.

Uganda’s military has confirmed that its forces entered Bunia in the Ituri region of North Kivu after consulting with FARDC leadership. Their purpose in the town is reportedly to “avert evolving genocide” amid alleged killings by armed groups along ethnic lines. This is likely linked to the ongoing intercommunal conflict between the Lendu farming community and Hema pastoralists. The DRC government has reportedly requested military support from Chad to assist against AFC/M23.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Following the capture of Kamanyola in South Kivu, AFC/M23 now controls all three border crossing points between the DRC and Rwanda. It is highly likely that group will continue to push south towards the city of Uvira, enabling them control of the border crossing between the DRC and Burundi. Burundi, whose government is hostile to Rwanda and AFC/M23, will almost certainly see this as a security threat, risking an escalation of the conflict.

Following AFC/M23’s capture of Kitsombiro in North Kivu, they will highly likely push on to the mineral-rich Butembo, approximately 70 kilometres north. There is a realistic possibility that the capture of more major regional cities will result in further unrest in Kinshasa, which has, so far, remained relatively quiet since 29 January.

AFC/M23 increasingly threaten to encroach into regions where Ugandan forces are operating. Beni, 55 kilometres north of Butembo, has been the site of intense counterinsurgency efforts by Ugandan forces against the ADF Islamist rebel group in recent years. Uganda’s deepening involvement is almost certainly linked to the widening security gap along the Congolese border due to the diversion of FARDC resources to combat AFC/M23 militants.

Because of the importance of its military presence in Eastern DRC, Kampala would likely be reluctant to antagonise Kinshasa. An AFC/M23 advance on Beni would highly likely test Uganda’s tentative backing of the rebel group, which has so far been fragmented with senior military figures voicing support while government figures have been muted. There is a realistic possibility that if AFC/M23 do not directly threaten Ugandan troops or their ongoing counterinsurgency against the ADF, Uganda will assume a mediating role.

Fears of M23’s advancement have led to repeated reports of approaches towards Kinshasa. On 17 February, rumours claimed that M23 rebels had established a presence in the Kindu region and that the FARDC abandoned the airport. On 19 February, rumours proliferated that AFC/M23 members had been arrested in Kinshasa, something that was denied by FARDC. On the same day, a FARDC commander released a statement denying rumours that AFC/M23 rebels have a presence in Kisangani or the Tshopo province, significantly west of their current area of operations. Given the prevalence of inaccurate claims of AFC/M23 presence west of Kivu, the disinformation is likely deliberate but could influence public opinion, placing pressure on the government or triggering unrest.

Lebanese government scraps recognition of Hezbollah from yearly ministerial statement

The document, the first to be issued by the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, usually formally recognises the role of “armed resistance” to Israel as a legitimate part of the Lebanese political framework. Its omission is likely an important symbolic show of the government’s willingness to take advantage of Hezbollah’s post-conflict (and post-Assad) weakness to diminish the Shia militia’s political and military clout.

Beirut continues to face significant pressures domestically and from abroad; it is not only looking to improve ties with the Gulf states and the new administration of Syria but also aims to secure a new agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Hezbollah nevertheless remains a powerful force and is unlikely that Beirut will tackle it head-on. Instead, there is a realistic possibility that the government is pivoting towards a long-term strategy, meant to “starve” Hezbollah in both material and political terms.

The funeral of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, killed by Israeli strikes in September 2024, is set to be held on 23 February, and will likely be used by the group as a show of force and political legitimacy.

Ethiopia and Somalia hold first round of technical talks in Turkey

On 18 February, Ethiopian and Somalian diplomats held the first round of talks aimed at resolving a dispute over Ethiopia’s access to Somaliland’s port. Somaliland agreed to lease access to its port to the landlocked Ethiopia after Addis Ababa agreed to become the first country to formally recognise its independence on 1 January 2024. Mogadishu, viewing the breakaway Somaliland as illegitimate, has viewed Addis Ababa’s deal with the regional government as infringing on Somalia’s sovereignty and integrity, threatening a regional conflict. The talks aim to reach a potential agreement upholding Somalia’s territorial integrity while granting Ethiopia access to its port. The second round of talks is set to take place in March.

Four charged in Sweden over Islamic State links

The four individuals had been arrested in Tyresö last March, during a raid at a local Islamic cultural association. According to prosecutors, the four, two of whom are brothers, were radicalised during visits to Somalia, where the Islamic State (IS) has a growing branch (the Islamic State Somalia Province, or ISS). Moreover, prosecutors note how the cultural association had become a vehicle of radicalisation, with local preachers espousing pro-IS rhetoric. The suspects’ sentences reflect a 2023 law on terrorism, which more heavily sanctions individuals convicted of participating with a terrorist organisation. The case further highlights the threat posed by transnational IS ideology and how smaller IS branches are leveraging connections to foreign diasporas to recruit and plot external operations.

Attempted “Incel” lone wolf attack in Annecy, France

On 16 February, a 17-year-old tried to carry out a knife attack in the central square of the French town of the Haute-Savoie department. The attacker, who was shot and wounded by responding police before he could injure anyone, reportedly tried to livestream his attack on TikTok and stated that he intended to target women. The attack is almost certainly tied to “Incel” (or “involuntary celibate”) ideology, a set of beliefs characterised by extreme sexism and misogyny, which has in the past driven multiple lone wolf attacks. In France, another possible Incel attack was thwarted in May in Bordeaux, where an individual was arrested for planning an attack during the relay of the Olympic flame.

Deadly shooting at Brussels Metro highlights growing organised crime threat

On 15 February, a 19-year-old was shot and killed in a shooting at Clemenceau metro station in the Anderlecht district of Brussels. The attack is the latest in a series of violent incidents linked to drug-related territorial conflicts, which have escalated in recent weeks and resulted in two deaths. The brazen nature of these attacks likely indicates that organised crime groups feel emboldened, with the heavily trafficked metro system being exploited for the attacks and as an escape route. Belgian officials have called for stricter measures, with an emergency meeting scheduled with federal police.

IS-inspired knife attack in Villach, Austria, kills one

The attack occurred on 15 February in the main town square of Villach. The attacker was a 23-year-old Syrian national, who targeted random pedestrians, injuring five and killing a 14-year-old. According to security sources, the attacker became self-radicalised online within only three months, espousing IS ideology. IS channels have claimed responsibility for the attack, despite no known direct communication between the attacker and the group.

The case likely further proves the point made by MI5 head Ken McCallum, that lone wolf attackers are becoming radicalised increasingly quickly, making it harder for authorities to prevent attacks. There is a realistic possibility of further copycat attacks following the stabbing, as well as “retaliatory” violence against Muslim communities in Austria. Indeed, an early example of a copycat attack was likely thwarted by Austrian authorities on 19 February, as they arrested a 14-year-old who was planning to carry out a knife attack at the Vienna train station on behalf of IS.

Another large-scale Moroccan raid on IS cells highlights growing threat from the Sahel

On 19 February, reports emerged of multiple raids by Moroccan special forces, in at least eight cities, aimed at dismantling IS-affiliated networks. Authorities secured explosive materials, bladed weapons, and firearms. Local media also claimed that security forces found improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted at sites just outside Rabat. The raids, which follow multiple counterterrorism operations in recent weeks, have been linked to the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which is increasingly attempting to expand its areas of influence. Moroccan authorities have expressed growing concerns over the ISSP’s attempts to establish operational cells within the country, particularly as instability in the wider Sahel region provides a fertile ground for jihadist recruitment and cross-border operations. Moreover, the sophistication of the recent plots suggests coordinated planning and guidance, rather than isolated groups.

Wagner/Africa Corps forces massacre Tuareg civilians in Mali

On 17 February, reports from pro-Azawad channels indicated that a convoy of Russian mercenary and Malian government forces, departing from Gao towards the Algerian border, massacred at least 20 civilians in the Tilemsi region. According to reports, the convoy opened fire on two civilian vehicles, killing the occupants. The case further highlights the contradictory and brutal, and so far, ineffective, counterinsurgency tactics used by the Wagner-supported Malian forces in the predominantly Tuareg northern regions of the country. It is highly likely that the case will further drive local opposition to the junta government.

Sahelian militants attack army post in northern Benin

A militant attack on an army post in northern Benin on 17 February killed six soldiers and 17 militants. This follows a deadly attack in January that claimed the lives of dozens of soldiers in the northern Alibori department, a region bordering Niger and Burkina Faso, which are struggling to contain Islamist insurgencies. The attack likely underscores the growing threat of armed extremist groups expanding from the Sahel into coastal West Africa, with Benin and neighbouring Togo increasingly targeted. Violent extremist organisations like the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and are likely attempting to destabilise the northern region of these countries, fuel an insurgency, expand recruitment, and force national governments to divert resources internally rather than conduct operations in the Sahel.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF) escalate attacks after Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) advances

The SAF is currently dislodging the RSF from its positions in the capital Khartoum, forcing the paramilitary group to retreat west towards Darfur where it controls much of the region. However, the SAF is targeting the route out of the capital with drones and fighter jets, which is resulting in high rates of collateral damage.

In response to the SAF’s progress, the RSF has increased its attacks on the civilian population. The RSF reportedly killed 200 unarmed civilians in a cluster of villages in El Geteina in the White Nile State.

Attacks have also intensified in Darfur, with the RSF attacking the Zamzam camp, Sudan’s largest refugee camp, apparently turning it into a “killing field”. Attacks on civilians have likely become a deliberate RSF tactic and are expected to escalate as the group retreats west to Darfur. This strategy appears aimed at undermining the Sudanese government by instilling fear, destabilising communities, and disrupting governance structures in regions where the RSF maintains influence.

Turkey conducts nationwide operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

Turkish police have detained almost 300 individuals accused of having ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group designated by Turkey and many of its allies as a terrorist organisation. The arrests have included journalists, politicians, academics, and members of other pro-Kurdish groups. The arrests, which occurred over five days in 51 provinces, coincide with a wider effort to curb Kurdish influence. This has involved the removal of pro-Kurdish mayors and major military action against allegedly related Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria.

The arrests have received criticism from human rights groups, journalists, and Kurdish groups, who characterise them as authoritarian and likely to undermine peace talks. There is a realistic possibility that the arrests will provoke protests in major Kurdish settlements and could incite attacks on Turkish security services.

Magnitude 6.0 earthquake in Ethiopia causes light shaking in Addis Ababa

Late on 14 February, a strong magnitude 6.0 earthquake at a shallow depth of 10 kilometres struck 6 kilometres northeast of Metahāra. Approximately 120 kilometres east of Addis Ababa, the earthquake caused light shaking in the capital. Despite the earthquake’s strength and shallow depth, however, the tremblor highly likely only caused minimal impact due to limited population exposure near the epicentre.

Since late September 2024, Ethiopia has experienced a series of earthquakes that have raised concerns about volcanic eruptions being triggered. In early January, authorities announced the evacuation of 80,000 people in the Afar, Oromia, and Amhara regions due to the increased risk. Additionally, a task force was set up to assess the risk of seismic activity to Addis Ababa and bolster disaster preparedness.

While Addis Ababa has not historically suffered from significant earthquake damage, the ongoing earthquake “swarm” likely increases the risk of such an event.

Over 40 killed in mine collapse in western Mali

On 15 February, over 40 people, most of whom were women, were killed after an artisanal gold mine collapsed near the town of Kenieba in western Mali. The individuals had reportedly climbed down into open-pit areas left by industrial miners to look for scraps of gold when the earth collapsed around them. This is Mali’s second major mining accident in three weeks, following a flooded tunnel collapse in late January that killed at least 10 miners.

Unregulated artisanal mining of abandoned mines has increased as a result of foreign mining companies leaving Mali due to security concerns, political instability, and the junta targeting foreign companies in revenue disputes. Accidents are likely to increase as international gold prices continue to increase while domestic economic conditions deteriorate, further driving the demand for gold extraction in dangerous and unregulated mines.

Major flooding across Botswana

Botswana is experiencing severe flooding across multiple regions, including the capital, Gaborone, and the Ghanzi District. The flooding has caused widespread disruptions, leading to the closure of all public schools until 24 February. President Duma Boko confirmed that heavy flooding continues in Gaborone and surrounding areas, with at least one reported death. In the Ghanzi District, local media report that hundreds of residents have been displaced. Additionally, the airport in Ghanzi has been closed due to the extreme weather conditions.

Widespread flooding in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal

Heavy rainfall has resulted in major flooding and landslides in several parts of South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province. As of 21 February, at least three fatalities have been confirmed due to the adverse weather conditions. Flooding and landslides have disrupted businesses, forced the closure of schools and caused major traffic disruptions, particularly along the M4 highway in Durban. Further rainfall is predicted, with the South African Weather Service (SAWS) issuing two weather warnings for KwaZulu-Natal, predicting rainfall between 40mm and 100mm.

Pakistan will host the ICC Champions Trophy 2025 from 19 February to 9 March, with the tournament taking place across four venues. The National Stadium in Karachi, the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore and the Rawalpindi Cricket Stadium in Rawalpindi will host games played within Pakistan. Any matches involving India will be played at the Dubai International Cricket Stadium, with India refusing to play in Pakistan due to security concerns.

This will be the first major international cricket tournament held in Pakistan since the 2009 terror attack on the Sri Lanka national cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan. During the attack, 12 gunmen armed with AK-47s, RPGs, and hand grenades attacked the team while they were en route to the stadium. Six members of the Sri Lankan team were injured, and six Pakistani policemen and two civilians lost their lives. The attack was believed to be conducted by the violent Islamist extremist group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which has links to al-Qaeda and other militant groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hosting a successful international cricket tournament in Pakistan would be a huge victory for the government for several reasons. It would not only signal a return to normalcy after years of security concerns but would also bolster Pakistan’s global image, economy, and internal stability. This will almost certainly make it a coveted target for terrorist groups seeking to undermine the government and gain international publicity, especially if they can successfully attack international cricket teams or sites frequented by foreign nationals.

Pakistan is currently contending with border skirmishes with the Afghan Taliban, sectarian violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and a resurgence in militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the restive Balochistan region. The authorities have stressed that the violence is nearly entirely limited to the remote border regions, far away from the stadiums. However, militant groups have demonstrated their ability to strike way beyond their primary areas of operations. As recently as October 2024, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed two Chinese nationals and one Pakistani in an attack near Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, demonstrating the BLA’s ability to attack areas that typically have a heightened security presence.

While security has been increased to protect the tournament, with so many groups likely seeking to conduct an attack, combined with the overstretching of Pakistan’s security services, the hosting of a major international event will invariably be a significant challenge. Moreover, if internal security is diverted to protect the tournament, this may present an opportunity for militant groups to escalate attacks in the border regions or other areas with less security oversight.

Operation Devil Hunt, a series of raids by police and security forces across the country, resulted in 532 reported arrests in only 24 hours. Most of the arrested were members or supporters of the Awami League (AL). The operation was reportedly triggered by clashes in Gazipur on 7 February, the city being considered a stronghold of the party of ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Hasina has recently attacked the interim government of Muhammad Yunus from her exile in India, accusing it of releasing “terrorists” and refusing to punish perpetrators of the violence that accompanied the July-August 2024 protests.

On 19 February, more than 150 students were injured in clashes in Khulna. The violence erupted while student supporters of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) were carrying out recruitment efforts and were confronted by supporters of the Students Against Discrimination group, one of the key formations that led the anti-Hasina protests in August 2024.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Political forces and vigilante groups supporting the new government have continued to carry out attacks on AL members or perceived supporters, as well as on local religious minorities. The AL sought to stage large-scale protests in early February, the first since losing power, but these plans have likely been crushed via a joint government and mob intervention. The latest arrests are likely part of the interim government’s efforts to displace AL from local institutions and positions of influence.

The clashes in Khulna likely showcase the tense, violent, and unstable state of the Bangladeshi political system at the present moment. BNP channels have blamed the clashes on members of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), while other student groups retaliated by staging anti-BNP demonstrations in Dhaka. Parties that were previously members of the opposition, like BNP or JI, likely continue to compete to fill the vacuum left by the overthrow of AL, including the control of local police, academic institutions, and bureaucracy. With the Yunus government unable (and likely unwilling) to intervene due to its dependence on the opposition’s political support, this competition is highly likely to continue taking the form of mob violence and targeting of political opponents. The arming of student groups – the groups that clashed in Khulna were armed with machetes and other bladed weapons – is likely to make universities particularly at risk for severe violence.

Student-led protests have erupted in multiple cities across Indonesia in response to President Prabowo Subianto’s budget cuts and policies. The protests, which have been given the moniker “Dark Indonesia”, have been organised over fears that the budget cuts will weaken social support systems in favour of supporting the president’s policies such as a new school lunch programme. Protests were organised on 17 and 18 February by the All-Indonesian Students’ Union (BEM SI) and were observed in Jakarta, Medan, Yogyakarta, Denpasar, and several other cities across multiple Indonesian islands. The Civil Society Coalition has called for civilians to demonstrate on 21 February following Friday prayers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

These are the first major protests to occur under President Subianto and have so far remained relatively peaceful, with only a handful of arrests and injuries reported. However, the attendance and geographical spread of the protests likely indicate a wider dissatisfaction with the incumbent government’s austerity-laden economic policies. The movement has also called for the removal of the military’s role in civil posts, with many Indonesians likely fearing that the president’s former role as Minister of Defence and military career has disproportionately benefitted the military over ordinary Indonesians.

Students have promised to continue to protest the budget cuts but the real litmus test for the government will be on 21 February. If large sections of society join the demonstrations, it could indicate broader public discontent beyond the student movement. Given President Subianto’s strong approval ratings, the government is unlikely to make significant concessions unless protests escalate in size or intensity. However, if the protests continue to gain momentum, there is a high likelihood of clashes with the police. Under such circumstances, the Indonesian police will likely use tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons to disperse protests, especially if violent or causing major disruptions.

Afghanistan pulls out of the International Criminal Court (ICC)

On 20 February, Taliban channels issued a declaration that the 2003 decision by their predecessor governments to join the ICC was illegal and that Afghanistan would subsequently be outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. Kabul notably quoted the fact that ‘many of the world’s major powers are not signatories’, likely referencing the US and Russia, which, although being signatories to the Rome Statute, have not ratified it. In January, the ICC stated it was seeking arrest warrants for senior Taliban leaders, including Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada over persecution of ‘Afghan girls and women’, citing the extremely strict rulings and bans on social participation that the Taliban government has issued. The move is likely to further damage Afghanistan’s government’s chances of re-establishing ties with Western powers and improve its international legitimacy.

Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte asks for impeachment to be thrown out

On 18 February, Duterte’s lawyers asked the Supreme Court to revoke her impeachment ruling and block a Senate trial. Duterte was impeached on 5 February after being accused of plotting to assassinate the president, engaging in corruption, and misusing confidential funds. Lawyers argued that the impeachment was sent to the Senate too quickly to be studied and ‘was procedurally defective, constitutionally infirm, and jurisdictionally void.’ Duterte will highly likely be convicted in the Senate trial, which would bar her from holding public office.

Beijing pens new agreement with the Cook Islands

The Pacific nation, the Cook Islands has released details regarding its new strategic partnership deal with China. Under the terms of the deal, Beijing will contribute more funding towards infrastructure and educational projects and will cooperate with seabed mineral mining. The deal has provoked a diplomatic dispute with New Zealand, Cook Island’s primary benefactor and military ally. Unlike other deals Beijing has signed in the region, the agreement does not include security cooperation. However, the growing Chinese influence in the South Pacific is raising mounting concerns, as it points to an expansion of China’s economic presence and potential future military footprint in the region, which could destabilise the area and lead to increased militarisation.

Attack on aid convoy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

On 17 February, at least 20 gunmen attacked a convoy of aid trucks carrying food supplies to Parachinar in the Kurram district, killing a truck driver and security escort and injuring seven. The attackers also ambushed a paramilitary reinforcement unit, setting three border force vehicles on fire and killing four soldiers. In total, six people were killed and 15 people were injured. The Pakistani military deployed helicopter gunships to target mountain hideouts in the region after the attack. The military reported the militants to be from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Evacuation orders have been issued for residents in four villages of Lower Kurram due to the recent violence. Approximately 250 people have been killed in the region since July 2024, according to local officials. Numerous truces have failed to quell the violence.

Tajik court sentences 30 individuals in poisoning plot linked to Islamic State

A court in Tajikistan has sentenced over 30 individuals to prison for attempting to poison attendees of a Nowruz festival in 2023. Authorities have linked the plot to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the primarily Afghanistan-based offshoot of the Islamic State. In 2024, there were three ISKP-linked attacks in Tajikistan and the security services thwarted at least two other attacks. These trends likely allude to an expansion of ISKP’s operations, with the group increasing its influence in Central Asia and Russia. ISKP is likely attempting to position itself as more of a transregional organisation, a development that will enable it to spread its propaganda, increase recruitment, and conduct attacks beyond its traditional area of operations.  

Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS) outbreak in Maharashtra, India

The GBS outbreak in Maharashtra, India, has resulted in 11 deaths, the first one on 26 January. The rare neurological disorder causes the body’s immune system to attack the peripheral nervous system, causing muscle weakness, paralysis, or death. The state has confirmed four cases and is investigating seven suspected cases. The outbreak has spread to Mumbai, with the first death reported there involving a 53-year-old patient. Overall, the region has detected 197 cases, with Pune being significantly affected. In response, authorities have shut down 30 private water supply plants in Pune and advised the public to consume clean and boiled water and avoid stale or partially cooked food. Investigations into the cause of the outbreak are ongoing, with water contamination being a potential factor.

Cyclone Zelia causes flooding in Western Australia

Cyclone Zelia has caused severe flooding in remote areas of Pilbara, Western Australia, particularly affecting cattle farms. The cyclone, which made landfall near Port Hedland on 14 February, initially brought destructive winds and heavy rains, leading to emergency warnings and evacuations in the region. Ports in Dampier and Varanaus Island have since reopened after the cyclone passed through Pilbara. Authorities have been actively managing the situation, with evacuations conducted in areas like Warralong. The De Grey River catchment has experienced rising water levels, prompting warnings of potential isolation for residents.

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