Mexico’s deployment of 10,000 troops to its northern border is almost certainly a reaction to the US tariff threat. There is a realistic possibility that Mexico’s actions will escalate tensions with the well-armed cartels.

There is a realistic possibility that Argentina’s designation of a radical Mapuche group as a terrorist organisation could escalate tensions resulting in more attacks on state and corporate interests.

The deadliest shooting in Swedish history, which occurred in the town of Orebro, is likely a case of lone-wolf terrorism inspired by far-right ideology. Further attacks remain possible as more information is released.

Russian intelligence’s alleged sponsoring of a sabotage campaign targeting private vehicles in Germany is likely part of a broader attempt to polarise society and influence the upcoming elections.

A new Russo-Belarusian security pact will almost certainly be ratified by Russia’s parliament, and will likely significantly increase the threat of Belarus joining the war against Ukraine.

Turkey’s proposed involvement in counter-ISIS operations in Syria is likely a pretext to expand its operations against the SDF and Kurdish people in anticipation of a US withdrawal. 

Iran’s rapid advancement of its nuclear weapons programme is almost certainly a response to the degradation of its conventional deterrents and a development that could decrease regional stability.

Record-breaking levels of snowfall in northern Japan will almost certainly continue to impact daily life and result in severe transport disruptions.

The ambushing of Pakistani troops by Baloch separatists is likely indicative of overstretched security services and a rapidly deteriorating security situation.

This is the paragraph. Paste as uOn 3 February, the White House announced that it would pause the imposition of planned 25 per cent tariffs on Mexican goods after reaching a deal on the US-Mexico border. The deal calls for the deployment of at least 10,000 Mexican soldiers to the border, in efforts to stop cross-border flows of migrants, as well as smuggling of narcotics and firearms.

The deal occurs at a time of growing violence at the border. On 3 February, multiple gun battles occurred in the Mexican border city of Nuevo Laredo following the arrest of a local cartel leader, which resulted in the US consulate and airport briefly pausing operations. In the past weeks, there have been multiple cases of US border patrol officers exchanging fire with suspected cartel members near the border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The deployment of 10,000 troops is almost certainly a reaction to Trump’s economic coercion, and will highly likely have some impact on Mexico’s overall approach to combating organised crime in the country.

President Claudia Sheinbaum was elected on a platform similar to that of her predecessor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), which called for a “hugs not bullets” strategy for the cartel problem. This approach emphasised improving economic opportunity and reducing social issues in at-risk regions, rather than directly attacking the cartels. AMLO had remained a staunch supporter of this policy despite Washington’s appeals to change course.

Sheinbaum has, instead, gradually signalled a willingness to take a tougher line, also because of a significant reported increase in the number of murders and kidnappings during the president’s first months in power.

However, even if the deployment of 10,000 troops has an important political value, and has successfully paused the threat of US sanctions, it will not necessarily alter the situation at the border. The protracted threat of US economic sanctions will almost certainly force Mexico City to take measures to ensure an increase in narcotics and weapons seizures. This may result in an increase in clashes with local cartel units.

If the threat of government measures becomes unacceptable for the cartels, it could result in escalating violence targeting civil sector workers and politicians. Mexican cartels can in some cases match the firepower of state security forces, and recent trends highlight a growing militarisation of their units. For instance, cartels are increasingly producing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and deploying them via drones, using tactics that match those by armed militias and rebel groups in conflicts such as those in Myanmar and Syria. In states like Michoacan and Jalisco, cartels like the Jalisco Nueva Generation (CJNG) have systematically deployed drone-dropped IEDs to attack police forces and buildings.

ThOn 4 February, Argentine National Security Minister Patricia Bullrich stated that she would designate an indigenous Mapuche group a “terrorist organisation” in response to the group allegedly starting numerous intentional fires in the Patagonia region.

The announcement follows a local media report in which the leader of the Mapuche Ancestral Resistance (RAM), Facundo Jones Huala, declared that sabotage is a legitimate form of struggle for the Mapuche people and claimed responsibility for several arson attacks in the Chubut region, at a time when Argentina is struggling with a series of wildfires, many of which are suspected to be deliberate. Huala also reportedly denied the existence of the Argentine state and called for an armed struggle against the Milei government.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Mapuche are an Indigenous people of South America, primarily living in Chile and Argentina, particularly in the regions of Araucanía, Los Ríos, and parts of Patagonia. Mapuche groups have raised long-standing demands for the return of their ancestral lands from the state or private companies. These demands typically take the form of political activism.

However, in the last two decades, elements of the Mapuche movement have become far more militant. In Chile, the Mapuche have been waging a renewed war against the government since the 1990s after Chile’s return to democracy.  The Mapuche conflict in Chile has entailed arson attacks, sabotage and violent clashes with the Chilean police and military.

In response, Santiago has deployed military forces and special police units to suppress Mapuche groups and has used counterterrorism laws from the Pinochet era to detain key Mapuche figures.

In Argentina, there is a realistic possibility that the declaration of RAM as a terrorist organisation could energise the Mapuche movement and exacerbate tensions with the indigenous community. RAM only emerged in the early 2000s and is likely still in its infancy.

The use of counterterrorism laws, potential human rights violations, freezing of assets, expanded surveillance and a potential increased military presence in Patagonia could easily work in favour of RAM, enabling it to recruit more from an increasingly alienated Mapuche community. If mismanaged, the Mapuche movement in Argentina may adopt a more militant character, as observed in neighbouring Chile.

This could include arson attacks, sabotage against critical infrastructure, and destruction of forestry plantations, agricultural estates and even native forests, which the Mapuche have been known to target as a symbolic act against state and corporate interests.

Trump sanctions International Criminal Court (ICC)

On 6 February, President Trump signed an executive order to authorise economic and travel sanctions targeting ICC staff and family members, if they are determined to be involved in investigations or prosecutions targeting US citizens or allies, namely Israel. The move has been condemned by the organisation, of which the US is not a member.

The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, alongside a leader of Hamas, in November 2024. Trump condemned the simultaneous issuing of these arrest warrants as immoral and baseless, suggesting that the Israeli PM should not be held in the same regard as the leader of the militant group. The ICC has stated that the sanctions are likely to undermine its work.

The decision follows the renewal of US aid packages for Israel and Trump’s controversial comments over US control of Gaza. The convergence of these developments is likely to galvanise pro-Palestinian demonstrations across the globe, viewing it as an endorsement of the Netanyahu administration’s handling of the Gaza conflict, who may seek to organise protests outside US embassies, Trump-owned businesses or other locations associated with US interests could also be targeted.

Greenland tries to “Trump-proof” itself

The government of Greenland has passed a series of measures designed to reduce the likelihood of foreign influence on its internal affairs while simultaneously calling for cross-parliamentary unity. On 5 February, Prime Minister Mute Egede called for snap elections, which would be held on 11 March, likely in the hope of giving his independentist party a stronger mandate to negotiate with Copenhagen and Washington. Coinciding with the call for new elections, the Greenlandic parliament passed laws to ban anonymous foreign contributions to electoral campaigns, as well as legislation to restrict the purchase of land to Greenlandic and Danish citizens and long-term residents only.  

Argentines protest President Javier Milei’s Davos speech

Thousands of protesters gathered in central Buenos Aires on 2 February in response to the president’s remarks. During his speech at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, Milei rallied against “wokeism” and described a global struggle between free market capitalist and socialist forces, also praising US President Donald Trump and his billionaire ally Elon Musk.

Milei has repeatedly used international summits and events as opportunities to build positive relations with key right-wing leaders, particularly those in Washington and in European countries led by the right, such as Italy. It is likely that Milei adapted the speech’s rhetoric, which is directly borrowed from the American right’s domestic political messaging, to accompany Trump’s own speech at Davos, the first since he returned to the White House. A self-proclaimed “anarcho-capitalist”, Milei has often espoused conservative social rhetoric, despite it being ideologically contradictory to libertarian principles. On 5 February, the Milei administration announced that it, like the US, would also withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO), a further development that is likely to energise unrest in Argentina.

US aid freeze threatens UN-backed mission in Haiti

The Trump administration has notified the United Nations that it is freezing some of the funding allocated to the Kenyan-led international task force in Haiti. The US has been the largest contributor to the UN-backed mission, which was launched in 2024 and was already struggling with funding. The aid freeze will present a major threat to the success of the mission and could shape the conditions for the gangs to assume almost full control of the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, where they already control an assessed 85 per cent. Criminal gangs are likely to be emboldened by this development and will likely respond with increased attacks on Haitian and international forces. In recent days, the Viv Ansanm gang coalition has been going door-to-door in one of the capital’s more prosperous neighbourhoods, attempting to target the country’s elite while indiscriminately killing civilians.

ELN warns Colombian government that it will not surrender

After launching an offensive against rival non-state groups in Colombia, which resulted in the deployment of government troops to the regions affected, the National Liberation Army (ELN) has vowed that it will never accept submission or surrender. The statement follows weeks of increased violence in the conflict-ridden parts of Norte de Santander and a gesture from President Petro which involved him pointing at an ELN base displayed on classified satellite-derived imagery. The gesture, which was accompanied by verbal threats, almost certainly indicates a major shift in the Petro administration’s policy of “total peace” and the championing of dialogue. The renewed conflict is likely to trigger a wave of attacks across Colombia, The ELN has a major presence in multiple departments of Colombia, especially in the border region, and is likely to stage attacks against the government, rival guerilla groups, organised crime groups and even the civilian population.

Ecuador to close borders and militarise ports of entry during election

President Daniel Noboa of Ecuador has ordered the closure of all borders between 8-10 February during the country’s presidential election. Noboa also ordered the immediate militarisation of all ports of entry in Ecuador and an increased military presence on the border. The orders have purportedly been issued in response to intelligence indicating that “narco-terrorists” are preparing to destabilise the country during the election, with regional cartels likely seeking to undermine Noboa after his administration introduced measures like those introduced by President Bukele of El Salvador, including mass detentions, states of emergency and increased security patrols.

Flooding in Recife, Brazil, threatens at-risk communities and informal settlements

Heavy rain, which started on 3 February, has resulted in local authorities issuing a maximum alert level on 4 February. According to the Pernambuco Water and Climate Agency (APAC), more than 110 mm of rain fell on parts of Recife in 12 hours. At least one person has been killed due to the severe weather event. Local schools closed and widespread traffic disruptions were recorded due to the floods. The risk of flooding in Recife is particularly high in informal settlements, or favelas. There are an estimated 295 favelas in Recife, where 360,000 people live, or approximately 24 per cent of the population. These are often located on hillsides, with poor drainage infrastructure, meaning that floods can result in buildings collapsing and severe mudslides affecting thousands of residents. The cramped layout of the settlements also makes evacuation and search and rescue operations extremely difficult.

On 4 February, a gunman opened fire inside an adult education centre in the Swedish town of Orebro, located approximately 200 kilometres from Stockholm, killing 11 people. The perpetrator, who was found dead at the scene, was a 35-year-old Swedish national with no criminal history who had reportedly previously been a student at the school. The shooting is the deadliest in Sweden’s history and has sparked a debate over Sweden’s gun laws.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Swedish authorities have not released a possible motive for the attack but have not ruled out the possibility of an ideological motive. There are multiple elements, however, that the shooting in Orebro shares with recent cases of lone actor terrorism.

First, the shooting occurred at a school that primarily caters to migrants. Second, it follows the high-visibility case of an Iraqi, Sweden-based anti-Islam activist, who was recently killed on the eve of his trial. Third, the perpetrator reportedly changed into a “military uniform” prior to carrying out the shooting, according to witnesses. It is notable, here, that multiple perpetrators of far-right terrorist actions, including the Christchurch and Buffalo shooter, as well as the more recent perpetrator of the Eskisehir mosque stabbing attack, wore makeshift “uniforms”. Fourth, elements of the shooter’s profile resemble those of other “lone wolves”, including a history of social isolation. Finally, testimonies (and possible audio) exist of the shooter reportedly shouting anti-migrant slogans during the attack, although, as of the time of writing, these remain unverified by Swedish authorities.

These elements, taken together, make it likely that the shooting was a case of far-right and identitarian extremist violence, similar to other notable cases of lone wolf terror attacks. There is a realistic possibility of copycat attacks, as well as retaliatory violence, as more information regarding the shooting is released.

On 5 February, Der Spiegel released a report claiming that Russian intelligence hired German residents to carry out a deliberate sabotage operation targeting private vehicles in December. According to the report, more than 270 cars were found to have been damaged in Berlin, Brandenburg, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg by having sealant foam sprayed in their exhausts. The vehicles were also tagged with stickers promoting the German Green Party. German authorities reportedly arrested three German residents from Serbia and Bosnia, who confessed to having been recruited by Russian intelligence via the messenger app “Viber”, with the promise of EUR 100 for each sabotaged car.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The operation is almost certainly a clear example of Russian intelligence’s use of “disposable” local agents for unsophisticated acts meant to sow confusion and disruption in target societies. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has established a de facto “gig economy” for sabotage across Europe. Russian sympathisers or people hostile to the state in which they live are identified online, often through social media analysis. Russian intelligence can then recruit them through a decentralised online network, utilising applications such as Viber. Disenfranchised individuals, often those with far-right tendencies, are then recruited to conduct acts like sabotage and arson at the behest of the Kremlin in exchange for remuneration via secure online payments of cryptocurrencies. These acts are then often conducted in a manner that seeks to attribute blame to another group. This strategy has provided Moscow with a low-cost and highly deniable method of disrupting or undermining target countries, without risking its intelligence operatives and demanding only minimal organisation.

Russia’s objective in orchestrating this sabotage campaign is likely to destabilise the German political landscape by sowing confusion and influencing the upcoming 23 February elections. The Greens are currently polling at 13 per cent, and their vote share may become fundamental in shaping a possible government coalition in an increasingly fractured German electorate. The aim was likely to tarnish the image of environmentalists and Green supporters by emulating acts that the more extreme elements of these groups have done before, such as sabotage of a Tesla gigafactory and vandalism of electric cars. If successfully attributed to the green movement, this could gain traction with the German far-right and continue to polarise the country. The destabilising effect of this one operation is likely to be limited. However, the aggregate effect of multiple Russian influence operations in both the physical and virtual world that have yet to be exposed in the open-source domain, is likely far more significant and likely to increase as the federal elections approach.

On 5 February, a security pact between Russia and Belarus was presented to the Russian parliament (the Duma) for ratification. The pact, that was signed between Minsk and Moscow on 6 December 2024, has three key stipulations: The inclusion of Belarus under Russia’s protective ‘nuclear umbrella’ (meaning Russia will hypothetically use nuclear weapons to protect Belarus against external aggression), allowing the deployment of Russian military bases on Belarusian territory, and according to an independent Belarusian media outlet, the potential recruitment of Belarusian citizens to fight against Ukraine so as to defend “Russia’s territorial integrity”. Additionally, on 3 February, the Belarusian Ministry of Defence announced the start of ‘combat readiness checks’. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service (SBGS) stated that while underway, the combat readiness checks do “not pose any threat to Ukraine” as no movement of equipment, personnel or strike formations along the Ukrainian-Belarusian border has been detected.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The treaty has been given priority status by the Duma, and will almost certainly be ratified. Having won every presidential election since 1994, the president of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko won yet again another election on 26 January in a political system that is almost certainly highly undemocratic (Belarus has a low performance across all of the Global State of Democracy Initiative’s categories). Russia and Belarus have de jure been in a Union State since 1999, although de facto maintain independence from one another – the new security pact’s initial signing coincided with the 25^th anniversary of the Treaty on the Creation of the Union State.

While Belarusian armed forces have not as of yet taken part in the war against Ukraine, the Kremlin used Belarus as a staging post for an offensive against Kyiv in the initial stages of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While this offensive was successfully repelled, it is almost certain that the Ukrainian military establishment has significant concerns about the threat posed by any further offensive from Belarus, enabled by the involvement of Belarusian armed forces. Such an offensive would likely severely overstretch Ukrainian forces, whose main efforts are currently the defence of the eastern front and holding the Kursk salient in internationally recognised Russia. Russia struggles with manpower shortages of its own, with North Korean troops being withdrawn from the front lines in the Kursk salient due to considerable casualty rates, so the potential addition of Belarusian troops is almost certainly highly desirable for the Kremlin. On 5 February, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned in a news conference with the UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy that Russia will deploy further forces on Belarusian territory later this year and that the Kremlin will “pull Belarus into the war”. Lukashenko’s position in Belarus is highly likely more fragile than Putin’s in Russia, and while Lukashenko has endeavoured to limit Belarus’ involvement in the war thus far, the inclusion of Belarus into Russia’s nuclear protection zone would likely significantly increase the chances of their direct involvement, especially if Russia has made guarantees to protect the Lukashenko regime domestically.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has stated that Turkey will join forces with Syria, Iraq and Jordan to combat the remnants of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He also suggested that Turkish operations would allow the US to sever its ties with Kurdish militants in Syria, a relationship that Ankara strongly opposes. Fidan also stated that the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), which form the spearhead of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), had only been guarding ISIS detainees in SDF-run prisons and have contributed little else to counter the resurgent threat of ISIS. Ankara has also reiterated its view that the SDF should be absorbed into the new conventional Syrian military.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Turkey has long opposed the SDF, which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group considered a terrorist organisation by Turkey and its allies. Turkey is also currently engaged in an offensive against the SDF in northern Syria, backed by its proxy force the Syrian National Army (SNA). Ankara is likely concerned that the SDF’s influence in Syria could bolster or embolden separatist movements within Turkey, threatening its national security. There is a realistic possibility that Turkey is using anti-ISIS operations as a pretext to increase its force posture in Syria, with its true objective being the suppression of Kurdish forces and the consolidation of control over key areas in northern Syria close to Turkey. In parallel, Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are currently discussing a potential defence pact that could result in Syrian forces being trained by Turkey and the establishment of Turkish airbases in central Syria. If agreed, Turkey will benefit from Iran’s loss of influence in Syria, be in a much stronger position to project strength into the Middle East and will be in a stronger position to counter Kurdish forces in Syria.

Using anti-ISIS operations as a pretext would likely appeal to the Trump administration. Trump has suggested that the US may entirely withdraw from Syria, where CENTCOM currently has approximately 2,000 troops to counter ISIS. Turkish involvement in a regional counter-ISIS coalition would likely be endorsed by Trump and help him facilitate a US withdrawal. However, ISIS has already demonstrated the early signs of a resurgence, with increased and more brazen attacks. If Turkey’s true goal is to suppress Kurdish forces under the cover of anti-ISIS operations while the US withdraws from both Iraq and Syria, it could inadvertently create an opportunity for ISIS to regroup. Ultimately, increased Turkish military presence in Syria could pressure the SDF into disbanding as a military organisation and integrating into the new Syrian forces, a shift that would weaken Kurdish forces in Syria, align with Turkey’s objectives, and simultaneously avoid alienating the SDF’s Western backers..

Reports indicate that Iran is expediting its development of a nuclear weapon, which could potentially enable it to acquire the capability in a matter of months. A secret team of engineers and scientists purportedly linked to the Organization of Defense Innovation and Research (SPND), has been involved in the process, an organisation that was pivotal in Iranian nuclear weapons research before 2003. This approach could shorten the time required to convert weapons-grade uranium (enriched to 90 per cent) into a nuclear weapon. The report states that Iran currently holds uranium enriched to approximately 60 per cent, considered near weapons-grade.

Solace Global Assessment: 

As a result of the conflict in the Middle East, Iran has been left considerably weakened and lacks an effective deterrent. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has effectively defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip, significantly degraded Hezbollah in Lebanon and demonstrated its capability to strike Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. The IDF also demonstrated its capability to strike deep within Iran, whilst also degrading much of Iran’s strategic air defence and ability to produce ballistic missiles. Furthermore, Tehran has lost a key ally in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. This development has also fractured part of Iran’s Shia Crescent, disrupting ground lines of communication to Hezbollah, which was its main deterrent against Israel. With its conventional deterrence severely diminished, Tehran has likely calculated that its only viable option is to pursue a nuclear deterrent, which may lead to the Supreme Leader revoking his fatwa on nuclear weapons. Such a development is likely to raise the chances of escalation between Iran and not just Israel, but also the Gulf States, potentially triggering an arms race in the Middle East.

However, US officials have stated that Iran’s new approach to developing a nuclear bomb would only enable it to build an older-style nuclear weapon, commenting that such a warhead would not fit on a ballistic missile and be far less reliable than a modern nuclear weapon.  This limits Iran’s ability to deploy such a weapon, with aerial delivery the most likely method. However, Israel and the Gulf States possess superior air and air defence capabilities, which are likely sufficient to intercept Iranian aircraft before they reach their intended targets. The main advantage of the new process is that it would significantly reduce the time that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have to detect Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear bomb, which could provide Iran with a window to strike before the development of the capability is widely known.

The Trump administration has expressed that it will reinstate “maximum pressure” on Iran, specifically threatening Iranian oil exports. Trump has also expressed a willingness to engage in negotiations, but his primary objective is to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Renewed sanctions will almost certainly exacerbate Iran’s already fragile economy, which is characterised by deep-rooted structural issues including mismanagement, corruption, nepotism, limited diversification, inflation, and high unemployment. Iran may be seeking to develop nuclear weapons for strategic leverage, viewing them as a means to enhance its deterrence and strengthen its position in any future negotiations. However, such a strategy may backfire if it provokes an aggressive response from an unpredictable White House, leading to further economic degradation. Such a scenario would likely intensify the pressure on the Iranian regime, potentially triggering greater anti-regime social unrest within the country. Alternatively or additionally, the ‘moderate’ president Masoud Pezeshkian was elected on a mandate to tackle the economic crisis by reducing sanctions. If Pezeshkian fails to do this, there is a realistic possibility of a radical backlash against his more moderate foreign policy posture, empowering the more hawkish anti-West military and theocratic establishment.

Far-right activists protest in London

At least six people were arrested on 1 February, during large-scale protests in central London by supporters of far-right figure Tommy Robinson. Robinson is currently serving an 18-month jail sentence for breaching a 2021 High Court injunction. Isolated clashes were reported as protesters entered the designated area for counter-protesters. The protests follow broader signals of a growing popularity of the far-right in UK politics, with early February polls projecting Nigel Farage’s Reform Party as the most popular party in the UK, having overtaken both the Conservatives and the ruling Labour Party. Farage and Reform have disavowed Robinson and his supporters to win Conservative Party voters; however, both sides have adopted similar political discourses and have received common endorsements. Most notably, Elon Musk endorsed and has reposted Reform with some regularity since mid-2024, only to then call on Farage to step down as party leader following the latter’s disavowal of Robinson. In turn, Musk then demanded Robinson’s release.

Protests against Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) and Alternative for Germany (AfD)

An estimated 50,000 people gathered in Vienna after the FPO was formally tasked with trying to form a government with the conservative People’s Party (OVP). While the FPO and OVP have previously been government partners, the FPO’s victory at the past elections makes it almost certain that if a deal were to be reached the far-right party would occupy a senior position in the coalition. The possible FPO-OVP deal follows the collapse of previous OVP-led talks with other “cordon sanitaire” parties, and has been under negotiation since early January. The latest wave of protests has likely been influenced by developments over the border in Germany, where tens of thousands of protesters continue to oppose the rising Alternative for Germany (AfD). On 3 February, an estimated 160,000 people rallied in Berlin in protest of a migration reform advanced by the Christian Democrats (CSU/CDU) with the AfD’s votes. While the bill failed to pass, further protests are likely to occur before the elections scheduled for 23 February.

Kosovo to hold parliamentary elections on 9 February

Kosovo’s parliamentary elections on 9 February will see 27 political groups competing for 120 available seats, with 20 reserved for minority representatives, including Serbs, Bosniaks, Turkish and Roma communities. However, tensions remain high between the central government and the Serb-majority communities in northern Kosovo, after Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s attempts to dismantle Serb-run parallel institutions. A victory for Kurti and his Self-Determination Movement party is likely to increase tensions with both Kosovo’s Serb communities and with neighbouring Serbia, potentially leading to unrest in the north of the country.

Uganda’s president to continue to prosecute civilians in military tribunals despite court ruling

On 1 February, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni declared that the government would continue to prosecute civilians in military tribunals. The declaration comes after a court ruling banned the practice on 31 January, declaring it unconstitutional, and ordering ongoing cases to be continued in civil courts. Museveni claims to be reluctant to abandon military tribunals given their use in pacifying Uganda’s restive northeastern Karamoja region. Uganda’s military courts have tried hundreds of civilians including opposition politicians and government critics. Kizza Besigye, the opposition leader, is facing the death penalty after being abducted in Kenya in November 2024 and tried in a military tribunal in Kampala. Museveni’s reluctance to shift power over to civil courts is almost certainly to retain a hold on power and prevent formal opposition blocs from forming. There is a realistic possibility that Museveni’s refusal to adhere to the court ruling will be used as a catalyst for unrest targeting perceived government corruption.

Azerbaijani forces carry out anti-Islamic State (IS) operation in Qusar

The raid’s target is the same northeastern district where an IS cell was discovered “by accident” in the late summer of 2024. At least eight IS fighters were reportedly killed. The operation is part of growing efforts by Baku to disrupt the Islamic State Caucasus Province (ISCP) from establishing a foothold in the country. IS’ operations in Azerbaijan are likely part of IS’ broader drive to improve its position in the Caucasus, especially in Dagestan, which Qusar borders. Azerbaijani reports identified the fighters as “Forest Brothers”. This term indicates members of the Dagestan-based Derbent Jamaat group, and may highlight a growing interplay between pre-existent Islamist groups in the area and IS (although, it may be a political move by Baku to avoid recognising the existence of IS on its territory). It is highly likely that the operation in Qusar will be followed by further counterterrorism efforts in the north. Given the strain of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Russian forces are increasingly vulnerable to threats from IS. There is a realistic possibility that Moscow will pursue joint counterterrorism operations with Baku to combat the transregional terror group.

The US conducts airstrikes conducted on Islamic State Somalia (ISS)

The airstrikes took place in the Puntland region of Somalia, where security forces have been battling a jihadist insurgency since 2015. Sanctioned by President Donald Trump, the strikes targeted cave systems used by ISS militants and reportedly killed multiple jihadists, including senior leadership. After the strike, Trump took to Truth Social, stating ‘The message to ISIS and all others who would attack Americans is that ‘WE WILL FIND YOU, AND WE WILL KILL YOU!’ Occurring shortly after Trump’s inauguration, this is almost certainly a statement of intent for the administration after President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appealed to Trump to not pull advisors from Somalia. While Trump has generally opposed direct US military involvement in conflicts, he has typically relied on airstrikes as a tool for counterterrorism, increasing their number significantly during his first administration. He will almost certainly utilise similar tactics during this administration as he seeks to withdraw US personnel from Syria.

Somali Puntland forces strike IS positions

Counterterrorism forces of the Somali breakaway region of Puntland have launched an operation targeting strongholds of the Islamic State Somalia Province (ISS) in the al-Miskaad mountain range. Puntland sources reported the killing of at least 57 ISS members in the operation, which likely constitutes a major escalation in the conflict against ISS. Coinciding with the operation, US airstrikes and joint US-UAE aerial surveillance operations were reported, likely indicating Washington’s growing concern for Somalia as a staging ground for IS operations. ISS has long been considered a “small” branch of IS. However, ISS has disproportionately grown in importance as a key transit hub for IS operations in the Middle East and South Asia from Africa, under the leadership of Abdul Qadir Mumin, who also likely acts as a leader in IS’ global operational planning. Puntland sources reported that “all” those killed in the recent raids were foreigners. While possibly exaggerated, it is highly likely that ISS’s growth has benefitted from inbound flows of fighters from the Arabian Peninsula, particularly from Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

Intense fighting continues in the eastern DRC despite a unilateral ceasefire

On 3 February, a unilateral ceasefire effective from 4 February was announced by the AFC/M23 militant group which seized the city of Goma in North Kivu in late January. The ceasefire has almost certainly failed to end the heavy fighting in the eastern DRC. The government has denounced the ceasefire as “false communication”, and AFC/M23 advances have almost certainly continued along the main road toward the South Kivu capital of Bukavu, despite the ceasefire’s claim that they had “no intention of taking control of Bukavu”. AFC/M23 forces are reportedly now just 50km north of Bukavu. Fighting on 5 February was reportedly intense around Nyabibwe, and the DRC assembly president Vital Kamerhe stated that AFC/M23 forces reached the town of Ihusi after taking Nyabibwe. It is almost certain that significant developments in the conflict, such as the fall of Bukavu, will trigger violent unrest targeting foreign interests in Kinshasa and other major population centres.

Al-Shabaab gunmen abduct five officials in northeast Kenya

On 3 February, five chiefs were kidnapped by al-Shabaab gunmen in Mandera County, near the border with Somalia. The officials were reportedly travelling from Wargadud to Elwak town as they were abducted. The attack was likely carried out by Jaysh Ayman, al-Shabaab’s Kenyan wing responsible for several significant attacks in Kenya in recent years. This is the latest in a series of attacks by the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab in northeastern regions of Kenya, which aims to destabilise the region and undermine local governance. The persistent threat is also partially in retaliation to Kenya’s military presence in Somalia as part of the African Union’s peacekeeping missions, the latest being the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which ended on 31 December 2024, replaced by African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). Despite the persistent activity in Kenya’s border regions, Kenya is highly unlikely to withdraw from AUSSOM, with the mission recently being endorsed by Kenyan President William Ruso, which will likely inspire further al-Shabaab activity in Kenya.

Locals evacuated after a wave of earthquakes hits Greek island Santorini

A series of earthquakes have impacted the Greek Aegean region, particularly impacting the islands of Santorini and Amorgos. The seismic activity, which began with over 200 earthquakes in late January, has led to significant disruptions, including the evacuation of at least 11,000 people from Santorini. The recent earthquakes, some reaching magnitudes as high as 4.9, have prompted authorities to close schools and restrict access to certain areas due to the risk of landslides. The situation remains dynamic as officials work to manage the impact of the ongoing seismic activity. Emergency services continue to urge the public to stay alert and heed safety warnings as the region navigates through this challenging period.

Niger bans Red Cross from operating on its territory

Orders to cease activities were issued to the Red Cross and other NGOs providing humanitarian aid to the Sahel country on 4 February. Nigerien authorities did not provide a reason for the decision, but it is highly likely that it is a further move against what the government perceives as “foreign influence”. The expulsion of Red Cross staff is highly likely to have a negative impact on the civilian population. In Niger, the Red Cross has played a fundamental role in guiding responses following severe environmental events, such as the September 2024 floods in Agadez, Diffa, Tahoua and Tillabery, which affected up to one million people.

Since 4 February, record-breaking snowfall has occurred in northern Japan. The snow has severely impacted everyday life and resulted in major transport disruptions. Japan’s second-largest island, Hokkaido, has been hit hardest by what the authorities are describing as “the strongest cold wave of the season,” forcing the authorities to issue snowstorm warnings for parts of the island. However, the situation is not limited to Hokkaido. Parts of northern Honshu have also received extreme levels of snowfall. The town of Shirakawa in Gifu prefecture received 129cm (47 inches) of snowfall in less than 48 hours, with multiple other locations reporting similarly high levels.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Unstable atmospheric conditions in the area will likely cause significant snowfall in the coming days, leading to further disruptions. Major airports in Hokkaido, including Obihiro Airport and Kushiro Airport, have been forced to close their runways due to heavy snow accumulation, causing delays and cancellations. With more snowfall anticipated, additional airports in both Hokkaido and Honshu may be forced to suspend flights, further disrupting domestic and international travel. Furthermore, the knock-on effect of cancellations is affecting airport operations in parts of Japan less affected by snowfall. On 6 February, it was reported that All Nippon Airways was forced to cancel two per cent and delayed 22 per cent of flights out oof Tokyo International Airport (Haneda).

Other forms of transport have been severely disrupted and will likely remain so for the coming days. Thousands of snow ploughs have been deployed across the impacted areas but are unlikely to keep up with demand. As initial layers of snow freeze and become buried under fresh snowfall, hazardous travel conditions are likely to develop. Concealed ice on roads will increase the risk of road traffic accidents and delay bus and coach services. Rail travel will also likely be severely impacted, with ice accumulation on the tracks reducing traction, leading to delays and potential derailments. Ice accumulation on power lines coupled with strong winds may also cause lines to snap leading to power outages, which are likely to be exacerbated by an increased electricity demand for heating.   

On 31 January, insurgents of the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) killed 18 unarmed soldiers belonging to the Frontier Corps paramilitaries after ambushing their vehicle near the town of Kalat, near the Afghanistan border. Approximately 70-80 BLA militants ambushed the soldiers when they were attempting to dismantle a roadblock which had reportedly been erected by the BLA. Pakistani security forces responded quickly to the incident, killing 23 BLA militants in a series of subsequent operations in the region that were described as some of the heaviest fighting in Balochistan in recent years. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s office in Islamabad condemned the violence and the Pakistani Army stated that “sanitisation operations” will continue until the perpetrators are brought to justice.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The number of militants involved in the attack suggests it was a planned assault, and the ambush of security forces attempting to remove roadblocks could be a developing tactic, technique, or procedure employed by the BLA, designed to maximise casualties of exposed and vulnerable targets. Acts of extreme violence, such as ambushes, are likely to become an increasingly common tactic for the BLA, given their effectiveness in generating compelling propaganda, attracting new recruits and undermining the perception of security in Balochistan. There is a realistic possibility that the BLA knew that the paramilitary soldiers were unarmed, which may indicate that the BLA has penetrated the Pakistani armed forces to some degree, enabling it to obtain vital intelligence. In response to the ambush, the Pakistani armed forces will almost certainly expand their operations against the BLA and other Baloch separatist groups.

However, with widespread social unrest, sectarian violence and militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and periodic clashes with the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani military is likely already overstretched. This may explain the deployment of lesser-trained and less experienced paramilitary forces to Balochistan. Moreover, an expansion of Pakistani military operations in the area will almost certainly inspire a wave of reprisal attacks in Balochistan, which may migrate into other parts of Pakistan. Pakistan’s prime minister is currently conducting a state visit to China and it is almost certain that issues like the revitalisation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project will be high on the agenda. China has pledged support to Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts and has conducted military drills within the country. If the security situation continues to deteriorate, Beijing will likely pressure Islamabad to approve the deployment of Chinese security forces to protect Chinese works and assets linked to the Belts and Roads Initiative (BRI).

Taliban deputy foreign minister flees Afghanistan after speech in favour of women’s education

Mohammed Abbas Stanikzai reportedly relocated to the UAE for “health” reasons. However, his departure followed an order by Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada to arrest him. The deputy foreign minister had recently given a speech in which he decried the Taliban government’s ban on women’s education, and reportedly privately criticised Akhundzada. The episode represents a rare but likely notable public spat between Taliban officials. It is highly likely that Akhundzada, whose hold on power faces significant domestic and foreign threats, will continue to respond harshly to perceived internal political threats. International pressure on the Taliban is likely to increase in the short and medium term. Notably, the interruption of USAID projects in the country, which amounted to more than USD 740 million in 2024 (and USD 3.7 billion since 2022) is highly likely to have severe humanitarian impacts and may result in widespread discontent directed towards the Taliban regime.

Modi’s Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) on track to win assembly elections in Delhi, India

The elections were held on 5 February, and the final results are scheduled to be released on 8 February. Early results show the BJP comfortably ahead of the incumbent Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). If these were to be certified, it would be the first BJP victory in the capital in 27 years. Moreover, they would represent a significant reversal of the 2020 results, where AAP won 62 seats out of 70. For Modi, the victory likely represents an important political result, as it gives the BJP further momentum following last year’s general elections which were won by the Hindu nationalist party but not as decisively as its leaders would have hoped. The AAP is a reformist and anti-establishment party, that came to power in Delhi in 2015 on a wave of anti-corruption sentiment.

Bangladeshi protesters attack Awami League assets

Civil unrest was recorded in Dhaka and other cities on 5-6 February, following ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s calls to her supporters, the Awami League (AL) party, to oppose the interim government. Protesters torched Hasina’s father’s former house in Dhaka and continued to attack suspected AL supporters. AL recently called for a two-week-long period of protests against the interim government, the first major protest appeal since the party was removed from power in August 2024. The vandalism by anti-Hasina activists was almost certainly a case of “bulldozer justice” (the protest had been called a “bulldozer procession” by some local activists), a form of mob violence that especially targets opponents’ physical assets, and often poses a threat to uninvolved bystanders.

Islamic State (IS) supporters start prison riot in Tajikistan

At least five inmates were killed and three guards injured in a riot on 3 February at the prison of Vahdat, Tajikistan. The riot was reportedly launched by a group of IS-affiliated inmates. The case continues to highlight how Tajikistan is a growing recruitment ground for IS. Not only is Tajikistan located close to some of the countries where IS already operates (Afghanistan), has carried out attacks (Russia), or aims to expand (China), but the highly repressive government, which has significantly curtailed freedom of worship, has likely been a key driver for radicalisation. Multiple notable recent attacks, including the Crocus Hall attack, were perpetrated by Tajik IS militants.

Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) commander assassinated in Kabul, Afghanistan

A stabbing attack occurred in Kabul on 2 February, which resulted in the death of “Kohi”, nom de guerre of the commander of the BLA’s Majeed Brigade. Sometimes described as a “suicide” brigade, the Majeed unit is responsible for carrying out suicide attacks in Pakistan and is assessed as one of the more elite units within the BLA. The attack was likely a targeted killing of an important BLA unit linked to significant militant activity in Pakistan. Whilst no group has claimed responsibility for the killing, the BLA will likely assess that Pakistan was in some way behind the killing, which is likely to provoke BLA reprisal attacks in Pakistan.

Further IED attack on Thai security forces

On the morning of 7 February, four Thai police officers were injured when an improved explosive device (IED) detonated near a police booth in the Nong Chik district in the restless Patani province. There are currently no indications as to who planted the IED and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers were examining the area. However, there have been a series of often underreported IED attacks on the Thai police in the far south of the country, with Islamist separatist groups like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) most commonly suspected. The frequency of the attacks may indicate a gradual resurgence of the South Thailand insurgency, likely fueled by internal divisions within the insurgency and systemic failures of peace efforts.

Widespread disruption after cold front brings heavy snow across South Korea

A cold front in South Korea has caused widespread disruption and is expected to last until at least 9 February, with icy temperatures recorded nationwide. Heavy snowfall has resulted in major transport disruptions, flight cancellations and multiple road accidents, including a 30-car pileup on the Sunchon-Wanju Expressway. The Korea Meteorological Administration has warned of continued snowfall in mountainous and inland regions, predicting up to 8 centimetres of additional snow in these areas and temperatures falling to as low as minus 17 degrees Celsius.

Flooding causes widespread disruptions in Queensland, Australia

Northern Queensland, Australia, is experiencing severe flooding due to a low-pressure system that has brought heavy torrential rains. Emergency warnings have been issued for fast-moving floods in Georgetown, with dangerous conditions prompting urgent advisories. At least two fatalities have been reported due to flood-related incidents since the onset of the severe weather. Authorities have also issued flood advice for the Burdekin region and urged residents in Hinchinbrook to conserve water as the flooding has disrupted power and water supplies. In Townsville, residents who had previously evacuated from areas such as Rosslea, Hermit, and Railway Estate have been allowed to return home. However, the region continues to face challenges, with water supply disruptions in Charters Tower and widespread internet and phone outages in Far North Queensland. A highway bridge between Ingham and Townsville collapsed, severing a critical access point for some towns.

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