On 10 January, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was sworn in for his third term despite widespread allegations of electoral fraud during the presidential election. Few international leaders attended the inauguration and only two Latin American leaders were present, President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua and President Miguel Díaz-Canel of Cuba, both of whom share Maduro’s far-left authoritarian stance.

Protests occurred in the run-up and during the inauguration but did not reach the levels witnessed during the presidential election. The US, UK and the EU imposed new sanctions on the Maduro regime following the inauguration, with US sanctions including an increased reward for information leading to Maduro’s arrest to USD 25 million from USD 15 million.

Maduro denounced sanctions as an “economic war” on Venezuela and threatened to seize Puerto Rico from the US.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Maduro’s third term will likely be marked by continued and widespread repression of the opposition, with the regime overly dependent on the military and police to ensure its survival. The scale of protests during the inauguration was likely limited by the arrest of key opposition leaders, a tactic that will almost certainly continue as Maduro consolidates power and curbs the influence of the opposition, civil society groups, journalists and any other critic of the regime.

The low international turnout and the imposition of new sanctions reflect the broader international condemnation of Maduro’s presidency and its lack of legitimacy. These trends will likely push Caracas further towards the orbit of states hostile to the West, including Russia, China and Iran despite BRICS recent rejection of Venezuela- a move caused by Brazil’s veto.

Maduro’s threat towards Puerto Rico is almost certainly sabre-rattling designed to rally his base, with Venezuela lacking the military strength to mount any viable challenge to the US. However, now that Maduro has begun his third term, there is a realistic possibility of increased hostilities with Guyana, with Venezuela claiming the oil-rich Essequibo region. As Maduro consolidates his grip on power, he may seek to intensify these tensions to distract from domestic issues and rally nationalist support.

Supporters of former Bolivian President Evo Morales marched on Bolivia’s administrative capital, La Paz on 13 January. Protestors have clashed with police on multiple occasions and have tried to gain entry to government buildings, including the vice-presidency building. The police have deployed crowd dispersal methods in response, including the use of tear gas.

The protests, predominantly led by Bolivia’s Indigenous community, are partly a reaction to the reissuance of an arrest warrant for Morales in December for charges of statutory rape. However, they are also fuelled by economic hardship and a belief that President Arce is using legal charges against Morales to diminish his influence ahead of the August 2025 presidential election.

Solace Global Assessment: 

With inflation reaching ten per cent, major fuel shortages, critical shortages in imported goods and a lack of foreign reserves, Bolivia is potentially heading for a major economic crisis that will likely sustain unrest until the 2025 presidential election and potentially beyond.

However, the protests, particularly those led by Bolivia’s Indigenous community, have likely exacerbated the country’s economic challenges. Roadblocks, which have become a common tactic in these demonstrations, have significantly disrupted the flow of goods and services, particularly along major supply routes where they have often been erected. The roadblocks are assessed to have cost the economy in excess of USD 2 billion and have exacerbated inflation and fuel supply issues.

The prolonged targeting of Morales combined with the police’s forceful response to indigenous protests, is likely to lead to an increased mobilisation of the indigenous community and heightened tensions, with previous examples suggesting that such tactics only fuel more unrest.

With mounting economic pressures, continued unrest and heightened tensions, Bolivia is likely to enter into a cycle of political instability, further deepening the economic crisis and likely shaping the conditions for a volatile and often violent run-up to the 2025 presidential election.

US to remove Cuba from “state sponsors of terrorism” risk and ease sanctions

The announcement is likely to be one of the last major foreign policy moves made by the Biden administration and follows the precedent set by the Obama White House. Donald Trump reversed President Obama’s move towards the end of his first term, and it is likely that the same will happen once the transition is completed. It is therefore unlikely that this development will be anything more than a symbolic gesture before the return of the Trump administration, with the incoming president likely to sustain his tough stance on the Caribbean nation.

US presidential inauguration to occur on 20 January

President-elect Donald Trump is set to be inaugurated on 20 January for his second term in office, an event that will likely bring severe traffic disruption to central Washington D.C. and a massive security deployment of around 25,000 military and law enforcement personnel.

The highly visible nature of the ceremony makes it an attractive potential target for violent extremists, including domestic and foreign actors. While FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that no specific or credible threats have been identified, this does not rule out the possibility of an attack. Self-radicalised lone actors pose the greatest threat, particularly given the relative ease of obtaining firearms in the US compared to other Western nations. Security agencies have also warned of potential disruptions from anticipated protests,

Over one million now displaced within Haiti

The United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) has stated that over one million people, more than half of whom are children, have now been displaced within Haiti due to escalating gang violence. This figure is three times that of December 2023 and is largely in part to the gangs’ near-total control of Port-au-Prince and other highly populated areas.

The agency warned that shelters are overcrowded, and access to basic necessities such as food and water remains critically limited. Deportations from neighbouring countries, mainly the Dominican Republic, have exacerbated the humanitarian strain, which aid agencies are struggling to deal with.

The IOM has called for urgent aid and long-term solutions; however, with the gangs consolidating power in the capital and disrupting air travel from the island nation, major improvements are unlikely without a major international intervention.

Flooding crisis in eastern Brazil

Since 12 January, the flooding crisis in eastern Brazil has worsened due to ongoing heavy rains, with at least 26 deaths and 3,270 displaced in Minas Gerais as of 16 January. Sixty-three municipalities are under a state of emergency, and emergency responders are overwhelmed by calls in Divinopolis.

Other affected states include Bahia, Pernambuco, and Sergipe, with specific warnings for Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. Authorities have issued warnings for continued heavy rains, which will highly likely lead to more severe flooding and a high threat of major landslides.

Overnight on 13-14 January, Ukraine conducted a large-scale series of long-range strikes against multiple targets on multiple axes between 200-1,000km into Russia. The attack reportedly used six UK-provided Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and US-provided ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs), in addition to at least 146 one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs, or attack drones).

The targets included an oil refinery and oil storage facility, glide bomb and cruise missile warehouses, chemical plants, a thermal power plant and military-industrial facilities. These targets were struck in the oblasts of Bryansk, Saratov, Tula, as well as in the Republic of Tatarstan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the largest such attack by Ukraine against Russia in the war thus far, the strikes were primarily conducted against strategic, rather than tactical, targets. Strategic long-range strikes seek to degrade a state’s ability to wage war by destroying the basis of that state’s military capability.

The attack, therefore, likely indicates to the incoming Trump administration and other key Western allies that Ukraine is capable of continuing the fight against Russia for some time yet. There is a realistic possibility that while Ukraine only has a limited number of Western-provided advanced missile systems, Ukraine has built up a substantial stockpile of domestically produced OWA-UAVs that it can use to conduct further periodic large-scale strategic attacks into Russia.

The attack emulated the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) of large-scale Russian long-range attacks, by layering large quantities of cheap OWA-UAVS that can overwhelm air defences with advanced missile systems. With the advent of the OWA-UAV, this is highly likely a new universally applicable tactic of warfighting to penetrate advanced modern air defence, which will almost certainly be replicated by other state militaries as well as capable non-state actors (such as the Houthis in Yemen).

Russia is highly likely to retaliate. The November 2024 decision by the Biden administration to allow the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow against targets in internationally recognised Russian territory led to large-scale Russian retaliation strikes. The retaliation strikes included the use of the new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

There is a realistic possibility that in addition to the regular large-scale attacks against Ukrainian critical national infrastructure (CNI), such as a 14-15 January series of strikes, Russia will launch a notably significant wave of attacks against Ukrainian urban centres. These attacks could include the use of Oreshnik (largely due to its symbolic value) and the indiscriminate targeting of civilian targets.

On 11 January, intelligence officials of Syria’s new government announced they thwarted a plan by the Islamic State (IS) to bomb a Shiite shrine in the Damascus suburb of Sayyida Zeinab.

On 14 January, local channels reported the arrest of the Egyptian citizen Ahmad al-Mansur, who had reportedly sought to start an Islamist movement, named the “January 25 Revolutionaries”, to launch an insurrection against Egyptian leader al-Sisi.

On 15 January, other reports indicated that HTS forces had killed Bassem Hussam al-Din, the commander of a Latakia-based militia that had threatened the transition government weeks ago and had reportedly kidnapped multiple security forces members.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The new Syrian administration is likely focusing significant efforts on domestic security and counterterrorism as it seeks to bolster its domestic and international credibility as a long-term administrator for the country. At home, the administration is balancing multiple possible vectors of instability. The various anti-Assad rebel groups and splinter units that have remained armed after the regime’s fall may increasingly become attractive springboards for foreign-backed efforts to destabilise Syria, or may develop into radical formations.

Abroad, the new Syrian administration has taken considerable steps to reassure regional powers, as well as the West, of its viability as a diplomatic partner. The immediate decapitation of the January 25 movement can likely be interpreted in this light. Additionally, Syria’s forces counterterrorism operation against IS is a political victory for the new government, which has pledged to protect religious and ethnic minorities in the country. 

During this reporting period, representatives of Hamas and the Israeli government negotiating in Doha reportedly reached a “breakthrough”, making the approval of a ceasefire in Gaza imminent. By 16 January, reports indicated that the two sides agreed on a three-phase ceasefire framework.

During the first phase, which is to last 42 days, hostilities will end, and Israeli troops will withdraw to the border, retaining control over the Philadelphi corridor at the Gaza-Egypt border. Surviving Israeli hostages as well as the remains of those who died in captivity would then be exchanged for Palestinian prisoners (with a 30:1 or 50:1 ratio, the latter for women and underage hostages). Gradual hostage exchanges would then continue, while humanitarian aid to Gaza would be considerably boosted.

In phase two, also 42 days-long, Israeli forces will completely withdraw from Gaza. Phase three will mostly focus on reconstruction efforts.

On 16 January, the final approval to the agreement was reportedly delayed by internal disagreements within the Israeli government. Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich’s party “Religious Zionism” threatened to pull support from Netanyahu’s government if the deal were to be approved. Similarly, hard-right Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir also threatened to quit.

A meeting to finalise the ceasefire’s approval was delayed and is scheduled to be held on 17 January.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ceasefire achieves some but not all of the Netanyahu government’s stated war goals. It achieves the liberation of the remaining hostages and secures, at least for a period, Israeli control over the vital Egypt-Gaza border. However, the ceasefire does not include the disbandment of Hamas. While Hamas’ has been significantly weakened and depleted by the war and is unlikely to be able to fully replenish its strength during the ceasefire, it has survived the conflict. Hamas will almost certainly use the ceasefire to reinfiltrate parts of Gaza, especially in the north, and to carry out operations against other Palestinian militias operating in Gaza, which have threatened its authority.

In the short term, the ceasefire is almost certain to boost the delivery of much-needed aid to Gaza. This is likely to be compounded by renewed humanitarian efforts by EU and Gulf states. After phase one, there is a realistic possibility of the ceasefire breaking down, especially if the hard-right parties that support the Netanyahu government retain their maximalist positions. The first foreign policy actions of the Trump administration, set to begin on 20 January, are likely to be crucial for the viability of the ceasefire.

In Israel, the ceasefire will highly likely threaten the stability of the Netanyahu administration. The hard-right and pro-war activists are likely to see the ceasefire as “betraying” the goal of destroying Hamas in Gaza. Conversely, anti-war activists, generally on the left, will accuse the Netanyahu government of arbitrarily prolonging the war. Anti-government sentiment from both the left and hard right will likely result in large-scale demonstrations in Israeli urban centres.

If sustained, the ceasefire is likely to have an impact at the international level. A prolonged truce followed by reconstruction will likely lead to a reduction in pro-Palestine protests, although this will likely increase should either party renege. However, the threat posed by radicalisation after the war almost certainly will remain extant, with a high chance of lone-actor attacks in the West regardless of the ceasefire’s success.

After starting as a tropical depression in the Indian Ocean, the storm Dikeledi intensified into a tropical cyclone with maximum windspeeds of 169km/h. On 11 January, Cyclone Dikeledi made landfall in northern Madagascar, causing widespread flooding, landslides and heavy rainfall, resulting in at least three deaths.

After making landfall, Dikeledi weakened into a tropical storm and tracked west in the Mozambique Channel south of Mayotte and Comoros. In Mayotte, at least 14,500 people sought refuge in emergency shelters and heavy rainfall caused flooding and landslides.

The storm then again intensified into a cyclone and briefly made landfall in Mozambique east of Nampula on 13 January, before tracking south. In Nampula, authorities report at least five deaths, over 5,000 houses destroyed, and 35,000 people affected.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The most severe storm of the current South West Indian Ocean cyclone season so far, Cyclone Chido, devastated the French overseas department of Mayotte in December 2024. Mayotte was far less impacted by Dikeledi, although the ongoing recovery efforts from Chido have highly likely been impeded.

This current cyclone season is forecast to run from November 2024 to April 2025 (excluding Mauritius and the Seychelles, which is forecast to end in May 2025). The island nations and overseas territories in the South West Indian Ocean are highly vulnerable to the impact of cyclones.

In the event of a severe natural disaster, evacuation options for business travellers and employees in the region would be limited to difficult and costly maritime options in the event of critical airport closures.

On 15 January, Frelimo candidate Daniel Chapo was inaugurated as President of Mozambique. In his inauguration speech, Chapo announced several measures, promising to slim down government, reduce the number of ministries, and scrap the central-level State Secretariats. He stated that he would redirect the money to education, health, agriculture, water, roads, and energy.

As the third day of the announced three days of strikes, protests occurred across several cities in Mozambique including Maputo and Nampula. Demonstrations occurred directly outside the inauguration ceremony. Security forces responded with live ammunition and tear gas, killing at least eight people. Footage was shared on social media of security forces hitting an unarmed woman.  According to local NGOs, approximately 303 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began.

On 17 January, Frelimo is set to destroy all ballot papers from the October 9 general election. The destruction is set to take place publicly at the District and City Elections Commissions ‘before representatives of candidates, political parties, coalitions of political parties, groups of proposing voters, observers, journalists, and voters in general’, according to the National Elections Commission (CNE). On 8 January, the Public Integrity Center (CIP) reportedly filed an appeal with the Administrative Court to halt the destruction of the ballots.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is highly likely that Chapo is attempting to present himself as a reformer to portray a distinction between his ministry and the previous government. Now Frelimo have successfully inaugurated their candidate, they will likely attempt to appease protesters with reforms. While the destruction of the ballot papers will likely be incendiary in the immediate term, with protesters likely attempting to storm the District and City Elections Commissions, it may inject a sense of defeatism into opposition forces since they will no longer able to concretely prove that the election was fraudulent.

Opposition leader Venâncio Mondlane has declared that he is the legitimate head of state and will announce a program for the ‘first 100 days of his term in office’ on 17 January at 15:00 local time (13:00 UTC). Given he does not have access to state resources, these measures will likely be highly symbolic. He has previously stated that Mozambique requires a new flag; this will likely feature on the agenda. Mondlane has also indicated an end to the protests over the coming months as he implements his shadow government. While the details are yet to be released, this is highly likely to take the momentum out of the demonstrations, which have relied on Mondlane’s organisation since the election.

There is a realistic possibility that Chapo’s inauguration marks a turning point for unrest in Mozambique. The inauguration period has now ended, and Frelimo will almost certainly aim to portray Chapo as a fresh leader with ambitions to better the population, as reflected in Chapo’s inauguration speech. Furthermore, international pressure will likely decrease as other countries set out to strengthen relations with Mozambique’s new government.

Whether demonstrations continue to escalate is almost certainly dependent on Mondlane’s announcement on 17 January. While security forces attempting to arrest Mondlane would also almost certainly incentivise demonstrations, the government has, so far, refrained from taking such measures. It is likely they will continue to refrain from inflaming demonstrations. Without a clear route to power, the widespread perception that Frelimo have “won”, and exhaustion from the economic disruption from the unrest, there is a realistic possibility that demonstrations will gradually diminish over the coming months.

German far-right congress blocked by 10,000 protesters

The demonstrators blocked the entrance to the planned event, in the east German town of Riesa, Saxony, which had been organised by the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. Germany is holding general elections on 23 February, and the AfD is polling at 21 per cent, which would be the party’s best-ever result in national elections. Party leader Alice Weidel was nominated as the AfD’s official candidate for the chancellorship despite the disruptions. Further protests against the far-right are almost certain in the run-up to the elections, with previous demonstrations attracting hundreds of thousands of participants.

Davos summit likely to drive civil unrest in Western urban centres

The World Economic Forum (WEF) will host its annual meeting in Davos, Switzerland, between 20 and 24 January. The Davos summit is a preferred target for environmentalists, anti-capitalist left-wing groups, and other organisations, and is likely to attract protests. Civil unrest is highly likely to occur in Davos itself, causing some disruptions. Other protests are likely to occur in large Western urban centres, like London, Paris, or Brussels. There is a particularly high likelihood of small-scale symbolic actions by anti-WEF groups, including actions meant to disrupt public transport in target cities.

Thousands demonstrate in Belgrade

On 12 January, 20,000 people gathered in a student-led anti-government protest outside the Constitutional Court of Serbia in Belgrade to commemorate victims of the railway station roof collapse in Novi Sad on 1 November 2024 which left 15 dead. The roof collapse has been blamed on sloppy reconstruction work due to corruption; the Novi Sad railway station building was renovated in a deal with Chinese state companies.

A separate protest also occurred in Nis. Protesters demanded that those responsible be brought to justice. The unrest follows a series of protests which occurred in November and December 2024. The demonstrations reflect a broader frustration with perceived failings of the government. President Aleksandar Vucic is increasingly perceived as shifting towards autocratic rule by curbing democratic freedoms and infringing on civil rights. Further unrest in Serbia is highly likely.

Former Georgian prime minister hospitalised after beating by unidentified individuals

Anti-government protests have continued in Georgia, with levels of political violence escalating. Alongside the deployment of draconian riot police tactics against protesters, the role of pro-government plainclothes provocateurs continues to increase. Called “Titushky” by opposition supporters, a Ukrainian name which derives from the pro-Russian “thugs” who frequently attacked pro-European Ukrainians during the Euromaidan movement, they have highly likely been used to suppress the pro-European movement in Georgia with violence.

On 15 January, footage surfaced showing unidentified men attacking participants of a strike that had gathered in central Tbilisi. On 14 January, Giorgi Gakharia, a former prime minister of Georgia between 2019-2021 who now leads the For Georgia opposition party, was hospitalised after being severely beaten in the lobby of the Sheraton hotel in Batumi. The attack, highly likely conducted by “Titushky”, is likely indicative of an increasingly violent crackdown on the Georgian opposition.

Nawaf Salam is the new Lebanese Prime Minister

Nawaf Salam is the head of the International Court of Justice and was widely supported by Christian, Druze, and Sunni members of parliament, while the Shiite representatives, Hezbollah and its ally the Amal Movement, failed to field a candidate. The appointment of Salam is a political setback for Hezbollah and may underscore a greater boldness by its Lebanese opponents to confront its position as an informal “second military” in Lebanon.

Last week, President Joseph Aoun vowed to ensure that only the state retains control of all arms in the country, a statement that was obviously directed at Hezbollah. While no concrete measures are in place to disarm Hezbollah, such a plan is almost certainly too ambitious to be implemented by the Lebanese government.

More realistically, Salam could work to reduce Hezbollah’s influence in the judiciary and legislature while directing “kinetic” efforts to ensure the continuation of the ceasefire agreement with Israel south of the Litani river, a move that may also send positive signals to Lebanon’s southern neighbour and its allies in Washington.

Mali forces seize gold stocks at Canadian mining company site

The government of Mali began enforcing a provisional order to seize gold at the Loulo-Gounkoto site operated by the Canadian Barrick Gold mining company. The move follows Mali blocking gold shipments by the company, and detaining company employees. It almost certainly continues to highlight the worsening security and viability of Western private actors in the Sahel. There is a realistic possibility that similar developments will follow in Burkina Faso, Niger, and potentially Chad.

NATO to increase force posture in Baltic Sea after multiple cables cut

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has initiated operation “Baltic Sentry” in response to a rise in suspected incidents of underwater sabotage that have primarily targeted undersea internet cables. The operation will include the deployment of frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and autonomous vehicles, including uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).

The operation will almost certainly involve an increase in surveillance on suspected Russian “shadow fleet” vessels, civilian flagged vessels that are alleged to work at the behest of Russian intelligence. However, with Russia’s shadow fleet estimated to contain hundreds of vessels, the NATO task group will likely struggle to actively monitor and deter Russia vessels capable of engaging in Russia’s maritime grey zone strategy.

Anarchist activist firebombs Italian army barracks

On the night of 13 January, a barracks operated by the Carabinieri (Italy’s gendarmerie) in Borgo San Lorenzo, near Florence, was attacked with Molotov cocktails, causing some damage but no injuries. An individual, reportedly an Anarchist activist, was arrested in connection to the incident. There is a realistic possibility that the firebombing was linked to ongoing anti-police protests in central and northern Italy, which have been sparked by the killing of a 19-year-old during a police chase.

Armenia to join global coalition against the Islamic State (IS)

Armenian and American officials announced the beginning of closer defence cooperation between Armenia and the United States, including the former joining the global coalition against IS. Politically, the announcement follows previous Armenian efforts to pivot towards the West following the significant deterioration of its relations with Moscow, following the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The announcement almost certainly highlights a growing US interest in the Caucasus, where IS presence is growing through the increased recruitment of Islamic State-Caucasus Province (IS-CP) . In late 2024, an IS-CP cell was discovered in north Azerbaijan and IS-CP has recently claimed attacks in Dagestan, Russia.

Spanish tourist reportedly kidnapped in southern Algeria

Uncorroborated reports indicate that on 15 January a female Spanish tourist was kidnapped from near the southern Algeria town of Tamanrasset, approximately 300km away from the borders with Mali and Niger. The woman was then taken across the border to Mali, where much of the northern region remains largely lawless.

Reports suggest that the woman was captured by militants belonging to the Islamic State Sahel Province, an affiliate of the Islamic State that has grown substantially because of the destabilisation of the Sahel. The kidnappers will now likely attempt to secure a ransom from the Spanish government to fund future operations.

Russia and Iran scheduled to sign 20-year strategic pact

On 17 January, the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Russian President Vladimir Putin are scheduled to meet in Moscow and sign strategic partnership deal that will govern relations between Russia and Iran for the next 20 years. The deal is claimed to include the further expansion of bilateral ties in trade, investment, transportation, and humanitarian sectors, as well as a deepening of cooperation in defence and security.

Russo-Iranian cooperation is already significant, with Iran supplying Russia with large quantities of Shahed series one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVs), attack drones that Russia uses to conduct almost daily attacks against Ukraine. In 2024, the Kremlin made a similar strategic partnership with Pyongyang, leading to the deployment of over 10,000 North Korean troops which are currently engaged in high-intensity combat operations against Ukraine in the Kursk salient. It is unlikely, however, that Iran will send troops.

The agreement is an immediate challenge for the shortly forthcoming Trump administration, with Trump having previously adopted a distinctly hawkish foreign policy posture towards Iran. The agreement likely indicates that Moscow is unwilling to distance itself from Tehran and risk losing critical attack drone supplies in an effort to appease Trump.

Niger and China sign pipeline security memorandum

On 14 January, the Chinese pipeline operator WAPCO signed a framework covering security at its Niger-based operations. The development not only highlights China’s growing economic and strategic footprint in the Sahel, partially accelerated by the West’s retrenchment but also likely Beijing’s growing worries about Islamist groups targeting its assets and citizens in at-risk countries. Attacks on Chinese economic interests have been pervasive in Pakistan, and there is a high likelihood that as China’s footprint grows, African Islamist groups, particularly those affiliated with transregional groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, will increasingly target Chinese interest in the region.

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) make progress in Gezira state, take Wad Madani

SAF units reportedly pushed out Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from the city in Gezira state. Wad Madani is a key logistical hub on the Blue Nile, which controls supply routes to Khartoum, located just to its north, and to eastern regions of the country. The offensive is likely to be important for future SAF efforts to secure control of Gezeira state. There is a realistic possibility that the capture of Wad Madani will strengthen the Sudanese government’s position in Khartoum, where SAF advances have recently resumed.

Icelandic authorities increase aviation alert level in response to seismic activity

On 14 January, the Icelandic Meteorological Office elevated the aviation alert level from green to yellow as a precaution. The decision was taken after 130 earthquakes were detected beneath Iceland’s Bardarbunga volcano, provoking concerns over an eruption. The earthquakes included a magnitude 5.1 tremor and 17 others registering above magnitude 3, likely indicating magma accumulation beneath the volcano. The volcano is one of six volcanic systems located under Europe’s biggest glacier Vatnajokull, and in the event of a subglacial eruption, there is a substantial risk of an ash eruption and subglacial flooding

Marburg outbreak suspected in northwest Tanzania

An outbreak of Marburg Virus Disease (MVD), a severe haemorrhagic fever with no known treatment or vaccine, is suspected in Tanzania’s Kagera region, near the borders with Rwanda and Burundi. Nine suspected cases have been reported, including eight deaths, resulting in a case-fatality ratio of 89 per cent. Healthcare workers are among the affected.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has raised concerns about the potential for further spread, particularly given Kagera’s position as a transit hub with frequent cross-border movement. A recent MVD outbreak in Rwanda, which affected 66 people and caused 15 deaths, was declared over in December 2024. In response, rapid response teams have been deployed, a mobile laboratory and treatment centres have been established, and ongoing laboratory tests and contact tracing are underway.

On 15 January, authorities detained Yoon after he failed to comply with multiple summonses from police and investigators. Yoon stated that he would cooperate with investigators but criticised his arrest as illegal. Investigators have 48 hours to question him at the corruption agency’s headquarters in Gwacheon before applying for a detention warrant that could extend his detainment for up to 20 days. On 17 January, South Korea’s anti-corruption agency stated that it would seek to extend Yoon’s detention. Yoon’s defence team is seeking a review of his arrest warrant, and his impeachment trial is set to continue.

The arrest followed a standoff at the presidential residence in Seoul, where authorities faced resistance from Yoon’s supporters and the acting chief of presidential security, who was subsequently detained for obstruction. Approximately 3,000 police officers were deployed to arrest Yoon.  A similar incident occurred on 3 January, whereby authorities were prevented from arresting Yoon after being blocked for approximately six hours. The situation remains fluid, with Yoon’s legal team negotiating for his voluntary appearance before investigators.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Yoon is the first sitting president of South Korea to be arrested. He reportedly faced hours of questioning after his arrest but has not yet been charged. If found guilty of insurrection, Yoon faces the prospect of a heavy fine or life imprisonment. The crime also technically carries the death sentence, but this outcome is highly unlikely due to a long-standing moratorium on executions.

Yoon’s arrest constitutes an important step in restoring normality in South Korean politics. Since Yoon’s declaration of martial law on 3 December, uncertainty has persisted after Yoon refused to step down despite efforts by opposition forces to impeach him, which eventually succeeded on 14 December. The longer Yoon resisted arrest, the greater the chances of further unrest and clashes between his supporters and anti-Yoon movements and government forces. Furthermore, the authorities’ failure to arrest Yoon constituted a source of embarrassment for South Korea’s security forces. If Yoon successfully evaded arrest, it may embolden politicians to curb democratic institutions to retain power.

On 13 January, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated near Muang Pattani police station in Thailand’s southern province of Pattani, injuring nine paramilitary rangers and one Malaysian tourist. The bomb was attached to a motorcycle, which was left by a suspect who fled on foot. Police cordoned off the area and jammed mobile phone signals, fearing that suspected insurgents might have planted a second bomb to ambush officers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This attack adds to a growing series of militant assaults in southern Thailand, a region long plagued by insurgent activity, largely attributed to separatist Islamist groups such as the  Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the New Pattani Revolutionary Front (BPP). Although the latest attack did not result in fatalities, it marks yet another example of the increased use of IEDs by separatist groups in the region.

These attacks have largely escaped international attention, partly due to the lack of high-profile casualties and the Thai authorities’ efforts to downplay the violence to protect the tourism industry and foreign investment. However, the increase in attacks may indicate a resurgence of the insurgency, with peace talks failing to make meaningful progress.

On 16 January, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra visited the three southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, despite the threat of militancy. Her visit was likely a bid to reassure the public and demonstrate the government’s commitment to the restive south, as well as to reassure Chinese visitors, millions of whom visit Thailand during the Chinese Lunar year which begins on 29 January.

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan sentenced to 14 years in prison

The sentence is linked to a corruption case. Khan was accused of exchanging government land for favours by a major real estate developer. Khan, who has been in prison since August 2023, is the leader of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and remains hugely popular in the country and among the Pakistani diaspora community. PTI activists and other supporters have staged sporadic large-scale protests since Khan was imprisoned.

In November 2024, protests led to multiple cities in Pakistan being paralysed, six deaths, and over 1,000 arrests. There is a high likelihood that this development will lead to further protests. Moreover, there is a realistic possibility of civil unrest in cities with a large Pakistani community, including London and other UK urban centres.

Pakistani army expands operations against Baloch militants

At least 27 militants, most belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), have been killed by Pakistani army operations in the restless Balochistan province. Army operations targeted several militant hideouts, as well as weapons and ammunition depots, resulting in the capturing of lethal material. The raids were initiated after a series of BLA and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) which killed multiple government troops.

However, both militant groups have responded with IED attacks on government forces. This is likely to demonstrate strength and to exploit the current overstretching of the Pakistani military which is also contending with a border conflict with the Afghan Taliban, an increase in attacks attributed to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and a wave of sectarian violence in the west of the country.

Beijing deploys its largest coastguard vessel in the Philippines’ waters

On 14 January, Beijing deployed a 164.89-metre-long coastguard vessel 5901 (IMO: 9756028) nicknamed “The Monster” approximately 77 nautical miles off the coast of Philippines’ Zambales province. Manila criticised the act as intended to ‘intimidate fishermen’ and reflective of Beijing’s ‘increasing aggression’. In response to the vessel’s presence, the Philippine Coastguard deployed two of its largest vessels and demanded the withdrawal of the vessel from its exclusive maritime economic zone (EEZ).

On 17 January, the Philippine navy conducted drills near the contested Scarborough shoal in the South China Sea, an act almost certainly conducted in response to perceived Chinese aggression. This incident constitutes the latest spat amid frequent brinkmanship between Philippine and Chinese maritime forces around the contested waters.

Magnitude 6.9 earthquake off Miyazaki, Japan

On 13 January, a magnitude 6.9 earthquake struck off the coast of Miyazaki Prefecture in Japan, prompting a tsunami advisory for coastal areas in Miyazaki and Kochi prefectures. The Japanese meteorological agency reported multiple aftershocks with magnitudes between 3 and 4.1. Following the earthquake, evacuation orders were issued for the coastal areas of Takanabe and Kadogawa. A 10-centimetre wave was observed at Cape Muroto and Tosashimizu, while tide gauges reported a 20-centimetre sea level rise at Miyazaki and Aburatsu ports.

The tsunami advisories and warnings were later lifted, with no reports of significant damage. In the aftermath, local authorities reported minor disruptions, including water outages in the Ikime area of Miyazaki due to apparent pipe damage. At least one person sustained minor injuries in Oita Prefecture. Authorities have called for people to remain alert for further strong tremors in the week following the earthquake.

Eruption of Mount Ibu in Indonesia

On 16 January, Mount Ibu in Indonesia’s North Maluku region erupted Authorities have initiated evacuations for approximately 3,000 residents living in the vicinity of the volcano. As of the latest reports, 182 individuals have taken refuge in evacuation centres. The Indonesian disaster agency has issued a warning to the public to refrain from engaging in activities within a three-mile radius of the volcano’s active crater. Emergency responders have been deployed to manage the situation, following the elevation of the alert status to its highest level. The eruption has prompted swift action to ensure the safety of the local population, which numbers around 13,000 people.

Copyright © 2025 Solace Global Risk Limited. All rights reserved. No part of this document or content may be reproduced, copied, translated, sold, or distributed, in whole or in part without the consent of Solace Global Risk Limited.