During the New Year’s celebrations, a man rammed a vehicle into crowds gathered on Bourbon Street in the city’s historic French Quarter, killing 15 and injuring more than 30. The attacker also engaged in a firefight with intervening police officers before being killed.

After the attack, the perpetrator was identified as a US citizen who reportedly had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), and an IS flag was retrieved from the back of the vehicle used to carry out the attack. Videos from the perpetrator’s Facebook page, posted prior to the attack, included multiple statements of support for the Islamic State. The FBI stated that agents found an unused improvised explosive device (IED) in the vehicle.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Initially, US law enforcement agents stated that they believed that the perpetrator did not act alone. This assessment, which was then refuted, was almost certainly due to the use of multiple weapons used or present during the attack, most notably IEDs.

The attack nevertheless shares many similarities with other “lone wolf” attacks in Europe and North America. The attacker targeted a busy, high visibility area (the French Quarter, a popular tourist destination in New Orleans and a symbol of the city’s history and culture), used low-complexity and easily obtainable weapons (noting that firearms are more easily accessible in the US compared to most West European countries and that the IEDs prepared by the attacker resembled rudimentary “pipe-bombs”), and made multiple symbolic gestures, such as releasing video pledges of allegiance to IS or carrying and IS flag, that clearly associated his actions to the extremist group.

The timing of the attack also further demonstrates how public holidays and celebrations are often targeted by lone actors due to their high visibility.

It is almost certain that the attack was inspired by other IS attacks that used vehicles as primary weapons. In 2017, a man who had pledged allegiance to IS drove a pickup truck into a bike path in Manhattan, killing eight; in 2016, more than 80 people were killed when another IS supporter used a truck to attack a Bastille Day celebration in Nice; in the same year, another truck attack at a Christmas market in Berlin killed 12.

In the United States, vehicle attacks have not solely been carried out by groups or individuals affiliated with IS. In 2017, a man rammed a car into a crowd that was protesting a far-right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, killing one. In 2020 alone, more than 60 car attacks were recorded targeting protesters linked with the Black Lives Matter movement.

There is a realistic possibility that the New Orleans attack will result in further copycat attacks. Online propaganda channels, which are often only loosely affiliated with the Islamic State act as independent broadcasters of pro-IS narratives, and are almost certain to capitalise on the attack to call for further action targeting civilians in the United States and Europe.

In this sense, it is important to note that the number of IS-related arrests in the US increased to 14 in 2024, from nine in 2023. Of these 14, five entailed concrete attack plots, with varied targets including Christian and Jewish places of worship, as well as political events (election day) and other high-visibility events (a pride parade in Phoenix).

On 24 December, the coalition of gangs known as the Viv Ansanm attacked the reopening of the State University of Haiti Hospital in Port-au-Prince, the country’s largest medical facility. The attack resulted in at least four deaths, including two Haitian National Police officers, and more than 15 injuries, several of which were journalists.

The hospital was set to reopen following a previous gang attack in February which had forced it to suspend operations. One of the prominent Viv Ansanm leaders, Johnson “Izo” André, claimed responsibility for the attack and stated that the gang coalition had not authorised the reopening of the hospital.

The attack also led to dismissal of the Haitian health minister who has been temporarily replaced by the country’s justice minister.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The reopening of the hospital was set to be widely covered by the media and serve as a significant achievement for the Haitian government, marking a rare instance of progress amidst widespread violence and instability. The gangs almost certainly attacked the hospital to undermine both the government’s credibility and its ability to restore essential services, with media coverage offering them an opportunity to gain widespread publicity. Furthermore, it is likely that the gangs would have interpreted the reopening of the hospital as a direct challenge to their own power, likely setting a precedent for future attacks.

Most hospitals in Port-au-Prince are now in gang-controlled territory or remain inaccessible due to the extent of violence. The attack on State University of Haiti Hospital combined with these wider trends has hugely disrupted the provision of healthcare in Haiti and will likely lead to a further increase in medical professionals fleeing the country (estimates suggest 40 per cent have already fled) as well as denying the opportunity to train new ones.

NGOs and non-profit organisations will likely be forced to take on even greater responsibility to meet growing healthcare needs but are already overstretched, underfunded, and themselves frequently targeted by gang violence. The collapse of Haiti’s healthcare system is likely to exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation, resulting in increases in disease outbreaks, preventable deaths and levels of food insecurity.

Trinidad and Tobago’s government declared a state of emergency on 30 December in response to the growing criminal activity in the country. The most recent incident involved the gunning down of five men in a neighbourhood on the outskirts of Port of Spain in an act of vengeance over a murdered gang member. The measure reportedly comes in response to advice from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service, who has stressed the threat to public safety.

The state of emergency is set to last 15 days, after which time the government will be able to vote on its extension for up to three months. The measure will give the police and army authority to detain individuals without charge and search properties without a warrant. No curfew or ban on public gatherings will reportedly be part of the emergency measures.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The state of emergency is the first since Covid measures were introduced in 2021 and comes as high-calibre automatic firearms are increasingly used by criminal gangs. Murders have reportedly reached 623 out of a population of 1.5 million in 2024, placing the country’s murder rates as among the highest in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Gangs are largely responsible for the homicide rate increase; they have taken advantage of the country’s proximity to Venezuela, porous borders, and transportation routes to Europe and the US to ship narcotics. In the wake of the recent spate of killings, the police reportedly expect an increase in reprisal shootings between criminal gangs.

The measures will expand the powers of security forces to crack down on criminal gangs in the country to make it uncomfortable for them to operate. Reducing the prevalence of firearms is a target of these emergency measures, with security forces increased powers to search individuals and properties a key deterrent. People found in the company of anyone owning firearms are also liable to arrest to disrupt criminal gang networks.

Exploiting states of emergency to crack down on criminal gangs have been used by other Latin American countries with varying degrees of success. El Salvador’s March 2022 state of emergency led to the arrest of over 81,000 individuals, significantly increasing the country’s safety. Honduras implemented similar measures in December 2022; while the number of murders dropped by 356 in the first two months compared to the same period in the preceding year, gang violence is still a prevalent issue in the country.

To combat the gang violence, these countries utilised the state of emergency to crack down on the gangs with mass arrests and the use of the military, measures which would not have been constitutionally possible without the government decree. It is highly likely that Trinidad and Tobago will follow similar tactics to these countries, using the state of emergency to crack down on gangs with significant force.

The state of emergency has been imposed as the country prepares for a general election to be held before August 2025. Opposition leader and former prime minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar is expected to pose a significant threat to Prime Minister Keith Rowley’s People’s National Movement. These emergency measures, therefore, are highly likely influenced by public perception of Rowley’s administration, which is projecting itself as tough on crime.

Thousands of Cubans march on US Embassy

On 20 December, tens of thousands of Cubans, led by Raul Castro and President Miguel Diaz-Canel, marched in front of the US embassy in Havana to protest Washington’s long-standing sanctions on Cuba and over concerns of harsher sanctions under President-elect Donald Trump. Cuba has recently suffered from a range of economic issues including inflation, systemic power outages and severe shortages of essential goods, which many Cubans blame the US for and have been the drivers of civil unrest against the Cuban government.

The march, organised by the incumbent government, is likely an attempt to deflect hostility away from the government but may also signal a shift in Cuba’s approach to the US, especially with mounting fears of harsher sanctions under Trump.

El Salvador lawmakers overturn metals mining ban

On 23 December, El Salvador’s legislature has voted in favour of overturning a ban on metals mining in a bid to boost economic growth and granted the government sole authority over mining activities. The country was the first in the world to impose a ban, which had been in place for seven years. President Nayib Bukele has been striving to overturn it since taking office in 2019.

Environmental groups oppose the overturning of the ban, with the Economic and Social Development Santa Marta Association (ADES) labelling it “the biggest attack on water, health, and life in El Salvador”. Bukele has defended the move, emphasising El Salvador’s gold reserves. The move will likely attract significant foreign investment and boost employment, something which is key for El Salvador’s debt-ridden economy. However, water contamination is a significant issue which led to the ban in the first place and environmentalists have staged demonstrations against the government measures.

President-elect Donald Trump threatens to return the Panama Canal to the US

On 21 December, Trump claimed on X that the Panama Canal fees are ‘ridiculous’ and that if they are not reduced then he ‘will demand that the Panama Canal be returned to us’. Trump also emphasised that the canal is under threat of falling under China’s influence. The canal is a vital waterway for trade; over 40 per cent of consumer goods traded in 2023 between north-east Asia and the US east coast were reportedly transported through the canal.

Fees have increased in recent years due to droughts, which have reduced the canal’s capacity and driven up variable rates. Trump’s rhetoric is in line with his America First agenda, which aims to reduce perceived exploitation of the US’ goodwill. The ‘canal giveaway’ was a source of humiliation for many in the US, who view it as a loss of a key strategic asset. Pressuring Panama’s authorities to reduce operating costs for US businesses and reduce Chinese influence is, therefore, likely perceived to be a popular measure.

Likely car bomb detonates outside Trump Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada

On 1 January, a Cybertruck manufactured by Tesla exploded outside the entrance to the Trump Hotel in Las Vegas. The truck’s driver, a former Green Beret, was killed, and seven people were injured in the explosion. According to local authorities, the truck, which had been rented hours before the explosion, was found to be filled with fireworks and fuel canisters. It is highly likely that the incident was a planned attack, rather than an accidental detonation.

In addition to the presence of fireworks and fuel (the Cybertruck is an electric vehicle) on the scene, the brand Tesla is owned by billionaire Elon Musk, who has been a key player in Donald Trump’s 2024 electoral campaign. While the attack’s dynamics make it highly likely that it was planned, the perpetrator’s motive remains so far unclear.

90-day environmental emergency declared in Peru after oil spill

On 20 December, a leak was detected as oil was being loaded onto a tanker belonging to state-owned company Petroperu on Las Capullanas beach. The spill reportedly covers an area of approximately 10,000 square metres of seawater and has spread to at least seven beaches. Wildlife including birds and marine fauna has reportedly been significantly affected by the spill.

The public prosecutor’s office has launched an investigation regarding environmental contamination against the company, which has been engaged in cleanup efforts. During the state of emergency, authorities must carry out recovery and remediation work at the affected locations.

Bridge over Tocantins River in Brazil collapses.

On 22 December, the Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira Bridge, which connected the towns of Estreito in Maranhão and Aguiarnopolis in Tocantins, Brazil, collapsed. The collapse sent vehicles, including tankers with hazardous chemicals, into the Tocantins River. 11 people were killed because of the incident.

Search and rescue operations have been ongoing, with six people still reported missing. The local government and emergency services have been actively involved in the recovery and search operations. The Brazilian transportation minister has issued an emergency decree to expedite the rebuilding of the bridge. Despite the hazardous materials involved, the governor of Maranhão has emphasised that there is no risk of contamination to the Tocantins River; water collection from the river has resumed. Investigations into the cause of the incident are ongoing.

Nationwide power outage in Puerto Rico.

On 31 December, Puerto Rico experienced a power outage that affected over one million customers due to a technical fault at a transmission facility in Costa Sur. The blackout led to widespread disruptions, including the suspension of the Tren Urbano rail service and affected essential services like hospitals and medical centres in San Juan.

Power restoration efforts began immediately but there were renewed outages affecting more than 300,000 customers on 1 January. The exact cause of these subsequent outages was unclear, as it was not determined whether they were due to planned load shedding or technical faults. By 2 January, 99 per cent of customers reportedly had their power restored. While efforts to stabilise the power grid are ongoing, further disruptions are likely.

On 26 December, Finnish police and border guards boarded and seized the Cook Island-flagged crude oil tanker, Eagle S (IMO: 9329760), after it was suspected of conducting undersea sabotage. On 25 December, an undersea electricity cable, the Estlink 2, was damaged in the Baltic Sea, disrupting the delivery of power between Estonia and Finland.

Preliminary investigations have discovered anchor drag marks on the seabed several kilometres in length suspected to have been caused by the Eagle S. Upon boarding the vessel, it was discovered that the tanker was equipped with transmitting and receiving devices designed for espionage, allowing it to monitor NATO naval and aircraft activities.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The Eagle S incident follows a series of suspected undersea sabotage incidences in the Baltic attributed to Russia, whereby civilian-flagged vessels have been accused of conducting highly deniable forms of sabotage, primarily targeting vulnerable seabed infrastructure with anchors. The incident likely highlights Russia’s increasing use of commercial vessels which form part of its “shadow fleet” as part of a wider hybrid warfare strategy used to deter support to Ukraine.

The discovery of surveillance equipment on board the vessel also likely suggests that the vessel is directly linked to Russian intelligence, which has likely tasked it to monitor NATO assets and where to conduct sabotage.

Despite NATO promises to increase patrols in the Baltic, the active monitoring of potentially hundreds of repurposed civilian vessels directed by Russian intelligence will almost certainly be incredibly challenging, especially with NATO military assets also tasked with monitoring Russia’s conventional military capabilities. Moreover, the boarding of a vessel is difficult due to legal constraints, the need for international cooperation, potential diplomatic fallout, and operational challenges.

Consequently, it is almost certain that Russia will continue to exploit this disruptive yet low-cost and highly deniable form of sabotage as the West continues to pledge support for Ukraine.

Following a controversial presidential election, Mikheil Kavelashvili was sworn in as Georgia’s new president on 29 December. The election was conducted with an indirect electoral college whose makeup was derived from the contested October 2024 parliamentary election. Kavelashvili, an anti-West ally of the ruling Georgian Dream party, is set to replace Salome Zourabishvili, a pro-Europe figurehead for the anti-government protest movement which has gripped Georgia since October 2024.

Zourabishvili has refused to step down, labelling the presidential election illegitimate, but has vacated the presidential palace.

Major protests have continued across Georgia, primarily in Tbilisi but also in other cities such as Batumi. Protests of varying size and intensity have been organised in Tbilisi in the vicinity of Georgia’s parliament building every day for the past 37 days as of 3 January. While mostly peaceful, the more significant protests have been marked by violent clashes and draconian riot police enforcement methods; the protests during the inauguration on 29 December led to at least seven arrests.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Zourabichvili’s decision to vacate the presidential palace was likely made due to the potential threat of arrest, with multiple political opponents (including the prime minister) having called for her arrest if she did not step aside. If Zourabishvili is arrested, intense protests will almost certainly break out in support of her, likely marked by violent clashes.

The founder of the ruling Georgian Dream party, the oligarch and former prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvi, is almost certainly the most influential figure in Georgian politics, essentially constituting the de facto political leader of the country. In a notable development, the US has imposed sanctions on Ivanishvi due to the claimed erosion of democratic institutions and human rights abuses by security forces. These sanctions include the freezing of his US assets and follow earlier imposed sanctions against senior Georgian Dream interior ministry officials, as well as UK sanctions.

While the EU’s parliament is considering imposing sanctions, these proposals have been hampered by countries perceived to be pro-Russian, namely Hungary and Slovakia.

Unless deposed, it is highly likely that the Georgian Dream government will take Georgia closer into Russia’s sphere of influence. The suspension of EU accession talks has notably led to the most significant escalation in protests. The protest movement, therefore, is likely an existential moment for Georgia towards either a western-aligned pro-Europe or anti-West pro-Russia future. While this fear has almost certainly sustained the protest movement, the feasible options for ousting the ruling Georgian Dream party are slim and it is unlikely that significant concessions that cannot be easily undone will be granted.

On 25 December, An Azerbaijan Airlines flight en route from Baku, Azerbaijan to Grozny, Chechnya crashed during an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan. The crash resulted in at least 38 fatalities and 29 hospitalisations.

Initial reports suggest that the aircraft was likely hit by shrapnel from a Russian surface-to-air missile while flying over Grozny where Russian air defences were reportedly targeting Ukrainian drones. While Russian officials have speculated that the crash occurred because of a bird strike or exploding oxygen tank, the damage appears consistent with Russian surface-to-air missiles. This has yet to be officially confirmed, however.

Azerbaijan Airlines has suspended flights to several Russian cities, citing potential safety risks. Russian President Vladimir Putin has issued an apology to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev for the incident, acknowledging that it occurred in Russian airspace.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has expressed anger at Moscow’s handing of the incident. After the plane was shot down, emergency landing permission in Russian territory was allegedly denied, something which could have potentially led to fewer fatalities. Moscow’s lack of acceptance of responsibility has caused significant outrage in Azerbaijan, notably from state-owned and pro-government media, which has recently typically avoided criticising Russia.

This incident comes amidst Moscow and Baku’s relationship having strengthened in recent years. This is largely due to Moscow’s de facto enabling of the Azerbaijani incursion into Nagorno Karabakh in September 2023, which was formerly an autonomous Amenia-aligned breakaway state that was internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan.

Russian peacekeeping forces stood back to enable the Azerbaijani military offensive before withdrawing completely. Russian support for the Azerbaijani offensive occurred despite Armenia, Azerbaijan’s regional rival, being a member of the Russian-led military alliance Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Baku, likely in response to Moscow’s enabling of Azerbaijan’s presence in Nagorno Karabakh, has avoided taking a side in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Yerevan has since announced its intention to leave the CSTO.

Despite Azerbaijan not being a member of CSTO, economic, diplomatic, and cultural factors make good relations important for each country. Russia is one of Azerbaijan’s key trading partners, with Russian companies investing significantly in Azerbaijani energy and infrastructure. Furthermore, Azerbaijan has the largest Russian presence in the South Caucasus and Russian is widely spoken in the country. Simultaneously, a significant Azerbaijani diaspora resides in Russia.

Despite this high-profile plane crash representing a point of tension for the two nations, their shared interest in maintaining good relations makes a major diplomatic severing undesirable for each country. Therefore, a significant worsening of relations is unlikely in the aftermath of the plane crash, despite public anger.

The de facto leader of Syria and the emir of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Golani), gave an interview with Al Arabiya on 29 December in which he laid out an agenda for Syria’s future. Some of the key points made included a transitional process involving a constitution writing process which may take three years, elections which may take four years (that will require a comprehensive population census prior), the dissolution of HTS, no federalisation and the integration of Kurdish forces into the new Syrian military, and the maintenance of a relationship with Russia.

Furthermore, pro-Assad supporters killed at least 14 interior ministry troops on 26 December near Tartus, one of the deadliest attacks by regime loyalists since the overthrow of Assad by rebel forces.

Clashes and military operations have continued in northern Syria between the Kurdish-led and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Turkish-led Syrian National Army (SNA) with support from the conventional Turkish military. The most intense fighting has occurred in the eastern countryside of Manbij in the vicinity of the strategically important Tishreen Dam, despite a Pentagon statement on 30 December that claimed a ceasefire “is holding”. The Turkish Air Force has provided close air support (CAS) for the SNA, and the Turkish military has conducted extensive artillery strikes on numerous villages.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Iran is likely to be the state actor that loses most from Syria’s new geopolitical direction. Notably, al-Sharra made a particular effort to be conciliatory regarding Russia, despite Moscow’s key role in militarily supporting the Assad regime (which included indiscriminate bombing campaigns against previously rebel-held urban areas such as Aleppo and Idlib). Al-Sharaa stated that Russia is the “second most powerful country in the world” and Syria has “strategic interests” with Russia.

The Russian military still maintains a presence in Syria, although significantly reduced since the lightning HTS-led offensive that overthrew the regime. There is a realistic possibility that a deal may be reached between Russia and Syria’s new government that formally allows Russia to continue its leasing of the Hmeimim airbase and Tartus naval base.

China’s exclusion is notable, with a sizable contingent of Uyghurs from the Chinese territory of Xinjiang fighting for HTS. Uyghurs have been given senior military roles in Syria’s new armed forces – it is likely that the strong anti-Beijing sentiment of HTS’ Uyghur fighters will factor into Damascus’ new foreign policy towards China.

The largest threat to stability in post-Assad Syria likely remains the status of the Kurdish-led SDF-controlled areas of north-northeastern Syria. Al-Sharaa, in addition to other senior HTS figures, has explicitly stated that federalisation will not be pursued. This highly likely presents a challenge to the prospective future autonomy of Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria.

Without substantial support from the US (which may be limited due to the incoming Trump administration, with Trump stating a desire to be disentangled from Syrian affairs) and amidst the ongoing conflict between Turkish-led forces and the SDF (which may further escalate), it is likely that aligning themselves with HTS is one of few options for the SDF to avoid an escalation in conflict that could pose an existential threat to the Kurdish population.

While Turkey has given substantial support to HTS, HTS are almost certainly far less influenced by Ankara than the SNA and al-Sharra has expressed that the Kurds are “an integral part” of Syria. This has highly likely conditioned an SDF statement that they are ready to cooperate with al-Sharra to be the “nucleus of the Syrian army”, despite the significant risks posed to the Kurds by the SDF losing its autonomy through integration.

In mid-December, protests were sparked in Kenya over the alleged abduction of critics of the President William Ruto-led Kenya Kwanza government. The allegations stipulate that the government has illegally apprehended dozens of people who were believed to be involved in the June protests sparked by deeply unpopular taxes.

The Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC) estimates that over 80 people have gone missing, with at least seven more being abducted since mid-December. Small-scale protests that were primarily organised in central Nairobi have spread to other parts of the capital and have also been recorded in other major population centres, including Mombassa, Eldoret, Embu and Kisumu.

Protests have also grown in size and have led to several instances of violent clashes with the police, the deployment of tear gas and multiple arrests, including the arrest of an opposition senator who had publicly criticised the abductions.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The government’s continued abductions, use of crowd dispersal measures and arrest of opposition figures will highly likely sustain protest activity which is likely to increase in scale and spread to other cities. Following the June protests and proposed tax increases, the Ruto administration remains deeply unpopular, especially with the youth who have been the instigators of much of the unrest.

Critics have even warned of a general trend of democratic backsliding and a return to the repressive use of tactics that were witnessed under President Daniel Moi (1978-2002), which was marked by the detention, torture and disappearance of critics, journalists, activists and members of the opposition.

Moreover, despite the withdrawal of many of the controversial planned tax increases following the June protests, multiple new taxes will be introduced in 2025 that will help shape the conditions for more unrest.

In 2024, there were an estimated 1,800 demonstrations held across Kenya, indicating the level of dissatisfaction with the current administration. Most of these protests also continued despite the government’s use of force, which in some cases involved the firing of live ammunition.  Given the underlying drivers and unresolved grievances that have previously contributed to unrest, there is a high likelihood that the current anti-abduction protests will be co-opted, especially by Kenya’s youth, and develop into violent unrest comparable to the protests observed in June 2024. 

On 29 December, Chad held its first parliamentary, regional, and municipal elections in over a decade. 8.3 million people are registered to vote in Chad and voted for legislators in a 188-seat parliament, 95 of which are required for a majority.

The election was marked by significantly low voter turnout, with opposition parties, including the primary opposition party, the Transformers Party, boycotting the election over concerns about the credibility of the electoral process, raising concerns over the election’s transparency and fairness.

The election was marked by significant repression, with the Chadian National Election Management Authority (ANGE) prohibiting pictures and photographs of the results, citing the threat of manipulated results being uploaded. Furthermore, online newspapers were banned from broadcasting videos related to the election on 4 December. ANGE has declared that vote counting is under way and provisional results are expected by 15 January.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Since the death of President Idriss Déby in 2021, Chad has been led by a transitional military government led by the former president’s son, Mahamat Déby, who has run as part of the Patriotic Salvation Movement. These elections mark a key transition point in the move away from military rule, with the election formally ending the “transitional period”. The elections were initially promised in 2020 but were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Chad is the first of the recently coup-hit Sahel countries to hold elections. Déby, whose family has ruled Chad since 1991, will almost certainly claim victory in the provisional results.

Many opposition figures have criticised the elections as fraudulent. Déby has been criticised over utilising the elections to consolidate power. Security forces reportedly killed opposition candidate Yaya Dillo, Déby’s biggest challenger, in February 2024. According to a poll issued by the Center for Development Studies and the Prevention of Extremism, 50.94 per cent of respondents claimed that they did not believe in the credibility of Chad’s electoral authorities. More than 90 per cent of the registered voters reportedly adhered to opposition calls for election boycott. Without full opposition participation, human rights organisations including Amnesty International have claimed that the election is likely to be unfair.

Given the widespread view in Chad that the elections are fraudulent, civil unrest is highly likely as ANGE publishes the provisional results, with small-scale demonstrations already held in the capital N’Djamena. Chad’s government, which has previously cracked down on protests with live ammunition, tear gas, arbitrary detentions, and media censorship, will highly likely turn to these measures again if unrest reaches a significant level. Notably, after Déby postponed elections due in October 2022, security forces killed over 100 people with live ammunition after demonstrations erupted against the government.

The most recent phase of unrest, labelled “TurboV8”, was sparked in response to the Constitutional Council ruling in favour of the government on 23 December. It has constituted the most violent phase yet, with at least 176 deaths, and has triggered the FCDO to issue an advisory against all but essential travel to Mozambique. In the “TurboV8” phase, demonstrations occurred across major cities in Mozambique including Maputo, Beira, and Nampula. In Maputo, protesters set several buildings on fire. In Beira, protesters blocked multiple roads and set tyres on fire. In Maganja da Costa and Namicopo, armed individuals reportedly invaded police stations.

Most bus services from Maputo to other provinces have been halted after protesters vandalised the main terminal in the city. There is a fuel shortage in Maputo and Matola due to fuel stations being targeted by protesters. Security forces responded to unrest with tear gas and live ammunition. According to local NGOs, approximately 261 people have been killed in Mozambique since the post-election unrest began.

On 25 December, at least 6,000 inmates escaped from the maximum-security Central Prison of Maputo following prison riots whereby prisoners overpowered guards and seized their weapons. Among the escapees were Islamic State Mozambique (ISM/Shabaab Cult) militants. Around 13,000 people have reportedly crossed the border into southern Malawi via the Shire River and Ruo River to escape the unrest. A further 1,000 have requested asylum in Eswatini. This is indicative of the lack of end in sight and continued deterioration of the country’s security situation.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane has set 15 January as the date to be sworn in as president, the same day Frelimo candidate Daniel Chapo is set to be sworn in. Mondlane has laid the groundwork for potential rule in 2025, expressing that he will remove the weapon from Mozambique’s flag, revise its constitution, and change the names of streets named after communists. Furthermore, he has called for Mozambicans to elect their own regional leaders in elections on 6 and 7 January. Unrest will almost certainly continue until the government steps down, something that is unlikely to happen without significant pressure, with demonstrations highly likely to increase in intensity as 15 January nears.

Opposition candidate Venâncio Mondlane has announced a new phase of unrest titled “ponta de lança” (spearhead). While he was set to announce the details on the phase on 2 January, this was postponed. Mondlane has indicated that this phase will encompass a “five-day tolerance” period for international humanitarian and investigative organisations to assess alleged human rights abuses by security forces.

Mondlane has declared the prison break a calculated government move to distract from the protests and manipulate public opinion. This is unlikely to be the case; however, since the addition of more IS fighters to the ongoing insurgency in the Cabo Delgado region will almost certainly further strain government resources as it diverts assets to tackle the insurgency. The inmates, likely calculating that law enforcement resources are strained and unable to focus on securing the prison, almost certainly used the context of the protests to take advantage of reduced security measures. This prison escape will likely add to the pressure from demonstrations.

Anti-government protests in Albanian capital

On 23 December, Albania’s main opposition party, the Democratic Party, organised protests in central Tirana to demand a technocratic caretaker government ahead of the May 2024 elections. The demonstrations, led by recently released party leader Sali Berisha, accused Prime Minister Edi Rama’s left-wing government of corruption and election manipulation. The protests blocked several main intersections in the capital and police intervened after 90 minutes, leading to clashes. Further protests are likely ahead of the May elections, especially as the accusations of corruption, government overreach and electoral manipulation are damaging Albania’s progress towards EU integration.  

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announces plans to change Turkey’s constitution

On 21 December, Erdoğan renewed his long-standing aim for a new constitution upholding ‘democratic, inclusive, and libertarian’ values during a speech in Muğla in southwest Turkey. Erdoğan is currently serving his third and apparently final term, with the next presidential election not due until May 2028.

By creating a new constitution, it is highly likely that Erdoğan will seek to eliminate constitutional limits on presidential terms, which would allow him to run for president again in 2028. If Erdoğan proceeds with measures to amend the constitution, significant unrest is highly likely.

According to local news polls, 66.3 per cent of the Turkish population oppose a constitutional amendment which would enable Erdoğan to run in 2028. A successful referendum on Turkey’s constitution was held in 2017, with the population voting to change the country from a parliamentary system into a presidential republic. Another amendment would almost certainly help Erdoğan further consolidate power.

Protests in Iran over economic conditions

Merchants and business owners in Tehran’s historic bazaar staged a rare strike on 29 December to protest rising inflation and the soaring devaluation of the Iranian rial, which has surpassed 810,000 to the dollar. The strike, initially led by shoe sellers, quickly spread to other sectors and key commercial hubs. Merchants cited skyrocketing raw material costs, reduced consumer demand, and widespread closures of workshops as driving factors, with over a third of the population now living below the poverty line. While security forces were deployed and gatherings subsided by day’s end without reported violence, the unrest highlights the dire economic state of Iran under US-led sanctions which could become more common and potentially violent if the incoming Trump administration increase sanctions on Iran.

Zimbabwe abolishes the death penalty

On 31 December, President Emmerson Mnangagwa approved a law to abolish the death penalty with immediate effect. The death penalty has not been used since 2005, largely because of a general reluctance to take up the job of state executioner. Mnangagwa has publicly opposed the death penalty since 2017, leveraging his presidential powers several times to commute death sentences of inmates. By the end of 2023, approximately 60 people were on death row; they will be re-sentenced. Zimbabwe will be the 113^th country globally to abolish the death penalty, according to Amnesty International.

Rare mass shooting in Montenegro

On 1 January, a mass shooting in the town of Cetinje resulted in the deaths of 12 people, excluding the gunmen who died by suicide. The shooting occurred after an altercation at a bar and is almost certainly an isolated incident. However, this is the second mass shooting in three years in Cetinje and the incident will likely spark calls for stricter gun control in Montenegro and may lead to protests similar to those witnessed in neighbouring Serbia after it suffered two mass shootings.

Palestinian militants increase rate of attacks in north Gaza Strip

Between 30 and 31 December, Israeli sources reported a growing number of “multi-wave” attacks by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters on Israel Defence Forces (IDF) positions near Jabalia. These attacks, which were carried out by reportedly groups of up to 30 fighters at a time, were larger than any attack on Israeli forces in Gaza in recent months. According to the IDF, approximately 100 Palestinian fighters were killed during the attacks. The IDF has been seeking to clear Jabalia for months, after isolating the northernmost refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, and Israeli forces assess that approximately 200 fighters remain in the area.

Nigerian military strike kills civilians on Christmas Day

On 25 December, a Nigerian military airstrike killed at least 10 people and injured several others in the northwestern Sokoto state. The operation was reportedly targeting the newly formed Lakurawa terrorist group that may have links to regional jihadist coalition, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).

The strike follows a series of largely aerial Nigerian military operations that have accidentally killed civilians which has led to calls to review targeting procedures and enhance intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, with such strikes likely enabling extremist groups’ recruitment and propaganda campaigns.

The Nigerian government has conducted a probe into the strike and has determined that the fatalities were attributed to “secondary explosions” and not airstrikes, a claim that will likely be widely refuted.

Clashes between Somali and Ethiopian forces

On 23 December, Somali and Ethiopian forces reportedly clashed in the border town of Doolow in Somalia’s Gedo region. The incident occurred amidst heightened tensions between Mogadishu and the Jubaland region, which recently elected its president for a third term in elections viewed as illegitimate by the federal government.

Ethiopia, which has forces situated in the country as part of the peacekeeping African Union transition mission in Somalia (ATMIS), has been accused of backing Jubaland against the government in a bid to stabilise Ethiopia’s eastern border against al-Shabaab. Since the controversial Jubaland election on 25 November, Somali federal forces and Jubaland Derawish forces have clashed several times as Mogadishu attempts to assert control over Somali territory.

According to Mogadishu, Ethiopia violated its sovereignty which ‘will not go unanswered’. This incident comes shortly after a Turkey-brokered treaty between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa to settle the Somaliland port dispute. Given that this treaty has done little to prevent clashes, further tensions between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa are highly likely.

UN authorises new peacekeeping mission in Somalia

On 27 December, the UN adopted the resolution for a new peacekeeping mission, African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which will support the deployment of up to 12,626 personnel and replace the existing African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The mission aims to support Mogadishu in its ongoing conflict with the al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabaab, which is currently waging an insurgency in Somali territory.

Mogadishu is still deciding which countries will contribute troops. Ethiopia, a focus of recent tensions, is notably excluded from the mission. Egypt, a regional rival of Ethiopia, has announced plans to participate in the mission. Burundi’s government has declared that it would not contribute troops due to a lack of consensus with Mogadishu over troop numbers.

While AUSSOM will help Mogadishu combat the insurgency, its effectiveness will likely be limited. ATMIS encountered significant challenges and was not able to significantly degrade al-Shabaab. Mogadishu, amidst ongoing struggles to consolidate power over Somalia, will likely continue to struggle against ongoing al-Shabaab and Islamic State insurgencies despite the peacekeeping presence.

Islamic State Somalia Province (ISSP) launches large-scale attack in Puntland, Somalia

On 31 December, ISSP forces launched a large scale attack on Puntland forces in Dharjaale. According to available Puntland sources, ISSP forces used multiple suicide bombers and suicide vehicle borne IEDs (SVBIEDs) to attack their military targets, killing at least 20.

In the attack’s aftermath, pro-IS channels noted how the operation was led by foreign fighters, mostly from North Africa and the Arab Peninsula. The large scope and sophistication of the operation and the use of foreigners almost certainly demonstrate the growing importance of the Somali branch of IS, led by Abdul Qadir Mumin.

Mumin, who some reports (likely incorrectly) identified as IS’ “Caliph”, has a large influence over the group due to ISSP’s central role in routing flows of funds to other African and Asian IS branches.

Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) kill 21 civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

The series of attacks began on 21 December after the ADF made an incursion into the village of Robinet in the North Kivu region, killing six civilians. On 22 December, the ADF entered the neighbouring village of Kodjo and killed 12 more civilians. Three more civilians were killed on 25 December after the ADF entered Makele, another village in the area.

The attacks all happened around the resource-rich Manguredjipa and represent a fresh escalation of terror attacks in the region. The ADF is a militant Islamist group that originated in Uganda in 1995 and pledged allegiance to Islamic State in 2019.

While both DRC and Ugandan forces are currently fighting the ADF, they have been unable to contain the group, which has expanded its operations since 2021 and conducted numerous attacks targeting civilians in both the DRC and Uganda. Further attacks targeting civilians in North Kivu are highly likely in the coming weeks.

Journalist arrested in Tehran as possible “retaliation” for US-backed arrests of IRGC supporters

An Italian journalist, Cecilia Sala, was arrested in Tehran days after arriving in the country over an unspecified “violation” of Iranian law. The arrest took place days after two Iranian citizens were detained in an international police operation coordinated by Washington, over allegedly providing material support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). One of the two suspects, Mohammad Abedini Najafabadi, was arrested at the Milan airport, where he landed on a flight from Turkey. The arrests could precipitate a diplomatic crisis between Tehran and the European Union at a time where the Pezeshkian administration is cautiously signalling its willingness to improve its relations with Brussels.

Nigeria establishes emergency response centre to address Lassa fever outbreak

Nigeria has activated an emergency response centre to address a Lassa fever outbreak that has killed 190 people and infected 1,154 across six states this year. The disease, transmitted through contact with rodent-contaminated items or bodily fluids, peaks during the dry season (October to May). The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) categorised the risk as high, with the response centre coordinating efforts to manage the viral haemorrhagic illness, which causes symptoms ranging from fever to death. Lassa fever is classified by the WHO as a priority disease due to its epidemic potential and the absence of approved vaccines.

Sudan suspends participation in hunger monitoring system

On the eve of a critical report expected to reveal famine spreading to five regions in Sudan, the Sudanese government has withdrawn from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) system, citing concerns about sovereignty and the reliability of IPC reports. The decision will almost certainly reduce the ability of external actors to access the humanitarian situation on the ground and will likely undermine the efforts of aid agencies and NGOs operating in the country, where an estimated 25 million people are experiencing crisis levels of hunger.

DRC government releases most Chinese nationals held for illegal mining

On 25 December, the DRC government released 14 of 17 Chinese nationals arrested over the operation of an illegal gold mine after they were unable to provide the necessary documentation. The arrests were part of a broader crackdown on illegal mining in the resource-rich country. The government has struggled to maintain control of these resources amidst armed groups and unlicenced mining companies exploiting them illicitly.

On 24 December, Pakistani airstrikes targeted alleged Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan/Pakistani Taliban (TTP) camps, training facilities, and rear areas in Afghanistan’s Paktika province. The strikes reportedly caused multiple civilian casualties, as claimed by the Afghan Taliban, with the UN supporting these claims with credible evidence. In response, the Afghan Taliban summoned Pakistan’s envoy in Kabul to protest the attack. On 28 December, the Afghan Taliban launched retaliatory attacks on Pakistani border posts, with violence primarily concentrated in the Waziristan region in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on the international border.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Pakistan’s airstrikes in Afghanistan likely reflect an escalation in its counter-terrorism operations against the TTP, which has long used the border areas as a safe haven to sustain its activities and has been supported by the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has endured its worst year of terrorist attacks in a decade, which have increased since the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan.

With limited resources to conduct a major ground offensive in parts of Pakistan where the TTP hold influence, Pakistan likely calculates that airstrikes within Afghanistan are its best course of action to degrade the TTP whilst retaining its own combat power. Moreover, Pakistan is under pressure from China to address its security challenges to protect Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments.

Consequently, there is a realistic possibility that Pakistan will increasingly use airstrikes within Afghanistan, with ground forces overstretched due to ongoing insurgencies, terrorist attacks and widespread civil unrest.  

The Afghan Taliban is unlikely to attempt to restrain TTP activities over fears of a backlash and defections to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Other efforts, such as relocating TTP militants deeper into Afghanistan or diplomatic engagements have largely failed. These trends will likely sustain the current hostilities and invite further Pakistani attacks within Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s response will likely include increased attacks on Pakistani military outposts in the border regions but could also include the sponsoring of major TTP attacks within Pakistan. Whilst primarily based in the border regions, the TTP is known to have sleeper cells and networks throughout Pakistan and has previously conducted mass casualty attacks in cities like Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Karachi and Lahore.

The current cross-border conflict could signal a dangerous cycle, with both sides unlikely to back down, increasing the risk of broader regional instability and increased attacks within Pakistan.

The South Korean judiciary has been actively pursuing legal actions against Yoon and other officials involved in the martial law declaration. The South Korean court has issued arrest and search warrants for Yoon on charges related to sedition and abuse of power. The prosecutors have been consulting with police to execute these warrants, which are set to expire on 6 January.

However, Yoon’s legal team argues that the requirements for his arrest have not been met, and they question the prosecutorial authority to investigate sedition. Acting president Han Duck-soo has also been impeached over his refusal to appoint judges to the Constitutional Court, a move that opposition lawmakers claim was politically motivated. The finance minister Choi Sang-mok has assumed the acting presidency.

Solace Global Assessment: 

It is unclear whether investigators will be able to execute the warrants before they expire. Yoon’s security team have blocked investigators from entering the presidential office grounds and Yoon’s residence for searches. On 3 January, police forces called off an arrest operation after they were blocked for six hours. Yoon continues to retain a support base among the population. There is a realistic possibility that protesters will prevent police from arresting Yoon, something that has occurred in the past after authorities have attempted to arrest politicians in the past. Further attempts to arrest Yoon will almost certainly be met with resistance.

Several military officials also face charges over the declaration of martial law. The commander of the Intelligence Command and the Army Chief of Staff, among others, have been arrested or indicted for their roles in the martial law implementation. These actions reflect the broader efforts by South Korean authorities to hold accountable those who participated in what is viewed as an unlawful and politically motivated imposition of martial law.

As the Constitutional Court prepares for the next hearing in Yoon’s impeachment trial set for 3 January, the political and legal challenges facing South Korea remain acute. The outcomes of these proceedings will have significant implications for the country’s governance and the future of its democratic institutions.

Shia communities stage protests across Pakistan

Shia groups and communities are staging indefinite sit-in protests across multiple Pakistani cities, including Karachi and Lahore, to condemn sectarian violence that has been targeting Shia Muslims in northwestern Pakistan since late November. The protests, which include blockades in Karachi and Kurram District’s Parachinar, have caused significant disruptions, particularly in Karachi, where major intersections and key roads, including routes to Jinnah International Airport.

Despite the imposition of a state of emergency in the areas where Shia communities are being targeted, the violence is unlikely to decrease in the short term given the wealth of security issues the government is being forced to contend with, including Baloch uprisings, Taliban assaults on the border and other forms of militancy.

There is a realistic possibility of the protests increasing and spreading to other cities, leading to further transport disruptions, clashes with the police and the issuing of Section 144s by the authorities.

Significant transport disruption in Punjab during farmer’s protest.

On 30 December, farmers in Punjab, supported by transporters, workers, traders, and religious groups, caused an effective shutdown between 07:00 and 16:00 local time. The shutdown included a suspension of bus services, train cancellations, and over 200 major highway blockages. Protesters are demanding a debt waiver, pensions, frozen electricity tariffs, the withdrawal of police cases, the reinstatement of the Land Acquisition Act, and justice and compensation for victims of the 2021 Lakhimpur Kheri vehicle-ramming, drive-by shooting, and mob lynching. Jagjit Singh Dallewal, the leader of the protesters, has been hunger striking for over a month, refusing all medical treatment. Further disruptions are highly likely.

Hong Kong issues new arrest warrants for pro-democracy activists.

In a move that has been condemned by the US and other Western nations, Hong Kong issued arrest warrants for six overseas pro-democracy activists and bounties of HKD one million on 24 December. The activists face charges of secession, subversion, and collusion with foreign forces under the national security law which has been used extensively to quash dissent but at the expense of Hong Kong’s reputation as an international finance hub.

Authorities impose curfew in Noumea and three neighbouring municipalities in New Caledonia

French officials have imposed a curfew in the capital Noumea and three neighbouring municipalities on 1 and 2 January, following months of unrest related to a proposed constitutional change. The curfew, which comes just weeks after the previous one was lifted on 2 December, is a response to the ongoing tensions and concerns about potential public disorder during the festive season. The reinstatement of the curfew also follows a rise in road fatalities since the lifting of the previous curfew. The traditional car parades which typically take place in Noumea over the festive season have been cancelled as a result of the curfew. The authorities are likely aiming to curtail any further accidents or violent incidents, as the region grapples with social unrest.

State of emergency declared in parts of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province

On 23 December the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) provincial cabinet approved the imposition of a state of emergency in the districts of Kurram and Khyber in response to the deteriorating security situation in the region. Months of sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia communities has resulted in hundreds of deaths through violence and an estimated 120 children have died as a result of medicine shortages caused by road blocks according to a former minister. However, relief efforts will likely be delayed by militant and Taliban attacks along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan.  

Bangladeshi Christian homes set on fire on Christmas Eve

On Christmas Eve at least 17 homes belonging to the minority Christian community were set on fire in the Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts area. This act is likely further evidence that the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has led to the emboldening of extremism in Bangladesh, with attacks on the Hindu minority community also having been widely reported since the changing of the government.

China’s President Xi threatens Taiwan in New Year’s speech

China’s President Xi Jinping reiterated in his New Year’s speech that China’s “reunification” with Taiwan is inevitable, warning against pro-independence forces. The veiled threat follows a year marked by an increase in Chinese military incursions in Taiwan’s waters and air space, with almost daily violations, including several exercises simulating the encirclement of the island nation.  Whilst most of this activity has been designed to intimidate Taiwan, isolate Taipei and normalise Chinese military presence in the area, the increase in military activity has almost certainly heightened the risk of miscalculation that could trigger a broader conflict. On 3 January, China doubled down on its stance by imposing sanctions on 45 US entities accused of providing arms to Taiwan, further escalating tensions.

Plane crashes at South Korea’s Muan Airport

On 29 December, a Jeju Airlines flight crashed at Muan Airport in South Korea. Emergency services confirmed that 179 of 181 passengers were killed, with two individuals rescued from the wreckage. The crash led to the closure of Muan Airport until 1 January, affecting all domestic and international flights. The South Korean transport ministry reported that a bird strike warning was issued shortly before the crash, and eyewitnesses captured video evidence of an engine failure just before the aircraft crash-landed. As of 30 December, South Korean officials reported that one of the two black boxes from the crashed plane was retrieved but partially damaged. The investigation into the cause of the crash is ongoing, with the damaged black box potentially hindering progress. Hundreds of people gathered at the airport in the aftermath to express their frustration at the length of time body identification has taken. Jeju Air chief executive Kim E-bae was barred by authorities from leaving the country pending investigation into the cause of the crash.

Authorities tackle wildfires in Australia’s New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory

On 30 December, 52 wildfires simultaneously occurred in New South Wales and Australian Capital Territory. Residents in parts of the Tamworth Local Government Area were advised to prepare to evacuate due to a wildfire burning to the south of the town. Earlier in the season, crews successfully took control of the Scrubby Gully Road Fire near Walcha, which had burned through 172 acres of grassland. The high number of uncontrolled fires signifies a continued risk and the need for vigilance and preparedness in the affected areas. Further wildfires are almost certain during Southeast Australia’s wildfire season which runs from December to February.

Vanuatu hit by a 6.1 magnitude earthquake

The earthquake occurred on 22 December approximately 30 kilometres west of Port Vila at a depth of 39.9 kilometres, resulting in no casualties or significant damage. The tremor occurred five days after the country was struck by a 7.3 magnitude earthquake. The initial earthquake killed 14 and injured 200, causing significant damage to the country’s infrastructure. In response to the earthquakes, Australia operated military flights delivering humanitarian aid and flying 568 citizens out of the country. Vanuatu is in the seismically active Pacific Ring of Fire region, which accounts for 90 per cent of the world’s earthquakes. Further earthquakes can occur spontaneously and may trigger tsunami warnings.

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