President-elect Donald Trump’s team is reportedly debating the nature and limitations of an invasion into Mexico to combat the cartels. Despite the controversial nature of the proposal, several of Trump’s cabinet picks, such as the nominated secretary of defence, secretary of state, national security advisor and “border czar” have publicly supported the idea of potentially deploying the US military to Mexico.

Undisclosed sources close to Trump have stated that the plan which has gained the most traction is that of a “soft invasion”, whereby US special forces will be deployed to assassinate cartel leaders on Mexican soil.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There is a high likelihood that plans to deploy US forces to Mexico are simply posturing by the Trump team to force Mexico into adopting more forceful measures against the cartels. While Trump may be able to deploy military forces for short-term operations under the War Powers Resolution, a long-term deployment would likely necessitate the approval of Congress, which would be challenging to secure. Such a plan would present a direct challenge to Mexico’s sovereignty and would almost certainly strain relations with the US’ southern neighbour.

Additionally, the deployment of US forces to Mexico in any capacity would likely lead to security issues in both countries. In Mexico, the assassination of cartel leaders would lead to power vacuums and increased cartel violence, as evidenced by the civil war that erupted in the Sinaloa Cartel following the July 2024 US arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada. The cartels could also escalate violence on US citizens and assets within Mexico, resulting in attacks on US tourists, increased kidnappings, and attacks on US businesses.

The Mexican public could also turn strongly against the US, resulting in anti-American protests and potential boycotts of US businesses. The cartels could escalate violence on US streets through increased gang conflict or targeted killings, while also intensifying drug trafficking to the US to exacerbate domestic issues such as addiction, overdoses, and associated crime.

The United Nations (UN) has initiated a partial withdrawal of staff from Port-au-Prince, Haiti in response to escalating gang violence. The UN has been evacuating staff from the capital via helicopter, moving some staff to safer areas like Cap-Haitien. As of 27 November, the UN reported that more than 40,000 people had been displaced from the capital in the previous ten days.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The partial withdrawal of UN staff and widespread displacement of people within the capital is highly likely indicative of the gangs seizing more territory and an increase in gang violence. However, the UN’s withdrawal from Port-au-Prince is unlikely a signal that the organisation is ceasing operations altogether in Haiti. The partial withdrawal is likely a strategic downsizing of staff in the capital to ensure the ability to conduct a full and rapid evacuation if the security situation further deteriorates and has almost certainly been triggered by the gangs previous targeting of airplanes heading to Toussaint Louverture International Airport, which has forced multiple airliners into suspending operations to the capital.

A reduced staff footprint in the capital will almost certainly reduce the UN’s ability to coordinate humanitarian operations and may also influence NGOs to reduce or cease operations in Haiti. Moreover, the UN’s partial withdrawal will likely foster perceptions of abandonment amongst the civilian population. This dynamic will likely to play into the hands of the gangs who are increasingly becoming the main provider of protection, aid and other necessities in many of the areas under their control, enabling them to increase control and recruitment.

The withdrawal will also likely embolden gangs, who are likely to assess that their campaign of violence is producing the desired objectives. There is a realistic possibility that the reallocation of UN staff to areas like Cap-Haitien will lead to an increase in internally displaced people (IDPs) seeking assistance in the northern and rural regions where the gangs have a reduced presence. This trend will likely overstretch both the security forces and humanitarian efforts.   

UK-Argentina tensions flare up over Falklands oil drilling

Tensions between the UK and Argentina have escalated as the Falklands government has approved plans for offshore oil exploration, with production expected to begin in 2027. The Sea Lion field, located 220 km from the islands, is being developed by Israeli company Navitas and British firm Rockhopper Exploration.

Argentina has expressed its disapproval of the project, claiming it is an illegal resource extraction in disputed waters, in a challenge to UK sovereignty. The development could produce up to 80,000 barrels per day, significantly affecting both the Falklands’ economy and likely escalating the regional dispute with Argentina.

Left wing wins elections in Uruguay

The opposition’s candidate Yamandú Orsi narrowly secured victory by approximately 13,000 votes. Orsi is a moderate and ran a very conciliatory campaign, which will result in the Broad Front returning to power after five years of conservative rule. It is unlikely that the election results, which were swiftly accepted by the losing side, will drive protests in the coming weeks.

Multiple bomb threats against Trump cabinet nominees

Several of the president-elect’s picks for the next administration’s key posts have received bomb threats and have been the victims of “swatting” since their appointments. The incidents follow an escalation of violence and threats targeting US politicians, which included the two assassination attempts against Donald Trump. The individuals responsible for the threats have not yet been identified.

Swatting, the practice of making a hoax call to emergency services to prompt the deployment of an armed police force to an address, is widely employed by extremist political activists in the US due to its low cost and risk of identification for the caller, and its severe mental and possibly physical harm it inflicts on its targets.

Colombia-led operation leads to seizure of record amounts of cocaine

A Colombian-led operation labelled Operation Orion, which involved cooperation between 62 countries, has resulted in the record seizure of 225 tonnes of cocaine and over 400 arrests in six weeks. The operation also led to the interdiction of six semi-submersible vessels, which identified the existence a new major trafficking route to Australia.

The operation will likely result in a limited disruptions of the cartels’ drug trafficking networks. However, there is a realistic possibility that the success of the operation will lead to cartel reprisals, most often characterised by direct attacks on law enforcement, the military or politicians responsible.  

Mass power outages in Sao Paulo, Brazil

On 28 November, more than 130,000 residents of Sao Paulo were left without electricity due to ongoing infrastructural disruption due to heavy rain and winds, which followed high temperatures of 35 degrees Celsius. Protracted power outages can result in indirect but severe disruptions, including civil unrest. While local authorities have successfully reduced the number of affected households by the morning of 29 November, further forecasted extreme weather conditions could result in further power outages.

Romania held the first round of its presidential elections on 24 November. Călin Georgescu, an independent and anti-establishment candidate, won 22.9 per cent of the total votes, placing first and progressing to the second round, which will be held on 8 December. He is joined by Elena Lasconi, of the Save Romania Union (USR), who obtained 19.17 per cent of the total vote, and barely surpassed Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) candidate.

The election results are a massive upset, with pre-election polling placing Georgescu, who does not belong to a party and campaigned mostly on social media, at 5 per cent. Moreover, Ciolacu’s failure to reach the second round is likewise unexpected.

On 1 December, a week before the presidential vote, parliamentary elections are set to take place in Romania. Here, the PSD leads the overall polling (at around 30 per cent support) but is followed by the anti-establishment Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), which has endorsed Georgescu.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The first-round result has been a political shock not only for Bucharest, but also for Brussels. On 26 November, Valerie Hayer, who heads the reformist Renew group in the EU Parliament, called on the CEO of Chinese-owned social media company TikTok to speak at the parliament over concerns about disinformation. On 28 November, the Constitutional Court ordered the election votes to be recounted.

Georgescu has a realistic chance to win in the second round, also thanks to AUR’s endorsement. Lasconi’s position is not particularly strong, as the centre-right candidate needs to win the support of centre-left voters. Georgescu can instead appeal to a large and “post-ideological” reservoir of disenfranchised voters. In this sense, he can benefit from past political developments that have increased anti-institution sentiments, such as the judiciary’s decision to ban Diana Sosoaca, leader of far-right party SOS Romania, from the list of eligible presidential candidates in October.

The parliamentary vote is likely to be extremely important for the second round of the presidential elections. The Social Democrats suffered a political setback with Ciolacu’s defeat and have ended their alliance with another centre-right force, the National Liberal Party (PNL). This, alongside Lasconi’s USR’s unwillingness to work with PSD, creates a deeply fragmented centre, which may benefit anti-establishment forces.

If results on 1 December match the polls’ predictions, there is a realistic possibility of a parliament divided into three fronts: one led by the PSD, a liberal one, and an AUR-dominated right. In this case, a possible Georgescu win on 8 December could prove an extremely politically destabilising development, as the new president could make the creation of a precarious centrist coalition difficult. This, in turn, could create a situation that is extremely conducive to civil unrest driven by anti-establishment forces.

A weakening of the Romanian political system could open an opportunity for outside powers to increase their influence operations. Russian intelligence has almost certainly engaged in a large-scale effort to encourage acts of Sabotage in European states, especially in the bloc’s northeast. Similar efforts, which have often hinged on disaffected locals with no ideological commitment to Moscow, could be replicated in Romania if the country’s internal situation worsens.

On 26 November, hundreds of anti-government protesters gathered in central Tirana and blocked roads. For approximately three hours, protesters blocked roads in the vicinity of Tirana City Hall, Elbasan Street, Wilson Square, Black Bird and Palace of Arrows. Efforts by police to disperse the protesters led to violent clashes, with security forces deploying tear gas and water cannons. According to local media, 35 protesters were arrested. On 27 November, an opposition Democratic Party MP announced on social media that 21 protesters had been released from custody.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Civil unrest has been ongoing in Albania since late April 2024, marked by confrontations between demonstrators and law enforcement. Previously, protesters have used Molotov cocktails during clashes with police. The protesters are demanding that the incumbent Socialist Party Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama, resign and that a technocratic caretaker government be put in place until the 2025 elections. The leaders of the largest opposition parties, Sali Berisha of the Democratic Party and Ilir Meta of the Freedom Party have both been charged with corruption offences. They have said that the charges are politically motivated and accused the Albanian government of orchestrating them.

Protests are highly likely to continue until at least the 2025 parliamentary elections, which are expected to take place in Spring. 11 May 2025 has been proposed by the head of the Central Election Commission in Albania, and the ruling Socialist Party has expressed that the date is suitable.

The latest polling data suggests that the Socialist Party will win the election, an eventuality that would likely be conditioned by the division of the opposition parties splitting the vote. If the Socialist Party win the election, it is highly likely that civil unrest will follow. International actors such as the US and the European Union (EU) have urged the opposition to engage in dialogue with the government rather than engage in violent protest, with the violence hampering Albania’s accession to the EU which the Socialist Party hopes to achieve by 2030.

On 25 November, the Georgian parliament in Tbilisi inaugurated its first session since the contested October parliamentary elections. The opening was marked by protests in Tbilisi, with civil unrest ongoing in varying degrees of intensity since the contested election results were announced. Protesters blocked roads near the parliament and Heroes Square but mostly dispersed by the evening.

The following day, 26 November, parliament set the date for the next presidential election, which is now scheduled for 14 December. The ruling party, Georgian Dream, nominated a candidate from the pro-government and anti-West People’s Power party, Mikheil Kavelashvili, to be president.

In a significant development, the government announced on 28 November that they were suspending European Union (EU) accession negotiations until the end of 2028. The announcement followed just hours after the EU’s parliament adopted a non-binding resolution that rejected the results of October elections in Georgia due to “significant irregularities”.

Significant protests quickly erupted in Tbilisi outside the Georgian parliament from the pro-European opposition movement, marked by violent clashes between riot police and demonstrators. Security forces deployed water cannons, reportedly using water mixed with pepper spray, to disperse protesters, and several journalists have reported being injured as a result. Protesters, meanwhile, set up a barricade on Rustaveli Avenue and set it alight. The authorities claim that at least 43 arrests were made, and 32 officers were injured.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Firstly, it is highly likely that the Georgian Dream nominated candidate Kavelashvili will win the presidential election. A former footballer who played for the British football team Manchester City, Kavelashvili was one of the founders of the People’s Power party, which split from Georgian Dream in 2022. People’s Power is even more openly anti-West and pro-Russian than Georgian Dream, though still supports the Georgian Dream government, and proposed the controversial “foreign agents” bill that led to significant civil unrest in March 2023 and April-June 2024.

The presidential election will be the first conducted using an indirect vote system via a 300-member College of Electors, instead of a direct popular vote, following a 2017 constitutional change. Georgian Dream is projected to easily win as they have a majority in the electoral college, with at least 156 electors (89 from parliament, 54 from local representatives, and 13 from Adjara) either Georgian Dream or People’s Power members.

While the presidency in Georgia is a primarily ceremonial role, the head of state and commander-in-chief, the position has been used by the pro-European incumbent Salome Zourabichvili as a platform to effectively lead the opposition. It is highly likely that Zourabichvili’s ousting will further diminish the strength of the opposition, and the presidential election will likely be a trigger for further political instability and civil unrest.

The suspension of EU accession talks will almost certainly continue to act as a significant trigger for the intensification of civil unrest. Prospective membership of the EU is a central pillar of the pro-European opposition movement. While Georgian Dream has previously made efforts to present an ostensive willingness to progress EU accession, this development is almost certainly indicative of both increased establishment hostility to the EU due to its reaction to the contested election result, and Georgian Dream using its newfound position of strength to pursue an even more overtly anti-West and pro-Russian agenda.

It is highly likely that this will lead to continuing and intensified protests over the coming weeks, which will likely be marked by increased levels of violent clashes between protesters and riot police.

On 27 November, the Salafi-jihadist Syrian rebel group Hayy’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)launched a major offensive against Syrian Arab Army (SAA) regime forces in the Aleppo Governorate in northern Syria.  At least 200 people have died so far during the offensive. The surprise assault led by HTS, highly likely in collaboration with other Syrian opposition forces, seized several settlements in the countryside west and southwest of Aleppo City and has rapidly reached the outskirts of the city.

A local journalist has claimed that opposition officials informed them that the recapturing of Aleppo is one of the goals of the offensive. The offensive has cut off the Damascus-Aleppo international M5 highway. After 30+ hours of non-stop combat, HTS advances captured at least 37 villages west of Aleppo.

As of 29 November, combat is reportedly ongoing in close proximity to the New Aleppo area of Aleppo, which is indicative of the threat posed to the regime-controlled city by the offensive. Other rebel factions, including Turkish-backed militias, have allegedly joined the offensive. The Russian air force conducted numerous airstrikes, reportedly resulting in civilian casualties,  and additionally allegedly struck a Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) headquarters, highly likely to deter SNA involvement in the offensive.

However, early reports suggest that a limited number of rebel forces affiliated with the SNA have already participated in the offensive. HTS fighters made unverified claims to have eliminated Russian drone teams during the advance. The SAA has reportedly mobilised security forces following the implementation of an emergency law, and is almost certainly urgently redeploying forces from across regime-controlled Syria.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This is the most significant escalation in the Syrian Civil War since 2020. HTS as an organisation evolved from the defunct Syrian al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. While nonetheless maintaining a Salafi-jihadist ideology, however, HTS is almost certainly not affiliated with al-Qaeda and has engaged in significant conflict with the pro-al-Qaeda al-Nusra successor group Tanzim Hurras al-Din.

The HTS offensive has so far been highly successful, which has almost certainly been largely achieved through the element of surprise. As an example, HTS reportedly captured Khan al-Assal on the outskirts of Aleppo in just a few hours, whereas rebel forces took weeks to capture the district during intense fighting in 2013. Since the Syrian Civil War drastically reduced in intensity in 2020, HTS has gradually become the most militarily capable rebel group in northwest Syria, solidifying its presence in Idlib and enhancing its arsenals with new offensive and reconnaissance capabilities such as one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA-UAVS) and first-person view (FPV) UAVs.

Counter to the assessment that the HTS offensive could highly likely threaten the regime’s control of Aleppo, historical rebel offensives in northwest Syria generally followed the trend of rebels quickly penetrating SAA positions manned largely by conscripts in the initial stages, before Damascus stabilised and reversed the situation by deploying more capable units. While this may still happen, the capture of key urban positions and advantageous elevated terrain in the outskirts of Aleppo increases the likelihood that HTS will be able to maintain their newly acquired ground against SAA counteroffensives.

Turkish security sources claim that the purpose of the “limited offensive” is to prevent Russia-backed regime attacks against civilians in Idlib and to restore the “boundaries of the Idlib de-escalation zone” which was initially agreed in 2019 by Russia, Turkey and Iran. It is likely, however, that the considerable gains made may embolden HTS forces to advance further into Aleppo City, if they are not halted by SAA counteroffensives.

It is likely that a factor in the HTS leadership’s decision-making is the calculation that Russian support for the Assad regime will be more limited due to a reallocation of resources to Ukraine. However, Russian air superiority will still pose a considerable challenge to overcome, despite early indications that HTS militants have captured man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) from the SAA.  The offensive will highly likely lead to continued intense combat over the coming weeks.

The agreement, signed by the governments of Lebanon and Israel, came into effect at 04:00 local time on 27 November. The deal’s key points include:

1) The withdrawal of Hezbollah to the north of the Litani river and the dismantling of military infrastructure south of the Litani.

2) The phased withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory over a period of 60 days (25 January 2025).

3) The increased deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) units south of Litani to enforce the ceasefire.

4) The affirmation of Israel’s right of self-defence, essentially allowing Tel Aviv to retaliate if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire terms.

Notably, the deal contains no mention of Gaza.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The ceasefire almost certainly represents a strategic victory for Tel Aviv, which has achieved most of its stated objectives in Lebanon without having to compromise on its parallel efforts in Gaza.

Since the intensification of its conflict with Hezbollah in September, Israeli forces have effectively decapitated the organisation by killing most of its senior leadership, destroyed a considerable portion of its missile and rocket stocks, and have thus decreased its value as a proxy deterrent for Iran, which is likely why Tehran assented to the deal.

Importantly, the ground operation in Lebanon did not result in a protracted and costly deployment of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).

The ceasefire deal reaffirms Israeli aims to push Hezbollah back to the Litani River and effectively grants Tel Aviv an “open door” to return to Lebanon should Hezbollah fail to comply with the terms. Most importantly, the deal allows Tel Aviv to continue its operations in Gaza, while reducing the likelihood and practicality of further involvement by Iran and Hezbollah in support of Hamas.

Notably, the deal shifts significant responsibility on the LAF, which represents an important source of political leverage for Tel Aviv and its allies. However, the LAF faces significant challenges in exerting control over Hezbollah, a powerful political force in Beirut. Increased LAF involvement south of the Litani River is likely to escalate tensions between Hezbollah and other Lebanese political factions, potentially deepening divisions within the country’s fragile political landscape.

For Hezbollah, whose officials have nevertheless declared the ceasefire deal as a “victory”, the deal is both a political and strategic defeat. By accepting a deal that does not include Gaza, Hezbollah has de facto reneged on its stated political aim for its involvement in the conflict, which may compromise its standing at home among its key constituencies.

Moreover, the agreement to a phased Israeli withdrawal and a monitored intervention of the LAF will likely result in Hezbollah’s loss of multiple pre-prepared positions south of the Litani, whose reconstruction will necessitate considerable time and resources. Finally, Iran’s support for the deal likely restricts Hezbollah’s ability to re-engage in the conflict in the short term and will likely frustrate Hezbollah’s ability to replenish its weapon stocks.

The deal may result in a shift in Iran’s approach to supporting the Palestinian militias. The deal is likely to lead to a short-term escalation in Tehran’s attempts to make the West Bank a more important front in the conflict. Notably, on 27 November, Israeli forces seized a shipment of weapons in Jenin, including heavier weapon systems that are seldom used by West Bank militias like mortars and rockets. Iran’s strategy is likely to overstretch the IDF and isolate Israel on the international stage by forcing it to increase military operations in the West Bank.

On 28 November, the government of the Republic of Chad announced that it would be terminating its military cooperation with France, citing concerns about its sovereignty. Chad’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the decision to terminate the deal will enable the government to redefine its strategic partnerships. France currently has approximately 1,000 soldiers and several warplanes in Chad, its last military foothold in the wider Sahel region.

Solace Global Assessment: 

After the military coup in 2021, Chad was the only military government that remained open to the staging of Western forces within its borders. The sudden change in strategy has likely been greatly influenced by public opinion that has often translated into anti-French protests.

Many Chadians likely perceive the presence of French forces as undermining their national sovereignty, associating it with neo-colonialism and undue interference in domestic affairs. They have also likely been influenced by Russian information campaigns. Furthermore, despite France’s contributions to counter-terrorism efforts in Chad and the wider region, many likely believe that the presence of Western forces legitimises Chad as a target for extremist groups.

An effective expulsion from Chad would be a major blow to France’s international standing and weaken its position in Africa. French forces have already been expelled from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This has left the western states with almost no military presence in the Sahel, leaving junta governments to deal with a major increase in extremist attacks without access to critical capabilities such as intelligence, fast air and heavy air transport. Violent extremist organisations (VEOs) like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’ (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) will almost certainly seek to exploit this vacuum.

Western states, on the other hand, are attempting to re-establish a military presence in coastal West African states to contain the violence in the Sahel. However, France’s forced withdrawal is likely indicative of a wider regional shift away from the West and a realignment with Russia. The Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye has stated that France should close its military bases in the country, likely observing the destabilising effect of foreign forces in the Sahel and also citing concerns over sovereignty.

Chad, as well as potentially some of the West African states, will likely turn to Russia for military assistance. Russian private military companies (PMCs) like the Wagner Group (which has a presence in neighbouring Libya, the Central African Republic and Sudan) offer several advantages. As a PMC, they are not as directly associated with the Russian government and have less of a destabilising effect on the government and their presence is less likely to be viewed as an infringement on national sovereignty. Russia also has no colonial legacy in the region and any agreement will likely be transactional, with security exchanged for access to natural resources.

However, with a track record of human rights abuses, resource exploitation, supporting oppressive regimes and contributing to corruption, a pivot towards Russian PMCs may eventually backfire and play into the hands of the VEOs.

A planned meeting on 26 November, which was set for the government, led by President Filipe Nyusi, to discuss the post-election crisis with opposition figures, only lasted a few minutes before falling apart. The opposition leader and primary instigator of unrest Venâncio Mondlane, having received no response to his proposed agenda, did not attend. As such, a second meeting will reportedly be scheduled, but no date has been set.

Following the failure of the planned talks, Mondlane called for another three days of protests between 27-29 November. During this wave, multiple instances of violent clashes between protesters and security forces have taken place. Security forces have deployed tear gas and live ammunition to disperse protesters. On 27 November, a woman was run over by an armoured military vehicle and footage of the incident was quickly disseminated across social media.

So far, there have been over 70 deaths since protests began after the FRELIMO party, which has governed for 49 years, claimed victory in the 9 October election.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There is growing pressure on the government of Mozambique to re-examine the election results. Mondlane has continued to call for demonstrations and will almost certainly continue to do so until the government grants another meeting and consents to his agenda. The United States, Britain, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland have condemned the government for using excessive force against civilians. In addition, opposition party Podemos demanded the resignation of Nyusi and three other officials.

Economic damages will likely increasingly amplify external pressure on Nyusi. There have been significant disruptions at the Lebombo border crossing, the main border crossing between Mozambique and South Africa. Businesses have been forced to shut across multiple cities as workers are unable to travel to their workplaces and major ports and highways have also repeatedly been interrupted, further exacerbating economic damages. Maputo is a key corridor for supply chains in the region. If surrounding nations start to be significantly damaged economically by the unrest, they will likely add their voices to the growing list pressuring the government.

Nyusi has, so far, withstood pressure to re-examine the election results, utilising security forces to suppress demonstrations. This trend is highly likely to continue; the government has reportedly used plain-clothed National Criminal Investigation Service officers, who are allegedly driving unmarked vehicles and shooting demonstrators.

Since unrest shows little sign of slowing amidst a popular belief that election results were fraudulent, repression of demonstrations remains the primary tool for the government. The Constitutional Council is validating the election results to “establish electoral truth”, which are set to be announced around 23 December.

Nyusi is likely holding out for the Constitutional Council to ratify the election results and contradict popular opinion. Given the perceived corruption of the FRELIMO government, however, this is unlikely to shift public opinion.

EU Parliament approves second Von der Leyen commission

A total of 370 MEPs voted in favour of the commission, with 282 against, making the vote the one with the smallest majority in EU history. Von der Leyen’s majority is mostly built on the centrists’ and conservatives’ support, and its approval process was fraught by the opposition of large parts of the left.

The new commission is almost certain to continue maintaining previous EU policy commitments in fields such as sustainability and border security, while further emphasising the EU’s ongoing efforts to boost its defence capability vis-à-vis Russia.

Due to the uncertainties regarding the future Trump administration, a key point of focus is likely to be that of trade policy, although here Brussels cannot afford to act proactively, but will have to wait until January.

Austria’s far-right FPO wins elections in Styria

The Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) won an election in the state for the first time in its history, winning 35.3 per cent of the vote, nine points ahead of the conservative Austrian People’s Party (OVP). While unlikely to have an immediate impact at a national level, it may prove politically relevant.

First, the vote demonstrates the FPO’s continuing growth despite its exclusion from the national government after the general elections in late September. Second, Styria may become a testing ground for FPO’s ability to create a coalition. While at a national level the president nominates a party to attempt to form a majority, in Styria that prerogative is automatically afforded to the elections’ winner.

FPO will therefore have the “initiative” to attempt to form a coalition. If this succeeds, it may highlight weaknesses in the “cordon sanitaire” formed by the centrist parties.

Protests in Milan’s outskirts following death of 19-year-old during police chase

The youth reportedly died in the early hours of 24 November during a car chase with local police, the dynamic of which has still not been clearly established. Following the first reports of the incident, demonstrations were organised in the area of Corvetto, located southeast of Milan’s centre. These became violent and continued until 26 November, resulting in multiple arrests and at least four injuries. There is a realistic possibility of further unrest in Milan following developments in the police investigation of the incident.

Slovakia’s Prime Minister to attend WWII Victory Day parade in Moscow

Prime Minister Fico publicly stated that he accepted a Russian invitation to visit Moscow for the event. Fico has maintained warm relations with Moscow despite his country’s membership in the EU and has blocked the country’s aid to Ukraine after assuming office. There is a realistic possibility of protests in Bratislava before 9 May, possibly targeting the airport where Fico may depart to Russia from.

Mali again detains Western mining sector employees

On 27 November, Canadian gold mining company Barrick Gold announced that four of its employees, working at the Loulo-Gounkoto mine, were arrested by security forces under unclear charges. The employees are notably the same who were briefly detained in September.

The case highly likely demonstrates the growing trends of arbitrary detentions of Western employees and executives by the Sahel juntas for coercive purposes. It is likely that the growing frequency of these cases will alter the risk appetite of mining sector actors operating in the area.

Moreover, there is a realistic possibility that the Canadian company’s case will be resolved in a way similar to last week’s deal between the Malian government and Australian company Resolute Mining, where the latter agreed to pay approximately USD 160 million to the former as part of securing the release of detained employees.

Jubaland and Mogadishu issue reciprocal arrest warrants for each regions’ president

On 27 November, A judge in Somalia’s Jubaland region issued an arrest warrant for Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud on several charges including crimes against humanity, orchestrating civil war, weapon trafficking, collaboration with al-Shabaab, abuse of power, and corruption. The warrant enables the arrest of Mohamud anywhere in Somalia. If he is found guilty, these charges would result in a long-term prison sentence or the death penalty.

This comes shortly after a cluster of Somali lawmakers filed a lawsuit against Mohamud over “violations of human rights and due process in the illegal and forced deportation of Somali asylum seekers” at the European Court of Human Rights. In response to the arrest warrant, Mogadishu has issued its own arrest warrant for Jubaland president Ahmed Madobe on charges of treason and revealing classified information to foreign entities. This occurred amidst tensions between Mogadishu and Jubaland; on 25 November, Madobe was re-elected for a third term after Jubaland amended its constitution to remove presidential term limits. Mogadishu has declared these elections illegal since they were held without federal involvement.

Tensions between Mogadishu and Somalia’s regional entities will almost certainly continue as Mogadishu faces challenges from ongoing insurgencies from the Islamic State and al-Shabaab.

Namibian election marred by technical failures and ballot shortages

On 27 November, Namibians headed to the polls to elect the president and members of the National Assembly. The country has been ruled solely by the incumbent South West Africa People’s Organisation or SWAPO party since Namibia gained independence from apartheid South Africa in 1990. Election polls have indicated that SWAPO is in danger of losing power for the first time.

However, the election has been marred by technical failures and ballot shortages, which have resulted in several political parties stating that they will challenge the validity of the election. Results are anticipated to be released by 30 November; however, should SWAPO declare victory after the election’s contentious circumstances, significant unrest could arise, especially among Namibia’s youth, which makes up a significant proportion of the country’s electorate and has expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the ruling party.

On 26 November, the Namibian government issued the satellite internet provider Starlink to cease operations in the country. There is a realistic possibility that this move is aimed at limiting the dissemination of information that could contribute to the spread of election-motivated civil unrest.

NATO warships surround Chinese vessel suspected of sabotage in Danish waters

Several NATO warships have surrounded the vessel, Yi Peng 3 (IMO: 9224984), a Chinese-flagged bulk carrier that is suspected of sabotaging two undersea fibre optic cables in the Baltic. Preliminary investigations allege that the vessel deliberately dragged its anchor for over 100 nautical miles after leaving the Russian port of Ust-Luga on 15 November, with the vessel also failing to transmit its location on its automatic identification system (AIS).

Several Western intelligence sources have indicated that the vessel in question was partially crewed by Russians, and they suspect that Russian intelligence agencies were behind the deliberate underwater sabotage. However, under international maritime law, NATO ships can’t force the vessel to sail to one of its ports and must seek Beijing’s permission before questioning the crew.

EU, UK and Iranian diplomats hold nuclear talks in Switzerland

The meeting will be held on 29 November in Geneva and was described by Iranian officials as the continuation of talks held during the United Nations General Assembly summit in New York. The decision to hold the latest round of talks likely follows last week’s resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) calling on Iran to cooperate with the UN watchdog. Iran responded to the resolution by claiming to have accelerated its efforts to acquire greater quantities of enriched uranium.

The new Pezeshkian government has declared itself open to resuming nuclear talks with its EU counterparts but likely is aware of how returning to a pre-2018 framework will be difficult during a second Trump term. The meetings are likely therefore aimed at assessing Brussels and London’s positions and willingness to pursue some form of détente independently from Washington.

Gunman killed during attack on security outside Israeli embassy in Jordan

The attack occurred in the Rabiah neighbourhood of Amman on 24 November and resulted in three security guards being wounded. While the exact motive of the attack was not disclosed, it is highly likely that it is related to the ongoing war in Gaza. Multiple pro-Palestine protests have occurred in the vicinity of the Israeli embassy. There is a realistic possibility that the lack of a ceasefire in Gaza will result in further unrest in Jordan, where almost half the population have Palestinian lineage.

Islamic State (IS) network dismantled in Cote d’Ivoire and Madagascar

Reports of multiple arrests of Syrian and Iraqi citizens, which took place in July, were released by French media. The arrests were carried out via a US-French joint intelligence operation and were aimed at preventing extremist plans to carry out attacks during the Paris Olympics.

While the presence of IS in coastal West African states is well-attested, Madagascar is increasingly used by IS affiliates to evade detection and as a logistics hub for the rerouting of funds to other branches of the organisation. In West Africa, IS has sought to smuggle sympathisers and militants through irregular migration routes to Europe via the Canary Islands.

The fact that the detained individuals were Syrians and Iraqis underscores how the group’s centre of gravity remains in the Middle East and may be indicative of an attempt to revive IS external operations.

At least five dead in the United Kingdom due to heavy floods and landslides

Storm Bert caused heavy rains, winds of up to 125 kph, and landslides across west and southwest England and Wales, with multiple traffic disruptions reported including at London airports like Gatwick and Stansted, with more than 400 flights being cancelled or diverted. The storm also caused significant infrastructural damage and damage to properties, with more than 500 properties reported as having been flooded. As of 29 November, delays and disruptions in transport, especially affecting the rail network in south England, continue to be recorded and will likely remain in place during the weekend.

Nationwide mobile service outage across Denmark

On 28 November, Denmark experienced a major nationwide mobile service outage that disrupted the services of its largest network provider, TDC. The outage caused significant disruptions, particularly affecting rail services and police communications. Rail services were halted due to the impact on the digital signal system, while police departments across the country struggled with downed phone lines, leading to the deployment of additional patrols to ensure public safety. TDC later confirmed that the issue was technical in nature and assured that it was not caused by any malicious forces.

Landslides and flooding in eastern Uganda

Heavy rainfall in Eastern Uganda has led to damaging landslides and floods, particularly affecting the Bulambuli district. At least 15 bodies have been recovered, and 15 injured individuals have been rescued and taken to medical centres following a landslide that buried more than 40 homes in the Buluganya region. Over 100 people remain missing. Furthermore, the River Nabuyonga has overflowed, causing significant flooding in Mbale and the surrounding area. Rescue efforts by the Red Cross and local authorities are ongoing; the Ugandan army reported one fatality during rescue efforts. The eastern regions of Uganda face heavy seasonal rainfall, which, along with poor drainage and low-lying terrain, leads to occasional flooding and landslides. The situation is worsened by extensive deforestation and rapid urban development, resulting in inadequate drainage and poor infrastructure for managing rainwater.

This week, a planned demonstration by Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party in Islamabad turned violent as protesters clashed with security forces. The PTI urged supporters to march from nearby regions to the capital on 24 November. In response, the government enforced Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prohibiting protests from November 23 to 25. As a further measure to dissuade demonstrators from marching to Islamabad, security forces (including paramilitary forces) set up barricades on major routes into the capital and cut off internet access.

Despite government measures, tens of thousands of PTI supporters gathered in Islamabad. As protests escalated on 26 November, the military was called in and security forces resorted to using live ammunition, tear gas, and mass arrests to disperse protesters. 954 protesters were arrested, 210 vehicles and weapons were seized, and PTI leaders claim that several protesters were killed, the numbers ranging from 10 to 200, though this is disputed by the government.

On 27 November, authorities successfully dispersed protesters and cleared roads and barricades as the PTI called for a temporary suspension of the protests. The same day, a senior official declared that “the operation has been successfully concluded and normalcy is being restored”. Motorways have resumed operations and business activities have restarted. In the wake of the unrest, the government has issued a series of charges, one related to “terrorism”, against Khan, his wife, Bushra Bibi, and hundreds of PTI supporters for inciting violence this week.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Protests were called by Khan to denounce judicial reforms by the government, unjust arrests, as well as a “stolen mandate”. Protesters also demanded the release of Khan, who is currently in jail after being arrested under anti-terrorism laws shortly after being granted bail.

Pakistan has seen significant unrest driven by Khan’s PTI party. In May 2023, Khan’s arrest led to widespread unrest in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, and Peshawar as supporters clashed with security forces. Demonstrations led to eight deaths as protesters lit fires, threw stones, and blocked highways.

The government has since been wary of any protests planned by the PTI. Since passing Section 144 into law, the government has the power to ban protest activity and has primarily utilised it to prevent PTI from proceeding with planned protests.

Given Khan’s continued imprisonment and the government’s repressive response, the PTI will almost certainly call another mass protest. PTI leader Ali Amin Gandapur has emphasised that protests will continue until Khan calls an end to them.

The government is highly likely to continue to impose Section 144 to try to prevent future demonstrations, particularly given the scale of the unrest of this week’s protest. Given that the government’s pre-emptive measures did little to deter PTI supporters, future protests are likely to face a severe crackdown.

This likelihood is further increased by the fact that the repressive actions taken by security forces during this week’s protests successfully compelled the PTI to halt their demonstrations. The government will almost certainly continue to use the legal system to punish demonstrators who fail to abide by protest bans to dissuade leaders from organising demonstrations.

There is a realistic possibility that the government will expand its legal powers even further to stop further disruptive unrest from occurring.

Tropical depression Fengal moved past Sri Lanka on 26 and 27 November, causing heavy rainfall and flooding. The death toll has risen to at least 12 people, with 17 others injured. Additionally, one person remains missing, and search efforts are ongoing for at least two students after a tractor was swept away by floodwaters in Karaitivu; four bodies have been recovered so far.

Many residents have been evacuated in vulnerable areas due to landslide risks, particularly in Kandy, Matale, and Nuwara-Eliya districts. The Sri Lankan Disaster Management Center has reported that more than 230,700 people have been affected across 17 districts, with substantial damage to infrastructure, including a bridge collapse in Ampara and road blockages due to fallen trees.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The tropical depression has now intensified into a tropical cyclone, as confirmed by the Indian Meteorological Department. Initially forming over the Bay of Bengal, the system has been moving north-north-westwards and is expected to make landfall on the north Tamil Nadu-Puducherry coast by 30 November with sustained windspeeds of approximately 50-60 kph. As of 29 November, the cyclone is currently positioned approximately 250 miles southeast of Chennai, Tamil Nadu.

In India, the meteorological department has forecasted heavy rainfall for coastal Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, urging residents to prepare for the cyclone’s impact. The Regional Meteorological Centre has issued a Red Alert, indicating conditions that pose a significant threat to life and property, for the Tamil Nadu districts of Chengalpattu, Villuppuram, Cuddalore, Mayiladuthurai, and Nagapattinam and the town of Puducherry and municipality of Karaikal in Union Territory of Puducherry. Educational institutions in Puducherry and Karaikal have been closed as a precautionary measure.

The Indian Navy has activated a disaster response plan, stationing teams equipped with relief supplies in vulnerable areas in anticipation of flooding and damages. Significant transportation disruptions are highly likely due to flooding and debris blocking roads and railways. Authorities may issue evacuation warnings with little notice. Although the storm is expected to weaken as it moves inland, it will likely still bring heavy rainfall to regions such as Kerala, Mahe, and Karnataka.

Cyclones in the Bay of Bengal have increased in intensity in recent years, something which can largely be attributed to climate change. According to many experts, four main factors are linked to this phenomenon: rising ocean temperatures energise storms; warmer air retains more moisture, leading to heavier rainfall; rising sea levels exacerbate flooding; and changing atmospheric circulation patterns have shifted cyclone pathways. These have all allegedly contributed to more intense and damaging tropical cyclones.

The last tropical cyclone to affect Tamil Nadu was Cyclone Michaung in December 2023. The cyclone caused significant heavy rainfall in Chennai and other regions nearby, causing widespread disruption, property damage, and flooding. It resulted in 17 fatalities and the displacement of thousands of residents. The Tamil Nadu government offered financial relief to families affected by the storm. It is highly likely that Tropical Cyclone Fengal will result in similar effects.

Religious clashes over detained Hindu leader in Bangladesh

On 26 November, protests occurred in Chattogram after a Hindu leader, Krishna Das Prabhu, was detained over charges of sedition. Supporters of the detainee clashed with local officials and Muslim residents, resulting in at least one death and dozens of arrests. Local lawyers have pledged to boycott the courts, while Prabhu’s followers have denied responsibility for the killing. There is a realistic possibility that the case will result in cases of sectarian violence in Bangladesh, and possibly India, as tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities in the region remains high after the ousting of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

President of Taiwan set to visit Pacific Allies

Taiwan’s President Lai was set to conduct diplomatic visits to its Pacific allies of the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Palau from 3-6 December. Taiwanese diplomatic visits often include unannounced stop-overs to the US, its primary diplomatic and military ally, with visits to Hawaii and the US territory of Guam being announced last minute. The visits will likely provoke Beijing and as evidenced by historical examples, are likely to result in the staging of Chinese military exercises around Taiwan.

China and Philippines tensions escalate as maritime militia amass in disputed waters

Satellite derived imagery has indicated that China is amassing vessels near Thitu Island in the South China Sea, a key Philippine outpost. The vessels are primarily Chinese fishing vessels, which belong to Beijing’s People’s Armed Force Maritime Militia (PAFMM), a fleet of repurposed fishing vessels, often with reinforced hulls and retrofitted intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) equipment. The role of the PAFMM is likely to provide China with enhanced situational awareness in the contested area, especially as the US becomes more involved in backing Manila’s claims.

China investigates top military leaders

Beijing has suspended and placed under investigation Defence Minister Dong Jun and Admiral Miao Hua, a high-ranking member of the Central Military Command (CMC), which is the highest military leadership institution in the country and is directly chaired by Xi Jinping. Both individuals are being investigated for “violations of discipline”, which is used by Beijing as a euphemism for corruption. The actions likely follow previous efforts by Xi to root out corruption from the Chinese armed forces, which have coincided with the removal of other high-ranking officials.  

China warns New Zealand of negative consequences if country joins AUKUS

The government of New Zealand is considering adhering to Pillar II of the organisation, which also includes the US, Australia, and Britain, which entails the delivery of advanced capabilities and technology and increasing interoperability between members’ combat forces. The acceleration of the effort to enter into AUKUS was heralded by New Zealand’s new coalition government after October 2023, which has characterised the Indo-Pacific as a “deteriorating” environment, echoing Canberra and Washington.

China’s response is almost certainly a reflection of Beijing’s worry about the AUKUS framework serving as a tool for the US and key allies to evade Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty directives, and to increase US power projection in the southwest Pacific, a trend that will help arrest China’s ambitions of becoming an expeditionary naval force.

More than 240,000 families displaced due to extreme weather in Thailand

The Meteorological Department of Thailand (TMD) has issued a series of warnings covering ten provinces due to expected heavy monsoon rains. Southern regions, including the popular tourist areas of Chumphon, Surat Thani, and Nakhon Si Thammarat, are expected to be hit hardest, with the potential for flash floods and landslides.

Areas of southern Thailand, including parts of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces in the deep south have already been affected by major flooding, with heavy rain and high winds forecasted to last until 30 November. The Gulf of Thailand is also under advisories for rough seas with waves anticipated to reach two metres.

According to local reports, at least 240,000 families have been displaced across seven provinces in southern Thailand due to the flooding as of 29 November.

Heavy rains trigger deadly landslides in Western Indonesia

At least 27 people have been killed, dozens injured, and several remain missing after heavy rain in Indonesia’s Sumatra Island triggered multiple landslides. The torrential rain has caused widespread disruption in North Sumatra province and delayed voting in regional elections. Rescue teams with heavy machinery have been deployed to the area to clear roads and search for missing people. Authorities have warned that extreme weather, exacerbated by the La Niña phenomenon, is likely to persist into 2024 and will remain a major hazard in mountainous and flood-prone areas.

At least five dead in South Korea due to heavy snow

Since 28 November, extremely heavy snowfall has affected much of South Korea’s territory, with local media reporting that the phenomenon is the “heaviest in 100 years”. Parts of Seoul have received approximately 40 cm of snow according to local reports as of 29 November.

The heavy snowfall has resulted in disruptions to the power grid and the cancellation of hundreds of domestic and international flights. Heavy snow was also recorded in North Korea. Disruptions to the power grid are likely to have spillover health effects, for instance preventing residents from adequately heating their homes. While snowfall is common across much of South Korea’s territory, the months that are usually most affected are December, January, and February.

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