Hurricane Helene made landfall late 26 September in the Big Bend area of Florida. Just before making landfall, the storm was a category 4 hurricane, with maximum sustained wind speeds of 225 kmph. The storm rapidly weakened into a tropical storm as it moved overland.

However, over one million people in Florida were left without power, rising to over two million when including those in Georgia and the Carolinas. Floridian authorities issued evacuation orders, warning that the storm was “unsurvivable” for those in at-risk coastal or low-lying areas. States of emergency were declared in Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, Virginia and Alabama.

The hurricane caused a storm surge, with water levels being recorded as almost two metres higher than the mean average at Clearwater Beach and Cedar Key, with official warnings that this could increase to 4.5-6 metres in Florida’s Gulf Coast. So far, three deaths have been attributed to Hurricane Helene, one in Florida and two in Georgia.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Hurricane Helene is the joint fourteenth strongest hurricane to hit the US since records began, and the seventh strongest in Florida. The storm is the eighth named storm of the current Atlantic hurricane season, which the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) forecast would highly likely be an above-normal hurricane season. This was due to the high temperatures recorded in the Gulf of Mexico.

The Gulf of Mexico, where Hurricane Helene formed, has had record-breaking ocean temperatures recorded over the past few years, almost certainly due to climate change. Climate change is highly likely causing more destructive storms, according to climatologists, because of greater moisture evaporation from warmer seas and the simultaneous impact of warmer air retaining more moisture.

So far, however, the NOAA prediction has not occurred – predictions of 17-24 named storms and 13 hurricanes have not materialised with only nine storms and six hurricanes thus far, trending below average, which has confounded the hurricane forecasting community.

While Hurricane Helene has significantly weakened since making landfall, it is highly likely that the death toll will increase once the true extent of the storm’s impact is assessable in its aftermath.

The category 3 hurricane – which had maximum sustained wind speeds of 190 kmph, hit Mexico’s Pacific coast on 23 September, near Punta Maldonado, killing two. On 25 September, the hurricane weakened into a tropical storm, though still had significant record wind speeds of up to 90 kmph.

On 26 September, new forecasts indicated that the storm was once again strengthening over the Pacific Ocean, and could be expected to again become a hurricane and make landfall near the southwestern city of  Lázaro Cárdenas during the weekend. When it did, on Friday, it resulted in another three deaths in Guerrero state.

Hurricane John’s first landfall resulted in widespread disruptions, including the loss of power to at least 100,000 homes on the Pacific coast. The second resulted in less material damage.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the storm’s recorded wind speeds have considerably reduced, adverse rainfall highly likely threatens a continuing risk of flash floods and landslides. In 2023, Hurricane Otis devastated the area, the severity of the damage almost certainly being exacerbated by the lack of modern infrastructure and sufficient rescue resources. Hurricane Otis killed more than 50 people and caused an estimated USD 15 billion in damages.

Initial data suggests that there is a realistic possibility that Hurricane John could result in damages comparable to those caused by Otis. By the end of 24 September, the storm had resulted in more than 10cm of rainfall in parts of Guerrero and Oaxaca. These two states are two of the poorest in Mexico, and further impacts from the storm are likely to be particularly severe. Damages to infrastructure and housing in the region are likely to have important secondary effects. Internal displacement of thousands of individuals is a common driver of civil unrest, and a lack of security presence following the disaster could be leveraged by organised criminal groups to increase smuggling, extortion and trafficking operations in the area.

Argentina’s USD deposits increase

On 23 September, the central bank of Argentina reported that, since December 2023, foreign currency deposits have increased USD 8 billion. While libertarian President Javier Milei has likely abandoned plans to “dollarise” the Argentine economy, at least in the short-to-medium term, his administration has emphasised the need to drastically expand foreign currency reserves which have been depleted by years of crisis.

The latest figures have likely been reached due to a generous amnesty plan, in place until 30 September, which encourages residents to transfer funds held outside the national banking system. While Milei and his supporters will almost certainly hail the news as a triumph of the government’s drastic reforms, the political situation in the country remains unstable.

As recently as 12 September, protesters clashed with police outside the Congress building in Buenos Aires, after Milei vetoed an opposition bill to increase pensions, with further unrest almost certain.

Haiti UN police mission deadline near, as no resolution to conflict in sight

The 12-month mandate of the Kenya-led police mission in Haiti is set to expire in early October. However, the country continues to be plagued by the conflict involving powerful gang networks, which control much of the capital Port-au-Prince as well as nearby rural areas.

Fighting between gangs and the coalition of government and international forces has been particularly heavy in recent weeks, especially near the international seaport of the capital, a key entry point for essential imports. Gangs reportedly opened fire on approaching vessels, and recently allegedly kidnapped two Filipino seamen.

By attacking civilian vessels and thus delaying or blocking the delivery of vital goods, gangs likely aim to become the only welfare provider for the local population, ensuring protracted control.

Increased Hezbollah activity in Latin America a realistic possibility

Due to the recent escalation in conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, it is a realistic possibility that Hezbollah activities in Latin America will increase. In 1994, a Hezbollah-linked bombing at a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, Argentina killed 85 people. Hezbollah has a notable presence in South America, particularly in the “Tri-Border Area” between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, countries that each have sizable Lebanese diasporas.

Hezbollah’s activity in the region over the past decade has primarily been fundraising, with accusations of possible connections to local organised crime groups. As recently as in November 2023, however, Hezbollah was accused of plotting attacks against Jewish communities in Brazil, with two Hezbollah-linked individuals being arrested by Brazilian police.

One dead in attack on Peru gold mine

Authorities have connected the attack, which occurred in the province of Pataz, on the Amazon border, to criminal groups carrying out illegal mining activities in sites used by recognised companies. Since 2022, at least 30 people have been killed in attacks targeting Peruvian gold mines. In December 2023, a raid on a mine in the same province killed nine workers.

Government of St. Lucia reports Dengue fever outbreak.

The announcement follows a reported increase in the number of cases detected since August. At least 205 cases have been identified since January 2024. While reported cases are especially prevalent in the island’s north, particularly Castries and Gros Islet, there is a high likelihood that they will continue to increase across St. Lucia’s territory in the short term.  

On 23 July, Swedish authorities claimed that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sent at least 15,000 SMSs to Swedish Muslims encouraging them to take revenge over Quran burnings in the Summer of 2023. While Sweden permits the desecration of religious texts as part of its constitutional commitment to free speech, the episodes have greatly affected Stockholm’s international position and increased threats to Swedish interests and nationals abroad. In July 2023, a planned Quran burning resulted in the Swedish embassy in Baghdad being attacked by a mob. In October, an Islamic State (IS) sympathiser in Brussels, killed two Swedish football fans.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The timing of the reported messages is likely highly relevant. In 2023, Sweden was still in the process of joining NATO, and facing Turkish opposition – with Ankara also citing the Quran burnings, an increasingly common form of anti-Islam protests in Scandinavian countries, as a reason to deny Swedish entry. Iran therefore likely had a significant incentive to accelerate polarisation in Sweden by encouraging sectarian issues. However, the action was also highly likely linked to broader ongoing Iranian efforts to leverage Muslim communities in Sweden to pursue its global interests. In May 2024, Swedish authorities accused Tehran of taking advantage of organised criminal networks in the country to target Israeli and Jewish individuals and assets.  

Iran is almost certainly not the only country leveraging sectarian divisions in Europe to increase polarisation and divide societies. Russian hybrid operations in Europe have targeted both “sides” of the religious divides, in efforts aimed not at boosting Moscow’s position – but rather at destabilising rival nations. For example, in November 2023, French and Moldovan authorities identified several Moldovan citizens as having been recruited by Russian intelligence to paint dozens of stars of David on multiple buildings in Paris – likely in an effort to stoke both antisemitism and Islamophobia.

While hybrid operations require a level of coordination and expenditure, social media has increasingly enabled authoritarian regimes to carry them out. First, the mostly open media spaces in democracies allow for the easy propagation of inflammatory material and disinformation, including disingenuous calls to violence. Secondly, and more subtly, open media environments where users share their identities and opinions also allow authoritarian states to identify potential supporters and sympathisers, enabling the recruitment of internal actors.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted extensive airstrikes across Lebanon, reportedly killing at least 600 people. The strikes have primarily hit targets in southern Lebanon south of the Litani River and the Beqaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, but also Beirut.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, regularly launched rocket and missile attacks at targets in Israel. These strikes have been primarily targeted at northern Israel, including both civilian and military targets including a Rafael Advance Defence Systems complex near Haifa which has been targeted numerous times, as much of Hezbollah’s weapon arsenal has a maximum range of ~40km. Hezbollah also attempted to strike the Mossad headquarters near Tel Aviv with a longer-range ballistic missile, but this was intercepted.

The US and France proposed a 21-day temporary ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, however, this has so far been dismissed by the Netanyahu administration. IDF leadership informed Israeli troops that operations are being conducted to prepare for a possible ground offensive into Lebanon.

Solace Global Assessment: 

In the aftermath of the 17 and 18 September remote detonations of Hezbollah tactical communication devices (highly likely conducted by Mossad), the extensive IDF airstrikes and increased Hezbollah rocket attacks mark a further significant escalation in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.

IDF operations in the Gaza Strip have evolved into low-intensity counterinsurgency operations, with Hamas brigades likely assessed by the IDF as defeated (no longer able to function as cohesive military units, although still able to conduct opportunistic attacks) in large sections of Gaza, and the IDF has been moving units to northern Israel over the last two months. The return of the approximately 60,000 residents to northern Israel, who left due to the threat of Hezbollah rocket attacks, has been made an official war goal for Israel.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, has engaged Israel over the past year in what Hezbollah leadership highly likely calculated were sub-threshold attacks in solidarity with Palestine, to pressure Israel with multi-front attritional warfare to force it to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza that would allow Hamas to remain as a viable political and military force.

Without diplomatic off-ramps, even further escalation is currently likely. This is firstly because the Israeli war goal is only achievable with a cessation of Hezbollah rocket attacks into northern Israel, which is militarily highly likely only achievable with a ground offensive. Secondly, Hezbollah likely cannot cease their rocket attacks without losing all credibility.

The 2006 Lebanon War between Israel and Hezbollah exposed several limitations in the IDF, which were too reliant on airpower and did not have the required public support to justify the predicted level of troop fatalities for a major ground offensive into Lebanon.

If the IDF conducts a ground offensive into Lebanon, it would most likely consist of a limited offensive in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River. Israeli officials have cited UN Security Council Resolution 1701, issued after the 2006 war, which calls for the removal of Hezbollah forces south of the Litani River, as justification for a possible ground offensive.

Hezbollah, however, has a much stronger force than Hamas, with an estimated 50,000 fighters and 150,000 rockets and missiles. It is likely that an IDF ground offensive would incur a relatively high number of casualties, which may in turn increase domestic political and public pressure in Israel against the war.

There is an additional risk of regional escalation, as groups in Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’, the informal coalition of Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, may intensify attacks against Israel as part of the ‘Unity of the Arenas’ strategy – the coordination of Axis of Resistance forces to necessitate a multi-front war. Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds in Iraq have both called for increased attacks against Israel. Iran, meanwhile, has yet to carry out retaliation strikes against Israel for the 31 July assassination of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, which has been repeatedly vowed by Iranian military and political figures.

On 23 September, the al-Qaeda aligned Islamist group, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) released claims to have attacked government forces in both Togo and Benin. In Togo, JNIM operatives reportedly used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack a Togolese army patrol to the east of Kankanti, in the north of the country. In Benin, JNIM claimed to have attacked a Beninese army installation in Bangoun, close to the border with Niger, killing two soldiers.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs), like JNIM and other groups aligned to the Islamic State (IS) are especially active further north, in the three junta states of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, it is highly likely that they are pushing to obtain a presence closer to the coast. Coastal states, like Togo, Benin, and Ghana, are comparatively richer, and VEOs likely aim to leverage their resources to both strengthen their operations in West Africa and to support their associates abroad. Moreover, by forcing West African nations to divert resources internally, VEOs will likely achieve more freedom of movement in the Sahelian states. Increased attacks may also enable VEOs to increase their funding, propaganda and recruitment, especially in the northern regions of West African states where there are often disenfranchised local populations.

The ongoing tensions between the junta states and the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are likely to play into the hands of the Islamist groups, by preventing meaningful cooperation on counterterrorism operations. Despite the attempts at mediation by Senegal’s government, recent developments continue to highlight the overall decay in ECOWAS-AES states. On 23 September, the same day as the JNIM attacks, Burkina Faso’s ambassador to Ghana was reportedly sacked following the junta’s accusations that Ghana’s government is sheltering groups seeking to oust the Burkinabe leader Ibrahim Traore.

The Sudanese military lost most of the capital to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) at the beginning of the conflict in April 2023. The latest stage of fighting, which has quickly resulted in major early gains for the government forces, began with airstrikes on 26 September. Government forces are pushing southeast from the city of Omdurman, which is separated from Khartoum by the White Nile. Reports from local media have indicated that the fighting has already resulted in “hundreds” of casualties, although it is extremely difficult to assess its impact as of the time of writing.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The offensive is highly likely intended to push RSF forces south of the capital, and possibly at gaining control of the entire Khartoum region. Importantly, the operation in Khartoum is likely also meant to relieve some pressure from al-Fasher, in north Darfur, where government forces are besieged by the RSF.

Currently, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) forces have almost certainly taken control of key bridges over the White Nile to the northwest of the city centre, and have highly likely obtained a bridgehead in areas of Khartoum previously under RSF forces. Securing tenable positions in Khartoum would allow government forces to solidify control over neighbouring Omdurman, where SAF clearance operations have been concentrated during the summer.

In August, operations focused on neighbourhoods adjacent to the river, as well as to the city’s west. It is almost certain that these advances in Omdurman were a prelude to the ongoing offensive into Khartoum. Retaking Khartoum is a fundamental political objective for the Sudanese authorities, and the launching of the attack was highly likely planned to coincide with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s speech at the UN General Assembly on 26 September.

Urban fighting in Khartoum is likely to be extremely costly and will highly likely pose a severe threat to civilians present in the city. While initial reports of SAF advances may indicate that RSF units were unprepared to meet the offensive over the river, there is a realistic possibility that the frontlines will gradually solidify south of Khartoum’s city centre. Both sides continue to heavily rely on artillery to support operations, and it is highly likely that artillery fire will intensify as the SAF’s advance slows, which continues to be one of the main drivers of civilian deaths in the conflict.

France’s new Prime Minister unveils government

Centre-right politician Michel Barnier, appointed by President Macron to try to resolve months of political crisis following a stalemate at the recent National Assembly elections, assembled a cabinet which has been widely described as drastically tilting the executive to the right.

The new cabinet members are from Macron’s centrist coalition, as well as from the Republicans (LR), Barnier’s party. Some of them, like new Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau, are considered to be part of the right-wing of LR. It is likely that the appointments are meant to obtain at least the informal support of the far-right National Rally (RN), led by Marine Le Pen.

Still, it is highly likely that the new government remains unstable. In particular, the left is highly likely to increase action against Macron, possibly calling for protests.

Significant civil unrest likely in Paris during the weekend

Multiple protests have been scheduled to take place in Paris (and other major French cities) starting on 27 September. The increase in civil unrest is likely to be driven by the increase in Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon, by the appointment of a new, right-leaning government, and by the ongoing “impeachment” procedure against Macron, which is scheduled to be reviewed by the National Assembly on 2 October. There is a realistic possibility of clashes between left-wing protesters and police. Finally, as highlighted by cases from Lyon and Paris, there is a remote possibility of groups of far-right militants attacking left-wing demonstrations to disrupt them and injure participants, especially in urban centres with a large far-right presence.

German government narrowly survives Brandenburg elections

Following the first victory for a far-right party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), in a German state since 1945, the elections in Brandenburg were narrowly won by the Social Democrats (SPD) in what was almost certainly a crucial boost for the unstable coalition government. The AfD still finished second, winning 29.2 per cent of the vote (compared to the SPD’s 30.9 per cent).

Despite multiple controversies, the AfD has made important gains, especially among younger demographic groups. The result in Brandenburg will highly likely give Chancellor Olaf Scholz greater room for political manoeuvre in the short term. However, with the rise of the AfD, it is highly likely that the SPD, as well as the other major parties – the Greens and the Christian Democrats – will be increasingly forced in local-level “cordon sanitaire” deals to keep the far-right away from power.

The Greens have performed particularly poorly in recent elections – also due to important losses among their traditionally younger base of voters – and, following the vote in Brandenburg, party leaders Omid Nouripour and Ricarda Lang resigned.

Austrian right likely to win elections

The legislative elections will be held on 29 September. The vote is for the National Council, the lower Austrian chamber. According to the latest available polling data, the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) is on track to win the most votes (forecasts indicate it may win 25-27 per cent of the vote). The centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) is in a narrow second place, with 25 per cent of the vote according to polls. The Social Democrats (SPÖ) are assessed as having 21 per cent of preferences.

The current vote split presents a very divided situation, with no clear majority in sight. The ÖVP is currently in a coalition with the Greens, who are however likely to perform significantly worse than in 2019. There is a realistic possibility of an FPÖ victory leading to the formation of a FPÖ-ÖVP alliance, with the latter in a junior position.

Such an alliance would almost certainly result in the (at least partial) implementation of some of FPÖ’s more draconian policies, likely increasing the overall risk of civil unrest in Austria.

Burkina Faso claims to have stopped coup attempt

The junta of Burkina Faso announced that it stopped a “Western-backed” coup attempt. The Burkinabe junta, in power since 2022, has been greatly destabilised by a growing Islamist insurgency, with Islamist militants carrying out multiple attacks on government forces and civilians essentially at will. On 24 August, JNIM militants killed hundreds of civilians who were building defences for the town of Barsalogho.

The junta accused the West, as well as multiple ECOWAS states, of planning a coup to pursue their interests. These accusations highly likely reflect a growing internal worry about the police of a government collapse, or a palace coup, which was made increasingly likely by the repeated failures of junta forces. Junta leader Ibrahim Traore has notably limited his diplomatic trips in recent months, almost certainly due to the threat of a palace coup.

Finally, on 25 September, an AES “special judicial unit” opened an investigation on a France24 journalist who reported on the August attack in Burkina Faso and other Islamist operations in the region. Attempts to stifle foreign and domestic oversight on junta military failures are likely to increase as the juntas’ situations worsen. Junta governments across the Sahel are likely to prioritise regime survival over the protection of citizens, providing VEOs more opportunity to conduct attacks.

Benin arrests three suspected putschists

On 25 September, authorities announced the arrest of three officials, including a presidential guard commander, for allegedly planning a coup. The action was reportedly planned for 27 September, and would have likely entailed the removal of President Patrice Talon. Talon’s second term ends in 2026, and one of the putschists has declared his intention to contest the presidency at the next vote.

Son of Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni says he will not run in 2026, endorses father

Muhoozi Kainerugaba is Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, and is largely seen as a possible successor to his father, who has been in power since 1986. Uganda is an authoritarian state, and the regime maintains control both via the armed forces and via a system of clientelism with local armed groups that maintain a degree of independence from Kampala. The 2026 elections are almost certain to be neither free nor fair and are highly likely carried out to further bolster the regime’s claim to authority. Museveni is currently 80, and, while his son is likely the main candidate to replace him, there is a realistic possibility of a succession crisis arising from Uganda’s fragmented internal security structure.

Russia revises nuclear doctrine

On 25 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin highlighted changes to the country’s nuclear weapons doctrine during a meeting of the state’s Security Council. The changes most notably include a provision that, if a non-nuclear state attacks Russia “with the participation of a nuclear state”, then the action will be considered a “joint attack”. It is likely that this point is in connection to ongoing discussions by NATO members on whether to allow Ukraine to use Western-supplied weapons to strike deep inside internationally recognised Russian territory.

It is, however, highly unlikely that this note departs from Russia’s broader “nuclear sabre-rattling” practice, which has been ongoing since the beginning of the conflict. In fact, Ukraine’s ongoing operations in the Kursk Oblast – which includes NATO-procured equipment – likely already meet the threshold that would justify Russian nuclear retaliation, according to their revised doctrine.

Russia is more likely to increase elements of its hybrid doctrine against the West, including increased incidents of espionage, sabotage, disinformation and cyber-attacks.

Third reported Islamic State (IS) prison riot in Russia

On 24 September, reports emerged that a group of individuals associated with IS were detained while trying to break out of a detention facility in the Novgorod region of Russia. In August, four people were killed when four IS detainees launched an attack inside another prison in Volgograd, while in June a prison riot occurred in Rostov, where six IS inmates were killed by responding special forces. The latest case in Nizhny was reportedly stopped in its earliest stages, and no casualties have been reported. As of now, it is unclear if the individuals were radicalised in prison or were arrested for associating with IS.

Junta and Wagner forces likely to launch another offensive in Kidal, Mali

On 23 September, satellite imagery identified at least two separate convoys – likely consisting of combined junta and Wagner forces – moving north towards the stronghold region for the Tuareg rebels. Early reports suggest that the buildup could be aimed at an offensive towards Tin Zaouatine, at the Algeria-Mali border. It is highly likely that the operation is linked to the repeated setbacks suffered by the AES juntas and by their Russian security providers over the last few months, especially the disastrous ambush in Mai’s north in July, and the more recent attack in Bamako.

A successful military operation would allow Wagner forces to save face at home after the recent setbacks, which have added to ongoing worries about the viability of the group’s current operational approach and calls to accelerate the group’s transition to being fully controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defence as the ‘Africa Corps’. They would also provide important political capital to the Malian junta, which has faced significant domestic backlash following the Bamako attack.

In August, Malian and Burkinabe forces conducted drone strikes near Tin Zaouatine, resulting in multiple civilian deaths and likely no significant military progress. It is highly likely that large-scale Wagner-Malian operations would result in high civilian casualties in the area. Finally, even if the operation against the Tuaregs succeeds, it is unclear whether it would have any adverse impact on IS and JNIM, the latter posing the main threat to Bamako.

Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) carries out attack on Nigerien forces in Inkiwan

According to video and photo evidence, at least 30 Nigerien troops were killed in the attack, and ISSP forces also captured significant quantities of military equipment. The position of the Nigerien junta is likely as unstable as Burkina Faso’s junta, and the recent attack continues to reflect the general unpreparedness of local militaries to combat the growing insurgency. Out of the three AES members, Mali likely benefits from the greater presence of Russian troops, although the military government remains unstable.

Belarussian authorities restrict forest access due to risk of wildfires

The fire season in the country usually begins much earlier in the year. However, a red alert was declared in mid-September in the three regions of Gomel, Mogilev and Brest, and fires have continued throughout the month. Significant parts of Belarus’ area, like Canada’s, are marked as peatlands. However, only one-third of local peatlands are reported to be at a “natural” or “nearly natural” state, the rest having been drained for agricultural use. Drained peatlands are particularly conducive to wildfires. Moreover, peatlands store large amounts of carbon dioxide, which is released via combustion.

Egypt warns of possible cholera outbreak

The Egyptian health minister has carried out water testing in the Aswan region, following an increase in hospitalisations with stomach flu symptoms, which have driven worries of a possible spread of cholera from neighbouring Sudan. Reports from 25 September indicate that more than 430 people died from the illness in Sudan in August alone, with the ongoing conflict almost certainly creating severe difficulties in obtaining treatment.

The tightly contested election took place on 21 September. The leader of the far-left Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party Anura Kumara Dissanayake won, contesting the election as part of the leftist National People’s Power (NPP) coalition. The election was the closest in Sri Lanka’s democratic history. Sri Lanka uses a limited ranked voting electoral system where voters preferentially rank candidates and the winner requires over 50 per cent. Dissanayake won on the second count, the first case since presidential elections began in 1982. Dissanayake dissolved Parliament and called a parliamentary election for 21 November. The NPP only had 3 seats in parliament. While the president can issue executive orders, Dissanayake will need the support of parliament to pass laws.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The primary issue that influenced the result of the election likely was the ongoing economic crisis in Sri Lanka. The economic crisis has consisted of chronic inflation, shortages of essential goods and considerable international debt. In 2022, the crisis led to mass power outages, and fuel shortages led to the disruption of public transport and even medical transport. Following mass unrest across the country, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country. The economic crisis was at least in part, highly likely due to structural issues with the Sri Lankan economy. Following the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009, the government focused on the provision of goods domestically, rather than international trade – this limit of exports led to the economy becoming disproportionately import-focused, which resulted in Sri Lanka essentially running out of foreign currency reserves.

Rajapaksa’s replacement, Ranil Wickremesinghe, declared a nationwide state of emergency after coming into power. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has given Sri Lanka a USD 2.9 billion bailout, with conditions regarding the implementation of substantial austerity measures. The austerity measures implemented by Wickremesinghe have generated mass discontent and Dissanayake’s defeat of Wickremesinghe has highly likely been enabled by this. Dissanayake ran on an anti-corruption and anti-austerity platform and has promised to renegotiate the IMF deal.

The JVP party, which Dissanayake leads, conducted armed insurrections in the 1970s and 80s. While still Marxist-leaning, Dissanayake has moderated the more extreme far-left tendencies of the party. A comparison can be made with the 2015 election in Greece, where the far-left Syriza coalition was elected to power following the imposition of austerity by the ‘Troika’, which the IMF was part of. Like in Greece, where Syriza ultimately capitulated to the demands of the IMF, it is likely that Dissanayake’s far-left coalition will have to equally make significant concessions, which may in turn generate unrest.

On 25 September, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) announced the detection of 43 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft and eight People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels around Taiwan. According to the MND, 34 of the aircraft “crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait”, entering Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ). Chinese aircraft, including J-16 fighters and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), reportedly flew through the Bashi Channel south of Taiwan and then up past Taiwan’s eastern coast. On 26 September, the MND announced the detection of a further 29 Chinese aircraft patrolling with warships. The aircraft did not enter Taiwan’s territorial airspace. Additionally, on 25 September, China conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test, launching the missile into the Pacific Ocean.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The military exercises were likely to practice area denial to “stop foreign assistance” during a China-Taiwan war, in addition to air superiority and air refuelling. In the event of a major war in Taiwan, it is highly likely that the PLA would enforce a naval blockade and no-fly zones. Unlike Ukraine, where NATO members have been able to continually supply and resupply the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) across Ukraine’s substantial land border with friendly nations, Taiwan would effectively be cut off from the rest of the world in the event of a full-scale invasion.

In this scenario, evacuation options would be extremely limited without the provision of internationally agreed evacuation corridors. A full-scale invasion of Taiwan, however, would likely require the largest amphibious operation in military history, dwarfing the WWII Normandy landings in scale. Because of this, such a scenario would most likely be preceded by a significant and observable military buildup by the PLA, likely under the pretext of being “military exercises”, with the movement of considerable blood supplies and other key medical supplies being an especially notable development that would suggest imminent invasion.

An alternative scenario, that could precede a wider offensive, would be China seizing the Kinmen islands, a small group of Taiwan-controlled islands just off the coast of Fujian province in southeastern China – this would test the will of US-led international support for Taiwan in honouring defence obligations. Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessels regularly sail into Kinmen’s restricted waters, 42 times this year and twice just on 26 September.  

The ICBM test conducted by China on 25 September was likely a display of China’s strategic nuclear deterrence against Western intervention, in addition to the practical testing value. Chinese authorities notified the US of the test, and warned the Japanese Coast Guard about “space debris”. Such a test is rare, in that Chinese ICBM tests are generally conducted unannounced in isolated provinces like Inner Mongolia rather than in the Pacific Ocean.

The ICBM was highly likely launched from China’s Hainan Island in the South China Sea, indicating that it was launched from a road-mobile platform such as a DF-31 or DF-41, instead of an inland static silo. The launch’s location in the increasingly contested South China Sea likely further adds to the test’s value as demonstrative deterrence, while the launch platform indicates the continuing diversification and advancement of China’s nuclear capabilities.

Protests in India over labour codes.

On 23 September, thousands of protesters gathered in multiple large cities in India, including Kolkata, New Delhi and Lucknow. The unrest is linked to demands to repeal labour codes which local unions consider to be skewed in favour of large multinational corporations.

The nationalist government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been marked by policy reforms meant to make India more competitive as a manufacturing hub, with a particular focus on high-demand sectors like microchip manufacturing. Modi’s bid to compete with China and Southeast Asia states hinges on maintaining low labour costs and a lax bureaucratic environment.

Lack of pay increases, however, combined with poor safety standards and increased economic inequality, especially notable in large urban centres, is increasingly driving civil unrest. The recent protests are highly likely to be contextualised alongside the ongoing labour strike at a Samsung plant near Chennai, in the country’s south.

Japan’s ruling party leadership vote to replace Prime Minister Fumio Kishida

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has ruled Japan for much of its post-war history and remains uncontested despite significant scandals, including a recent corruption probe. Fumio Kishida announced that he would resign in August. Former Defence Minister Shigeru Ishiba narrowly won the contest after a runoff vote and is scheduled to replace Kishiba in October. It is unlikely that the appointment will have drastic consequences for Japan’s domestic politics and economics. However, the appointment is likely to be relevant from a foreign policy perspective, as Ishiba is widely considered to offer a bolder strategic outlook than some of his competitors for the position. Ishiba will almost certainly continue to deepen Japan’s cooperation with the US and South Korea, regardless of who is elected to the White House in November.

New “anti-Taliban” group announces first attack in Afghanistan

A newly-established group, called Jibhat al-Ribat, claimed responsibility for assassinating a Pakistani Taliban (TTP) leader in the Paktika province of Afghanistan. While this is the first claimed operation by the group, its existence was already reported by pro-Taliban channels in August, with claims that it was “created” by the government of Pakistan to combat the Taliban. No corroborating evidence for this claim is available but the targeted assassination of a TTP commander across the border – and its reporting in the group’s propaganda as the killing of a “terrorist” – likely demonstrates that the group maintains a clear anti-Taliban position.

Japanese warship transits the Taiwan Strait

It is the first time since the Second World War that a Japanese warship – destroyer “Sazanami” – transited the contested passage. The 10-hour transit was conducted alongside Australian and New Zealander vessels and resulted in a complaint by Beijing. The move is likely highly symbolic and highlights the continuation of Japan’s transition towards a more confrontational stance towards China. The transit, moreover, was almost certainly a response to the recent passage of a Chinese aircraft carrier near the Japanese island of Yonaguni, located east of Taiwan.

Mpox clade 1b variety identified in India.

At least one case was reported in Kerala, affecting an individual travelling to India from the UAE.

Clade 1b was first identified in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and is characterised by a higher transmission rate than other strains, as well as more severe symptoms. The high population density that characterises Indian urban centres entails a realistic possibility that more Mpox cases could be identified in the coming weeks.