On 15 September, US Secret Service agents opened fire at an individual at the golf club owned by former President Donald Trump in West Palm Beach, Florida. The individual – later identified as a 58-year old US citizen – reportedly was spotted by agents as he aimed a scoped rifle through the perimeter fence of the golf club. After being fired at, the individual escaped on foot and was subsequently arrested uninjured.

According to available reports, the individual, who intended to assassinate Trump, never had the former President in his sights and did not fire any shots. Trump claimed that the rhetoric used by his Democrat Party opponents is a major factor in driving targeted violence against him.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The suspect has a large online and legacy media footprint, as well as a criminal record, including a charge for possessing a “weapon of mass destruction” in 2002. On his various social media profiles, he shared pro-Palestine, pro-Taiwan content, and had reportedly carried out efforts to encourage US citizens to move to Ukraine to join foreign units fighting for Kyiv.

It is almost certain that the most recent assassination attempt was inspired by the first one that occurred in Butler, Pennsylvania, in July. The dynamic of the latest attempt – with the shooter waiting in an easily-accessible area of the golf course’s perimeter – suggests a low degree of organisation and sophistication. Nevertheless, some elements – including the Go-Pro wearable camera retrieved on the scene – suggest that the suspect sought to either livestream his action or boost its visibility via online broadcasting.

It is highly likely that this incident will further contribute to the polarisation of the ongoing electoral campaign, and there is a realistic possibility of further copycat actions targeting US politicians or government officials. Moreover, the scope of possible security threats is likely to extend beyond the US – due to the extremely high visibility of former President Trump, attempts on his life may drive copycat actions in third countries. Finally, as in the previous case, the assassination attempt resulted in the widespread online sharing of conspiracy theories, some likely meant to instigate lone wolf terrorist attacks on specific private companies or individuals. It is highly likely that this rhetoric will continue to be spread on social media in the weeks prior and immediately after the election.

Overnight on 16 September, major urban violence occurred in the Saint-Therese neighbourhood of Fort-de-France. A group of individuals set up barricades on the road and targeted police officers and vehicles with gunfire and Molotov cocktails. The unrest lasted for much of the night and at least seven police officers and one rioter were injured.

Authorities responded aggressively, with allegedly more than 300 tear gas canisters being used on the night in attempts to quell the unrest. As a result of the unrest, looting and vandalism occurred at the port of Fort-de-France. Only two arrests were reported.

On 18 September, an overnight curfew was announced in the Dillon and Jambette areas of Fort-de-France between the hours of 21:00 and 05:00.

Solace Global Assessment: 

This violence follows a recent trend in Martinique of police officers being targeted by gunfire. On 2 September six police officers were shot and injured during unrest in Fort-de-France and, on 6 September, the Fort-de-France police station was targeted with gunfire by two suspects, causing no casualties.

The recent unrest is occurring in parallel with protesters demanding that retailers align their prices with those charged in mainland stores. There have been multiple calls for nationwide protests until demands are met. It is highly likely a higher number of police officers will be deployed to deter future unrest, particularly in the Saint-Therese neighbourhood.

Further outbreaks of violence remain likely until the government responds to the protests. A general strike is also a realistic possibility. In 2009 a strike occurred in the Fort-de-France with an estimated 11,000 people involved, paralysing the capital. The strike action in 2009 was successful in its aims to get the minimum salary increased, and so it is possible the government agree to the protesters’ demands as an attempt to stop the protests and violence.

The National Liberation Army (ELN) attacked the installation in the northeastern Arauca province on 17 September. Colombian President Gustavo Petro stated that the attack “practically closes” peace talks. The ceasefire in place between the ELN and the Colombian government expired in August. The government has simultaneously pursued separate peace talks with ELN splinter groups.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Both sides accused the other for the failure of the ceasefire agreement. In August, government officials stated that the military would resume operations against the ELN, likely reflecting Colombia’s government assessment of a better strategic position to combat the group. The ELN, which is assessed as having 6,000 active members, has strongholds in the departments of Chocó, Norte de Santander, and Arauca, with a smaller presence in more than a dozen other Colombian departments.

Moreover, the ELN operates transnationally and has a sanctuary in Venezuelan territory, where it maintains friendly relations with pro-regime forces. The recent ELN attack is likely a reflection of ELN’s leaders’ confidence in the group’s ability to conduct protracted armed struggle against the government while retaining its main drug-related sources of income. Moreover, it is likely an attempt at destabilising the government’s parallel efforts to strike a ceasefire with rival splinter groups in disputed regions, such as the Comuneros del Sur, in Nariño.

Contrary to the assessment that the ELN has improved its position, President Gustavo Petro claimed that the ELN is “stagnant”. This assessment, however, appears untenable, as it both contradicts official government assessments of ELN growth and does not provide a clear explanation for the group’s decision to directly attack the military.

Haiti’s transitional administration sets up electoral council

As of the time of writing, there is no clear exact date for the elections, which are scheduled to be held by 2026. The gangs, which still control much of the country despite the arrival of a Kenya-led, UN-backed police contingent, are likely to continue attacks against officials, as part of their likely strategy to delay the creation of alternative administrative bodies that could challenge their authority.

Venezuelan authorities claim arrested Americans were planning coup

On 15 September, Venezuelan channels released more information about six American citizens, including a former Navy SEAL, arrested in the country in August. According to pro-regime sources, the six were planning a coup to oust Maduro.

It is highly likely that the Venezuelan regime is increasing efforts to provoke a domestic “rally round the flag” effect to minimise the risk of further post-election protests. Detaining foreigners – especially US citizens – allows the Maduro regime to bolster its claims of being under attack from abroad, while also granting greater leverage for future negotiations in the form of political prisoners.

It is highly likely that the regime will take advantage of further opportunities to arbitrarily detain foreign travellers to the country.

Evo Morales supporters clash with counterprotesters in Bolivia

The former president called for his supporters to join a “March to Save Bolivia” from Caracollo to La Paz. The march was initially peaceful but was reportedly attacked by supporters of current President Luis Arce. The two sides then clashed using improvised bombs, among other weapons. Tensions have remained high in Bolivia since the attempted coup in late June. Morales has announced plans to run in the 2025 presidential election, and will likely continue stoking unrest to retain a central position in the country’s politics.

At least 30 killed so far in Sinaloa, Mexico in cartel clashes

Heavy fighting in Sinaloa state between two rival factions of the powerful Sinaloa cartel, formerly led by Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, started on 9 September. Clashes have been particularly severe in the state capital, Culiacan. In July, Sinaloa leader Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada was arrested by US authorities after being reportedly lured onto a private plane by one of El Chapo’s sons, Joaquín Guzmán López, which then landed in El Paso, Texas.

Since then, it is almost certain that a power struggle has broken out between those loyal to El Chapo’s other sons, the “Chapitos”, and those loyal to Zambada. This is highly likely the primary cause for the clashes, effectively a cartel civil war.

While 2,200 personnel from the military and National Guard have been sent to Sinaloa, it is unlikely security forces will be able to quell the violence without substantial reinforcements. The outgoing Mexican President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), has adopted a policy of “hugs not bullets” against the cartel, seeking to resolve Mexico’s endemic crime problem with job opportunities and training programs, a policy that will highly likely be continued by his successor Claudia Sheinbaum.

Brazilian wildfires continue

Severe droughts are exacerbating the strength and spread of wildfires in Brazil, as authorities continue to struggle to combat a particularly intense wildfire season in the Amazon this year. On 15 September, the Supreme Court authorised the lifting of spending restrictions for wildfire and drought response in the Amazon and Pantanal regions.

It is highly likely that, while the drought conditions continue, authorities will struggle to contain the fires. In addition to the widespread agricultural impact and threat to residents in the Amazon and Pantanal regions, air quality has been considerably lowered in the major cities of Sao Paulo and Brasilia, which has led to flight disruptions and school closures.

At least 24 people have been killed by large-scale flooding in multiple European countries, including Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, Romania, Hungary, Germany, and Italy. The flooding was caused by a low-pressure storm which stemmed from a Genoa low, a relatively rare weather system which develops south of the Alps, and which was favoured by extremely high surface water temperatures in the Mediterranean Sea. After affecting Central Europe, where it caused more than EUR 1 billion in damages according to early reports, the storm moved southwards to Italy, where it caused widespread flooding in the region of Emilia Romagna.   

Solace Global Assessment: 

Researchers have predicted that the damages from storm Boris will reach the EUR 2 billion threshold by 20 September. Indirect damages from the floods will highly likely be much higher – the 2023 floods in Emilia Romagna alone caused damages of EUR 8.5 billion – and especially notable in regions that have lower flood-resilient infrastructure. The European Union has already pledged EUR 10 billion from the emergency “cohesion funds”. Infrastructural damage will almost certainly have short-term consequences for travellers and residents in the affected areas.

It is highly likely that the storm’s severity was affected by climate change. In 2024, extremely high Mediterranean Sea surface water temperatures were recorded, with season highs of above 31 degrees Celsius. Protracted high temperatures allow a greater level of atmospheric humidity, and therefore likelier severe precipitation events. Researchers have also argued that climate change also favours a phenomenon known as “atmospheric blocking”, whereby lack of movement between high- and low-pressure zones favours persistent weather conditions in the summer, with high-pressure areas experiencing protracted clear weather, possibly leading to drought, and low-pressure areas being at risk of considerable heavy rainfall.

On 17 September thousands of pagers used by Hezbollah members simultaneously detonated across Lebanon. At least 12 deaths were reported, including the son of a Hezbollah MP, and approximately 3,000 injuries, including Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon. Then, on 18 September, thousands of walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah members detonated, with unconfirmed reports that other devices such as home solar energy systems and biometric fingerprint scanners also exploded. 20 deaths were reported, with 450 injuries. Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed retribution for the attacks in a 19 September speech. During the speech, Israeli warplanes flew low over Beirut, and the Israeli military conducted over 52 strikes across southern Lebanon soon after the speech.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the 17 September pager detonations were more widespread, the 18 September walkie-talkie blasts were more powerful and deadly. The attacks were highly likely conducted by Mossad, but an official claim of responsibility is highly unlikely. Speculation that the attack involved hacking into the devices to make the batteries explode is almost certainly untrue, the detonations were almost certainly caused by remotely detonated small quantities of military-grade high explosives. The pagers that detonated were Taiwanese company Gold Apollo models, mostly AR924s. Hezbollah reportedly ordered over 5,000 pagers before distributing them to members throughout Lebanon, as well as to members and allies in Iraq, Syria and Iran – at least 14 people were injured in Syria.

Gold Apollo have since stated that the pagers were manufactured on license by the Budapest-registered company BAC Consulting, that they encountered issues with remittances from BAC and that payments had come through the Middle East. It is highly likely that BAC Consulting was an Israeli front posing as an international pager producer. It is highly likely that Israeli intelligence similarly infiltrated the supply chain of the walkie-talkies that detonated, primarily IC-V82 models from the Japanese company ICOM, with ICOM stating that they ended production of the model 10 years ago.

The most likely reason for the specific timing of the attack is that the capability was about to be exposed – a case of “use it or lose it”. It is likely that the operation was originally intended to be conducted as an immediate prelude to a wider operation into southern Lebanon by Israeli forces, but the potential imminent discovery of the device tampering expedited the operation.

On 16 September, the Israeli security cabinet made the safe return of residents to northern Israel an official war objective, and the defence minister Yoav Gallant stated after the device detonations that Israel is “opening a new phase in the war”, as Israeli forces reorient to the northern front against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

It is highly likely that Hezbollah will attempt to retaliate, due to the extent of the operation and the humiliation caused, however their operational effectiveness has almost certainly been degraded and Hezbollah will not wish to give the Netanyahu administration an excuse to launch a major IDF offensive into southern Lebanon.

Additionally, the at least 52 IDF strikes across southern Lebanon were almost certainly pre-emptive, as they largely targeted rocket launchers, further degrading Hezbollah’s capability to retaliate. Nonetheless, it is likely that Hezbollah will launch further retaliation strikes to the limited attacks already made, which will most likely consist of rocket and missile attacks against targets in northern Israel within range of the majority of their weapon systems, or about 40 kilometres.

King Abullah II of Jordan appointed the Harvard-educated palace aide Jafar Hassan as prime minister on 15 September, replacing former diplomat and palace advisor Bisher Khasawneh who had served as prime minister since 2020. The appointment followed the resignation of Jordan’s government, which conventionally occurs after legislative elections, with a parliamentary election having earlier taken place on 10 September.  

Solace Global Assessment: 

While Jordanians elect representatives to Jordan’s lower house of parliament, the House of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwwāb), as they did on 10 September, Jordan’s king holds all substantial powers within Jordan’s political system, with ultimate authority over the executive, legislative and judiciary. In this regard. the appointment of the technocrat and loyalist Jafar Hassan is almost certainly a continuation of the status quo. In addition to pervasive economic issues, namely unemployment and declining tourism because of regional conflict, Hassan will need to wrestle with increasingly Islamist (political Islam) sentiment in Jordan.

The political arm of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist Action Front (IAF) made significant gains in the parliamentary election, winning 31 seats out of 138, their best result in 35 years. This makes the IAF the largest political grouping in parliament, although pro-government independents and tribal factions are still overall dominant. The result came about firstly due to electoral reform in Jordan which allocated an increased number of seats to party lists. Political parties have previously only had a limited presence in Jordan’s legislature. Secondly, the aforementioned economic issues and a general “climate of disillusionment” have driven discontentment with the political system, benefiting the Islamists. Thirdly, and most notably, the ongoing Israel-Hamas war in Gaza has led to widespread protests in Jordan and increasing popular support for Islamism.

Compared to 2020 where polls indicated that 44 per cent of Jordan’s population expressed a positive view of Hamas, in November and December 2023 polling showed a rise to 85 per cent. The IAF has regularly organised protests, particularly in Amman, with common protest slogans including “we are all Hamas” and “Yahya Sinwar is our leader”. Between 50-70 per cent of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin, and the Israel-Hamas War has highly likely generated the greatest political shift in Jordan, a key military ally for the US, in decades.

On 17 September, the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), attacked the military airport in Bamako, Mali. JNIM claimed that the attack was in retaliation for recent joint operations involving Malian forces and Russian Wagner group operatives. The group also claimed that the attack killed up to 100 junta troops and destroyed dozens of military vehicles including six aircraft. There are reports that, following the attacks, lynch mobs formed in Bamako and killed uninvolved residents of the Fulani – also known as Peul – ethnic group, which have often been singled out as “allies” of the Islamists in local discourse.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The attack is highly significant for multiple reasons. First, it likely represents the greatest direct security failure experienced by the Mali junta, and the first attack of this kind in Bamako since 2016. The attack likewise further demonstrates the junta’s growing inability to cope with a growing Islamist insurgency and follows other significant losses and setbacks – most notably, the loss of at least 100 Mali and Wagner troops in a joint Tuareg-JNIM attack in the country’s north in July.

Second, JNIM operatives likely aimed to obtain maximum political leverage out of the attack. The attack solely targeted a military installation – unlike many  other JNIM attacks which target civilians indiscriminately. The Mali junta, as well as its allies in Niger and Burkina Faso, are likely increasingly unable to respond to a growing insurgency, which is also emboldened by the evident security vacuum in the Sahel following the withdrawal of Western counterterrorist assets and their replacement with more brutal but likely less effective Wagner forces operating under the Russian Defence Ministry-run Africa Corps.

Botched counterinsurgency operations by the juntas have resulted in civilian casualties, with cases of arbitrary and brutal treatment of civilians – including reported summary executions of even children – being leveraged by Islamist groups to bolster recruitment operations. As a return to cooperating with the West is highly unlikely due to the extremely high political costs, it is likely that the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) will further rely on extremely violent – and likely less strategically effective – counterinsurgency operations.

Currently, Islamist groups almost certainly have the capacity to strike Ouagadougou and Bamako at will, and will likely soon have the capacity to directly strike Niamey. Further attacks in major urban centres are likely to increasingly put pressure on the top junta leaders, making palace coups and replacement of current junta heads likely in the coming months. There is a realistic possibility of the complete collapse of one or more juntas in the medium term.

Eight migrants die in attempted English Channel crossing

On 14 September, 801 people arrived on small boats to the UK from France, the second highest daily number this year. The increased volume of crossings is almost certainly dependent on multiple days of relatively mild weather at the beginning of September. The deaths reportedly occurred near the French coast, as the vessel carrying migrants struck rocks near Ambleteuse.

Georgia parliament passes “family values” law

The law is largely seen as an anti-LGBTQ bill mirroring similar legislation in Russia. The law is highly likely to be understood as part of the broader process of alignment with Moscow that the current Georgian government has undertaken, most notably via the controversial “foreign agents” bill. The law is likely to drive further protests, and, as in Russia, it is highly likely that the law will allow Georgian authorities to further attack civil society and NGOs under the pretext of “defending family values”.

Armenian officials say they thwarted a Russian coup attempt

On 18 September, the Investigative Committee of Armenia stated that, earlier in 2024, Moscow attempted to carry out a coup via a trained network of at least six insurgents. The extent and scope of the alleged plan are still unclear.

Protests in Tunisia before Presidential elections

The vote will take place on 6 October and will highly likely be won by current President Kais Saied, who has concentrated significant power and reduced the freedom of independent election commission officials. In the last weeks, Saied’s government accelerated its campaign of arrests of political opponents, including detaining 97 members of the opposition party Ennahda on 12 September. It is highly likely that protests will continue in the coming weeks before the vote, and that Tunisian authorities will respond to them violently.

Elections in South Sudan postponed by two years

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir unilaterally announced the extension of the transitional period by two years, postponing elections for the second time – the first postponement having occurred in 2022. South Sudan’s government transition period started with the 2018 peace deal which ended five years of civil war. The decision to postpone the elections was largely expected, but it is unlikely that government forces will manage to solve all the issues that Kiir highlighted – including the lack of a constitution and widespread insecurity – before the end of the new two-year extension period.

Islamist knife attack in the Netherlands

On the evening of 19 September, a man carried out a stabbing attack on Erasmus Bridge in Rotterdam, killing one and wounding at least another. Information available so far indicates that the perpetrator, which was overpowered by a witness and then arrested, likely was a self-radicalised lone wolf Islamist terrorist.

Two explosions in Cologne, Germany, in less than a week

On 17 September, a second explosion in three days occurred in Cologne, Germany. Both blasts occurred in the city centre, outside residential buildings. The blasts are still unexplained, but observers have indicated that detonating improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is a common intimidation tactic used by gangs in the Netherlands, which borders Cologne’s state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The blasts are therefore likely linked to drug trafficking routes from the Netherlands towards central and eastern Europe.

Eight Azeri troops killed in clashes with Islamist group

Local media reported that the troops were involved in counterterrorism operations in the Qusar district of north Azerbaijan. In August, an Azeri public official was reportedly killed by unidentified “Salafi” militants in the area. Residents in Qusar have reported ongoing counterterrorism operations for the past two weeks. The IS-affiliate an-Naba magazine claimed that IS was responsible for the attack on Azeri forces. If these claims are true, then it is highly likely that the militants were affiliates of the Caucasus Province of IS (ISCP), the branch of the group that was responsible for the 23 June attack in Derbent and Makhchkala, Dagestan.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) authorities sentence 37 to death after failed coup

The prisoners include three American citizens, a Belgian, a UK citizen, and a Canadian. They were captured following a suspected coup in May, which involved an attack on the home of a government ally. The attack was almost certainly carried out by the “New Zaire Movement”, a group linked to Christian Malanga, a DRC politician who was killed in the attack and had previously lived in political exile in the US. The DRC allows the death penalty, but had a moratorium on it for two decades, which was only lifted in March, making executions in this case likely to occur. There is a realistic possibility of international involvement affecting the sentences faced by the six dual citizens.

Comoros President stabbed, attacker found dead in cell days later

Comoros President Azali Assoumani was stabbed during a funeral procession and received minor injuries to his hand on 14 September. Days later, the suspect that had been arrested in connection with the stabbing was found dead on the cell where he was being detained. The alleged perpetrator of the attack was a 24-year-old soldier, with no clear personal or ideological motive.

Three firefighters dead due to Portugal wildfires

At least 50 wildfires are currently active in the country, and approximately 5,300 firefighters have been deployed to combat them. The fires have caused multiple roadway and railway closures, and are likely to have significant protracted effects on the mainland. Despite the end of the hottest months of the year and a higher volume of precipitation than usual, temperatures in Portugal and Spain continue to be around 30 degrees during the warmest part of the day, which facilitates the outbreak and spread of fires.

Kenya invests more resources to combat Mpox

Kenyan officials committed USD 52 million on 15 September after five cases of Mpox were confirmed in Taita Taveta, Busia, Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru. It is highly likely that the actual number of cases is much higher. The rapid transnational spread of Mpox has led the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention to declare its first-ever Public Health Emergency of Continental Security.

On 16 September, Typhoon Bebinca made landfall in Shanghai as a category 1 storm with maximum recorded windspeeds of 151 km/h. 400,000 people were evacuated, 56,000 rescue workers were deployed, and 30,000 homes lost power. Bebinca caused severe travel disruptions, with mass flight and train service cancellations, and widespread business closures occurred as Shanghai authorities issued a weather alert at the highest level. Considerable port disruptions also occurred in Shanghai and Ningbo, with vessel bunching at the ports disrupting departures from container terminals. One injury was reported in Shanghai.

Typhoon Bebinca eased into a Tropical Storm, moving into Jiangsu province, causing two deaths in Zhoushi Town after a high-voltage power line fell. Then, on 19 September, a second named storm hit Shanghai, Tropical Storm Pulasan. Pulasan twice made landfall, first in Zheijiang Province and then in Shanghai later in the day. The storm caused torrential rainfall, with local precipitation records being broken in parts of Shanghai. While some parts of Shanghai experienced notable flooding, no reports of serious damage or casualties have been reported thus far as a result of Pulasan.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Typhoon Bebinca is the most powerful tropical cyclone to hit Shanghai in over 70 years, since the 1949 Typhoon Gloria. Tropical Storm Pulasan, meanwhile, is the 14^th named storm in the Asia Pacific region this year, with the highly powerful Typhoon Yagi having recently caused significant damage, disruptions and deaths in the Philippines, China, Vietnam and Myanmar.

Disruptions in Shanghai over the past week have been extensive, however, the level of damage and casualties has been remarkably low, almost certainly due to Shanghai’s very high level of development, the substantial state capacity afforded to response operations, and the rigorous preparedness and resiliency measures deployed.

Climate change is highly likely a significant factor in conditioning the measured worsening of annual tropical storm seasons internationally, as warmer seas highly likely cause stronger storms. China is the world’s biggest carbon emitter, though the United States has a significantly higher per capita emission rate. Some studies suggest that predicted levels of climate change could lead to large portions of the most populated and developed region of China, in and around the North China Plain, experiencing severe habitability challenges by 2100 on current trajectories. This is due to the threat posed by “wet-bulb temperatures”, the phenomenon where both humidity levels and temperatures are so high that evaporative cooling via sweating in humans is limited to the extent that humans will very quickly die from hyperthermia.

China has made substantial investments into renewable energy and now has more renewable power capacity than any other country in the world. It is highly likely that these policy decisions have been made due to China’s particular vulnerability to climate change. It is likely that Beijing will make increasingly strong diplomatic efforts to make combatting climate change an international priority as climate change continues to worsen.

A man was sentenced to 14 months in prison for “sedition” after pleading guilty to wearing a t-shirt with the slogan “liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times”, associated with the 2019 protests. The individual is the first person to be charged, convicted and sentenced under the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), the new national security law in effect since March 2024.

Solace Global Assessment: 

At least 12 other people have been arrested for sedition since the SNSO was enacted. The new legislation is almost certainly aimed at nullifying the possibility of further anti-Beijing protests, and is part of broader Chinese efforts to diminish civil society and opposition forces in Hong Kong. The recent crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong has likely de facto ended most aspects of the “one country, two systems” framework in place since the UK handed over the territory in 1997.

It is highly likely that, in addition to its political implications, the strict implementation of the SNSO will also increasingly affect Hong Kong’s competitiveness as a global hub for finance and business. Combined with high US-China tensions, Beijing’s growing influence and oversight over the city has likely contributed to accelerating the exodus of foreign companies to other business-friendly locations in Southeast Asia. Between 2019 and 2021, the number of global companies that had their regional headquarters in Hong Kong decreased by approximately 13 per cent, many having relocated to Singapore.

At the same time, however, much of this decrease has been compensated by an influx of Chinese companies, likely contributing to maintaining Hong Kong on an upward economic trajectory in 2023 and 2024.

Presidential election in Sri Lanka set to take place on 21 September

The election has been tightly contested, with the economy being the key issue, and the outcome will likely be close. After collapsing in 2022, Sri Lanka’s economy has struggled to recover with inflation rates almost reaching 70 per cent. With 38 candidates running, the front runners are the incumbent President Ranil Wickremesinghe, the leader of the opposition Sajith Premadasa, and Anura Kumara Dissanayake.

Wickremesinghe became President in 2022 after his predecessor was forced to flee Sri Lanka due to widespread unrest stemming from the economic crisis and is a centre-right liberal conservative. Premadasa is a centrist who wishes to change some conditions in the International Monetary Fund’s USD 2.9 billion bailout programme. Dissanayake is contesting the election as part of the National People’s Power (NPP) coalition, a left-wing coalition that includes the far-left People’s Liberation Front, which Dissanayake leads.

Sri Lanka uses a limited ranked voting electoral system where voters preferentially rank candidates. Almost every presidential election since 1982 has resulted in a candidate winning a majority in the first count. This election, however, is likely to go to second or even third counts. Polling indicates that Dissanayake is the most likely to win the first count, although the accuracy of Sri Lankan polling is unreliable. With the first preference centre and centre-right vote split between the other two frontrunners, it is likely that Dissanayake will fare worse in any additional counts.

North Korea conducts multiple missile tests

South Korean and Japanese authorities have reported that North Korea conducted missile testing twice in one week, on 18 and 19 September. The missiles were primarily short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), with North Korean state media (KCNA) claiming that they were new Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5) designs with “super-large warheads”. KCNA additionally claimed a test of a “strategic cruise missile”. The new missile design is highly likely an iterated Hwasong-11 (KN-23) design with a larger warhead. Hwasong-11s have highly likely been used by Russia in its war against Ukraine, according to Ukrainian state prosecutors who examined missile debris, though Moscow and Pyongyang deny this. The missile tests are likely part of North Korean efforts to speed up the development of the new missile variant to sell to Russia.

Taliban suspends Polio vaccinations in Afghanistan

The decision was taken despite the increase in polio cases recorded in Afghanistan, 18 in 2024, up from six in 2023. Taliban officials did not provide an explanation for the move, which was announced days before the scheduled beginning of a September immunisation campaign. The lack of immunisation is likely to not only affect Afghanistan, but also neighbouring states and especially border regions in Pakistan, due to the high influx of Afghan migrants and refugees.

Tropical Storm Soulik makes landfall in northern Vietnam

At approximately 14:00 local time on 19 September, Tropical Storm Soulik made landfall in Quang Tri province, northern Vietnam. Expected to follow a similar trajectory to the recently devastating Typhoon Yagi, the storm has prompted mass evacuations in both Quang Tri and Binh provinces. While Soulik’s strength is far weaker than Yagi, the lingering devastation from Yagi’s recent impact will likely exacerbate the storm’s impact on northern Vietnam and neighbouring Laos.

Flooding from Typhoon Yagi kills at least 226 people in Myanmar

Although Yagi, which had earlier hit Hainan, China and northern Vietnam, was significantly weakened, Myanmar is highly vulnerable to the impact of flooding. The ongoing civil war in Myanmar means that a third of Myanmar’s population already required humanitarian aid, and many of the worst impacted regions are difficult to access for already highly limited rescue operations. The major cities of Naypyidaw and Mandalay also experienced significant floods. Shan State, which has had considerable heavy fighting during the civil war, was also particularly impacted. The rebel forces that control most of Shan State are almost certainly under-resourced to deal with the floods, exacerbating the impact.