On 29 July, the Venezuelan electoral commission released the official data for the previous day’s vote. According to the officials, incumbent President Maduro was re-elected with 51.2 per cent of the vote.

The opposition, which has recently encountered numerous institutional challenges including the barring of leader Corina Machado from running for president, claimed the results were unfair. An alternative exit poll released by the opposition indicated that they had received approximately 70 per cent of the popular vote.

Following the vote, protests broke out in various part of Venezuela, with authorities (and paramilitary groups affiliated with the government) intervening to violently quash them. Dozens of protesters have been injured or killed as of the time of writing.

Numerous states, including the US, have officially recognised the opposition’s victory, while other regional powers, including Brazil, have called for Venezuela to release concrete proof of its claims.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The election results have almost certainly been doctored, and multiple reports indicate widespread manipulation of the voting process. The protests, no matter their severity, are, however, for now, unlikely to result in a reversal of Maduro’s claims and the opening of a pathway towards democratic transition.

The Venezuelan military, the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB) and other security forces in the country remain loyal to the government, and there is only a remote possibility that this will change due to popular pressure. The FANB’s fidelity can likely be explained via the repeated economic concessions that the Maduro regime has granted the military, including management positions in the company’s national oil company PDVSA, and much of the capital allocated for the National Development Fund.

Moreover, over the past months, Maduro has taken advantage of a respite in the US-led sanctions regime – following the government’s agreement to hold free and fair elections – to increase its oil exports, thus guaranteeing a vital influx of funds to be allocated towards ensuring the retention of the military’s support. The armed forces are also unlikely to defect as the regime has “coup-proofed” them, by allowing Cuban intelligence to oversee their commitment to the government (including by independently purging officers), and by playing the FANB against other security institutions, like the Bolivarian National Guard and Bolivarian National Police.

Finally, the opposition has also failed to gain traction among senior military officials. Instead, Machado’s plans to liberalise the Venezuelan oil market directly threaten their vital source of funds, making it an unpalatable option.

After reneging on its promise to hold free and fair elections, further sanctions will likely be imposed on Venezuela. This will further isolate Caracas and accelerate its shift towards states hostile to the US, such as Russia, China and Iran. However, this development may also harm the US, which could lose much of its remaining leverage on Venezuela. Unconstrained by US influence, Venezuela could seek to damage Washington in multiple ways.

First, it could further seek to stimulate migrant flows towards Central America, forcing Washington to either devote even more resources to help Central American states’ border control efforts or face a worsening situation at its southern border. Even more importantly, the Venezuelan government could increasingly seek to allow continental (and extra-continental) drug flows towards the United States. In 2023, reports credibly proved that the Maduro regime, and its top military officials, have benefitted from allowing the transit of Colombian cocaine through the county’s territory. Following further isolation, Venezuela may also look to increasingly benefit from the traffic of drugs manufactured in and outside of the Americas, potentially becoming a landing hub for Chinese-made fentanyl.

Brazilian government data showed that Amazon rainforest fires affected more than 11,400 hotspots in July, the highest number for that month since 2005. In June, 17,500 square kilometres were burned, the largest area since 2005. The wildfires are occurring during a period of drought and extremely high temperatures. The high volume of fires in the Amazon rainforest and the Pantanal wetlands at its borders continue to threaten native peoples living in the area.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva started on premises that were completely different from those of its predecessor Bolsonaro. Lula has committed to stop deforestation by 2030, and has campaigned on preserving the Amazon and its native peoples.

On 31 July, the president signed another law trying to curb deforestation. The latest fires highly likely demonstrate the ongoing severe weaknesses and failures of the Lula administration to protect the Amazon. Compared to Europe, there is a higher incidence of human-caused fires in the Amazon. Many are started by farmers or herders, seeking to clear large areas of forests at little cost.

In addition to being a consequence of the impacts of climate change, the records set during this summer almost certainly reflect a policing failure on the authorities’ part.

Importantly, the ongoing vulnerabilities of the Brazilian government’s strategy to fight deforestation, and the criminality often associated with it, are likely to further perpetuate threats to aid workers, Indigenous people, and activists in the area. In the 2012-2022 decade, around 90 per cent of the almost 2,000 environmentalist activists killed globally were killed in Latin America. One in five murders took place in the Amazon rainforest in 2022. In Brazil, 34 activists were killed in 2022.

Logging, mining, and farming companies, some of which operate almost completely illegally, often deploy quasi-paramilitary groups that carry out targeted killings, torture, and intimidation operations. Lack of government response, or insufficient assets deployed, is likely to continue contributing to a failure to address these fundamental threats, consequently forcing activists to face high risks.

The government’s inability to protect the Amazon either through illegal activities or other reasons has also historically been a major trigger for Indigenous protests throughout Brazil and the wider Amazon region.

Canada tries to reduce temporary immigration

The Canadian government announced on 1 August that it would implement measures to reduce the number of temporary migrants arriving in the country, and will postpone plans to award resident status to undocumented migrants. The shift comes after months of pressure from right-wing parties, as well as numerous security issues – including multiple cases of extremist violence and planning, and political assassinations linked with foreign powers.

There is a high likelihood that a crackdown on immigration will result in localised protests in large Canadian urban centres. Moreover, it may not resolve the government’s woes, as the opposition is unlikely to be satisfied by planned measures, which may nevertheless also upset the government’s liberal electorate.

Trump campaign crushes Project 2025

On 30 July, the director of the controversial Project 2025, a plan spearheaded by the Heritage Foundation to lobby a possible second Donald Trump administration to approve far-right, socially conservative policies, resigned. The resignation was explained by Heritage Foundation members as due to “pressure” from the Trump campaign and followed Trump directly rejecting the project and its organisers.

The move by Trump is likely an attempt at winning undecided, centre-right voters, and to remove one of the Democrat Party’s main campaign targets. Still, Trump likely assesses that Project 2025 can retain some utility due to its proponents’ interest in the question of staffing the next Republican administration with pre-vetted, ideologically committed officials and bureaucrats, which would afford the possible two-term president more room for manoeuvre compared to the 2016-2020 period.

Largest prisoner swap since the Cold War between the US and Russia

On 1-2 August, the US and Russian governments, as well as some European US allies, exchanged two dozen prisoners, with the swap taking place in Ankara. Many of the prisoners released by the US and its European allies had ties to Russian intelligence services. Among the most notable ones is Vadim Krasikov, who had been serving a life sentence in Germany for carrying out an assassination in Berlin.

On the Russian side, the released prisoners include political opposition members Ilya Yashin and Oleg Orlov. The last comparable swap took place in Vienna in 2010. At that time, Sergei Skripal, who would later be targeted by Russian intelligence with the Novichok nerve agent in Salisbury, was among the prisoners released by Russia.

Islamist groups spread anti-US propaganda, encourage lone wolf attacks

During this reporting period, OSINT analysis revealed multiple social media campaigns launched by Islamist violent extremist organisations (VEOs) calling for lone-wolf attacks in the United States. The campaigns were mainly driven by media associated with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The former is likely the most active branch of the Islamic State (IS) abroad and was responsible for various high-profile attacks including the Crocus Hall and Dagestan attacks in Russia. The latter is smaller, but, following the appointment of a new Emir, has increasingly sought to incite violence abroad.

Two likely drivers of the increase in Islamist propaganda have been the attempted assassination of Donald Trump – which was used to incite further attacks on Western, and particularly US, leaders – and the most recent developments in the Israel-Hamas war.

Russian warships visit Cuba for the second time in two months

On 27 July, a small group of Russian warships from Russia’s Baltic fleet docked in Cuba. The visit follows another one in June, which included a nuclear submarine and frigate. These port calls are routine but normally only occur about once a year. US officials have dismissed the threat.

However, Putin has recently warned of a new Cold War-style missile crisis after the US decision to deploy nuclear-capable long-range missiles to Germany that could strike Russia within ten minutes. Putin has suggested that Russia would station similar missiles in striking distance of the US, with Cuba serving as an obvious base, with these deployments potentially serving as strategic messaging to Washington.

Russia is also seeking to establish a network of international naval bases to aid bluewater operations after losing this capability after the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Cuba a long-coveted destination.

Early indications that Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel is fragmenting

After their recent apprehensions, Sinaloa Cartel figures “El Mayo” and Guzmán López have made court appearances in Texas. The arrest of senior leadership may lead to the further fragmentation of Mexico’s most powerful cartel, which reportedly now operates almost as four independent factions. Continued fragmentation will likely result in increased competition and associated violence within the cartel and rival cartels may seek to capitalise on these perceived weaknesses.

Wildfires continue in British Columbia, Canada

On 30 July, up to 349 wildfires were reportedly burning in the Canadian province of British Columbia. In Alberta, the wildfire responsible for destroying up to a third of the town Jasper’s structures last week has been extinguished. Officials have received criticism for poor wildfire management practices. Reduced temperatures and rainfall have aided the efforts of authorities to tackle the spread of wildfires, however as temperatures are forecast to rise again in the coming days, the spread of wildfires will likely continue.   

Forecasts predict Tropical Storm Carlotta to become a hurricane on Friday

The storm, the third named one to form in the Eastern Pacific in 2024, has air speeds of above 100 kph and is expected to affect the coasts of west-central mainland Mexico and the Baja California peninsula during the weekend. Storm formation in the Pacific will almost certainly be affected by the likely development of the La Nina phenomenon. While, in the Atlantic, La Nina reduces wind shear and makes storms more likely to form, in the Pacific it has the opposite effects, making phenomena like Carlotta less likely.

On 29 July, a 17-year-old attacked a children’s dance class in Southport, England, killing three and wounding eight. No motive has been identified as of the time of writing, but it appears certain that the attacker deliberately targeted the dance class, making the attack a likely case of lone-wolf terrorism.

On 30 July, protesters gathered in the city and clashed with police, injuring at least 22 officers, and tried to set fire to a local Mosque. On the following day, clashes between police and a few hundred protesters took place near Whitehall, London, as well as in Hartlepool – where rioters set fire to a police car – in Manchester, where police were pelted with rocks, and in Aldershot, where protesters gathered outside a hotel where migrants are housed.

Notably, no credible media coverage alleged that the attacker was Muslim, only that he had Rwandan heritage, a primarily Christian country. Nevertheless, open-source analysis revealed that, in the hours after the attack, far-right channels began promoting narratives linking the attack with Islamist terrorism.

On the day before the stabbing, former English Defence League (EDL) co-founder Tommy Robinson organised a large demonstration in London, the second in the space of a few months. On 28 July, Robinson was arrested but subsequently released on bail. Robinson then fled to the continent to avoid a possible trial for contempt of court.

Solace Global Assessment: 

While the protests were not solely driven by far-right groups, there is a high likelihood that UK-based identitarian movements sought to exploit the attacker’s background to drive civil unrest in a way beneficial to their cause. In particular, far-right channels, both in the UK and from other Anglophone countries, immediately began promoting conspiracy theories and fake narratives alleging that the attacker was Muslim, almost certainly to direct local residents’ outrage towards the local Muslim community.

In this sense, the incident can likely be considered to mirror previous cases of misinformation-driven unrest and sectarian violence in countries like India and Egypt. In these cases, as in the recent Southport one, the rapid spread of false narratives online prompted both an intensification of violence among local protesters, and helped drive the influx of more ideologically-committed individuals from other parts of the UK. While the protests in Southport saw notable participation of the local community – and therefore were not simply “far-right” – it is highly likely that identitarian groups managed to coopt the unrest, leading to the later violence in London, Manchester, Hartlepool and Aldershot.

The far-right London protests, as well as the large turnout of rioters and protesters at these locations, possibly highlight a resurgence in the British far-right. Over the past decade, far-right and identitarian groups in the UK have not managed to organise actions similar in scale and severity to those staged by their European counterparts. Historically, UK far-right politics were centred on small parties, like the British National Party (BNP), who had a fundamental interest in breaking into mainstream politics. This “normalisation” objective was likely a restraining factor on the development of neofascist and identitarian militant groups and collectives similar to those in continental European countries like France or Italy, which have historically had a primarily extra-parliamentary focus. With the decline and eventual collapse of BNP in 2013, the rise of the EDL and even smaller groups like Britain First (BF) only partly saw a move towards exclusively militant politics – with the latter still hoping to achieve recognition as an “accepted” party. However, during the 2024 electoral campaign, increasing far-right activity was recorded, especially targeting British Muslims. Tommy Robinson and other former EDL members have likely successfully began leveraging online media, thus mostly abandoning local support-building, to achieve “viral” status for their identitarian efforts and ideology.

The 28 July protest, and the riots of 30-31 July, almost certainly underscore the growing success of this online-based approach. Even if remaining outside the UK, it is highly likely that Robinson will continue to encourage sectarian violence in the country. Finally, a likely relevant factor in boosting online far-right recruitment and operational efforts is that of language. UK-based channels are almost certainly more significantly influenced by American ones, and by English-language discourse coming from Europe and beyond. While the large diversity of narratives and discourses likely disincentivises local organising or the mainstreaming of specific grievances, it likely contributes to amplifying the otherwise limited media capabilities of UK far-right groups.

In the early hours of 26 July, fires were reported at multiple signal boxes and electricity installations at five stations scattered across the north of France, all serving lines leading to Paris. The damage that resulted affected the first weekend of the Olympics, causing massive delays. In the following days, further cases of sabotage, targeting energy and telecommunications infrastructure, were reported in various – often isolated and rural – parts of the country, resulting in further limited disruptions. Left-wing activists opposed to the Olympics have been arrested in connection with the fires and sabotage.

Solace Global Assessment: 

There is a strong anti-Olympic Games movement in France that has its ideological roots in the extreme and anarchist left, but also overlaps considerably with other activist networks, including the environmentalist one. The action on 26 July, and the further simultaneous sabotage of multiple telecom installations, demonstrates at least a level of organisational capacity on the part of the saboteurs. This has led some observers to speculate that responsibility for the act fell on foreign intelligence services (likely, Russia).

Reports of Russia both directly employing its intelligence assets to carry out operations or, more frequently, funding and indirectly ordering dissatisfied activists and individuals within target countries to attack local sites have been widespread. There is a realistic possibility that some of these recent cases of low-sophistication sabotage were indirectly sponsored by the Kremlin. However, it is important to note that these sabotage actions are extremely low-cost in terms of the tools required, and their targets are often so isolated as to be impossible to defend or monitor. Consequently, there is a higher likelihood that the action was carried out by anti-Olympic protest groups, with third-country influence likely only playing a limited role, if any at all.

Regardless of attribution, actors, both inside and outside France, have likely monitored the success, deniability and complications regarding investigating these attacks and may seek to imitate them- as recently demonstrated by the sabotage of a German railway. While unlikely to have been directly responsible for this case, it is almost certain that Moscow is currently seeking to disrupt the Olympics and to destabilise or undermine France by carrying out cyber, information, and other operations. It is almost certain that, in the coming weeks, further sabotage actions will be attempted by a variety of different groups. These actions are likely to affect travel and business and could be so severe as to directly threaten life.

On 30 July, the Hamas Political Bureau Chairman, Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated when staying at an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force facility in northern Iran. Haniyeh had reportedly only been in Iran for a day and was attending the inauguration of the new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Pezeshkian has vowed to make Israel regret what he declared was a cowardly action. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei has stated that avenging Haniyeh’s death is Tehran’s duty, and Iran’s formidable IRGC has stated that Israel will face “a harsh and painful response” from Iran and its allies- almost certainly referring to Tehran’s wider network of proxy forces.

The assassination of Haniyeh was the second major strike conducted by Israel, with Hezbollah’s second in command, Fuad Shakr killed in southern Beirut less than twelve hours earlier.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Haniyeh’s assassination in the Iranian capital will be a huge embarrassment for Tehran and raises questions over the regime’s ability to protect the leaders of its strategic proxy forces within its territory. The attack demonstrates Israel’s ability to infiltrate Iran and strike high-value targets (HVTs), a strong warning to the regime itself and any proxy force leader.

Little is known about how the assassination was conducted but imagery of the targeted strike indicates that the weapons system had a small payload. Reports vary as to whether it was an explosively laden drone, short-range missile or bomb smuggled into the complex months before. All of these systems indicate that the attack was likely conducted or set up from within Iranian territory, an act that would severely undermine Iranian security.

Moreover, Israel’s ability to locate, track and target Haniyeh within such condensed timeframes indicates a high level of intelligence penetration into Iran and significant weaknesses in Iranian counterintelligence. The nature of the attack and intelligence flaws may also point towards Israel being able to leverage inside help from disaffected Iranians. Many Iranians are greatly dissatisfied with the regime and there are even indications of grassroots support for Israel, largely driven by the repressive nature of the regime which has killed and abused thousands.

There is evidence to suggest that Israel’s 19 April retaliatory strike on an Iranian military site was conducted with quadcopters from within the country.

An attack within Iran itself during a presidential inauguration will be interpreted as an attack on the country’s sovereignty and honour, a situation that will likely warrant a stronger response from Tehran. While Iran has promised severe consequences, it will have to factor in several variables before it retaliates. A major escalation will likely see increased sanctions on Iran and jeopardise Pezeshkian’s attempts to reconcile with the West. A major escalation will likely be met with Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear programme sending it back years, a development the regime will want to avoid as it is closer than ever to achieving a nuclear deterrent, one of the regime’s primary objectives.

For these reasons, Iran may seek to conduct a sub-threshold attack that sends a statement to Israel without provoking a regional conflict. Its first option is to leverage its proxy forces to conduct a coordinated missile and drone attack similar in nature to the April attack. To increase the success of this attack it may use its proxy forces to strike from closer range, providing Israel and its allies less time to provide early warning and prepare air defences. In such a scenario, debris from intercepted projectiles will pose a major risk to anyone in Israel and countries on the approach, such as Jordan, as evidenced by the April attack.

To avoid direct escalation, Iran may rely on Hezbollah and other proxy forces to strike Israel from Lebanon. This strategy allows Iran to preserve its own military assets and maintain plausible deniability, reducing the risk of direct conflict. With an arsenal of approximately 150,000 rockets and missiles, combined with its expertise in both conventional and unconventional tactics, Hezbollah is well-positioned to inflict damage on Israel while serving Iran’s interests.

Another option available to Iran is to attack Israeli interests or Jews globally, a tactic Iran has done numerous times before. For the people of Gaza, Haniyeh’s assassination may be to their detriment. Haniyeh was crucial in fostering diplomatic channels despite his limited influence in Gaza itself. His death may lead to a complete collapse of current ceasefire negotiations and may embolden hardliners within Hamas, potentially leading to a halt in peace talks and prolonging the conflict.

On 27 July, a multi-day battle concluded between the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), supported by Wagner Group, against Tuareg and Al-Qaeda insurgents. Approximately 50 or more Wagner combatants were killed in the battle, marking the biggest defeat for the Russian state-funded private military company (PMC) since they were deployed to Mali in 2021. The battle took place in Tinzaouaten in the far northeast of Mali, near the Algerian border.

Reportedly, a FAMa and Wagner armed convoy, consisting of approximately 20 vehicles, was deployed to find Tuareg insurgents. A Wagner statement on Telegram claims that their contingent, led by Sergei Shevchenko (callsign “Pond”), was initially successful in repelling attacks by Tuareg militants over multiple days, though suffered casualties. A sandstorm on 25 July then, however, forced the convoy to retreat into Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) territory, a jihadist affiliate of al-Qaeda. Regrouped Tuareg fighters then reportedly ambushed the convoy on 26 July. Forced onto disadvantageous low ground, the column was attacked by substantial numbers (allegedly close to a thousand fighters), leading to a rout. Retreating forces were then ambushed by JNIM fighters, who fought alongside Tuaregs according to some sources, though this has not been verified.

The Tuareg rebels fought under the banner of the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PSD), a coalition of Azawad Tuareg rebel groups. On 29 July, the Kyiv Post published a photograph depicting Tuareg rebels holding a Ukrainian flag, with what appears to be a Ukrainian advisor. A Ukrainian Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) official stated that Ukraine provided Azawad forces with key intelligence for the attack although a BBC investigation suggests that this photograph was likely doctored.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The heavy losses suffered by the Russian PMC group is a major defeat in their ongoing campaign in Mali. Following their failed mutiny, Wagner Group was reorganised by Russian authorities with a renewed focus on its operations in the African theatre. Renamed to Africa Corps by the Russian Ministry of Defence in late 2023, Wagner Group is treated with suspicion by Russian military authorities, who likely aim to gradually replace long-serving Wagner veterans in the Sahel with new Africa Corps personnel.

The PMC have played a pivotal role in anti-insurgency operations in Mali since late 2021. After the May 2021 Malian coup, the junta sought to replace the military capability lost by withdrawn French and international forces. Wagner Group filled this vacuum, in exchange for access to highly profitable mines. This dynamic is almost certainly currently replicating in Niger, where Nigerien junta forces have recently suffered major defeats. Wagner have already deployed instructors to Niger.

The severe defeat in Tinzaouaten, however, is likely to influence the risk tolerance of Africa Corps commanders, which may factor into any future decisions regarding increased deployments to Niger. With already limited manpower, it is unlikely that Wagner will launch more deep operations into highly contested Malian territory in the coming months, which may enable insurgents to make further territorial gains. Additionally, the Russian military establishment may seek to exploit the defeat to accelerate the replacement of Wagner veterans with more loyal Africa Corps personnel.

The CSP-PSD are an Azawad Tuareg group. While the Malian military campaigns against CSP and JNIM overlap, the Azawad rebel coalition is primarily separatist, and not aligned with jihadism. The possible direct collaboration between Tuareg and JNIM forces in the battle, however, would be a notable development. The claims of Ukrainian involvement would be a significant development in the scope of Ukraine’s overseas operations. Though unconfirmed, there are strong suggestions that Ukraine has already previously deployed special forces in Sudan to fight against Russian paramilitary forces. Ukrainian intelligence (HUR) may just be engaging in information warfare, their possible involvement in the Malian battle raises several prospects. Firstly, it is likely that such a success would encourage HUR to emulate the tactics elsewhere, further expanding the geographic scope of the Ukraine War. Secondly, the involvement of JNIM in the battle is problematic, and HUR are likely to have received criticism from Western partners for potentially empowering jihadists. Thirdly, such Ukrainian involvement in the Sahel would likely accelerate the strategic realignment of the post-coup juntas in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, driving these governments further into the sphere of Russian influence.

On 1 August, Nigerian police and troops increased security measures in Lagos, Abuja and multiple, other cities in anticipation of nationwide protests. The protests are over the country’s poor governance, soaring inflation, the deflation of the Naira currency and several other issues. The protests have been scheduled from 1 to 10 August and have been observed in multiple Nigerian towns and cities as well as long major roads such as the Abuja-Kaduna highway, leading to traffic congestion.

Nigerian police issued a statement saying that they are on nationwide alert and directed to “act and deal decisively” during anti-government demonstrations. Police action has included the use of tear gas and other crowd dispersal methods, including the firing of live ammunition. By Friday morning, the head of Amnesty International in Nigeria reported that at least 13 protesters had been killed and over 300 arrested. Multiple curfews have been enforced, including 24-hour curfews in Borno Starte and Kano State.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The protests in Nigeria follow the recent doubling of the minimum wage that was ultimately accepted by many of the country’s unions. However, the rise was much lower than what many were demanding and the rise has failed to offset the Tinubu administration’s devaluation of the Naira in June 2023 and January 2024. Under Tinubu, food inflation in Nigeria currently stands at 40 per cent, the highest in three decades and the reintroduction of fuel subsidies has drained almost half of Nigeria’s oil revenues, curtailing the government’s ability to invest.

In the south of Nigeria, the economic situation is likely the main driver of the protests. In the north, concerns over Nigeria’s security are likely providing more energy to the unrest. Unchecked banditry and a resurgence in Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and other extremist attacks have almost certainly increased concerns over internal security in the north. Many Nigerians in the north have been displaced by endemic violence and the growing threat of kidnappings, with extremist groups almost certainly exploiting the continued destabilisation of bordering Niger. The Federal Government has tightened security at the borders, likely out of fears of cross-border incursions from militant groups seeking to exploit the unrest and current overstretching of the security services.

With the nationwide protests set to last for several days, multiple scenarios could surface that would likely exacerbate the unrest and likely result in an escalation in violence. As observed in Bangladesh, the government’s excessive use of force is likely to sustain demonstrations. The government’s refusal to agree to any of the protestors’ demands could also catalyse more protests. Given the country’s complicated tribal, ethnic and religious dynamics, there is always a possibility of the protests provoking existing tensions. Lastly, extremists may attempt to target large crowds and undermine the government’s ability to provide security, a development that will likely aggravate the current unrest.

On 26 July, South African police detained 95 Libyan nationals after a morning raid on a suspected secret military training camp near the town of White River, approximately 350 kilometres east of Johannesburg. Police issued a statement indicating that the Libyans had entered the country on study visas to train as security guards but initial police investigations suggest that they have received military training. According to South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority, the Libyan nationals will now be charged for misrepresentations on their visa applications. The authorities are now investigating to ascertain if there are any more illegal bases in other parts of South Africa.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The discovery of a secret military training camp has raised concerns that violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have exploited South Africa’s huge private security industry to train militants in third parties where they would likely attract less attention. There is currently no clear indication as to what group or movement the Libyans are associated with. However, Libya has been in a state of civil war since 2011 after the NATO-backed overthrow of long-term ruler Muammar Gaddafi.

The Libyan government has denied any knowledge of this operation and initial investigations indicate that the men are from eastern Libya, an area currently under the control of General Haftar’s Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA). Moreover, the LNA which currently controls most of Libya receives funding from several external actors, such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Russia as well as from its own oil revenues. This places it in an advantageous position to fund the external training of soldiers within South Africa’s highly developed private security industry.

VEOs affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ) have a presence in Libya, particularly in the south of the country. However, militant groups like these would more likely exploit Libya’s and the wider region’s instability and ungoverned spaces to conduct training at this scale, would be under more foreign surveillance and would likely struggle to finance this level of training.

The UK’s Conservative Party announced its party leadership candidates

Following a disastrous general election, the leader of the Conservative Party and former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak resigned from his post. A successor will be nominated at the party’s September conference, after votes by party MPs and party members. Suella Braverman, former Home Secretary and representative of the right-wing of the party, opted not to run citing differences with the majority of conservative MPs.

Of the six candidates, Priti Patel, Kemi Badenoch and Robert Jenrick represent the party’s right wing, the latter being in the same current as Braverman. James Cleverly, Tom Tugendhat and Mel Stride are close to Sunak and are portraying themselves as “unity” candidates. It is highly likely that, to cover from the threat posed by the Reform Party, the Tory leadership contest will see a shift of the party to the right.

Pay deal likely to end doctor’s strikes in UK

Months of strikes by the UK’s junior doctors may come to an abrupt end after the new Labour government agreed to increase their pay by over 22 per cent. The deal was announced on 29 July by the Labour government and the British Medical Association (BMA), which represents around 50,000 junior doctors. The decentralised nature of the protests was not hugely disruptive, however, the strikes have overburdened an overstretched National Health Service (NHS) and interrupted the provision of healthcare.  

Macron surprisingly approves Moroccan line on Western Sahara

On 30 July, French President Macron released a statement in support of Morocco’s 2007 plan on Western Sahara. The Algerian government reacted by immediately recalling their ambassador in Paris, thus sparking a diplomatic crisis during the Olympics. Macron’s statement likely reflects the changing balance of power in northwest Africa, with Algerian influence waning thanks to decreasing French reliance on its oil (about eight per cent of the oil imported by France is Algerian) and a growing appeal of Morocco as a diplomatic and trading partner.

Spanish PM’s wife under investigation for corruption

On 30 July, Spain’s socialist Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez refused to testify as a witness in a judicial investigation into his wife. The case involves allegations of corruption and influence peddling against his wife. Sanchez and his wife deny the allegations and have denounced them as baseless and orchestrated by right-wing political foes, including the legal activist group called Manos Limpias, or “Clean Hands.” Previous cases of corruption against Pedro’s wife have resulted in thousands of supporters rallying behind the prime minister on the streets of Madrid with similar scenes likely as the case develops.

Turkey blocks Instagram, gives no explanation

On 2 August, Turkish authorities blocked Instagram in the country, without however making any public announcement about the ban, nor giving any explanation for it. It is highly likely that the ban is linked to previous accusations, raised by Turkish government officials, that the social network was censoring tributes to Hamas leader Haniyeh.

Israeli far-right attacks detention facility

On 29 July, far-right, religious fundamentalist politician Zvi Sukkot and other far-right Zionist leaders led crowds of supporters to storm the Sde Teiman detention camp, near the Israeli-Gaza border. Nine IDF reservists were held at the base, facing possible charges for allegedly sexually abusing a Palestinian prisoner. The protesters broke into the facility’s perimeter and succeeded in pressuring authorities into later releasing the accused.

Reports of the alleged rapes have highly likely demonstrated growing cracks within the Israeli parliament and coalition, with the radical right continuing to gain significant political traction, and members of it (including Likud party politicians) either denying the suspects’ alleged crimes or outright defending them. The riot likewise demonstrates a growing domestic threat from nationalist-religious extremists, capable of organising quickly to carry out violent actions.

ANC expel former South African president from party

South Africa’s former president, Jacob Zuma, has been expelled from the African National Congress (ANC) party for supporting the rival party uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in May’s parliamentary election, which led to the ANC losing its majority for the first time since the apartheid era. Zuma has 21 days to appeal and challenge the expulsion. Despite his tenure being marred by corruption scandals and economic decline, Zuma still commands a lot of support in South Africa and his supporters could trigger unrest.

The EU and US impose sanctions on Rwanda-backed M23 group

The new wave of sanctions targeting M23 leaders, which were announced on 26 July, is highly unlikely to affect conditions on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) eastern provinces, where M23 rebels, supported – according to new UN reports – by thousands of Rwandan troops, continue to advance against the overstretched local military. Recently, M23 has likely increased GPS-jamming to disrupt air traffic in the mineral-rich North Kivu region. M23 advances will almost certainly continue accelerating the illegal trade of minerals to the detriment of the DRC and the benefit of Rwanda and of large multinational companies.

Islamist extremist Anjem Choudary sentenced by UK court

Following his conviction on charges of running a multinational terrorist network. UK radical preacher Anjem Choudary was sentenced to a minimum of 28 years in prison following a multinational operation involving US, UK and Canadian security forces. There is a realistic possibility of protests and retaliatory lone-wolf attacks following the sentencing. Unlike other leadership figures in extremist organisations, Choudary maintained an extremely visible media presence, appearing in multiple mainstream legacy media broadcasts since the early 2000s.

Erdogan threatens to send Turkish forces to Israel

Turkish President Erdogan, the leader of a NATO member state, announced, on 28 July, that Ankara has the capability to invade Israel over the war on Gaza. The statement is almost certainly primarily an effort to bolster the president’s support among the Turkish electorate, which is widely pro-Palestinian. Still, Erdogan’s threats are also likely aimed at putting further pressure on NATO allies to adopt a more neutral stance in the conflict and to effectively restrain Israel’s policies in Gaza.

Sabotage conducted against German rail network

German authorities are investigating an arson attack on the railway line between Hamburg and Bremen which occurred on 29 July. In an attack reminiscent of recent arson attacks in France before the Olympic ceremony, unidentified perpetrators set fire to a cable shaft near Bremen’s Bürgerpark using an incendiary agent. Germany’s state security agency (Bundeskriminalamt) is now investigating whether the attack was politically motivated but has not released any information regarding suspects.

Spanish man dies from Ebola-like disease

The man had reportedly been bitten by a tick, and developed symptoms associated with the Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF). The disease is extremely dangerous, with no vaccine available and a mortality rate of 40 per cent – depending on age and health factors. Increasingly hot summers have favoured the reproduction of ticks in Spain, increasing the transmission rate and extending the period of the year during which the disease is most prevalent.

Bangladesh, including Dhaka, Sylhet, Chattogram, Rangpur, Barishal, and Bogura. Local police forces have used crowd control measures such as tear gas and sound grenades to disperse crowds and maintain public order.

Since student protests over Bangladesh’s job quota system erupted in mid-July, it is estimated that over 200 have been killed, largely as a result of the police firing into crowds and over 10,000 people have been detained. The most recent “March for Justice” protests were organised by the Students Against Discrimination movement over the mass killings, arrests, attacks and disappearances of civilians.

Solace Global Assessment: 

Students have been protesting for over three weeks against efforts to reinstate quotas in civil service jobs for relatives of veterans from the country’s 1971 war for independence from Pakistan. This system allocated a third of public sector jobs to this demographic- a system deemed unnecessarily exclusionary to the student population, many of whom are struggling to secure jobs. The government’s violent suppression of these protests has inspired a new round of protests that have taken on a much wider geographical footprint within the country.

Moreover, the protests now involve a much wider cross-section of Bangladeshi society, including teachers, parents, civil society members, and cultural organisations. Thousands of people have also changed their profile pictures on social media to a red colour in a sign of solidarity with the students. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government has denied responsibility, deflecting the blame to the main opposition parties, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Jamaat-e-Islami Party for the unrest, the latter of which has now been banned under anti-terrorism legislation. This has led to a government crackdown on the opposition.

Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, the European Union, has postponed talks over a new economic deal over the government’s actions. The diversity of people now involved in the protests, the government’s continued use of force and detentions, the crackdown on the opposition and the refusal of government officials to resign over the violence are likely to sustain unrest for days to come. The ongoing protests and government responses could lead to increased international pressure and widespread civil disobedience, disrupting daily life and economic stability. If the government maintains its hardline stance, it risks alienating the youth and wider society, fostering a stronger opposition and larger protest movements- trends that may deter foreign investment and disrupt supply chains in a country with huge textile, agricultural and manufacturing sectors.

One month after Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) announced the creation of an Urdu-language media division on 28 June, ISKP published their first issue of a dedicated Urdu language Nida-e-Khorasan (Voice of Khorasan). Urdu is the national language of Pakistan, and widely spoken by Muslims in northern India and Kashmir. The publication had significant content dedicated to Kashmir.

Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) also published a new issue of its Urdu-language magazine, Nawai Ghazwa-e-Hind (The Voice of the Battle of India) magazine, which similarly focused on Kashmir.

Solace Global Assessment: 

The publications of two Urdu-language pieces focused on Kashmir by the rival transnational jihadist groups ISKP and AQIS highly likely indicate a strategic shift by both groups, seeking to exploit a recent surge in violence in Jammu and Kashmir. While the much smaller AQIS has historically specifically targeted Urdu-speaking jihadist sympathisers with their publications before, the new publication by ISKP reveals a notable development in their propaganda strategy. 

Founded in 2014, ISKP seeks to establish a caliphate in Afghanistan. ISKP has grown to be one of the most capable and ambitious transnational terrorist organisations in the world, successfully having carried out multiple attacks internationally. This year alone, ISKP are thought to be responsible for both the 3 January Kerman bombings that killed over 100 people in Iran, and the 22 March Crocus City Hall attack that killed 145 people in Moscow, Russia.

ISKP’s propaganda and outreach have proven to be highly successful at enabling fundraising and recruitment from the former-Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and European authorities have arrested multiple suspected jihadists from these regions for plotting terrorist attacks. On 31 May, a Chechen who was in communication with ISKP was arrested in France for an alleged plot targeting the Paris Olympics, and on 4 July, nine suspects from Central Asia in contact with ISKP were arrested in Germany and the Netherlands.

Al-Azaim is ISKP’s media outlet, a considerable transnational propaganda network that exploits sectarianism and the challenges faced by minority groups across Central and South Asia. “Media jihad” is considered a crucial strategy by ISKP, and the Voice of Khorasan publication is ISKP’s primary propaganda instrument. The development in ISKP propaganda towards targeting Urdu-speaking populations threatens to grow ISKP’s influence in Pakistan, India, Jammu and Kashmir, and amongst global diaspora populations.

In Pakistan, where Urdu is the national language, ISKP are thought to be primarily responsible for a recent targeted assassination campaign in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The newly published edition of Voice of Khorasan makes specific reference to Pakistani military figures, and ISKP are likely seeking to exploit sectarian tensions against Pakistan’s Shia minority.

In India, the regular circulation of anti-Hindu propaganda indicates ISKP efforts to exploit the marginalisation of India’s significant Muslim minority population. In Jammu and Kashmir, a union territory administered by India with a Muslim majority in Kashmir, there has been a recent surge in militant attacks targeting Hindus. ISKP are highly likely seeking to exploit a perceived power vacuum in Kashmiri jihadist networks, evidenced by the new Voice of Khorasan’s focus on Kashmir.

Globally, particularly in Europe, ISKP’s expansion of media efforts targeting Urdu speakers will likely broaden ISKP’s appeal amongst extremist sympathisers in Urdu-speaking diaspora communities.

Thai court to consider dissolving Move Forward Party

On 7 August, the constitutional court of Thailand will rule as to whether or not it should dissolve the progressive Move Forward political party. The party, which won the most seats in the 2023 elections, has been targeted by Thailand’s conservative base and military for some of its policies such as reform of the country’s strict lèse-majesté laws. The party has great appeal with Thailand’s youth and a move to dissolve the party is likely to trigger protests, as evidenced by the 2020 dissolution of the Future Forward Party.

Calls for renewed protests in France’s New Caledonia

Cellule de Coordination des Actions de Terrain (CCAT), the main independence group in New Caledonia has called for renewed protests in the coming days in an attempt to abolish the electoral reform bill once and for all. The CCAT is likely attempting to exploit France’s current focus on the Olympics and the event’s publicity fir its own cause.

The United States Pacific Command (PACOM) has announced that it will upgrade its military command in Japan in response to the growing threat from China. As part of the overhaul, the US will increase its coordination with Japanese forces and the US Forces Japan would be upgraded to a joint force headquarters with expanded missions. The move also aligns with Japan’s gradual shift from post-war pacifism, characterised by increased defence spending and more military cooperation with South Korea and the US. The move will almost certainly be condemned as escalatory by China who will likely conduct reactionary military drills in a demonstration of strength.

Canadian warship passes through the Taiwan Strait

On 1 August, the Canadian frigate transited through the Taiwan Strait, passing through an area that China claims as part of its territorial waters. The transit, which drew Beijing’s ire, was likely meant to send a signal following last week’s transit of four Chinese and Russian bombers in close proximity to Alaskan and Canadian airspace. Both US and Canadian officials are likely increasingly willing to respond to Chinese (and Russian) shows of force in the Pacific.

Series of landslides kills hundreds in Indian state of Kerala

On 30 July, a series of landslides in Kerala has resulted in the deaths of at least 166 people with an estimated 200 still missing. Hundreds of homes were destroyed in Wayanad by two massive landslides following five times the normal rainfall, causing the Eruvazhanji River to overflow and submerge villages.

Rescue efforts have been hindered by adverse weather and washed-away roads which have disrupted access to the affected locations. The extent of the damage has likely been compounded by the practice of building informal houses on unstable hill terrain and the clearing of forests for plantations. This has compromised the soil and reduced vegetation interception, increasing the area’s susceptibility to landslides.

High temperatures recorded in China’s east coast

On 2 August, temperatures of above 40 degrees Celsius were recorded in China’s east coast regions, with particularly severe heat recorded in Shanghai and Hangzhou. July 2024 had the highest temperatures on record for that month in China, and Chinese authorities issued warnings for other provinces further inland. Extremely high heat can result in power outages and the overwhelming of electrical infrastructure. In densely populated urban centres, this is not only highly likely to have a severe economic impact, but may also result in the breakdown of public services, increased wait times for healthcare services, and other developments likely to pose a threat to residents and travellers.